2018 INSC 0583
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1094  OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No.5528 of 2015)
State of Uttar Pradesh             Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Anil Kumar @ Badka & Ors. Respondent(s)
                 
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This   appeal   is   filed   by   the   State   of   U.P.   against
the final judgment and order dated 02.09.2014 passed
by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in
Government   Appeal   No.3317   of   2014   whereby   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the
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application  filed by  the appellant  herein seeking  leave
to   file   appeal   under   Section   378(3)   of   the   Criminal
Procedure   Code,   1973   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
Code”)     and   affirmed   the   judgment   dated   31.05.2014
passed by  the Additional  Sessions Judge, Court No.3,
Kannauj   acquitting   the   accused­respondents   in   S.T.
No.204 of 2012.   
3) Keeping in view the short point involved in the
appeal, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail
except   few   to   appreciate   the   grievance   of   the
appellant.
4) The   respondents   (accused)   were   prosecuted
and   tried   for   commission   of     offences   punishable
under   Sections   363,   366,   376   and   120­B   of   the
Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“IPC”)   pursuant  to  lodging  of FIR No. 139/2012 in
Police   Station     Gursahay   Ganj,   sub­District   Sadar,
District   Kannauj   in   Sessions   Trial   Case   No.   204   of
2012   in   the   Court   of   the   Additional   District   Judge,
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Court   No.3,   Kannauj.   The   prosecution   adduced
evidence in support of their case.
5) By judgment dated 31.05.2014, the Additional
Sessions   Judge   on   appreciating   the   evidence
adduced   by   the   prosecution   acquitted   the
respondents   (accused)   of   the   charge   of   offences
punishable   under   Sections   363,   366,   376,   120­B
IPC.
6) The   State   of   U.P.,   felt   aggrieved   by   the
respondents' acquittal, filed an application for leave
to   appeal   before   the   High   Court   under   Section   378
(3) of the Code.
7) By impugned order, the High Court declined to
grant leave and accordingly rejected the application
made by the State. It is against this order, the State
has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition
in this Court.
8) Heard learned counsel for the parties.
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9) Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­State   has
made only    one submission.   According  to him, the
High   Court   while   dismissing   the   application   for
leave to appeal did not assign any reason and hence
the   impugned   order   is   rendered   bad   in   law.   It   was
his   submission   that   there   were   several
discrepancies   and   errors   in   the   judgment   of   the
Sessions   Judge   against   which   the   leave   to   appeal
was sought and, therefore, this was a fit case where
the High Court should have granted leave to appeal
for   further   probing   into   the   case   by   the   Appellate
Court.   In   support   of   his   submission,   he   placed
reliance   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   State   of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar,
(2008) 9 SCC 475.  
10) We   are   inclined   to   agree   in   part   with   the
submission   urged   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellant.
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11) The   question   as   to   how   the   application   for
grant of leave to appeal made under Section 378 (3)
of   the   Code   should   be   decided   by   the   High   Court
and what are the parameters which the High Court
should   keep   in   mind   remains   no   more   res   integra .
This   issue   was   examined   by   this   Court   in   State   of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).   Justice   C.K.   Thakker   speaking   for   the
Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 as under:  
“ 19.   Now,   Section   378   of   the   Code   provides
for   filing   of   appeal   by   the   State   in   case   of
acquittal.   Sub­section   (3)   declares   that   no
appeal   “shall   be   entertained   except   with   the
leave   of   the   High   Court”.   It   is,   therefore,
necessary   for   the   State   where   it   is   aggrieved
by   an   order   of   acquittal   recorded   by   a   Court
of   Session   to   file   an   application   for   leave   to
appeal   as   required   by   sub­section   (3)   of
Section   378   of   the   Code.   It   is   also   true   that
an   appeal   can   be   registered   and   heard   on
merits by the  High  Court  only after  the High
Court   grants   leave   by   allowing   the
application   filed   under   sub­section   (3)   of
Section 378 of the Code.
20.   In   our   opinion,   however,   in   deciding   the
question   whether   requisite   leave   should   or
should   not   be   granted,   the   High   Court   must
apply   its   mind,   consider   whether   a   prima
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facie   case   has   been   made   out   or   arguable
points   have   been   raised  and   not  whether  the
order   of   acquittal   would   or   would   not   be   set
aside.
21.   It   cannot   be   laid   down   as   an   abstract
proposition   of   law   of   universal   application
that each and every petition seeking leave to
prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal
recorded   by   a   trial   court   must   be   allowed   by
the appellate court and every appeal must be
admitted   and   decided   on   merits.   But   it   also
cannot   be   overlooked   that   at   that   stage,   the
court   would   not   enter   into   minute   details   of
the   prosecution   evidence   and   refuse   leave
observing   that   the   judgment   of   acquittal
recorded   by   the   trial   court   could   not   be   said
to   be   “perverse”   and,   hence,   no  leave   should
be granted.
24.  We may hasten to clarify that we may not
be understood to have laid down an inviolable
rule   that   no   leave   should   be   refused   by   the
appellate   court   against   an   order   of   acquittal
recorded   by   the   trial   court.   We   only   state
that   in   such   cases,   the   appellate   court   must
consider   the   relevant   material,   sworn
testimonies   of   prosecution   witnesses   and
record reasons why leave sought by the State
should   not   be   granted   and   the   order   of
acquittal   recorded   by   the   trial   court   should
not   be   disturbed.   Where   there   is   application
of   mind   by   the   appellate   court   and   reasons
(may   be   in   brief)   in   support   of   such   view   are
recorded,   the   order   of   the   court   may   not   be
said   to   be   illegal   or   objectionable.   At   the
same   time,   however,   if   arguable   points   have
been   raised,   if   the   material   on   record
discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation,
review   or   reconsideration   of   evidence,   the
appellate   court   must   grant   leave   as   sought
and   decide   the   appeal   on   merits.   In   the   case
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on   hand,   the   High   Court,   with   respect,   did
neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the
case did not require grant of leave. But it also
failed   to   record   reasons   for   refusal   of   such
leave.”
12) Coming   now   to   the   facts   of   this   case,   it   is
apposite   to   reproduce   the   impugned   order   in
verbatim infra:
“ On   a   careful   perusal   of   the   judgment   and
record, it cannot be said that the view taken
by the trial judge is perverse or unreasonable.
Simply   because   another   view   might   have
been   taken   of   the   evidence   provides   no
ground   for   interfering   with   the   order   of
acquittal   unless   the   view   taken   by   the   trial
judge is not a possible view.  On the evidence
available on record, it cannot be said that the
view   taken   by   the   trial   judge   was   not   a
reasonably possible view.  
In   this   view   of   the   matter,   there   is   no
merit   in   the   application   for   leave   to   appeal
which   is   rejected   and   consequently,   the
Government Appeal is also dismissed.”
13) We   are   constrained   to   observe   that   the   High
Court   grossly   erred   in   passing   the   impugned   order
without   assigning   any   reason.     In   our   considered
opinion,  it was a clear case of total  non­application
of  mind  to  the   case  by  the   learned  Judges  because
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the   order   impugned   neither   sets   out   the   facts   nor
the submissions of the parties nor the findings and
nor the reasons as to why the leave to file appeal is
declined to the appellant. We, therefore, disapprove
the   casual   approach   of   the   High   Court   in   deciding
the   application   which,   in   our   view,   is   against   the
law laid down by this Court in the case of   State of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).
14) In   the   light   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   the
impugned order deserves to be set aside. The appeal
thus   succeeds   and   is   accordingly   allowed   and   the
impugned  order  is   set   aside.   The   case   is   remanded
to the High Court for deciding the application made
by   the   appellant   for   grant   of   leave   to   appeal   afresh
on   merits   in   accordance   with   law   keeping   in   view
the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   State   of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).
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15) It   is   made   clear   that   we   have   not   applied   our
mind   to   the   merits   of   the   case   and   remanded   the
case to the High Court having noticed that it was an
unreasoned order.   The High Court will accordingly
decide   the   application   on   merits   uninfluenced   by
any of our observations made in this order.
                                      .……...................................J.
                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
                
                     ……… ..................................J.
                     [UDAY UMESH LALIT]
New Delhi,
August 29, 2018.
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