2019 INSC 0008 1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1931 OF 2009 Champa Lal Dhakar .. Appellant Versus Naval Singh Rajput & Ors. .. Respondents J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated   1.2.2008   in   Criminal   Revision   No.   830   of   2007,   by   which the   High   Court   has   partly   allowed   the   said   Revision   Application preferred   by   the   respondents   herein   –   original   Accused   and   has set aside the order passed by the learned trial Court framing the charge   under   Section   307   of   the   IPC,   the   original   Complainant has preferred the present appeal. 2 2. That   the   Appellant   herein   –   original   Complainant   lodged   a FIR  against  the  original  Accused for   the offences under   Sections 147, 148, 451, 325/149, 307/149, 294/149 and 506/149 of the IPC. That the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sironj, District Vidisha   in   S.T.   No.   197   of   2005   framed   the   charge   against   the original Accused for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 451, 325/149, 307/149, 294/149 and 506/149 of the IPC. That   feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order   passed   by the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Sironj,   District   Vidisha   framing the charge against the original Accused for the aforesaid offences, the   accused   preferred   the   Revision   Application   before   the   High Court,   being   Criminal   Revision   Application   No.   830   of   2007. Having noticed the injuries sustained by the complainant and as it was found that no case is made out for the offence punishable under   Section   307   of   the   IPC,   the   High   Court   by   the   impugned judgment   and   order   has   partly   allowed   the   said   Revision Application   and   has   quashed   and   set   aside   the   order   passed   by the   learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge   with   regard   to   framing   of the   charge   under   Section   307   of   the   IPC   and   has   directed   the learned trial Court to reconsider its order with regard to framing of the charge and take further steps in accordance with law.   By 3 passing   the   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   was   of   the   opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the   material   on   record,   more   particularly,   the   injuries   sustained by the complainant, a charge under Section 325 of the IPC ought to have been framed. 2.1 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   quashing   and setting   aside   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court   with regard to framing of the charge under Section 307 of the IPC, the original Complainant has preferred the present Criminal Appeal. 3. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   original Complainant   has   vehemently   submitted   that,   in   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   the   High   Court   has   committed   a manifest error in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the   learned   trial   Court   framing   charge   under  Section  307   of   the IPC. 3.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on   behalf   of   the   Appellant   herein–original   Complainant   that,   in fact,   approximately   17   to   18   persons   attacked   and   beaten   the complainant with an intention to commit murder and, therefore, the   learned   trial   Court   rightly   framed   the   charge   against   the 4 accused persons for the offences under Section 307 of the IPC.  It is   submitted   that,   therefore,   when   the   learned   trial   Court exercised   the   discretion/powers   judiciously,   the   High   Court   has committed   an   error   in   quashing   and   setting   aside   the   order passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court   in   exercise   of   its   Revisional Jurisdiction. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original Accused has supported the order passed by the trial Court. 5. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties at length.     We   have   also   perused   and   considered   the   material   on record,   more   particularly,   the   injuries   sustained   by   the   original Complainant.     Considering   the   material/evidence   on   record,   we have noticed that the complainant sustained injuries on the nose and fracture of the nasal bone was found.  That the case may fall within  the   grievous   hurt,  but  it  cannot  be said  that   even,   prima facie,  a case is made out for the offence under Section 307 of the IPC.  Section 307 of the IPC reads as under: “307.   Attempt   to   murder .—Whoever   does   any act with such intention or  knowledge, and under  such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death,  he would   be   guilty   of   murder,   shall   be   punished   with imprisonment   of   either   description   for   a   term   which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; 5 and   if   hurt   is   caused   to   any   person   by   such   act,   the offender   shall   be   liable   either   to   imprisonment   for   life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.” 6. Considering   the   material/evidence   on   record   and   the medical certificate and the injuries sustained by the complainant, it cannot be said that the intention of the accused was to cause death   of   the   complainant.     Therefore,   as   rightly   observed   by   the High Court, a charge under Section 325/149 ought to have been framed.   Therefore, the High  Court has  not  committed any  error in   setting   aside   the   order   passed   by   the   trial   Court   insofar   as framing   the   charge   under   Section   307   of   the   IPC.     We   are   in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. 7. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the present   Appeal  fails  and  the  same  deserves  to  be  dismissed  and is accordingly dismissed. ……………………………………J. (D. Y. CHANDRACHUD) ……………………………………J. (M. R. SHAH) New Delhi, January 4, 2019.