2018 INSC 0577
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1198 OF 2006
Menoka Malik and others ..Appellants
Versus
The State of West Bengal and others ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
1. The   instant   appeal   arises   out   of   the   judgment   and   order
dated   30 th
  June,   2004   passed   in   C.R.R.   No.   765   of   2002   by   the
High Court of Judicature at Calcutta confirming the judgment of
acquittal   passed   by   the   Sessions   Judge   at   Burdwan   dated   15 th

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December,   2001   in   Sessions   Case   No.   91/1998   (Sessions   Trial
No. 10(7)/2000).
2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   in   brief   is   that   on   30.05.1993,
panchayat   elections   were   held   in   Karanda   village,   wherein   the
CPI(M) party won and the IPF party lost.  On the next day, i.e. on
31.05.1993,   at   about   8:30   a.m.,   15   to   16   members   of   the   IPF
party  took shelter  in the house of PW2, Badal Malik, their  party
leader,   upon   being   chased   by   some   CPI(M)   workers.     At   around
1:30 p.m., Bhanu Hathi, Kachi Hathi and Bhaluk Hathi (accused
no.56/respondent no.57 herein) started to abuse PW3, Shyamali
Pakrey,   the   wife   of   PW30,   Sunil   Pakrey,   an   IPF   supporter,   upon
whose   protest,   the   CPI(M)   persons   mobilised   around   250­300
party   workers,   all   being   armed   with   weapons   such   as   lathi,
balam, tangi etc.  It is further the case of the prosecution that the
persons   belonging   to   CPI(M)   party   set   on   fire   the   houses   of   IPF
members,   including   the   party   leader   Badal   Malik,   assaulted   IPF
members and broke into the houses of the locality and destroyed
household   articles,   apart   from   stealing   an   amount   of   Rs.700/­
and   snatching   a   pair   of   gold   earrings.     In   the   assault   on   IPF
members,   five   persons   expired   and   24   persons   were   seriously
injured.

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3. The   first   information   came   to   be   lodged   by   Menoka   Malik
(PW1/appellant   no.1   herein)   before   Memari   Police   Station,
Burdwan   District,   which   came   to   be   registered   in   Case   No.
82/1993   dated   31.05.1993   for   the   offences   punishable   under
Sections   147,  148,  149,   342,  448,  325,   326,  436,  379,   307  and
302 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. Charges   were   framed   for   the   aforementioned   offences.     As
many as 82 accused were tried.   49 witnesses were examined by
the prosecution, which included 36 eye witnesses, i.e. PWs 1­23,
29,   30,   31,   33,   34,   35,   39,   40,   42,   43,   44,   45   and   47.   Out   of
these,   the   testimonies   of   PWs   17   and   18   ran   counter   to   the
prosecution’s   case,   and   PW42   claimed   to   not   recollect   the
incident on account of mental sickness.
5. The   trial   Court,   at   the   outset,   determined   that   there   were
cogent allegations only against 32 persons out of the 82 accused
and proceeded to examine the evidence against those 32 persons
only.   On   evaluation   of   the   material   on   record,   the   trial   Court
acquitted  all  the   accused   by   giving   them  the   benefit  of  doubt.   It
was   observed   by   the   trial   Court   that   the   prosecution   sought   to
establish the death of five persons through the use of sharp and
pointed   weapons,   but   such   factum   was   not   alleged   in   the   first

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information report  and  only  the factum  of assault leading  to the
death   of   two   persons   was   reported;   the   names   of   the   assailants
had   not   been   disclosed   in   the   first   information   report;   several
witnesses were found to have admitted to have made disclosures
of   allegations   for   the   first   time   before   the   Court   at   the   time   of
recording   their   depositions;   the   evidence   of   the   investigating
officer disclosed a number of contradictions in the evidence of eye
witnesses;   there   was   non­recovery   of   burnt   articles,   etc.     It   was
also   observed   by   the   trial   Court   that   the   medical   evidence   was
contrary   to   the   ocular   testimony   of   the   witnesses,   inasmuch   as
the   post   mortem   reports   of   the   deceased   and   medical   reports   of
the injured showed the absence of incised or punctured wounds,
wherein  the   prosecution   witnesses   had   stated   that   the   deceased
and   injured   had   been   assaulted   with   sharp   weapons   such   as
tangi, ballam, kencha, etc.  The injuries found on the deceased as
well   as   on   the   injured   persons   were   in   the   nature   of   bruises,
abrasions   and   lacerations,   which,   according   to   the   trial   Court,
might   have   been   suffered   due   to   a   stampede.     On   these,   among
other grounds, the trial Court acquitted the accused.
6. The   State   did   not   prefer   any   appeal   against   the   judgment
and   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   trial   Court.     However,   the

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first   informant   along   with   three   others   filed   a   revision   petition
under   Section   401   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   before   the
High Court.  During the course of hearing of the revision petition,
it was submitted on behalf of the revision petitioners that no case
is  made  out   against  48 of   the  82  accused, and  that  the  revision
petition would be concerned only with rest of the 34 accused.   It
may   be   noted   at   this   juncture   that   in   the   course   of   arguments
before   us,   it   was   brought   to   our   notice   that   6   out   of   these   34
accused are now dead. 
7. The High Court found that there was no perversity or gross
procedural   defect   or   error   of   law   leading   to   glaring   injustice,   to
warrant interference with the decision of the trial Court.  Though
a   number   of   contentions   were   raised   by   the   revision   petitioners
before   the   High   Court,   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   decide   the
revision   petition   merely   on   the   basis   of   the   above   finding.   The
only other finding was that the non­determination of the issue of
unlawful assembly by the trial Court in the manner suggested by
the   appellants   was   not   a   sufficient   reason   to   remand   the   case.
This was based on the reasoning that a direction for  reappraisal
of evidence would create an unconscious impression in the mind
of   the   trial   judge   that   the   High   Court   wished   the   lower   court   to

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reach   a   particular   conclusion,   and   would   also   complicate   the
issue   in   the   given   situation,   where   a   large   number   of   persons
were involved but no evidence existed against most of them. The
High Court further proceeded to observe that the trial Court had
reached   a   finding   of   acquittal   upon   a   consideration   of   the
probative value of the evidence on record, in accordance with set
canons of law, and upon a meticulous examination of the same.
Certain   general   observations   relating   to   the   revisional   powers   of
the High Court were adverted to by the High Court, while coming
to its conclusion.  Practically, the High Court has not touched the
case of the prosecution on merits, at least  prima facie , to find out
as   to   whether   the   trial   Court’s   reasoning   is   just   and   proper   or
not. 
Preliminary Issue:
8. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   on   either   side.     Before
proceeding   further,   we   would   like   to   decide   the   preliminary
question that arose during the course of arguments regarding the
scope   of   interference   by   this   Court   with   a   judgment   of   the   High
Court   in   exercise   of   its   revisional   power,   affirming   a   conviction.
The   question   is   no   more   res   integra,   inasmuch   as   this   Court   in
the case of   Dharma vs. Nirmal Singh, (1996) 7 SCC 471   has held

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that   the  bar   under  Section   401(3)  does   not   restrict  the   power   of
the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.   While
concluding so, the following observations were made:
“4.   Before   we   record   our   reading   of   the   evidence
produced   in   the   case,   let   a   legal   submission
advanced by Shri Lalit, appearing for the respondent­
accused, be dealt with. His submission is that as the
complainant   had   approached   the   High   Court   in
revision   and   as   under   the   revisional   power   available
to the High Court under Section 401 CrPC, the High
Court  could   not   have   altered  the   finding  of   acquittal
into   one   of   conviction,   because   of   what   has   been
stated   in   sub­section   (3)   thereof,   if   we   were   to   be
satisfied that the acquittal was wrongful, it would not
be within our competence to convict the respondent;
at best the case could be sent back for retrial. We are
not impressed with this submission inasmuch as the
approach to this Court being under Article 136 of the
Constitution.   We   do   not   read   the   limitation   imposed
by Section 401(3) of the Code qua the power available
to us under the aforesaid provision. May it be pointed
out that a similar submission had been advanced by
Shri   Lalit   himself   in   the   case   of   E.K.
Chandrasenan   v.   State   of   Kerala   [(1995)   2   SCC   99   :
1995   SCC   (Cri)   329   :   JT   (1995)   1   SC   496]   ,   then
contending   that   this   Court   is   incompetent   to   issue
rule   of   enhancement   as   had   been   done   in   those
cases.   It   was   held   in   the   aforesaid   decision   that   the
power available to this Court under Article 136 is not
circumscribed   by   any   limitation.   In   any   case,   power
under   Article   142   is   available   to   pass   such   order   as
may   be   deemed   appropriate   to   do   complete   justice.
We, therefore, reject this contention of Shri Lalit and
proceed to examine the materials to find out whether
case of conviction does exist, as the contention of the
appellant.”

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9. In   the   case   of   State   of   Rajasthan   vs.   Islam,   (2011)   6   SCC
343 ,   this   Court   relying   upon   the   earlier   judgment   in   Dharma’s
case, held that if this Court is of the opinion that the acquittal is
not   based   on   a   reasonable   view,   then   it   may   review   the   entire
material   and   there   will   be   no   limitation   on   this   Court’s
jurisdiction   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   to   come   to   a
just conclusion quashing the acquittal.
10. From the aforementioned decisions, it is amply clear that it
is open for this Court to review the entire material and there is no
limitation   on   this   Court’s  jurisdiction  under   Article   136   to   come
to   a   just   conclusion   if   it   determines   that   the   High   Court’s   view
was   not   reasonable.   The   restriction   as   contained   under   Section
401(3)   of   the   Cr.P.C.   on   the   High   Court   cannot   restrict   the
powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.  Thus,
it   is   for   us   to   determine   whether   the   view   taken   by   the   High
Court was reasonable or not based on available records.
Main Issue:
11. The   trial   Court,   while   coming   to   its   conclusion,   has
observed   that   several   eye   witnesses   had   revealed   the   material
facts   before   the   trial   Court   for   the   first   time,   inasmuch   as   such
statements   of   the   witnesses   before   the   Court   are   material

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improvements; such statements were not made by the witnesses
during   the   course   of   investigation   before   the   police   officials   and
omissions are proved as per law. 
However,   we   have   endeavoured   to   satisfy   our   conscience
regarding   the   consistency/inconsistency   of   the   eyewitness
accounts.   To   that   end,  we   have   gone  through   the   testimonies   of
the   PWs.   As   we   do   not   wish   to   burden   this   judgment   by
discussing the testimonies of all PWs, we would like to revisit, as
examples, the testimonies of PWs 5, 7 and 14. Moreover, we are
mindful   of   the   principle   that   in   cases   of   this   nature   involving   a
large   number   of   offenders   and   a   large   number   of   victims,   the
evidence   of   only   two   or   three   witnesses   who   give   a   consistent
account of the incident is sufficient to sustain conviction, as was
observed by this Court in the case of  Masalti vs. State of U.P., AIR
1965 SC 202 .
PW5, Anna Pakrey, deposed that on the day of the incident,
some IPF workers took shelter in the house of PW2, Badal Malik
on   being   threatened   by   some   CPI(M)   workers.   After   some   time,
around   200­250   CPI(M)   workers,   including   Harigopal   Goswami
(A­80/R­81   herein),   Ram   Tah   (A­68/R­69   herein)   and   Satya

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Chakroborty   (A­71/R­72   herein)   assembled   around   the   house,
hurling  abuses  at  the  persons  inside. The  CPI(M)  workers  asked
Bhanu Hati (chargesheeted as accused, since deceased) to set the
house on fire, upon which the hiding people rushed out and took
shelter in the house of PW9, Mantu Mal, which was set on fire by
one   Kachi   Hati   (a   reference   to   Kartik   Hazra,   A­28/R­29   herein).
Thereafter,   the   IPF   workers   started   running   from   room   to   room.
Dilip Pakrey  (deceased), PW5’s husband, came out of the house,
at which point he was assaulted by Jiten Kora (A­1/R­2 herein),
Kena   Kora   (A­7/R­8   herein),   Bhola   Mukherjee   (A­77/R­78
herein),   and   Sitaram   Makar   (A­70/R­71   herein),   with   deadly
weapons such as tangi, bogi, and kencha. Pranab Bouri (A­40/R­
41   herein),   struck   Dilip   Pakrey   with   a   ballam.   Sakti   Gadi   (A­
15/R­16   herein)   passed   urine   in   his   mouth.   At   this   point,   PW5
fainted.   After   she   regained   consciousness,   she   went   around
looking for her children and got assaulted by Radhi Kora (A­8/R­
9 herein) with a shavol and by one Santana Majhi (a reference to
Sanatan   Mandi,   A­44/R­45   herein)   by   a   bamboo   lathi.   PW5
further   stated   that   Manik   Hazra   (deceased)   was   assaulted   by
Sudeb Hati (a reference to Sudeb Hazra, A­30/R­31 herein), and
that one Rajib Kora cut off Manik Hazra’s penis. 

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PW7,   Nemai   Hazra   is   an   injured   witness.   He   deposed   that
on   the   day   of   the   incident,   on   being   threatened   by   CPI(M)
workers,   he,   his   elder   brother   Manik   Hazra   (deceased),   PW10,
Uttam  Hazra, PW33, Uday  Hazra, one Madan Hazra (referring to
PW43,   Madau   Hazra)   and   Narayan   Hazra   (referring   to   PW39,
Harayan   Hazra)   took   shelter   in   PW2   Badal   Malik’s   house.   At
around 11­11.30 am, around 100­150 persons armed with lathis,
rods,   sabol,   tangi,   etc.   assembled   nearby,   upon   which   Badal
Malik   left   the   house   and   did   not   return.   Soon,   the   mob   outside
surrounded   the   house,   and   started   throwing   stones,   brickbats,
etc.   at   the   house.   Thereafter,   they   set   the   house   on   fire,   with   a
view   to   smoke   out   the   hiding   persons,   upon   which   the   people
hiding inside took shelter in PW9 Mantu Mal’s house. This house
was also set on fire, though PW7 did not see the perpetrator. As
the hiding persons came out, they started getting assaulted. PW7
was   assaulted   by   Sudeb   Hazra   (A­30/R­31   herein)   with   a   tangi,
Jeydeb   Hazra   (A­29/R­30   herein)   with   an   iron   rod,   Sitaram
Makar (A­70/R­71 herein) with a lathi, Sadhan Some (A­78/R­79
herein)   with   a   lathi   and   by   Becha   Duley   (A­67/R­68   herein)   as
well. 

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In his cross examination, PW7 stated that he did not know
of   any   provocation   for   the   incident.     He   also   stated   that   around
40­50 persons had hidden inside Badal Malik’s house. He further
stated that he was beaten severely by the mob, and received 8­10
lathi blows, one rod blow, and was also assaulted by tangi, sabol,
etc.
PW14,   Subhadra   Malik   is   the   mother   of   Manik   Hazra
(deceased) and PW2, Badal Malik. She deposed that on the day of
the incident, Manik Hazra along with several IPF supporters took
shelter   in   Badal   Malik’s   house,   where   PW14   also   lived,   after
CPI(M)   workers   started   threatening   IPF   workers.   Soon,   several
CPI(M)   workers   surrounded   the   house.   Bhanu   Hati   and   his   son
Bhaluk Hati (A­56/R­57 herein) entered the house, and the latter
set the house on fire on his father’s instruction. After being thus
smoked   out,   the   hiding   persons   sought   shelter   in   PW9   Mantu
Mal’s house, which was set ablaze by Kachi Hati (possibly Kartik
Hazra,   A­28/R­29   herein,   see   supra).   The   IPF   persons   started
coming   out   one   by   one   and   got   assaulted.   Sitaram   Makar   (A­
70/R­71 herein), Abhoy Roy (A­69/R­70 herein), one Sakti Duley,
Joydev   Duley,   Joydev   Hati   (Joydeb   Hazra,   A­29/R­30   herein),
Sudeb   Hati   (Sudeb   Hazra,   A­30/R­31   herein),   one   Khudi   Tah,

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Ganesh   Kshetrapal   (A­39/R­40   herein),   one   Promod   Kshetrapal
and   one   Angad   Kshetrapal   began   to   assault   Dilip   Pakrey.   One
Pranab  Pakrey   pierced his belly  with  a  ballam.  Sona  (Som) Kora
(deceased)   was   assaulted   by   Sitaram   (A­70/R­71   herein),   Abhoy
Roy   (A­69/R­70   herein),   Joydeb   (A­20/R­21   herein),   Sudeb   Hari
(Sudeb Hazra, A­30/R­31 herein), Joydeb Hari (Joydeb Hazra, A­
29/R­30   herein)   and   others.   Sadhan   Nayak   (deceased)   was
dragged out of PW9 Mantu Mal’s house and assaulted by Sitaram
(A­70/R­71   herein),   Abhoy   (A­69/R­70   herein)   and   others.   Suko
Kora (A­53/R­54 herein) assaulted Sadhan with an axe and killed
him. Manik Hazra (deceased) was assaulted by Sitaram (A­70/R­
71   herein)   with   a   ballam,   and   by   Sudeb   Hari   (Sudeb   Hazra,   A­
30/R­31 herein) with a sabol, after which he died. Sudeb inserted
a   sabol   in   his   rectum.   Rajib   Kora   cut   off   Manik’s   penis   with   a
banti.   PW14   further   deposed   that   she   herself   was   assaulted   by
one   Sudeb   Tah,   one   Kena   Bagdi   and   others   with   a   lathi,   after
which she lost consciousness. She was in hospital for a number
of days due to her injuries.  In her cross examination, she stated
that she did not recollect stating the above facts to the IO. 
12. We   could   not   find   any   significant   variation   in   the
testimonies   of   all   these   witnesses.   No   major   contradiction   or

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variation is found. The presence of the witnesses on the spot has
not   been   seriously   doubted   by   the   defence   during   the   cross­
examination. It is but natural to have certain minor variations in
the evidence of eye­witnesses, when a large number of people had
gathered to assault a smaller group of people and which resulted
in   death   of   five   persons   and   injuries   to   24   persons.   In   such   a
scenario, it could not have been possible to meticulously observe
all the actions of each and every accused. The Court also should
not expect from the witnesses to depose in a parrot­like fashion.
However,   the   overall   evidence   of   these   witnesses,   prima   facie ,
appears to be untainted.
13. It   is   also   evident   that   the   above   testimonies   are   consistent
on material facts, such as that on the day of the incident, CPI(M)
workers   threatened   IPF   workers,   who   hid   in   PW2   Badal   Malik’s
house.   Thereafter,   a   mob   of   CPI(M)   workers   assembled   outside
the house, which was set on fire to smoke out the hiding persons.
When   they   tried   hiding   in   PW9   Mantu   Mal’s   house,   that   house
was   set   on   fire   as   well.   Finally,   the   IPF   supporters   ran   out,   at
which   point   they   were   assaulted   by   CPI(M)   persons.   All   the
witnesses   may   not   be   consistent   on   each   and   every   detail,   such

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as   who   set   the   house   on   fire   and   who   hit   who   with   which
weapon,   etc.   It   may   be   true   that   their   depositions   are   found   to
contain  exaggerations  such  as the  mutilation  of  deceased Manik
Hazra’s   penis,   which   was   found   to   be   intact   upon   medical
examination. However, such embellishments and inconsistencies
do not go to the root of the matter.  Additionally, we find from the
material on record that the improvements, if any, were only with
respect to weapons that had been used in the assaults and not to
the factum of assaults  per se.  The improvements, if any, made for
the   first   time   before   the   Court,   no   doubt,   need   to   be   eschewed.
But that does not mean that the entire evidence of the witnesses
should be ignored only on the said ground. 
14.  It   is   a   well   settled   position   of   law   that   the   testimony   of   a
witness cannot be discarded in toto merely due to the presence of
embellishments   or   exaggerations.   The   doctrine   of   falsus   in
uno,   falsus in omnibus , which means “false in one thing, false in
everything”   has   been   held   to   be   inapplicable   in   the   Indian
scenario,   where   the   tendency   to   exaggerate   is   common.   This
Court   has   endorsed   the   inapplicability   of   the   doctrine   in   several
decisions,   such   as   Nisar   Ali   v.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh,   AIR   1957
SC   366,     Ugar   Ahir   v.   State   of   Bihar,   AIR   1965   SC   277,     Sucha

16
Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab,   (2003)   7   SCC   643,     Narain   v.   State   of
Madhya   Pradesh,   (2004)   2   SCC   455   and   Kameshwar   Singh   v.
State   of   Bihar,   (2018)   6   SCC   433 .   In   Krishna   Mochi   v.   State   of
Bihar,   (2002)   6   SCC   81 ,   this   Court   highlighted   the   dangers   of
applying the doctrine in the Indian scenario:
“51.   …The   maxim   falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in
omnibus   has   no   application   in   India   and   the
witnesses   cannot   be   branded   as   liars.   The
maxim   falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus   (false   in   one
thing,   false   in   everything)   has   not   received   general
acceptance   nor   has   this   maxim   come   to   occupy   the
status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All
that   it   amounts   to   is,   that   in   such   cases   testimony
may   be   disregarded,   and   not   that   it   must   be
disregarded.   The   doctrine   merely   involves   the
question   of   weight   of   evidence   which   a   court   may
apply   in   a   given   set   of   circumstances,   but   it   is   not
what   may   be   called   “a   mandatory   rule   of   evidence”.
(See   Nisar Ali   v.   State of U.P.   [AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957
Cri   LJ   550]   )…   The   doctrine   is   a   dangerous   one,
specially in India, for if a whole body of the testimony
were   to   be   rejected,   because   the   witness   was
evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to
be   feared   that   administration   of   criminal   justice
would   come   to   a   dead   stop.   Witnesses   just   cannot
help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in
the   main.   Therefore,   it   has   to   be   appraised   in   each
case   as   to   what   extent   the   evidence   is   worthy   of
acceptance, and merely because in some respects the
court considers the same to be insufficient for placing
reliance   on   the   testimony   of   a   witness,   it   does   not
necessarily   follow  as  a  matter  of  law   that  it  must  be
disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has
to   be   sifted   with   care.   The   aforesaid   dictum   is   not   a
sound   rule   for   the   reason   that   one   hardly   comes
across   a   witness   whose   evidence   does   not   contain   a

17
grain   of   untruth   or   at   any   rate   exaggeration,
embroideries   or   embellishment.   (See   Sohrab   v.   State
of   M.P.   [(1972)   3   SCC   751   :   1972   SCC   (Cri)   819]
and   Ugar   Ahir   v.   State   of   Bihar   [AIR   1965   SC   277   :
(1965) 1 Cri LJ 256] .) An attempt has to be made to,
as   noted   above,   in   terms   of   felicitous   metaphor,
separate   the   grain   from   the   chaff,   truth   from
falsehood.”
 15. It   is   not   uncommon   for   witnesses   to   make   exaggerations
during   the   course   of   evidence.     But   merely   because   there   are
certain   exaggerations,   improvements   and   embellishments,   the
entire prosecution story should not be doubted.    In   Ranjit  Singh
v. State of Punjab ,  (2013) 16 SCC 752,    this Court observed:
“26.   It   is   trite   that   even   when   exaggerations   and
embellishments are galore the courts can and indeed
are   expected   to   undertake   a   forensic   exercise   aimed
at   discovering   the   truth.   The   very   fact   that   a   large
number   of   people   were   implicated   in   the   incident   in
question who now stand acquitted by the High Court
need   not   have   deterred   the   High   Court   from
appreciating   the   evidence   on   record   and   discarding
what   was   not   credible   while   accepting   and   relying
upon   what   inspired   confidence.   That   exercise   was
legitimate   for   otherwise   the   Court   would   be   seen   as
abdicating   and   surrendering   to   distortions   and/or
embellishments   whether   made   out   of   bitterness   or
any   other   reason   including   shoddy   investigation   by
the   agencies   concerned.   The   ultimate   quest   for   the
court   at   all   times   remains   “discovery   of   the   truth”
and   unless   the   court   is   so   disappointed   with   the
difficulty besetting that exercise in a given case, as to
make   it   impossible   for   it   to   pursue   that   object,   it
must make an endeavour in that direction.”

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This   Court   in   State   of   Punjab   v.   Hari   Singh   (1974)   4   SCC   552,
observed as follows:
“16.   As   human   testimony,   resulting   from   widely
different   powers   of   observation   and   description,   is
necessarily   faulty   and   even   truthful   witnesses   not
infrequently exaggerate or imagine or tell half truths,
the Courts must try to extract and separate the hard
core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is
meant   by   the   proverbial   saying   that   Courts   must
separate   “the   chaff   from   the   grain”.   If,   after
considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of
acceptable   truth   is   established   by   the   prosecution
beyond   any   reasonable   doubt   the   Courts   are   bound
to   give   effect   to   the   result   flowing   from   it   and   not
throw   it   overboard   on   purely   hypothetical   and
conjectural grounds.”
 16. Thus, it cannot be doubted that it is the duty of the Court to
separate   the   chaff   from   the   grain.   Moreover,   minor   variations   in
the   evidence   will   not   affect   the   root   of   the   matter,   inasmuch   as
such   minor   variations   need   not   be   given   major   importance,
inasmuch   as   they   would   not   materially   alter   the
evidence/credibility of the eye witnesses as a whole. 
17. In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   prima   facie ,   we   find   from
the records that the versions of the eye witnesses cannot be said
to be untrustworthy, especially in light of the observation of this
Court in  Masalti’s  case (supra).  There are as many as 24 injured

19
eye witnesses in the case and their presence cannot be doubted.
In this situation, we find that the High Court has not applied its
judicial   mind   in   determining   whether   the   judgment   of   the   trial
court was perverse inasmuch as the entire body of evidence was
discarded,   simply   on   the   basis   that   some   of   the   witnesses   had
deposed for the first time before the Court. 
18. Curiously,   the   High   Court   has   not   at   all   considered   the
evidence   concerning   charges   other   than   murder.     Although,   the
charges had been framed on questions such as burning  houses,
unlawful   assembly,   etc.,   the   evidence   on   these   questions   was
entirely overlooked and no finding was made by the trial Court as
well   as   the   High   Court.   For   instance,   the   Trial   Court   has
overlooked   the   entire   evidence   related   to   burning   of   houses,   on
the sole ground that the burnt articles were not produced before
the Court. On the other hand, we find from the records that the
burnt   articles   were   seized   and   produced   before   the   Court,   as   is
clear from the seizure list (Ex. 1).  
19. So far as the issue of unlawful assembly and common object
of the unlawful assembly is concerned, the Court generally could
determine those aspects based on the evidence on record. In the

20
matter on hand, 36 eye­witnesses are available. According to the
case   of   the   prosecution,   all   the   accused   came   in   a   group   to   the
house   of   PW2,   Badal   Malik   and   PW9,   Mantu   Mal,   and   torched
these   houses   knowing   fully   well   that   the   IPF   party   men   had
assembled in those houses.   P rima facie , the Court can visualize
the common object of unlawful assembly from this evidence. The
Court cannot expect the prosecution to prove its case by leading
separate   evidence   with   respect   to   unlawful   assembly   and
common   object.   If   those   factors   can   be   found   out   based   on   the
available   material   on   record,   there   is   no   reason   as   to   why   the
Courts should ignore the same.
20. The   non­consideration   of   such   vital   issues   by   the   High
Court, without which a question before the Court could not have
been   satisfactorily   determined,   has   led   to   injustice   of   a   serious
and   substantial   character,   warranting   interference   of   this   Court
and   remand   of   the   matter   to   the   High   Court   for   rehearing.     We
find  that  the  High  Court has  failed to  consider  whether   the  trial
Court   brushed   aside   material   evidence   related   to   the   issue   of
murder,   attempt   to   murder   and   grievous   hurt,   and   entirely
overlooked   material   evidence   on   vital   issues   such   as   house

21
burning,   grievous   hurt   and   unlawful   assembly.     Thus,   in   this
aspect too, the High Court has failed to apply its judicial mind to
verify whether the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court
was perverse or not. 
21. With   regard   to   the   conflict   between   the   ocular   testimony
and   the   medical   evidence,   in   our   considered   opinion,   the   High
Court   has   ignored   the   fact   that   lathis   were   also   used   while
assaulting   along   with   sharp   edge   weapons.     Moreover,   it   is   by
now   well   settled   that   the   medical   evidence   cannot   override   the
evidence   of   ocular   testimony   of   the   witnesses.     If   there   is   a
conflict   between   the   ocular   testimony   and   the   medical   evidence,
naturally   the   ocular   testimony   prevails.     In   other   words,   where
the   eye   witnesses   account   is   found   to   be   trustworthy   and
credible,   medical   opinion   pointing   to   alternative   possibilities   is
not   accepted   as   conclusive   [See   State   of   U.P.   vs.   Krishna   Gopal,
(1988)   4   SCC   302 ].   We   do   not   wish   to   comment   further   on   the
merits   of   the   matter   at   this   stage   since   the   matter   needs
remittance to the High Court.  
22. The   High   Court   has   not   at   all   assigned   any   cogent   reason
for   reaching   its   conclusion.     We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that

22
revisional   jurisdiction   must  be  exercised   by  the  High   Court   only
in exceptional circumstances, where there is a gross miscarriage
of justice, manifest illegality or perversity in the judgment of the
lower   court.     Interference   would   be   warranted   only   if   there   is   a
manifest illegality in the judgment of the lower court.   But in the
matter   on   hand,   in   our   considered   opinion,   because   of   non­
furnishing of valid reasons by the Trial Court, while coming to its
conclusion,  there is manifest illegality,  and  thus, the  view taken
by the High Court cannot be termed as reasonable. When there is
a glaring defect or manifest error leading to a flagrant miscarriage
of   justice,   this   Court   cannot   shut   its   eyes   merely   on
technicalities,   particularly   while   exercising   jurisdiction   under
Article   136   of   the   Constitution.     In   our   considered   opinion,   the
revisional   jurisdiction   vested   in   the   High   Court   has   not   been
properly exercised by the High Court.  The High Court should not
have proceeded casually while affirming the judgment of the trial
Court.     Having   regard   to   the   material   on   record   and   having
regard   to   the   magnitude   of   the   offence,   the   High   Court   should
have been more serious while considering the revision petition.
23. In the case of   Sheetala Prasad vs. Shree Kant (2010) 2 SCC
190,   this   Court   noted   the   principles   on   which   the   revisional

23
jurisdiction   can   be   exercised.     The   relevant   observations   of   this
Court are as under:
“12.   The   High   Court   was   exercising   the   revisional
jurisdiction   at   the   instance   of   a   private   complainant
and, therefore, it is necessary to notice the principles
on   which   such   revisional   jurisdiction   can   be
exercised. Sub­section (3) of Section 401 of the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure   prohibits   conversion   of   a
finding   of   acquittal   into   one   of   conviction.   Without
making   the   categories   exhaustive,   revisional
jurisdiction can be exercised by the High Court at the
instance of a private complainant
( 1 )   where   the   trial   court   has   wrongly   shut   out
evidence which the prosecution wished to produce,
( 2 )   where   the   admissible   evidence   is   wrongly
brushed aside as inadmissible,
( 3 )   where   the   trial   court   has   no   jurisdiction   to   try
the case and has still acquitted the accused,
( 4 )   where   the   material   evidence   has   been
overlooked either by the trial court or the appellate
court   or   the   order   is   passed   by   considering
irrelevant evidence, and
( 5 )   where   the   acquittal   is   based   on   the
compounding of the offence which is invalid under
the law.
13.   By   now,   it   is   well   settled   that   the   revisional
jurisdiction,   when   invoked   by   a   private   complainant
against   an   order   of   acquittal,   cannot   be   exercised
lightly   and   that   it   can   be   exercised   only   in
exceptional cases where the interest of public justice
requires   interference   for   correction   of   manifest
illegality   or   the   prevention   of   gross   miscarriage   of
justice.   In   these   cases,   or   cases   of   similar   nature,
retrial or rehearing of the appeal may be ordered.”

24
    (Emphasis Supplied)
24. From the aforementioned decision, it is clear that where the
material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial Court or
by   the   appellate   Court   or   the   order   is   passed   by   considering
irrelevant evidence, the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by
the   High   Court.     In   the   matter   on   hand,   as   already   mentioned,
material evidence has been overlooked by the Trial Court and the
High   Court   was   incorrect   in   observing   that   the   witnesses   have
deposed   for   the   first   time   before   the   court.     We   have   already
clarified that the contradictions and improvements were minor in
nature,   e.g.  mainly   with  regard  to   weapons  used.   In   the  matter
on hand, the presence of the witnesses is not in dispute, and the
fact that 24 witnesses have suffered injuries cannot be disputed
either. Five deaths have also taken place.   Curiously, the Courts
have   observed   that   the   injuries   must   have   been   suffered   in   a
stampede.  There is no reason as to why only one group of people
would sustain injuries in the alleged stampede, if any. Thus, the
theory   of   stampede   also   prima   facie   may   not   be   available   to   the
defendant   having   regard   to   the   evidence   on   record.       Moreover,

25
the   material   evidence   regarding   the   charges   other   than   murder
has also been ignored. 
25. Thus,   the   High   Court   has   failed   to   consider   whether   the
Trial Court discarded material evidence in the form of eye­witness
testimony   on   the   issues   of   murder,   attempt   to   murder   and
grievous   hurt   and   completely   overlooked   evidence   on   other
charges   such   as   unlawful   assembly   and   house­burning.
Consequently,   we   find   that   the   High   Court   has   not   given   due
consideration   to   the   evidence   on   record   to   arrive   at   a   reasoned
conclusion   and   has   thus   failed   to   exercise   its   revisional
jurisdiction   in   accordance   with   established   principles.   In   our
opinion, it would be appropriate for the High Court to undertake
proper consideration of the material of the matter once again with
due application of the judicial mind to find out as to whether the
trial   Court’s   order   has   caused   gross   miscarriage   of   justice,
manifest illegality or perversity.
26. Before   parting   with   the   matter,   we   hasten   to   add   that   any
observations made in this order will not influence the High Court
in   deciding   the   revision   petition   on   merits.   With   these
observations, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment and
order   of   the   High   Court   dated   30.06.2004   passed   in   C.R.R.   No.

26
765   of   2002   is   set   aside   and   the   matter   is   remitted   to   the   High
Court   to   decide   the   revision   petition   on   merits,   in   accordance
with law.
……………………………………..J.
[N.V. RAMANA]
NEW DELHI; ………………………………………J.
AUGUST 28, 2018. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR]