2019 INSC 0070
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION [C] NO. 612 OF 2016
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN … PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The petitioner, who is an Advocate, has filed the petition under Article
32 of the Constitution of India, questioning the vires of amended Rules   14­
A, 14­B, 14­C and 14­D of the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 made
by the High Court of Madras under section 34(1) of the Advocates’ Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Advocates’ Act’). 
2. The   High   Court   has   inserted   Rule   14A   in   the   Rules   of   High   Court   of
Madras,   1970   empowering   the   High   Court   to   debar   an   Advocate   from
practicing. The High Court has been empowered to take action under Rule
14­B where any misconduct referred to under Rule 14­A is committed by an
Advocate   before   the   High   Court   then   the   High   Court   can   debar   him   from
appearing before the High Court and all subordinate courts. Under Rule 14­

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B(v)   the   Principal   District   Judge   has   been   empowered   to   initiate   action
against   the   Advocate   concerned   and   debar   him   from   appearing   before   any
court   within   such   District.   In   case   misconduct   is   committed   before   any
subordinate   court,   the   concerned   court   shall   submit   a   report   to   the
Principal District Judge and in that case, the Principal District Judge shall
have the power to take appropriate action. The procedure to be followed has
been provided in the newly inserted Rule 14­C and pending inquiry, there is
power   conferred   by   way   of   Rule   14­D   to   pass   an   interim   order   prohibiting
the   Advocate   concerned   from   appearing   before   the   High   Court   or   the
subordinate   courts.   The   amended   provisions   of   Rule   14A,   14B,   14C   and
14D are extracted hereunder:
 “14­A: Power to Debar:
(vii) An Advocate who is found to have accepted money in the name
of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or
(viii)   An   Advocate   who   is   found   to   have   tampered   with   the   Court
record or Court order; or
(ix) An Advocate who browbeats and/or abuses a Judge or Judicial
Officer; or
(x) An Advocate who is found to have sent or spread unfounded and
unsubstantiated allegations/petitions against a Judicial Officer or a
Judge to the Superior Court; or
(xi) An Advocate who actively participates in a procession inside the
Court   campus   and/or   involves   in   gherao   inside   the   Court   Hall   or
holds placard inside the Court Hall; or
(xii)   An   Advocate   who   appears   in   the   Court   under   the   influence   of
liquor; 
shall   be   debarred   from   appearing   before   the   High   Court   or
Subordinate   Courts   permanently   or   for   such   period   as   the   Court
may   think   fit   and   the   Registrar   28   General   shall   thereupon   report
the said fact to the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu.
14­B: Power to take action:­
(iv)   Where   any   such   misconduct   referred   to   under   Rule   14­A   is
committed   by   an   Advocate   before   the   High   Court,   the   High   Court
shall   have   the   power   to   initiate   action   against   the   Advocate

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concerned and debar him from appearing before the High Court and
all Subordinate Courts.
(v)   Where   any   such   misconduct   referred   to   under   Rule   14­A   is
committed   by   an   Advocate   before   the   Court   of   Principal   District
Judge,   the   Principal   District   Judge   shall   have   the   power   to  initiate
action   against   the   Advocate   concerned   and   debar   him   from
appearing before any Court within such District.
(vi)   Where   any   such   misconduct   referred   to   under   Rule   14­A   is
committed by  an Advocate  before  any  subordinate court,  the Court
concerned   shall   submit   a   report   to   the   Principal   District   Court
within whose jurisdiction it is situate and on receipt of such report,
the   Principal   District   Judge   shall   have   the   power   to   initiate   action
against   the   Advocate   concerned   and   debar   him   from   appearing
before any Court within such District.
14­C: Procedure to be followed:­
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge, as the case
may   be,   shall,   before   making   an   order   under   Rule   14­A,   issue   to
such   Advocate   a   summon   returnable   before   it,   requiring   the
Advocate   to   appear   and   show   cause   against   the   matters   alleged   in
the   summons   and   the   summons   shall   if   practicable,   be   served
personally upon him.
14­D: Power to pass Interim Order:­
The High Court or the Court of Principal District Judge may, before
making   the   Final   Order   under   Rule   14­C,   pass   an   interim   order
prohibiting  the Advocate concerned from  appearing  before the High
Court   or   Subordinate   Courts,   as   the   case   may   be,   in   appropriate
cases, as it may deem fit, pending inquiry."
3. Rule   14­A   provides   that   an   Advocate   who   is   found   to   have   accepted
money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or who
has   tampered   with   the   court   record   or   court   order;   or   browbeats   and/or
abuses a Judge or judicial officer; or is responsible for sending or spreading
unfounded   and   unsubstantiated   allegations/petitions   against   a   judicial
officer   or   a   Judge   to   the   superior   court;   or   actively   participates   in   a
procession   inside   the   court   campus   and/or   involves   in   gherao   inside   the
court   hall,   or   holds   placard   inside   the   court   hall   or   appears   in   the   court
under   the   influence   of   liquor,   the   courts   have   been   empowered   to   pass   an

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interim   order   of   suspension   pending   enquiry,   and   ultimately   to   debar   him
from  appearing   in  the  High  Court  and  all  other  subordinate  courts,  as   the
case may be.
4. The aforesaid amended Rule 14­A to 14­D came into force with effect
from the date of its publication in the Gazette on 25.5.2016. Petitioner has
questioned   the   vires   of   amended   Rules   14A   to   D   on   the   ground   of   being
violative   of   Articles   14   and   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   as   also
sections   30,   34(1),   35   and   49(1)(c)   of   the   Advocates'   Act,   as   the   power   to
debar   for   such   misconduct   has   been   conferred   upon   the   Bar   Council   of
Tamil   Nadu   and   Puducherry   and   the   High   Court   could   not   have   framed
such rules within ken of section 34(1) of the Advocates Act. The High Court
could have framed rules as to the ‘conditions subject to which an advocate
shall be permitted to practice in the High Court and the courts subordinate
thereto'.   Debarment  by   way  of  disciplinary   measure  is  outside  the   purview
of section 34(1) of the Act. The Bar Council enrolls Advocates and the power
to debar for misconduct lies with the Bar Council. The effort is to confer the
unbridled   power   of   control   over   the   Advocates   which   is   against   the   rule   of
law.   Misconduct   has   been   defined   under   section   35   of   the   Advocates   Act.
Reliance has been placed on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.  (1998) 4 SCC 409.
5. The   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras   in   its   counter   affidavit   has
pointed out that the rules are kept in abeyance  for the time being  and  the
Review   Committee   is   yet   to   take   a   decision   in   the   matter   of   reviewing   the

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rules.   In the reply filed the High Court has justified the amendment made
to  the  rules on the ground that they have been  framed in compliance with
the   directions   issued   by   this   Court   in   R.K.   Anand   v.   Registrar,   Delhi   High
Court  (2009) 8 SCC 106 in which this Court has directed the High Courts to
frame rules under section 34 of the Advocates Act and to frame the rules for
having Advocates­on­Record based on the pattern of this Court. It has been
further pointed out that the conduct and appearance of an advocate inside
the   court   premises   are   within   the   jurisdiction   of   a   court   to   regulate.   The
High Court has relied upon the decision in  Pravin C. Shah v. K. A. Mohd. Ali
(2001)   8   SCC   650   in   which   vires   of   similar   rule   was   upheld   as   such   the
rules   framed   debarring   the   advocates   for   misconduct   in   court   are   thus
permissible.
6. The   High   Court   has   also   relied   upon   the   decision   in   Ex­Capt.   Harish
Uppal v. Union of India  (2003) 2 SCC 45 to contend that court has the power
to debar advocates on being found guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional
or unbecoming conduct, from appearing  before the courts. The High Court
has   referred   to   the   decision   in   Bar   Council   of   India   v.   High   Court   of   Kerala
(2004) 6 SCC 311.
7. The High Court has contended that the rules have been framed within
the framework of the directions issued by this Court and in exercise of the
power  conferred   under  section   34(1)   of   the  Advocates   Act.  Pursuant  to   the
directions issued in  R.K. Anand ’s case (supra), the matter was placed before

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the   High   Court’s   Rule   Committee   on   17.3.2010.   The   Committee   consisting
of   Judges,   Members   of   the   Bar   Council   and   members   of   the   Bar   was
formed,   and   the   minutes   were   approved   by   the   Full   Court   on   23.9.2010.
Thereafter   the   Chief   Justice   of   the   High   Court   of   Madras   on   2.9.2014
constituted   a   Committee   consisting   of   two   Judges,   the   Chairman   of   Bar
Council of Tamil Nadu & Puducherry, Advocate General of the High Court,
President,   Madras   Bar   Association,   President,   Madras   High   Court
Advocates’ Association, and the President of Women Lawyers’ Association to
finalise the Rules.
8.  The  High   Court   has   further   contended  in   the   reply   that  the  Director,
Government   of   India,   Ministry   of   Home   Affairs   vide   communication   dated
31.5.2007   enclosed   a   copy   of   the   ‘Guidelines'   and   informed   the   Chief
Secretaries of the State Governments to review and strengthen the security
arrangements   for   the   High   Courts   and   District/subordinate   courts   in   the
country   to   avoid   any   untoward   incident.   The   High   Court   has   further
contended that there have been numerous instances of abject misbehaviour
by   the   advocates   within   the   premises   of   the   High   Court   of   Madras   in   the
year 2015. The advocates have rendered the functioning of the court utterly
impossible   by   resorting   to   activities   like   holding   protests   and   waving
placards   inside   the   court   halls,   raising   slogans   and   marching   down   the
corridors   of   the   court.   Some   advocates   had   resorted   to   using   hand­held
microphones   to   disrupt   the   proceedings   of   the   Madurai   Bench   and   even
invaded the  chambers of the  Judges. There  were  two  incidents when there

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were   bomb   hoaxes   where   clock­like   devices   were   smuggled   into   the   court
premises   and   placed   in   certain   areas.   The   Judges   of   the   High   Court   were
feeling totally insecure. Even CISF had to be employed. Thus, there was an
urgent need to maintain the safety and majesty of the court and rule of law.
After various meetings, the Rules were framed and notified. Order 4 Rule 10
of   the   Supreme   Court   Rules,   2013   is   similar   to   Rules   which   have   been
framed. In   Mohit Chaudhary, Advocate, In re , (2017) 16 SCC 78, this Court
had suspended the contemnor from practicing as an Advocate on Record for
a period of one month.
9. In  Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P.  (2016) 8 SCC 335, the court has
observed   that   the   Bar   Council   of   India   might   require   restructuring   on   the
lines   of   other   regulatory   professional   bodies,   and   had   requested   the   Law
Commission to prepare a report. An Advisory Committee was constituted by
the   Bar   Council   of   India.   A   Sub­Committee   on   ‘Strikes,   Boycotts   &
Abstaining   from   Court   Works'   was   also   constituted.   Law   Commission   had
finalized and published Report No.266 dated 23.3.2017 and has taken note
of the rules framed by the Madras High Court. Court has a right to regulate
the conduct of the advocates and the appearance inside the court. As such
it   is   not   a   fit   case   to   exercise   extraordinary   jurisdiction   and   a   prayer   has
been made to dismiss the writ petition.
10. The   petitioner   in   person   has   urged   that   rules   are   ultra   vires   and
impermissible   to   be   framed   within   scope   of   section   34(1)   of   the   Advocates

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Act.   They   take   away   the   independence   of   the   Bar   and   run   contrary   to   the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court  in Supreme Court Bar Association
v. Union of India  (supra).
11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the High Court, has contended that the rules have been framed within the
ambit of section 34(1) and in tune with the directions issued by this Court
in   R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court   (supra). He has also referred to
various   other   decisions.   It   was   submitted   that   under   section   34   of   the
Advocates   Act,   the   High   Court   is   empowered   to   frame   rules   to   debar   the
advocate   in   case   of   unprofessional   and/or   unbecoming   conduct   of   an
advocate.   Advocates   have   no   right   to   go   on   strike   or   give   a   call   of   boycott,
not even on a token strike, as has been observed in   Ex.­Capt. Harish Uppal
(supra). It was also observed that the court may now have to frame specific
rules   debarring   advocates,   guilty   of   contempt   and/or   unprofessional   or
unbecoming   conduct,   from   appearing   before   the   courts.   Advocates   appear
in   court   subject   to   such   conditions   as   are   laid   down   by   the   court,   and
practice   outside   court   shall   be   subject   to   the   conditions   laid   down   by   the
Bar   Council   of   India.   He   has   also   relied   upon   Bar   Council   of   India   v.   High
Court   of   Kerala   (2004)   6   SCC   311   in   which   the   validity   of   Rule   11   of   the
Rules   framed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   came   up   for   consideration.
Learned   senior   counsel   has   also   referred   to   the   provisions   contained   in
Order   IV   Rule   10   of   the   Supreme   Court   Rules,   2013   framed   by   this   Court

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with   respect   to   debarring   an   Advocate   on   Record   who   is   guilty   of
misconduct or  of  conduct unbecoming  of  an  Advocate­on­Record,  an   order
may be passed to remove his name from the register of Advocates on Record
either permanently or for such period as the court may think fit. This Court
has  punished  an  advocate  on  record and  has debarred him  for  a period of
one   month   in   the   case   of   Mohit   Chaudhary,   Advocate   (supra).   The   High
Court has framed the rules to preserve the dignity of the court and protect
rule   of   law.   Considering   the   prevailing   situation,   it   was   necessary   to   bring
order   in   the   premises   of   the   High   Court.   Thus   framing   of   rules   became
necessary. The Bar Council of India and the State Bar Council have failed to
fulfil the duties enjoined upon them. Therefore, it became incumbent upon
the   High   Court   to   act   as   observed   in   Mahipal   Singh   Rana   (supra)   by   this
Court.
12. This   Court   has   issued   a   notice   on   the   petition   on   9.10.2017   and   on
4.9.2018. The Court observed that prima facie the rules framed by the High
Court   appear   to   be   encroaching   on   the   disciplinary   power   of   the   Bar
Council. As the time was prayed by the High Court to submit the report of
the   Review   Committee,   time   was   granted.   In   spite   of   the   same,   the   Review
Committee   has   not   considered   the   matter,   considering   the   importance   of
the   matter   and   the   stand   taken   justifying   the   rules.   We   have   heard   the
same on merits and have also taken into consideration the detailed written
submissions filed on behalf of the High Court.                        

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13. The   Advocates   Act   has   been   enacted   pursuant   to   the
recommendations of the All India Bar Committee made in 1953 after taking
into account the recommendations of the Law Commission on the subject of
the reforms of judicial administration.  The main features of the Bill for the
enactment of the Act include the creation of autonomous Bar Council, one
for the whole of India and one for each State.   The Act has been enacted to
amend   and   consolidate   the   law   relating   to   the   legal   practitioners   and   to
provide for the constitution of the Bar Council and an All India Bar.  
14. The   legal   profession   cannot   be   equated   with   any   other   traditional
professions.   It is not commercial in nature and is a noble one considering
the   nature   of   duties   to   be   performed   and   its   impact   on   the   society.     The
independence   of   the   Bar   and   autonomy   of   the   Bar   Council   has   been
ensured   statutorily   in   order   to   preserve   the   very   democracy   itself   and   to
ensure   that   judiciary   remains   strong.       Where   Bar   has   not   performed   the
duty independently and has become a sycophant that ultimately results in
the denigrating of the judicial system and judiciary itself.   There cannot be
existence of a strong judicial system without an independent Bar.  
15. It cannot be gainsaid that lawyers have contributed in the struggle for
independence   of   the   nation.     They   have   helped   in   the   framing   of   the
Constitution of India and have helped the Courts in evolving jurisprudence
by doing hard labor and research work.   The nobility of the legal system is
to   be   ensured   at   all   costs   so   that   the   Constitution   remains   vibrant   and   to
expand its interpretation so as to meet new challenges.

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16. It   is   basically   the   lawyers   who   bring   the   cause   to   the   Court   are
supposed   to   protect   the   rights   of   individuals   of   equality   and   freedom   as
constitutionally envisaged and to ensure the country is governed by the rule
of   law.   Considering   the   significance   of   the   Bar   in   maintaining   the   rule   of
law,   right   to   be   treated   equally   and   enforcement   of   various   other
fundamental   rights,   and   to   ensure   that   various   institutions   work   within
their   parameters,   its   independence   becomes   imperative   and   cannot   be
compromised. The lawyers  are supposed to be fearless and independent in
the protection of rights of litigants. What lawyers are supposed to protect, is
the legal system and procedure of law of deciding the cases.  
17. Role of Bar in the legal system is significant.   The bar is supposed to
be the spokesperson for the judiciary as Judges do not speak.  People listen
to   the   great   lawyers   and   people   are   inspired   by   their   thoughts.     They   are
remembered and quoted with reverence.  It is the duty of the Bar to protect
honest   judges   and   not   to   ruin   their   reputation   and   at   the   same   time   to
ensure that corrupt judges are not spared.   However, lawyers cannot go to
the streets or go on strike except when democracy itself is in danger and the
entire judicial system is at stake.  In order to improve the system, they have
to   take   recourse   to   the   legally   available   methods   by   lodging   complaint
against corrupt judges to the appropriate administrative authorities and not
to   level   such   allegation   in   the   public.   The   corruption   is   intolerable   in   the
judiciary.
18. The Bar is an integral part of the judicial administration.    In order to

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ensure   that   judiciary   remains   an   effective   tool,   it   is   absolutely   necessary
that   Bar   and   Bench   maintain   dignity   and   decorum   of   each   other.     The
mutual   reverence   is   absolutely   necessary.   The   Judges   are   to   be   respected
by   the   Bar,   they   have   in­turn   equally   to   respect   the   Bar,   observance   of
mutual   dignity,   decorum   of   both   is   necessary   and   above   all   they   have   to
maintain self­respect too.
19. It   is   the   joint   responsibility   of   the   Bar   and   the   Bench   to   ensure   that
equal justice is imparted to all and that nobody is deprived of justice due to
economic   reasons   or   social   backwardness.   The   judgment   rendered   by   a
Judge   is   based   upon   the   dint   of   hard   work   and   quality   of   the   arguments
that are advanced before him by the lawyers. There is no room for arrogance
either for a lawyer or for a Judge.
20. There is a fine balance between the Bar and the Bench that has to be
maintained   as   the   independence   of   the   Judges   and   judiciary   is   supreme.
The   independence   of   the   Bar   is   on   equal   footing,   it  cannot  be  ignored   and
compromised and if lawyers have the fear of the judiciary or from elsewhere,
that   is   not   conducive   to   the   effectiveness   of   judiciary   itself,   that   would   be
self­destructive.
21. Independent   Bar   and   independent   Bench   form   the   backbone   of   the
democracy.   In  order   to  preserve  the  very  independence,  the  observance  of
constitutional   values,   mutual   reverence   and   self­respect   are   absolutely
necessary.     Bar   and   Bench   are   complementary   to   each   other.     Without
active   cooperation   of   the   Bar   and   the   Bench,   it   is   not   possible   to   preserve

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the   rule   of   law   and   its   dignity.     Equal   and   even­handed   justice   is   the
hallmark of the judicial system.  The protection of the basic structure of the
Constitution and of rights is possible by the firmness of Bar and Bench and
by proper discharge of their duties and responsibilities.  We cannot live in a
jungle raj.
22. Bar   is   the   mother   of   judiciary   and   consists   of   great   jurists.     The   Bar
has   produced   great   Judges,   they   have   adorned   the   judiciary   and   rendered
the real justice, which is essential for the society.
23. The role of Lawyer is indispensable in the system of delivery of justice.
He is bound by the professional ethics and to maintain  the high standard.
His   duty   is   to   the   court   to   his   own   client,   to   the   opposite   side,   and   to
maintain the respect of opposite party counsel also. What may be proper to
others   in   the   society,   may   be   improper   for   him   to   do   as   he   belongs   to   a
respected   intellectual   class   of   the   society   and   a   member   of   the   noble
profession,   the   expectation   from   him   is   higher.   Advocates   are   treated   with
respect in society.  People repose immense faith in the judiciary and judicial
system   and   the   first   person   who   deals   with   them   is   a   lawyer.     Litigants
repose faith  in a lawyer  and share with  them  privileged  information.   They
put their signatures wherever asked by a Lawyer. An advocate is supposed
to  protect their rights and to ensure that untainted justice delivered to his
cause.
24.   The   high   values   of   the   noble   profession   have   to   be   protected   by   all
concerned at all costs and in all the circumstances cannot be forgotten even

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by the youngsters in the fight of survival in formative years. The nobility of
legal   profession   requires   an   Advocate   to   remember   that   he   is   not   over
attached to any case as Advocate does not win or lose a case, real recipient
of justice is behind the curtain, who is at the receiving end. As a matter of
fact,   we   do   not   give   to   a   litigant   anything   except   recognizing   his   rights.   A
litigant has a right to be impartially advised by a lawyer.  Advocates are not
supposed to be money guzzlers or ambulance chasers.  A Lawyer should not
expect any favour from the Judge and should not involve by any means in
influencing   the   fair   decision­making   process.     It   is   his   duty   to   master   the
facts   and   the   law   and   submit   the   same   precisely   in   the   Court,   his   duty   is
not to waste the Courts' time.  
25. It is said by Alexander Cockburn that  “the weapon of the advocate is
the sword of a soldier, not the dagger of the assassin”.  It is the ethical duty
of   lawyers   not   to   expect   any   favour   from   a   Judge.   He   must   rely   on   the
precedents,   read   them   carefully   and   avoid   corruption   and   collusion   of   any
kind,   not   to   make   false   pleadings   and   avoid   twisting   of   facts.     In   a
profession,   everything   cannot   be   said   to   be   fair   even   in   the   struggle   for
survival.     The   ethical   standard   is   uncompromisable.     Honesty,   dedication
and hard work is the only source towards perfection. An Advocate conduct
is supposed to be exemplary.   In case an Advocate causes disrepute of the
Judges or his colleagues or involves himself in misconduct, that is the most
sinister   and   damaging   act   which   can   be   done   to   the   entire   legal   system.
Such a person is definitely deadwood and deserves to be chopped off.

15
26. Francis   Bacon   has   said   about   the   Judges   that   Judges   ought   to   be
more   learned   than   witty,   more   reverend   than   plausible,   and   more   advised
than   confident.     Above   all   thingst,   integrity   is   their   portion   and   proper
virtue.  Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice, and an
overspeaking judge is no well­tuned cymbal.
27. The balancing of values, reverence between the Bar and the Bench is
the edifice of the independent judicial system.  Time has come to restore the
glory   and   cherish   the   time­tested   enduring   ideals   and   principles.     For   a
value­driven   framework,   it   is   necessary   that   perspective   is   corrected   in   an
ethical   and   morally   sound   perspective.     The   perception   of   ambulance
chasers, money guzzlers and black sheep should not be presumptive.  Such
public   perception   as   to   lawyers   undermines   the   credibility   of   the   legal
profession, all the evils from the system have to be totally weeded out.   No
human institution is ever perfect.  In order to drive towards more perfection,
one   has   to   just   learn   from   the   mistakes   of   the   past   and   build   upon   the
present days’ good work so as to make out a better tomorrow.
28. The   background   as   to   what   has   happened   in   the   High   Court   at
Madras   as   projected   in   reply   of   the   High   Court,   has   prompted   us   to   make
the   aforesaid   observations.     While   deciding   the   case,   we   have   pointed   out
the   importance   of   the   Bar   just   to   remind   it   of   its   responsibilities   and
significance in a democratic setup.   The atmosphere that had been created
in   Madras   as   projected   in   the   counter   affidavit   filed   by   the   High   Court,

16
would have prompted us also to take a stern view of the matter by invoking
Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   but   for   the   time   gap   and   things   have   settled   by
now due to herculean effort of the High Court. It is not for this court much
less for the High Court to tolerate such intemperate behavior of the lawyers
as projected in the counter affidavit of the High Court.  The acts complained
of   are   not   only   contemptuous   but   also   tantamount   to   gross   professional
misconduct.
29. There is no room for taking out the procession in the Court premises,
slogan   raising   in   the   Courts,   use   of   loudspeakers,   use   of   intemperate
language   with   the   Judges   or   to   create   any   kind   of   disturbance   in   the
peaceful,   respectful   and   dignified   functioning   of   the   Court.     Its   sanctity   is
not less than that of a holy place reserved for noble souls.  We are shocked
to   note   that   the   instances   of   abject   misbehavior   of   the   advocates   in   the
premises  of  the  High  Court of  Madras   resulting   into  requisitioning  of  CISF
to   maintain   safety   and   majesty   of   the   Court   and   rule   of   law.     It   has   been
observed by this Court in   Mahipal Singh Rana (supra)   that Bar Council has
failed   to   discharge   its   duties   on   the   disciplinary   side.     In   our   opinion,   in
case such state of affairs continues and Bar Council fail to discharge duties
the   Court   shall   have   to   supervise   its   functioning   and   to   pass   appropriate
permissible   orders.   Independence   of   Bar   and   Bench   both   are   supreme,
there has to be balance  inter se .  
30. We now advert to main question whether disciplinary power vested in

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the   Bar   Council   can   be   taken   away   by   the   Court   and   the   international
scenario in this regard.
31. The   legislature   has   reposed   faith   in   the   autonomy   of   the   Bar   while
enacting Advocates Act and it provides for autonomous Bar Councils at the
State   and   Central   level.     The   ethical   standard   of   the   legal   profession   and
legal   education   has   been   assigned   to   the   Bar   Council.     It   has   to   maintain
the   dignity   of   the   legal   profession   and   independence   of   Bar.     The
disciplinary control has been assigned to the Disciplinary Committees of the
Bar Councils of various States and Bar Council of India and an appeal lies
to this Court under section 38 of the Act.
32. The   bar   association   must   be   self­governing   is   globally   recognised.
Same   is   a  resolution   of   the   United   Nations   also.     Even   Special   Rapporteur
on the independence of Judges and lawyers finds that bar associations play
a   vital   role   in   safeguarding   the   independence   and   integrity   of   the   legal
profession   and   its   members.     The   UN's   basic   principles   on   the   role   of
lawyers   published   in   1990   noted   that   such   institutions   must   possess
independence   and   its   self­governing   nature.     The   bar   association   has   a
crucial   role   to   play   in   a   democratic   society   to   ensure   the   protection   of
human rights in particular due process and fair­trial guarantees.  Following
is the extract of the report of the United Nations: 
“ Mandate
In   the   report,   Special   Rapporteur   Diego   García­Say	án   finds   that
associations should be independent and self­governing because they
hold   a   general   mandate   to   protect   the   independence   of   the   legal
profession and the interests of its members.

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They should also be recognized under the law, the UN says.
“Bar associations have a crucial role to play in a democratic society
to enable  the  free  and   independent   exercise  of   the   legal  profession,
and to ensure access to justice and the protection of human rights,
in  particular,  due  process  and  fair   trial  guarantees,"  UN   Secretary­
General António Guterres says. 
Self­governing
The      UN’s   Basic   Principles   on   the   Role   of   Lawyers     (published   in
1990)   recognize   that   lawyers,   like   other   citizens,   have   the   right   to
freedom   of   association   and   assembly,   which   includes   the   right   to
form   and   join   self­governing   professional   associations   to   represent
their   interests.   Since   its   publication,   this   universal   document   has
been referenced in wrangles between lawyers and governments.
Requirements
Existing   legal   standards   do   not   provide   a   definition   of   what
constitutes a professional association of lawyers. They simply focus
on the necessary requirements that such institutions must possess,
such as independence and a self­governing nature.
The report recommends that: “In order to ensure the integrity of the
entire profession and the quality of legal services, it is preferable to
establish   a   single   professional   association   regulating   the   legal
profession. ”
Elected by peers
Another principle of the UN report is that: “In order to guarantee the
independence of the legal profession, the majority of members of the
executive   body   of   the   bar   association   should   be   lawyers   elected   by
their peers.”
It   says   that   state   control  of   bar   associations   or   governing   bodies   is
“incompatible   with   the   principle   of   the   independence   of   the   legal
profession”.”
(emphasis supplied)
33. In   the   conference   of   Presidents   of   Law   Association   in   Asia,   Law
Council   of   Australia   held   20 th
  March,   2005   at   Queensland,   Australia,
Justice   Michael   Kirby   AC   CMG   presented   his   papers   on   ‘Independence   of
the   Legal   Profession:   Global   and   Regional   Challenges’   and   pointed   out   the
importance of the independence of the bar in his papers thus:
“One of the features of the law that tends to irritate other sources of
power is the demand of the law's practitioners ­ judges and lawyers
­ for independence. The irritation is often true of politicians, wealthy
and   powerful   people,   government   officials   and   media   editors   and
their   columnists.   Those   who   are   used   to   being   obeyed   and   feared

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commonly find it intensely annoying that there is a source of power
that   they   cannot   control   or   buy   the   law   and   the   courts .   Yet   the
essence of a modern democracy is observance of the rule of law. The
rule   of   law   will   not   prevail   without   assuring   the   law's   principal
actors ­ judges and practicing  lawyers and also legal academics ­ a
very high measure of independence of mind and action.
 
An independent legal profession also requires that lawyers be free to
carry out their work without interference or fear of reprisal . Lawyers
have a duty, within the law, to advance the interests of their clients
fearlessly   and   to   assist   the   courts   in   upholding   the   law.   To   enable
them   to   perform   these   duties   it   is   necessary   that   lawyers   enjoy
professional   independence.   Challenges   to   such   independence   may
arise   where   lawyers   are   not   able   to   form   independent   professional
organizations;   are   limited   in   the   clients   whom   they   may   represent;
are threatened with disciplinary action, prosecution or sanctions for
undertaking   their   professional   duties ;   are   in   any   other   way
intimidated   or   harassed   because   of   their   clients   or   the   work   that
they undertake; or are subjected to unreasonable interference in the
way they perform their duties.
Independence is not provided for the benefit or protection of judges
or lawyers as such . Nor is it intended to shield them from being held
accountable   in   the   performance   of   their   professional   duties   and   to
the general law. Instead,   its purpose is the protection of the people ,
affording them an independent legal profession as "... the bulwark of
a free and democratic society."
(emphasis supplied)
 
 
Justic e   Kirby   also   pointed   out   in   his   papers   that   principle   of
independence   of   the   legal   profession   is   recognized   internationally.     The
pursuit   of   the   independence   of   the   Judges   and   the   lawyers   are   not,
therefore,   merely   an   aspirational   principle.     It   is   a   central   tenet   of
international   human   rights   law   of   great   practical   importance.     He   has
further observed thus:
“…If   all   people   are   entitled   to   equal   protection   under   the   law,
without   exception,   lawyers   must   be   able   to   represent   unpopular
clients fearlessly   and to advocate on behalf of unpopular causes, so
as  to  uphold   legal   rights.   To   ensure   the   supremacy   of   the  law   over
the   arbitrary   exercise   of   power   a   strong   and   independent   legal
profession is therefore essential .  

20
In   this   way,   an   independent   legal   profession   is   an   essential
guardian of human and other rights . By ensuring that no person is
beyond   the   reach   of   the   law,   the   legal   profession   can   operate   as   a
check   upon   the   arbitrary   or   excessive   exercise   of   power   by   the
government and its agents or by other powerful parties.” 
(emphasis supplied)
He also emphasized in his papers to promote access to law, reform of
the  law and  its rules and  the engagement of  lawyers  with  ordinary   people
and litigants to whom, ultimately, the law clearly belongs.
34. The   independence   of   the   Bar   came   to   be   discussed   in   28 th
  Annual
Convention Banquet of the National Lawyers Guild held at San Francisco,
California   on   13 th
  November   1965   in   which   Robert   F.   Drinan,   S.J.,   Dean,
Boston   College   Law   School,   Brighton,   Massachusetts   pointed   out   the
independence   of   the   Bar   and   its   facets.     He   has   pointed   out   that   lawyers
have to be loyal to their client's interests and faithful to the maintenance of
the integrity and independence of the courts.   It requires a commitment to
many  moral and spiritual  values.   Lawyers boldly  challenge the inequality
in every form.  He also pointed out that independence of mind and heart is
necessary.   The   Bar   cannot   be   a   prisoner   of   passions   and   prejudices   and
independence of judgment need to be construed and from an unreasonable
fear of the power of the judiciary is necessary and has observed that lawyer
should feel free to criticize judicial decisions of every Tribunal.  At the same
time, he said to impugn the motives to Judges undermine the very essence
of   every   civilized   society.     A   lawyer   has   to   be   detached   from   financial

21
considerations.     If   lawyers   are   appreciated   and   embraced   with   these
sentiments,   we   would   witness   the   full   flowering   of   the   indispensable
element of a truly free society – an independent Bench and an independent
Bar.  He has observed: 
“Members of the legal  profession under  the  Anglo­American system
of   justice   have   been   entrusted   with   dual   and   conflicting   loyalties.
They   must   be   simultaneously   both   loyal   to   their   client's   interests
and faithful to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of
the courts of which they are officers. The complex dualism inherent
in being  both an advocate and an officer of the Court requires that
the   lawyer   have   a   unique   independence,   ­   a   detachment   from   any
excessive   adherence   to   his   client's   interests   as   well   as   a   freedom
from  being  inordinately attached to the rulings and interests of the
judicial system.
The   independence   of   the   bar   does   not   mean,   let   us   make   it   clear
immediately, a state of non­commitment to truths or values. Indeed
the   independence   of   the   bar   presupposes   and   requires   a
commitment   to   many   moral   and   spiritual   values   which   must   be
served   in   whole   or   in   part   by   America's   legal   institutions.   The
spiritual   value   indispensable   for   an   independent   bar   to   which   the:
National  Lawyers'   Guild   in   a   particular   way   has   lent  its   power   and
prestige   is   the   basic   injustice   of   permitting   false   accusations   to   be
made   by   public   bodies   in   the   name   of   patriotism   or   loyalty   to   the
nation.
The   lawyer   whose   mind   is   independent   of   the   passions   and
prejudices of his own generation or his own century transcends the
collective   compromises   of   his   own   age   and   boldly   challenges
inequality in every form.  The lawyers who formed and fashioned the
American   Republic   had   the   independence   of   mind   and   heart
unparalleled by any subsequent generation of attorneys in America;
their   vision   and   their   courage   are   the   legacies   of   every   lawyer   in
America. So few members of the bar recognize that legacy because,
being the prisoners of the passions and prejudices of their own age,
they   have   lost   that   independence   of   judgment   without   which   a
lawyer   cannot   really   identify   himself   or   the   noble   profession   of
which he is a member .
II.   THE   INDEPENDENCE   OF   THE   BAR   FROM   JUDICIAL
PRECEDENT AND FROM FEAR OF THE JUDICIARY 
If a lawyer cannot really fulfill his self­identity or carry out his moral
mission unless he is independent of the prejudices and passions of
his age he is similarly impeded unless he can discover and maintain

22
an   attitude   of   respectful   independence   from   the   judiciary.   This
independence  from   the  judiciary  should  prompt  lawyers  to feel  free
to   criticize   judicial   decisions   consistently   and   courageously.   This
criticism should not be confined to the higher courts but should be
applicable to every tribunal whose opinions are deficient in inherent
logic and a clear consistency. 
Does constitutionally protected freedom of speech or freedom of the
press   give   immunity   for   slander   and   public   defamation   of   the
nation's   highest   tribunal?   And   by   what   principle   can   an
independent bar justify its inaction towards those who, by calumny
and   libel,   impugn   the   motives   of   judges   and   undermine   the   very
essence of every civilized society ­ the rule of law ?
The  bench  generally   speaking  cannot   be  expected  to rise  above the
level   of   the   bar.   A   bar   that   is   subservient   and   servile   to   the   bench
will tend to corrupt both the bench and the bar .
The   independence   of   the   legal   profession,   therefore,   requires   that
lawyers   attain   such   an   attitude   of   detachment   both   from   their
duties as advocates   and their  role  as officers of the court  that  they
can   act   objectively   and   dispassionately,   ­   as   neither   solely   the
servants   of   their   clients   nor   as   exclusively   the   ministers   of   the
courts .”
(emphasis supplied)
35. In   an   article   ‘the   Importance   of   an   Independent   Bar’   by   Stephen   A.
Salzburg   published   in   Scholarly   Commons,   GW   Law   Faculty   Publications
and other works, referring to the Shakespeare it was pointed out that when
Dick the Butcher met to discuss the plan of attack and how they should go
about   gaining   the   political   control   of   England.     It   is   during   this   meeting
that   the   sentence   involving   “kill   all   the   lawyers”   occurred.     The   exact
sentence   in   the   play   was   “The   first   thing   we   do,   let’s   kill   all   the   lawyers”.
Governments need fear lawyers and Judges only when they fear the truth.
This is true here and it is true throughout the world.  The relevant portion
of the article is extracted hereunder:
“Attack on lawyers

23
It   is   from   this   perspective   that   I   wish   to   express   my   concern   as   to
recent attacks on the legal profession that have occurred here in the
United States and elsewhere in the world. Attacks on the private bar
often   are   accompanied   by   attacks   on   the   independence   of   the
judiciary, and these attacks are a frontal assault on the very notion
of the rule of law.
One  law  journal that  views  the  play   as I  do  concisely  summarize  it
as follows:
.…Before the plan was executed, Cade and his followers, among
whom was Dick the Butcher, met to discuss the plan of attack
and   how   they   should   go   about   gaining   the   political   control   of
England .   It   is   during   this   meeting   that   the   sentence   involving
“kill all the lawyers” occurs. The exact sentence in the play was,
“ The   first   thing   we   do,   let’s   kill   all   the   lawyers .”   We   see,   then,
that   this   sentence   was   uttered   by   a   riotous   anarchist   whose
intent   was   to   overthrow   the   lawful   government   of   England.
Shakespeare knew that lawyers were the primary guardians of
individual   liberty   in   democratic   England.   Shakespeare   also
knew   that   an   anarchical   uprising   from   within   was   doomed   to
fail unless the country’s lawyers were killed.
The   government   has   strained   to   keep   lawyers   away   from
Guantanamo   as   much   as   possible   because   it   knows   that   their
presence   means   challenges   to   unfair   proceedings,   to   secret
evidence, and to prolonged detentions . Lawyers have volunteered to
represent the detainees, but their ability to do so is greatly restricted
by   the   congressional   elimination   of   both   habeas   corpus   and   the
right of detainees to bring actions challenging their detentions or the
conditions of their detentions.
I   regret   deeply   what   has   happened   in   Guantanamo.   After   all,
governments  need  fear  lawyers  and  judges   only   when  they   fear   the
truth. This is true here and it is true throughout the world.
…..These  lawyers  and  judges   remind  us  that   preserving   the   rule  of
law   is   something   never   to   be   taken   for   granted.   It   often   is   a
challenge requiring self­sacrifice and risk­taking.
The Supreme Court of Canada wrote eloquently in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at
335­36:
The   independence   of   the   Bar   from   the   state   in   all   of   its
pervasive   manifestations   is   one   of   the   hallmarks   of   a   free
society.   Consequently,   regulation   of   these   members   of   the   law
profession   by   the   state   must,   so   far   as   by   human   ingenuity   it
can   be   so   designed,   be   free   from   state   interference,   in   the
political   sense,   with   the   delivery   of   services   to   the   individual

24
citizens in the state, particularly in fields of public and criminal
law.   The   public   interest   in   a   free   society   knows   no   area   more
sensitive   than   the   independence,   impartiality,   and   availability
to   the   general   public   of   the   members   of   the   Bar   and   through
those members, legal advice and services generally.
In   another   Canadian   case,   Andrews   v.   Law   Society   of   British
Columbia,   [1989]   1   S.C.R.   143   at   pp.   187­88:   Justice   McIntyre
wrote: 
“I   would   observe   that   in   the   absence   of   an   independent   legal
profession,   skilled   and   qualified   to   play   its   part   in   the
administration   of   justice   and   the   judicial   process,   the   whole
legal system would be in a parlous state. In the performance of
what   may   be   called   his   or   her   private   function,   that   is,   in
advising on legal matters and in representing clients before the
courts and other tribunals,  the lawyer is accorded great powers
not permitted to other professionals…... By any standard, these
powers and duties are vital to the maintenance of order in our
society and the due administration of the law in the interest of
the whole community .”
(emphasis supplied)
36. The   International   Bar   Associations   Presidential   Task   Force   was
constituted to examine the question of independence of the legal profession.
In   the   report   while   discussing   the   indicators   of   independence,   it   has   been
pointed   out   that   a   bar   association   is   generally   deemed   to   be   independent
when   it   is   mostly   free   from   external   influence   and   can   withstand   pressure
from   external   sources   on   matters   such   as   the   regulation   of   the   profession,
disbarment   proceedings   and   the   right   of   lawyers   to   join   the   association.
Judicial   independence   ensures   that   lawyers   are   able   to   carry   out   their
duties in a free and secure environment and an independent judiciary also
acts as a check on the independence of lawyers and vice versa. The relevant
portion of the report of task force is extracted hereunder:

25
“Judicial   independence   ensures   that   lawyers   are   able   to   carry   out
their duties in a free and secure environment, where they are able to
ensure   access   to   justice   and   provide   their   clients   with   intelligent,
impartial   and   objective   advice.   An   impartial   and   independent
judiciary   is   more   likely   to   be   tolerant   and   responsive   to   criticism,
which   means   that   lawyers   are   able   to   freely   criticize   the   judiciary,
without fear of retaliation, whether in the form of prosecution by the
government   or   unfavorable   judicial   decisions.   An   independent
judiciary   also   acts   as   a   check   on   the   independence   of   lawyers   and
vice   versa.   Thus,   the   relationship   between   judicial   independence
and  the   independence   of   lawyers   is   one   of   mutual   reliance   and   co­
dependence.”
There have to be clear and transparent rules on admission to the Bar, 
disciplinary proceedings and disbarment.  In this regard, the following 
observation has been made by the IBA Task Force:
“4.2.2.2.   Clear   and   transparent   rules   on   admission   to   the   Bar,
disciplinary   proceedings   and   disbarment   Clear   and   transparent
rules on admission, disciplinary  proceedings and disbarment refers
to rules  that are comprehensible and accessible , so  that those who
are  subject  to the  rules  are  able  to easily   access  them,  understand
their meaning and appreciate the implications of violating them. The
existence   of   comprehensible,   clear   and   transparent   rules   on
admission to the Bar ensures that those seeking admission are well­
informed   of   the   requirements   and   are   assessed   on   the   basis   of
objective   criteria   that   apply   equally   to   all   candidates.   Clear   and
transparent   rules   reduce   the   risk   of   arbitrary   disciplinary
proceedings   and   disbarment   and   also   guarantee   that   lawyers   are
held   accountable   and   responsible   for   their   actions .   Lawyers,   those
they   represent   and   the   general   public   should   have   access   to
efficient,   fair   and   functional   mechanisms   that   allow   for   the
resolution   of   disputes   between   the   profession   and   the   public,   an
imposition   of   disciplinary   measures   (where   appropriate)   and   an
effective   appeals   system.   This   ensures   that   the   rights   of   all   parties
are protected in accordance with the rule of law.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Complete   lack   of   self­regulation   can   have   a   negative   effect   on   the
independence   of   the   lawyers   and   lawyers   have   to   be   free   from   fear   of
prosecution   in   controversial   or   unpopular   cases.     Political,   societal   and,   in
some circumstances, media pressure in times of war, terror, and emergency

26
can   have   a   profound   impact   on   the   independence   of   the   profession.     They
can   be  attacked   by   unscrupulous   persons   for   discharging   their   duties   in   a
fearless manner.   That is why independence of the bar is imperative.  There
is   a   need   to   organize   seminars,   training   sessions   on   the   current
development   of   law   so   as   to   maintain   independence.     It   has   also   been
observed in the report of IBA Task Force that public often associates lawyers
with   corruption,   lying,   deceit,   excessive   wealth   and   a   lavish   lifestyle.     The
report has concluded thus:
“There   is   no   greater   issue   affecting   the   legal   profession   worldwide
than   the   manifold   threats   to   its   independence.   Without
independence,   lawyers   are   left   exposed   to   disciplinary   proceedings,
arbitrary   disbarment,   physical   violence,   persecution,   and   even
death.   Lawyers   around   the   world   have   been   targeted   by
governments   and   by   private   actors   simply   for   acting   in   the   public
interest or for undertaking cases or causes that some, including the
government, find objectionable.”
38. The   emphasis   on   the   disciplinary   control   by   the   independent   bodies
so   as   to   maintain   the   purity,   efficacy,   and   intellect   of   the   judicial   system
itself.     The   resolution   of   IBA   standards   for   the   independence   of   the   legal
profession with respect to disciplinary proceedings is extracted hereunder:
“Disciplinary proceedings
21.   Lawyers’   associations   shall   adopt   and   enforce   a   code   of
professional conduct of lawyers.
22.   There   shall   be   established   rules   for   the   commencement   and
conduct   of   disciplinary   proceedings   that   incorporate   the   rules   of
natural justice.
23. The appropriate lawyers’ association will be responsible for or be
entitled to participate in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings.
24. Disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted in the first instance
before   a   disciplinary   committee   of   the   appropriate   lawyers’
association .   The   lawyer   shall   have   the   right   to   appeal   from   the
disciplinary committee to an appropriate and independent appellate
body.”

27
(emphasis supplied)
The   IBA   resolution   emphasises   on   the   disciplinary   committee   of   the
Bar is necessary so as to maintain the independence of the Bar.
39. The members of the Bar are recognized as intellectual of the society.
They enjoy respect in the society being the protector of law as they fight for
equality.   The advocate has to fearlessly uphold the interests of his clients
by   all   fair   and   honourable   means   without   regard   to   any   unpleasant
consequences  to  himself  or   any   other.     An  advocate  is   supposed   to   find  a
solution   to   the   very   real   problem   as   ‘justice   hurried   is   justice   buried’   and
‘slow justice is no justice'.   It has become professionally embarrassing and
personally demoralizing for an advocate to give an answer to his client as to
the outcome of the matter and why it is pending and when it is to come up
for hearing. When a member of Bar is elevated to bench first relief which is
felt is of answerability to the client on aforesaid aspects which is in fact too
inconvenient and embarrassing but still problem subsists and is writ large,
it   has   to   be   solved   every   day.     In   such   circumstances   too,   the   tool   of
adjournment   is   used   to   kill   justice.     Adjournment   poses   a   question   mark
whether such kind of advocacy is acceptable?  
40. The   Bar   Council   has   the   power   to   discipline   lawyers   and   maintain
nobility   of   profession   and   that   power   imposes   great   responsibility.       The
Court   has   the   power   of   contempt   and   that   lethal   power   too   accompanies
with greater responsibility.   Contempt is a weapon like   Brahmasatra   to be

28
used sparingly to remain effective.  At the same time, a Judge has to guard
the   dignity   of   the   Court   and   take   action   in   contempt   and   in   case   of
necessity   to   impose   appropriate   exemplary   punishment   too.     A   lawyer   is
supposed to be governed by professional ethics, professional etiquette and
professional   ethos   which   are   a   habitual   mode   of   conduct.     He   has   to
perform   himself   with   elegance,   dignity,   and   decency.     He   has   to   bear
himself at all times and observe himself in a manner befitting as an officer
of   the   Court.     He   is   a   privileged   member   of   the   community   and   a
gentleman.   He has to mainsail with honesty and sail with the oar of hard
work, then  his  boat  is  bound  to reach  to the  bank .    He  has to  be honest,
courageous, eloquent, industrious, witty and judgmental.
41. In a keynote address to the 1992 Conference of the English, Scottish
and   Australian   Bar   Association   held   in   London   on   4 th
  July,   1992   on   the
‘Independence   of   the   Bench;   the   Independence   of   the   Bar   and   the   Bar’s
Role in the Judicial System’, Sir Anthony Mason, AC, KBE, Chief Justice of
Australia   has   pointed   out   that   for   its   independence   the   Court   should   be
responsible   for   its   own   administration   and   the   expenditure   of   funds
appropriated   to   it   by   Parliament.     He   has   also   referred   to   one   of   the
recommendations   made   by   an   economist   that   financial   incentives   should
be  offered  to judges to  expedite the disposition of cases, in that regard he
has   observed   that   incentive­based   remuneration,   no   matter   how   well
adapted it is to the football stadium  and the production line has no place
in the courtroom.  Judicial independence is a privilege of and protection for

29
the   people.     The   appointment   of   the   judges   should   be   from   the   dedicated
advocates. With respect to the independence of the Bar, he has mentioned
that   lawyers   stand   between   the   subject   and   the   Crown,   and   between   the
rich   and   the   poor,   the   powerful   and   the   weak.     It   is   necessary   that   while
the   Bar   occupies   an   essential   part   in   the   administration   of   justice,   the
lawyer   should   be   completely   independent   and   work   entirely   as   an
individual,   drawing   on   his   own   resources   of   learning,   ability,   and
intelligence.   Next, he has referred to Sir Owen Dixon when he became the
Chief Justice of Australia, said:
“ Because it is the duty of the barrister to stand between the subject
and   the   Crown,   and   between   the   rich   and   the   poor,   the   powerful
and   the   weak ,   it   is   necessary   that,   while   the   Bar   occupies   an
essential   part   in   the   administration   of   justice,   the   barrister   should
be   completely   independent   and   work   entirely   as   an   individual,
drawing on his own resources of learning, ability, and intelligence.”
(emphasis supplied)
A lawyer has to balance between the duty  to the court and interests
of his clients.  A lawyer has to be independent.  He has observed thus:
  “An   important   element   in   the   relationship   between   the   court   and   the
barrister is the special duty which the barrister owes to the court over and
above the duty which the barrister owes to the client.  The performance of
that   duty   contributes   to   the   efficient   disposition   of   litigation.     In   the
performance   of   that   duty   the   independence   of   the   barrister,   allied   to   his
familiarity with the judicial process, gives him a particular advantage.   In
balancing his duty to the court and that owed to the client, the barrister is
free   from   the   allegiances   and   interests   and   the   closer   and   continuing
association which the solicitor has with the client.  The significance of the
barrister’s   special   duty   to   the   court   and   the   expectation   that   it   will   be
performed played a part in the recognition of the common law’s immunity
of   the   barrister   from   in­court   liability   for   negligence.     That   immunity   is
founded   partly   on   the   existence   of   the   duty   and   its   performance   with
beneficial consequences for the curial process.   So much is clear from the
speeches in the House of Lords in  Rondel v Worsley  and  Saif Ali v. Sydney
Mitchell  &  Co.   and   the  majority  judgments  in   the  High   Court   of  Australia
in  Gianarelli v. Wraith .
The   Bar’s   best   response   to   the   new   challenge   which   confronts   it   is   to   re­

30
affirm   its   traditional   professional   ideals   and   aspire   to   excellence.     The
professional   ideal   is   not   the   pursuit   of   wealth   but   public   service.   That   is
the vital difference between professionalism and commercialism. 
It is timely to repeat what O’Connor J (with whom Rehnquist CJ  and
Scalia J agreed) said in  Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association  :
One   distinguishing   feature   of   any   profession,   unlike   other   occupations
that   may   be   equally   respectable,   is   that   membership   entails   an   ethical
obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering
to   standards   of   conduct   that   could   not   be   enforced   either   by  legal   fiat   or
through the discipline of the market.  There are sound reasons to continue
pursuing   the   goal   that   is   implicit   in   the   traditional   view   of   processional
life.  Both the special privileges incident to membership in the professional
and the advantages those privileges give in the necessary task of earning a
living are means to a goal that transcends the accumulation of wealth.  
Unless   the   Bar dedicates  itself   to  the  ideal  of  public   service,  it  forfeits   its
claim   to   treatment   as   a   profession   in   the   true   sense   of   the   term.
Dedication   to   public   service   demands   not   only   attainment   of   a   high
standard   of   professional   skill   but   also   faithful   performance   of   duty   to
client   and   court   and   a   willingness   to   make   the   professional   service
available to the public.”
42. Before   dilating   further   on   the   issue,   we   take   note   of   the   provisions
contained   in   the   Advocates   Act.     Section   9   provides   for   the   constitution   of
Disciplinary   Committee   by   the   Bar   Council.     A   Disciplinary   Committee
consists   of   three   members,   two   of   them   are   elected   members   of   the   Bar
Council   and  the   third  member   has  to  be  co­opted   by  the   Council  amongst
Advocates.  Section 9 is reproduced hereunder:
“9. Disciplinary   Committees.­   (1)   A   Bar   Council   shall   constitute   one   or
more disciplinary committees, each of which shall consist of three persons
of   whom   two   shall   be   persons   elected   by   the   Council   from   amongst   its
members   and   the   other   shall   be   person   co­opted   by   the   Council   from
amongst advocates who possess the qualifications specified in the proviso
to   sub­section   (2)   of   section   3   and   who   are   not   members   of   the   Council,
and   the   seniormost   advocate   amongst   the   members   of   a   disciplinary
committee shall be the Chairman thereof.
(2) Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­section   (1),   any
disciplinary   committee   constituted   prior   to   the   commencement   of   the
Advocates (Amendment) Act, 1964 may dispose of the proceedings pending
before it as if this section had not been amended by the said Act.”
43. Section   15   confers   the   power   on   the   Bar   Council   to   make   rules   for

31
carrying out the purposes of the Chapter II  inter alia  relating to disciplinary
committees.     Chapter   III   deals   with   the   provisions   regarding   enrolment   of
advocates contained in Sections 16 to 28.   Right to practice is conferred in
Section   29,   which   provides   that   advocates   be   the   only   recognized   class   of
persons entitled to practice law.  Section 30 of the Advocates Act gives right
of advocates to practice throughout the territory in all Courts including the
Supreme   Court   before   any   Tribunal   or   person   legally   authorize   to   take
evidence   and   before   any   other   authority   or   person   before   whom   such
advocate   is   by   or   under   any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   entitled   to
practice.   Now with the enforcement of Section 30 on June 15, 2011, after
five   decades,   right   to   practice   is   available   as   provided   under   Section   30.
Section   32   contains   a   non­obstante   clause   that   any   Court,   authority   or
person may permit any person, not enrolled as an advocate to appear before
it or him in any particular case.  The advocate has to enroll himself with the
State Bar Council in order to practice law as provided in Section 33 of the
Advocates Act. 
44. Section   34   empowers   the   High   Court   to   frame   rules   and   provide
conditions   subject   to   which   an   advocate   shall   be   permitted   to   practice   in
the High Court and the courts subordinate thereto.  Section 34 is extracted
hereunder:
“34. Power of High Courts to make rules.—
(1)   The   High   Court   may   make   rules   laying   down   the   conditions
subject   to   which   an   advocate   shall   be   permitted   to   practice   in   the
High Court and the courts subordinate thereto.

32
(1A)   The   High   Court   shall   make   rules   for   fixing   and   regulating   by
taxation   or   otherwise   the   fees   payable   as   costs   by   any   party   in
respect  of the fees of his adversary’s advocate upon all proceedings
in the High Court or in any Court subordinate thereto. 
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub­section (1),
the High Court at Calcutta may make rules providing for the holding
of   the   Intermediate   and   the   Financial   examinations   for   articled
clerks   to   be   passed   by   the   persons   referred   to   in   section   58AG   for
the   purpose   of   being   admitted   as   advocates   on   the   State   roll   and
any other matter connected therewith.” 
Section  34  clearly  enables  the  High  Courts   to  prescribe  conditions  to
practice.     The   provisions   contained   in   Section   34(1A)   empowers   the   High
Court to make rules regarding the fees payable as costs.
45. There   can   be   certain   conditions   on   right   to   practice   and   appear   in   a
case   which   can   be   imposed   by   the   High   Court   under   Section   34   such   as
filing fresh   vakalatnama , superseding the previous one that has to be done
as   per   the   High   Court   rules,   if   any   such   provision   has   been   made   by   the
High   Court.     Section   34   contained   in   chapter   IV   of   the   Act   intends   to
regulate   the   practice   of   the   advocate   in   the   High   Court   and   subordinate
courts.     It   does   not   empower   it   to   frame   the   rules   for   disciplinary   control.
Within the purview of section 34 of the Act, a dress   can also be prescribed
for an appearance  in the Court.   The High Court is free to frame the rules
for designation of the Senior Advocates and also the rules on similar pattern
as framed by this Court for Advocates on Record.
46. Chapter   V   deals   with   the   conduct   of   advocates   and   disciplinary
control.  Section 35 deals with the punishment of advocates for misconduct.
Section 35 is extracted hereunder:

33
“35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.—(1) Where on receipt
of   a   complaint   or   otherwise   a   State   Bar   Council   has   reason   to
believe  that   any   advocate  on its  roll has  been  guilty   of  professional
or   other   misconduct,   it   shall   refer   the   case   for   disposal   to   its
disciplinary committee.
(1A)   The   State   Bar   Council   may,   either   of   its   own   motion   or   on
application   made   to   it   by   any   person   interested,   withdraw   a
proceeding pending  before its disciplinary committee and direct the
inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State
Bar Council.
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date
for   the   hearing   of   the   case   and   shall   cause   a   notice   thereof   to   be
given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate­General of the
State.
(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the
advocate   concerned   and   the   Advocate­General   an   opportunity   of
being heard may make any of the following orders, namely:—
(a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at
the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be
filed;
(b) reprimand the advocate;
(c)   suspend   the   advocate   from   practice   for   such   period   as   it   may
deem fit;
(d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
(4)   Where   an   advocate   is   suspended   from   practice   under   clause   (c)
of   sub­section   (3),   he   shall,   during   the   period   of   suspension,   be
debarred   from   practicing   in   any   court   or   before   any   authority   or
person in India.
(5)   Where   any   notice   is   issued   to   the   Advocate­General   under   sub­
section (2), the Advocate­General may appear before the disciplinary
committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any
advocate appearing on his behalf.
[Explanation.—In   this   section,   [section   37   and   section   38],   the
expressions   “Advocate­General”   and   Advocate­General   of   the   State”
shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the Additional
Solicitor General of India.]”
47. Section   36   deals   with   disciplinary   powers   of   Bar   Council   of   India.
Where   a   lawyer   whose   name   is   not   on   any   State   roll   and   a   complaint   is
received   that   he   is   guilty   of   professional   misconduct,   the   Bar   Council   of

34
India   shall   refer   the   case   for   disposal   to   its   disciplinary   committee.     Bar
Council of India can withdraw any pending inquiry before itself and decide
it. Section 36 is extracted hereunder:
“36.   Disciplinary   powers   of   Bar   Council   of   India.—(1)   Where   on
receipt   of   a   complaint   or   otherwise   the   Bar   Council   of   India   has
reason   to   believe   that   any   advocate   whose   name   is   not   entered   on
any State roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it
shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee.
(2)   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   this   Chapter,   the
disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India may, either of its
own   motion   or   on   a   report   by   any   State   Bar   Council   or   on   an
application   made   to   it   by   any   person   interested,   withdraw   for
inquiry   before   itself   any   proceedings   for   disciplinary   action   against
any advocate pending before the disciplinary committee of any State
Bar Council and dispose of the same.
(3)   The   disciplinary   committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India,   in
disposing   of   any   case   under   this   section,   shall   observe,   so   far   as
may be, the procedure laid down in section 35, the references to the
Advocate­General   in   that   section   being   construed   as   references   to
the Attorney­General of India.
(4)   In   disposing   of   any   proceedings   under   this   section   the
disciplinary   committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   may   make   any
order   which   the   disciplinary   committee   of   a   State   Bar   Council   can
make   under   sub­section   (3)   of   section   35,   and   where   any
proceedings have been withdrawn for inquiry before the disciplinary
committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India   the   State   Bar   Council
concerned shall give effect to any such order.”
48. Section   36A   provides   for   the   procedure   on   the   change   in   the
constitution   of  disciplinary   committees.   In  case  of  change,  the  succeeding
committee   may   continue   the   proceedings   from   the   stage   at   which   the
proceedings  were   so   left  by  its   predecessor  committee.     Section  36B  of  the
Advocates   Act   deals   with   disposal   of   the   disciplinary   committee.     A
disciplinary   committee   of   the   State   Bar   Council   has   to   decide   the   case
within a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the complaint or

35
the   date   of   institution   of   proceedings   failing   which   the   proceedings   shall
stand transferred to the Bar Council of India.  Section 37 of the Act provides
that any   person  aggrieved  by  an  order   of  the  disciplinary   committee  of  the
State Bar Council may prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of India.  Section
38 provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court against the order made by
the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India.
49. Section   42   deals   with   powers   of   the   disciplinary   committee.     The
Presiding   Officer   of   the   Court   can   be   summoned   with   permission   of   the
High   Court   to   prove   misconduct   against   advocate   and   proceedings   are
deemed   to   be   judicial   one   as   provided   in   Section   42(2),   which   is   extracted
hereunder:
“42. Powers of disciplinary committee.— (1) The disciplinary committee  of
a Bar Council shall have the same powers as vested in a civil court under
the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908,   in   respect   of   the   following   matters,
namely:—
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining
him on oath;
(b) requiring discovery and production of any documents;
(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(d)   requisitioning   any   public   record   or   copies   thereof   from   any   court   or
office;
(e) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or documents;
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed:
Provided that no such disciplinary committee have the right to require the
attendance of—
(a) any presiding officer of a Court except with the previous sanction of the
High Court to which such court is subordinate; (b) any officer of a revenue
court except with the previous sanction of the State Government.
(2)  All   proceedings   before   a  disciplinary  committee   of   a  Bar  Council   shall
be   deemed   to   be   judicial   proceedings   within   the   meaning   of   sections   193
and   228   of  the   Indian   Penal  Code  and   every  such  disciplinary  committee
shall   be   deemed   to   be   a  civil   court   for  the   purposes   of   sections   480,   482
and 485 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
(3)   For   the   purposes   of   exercising   any   of   the   powers   conferred   by   sub­
section   (1),   a   disciplinary   committee   may   send   to   any   civil   court   in   the
territories   to   which   this   Act   extends,   any   summons   or   other   process,   for

36
the   committee   or   any   commission   which   it   desires   to   issue,   and   the   civil
court   shall   cause   such   process   to   be   served   or   such   commission   to   be
issued, as the case may be, and may enforce any such process as if it were
a process for attendance or production before itself.
(4)   Notwithstanding   the   absence   of   the   Chairman   or   any   member   of   a
disciplinary  committee   on  a   date  fixed   for  the  hearing  of  a  case   before   it,
the   disciplinary   committee   may,   if   it   so   thinks   fit,   hold   or   continue   the
proceedings   on   the   date   so   fixed   and   no   such   proceedings   and   no   order
made   by   the   disciplinary   committee   in   any   such   proceedings   shall   be
invalid   merely   by   reason   of   the   absence   of   the   Chairman   or   member
thereof on any such date:
Provided that no final orders of the nature referred to in sub­section (3) of
section   35   shall   be   made   in   any   proceeding   unless   the   Chairman   and
other members of the disciplinary committee are present.
(5)   Where   no   final   orders   of   the   nature   referred   to   in   sub­section   (3)   of
section 35 can be made in any proceedings in accordance with the opinion
of   the   Chairman   and   the   members   of   a   disciplinary   committee   either   for
want of majority opinion amongst themselves or otherwise, the case, with
their opinion thereon, shall be laid before the Chairman of the Bar Council
concerned or if the Chairman of the Bar Council is acting as the Chairman
or   a   member   of   the   disciplinary   committee,   before   the   Vice­Chairman   of
the   Bar Council,  as  the  case   may  be,  after  such  hearing  as  he  thinks  fit,
shall  deliver  his  opinion and  the  final  order  of  the  disciplinary  committee
shall follow such opinion.”
50. The order of the cost of proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee
is executable as provided in Section 43.  Section 44 deals with the review of
orders   of   the   disciplinary   committee.     Sections   43   and   44   are   extracted
hereunder: 
“43.   Cost   of   proceedings   before   a   disciplinary   committee.—   The
disciplinary committee of a Bar Council may make such order as to
the   cost   of   any   proceedings   before   it   as   it   may   deem   fit   and   any
such order shall be executable as if it were an order—
(a)   in   the   case   of   an   order   of   the   disciplinary   committee   of   the   Bar
Council of India, of the Supreme Court;
(b)   in   the   case   of   an   order   of   the   disciplinary   committee   of   a   State
Bar Council, of the High Court.
44.   Review   of   orders   of   disciplinary   committee.—The   disciplinary
committee   of   a   Bar   Council   may   of   its   own   motion   or   otherwise
review   any   order   within   sixty   days   of   the   date   of   that   order   passed
by it under this Chapter.
Provided that no such order of review of the disciplinary committee
of a State Bar Council shall have effect unless it has been approved
by the Bar Council of India.”

37
51. It is apparent from the aforesaid provisions and scheme of the Act that
Advocates   Act   has   never   intended   to   confer   the   disciplinary   powers   upon
the   High   Court   or   upon   this   Court   except   to   the   extent   dealing   with   an
appeal under Section 38.
52. By   amending   the   High   Court   Rules,   1970,   the   High   Court   of   Madras
has inserted impugned Rules 14(A) to 14(D).  The rules have been framed in
exercise   of   the   power   conferred   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act.
Section 34 of the Act does not confer such a power to frame rules to debar
lawyer   for   professional   misconduct.     The   amendment   made   by   providing
Rule   14(A)(vii)   to   (xii)   is   not   authorized   under   the   Advocate   Act.   The   High
Court has no power to exercise the disciplinary control.       It would amount
to   usurpation   of   the   power   of   Bar   Council   conferred   under   Advocates   Act.
However, the High Court may punish advocate for contempt and then debar
him   from   practicing   for   such   specified   period   as   may   be   permissible   in
accordance with law, but without exercising contempt jurisdiction by way of
disciplinary   control   no   punishment   can   be   imposed.   As   such   impugned
rules   could   not   have   been   framed   within   the   purview   of   Section   34.
Provisions clearly impinge upon the independence of the Bar and encroach
upon the exclusive power conferred upon the Bar Council of the State and
the Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act.  The amendment made to
the Rules 14(A) to 14(D) have to be held to be ultra vires of the power of the
High Court.   

38
53. We   now   analyze   the   proposition   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   various
decisions   relating   to   the   aforesaid   aspect.   In   reference:   Vinay   Chandra
Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584 , this Court rejected the argument that the powers
of suspending and removing the advocate from practice is vested exclusively
in the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council
of   India   and   the   Supreme   Court   is   denuded   of   its   power   to   impose   such
punishment both under Articles 129 and 142.  The Court observed that the
power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 cannot be trammeled in any
way by any statutory provision including the provisions of the Advocates Act
or the Contempt of Courts Act.  This Court imposed the punishment on the
then Chairman of the Bar Council suspended sentence of imprisonment for
a   period   of   six   weeks.     The   sentence   was   suspended   for   four   years   which
may be activated in case the contemnor is convicted for any other offense of
contempt   of   court   within   the   said   period.     The   contemnor   was   also
suspended   from   practicing   as   an   advocate   for   a   period   of   three   years   with
the   consequence   that  all   elective   and   nominated   offices/posts   held   by   him
in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith.
54. However, the decision was held not to be laying down a good law in a
writ petition filed by the  Supreme Court Bar Association  v . Union of India and
another,   (supra).     Supreme   Court   Bar   Association   filed   a   petition   under
Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India   aggrieved   by   the   direction   in   V.C.
Mishra 's case that the contemnor shall stand suspended from practicing as

39
an advocate for a period of three years issued by this Court while invoking
powers under Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution.  A prayer was made
to hold that the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councils set up under the
Advocates Act alone have exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend
or   debar   an   advocate   from   practicing   law   for   professional   or   other
misconduct.     The   question   posed   for   consideration   in   Supreme   Court   Bar
Association   v.   Union   of   India   (supra)   before   this   Court   is   extracted
hereunder:
“5. The only question which we are called upon to decide in this petition is
whether   the   punishment   for   established   contempt   of   court   committed   by
an   advocate   can   include   punishment   to   debar   the   advocates   concerned
from   practice   by   suspending  his   license   (sanad)   for   a   specified   period,   in
exercise   of   its   power   under   Article   129   read   with   Article   142   of   the
Constitution of India." 
The Constitution Bench of Court has observed:
37.   The   nature   and   types   of   punishment   which   a   court   of   record   can
impose,   in   a   case   of   established   contempt,   under   the   common   law   have
now been specifically incorporated in the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in
so   far   as   the   High   Courts   are   concerned   and   therefore   to   the   extent   the
contempt of Courts Act 1971 identifies the nature of types of punishments
which   can   be   awarded   in   the   case   of   established   contempt,   it   does   not
impinge   upon   the   inherent   powers   of   the   High   Court   under   Article   215
either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed.
39.   Suspending   the   license   to   practice   of   any   professional   like   a   lawyer,
doctor, chartered accountant etc. When such a professional is found guilty
of   committing   contempt   of   court,   for   any   specified   period,   is   not   a
recognized   or   accepted   punishment   which   a   court   of   record   either   under
the common law or under the statutory law can impose, on a contemner,
in addition to any of the other recognized punishments.
40.  The suspension of an Advocate from practice and his removal from the
State   roll   of   advocates   are   both   punishments   specifically   provided   for
under the Advocates Act, 1961, for proven "professional misconduct' of an
advocate.  While exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Article 129, the
only   cause   or   matter   before   this   Court   is   regarding   commission   of
contempt of court. There is no cause of professional misconduct, properly
so called, pending before the Court.  This Court, therefore, in exercise of its
jurisdiction   under   Article   129   cannot   take   over   the   jurisdiction   of   the

40
disciplinary committee  of the Bar  Council of the  State or the Bar Council
of   India   to   punish   an   advocate   by   suspending   his   licence,   which
punishment   can   only   be   imposed   after   a   finding   of   'professional
misconduct' is recorded in the manner prescribed under the Advocates Act
and the Rules framed thereunder.
41.   When   this   Court   is   seized   of   a   matter   of   contempt   of   court   by   an
advocate,   there   is   no   "case,   cause   or   matter"   before   the   Supreme   Court
regarding his "professional  misconduct" even though, in a given case, the
contempt committed by an advocate may  also amount  to  an abuse  of the
privilege granted to an advocate by virtue of the license to practice law but
no  issue   relating  to  his   suspension  from  practice   is  the  subject  matter  of
the case. The powers of this Court, under Article 129 read with Article 142
of   the   Constitution,   being   supplementary   powers   have   "to   be   used   in
exercise of its jurisdiction" in the case under consideration by this Court.
Moreover,   a   case   of   contempt   of   court   is   not   stricto   sensu   a   cause   or   a
matter between   the  parties   inter se.   It  is   a  matter between  the  court  and
the   contemner.   It   is   not,   strictly   speaking,   tried   as   an   adversarial
litigation.   The   party,   which   brings   the   contumacious   conduct   of   the
contemner   to   the   notice   of   the   court,   whether   a   private   person   or   the
subordinate court, is only an informant and does not have the status of a
litigant in the contempt of Court case.
42. The contempt of court is a special jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly
and with caution, whenever an act adversely effects the administration of
justice   or   which   tends   to   impede   its   course   or   tends   to   shake   public
confidence   in   the   judicial   institutions.   This   jurisdiction   may   also   be
exercised when the act complained of adversely effects the Majesty of Law
or dignity of the courts. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold
the   majesty   and   dignity   of   the   Courts   of   law.   It   is   an   unusual   type   of
jurisdiction combining "the jury, the judge and the hangman" and it is so
because   the   court   is   not   adjudicating   upon   any   claim   between   litigating
parties.   This   jurisdiction   is   not   exercised   to   protect   the   dignity   of   an
individual   judge   but   to   protect   the   administration   of   justice   from   being
maligned.   In   the   general   interest   of   the   community,   it   is   imperative   that
the   authority   of   courts   should   not   be   imperiled   and   there   should   be   no
unjustifiable   interference   in   the   administration   of   justice.   It   is   a   matter
between the  court and the  contemner and third parties cannot  intervene.
It   is   exercised   in   a   summary   manner   in   aid   of   the   administration   of
justice, the majesty  of law and  the dignity of the  courts. No such act can
be permitted which may have the tendency to shake the public confidence
in the fairness and impartiality of the administration of justice.
43.   The   power   of   the   Supreme   Court   to   punish   for   contempt   of   court,
though   quite   wide,   is   yet   limited   and   cannot   be   expanded   to   include   the
power   to   determine   whether   an   advocate   is   also   guilty   of   "Professional
misconduct"   in   a   summary   manner,   giving   a   go   bye   to   the   procedure
prescribed   under   the   Advocates   Act.   The   power   to   do   complete   justice
under  Article 142 is in a way, corrective power, which gives  preference to
equity   over   law   but   it   cannot   be   used   to   deprive   a   professional   lawyer   of
the   due   process   contained   in   the   Advocates   Act   1961   by   suspending   his
license   to   practice   in   a   summary   manner,   while   dealing   with   a   case   of
contempt of court. 

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44. In Re, V.C. Mishra case, while imposing the punishment of suspended
simple   imprisonment,   the   Bench,   as   already   noticed,   punished   the
contemner also by suspending his license to practice as an advocate for a
specified   period.   The  Bench  dealing with  that  aspect   opined:   (SCC p.624,
para 51)
“It is not disputed that suspension of the advocate from practice and
his   removal   from   the   State   roll   of   advocates   are   both   punishments.
There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of punishment that
this Court may award while exercising its contempt jurisdiction and
the said punishments can be the punishments the Court may impose
while exercising the said jurisdiction.”
45. In taking this view, the Bench relied upon Articles 129 and 142 of the
Constitution   besides   Section   38   of   the   Advocates   Act,   1961.   The   Bench
observed: (SCC p.624, paras 49­50)
"Secondly, it would also mean that for any act of contempt of court, if
it   also   happens   to   be   an   act   of   professional   misconduct   under   the
Bar Council of India Rules, the courts including this Court, will have
no   power   to   take   action   since   the   Advocates   Act   confers   exclusive
power   for   taking   action   for   such   conduct   on   the   disciplinary
committees of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India, as
the case may be. Such a proposition of law on the face of it observes
rejection for the simple reason that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
State   Bar   council   and   the   Bar   Council   of   India   to   take   action   for
professional   misconduct   is   different   from   the   jurisdiction   of   the
Courts   to   take   action   against   the   advocates   for   the   contempt   of
Court. The said jurisdiction co­exist independently of each other. The
action taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action under the
other jurisdiction.”
The contention is also misplaced for yet another and equally, if
not more, important reason. In the matter of disciplinary jurisdiction
under   the   Advocates   Act,   this   Court   is   constituted   as   the   final
Appellate authority under Section 38 of the act as pointed out earlier.
In   that   capacity,   this   court   can   impose   any   of   the   punishments
mentioned in Section 35(3) of the Act including that of removal of the
name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspending him from
practice.   If   that   be   so,   there   is   no   reason   why   this   court   while
exercising   its   contempt   jurisdiction   under   Article   129   read   with
Article   142   cannot   impose   any   of   the   said   punishments.   The
punishment so imposed will not only be not against the provisions of
any statute  but  in  conformity  with  the  substantive  provisions  of  the
advocates   Act   and   for   conduct   which   is   both   a   professional
misconduct   as   well   as   the   contempt   of   Court.   The   argument   has,
therefore, to be rejected."
46. These  observations,  as we shall presently demonstrate and we say so
with utmost respect, are too widely stated and do not bear closer scrutiny.
After recognising that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council
and the Bar Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is
different   from   the   jurisdiction   of   the   courts   to   take   action   against   the
advocates for the contempt of court, how could the court invest itself with

42
the jurisdiction of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council to punish
the   advocate   concerned   for   "professional   misconduct"   in   addition   to
imposing   the   punishment   of   suspended   sentence   of   imprisonment   for
committing contempt of court.
57.   In   a   given   case,   an   advocate   found   guilty   of   committing   contempt   of
court   may   also   be   guilty   of   committing   "professional   misconduct"
depending   upon   the   gravity   or   nature   of   his   contumacious   conduct,   but
the two jurisdictions are separate and distinct and exercisable by different
forums   by   following   separate   and   distinct   procedures.   The   power   to
punish an Advocate, by suspending his licence or by removal of his name
from the roll of the State Bar Council, for proven professional misconduct,
vests exclusively in  the statutory authorities created  under the  Advocates
Act, 1961, while the jurisdiction to punish him for committing contempt of
court vests exclusively in the courts.
58.  After the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961, exclusive power
for   punishing   an   advocate   for   "professional   misconduct   "has   been
conferred   on   the   State   Bar   Council   concerned   and   the   Bar   Council   of
India.   That   Act   contains   a   detailed   and   complete   mechanism   for
suspending   or   revoking   the   license   of   an   advocate   for   his   "professional
misconduct'. Since, the suspension or revocation of license of an advocate
has   not   only   civil   consequences   but   also   penal   consequences,   the
punishment   being   in   the   nature   of   penalty,   the   provisions   have   to   be
strictly   construed.   Punishment   by   way   of   suspending   the   license   of   an
advocate   can   only   be   imposed   by   the   competent   statutory   body   after   the
charge is established against the Advocate in a manner prescribed by the
Act and the Rules framed thereunder.
70. In   Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar & Ors., (1975) 2 SCC
702 ,   a   Seven   Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   analyzed   the   scheme   of   the
Advocates Act 1961 and inter alia observed: (SCC p.709, para 24)
"24.   The   scheme   and   the   provisions   of   the   Act   indicate   that   the
Constitution of State Bar Councils and Bar Council of India is for one
of   the   principal   purposes   to   see   that   the   standards   of   professional
conduct   and   etiquette   laid   down   by   the   Bar   Council   of   India   are
observed and preserved. The Bar Councils, therefore, entertain cases
of misconduct against advocates. The Bar Councils are  to safeguard
the rights, privilege, and interests of advocates. The Bar Council is a
body   corporate.   The   disciplinary   committees   are   constituted   by   the
Bar Council. The Bar Council is not the same body as its disciplinary
committee.   One   of   the   principal   functions   of   the   Bar   Council   in
regard   to   standards   of   professional   conduct   and   etiquette   of
advocates   is   to   receive   complaints   against   advocates   and   if   the   Bar
Council   has   reason   to   believe   that   any   advocate   has   been   guilty   of
professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to
its disciplinary committee. The Bar Councils of a State may also of its
own   motion   if   it   has   reason   to   believe   that   any   advocate   has   been
guilty   of   professional   or   other   misconduct   it   shall   refer   the   case   for
disposal to its disciplinary committee. It is apparent that a state Bar
Council   not   only   receives   a   complaint   but   is   required   to   apply   its
mind   to   find   out   whether   there   is   any   reason   to   believe   that   any
advocate   has   been   guilty   of   professional   or   other   misconduct.   The

43
Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned belief. The Bar Council
has a very important part to play, first in the reception of complaints,
second,   informing   reasonable   belief   of   guilt   of   professional   or   other
misconduct   and   finally   in   making   reference   of   the   case   to   its
disciplinary   committee.   The   initiation   of   the   proceeding   before   the
disciplinary   committee   is   by   the   Bar   Council   of   a   State.   A   most
significant   feature   is   that   no   litigant   and   no   member   of   the   public
can   straightway   commence   disciplinary   proceedings   against   an
advocate.   It   is   the   Bar   Council   of   a   State   which   initiates   the
disciplinary proceedings.
71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961 with effect
from   19­5­1961,   matters   connected   with   the   enrolment   of   advocates   as
also   their   punishment   for   professional   misconduct   is   governed   by   the
provisions of that Act only. Since, the jurisdiction to grant license to a law
graduate to practice as an advocate vest exclusively in the Bar Councils of
the State concerned, the jurisdiction to suspend his license for a specified
term or to revoke it also vests in the same body.
72.   The   letters   patent   of   the   Chartered   High   Courts   as   well   of   the   other
High   Courts   earlier   did   vest   power   in   those   High   Courts   to   admit   an
advocate   to   practice.   The   power   of   suspending   from   practice   being
incidental  to  that  of  admitting  to  practice  also  vested  in  the High  Courts.
However, by virtue of Section 50 of the Advocates Act, with effect from the
date when a State Bar Council is constituted under the Act, the provisions
of the Letters patent of any High Court and "of any other law" in so far as
they relate to the admission and enrolment of a legal practitioner or confer
on   the   legal   practitioner   the   right   to   practice   in   any   court   or   before   any
authority or a person as also the provisions relating to the "suspension or
removal"   of   legal   practitioners,   whether   under   the   letters   patent   of   any
High   Court   or   of   any   other   law.   have   been   repealed.   These   powers   now
vest exclusively, under the Advocates Act, in the Bar Council of the State
concerned.   Even   in   England,   the   courts   of   justice   are   now   relieved   from
disbarring advocates from practice after the power of calling to the Bar has
been delegated to the Inns of Court. The power to disbar the advocate also
now   vests   exclusively   in   the   Inns   of   Court   and   a   detailed   procedure   has
been laid therefor. 
76.   This Court is indeed the final appellate authority under Section 38 of
the   Act   but   we   are   not   persuaded   to   agree   with   the   view   that   this   Court
can   in   exercise   of   its   appellate   jurisdiction,   under   Section   38   of   the   Act,
impose   one   of   the   punishments,   prescribed   under   that   Act,   while
punishing   a   contemner   advocate   in   a   contempt   case.   'Professional
misconduct' of the advocate concerned is not a matter directly in issue in
the contempt of court case.  While dealing with the contempt of court case ,
this   court   is   obliged   to   examine   whether   the   conduct   complained   of
amounts to contempt of court and if the answer is in the affirmative, then
to   sentence   the   contemner   for   contempt   of   court   by   imposing   any   of   the
recognised   and   accepted   punishments   for   committing   contempt   of   court.
Keeping   in   view   the   elaborate   procedure   prescribed   under   the   Advocates
Act   1961   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   it   follows   that   a   complaint   of
professional   misconduct   is   required   to   be   tried   by   the   disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council, like the trial of a criminal case by a court of
law and an advocate may be punished on the basis of evidence led before

44
the   disciplinary   committee   of   the   Bar   Council   after   being   afforded   an
opportunity   of   hearing.   The   delinquent   advocate   may   be   suspended   from
practice   for   a   specified   period   or   even   removed   from   the   rolls   of   the
advocates   or   imposed   any   other   punishment   as   provided   under   the   Act.
The   inquiry   is   a   detailed   and   elaborate   one   and   is   not   of   a   summary
nature.   It   is,   therefore,   not   permissible   for   this   court   to   punish   an
advocate   for   "professional   misconduct"   in   exercise   of   the   appellate
jurisdiction   by   converting   itself   as   the   statutory   body   exercising   "original
jurisdiction". Indeed, if in a given case the Bar Council concerned on being
apprised   of   the   contumacious   and   blameworthy   conduct   of   the   advocate
by the High Court or this Court does not take any action against the said
advocate,   this   court   may   well   have   the   jurisdiction   in   exercise   of   its
appellate  powers  under Section 38 of the Act read with Article 142  of the
Constitution   to   proceed   suo   moto   and   send   for   the   records   from   the   Bar
Council   and   pass   appropriate   orders   against   the   advocate   concerned.   In
an   appropriate   case,   this   Court   may   consider   the   exercise   of   appellate
jurisdiction   even   suo   moto   provided   there   is   some   cause   pending   before
the Bar Council  concerned, and the Bar Council  does "not act" or fails  to
act, by sending for the record of that cause and pass appropriate orders.
77.   However,   the   exercise   of   powers   under   the   contempt   jurisdiction
cannot be confused with the appellate jurisdiction under Section 38 of the
Act.   The   two   jurisdictions   are   separate   and   distinct.   We   are,   therefore,
unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the contrary view expressed
by   the   Bench   in   V.C.   Mishra   case   because   in   that   case,   the   Bar   Council
had   not   declined   to   deal   with   the   matter   and   take   appropriate   action
against the advocate concerned. Since there was no cause pending before
the Bar Council, this court  could not  exercise its appellate  jurisdiction in
respect   of   a   matter   which   was   never   under   consideration   of   the   Bar
Council.
78.   Thus,   to   conclude   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   this   Court   cannot   in
exercise   of   its   jurisdiction   under   Article   142   read   with   Article   129   of   the
Constitution,   while   punishing   a   contemner   for   committing   contempt   of
court,   also   impose   a   punishment   of   suspending   his   license   to   practice,
where   the   contemner   happens   to   be   an   Advocate.   Such   a   punishment
cannot even be imposed by taking recourse to the appellate powers under
Section 38  of  the  Act  while  dealing  with  a  case  of contempt  of court  (and
not an appeal relating to professional misconduct as such). To that extent,
the   law   laid   down   in   Vinay   Chandra   Mishra,   Re   is   not   good   law   and   we
overrule it .
79.   An   Advocate   who   is   found   guilty   of   contempt   of   court   may   also,   as
already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a given case but it
is for the Bar Council  of the State or Bar Council  of  India to punish that
Advocate by either debarring him from practice or suspending his license,
as   may   be   warranted,   in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each   case .   The
learned   Solicitor   General   informed   us   that   there   have   been   cases   where
the   Bar   Council   of   India   taking   note   of   the   contumacious   and
objectionable   conduct   of   an   advocate,   had   initiated   disciplinary
proceedings   against   him   and   even   punished   him   for   "professional
misconduct",   on   the   basis   of   his   having   been   found   guilty   of   committing
contempt of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of
the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be when apprised of the

45
established contumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by
this Court, would rise to the occasion, and take appropriate action against
such   an   advocate.   Under   Article   144   of   the   Constitution   "all   authorities
civil   and   judicial,   in   the  territory  of  India  shall  act   in  aid   of  the  Supreme
Court". The Bar Council which performs a public duty and is charged with
the   obligation   to   protect   the   dignity   of   the   profession   and   maintain
professional   standards   and   etiquette   is   also   obliged   to   act   "in   aid   of   the
Supreme Court". It must, whenever, facts warrant rise to the occasion and
discharge   its   duties   uninfluenced   by   the   position   of   the   contemner
advocate.   It   must   act   in   accordance   with   the   prescribed   procedure,
whenever   its   attention   is   drawn   by   this   Court   to   the   contumacious   and
unbecoming   conduct   of   an   advocate   which   has   the   tendency   to   interfere
with due administration of justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to
draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional
misconduct   of   a   contemner   advocate   to   enable   the   State   Bar   Council   to
proceed   in   the   manner   prescribed   by   the   Act   and   the   rules   framed
thereunder.   There   is   no   justification   to   assume   that   the   Bar   Councils
would   not  rise   to   the  occasion,   as   they  are  equally  responsible   to   uphold
the   dignity   of   the   courts   and   the   majesty   of   law   and   prevent   any
interference   in   the   administration   of   justice.   Learned   counsel   for   the
parties   present   before   us   do   not   dispute   and   rightly   so   that   whenever   a
court   of   record,   records   its   findings   about   the   conduct   of   an   Advocate
while   finding   him   guilty   of   committing   contempt   of   court   and   desires   or
refers   the   matter   to   be   considered   by   the   Bar   Council   concerned,
appropriate   action   should   be   initiated   by   the   Bar   Council   concerned   in
accordance with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and
to   uphold   the   majesty   of   law   and   professional   standards   and   etiquette.
Nothing   is   more   destructive   of   public   confidence   in   the   administration   of
justice   than   incivility,   rudeness   or  disrespectful   conduct   on  the   part   of   a
counsel towards the court or disregard by the court of the privileges of the
bar.   In   case   the   Bar   Council,   even   after   receiving   'reference'   from   the
court, fails to take action against the advocate concerned, this court might
consider   invoking   its   powers   under   Section   38   of   the   Act   by   sending   for
the   record   of   the   proceedings   from   the   Bar   Council   and   passing
appropriate   orders.   Of   Course,   the   appellate   powers   under   Section   38
would   be   available   to   this   Court   only   and   not   to   the   High   Courts.   We,
however, hope that such a situation would not arise.
80.  In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, the
prevent   the   contemner  advocate   to  appear  before   it  till   he  purges   himself
of   the   contempt   but   that   is   much   different   from   suspending   or   revoking
his   license   or   debarring   him   to   practice   as   an   advocate.   In   a   case   of
contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an
Advocate­on­Record, this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme
Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate­an­
Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to
grant   the   privilege   includes   the   power   to   revoke   or   suspend   it.   The
withdrawal   of   that   privilege,   however,   does   not   amount   to   suspending   or
revoking   his   license   to   practice   as   an   advocate   in   other   courts   or
Tribunals .”
(emphasis supplied)

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The Court has observed that in a given case an Advocate found guilty
of   committing   contempt   of   court   may   at   the   same   time   be   guilty   of
committing   “professional   misconduct”   but   the   two   jurisdictions   are
separate, distinct and exercisable by different forums by following  different
procedures.     Exclusive   power   for   punishing   an   Advocate   for   professional
misconduct is with Bar Councils.  Punishment for suspending the license of
an   Advocate   can   only   be   imposed   by   a   competent  statutory   body.     Relying
upon   the   Seven­Judges   Bench   decision   in   Bar   Council   of   Maharashtra   v.
M.V. Dabholkar & Ors.   (supra) that under Advocates Act the power to grant
licenses   is   with   Bar   Council,   the   jurisdiction   to   suspend   the   licence   or   to
debar him vests in the same body.   Though appeal lies to this Court under
Section   38,   it   cannot   convert   it   to   statutory   body   exercising   "original
jurisdiction".   This Court,  in  the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 142
and 129 while punishing in the contempt of court, cannot suspend a licence
to practice.   The Court further held that it is possible for this Court or the
High Court to prevent contemnor Advocate to appear before it till he purges
himself   of   contempt   but   that   is   different   from   suspending   or   revoking   his
licence   to   practice   or   debarring   him   from   practice   for   misconduct.     This
Court   also   held   in   case   of   Advocate   on   Record   that   the   Supreme   Court
possesses   jurisdiction   under   its   rules   to   withdraw   the   privilege   to   practice
as   Advocate   on   record   as   that   privilege   is   conferred   by   this   Court.     The
withdrawal of that privilege does not tantamount to suspending or revoking
the licence.

47
55. Shri Mohan Parasaran learned senior counsel has relied on the matter
of  Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr.  (supra) in which the question was
whether an Advocate found guilty of contempt of court can appear in court
until   and   unless   he   purges   himself   of   contempt,   the   court   held   that   an
Advocate found guilty of contempt of court must purge himself before being
permitted   to   appear.     Rule   11   of   the   Rules   framed   by   the   High   Court   of
Kerala under section 34 (1) of Advocates Act reads thus:
"11. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court shall be
permitted   to   appear,   act   or   plead   in   any   Court   unless   he   has   purged
himself of the contempt."
This Court has relied upon in   Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union
of   India   (supra)   in   Pravin   C.   Shah   v.   K.A.   Mohd.   Ali   &   Anr.   (supra)   and
observed thus:
16.   Rule   11   of   the   Rules   is   not   a   provision   intended   for   the   Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of the State r the Bar Council of India. It is a
matter   entirely   concerning   the   dignity   and   the   orderly   functioning   of   the
courts.   The   right   of   the   advocate   to   practice   envelopes   a  lot   of   acts   to   be
performed   by   him   in   the   discharge   of   his   professional   duties.   Apart   form
appearing in the courts he can be consulted by his clients, he can give his
legal   opinion   whenever   sought   for,   he   can   draft   instruments,   pleadings,
affidavits   or   any   other   documents,   he   can   participate   in   any   conference
involving legal discussions etc.  Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the acts
done   by   an   advocate   during   his   practice   except   his   performance   insides
the   court.   Conduct   in   court   is   a   matter   concerning   the   court   and   hence
the   Bar   Council   cannot   claim   that   what   should   happen   inside   the   court
could   also   be   regulated   by   the   Bar   Council   in   exercise   of   its   disciplinary
powers.   The right to practice, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to
appear  and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   may   be   a   specie.   But   the   right   to
appear   and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   is   a   matter   on   which   the   court
must   have   the   major   supervisory   power.   Hence   the   court   cannot   be
divested   of   the   control   or  supervision   of   the   court   merely  because   it   may
involve the right of an advocate.
17.   When   the   rules   stipulate   that   a   person   who   committed   contempt   of
court   cannot   have   the   unreserved   right   to   continue   to   appear   and   plead
and   conduct   cases   in   the   courts   without   any   qualm   or   remorse,   the   Bar
Council cannot overrule such a regulation concerning the orderly conduct

48
of court  proceedings.   Courts  of law  are structured in such a design  as to
evoke   respect   and   reverence   for   the   majesty   of   law   and   justice.   The
machinery  for   dispensation   of   justice   according   to  law   is   operated   by   the
court.   Proceedings   inside   the   courts   are   always   expected   to   be   held   in   a
dignified   and   orderly   manner.   The   very   sight   of   an   advocate,   who   was
found   guilty   of   contempt   of   court   on   the   previous   hour,   standing   in   the
court   and  arguing  a  case   or  cross­examining  a  witness   on  the  same   day,
unaffected   by   the   contemptuous   behavior   he   hurled   at   the   court,   would
erode   the   dignity   of   the   court   and   even   corrode   the   majesty   of   it   besides
impairing   the   confidence   of   the   public   in   the   efficacy  of   the   institution   of
the   courts.   This   necessitates   vesting   of   power   with   the   High   Court   to
formulate   rules   for   regulating   the   proceeding   inside   the   court   including
the conduct of advocates during such proceedings. That power should not
be   confused   with   the   right   to   practice   law.   While   the   Bar   Council   can
exercise control over the latter the High Court should be in control of the
former.
18.   In   the   above   context,   it   is   useful   to   quote   the   following   observations
made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Prayag Das vs.
Civil Judge, Bulandshahr and ors. AIR 1974 All 133 : (AIR p.136, para 9)
" The High Court has a power to regulate the appearance of advocates
in courts.   The right to practise and the right to appear in courts are
not synonymous. An advocate may carry on chamber practice or even
practise   in   courts   in   various   other   ways,   e.g.   drafting   and   filing   of
pleadings   and   Vakalatnama   for   performing   those   acts.   For   that
purpose,   his   physical   appearance   in   courts   may   not   at   all   be
necessary. For the purpose of regulating his appearance in courts the
High Court should be the appropriate authority to make  rules and on
a proper construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it must be
inferred   that   the   High   Court   has   the   power   to   make   rules   for
regulating   the   appearance   of   Advocates   and   proceedings   inside   the
courts. Obviously, the High Court is the only appropriate authority to
be entrusted with this responsibility. "
19.   In   our   view,   the   legal   position   has   been   correctly   delineated   in   the
above   statements   made   by   the   Allahabad   High   Court.   The   context   for
making   those   statements   was   that   an   advocate   questioned   the   powers   of
the   High   Court   in   making   dress   regulations   for   the   advocates   while
appearing in courts.
20.   Lord   Denning   had   observed   as   follows   in   Hadkinson   vs.   Hadkinson
1952 (2) All ER 567: (All ER p.575B­C)
"…I   am   of   the   opinion   that   the   fact   that   a   party   to   a   cause   has
disobeyed   an   order   of   the   court   is   not   of   itself   a   bar   to   his   being
heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it
impedes   the   course   of   justice   in   the   cause,   by   making   it   more
difficult   for  the   court   to   ascertain   the   truth   or  to   enforce   the   orders
which   it   may   make,   then   the   court   may   in   its   discretion   refuse   to
hear   him   until   the   impediment   is   removed   or   good   reason   is   shown
why it should not be removed. "
21.   The   observations   can   apply   to   the   courts   in   India   without   any   doubt

49
and   at  the  same   time  without  impeding the  disciplinary  powers   vested  in
the Bar Councils under the Advocate Act.
35.   It   is   still   open   to   the   respondent   Advocate   to   purge   himself   of   the
contempt   in   the   manner   indicated   above.   But   until   that   process   is
completed respondent Advocate cannot act or plead in any court situated
within   the   domain   of   the   Kerala   High   Court,   including   the   subordinate
courts thereunder. The Registrar of the High Court of Kerala shall intimate
all the courts about this interdict as against the respondent­advocates.”
(emphasis supplied)
56. The  decision   in   Pravin   C.   Shah   (supra)  operates   when  an   Advocate   is
found guilty of committing contempt of court and then he can be debarred
from   appearing   in   court   until   he   purges   himself   of   contempt   as   per
guidelines laid down therein, however, the power to suspend enrolment and
debarring   from   appearance   are   different   from   each   other.     In   case   of
debarment, enrolment continues but a person cannot appear in court once
he is guilty of contempt of court until he purges himself as provided in the
rule. Debarment due to having been found guilty of contempt of court is not
punishment of suspending the license for a specified period or permanently
removing him from the roll of Advocates.  While guilty of contempt his name
still   continuous   on   the   roll   of   concerned   Bar   Council   unless   removed   or
suspended   by   Bar   Council   by   taking   appropriate   disciplinary   proceedings.
The observations made by Lord Denning in  Hadkinson v. Hadkindon  (supra)
was also a case of disobedience of court order and the Court may refuse to
hear   him   until   impediment   is   removed   or   good   reason   to   remove
impediment exist.
57. In  Ex­ Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India & Anr.  (supra) while holding

50
that advocates have no right to go on ‘strike’, the Court observed:
  "20. Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of every Advocate
who has accepted a brief to attend the trial, even though it may go on day
to day and for a prolonged period. It is also settled law that a lawyer who
has accepted a brief cannot refuse to attend Court because a boycott call
is given by the Bar Association. It is settled law that it is unprofessional as
well   as   unbecoming   for   a   lawyer   who   has   accepted   a   brief   to   refuse   to
attend   Court   even   in   pursuance   of   a   call   for  strike   or  boycott   by   the   Bar
Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that Courts are under an
obligation   to   hear   and   decide   cases   brought   before   them   and   cannot
adjourn matters merely because lawyers are on strike. The law is that it is
the   duty   and   obligation   of   Courts   to   go   on   with   matters   or   otherwise   it
would   tantamount   to   becoming   privy   to   the   strike.   It   is   also   settled   law
that   if   a   resolution   is   passed   by   Bar   Associations   expressing   want   of
confidence in judicial officers, it would amount to scandalizing the Courts
to undermine its authority and thereby the advocates will have committed
contempt   of   Court.   Lawyers   have   known,   at   least   since   Mahabir   Singh
case (supra) that if they participate in a boycott or a strike, their action is
ex­facie bad in view of the declaration of law by this Court. A lawyer's duty
is to boldly ignore a call for strike or boycott of Court/s. Lawyers have also
known,   at   least   since   Ramon   Services   case,   that   the   advocates   would   be
answerable   for   the   consequences   suffered   by   their   clients   if   the   non­
appearance was solely on grounds of a strike call. 
22.   It   was   expected   that   having   known   the   well­settled   law   and   having
seen that repeated strikes and boycotts have shaken the confidence of the
public   in   the   legal   profession   and   affected   the   administration   of   justice,
there   would   be   self­regulation.   The   abovementioned   interim   order   was
passed in the hope that with self­restraint and self­regulation the lawyers
would  retrieve   their  profession  from  lost  social   respect.   The  hope   has   not
fructified.  Unfortunately, strikes and boycott calls are becoming a frequent
spectacle.   Strikes,   boycott   calls,   and   even   unruly   and   unbecoming
conduct   are   becoming   a   frequent   spectacle.   On   the   slightest   pretense
strikes   and/or   boycott   calls   are   resorted   to.   The   judicial   system   is   being
held to ransom.  Administration of law and  justice is threatened. The  rule
of law is undermined.
33. The only exception to the general rule set out above appears to be the
item   ( III ).   We   accept   that   in   such   cases   a   strong   protest   must   be   lodged.
We   remain   of   the   view   that   strikes   are   illegal   and   that   courts   must   now
take a very serious view of strikes and calls for boycott. However, as stated
above,   lawyers   are   part   and   parcel   of   the   system   of   administration   of
justice.   A   protest   on   an   issue   involving   dignity,   integrity,   and
independence   of   the   Bar   and   judiciary,   provided   it   does   not   exceed   one
day, may be overlooked by courts, who may turn a blind eye for that one
day.
34.   One   last   thing   which   must   be   mentioned   is   that   the   right   of
appearance in courts is  still within the control and  jurisdiction of courts.
Section   30   of   the   Advocates   Act   has   not   been   brought   into   force   and
rightly   so.   Control   of   conduct   in   Court   can   only   be   within   the   domain   of
courts.   Thus Article 145 of the Constitution of India gives to the Supreme
Court and Section 34 of the Advocates Act gives to the  High Court power

51
to   frame   rules   including   rules   regarding   condition   on   which   a   person
(including  an  advocate)  can  practice   in   the  Supreme  Court   and/or in  the
High   Court   and   courts   subordinate   thereto.   Many   courts   have   framed
rules in this behalf.  Such a rule would be valid and binding on all.  Let the
Bar take note that unless self­restraint is exercised, courts may now have
to consider framing specific  rules  debarring advocates, guilty of contempt
and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the
courts.   Such   a   rule   if   framed   would   not   have   anything   to   do   with   the
disciplinary   jurisdiction   of   Bar   Councils.   It   would   be   concerning   the
dignity and orderly functioning of the courts.    The right of the advocate to
practice envelopes a lot of acts to be performed by him in the discharge of
his   professional   duties.   Apart   from   appearing   in   the   courts   he   can   be
consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion whenever sought for,
he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits or any other documents, he
can participate in any conference involving legal discussions, he can work
in any  office or firm as a legal officer,  he can appear for clients before an
arbitrator or arbitrators etc.  Such a rule would have nothing to do with all
the acts done by an advocate during his practice. He may even file vakalat
on   behalf   of   a   client   even   though   his   appearance   inside   the   court   is   not
permitted.   Conduct   in   court   is   a   matter   concerning   the   court   and   hence
the   Bar   Council   cannot   claim   that   what   should   happen   inside   the   court
could   also   be   regulated   by   them   in   the   exercise   of   their   disciplinary
powers.  The right to practice, no doubt, is the genus of which the right to
appear  and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   may   be   a   specie.   But   the   right   to
appear   and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   is   a   matter   on   which   the   court
must   and   does   have   major   supervisory   and   controlling   power.   Hence
courts cannot be and are not divested of control or supervision of conduct
in court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate.  A rule can
stipulate   that   a   person   who   has   committed   contempt   of   court   or   has
behaved unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will not have the
right   to   continue   to   appear   and   plead   and   conduct   cases   in   courts.   The
Bar   Councils   cannot   overrule   such   a   regulation   concerning   the   orderly
conduct of court proceedings . On the contrary, it will be their duty to see
that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts of law are structured in such
a   design   as   to   evoke   respect   and   reverence   to   the   majesty   of   law   and
justice.   The   machinery   for   dispensation   of   justice   according   to   the   law   is
operated   by   the   court.   Proceedings   inside   the   courts   are   always   expected
to   be   held   in   a   dignified   and   orderly   manner.     The   very   sight   of   an
advocate,   who   is   guilty   of   contempt   of   court   or   of   unbecoming   or
unprofessional   conduct,   standing   in   the   court   would   erode   the   dignity   of
the court and even corrode its majesty besides impairing the confidence of
the   public   in   the   efficacy   of   the   institution   of   the   courts.     The   power   to
frame   such   rules   should   not   be   confused   with   the   right   to   practice   law.
While  the  Bar  Council   can  exercise  control  over the  latter,  the  courts  are
in   control   of   the   former .   This   distinction   is   clearly   brought   out   by   the
difference in language in Section 49 of the Advocates Act on the one hand
and   Article   145   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and   Section   34(1)   of   the
Advocates Act on the other. Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council
to  frame   rules  laying  down  conditions  subject  to  which  an  advocate  shall
have   a   right   to   practise   i.e.   do   all   the   other  acts   set   out   above.   However,
Article   145   of   the   Constitution   of   India   empowers   the   Supreme   Court   to
make   rules   for   regulating   this   practice   and   procedure   of   the   court
including   inter­alia   rules   as   to   persons   practicing   before   this   Court.
Similarly, Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers High Courts to frame

52
rules,   inter­alia   to   lay   down   conditions   on   which   an   advocate   shall   be
permitted to practice in courts. Article 145 of the Constitution of India and
Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act   clearly   show   that   there   is   no   absolute
right to an advocate to appear in a court. An advocate appears in a court
subject   to   such   conditions   as   are   laid   down   by   the   court.   It   must   be
remembered that Section 30 has not been brought into force and this also
shows that there is no absolute right to appear in a court. Even if Section
30   were   to   be   brought   into   force   control   of   proceedings   in   Court   will
always remain with the Court. Thus even then the right to appear in Court
will   be   subject   to   complying   with   conditions   laid   down   by   Courts   just   as
practice   outside   Courts   would   be   subject   to   conditions   laid   down   by   the
Bar   Council   of   India.   There   is   thus   no   conflict   or   clash   between   other
provisions of the Advocates Act on the one hand and Section 34 or Article
145 of the Constitution of India on the other .
45.   Further,   appropriate   rules   are   required   to   be   framed   by   the   High
Courts   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act   by   making   it   clear   that
strike   by   advocate/advocates   would   be   considered   interference   with   the
administration   of   justice   and   advocate/advocates   concerned   may   be
barred from practicing before courts in a district or in the High Court."
(emphasis supplied)
The   question   involved   in   the   aforesaid   case   was   as   to   strike   and
boycott   of   Courts   by   Lawyers.   In   that   context   argument   was   raised   that
such an act tantamounts to  contempt of court and the court must punish
the party coercing others also to desist from appearance.  The Court cannot
be privy to boycott or strike.  The decision in  Supreme Court Bar Association
v. Union of India  (supra) has been reiterated.  The Court pointed out that let
bar   take   notice   of   the   fact  that   unless   self­restraint  is   exercised,   the   court
may   have   to   frame   rules   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act   debarring
advocates   guilty   of   contempt   of   court/   unprofessional   or   unbecoming
conduct from appearing  in Courts.  The  Court observed that in case  of Bar
Council   fail   to   act,   Court   may   be   compelled   to   frame   appropriate   Rules
under Section  34 of the Act.   The Court has observed about the rules that
may   be   framed   but   not   on   the   validity   of   rules   that   actually   have   been

53
framed   and   takes   away   disciplinary   control   of   Bar   Council.   The   power   to
debar   due   to   contempt   of   court   is   a   different   aspect   than   suspension   of
enrolment or debarment by way of disciplinary measure.  This Court did not
observe   that   decision   in   Supreme   Court   Bar   Association   v.   Union   of   India
(supra) is bad in law for any reason at the same time Court has relied upon
the same in   Ex­Capt. Harish Uppal   (supra), and laid down that Bar Council
can   exercise   control   on   right   to   practice.     The   Court   also   observed   that
power   to   control   proceedings   within   the   Court   cannot   be   affected   by
enforcement of Section 30.
58. In our opinion, the decision in  Ex­Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India
&   Anr.   (supra)   does   not   lend   support   to   vires   of   Rule   14A   to   14D   as
amended by the High Court of Madras.  The decision follows the logic of the
Supreme   Court   Bar   Association   v.   Union   of   India   as   contempt   of   court   may
involve professional misconduct if committed inside Court Room and takes
it further with respect to the debarring appearance in Court, which power is
distinct from suspending enrolment that lies with Bar  Council as observed
in  Ex­Capt. Harish Uppal  (supra) also in aforesaid para 34, the decision is of
no utility to sustain the vires of impugned rules.
59. In  Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala , (supra) vires of Rule 11
of   the   rules   framed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   under   section   34(1)   of
Advocates Act came to be impinged which debarred Advocate found guilty of
contempt   of   court   from   appearing,   acting   or   pleading   in   court   till   he   got

54
purged   himself   of   the   contempt.     The   court   considered   the   Contempt   of
Courts   Act,   Advocates   Act,   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   and   significantly
distinction between Contempt of Court and misconduct by an Advocate and
observed: 
  “29.   Punishment   for   commission   of   contempt   and   punishment   for
misconduct, professional or other misconduct, stand on different footings.
A person does not have a fundamental right to practice in any court. Such
a   right   is   conferred   upon   him   under   the   provisions   of   the   Advocates   Act
which necessarily would mean that the conditions laid down therein would
be   applicable   in   relation   thereto.   Section   30   of   the   Act   uses   the
expressions "subject to", which would include Section 34 of the Act.
30. In   Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.   (2004) 3 SCC 1
this Court noticed:
"Subject   to"   is   an   expression   whereby   limitation   is   expressed.   The
order is conclusive for all purposes.”
31.   This   Court   further   noticed   the   dictionary   meaning   of   "subject   to"
stating (SCC p. 38, paras 92­93):
" 92 . Furthermore, the expression 'subject to' must be given effect to.
93 .   In   Black's   Law   Dictionary,   Fifth   Edition   at   page   1278   the
expression "subject to" has been defined as under :
‘Liable, subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed
or affected by; provided that; provided, answerable for. (Homan
v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 345 Mo. 650, 136 SW 2d 289,
302)’"
Case­law
32. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn.,(1998)
4   SCC   409   no   doubt   overruled   its   earlier   decision   in   Vinay   Chandra
Mishra, Re (1995) 2 SCC 584 so as to hold that this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction   under   Article   142   of   the   Constitution   of   India   is   only
empowered   to   proceed   suo   motu   against   an   advocate   for   his   misconduct
and   send   for   the   records   and   pass   an   appropriate   orders   against   the
advocate concerned.
33. But it is one thing to say that the court can take suo motu cognizance
of professional or other misconduct and direct the Bar Council of India to
proceed against the advocate but it is another thing to say that it may not
allow   an   advocate   to   practice   in   his   court   unless   he   purges   himself   of
contempt.
34.   Although   in   a   case   of   professional   misconduct,   this   Court   cannot
punish an advocate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 129 of the
Constitution   of   India   which   can   be   imposed   on   a   finding   of   professional
misconduct   recorded   in   the   manner   prescribed   under   the   Advocates   Act
and the rules framed thereunder but as has been noticed in the Supreme
Court Bar Assn. professional misconduct of the advocate concerned is not

55
a matter directly in issue in the matter of contempt case .”
(emphasis supplied)
The   Court   referred   to   the   observation   in   Supreme   Court   Bar
Association v. Union of India, Ex­Capt. Harish Uppal  (supra) and held that in
a case of professional misconduct Court cannot punish an advocate under
Article 129 which has to be done under Advocates Act by the Bar Council.
In   Contempt   of   Court   Act,   misconduct   is   directly   not   in   issue.     After
considering principles of natural justice the court observed that it cannot be
stretched   too   far   and   Rule   11   cannot   be   said   to   be   violative   of   provisions
contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
60. In   R.K.   Anand   v.   Registrar,   Delhi   High   Court   (supra)   relied   on   by   the
respondents,   the   witnesses   were   tampered   with   by   the   appellant.   A   sting
operation  was  conducted  by  the T.V.  Channel  in connection with BMW  hit
and run case.  Advocate ­ R.K. Anand was found to be guilty of contempt of
Court.   He was debarred from appearing in Court for a certain period.   The
Court   also   dealt   with   a   motivated   application   filed   for   recusal.     The   Court
expressed concern and sharp deprecation of such tendencies and practices
of Members of Bar  and held that such prayer for recusal  ordinarily should
be   viewed   as   interference   in   the   due   course   of   justice   leading   to   penal
consequences.   The submission was raised that professional misconduct is
dealt with under Advocates Act. The Delhi High Court Rules do not provide
that   Advocate   on   conviction   for   Contempt   of   Court   would   be   barred   from
appearing   in   Court.     This   Court   noted   decisions   in   Supreme   Court   Bar

56
Association v. Union of India  (supra), upheld the order of the High Court and
directed   the   High   Courts   to   frame   the   Rules   under   Section   34   without
further delay.  This Court has observed:  
 “237. In both  Pravin C. Shah   v. K.A. Mohammed Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650  and
Ex.   Capt.   Harish   Uppal   v.   Union   of   India,   (2003)   2   SCC   45 ,   the   earlier
Constitution Bench decision in  Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India,
(1998)   4   SCC   409   was   extensively   considered.   The   decision   in   Ex.   Capt.
Harish   Uppal   was   later   followed   in   a   three­judge   Bench   decision   in   Bar
Council of India v. The High Court of Kerala  (2004) 6 SCC 311.
238.   In   Supreme   Court   Bar   Assn.   the   direction   prohibiting   an   advocate
from   appearing   in   court   for   a   specified   period   was   viewed   as   a   total   and
complete denial of his right to practice law and the bar was considered as
a punishment inflicted on him. In   Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal   it was seen not
as punishment for professional misconduct but as a measure necessary to
regulate   the   court's   proceedings   and   to   maintain   the   dignity   and   orderly
functioning of  the  courts.   We  may  respectfully add  that  in  a  given  case  a
direction   disallowing   an   advocate   who   is   convicted   of   criminal   contempt
from   appearing   in   court   may   not   only   be   a   measure   to   maintain   the
dignity   and   orderly   functioning   of   the   courts   but   may   become   necessary
for   the   self­protection   of   the   court   and   for   preservation   of   the   purity   of
court proceedings.  Let us, for example, take the case where an advocate is
shown to have accepted money in the name of a judge or on the pretext of
influencing him; or where an advocate is found tampering with the court's
record; or where an advocate is found actively taking part in faking court
orders   (fake   bail   orders   are   not   unknown   in   several   High   Courts!);   or
where   an   advocate   has   made   it   into   a   practice   to   browbeat   and   abuse
judges   and   on   that   basis   has   earned   the   reputation   to   get   a   case
transferred from an “inconvenient” court; or where an advocate is found to
be   in   the   habit   of   sending   unfounded   and   unsubstantiated   allegation
petitions   against   judicial   officers   and   judges   to   the   superior   courts.
Unfortunately, these examples are not from imagination. These things are
happening more frequently than we care to acknowledge. 
239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive  but there
may be other ways in which a malefactor's conduct and actions may pose
a real and imminent threat to the purity of court proceedings, cardinal to
any court's functioning, apart from constituting a substantive offense and
contempt   of   court   and   professional   misconduct.   In   such   a   situation   the
court does not only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon
it   to   protect   itself   and   save   the   purity   of   its   proceedings   from   being
polluted   in   any   way   and   to   that   end   bar   the   malefactor   from   appearing
before the courts for an appropriate period of time.
240. It is already explained in  Ex. Captain Harish Uppal  that a direction of
this   kind   by   the   Court   cannot   be   equated   with   punishment   for
professional   misconduct.   Further,   the   prohibition   against   appearance   in
courts   does   not   affect   the   right   of   the   lawyer   concerned   to   carry   on   his
legal   practice   in   other   ways   as   indicated   in   the   decision.   We   respectfully

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submit that the decision in   Ex­Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India   places
the   issue   in   correct   perspective   and   must   be   followed   to   answer   the
question at issue before us.
242. Ideally, every High Court should have rules framed under Section 34
of the Advocates  Act  in order to meet  with such eventualities  but even in
the   absence   of   the   rules,   the   High   Court   cannot   be   held   to   be   helpless
against such threats. In a matter as fundamental and grave as preserving
the purity of judicial proceedings, the High Court would be free to exercise
the   powers   vested   in   it   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act
notwithstanding the  fact that Rules prescribing the  manner of  exercise of
power   have   not   been   framed.   But   in   the   absence   of   statutory   Rules
providing   for   such   a   course   an   advocate   facing   the   charge   of   contempt
would normally think of only the punishments specified under Section 12
of the Contempt of Courts Act. He may not even imagine that at the end of
the proceeding he might end up being debarred from appearing before the
court.  The rules  of natural justice,  therefore,  demand that before  passing
an   order   debarring   an   advocate   from   appearing   in   courts   he   must   be
clearly told that his alleged conduct or actions are such that if found guilty
he   might   be   debarred   from   appearing   in   courts   for   a   specific   period.   The
warning   may   be   given   in   the   initial   notice   of   contempt   issued   under
Section  14   or  Section  17  (as   the  case  may  be)   of  the  Contempt   of  Courts
Act.   Or   such   a   notice   may   be   given   after   the   proceedee   is   held   guilty   of
criminal contempt before dealing with the question of punishment.
243.   In   order   to   avoid   any   such   controversies   in   future,   all   the   High
Courts   that   have   so   far   not   framed   rules   under   Section   34   of   the
Advocates Act are directed to frame the rules without any further delay. It
is   earnestly   hoped   that   all   the   High   Courts   shall   frame   the   rules   within
four months from today. The High Courts may also consider framing rules
for   having   Advocates   on   Record   on   the   pattern   of   the   Supreme   Court   of
India."
(emphasis supplied)
61. The   decision   in   R.K.   Anand   (supra)   is   not   a  departure   from   aforesaid
other decisions but rather affirms them.  It was a case of debarring advocate
for   a   particular   period   from   the   appearance   on   being   found   guilty   of
contempt   of   court,   not   a   case   of   suspension   of   enrolment   by   way   of
disciplinary proceedings which power lies with the Bar Council.
62. The   provisions   contained   in   Order   IV   Rule   10   of   the   Supreme   Court
Rules   have   been   pressed   into   service   so   as   to   sustain   the   amended   rules.
Rule 10 reads as follows: 

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  “10.   When,  on  the  complaint  of   any  person  or  otherwise,   the  Court  is  of
the opinion that an advocate­on record has been guilty of misconduct or of
conduct   unbecoming   of   an   advocate­on­record,   the   Court   may   make   an
order   removing   his   name   from   the   register   of   Advocates   on   record   either
permanently   or   for   such   period   as   the   Court   may   think   fit   and   the
Registrar  shall   thereupon   report   the  said  fact   to  the  Bar  Council   of  India
and to State Bar Council concerned:
Provided   that   the   Court   shall,   before   making   such   order,   issue   to   such
advocate­on­record   a   summons   returnable   before   the   Court   or   before   a
Special   Bench   to   be   constituted   by   the   Chief   Justice,   requiring   the
Advocate­on­Record   to   show   cause   against   the   matters   alleged   in   the
summons,   and   the   summons   shall,   if   practicable,   be   served   personally
upon him with copies of any affidavit or statement before the Court at the
time of the issue of the summons.
Explanation:   ­   For   the   purpose   of   these   Rules,   misconduct   or   conduct
unbecoming of an Advocate on Record shall include ­ 
a) Mere name lending by an Advocate­on­Record without any further
participation in the proceedings of the case; 
b)   Absence   of   the   Advocate­on­Record   from   the   Court   without   any
justifiable cause when the case is taken up for hearing; 
and;
c) Failure to submit appearance slip duly signed by the Advocate­on­
Record of actual appearances in the Court.”
The   aforesaid   rule   has   been   considered   in   Supreme   Court   Bar
Association   v.   Union   of   India   (supra)   and   it   is   observed   that   as   this   Court
enrolls   Advocate   on   Record   it   has   the   power   to   remove   his   name   from   the
register   of   Advocate   on   Record   either   permanently   or   for   a   specific   period.
That   does   not   tantamount   to   the   suspension   of   enrolment   made   by   Bar
Council under Advocates Act which can be ordered by Bar Council only.  
63. The   decision   in   Mohit   Chowdhary,   Advocate,   IN   RE,   (supra)   has   also
been   relied   upon   in   which   this   Court   considered   Rule   10   and   debarred
advocate to practice as Advocate on Record for a period of one month from
the date of order.  At the same time, this Court has observed that lawyer is
under   obligation   to   do   nothing   that   shall   detract   from   the   dignity   of   the
Court.     Contempt   jurisdiction   is   for   the   purpose   of   upholding   honor   or

59
dignity   of  the  court,   to   avoid   sharp   or   unfair   practices.    An  Advocate  shall
not to be immersed in a blind quest of relief for his client.  "Law is not trade,
briefs   no   merchandise".   His   duty   is   to   legitimately   present   his   side   of   the
case to assist in the administration of justice.  The Judges are selected from
Bar   and   purity   of   Bench   depends   on   the   purity   of   the   Bar.     Degraded   Bar
result degraded bench.   The Court has referred to Articles and standard of
processional conduct and etiquettes thus:
20.   Warvelle's Legal Ethics , 2nd Edn. at p.182 sets out the obligation of a
lawyer as:
“A   lawyer   is   under   obligation   to   do   nothing   that   shall   detract   from
the   dignity   of   the   court,   of   which   he   is   himself   a   sworn   officer   and
assistant. He should at all times pay deferential respect to the Judge,
and scrupulously observe the decorum of the courtroom".
21.   The   contempt   jurisdiction   is   not   only  to   protect   the   reputation   of   the
Judge concerned so that he can administer justice fearlessly and fairly but
also to protect "the fair name of the judiciary". The protection in a manner
of   speaking,   extends   even   to   the   Registry   in   the   performance   of   its   task
and   false  and  unfair  allegations  which  seek   to  impede  the  working of  the
Registry and thus the administration of justice, made with oblique motives
cannot be tolerated.  In such a situation in order to uphold the honor and
dignity   of   the   institution,   the   Court   has   to   perform   the   painful   duties
which   we   are   faced   with   in   the   present   proceedings.   Not   to   do   so   in   the
words   of   P.B.   Sawant,   J.   in   Ministry   of   Information   &   Broadcasting,   In   re ,
(1995) 3 SCC 619 would: (SCC p.635, para 20) ­
“20.   ….   The   present   trend   unless   checked   is   likely   to   lead   to   a
stage when the system will be found wrecked from within before
it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members of the profession
to introspect and take the corrective steps in time and also spare
the courts the unpleasant duty. We say no more.”
22. Now turning to the "Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette"
of the Bar Council of India Rules contained in Section I of Chapter II, Part
VI,   the   duties   of   an   advocate   towards   the   Court   have   been   specified.   We
extract the 4th duty set out as under:
"4.   An   advocate   shall   use   his   best   efforts   to   restrain   and   prevent
his client from resorting to sharp or unfair practices or from doing
anything   in   relation   to   the   court,   opposing   counsel   or   parties
which   the   advocate   himself   ought   not   to   do.   An   advocate   shall
refuse   to   represent   the   client   who   persists   in   such   improper
conduct.   He   shall   not   consider   himself   a   mere   mouthpiece   of   the
client,   and   shall   exercise   his   own   judgment   in   the   use   of
restrained   language   in   correspondence,   avoiding   scurrilous
attacks   in   pleadings,   and   using   intemperate   language   during

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arguments in court.”
23. In the aforesaid context the aforesaid principle in different words was
set   out   by   Crampton,   J.   in   R.   v.   O'   Connell,   7   Irish   Law   Reports   313   as
under:
"The  advocate  is  a representative  but  not a  delegate.  He  gives  to  his
client the benefit of his learning, his talents and his judgment; but all
through  he   never forgets  what  he  owes  to  himself   and  to  others.   He
will not knowingly misstate the law, he will not willfully misstate the
facts, though it be to gain the case for his client. He will ever bear in
mind   that   if   he   be   an   advocate   of   an   individual   and   retained   and
remunerated   often   inadequately,   for   valuable   services,   yet   he   has   a
prior and perpetual retainer on behalf of truth and justice and there
is   no   Crown   or  other   licenses   which   in   any  case   or  for  any  party  or
purpose   can   discharge   him   from   that   primary   and   paramount
retainer."
24. The fundamentals of the profession thus require an advocate not to be
immersed   in   a   blind   quest   of   relief   for   his   client.   The   dignity   of   the
institution   cannot   be   violated   in   this   quest   as   "law   is   no   trade,   briefs   no
merchandise" as per Krishna Iyer, J in  Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V.
Dabholkar  (1976) 2 SCC 291.
25.   It   is   also   pertinent   to   note   at   this   point,   the   illuminating   words   of
Vivian   Bose,   J.   in   'G'   a   Senior  Advocate   of   the   Supreme   Court,   In   re   AIR
1954 SC 557, who elucidated:
“10. …To use the language of the Army, an Advocate of this Court is
expected   at   all   times   to   comport   himself   in   a   manner   befitting   his
status as an "officer and a gentleman".
26.   It   is   as   far   back   as   in   1925   that   an   Article   titled   'The   Lawyer   as   an
Officer of the Court' Virginia Law Review ,  Vol.11,  No.4  (Feb 1925) pp.263­
77 published in the Virginia Law Review, lucidly set down what is expected
from the lawyer which is best set out in its own words:
"The   duties   of   the   lawyer   to   the   Court   spring   directly   from   the
relation   that   he   sustains   to   the   Court   as   an   officer   in   the
administration of justice. The law is not a mere private calling but is
a profession which has the distinction of being an integral part of the
State's   judicial   system.   As   an   officer   of   the   Court   the   lawyer   is,
therefore,   bound  to  uphold  the  dignity  and integrity  of  the Court;  to
exercise at all times respect for the Court in both words and actions;
to   present   all   matters   relating   to   his   client's   case   openly,   being
careful to avoid any attempt to exert private influence upon either the
judge or the jury; and to be frank and candid in all dealings with the
Court,   "using   no   deceit,   imposition   or   evasion,"   as   by   misreciting
witnesses or misquoting precedents. "It must always be understood,"
says   Mr.   Christian   Doerfler,   in   an   address   before   the   Milwaukee
County   Bar   Association,   in   December,   1911,   "that   the   profession   of
law   is   instituted   among   men   for   the   purpose   of   aiding   the
administration of justice. A proper administration of justice does not
mean   that   a   lawyer   should   succeed   in   winning   a   lawsuit.   It   means
that he should properly bring to the attention of the Court everything
by way of fact and law that is available and legitimate for the purpose
of properly presenting his client's case.

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His   duty   as   far   as   his   client   is   concerned   is   simply   to   legitimately
present   his   side   of   the   case.   His   duty   as   far   as   the   public   is
concerned   and   as   far   as   he   is   an   officer   of   the   Court   is   to   aid   and
assist in the administration of justice.”
In   this   connection,   the   timely   words   of   Mr.   Warvelle   may   also   well
be remembered:
"But   the   lawyer   is   not   alone   a   gentleman;   he   is   a   sworn   minister   of
justice.   His   office   imposes   high   moral   duties   and   grave
responsibilities, and he is held to a strict fulfillment of all that these
matters   imply.   Interests   of   vast   magnitude   are   entrusted   to   him;
confidence   is   imposed   in   him;   life,   liberty,   and   property   are
committed to his care. He must be equal to the responsibilities which
they create, and if he betrays his trust, neglects his duties, practices
deceit,   or   panders   to   vice,   then   the   most   severe   penalty   should   be
inflicted and his name stricken from the roll."
That   the   lawyer   owes   a   high   duty   to   his   profession   and   to   his   fellow
members   of   the   Bar   is   an   obvious   truth.   His   profession   should   be   his
pride,  and to preserve its  honor pure and unsullied  should be  among his
chief   concerns.   "Nothing   should   be   higher   in   the   estimation   of   the
advocate,"   declares   Mr.   Alexander   H.   Robbins,   "next   after   those   sacred
relations  of home and country than his profession. She should be  to him
the 'fairest of ten thousand' among the institutions of the earth. He must
stand   for   her   in   all   places   and   resent   any   attack   on   her   honor   ­   as   he
would if the same attack  were to be made against his own  fair  name and
reputation. He should enthrone her in the sacred places of his heart, and
to   her,   he   should   offer   the   incense   of   constant   devotion.   For   she   is   a
jealous mistress.
Again,   it   is   to   be   borne   in   mind   that   the   judges   are   selected   from
the ranks of lawyers. The purity of the Bench depends upon the purity of
the Bar.
“The   very  fact,   then,   that   one   of   the   co­ordinate   departments   of   the
Government   is   administered   by   men   selected   only   from   one   profession
gives   to   that   profession   a   certain   pre­eminence   which   calls   for   a   high
standard of morals as well as intellectual attainments. The integrity of the
judiciary is the safeguard of the nation, but the character of the judges is
practically   but   the   character   of   the   lawyers.   Like   begets   like.   A   degraded
Bar   will   inevitably   produce   a   degraded   Bench,   and   just   as   certainly   may
we   expect   to   find   the   highest   excellence   in   a   judiciary   drawn   from   the
ranks of an enlightened, learned and moral Bar.”
27. He ends his Article in the following words:
“No  client,   corporate   or  individual,  however powerful,   nor any cause
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive, nor should
any   lawyer   render,   any   service   or   advice   involving   disloyalty   to   the
law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which
we   are   bound   to   uphold,   or   corruption   of   any   person   or   persons
exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of
the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the
lawyer   invites   and   merits   stern   and   just   condemnation.
Correspondingly,   he   advances   the   honor   of   his   profession   and   the
best   interests   of   his   client   when   he   renders   service   or   gives   advice
tending   to   impress   upon   the   client   and   his   undertaking   exact

62
compliance   with   the   strictest   principles   of   moral   law.   He   must   also
observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until
a   statute   shall   have   been   construed   and   interpreted   by   competent
adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and
as   to   what   he   conscientiously   believes   to   be   its   just   meaning   and
extent.   But,   above   all,   a   lawyer   will   find   his   highest   honor   in   a
deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as
an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.”
28.   On   examination   of   the   legal   principles,   an   important   issue   emerges:
what   should   be   the   end   of   what   the   contemnor   had   started   but   has
culminated in an impassioned plea  of Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior
advocate   supported   by   the   representatives   of   the   Bar   present   in   Court,
marking  their  appearance   for  the   contemnor.   We  are   inclined   to  give   due
consideration   to   such   a   plea   but   are   unable   to   persuade   ourselves   to   let
the   contemnor   go   scot­free,   without   any   consequences.   We   are   thus   not
inclined   to  proceed  further  in   the  contempt  jurisdiction  except  to  caution
the   contemnor   that   this   should   be   the   first   and   the   last   time   of   such   a
misadventure. But the matter cannot rest only at that.
30.   We   are   of   the   view   that   the   privilege   of   being   an   Advocate­on­Record
under  the  Rules  has  clearly been   abused   by  the   contemnor.  The  conduct
was not becoming of an advocate much less an Advocate­on­Record in the
Supreme Court.
32.   The   aforesaid   Rule   makes   it   clear,   that   whether   on   the   complaint   of
any person or otherwise, in case of misconduct or a conduct unbecoming
of   an   Advocate­on­Record,   the   Court   may   make   an   order   removing   his
name   from   the   register   of   Advocate­on­Record   permanently,   or   for   a
specified   period.   We   are   not   referring   to   the   right   to   practice   as   an
advocate,   and   the   name   entered   on   the   rolls   of   any   State   Bar   Council,
which is a necessary requirement before a person takes the examination of
Advocate­on­Record. The present case is clearly one where this Court is of
the   opinion   that   the   conduct   of   the   contemnor   is   unbecoming   of   an
Advocate­on­Record.   The   pre­requisites   of   the   proviso   are   met   by   the
reason of the Bench being constituted itself by the Chief Justice, and the
contemnor being aware of the far more serious consequences, which could
have flowed to him. The learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner
has thrown him at the mercy of the Court. We have substantively accepted
the   request   but   lesser   consequences   have   been   imposed   on   the
contemnor."
64. Reliance   was   placed   on   the   decision   Mahipal   Singh   Rana   v.   State   of
Uttar   Pradesh,   (supra)   by   the   respondents.     This   Court   dealt   with   the
question when advocate has been convicted for criminal contempt as to the
sanctions/punishment   that   may   be   imposed   in   addition   to   punishments
that may  be  imposed  for   criminal   contempt under  the  Contempt  of  Courts

63
Act, 1971.   This Court held that regulation of right of appearance in courts
is   within   jurisdiction   of   courts   and   not   Bar   Councils,   thus,   Court   can   bar
Advocate convicted for contempt from appearing/pleading before any court
for   an   appropriate   period   of   time,   till   convicted   advocate   purges   himself   of
the   contempt,   even   in   absence   of   suspension   or   termination   of
enrolment/right   to   practice/licence   to   practice.   Secondly,   this   Court   also
held that bar on appearance/ pleadings in any court till contempt is purged
can be imposed by the Court in terms of the High Court Rules framed under
Section 34 of the Advocates Act, if such Rules exist.  However, even if there
is   no   such   rule   framed   under   said   Section   34,   unless   convicted   advocate
purges   himself   of   contempt   or   is   permitted   by   Court,   Court   may   debar   an
Advocate   as   conviction   results   in   debarring   such   advocate   from
appearing/pleading in court, even in absence of suspension or termination
of enrolment/right to practise/licence to practise.  This Court held thus:
“4.1.   ( i ) Whether a case has been made out for interference with the order
passed   by   the   High   Court   convicting   the   appellant   for   criminal   contempt
and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for two months with a fine of
Rs 2000 and further imprisonment for two weeks in default and debarring
him from appearing in courts in Judgeship at Etah; and
4.2.  ( ii ) Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be
allowed to practice.
32.   In   Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650,   this Court held
that   an   advocate   found   guilty   of   contempt   cannot   be   allowed   to   act   or
plead in any court until he purges himself of contempt. This direction was
issued having regard to Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court of
Kerala   under  Section  34(1)   of   the   Advocates   Act  and  also   referring  to  the
observations   in   para   80   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Supreme   Court
Bar   Assn.   v.   Union   of   India,   (1998)   4   SCC   409.     It   was   explained   that
debarring a person from appearing in court was within the purview of the
jurisdiction of the Court and was different from suspending or terminating
the  license  which could be  done by the Bar Council and on  the failure  of
the   Bar   Council,   in   exercise   of   appellate   jurisdiction   of   this   Court.   The
observations   are:  ( Pravin   C.  Shah   case ,  SCC  pp.  658­62,   paras  16­18,   24

64
& 27­28)
“ 16 .   Rule   11   of   the   Rules   is   not   a   provision   intended   for   the
Disciplinary   Committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   the   State   or   the   Bar
Council of India. It is a matter entirely concerning the dignity and the
orderly functioning of the courts. The right of the advocate to practice
envelops a lot of acts to be performed by him in the discharge of his
professional   duties.   Apart   from   appearing   in   the   courts,   he   can   be
consulted   by   his   clients,   he   can   give   his   legal   opinion   whenever
sought   for,   he   can   draft   instruments,   pleadings,   affidavits   or   any
other documents, he can participate in any conference involving legal
discussions, etc. Rule 11 has nothing to do with all the acts done by
an   advocate   during   his   practice   except   his   performance   inside   the
court.  Conduct in court  is  a matter concerning  the  court  and  hence
the   Bar   Council   cannot   claim   that   what   should   happen   inside   the
court   could   also   be   regulated   by   the   Bar   Council   in   exercise   of   its
disciplinary  powers.   The   right   to   practice,   no  doubt,   is   the   genus   of
which   the   right   to   appear   and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   may   be   a
specie.   But   the   right   to   appear   and   conduct   cases   in   the   court   is   a
matter   on   which   the   court   must   have   the   major   supervisory   power.
Hence   the   court   cannot   be   divested   of   the   control   or   supervision   of
the court merely because it may involve the right of an advocate.
17 .  When the Rules stipulate that a person who committed contempt
of court cannot have the unreserved right to continue to appear and
plead and conduct cases in the courts without any qualm or remorse,
the   Bar   Council   cannot   overrule   such   a   regulation   concerning   the
orderly conduct of court proceedings.  Courts of law are structured in
such   a   design   as   to   evoke   respect   and   reverence   for   the   majesty   of
law   and   justice.   The   machinery   for   the   dispensation   of   justice
according   to   law   is   operated   by   the   court.   Proceedings   inside   the
courts   are   always   expected   to   be   held   in   a   dignified   and   orderly
manner.   The   very   sight   of   an   advocate,   who   was   found   guilty   of
contempt   of   court   on   the   previous   hour,   standing   in   the   court   and
arguing   a   case   or   cross­examining   a   witness   on   the   same   day,
unaffected   by   the   contemptuous   behaviour   he   hurled   at   the   court,
would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode the majesty of
it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the
institution of  the  courts.  This  necessitates  vesting of  power with the
High   Court   to   formulate   rules   for   regulating   the   proceedings   inside
the   court   including   the   conduct   of   advocates   during   such
proceedings.   That   power   should   not   be   confused   with   the   right   to
practice   law.   While   the   Bar   Council   can   exercise   control   over   the
latter, the High Court should be in control of the former.
18 .   In   the   above   context   it   is   useful   to   quote   the   following
observations made by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court
in   Prayag Das   v.   Civil Judge, Bulandshahr , AIR 1974 All 133 (AIR p.
136, para 9)
‘[T]he   High   Court   has   the   power   to   regulate   the   appearance   of
advocates  in  courts.  The  right to  practice  and  the right to appear  in
courts   are   not   synonymous.   An   advocate   may   carry   on   chamber
practice or even practice in courts in various other ways e.g. drafting
and   filing   of   pleadings   and   vakalatnama   for   performing   those   acts.
For that purpose, his physical appearance in courts may not at all be
necessary. For the purpose of regulating his appearance in courts the

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High Court should be the appropriate authority to make rules and on
a proper construction of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act it must be
inferred   that   the   High   Court   has   the   power   to   make   rules   for
regulating   the   appearance   of   advocates   and   proceedings   inside   the
courts. Obviously, the High Court is the only appropriate authority to
be entrusted with this responsibility.'
* * *
24 .  Purging is a process by which an undesirable element is expelled
either   from   one's   own   self   or   from   society.   It   is   a   cleaning   process.
Purge   is   a   word   which   acquired   implications   first   in   theological
connotations.   In   the   case   of   a   sin,   purging   of   such   sin   is   made
through   the   expression   of   sincere   remorse   coupled   with   doing   the
penance required.  In the case of a guilt, purging means to get himself
cleared   of   the   guilt.   The   concept   of   purgatory   was   evolved   from   the
word   "purge",   which   is   a   state   of   suffering   after   this   life   in   which
those   souls,   who   depart   this   life   with   their   deadly   sins,   are   purified
and   rendered   fit   to   enter   into   heaven   where   nothing   defiled   enters
(vide   Words   and   Phrases ,   Permanent   Edn.,   Vol.   35­A,   p.   307).   In
Black’s   Law   Dictionary   the   word   “purge”   is   given   the   following
meaning:   ‘To   cleanse;   to   clear.   To   clear   or   exonerate   from   some
charge or imputation of guilt, or from a contempt.’ It is preposterous
to suggest that if the convicted person undergoes punishment or if he
tenders   the   fine   amount   imposed   on   him   the   purge   would   be
completed.
* * *
27 .   We   cannot,   therefore,   approve   the   view   that   merely   undergoing
the   penalty   imposed   on   a   contemnor   is   sufficient   to   complete   the
process   of   purging   himself   of   the   contempt,   particularly   in   a   case
where   the   contemnor   is   convicted   of   criminal   contempt.   The   danger
in   giving   accord   to   the   said   view   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   in   the
aforecited   decision   is   that   if   a   contemnor   is   sentenced   to   a   fine   he
can immediately pay it and continue to commit contempt in the same
court, and then again pay the fine and persist with his contemptuous
conduct.   There   must   be   something   more   to   be   done   to   get   oneself
purged of the contempt when it is a case of criminal contempt.
28 .   The   Disciplinary   Committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India
highlighted the absence of any mode of purging oneself of the guilt in
any of the Rules as a reason for not following the interdict contained
in   Rule   11.   Merely  because   the   Rules   did   not   prescribe   the   mode   of
purging  oneself   of   the   guilt   it   does   not   mean   that   one   cannot   purge
the   guilt   at   all.   The   first   thing   to   be   done   in   that   direction   when   a
contemnor   is   found   guilty   of   criminal   contempt   is   to   implant   or
infuse   in   his   own   mind   real   remorse   about   his   conduct   which   the
court   found   to   have   amounted   to   contempt   of   court.   Next   step   is   to
seek pardon from the court concerned for what he did on the ground
that he really and genuinely repented and that he has resolved not to
commit   any  such   act   in   future.   It   is   not   enough   that   he   tenders   an
apology.   The   apology   tendered   should   impress   the   court   to   be
genuine   and   sincere.   If   the   court,   on   being   impressed   of   his
genuineness,   accepts   the   apology   then   it   could   be   said   that   the
contemnor has purged himself of the guilt."
33.   In   Bar   Council   of   India   v.   High   Court   of   Kerala,   (2004)   6   SCC   311 ,

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constitutionality   of   Rule   11   of   the   Rules   framed   by   the   High   Court   of
Kerala for barring a lawyer from appearing in any court till he got himself
purged   of   contempt   by   an   appropriate   order   of   the   court,   was   examined.
This Court held that the rule did not violate Articles 14 and 19(1)( g ) of the
Constitution   nor   amounted   to   usurpation   of   power   of   adjudication   and
punishment conferred on the Bar Councils and the result intended by the
application   of   the   Rule   was   automatic.   It   was   further   held   that   the   Rule
was   not   in   conflict   with   the   law   laid   down   in   Supreme   Court   Bar   Assn.
judgment.   Referring to  the   Constitution  Bench  judgment   in   Harish   Uppal
v.   Union   of   India,   (2003)   2   SCC   45 ,   it   was   held   that   regulation   of   right   of
appearance   in   courts   was   within   the   jurisdiction   of   the   courts.   It   was
observed,   following   Pravin   C.   Shah ,   that   the   court   must   have   major
supervisory   power   on   the   right   to   appear   and   conduct   in   the   court.   The
observations are: ( Bar Council of India case , SCC p. 323, para 46)
“ 46 .   Before   a   contemnor   is   punished   for   contempt,   the   court   is
bound   to   give   an   opportunity   of   hearing   to   him.   Even   such   an
opportunity   of   hearing   is   necessary   in   a   proceeding   under   Section
345   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure.   But   if   a   law   which   is
otherwise  valid   provides   for  the   consequences  of  such  a  finding,  the
same by itself would not be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India inasmuch as only because another opportunity of hearing to
a   person,   where   a   penalty   is   provided   for   as   a   logical   consequence
thereof,   has   been   provided   for.   Even   under   the   penal   laws,   some
offenses carry minimum sentence. The gravity of such offenses, thus,
is   recognized   by   the   legislature.   The   courts   do   not   have   any   role   to
play in such a matter."
35.   In   R.K.  Anand v.   Delhi  High  Court,  (2009)   8  SCC  106   it  was  held   that
even   if   there   was   no   rule   framed   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act
disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt, is not only
a   measure   to   maintain   dignity   and   orderly   function   of   courts,   it   may
become   necessary   for   the   protection   of   the   court   and   for   preservation   of
the   purity  of   court   proceedings.   Thus,   the   court   not   only  has   a   right   but
also   an   obligation   to   protect   itself   and   save   the   purity   of   its   proceedings
from   being   polluted,   by   barring   the   advocate   concerned   from   appearing
before the courts for an appropriate period of time. This Court noticed the
observations about the decline of ethical and professional standards of the
Bar, and the need to arrest such trend in the interests of administration of
justice.   It   was   observed   that   in   the   absence   of   unqualified   trust   and
confidence   of   people   in   the   Bar,   the   judicial   system   could   not   work
satisfactorily.   Further   observations   are   that   the   performance   of   the   Bar
Councils   in   maintaining   professional   standards   and   enforcing   discipline
did not match its achievements in other areas. This Court expressed hope
and   expected   that   the   Bar   Council   will   take   appropriate   action   for   the
restoration   of   high   professional   standards   among  the   lawyers,   working  of
their position in the judicial system and the society.
42.  We may also refer to certain articles on the subject. In “ Raising the Bar
for   the   Legal   Profession ”,   published   in   The   Hindu   newspaper   dated   15­9­
2012, Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon wrote: 
"…   Being   a   private   monopoly,   the   profession   is   organised   like   a
pyramid in which the top 20 per cent command 80 per cent of paying
work, the middle 30 per cent managing to survive by catering to the
needs of the middle class and government litigation, while the bottom

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50   percent   barely   survive   with   legal   aid   cases   and   cases   managed
through undesirable and exploitative methods! Given the poor quality
of legal education in the majority of the so­called law colleges (over a
thousand   of   them   working   in   small   towns   and   panchayats   without
infrastructure   and   competent   faculty),   what   happened   with
uncontrolled expansion was the overcrowding of ill­equipped lawyers
in the bottom 50 per cent of the profession fighting for a piece of the
cake. In the process, being too numerous, the middle and the bottom
segments   got   elected   to   professional   bodies   which   controlled   the
management   of   the   entire   profession.   The   so­called   leaders   of   the
profession  who   have   abundant   work,   unlimited   money,   respect,   and
influence   did   not   bother   to   look   into   what   was   happening   to   the
profession   and   allowed   it   to   go   its   way—of   inefficiency,   strikes,
boycotts,   and   public   ridicule.   This   is   the   tragedy   of   the   Indian   Bar
today which had otherwise a noble tradition of being in the forefront
of   the   freedom   struggle   and   maintaining   the   rule   of   law   and   civil
liberties even in difficult times."
54.   Further,   in   exercise   of   appellate   jurisdiction   under   Section   38   of   the
Advocates   Act,   we   direct   that   the   license   of   the   appellant   will   stand
suspended for a further period of five years. He will also remain debarred
from appearing in any court in District Etah even after five years unless he
purges himself of contempt in the manner laid down by this Court in   Bar
Council   of   India   and   R.K.   Anand  
and   as   directed   by   the   High   Court.
Question ( ii ) stands decided accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
65. In   Mahipal   Singh   Rana   (supra)   the   advocate   was   found   guilty   of
criminal   contempt   as   such   punishment   for   debarring   from   the   Court   was
first passed and reliance has been placed for that purpose on the decision of
Constitution Bench of this Court in   Supreme Court Bar Association (supra) .
Thus,   the   decision   has   no   application   to   sustain   vires   of   Rules   14(A)   to
14(D) as amended by the High Court of Madras.
66. Shri   Mohan   Parasaran,   learned   senior   counsel   supported   the   Rules
pointing   out   that   grave   situation   has   been   created   in   the   High   Court   of
Madras as well as at its Madurai Bench, which compelled the Court to take
action   on   the   judicial   side   to   ensure   the   modicum   of   security.     The   High
Court had to order the security of the Court to be undertaken by CISF.   In

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this regard, orders were passed in Suo Moto Writ Petition No.29197 of 2015
by   the   High   Court   of   Madras   on   14.9.2015,   12.10.2015   and   30.10.2015.
The following incidents were noticed in the judicial orders:
i. Holding   protests   and   waving   placards   within   the   Court
premises; 
ii. Raising slogans and marching down the corridors of the Court.
iii. The   use   of   hand­held   microphones   to   disrupt   Court
proceedings.
iv. Attempting   to   and   in   some   cases   successfully   entering   the
Chambers   of   the   Puisne   Judges   of   the   Madurai   Bench   of   the
High Court.
v. Two instances of hoax bombs in the form of broken mechanical
clocks being placed at areas in the Court to ensure disruptions.
The   High   Court,   in   our   opinion,   could   have   taken   action   under
Contempt of Courts Act for aforesaid misconduct.
67. Rule   14A   provides   for   power   to   debar   an   advocate   from   appearing
before the High Court and the subordinate courts in case an advocate who
is found to have accepted money in the name of a Judge or on the pretext of
influencing   him;     or   an   advocate   who   is   found   to   have   tampered   with   the
Court record or Court order; or an advocate who browbeats and/or abuses
a   Judge   or   Judicial   Officer;   or   an   advocate   who   is   found   to   have   sent   or
spread   unfounded   and   unsubstantiated   allegations/petitions   against   a
judicial officer or a Judge to the Superior Court; or an advocate who actively
participates   in   a   procession   inside   the   Court   campus   and/or   involves   in
gherao   inside   the   Court   Hall   or   holds   placard   inside   the   Court   Hall;   or   an
advocate   who   appears   in   the   Court   under   the   influence   of   liquor   may   be
debarred   by   Court.   However,   it   is   not   provided   that   Court   would   do   so   in

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exercising   Contempt  Jurisdiction.    The  debarment is  sought to   be  done  by
way of disciplinary control, which is not permissible.
68. Rule   14­B   as   amended   provides   for   power   to   take   action.     Rule
14­B(iv) states that where any such misconduct referred to under Rule 14­A
is   committed   by   an   advocate   before   the   High   Court,   the   High   Court   shall
have the power to initiate action against the advocate concerned and debar
him   from   appearing   before   the   High   Court   and   all   subordinate   courts;   or
where   any   such   misconduct   is   committed   before   the   Court   of   Principal
District Judge, the Principal District Judge shall have the power to initiate
action against the advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before
any   Court   within   such   district;   or   where   any   such   misconduct   referred   to
under   Rule   14­A   is   committed   before   any   subordinate   court,   the   Court
concerned   shall   submit   a   report   to   the   Principal   District   Court   and   the
Principal   District   Judge   shall   have   the   power   to   initiate   action   against   the
advocate concerned and debar him from appearing before any Court within
such district.   Rule 14­C prescribes the procedure to  be followed and Rule
14­D   authorizes   the   High   Court   or   Principal   District   Judge   to   pass   an
interim order prohibiting the advocate concerned from appearing before the
High Court or subordinate Courts, as the case may be, pending inquiry.  
69. The   High   Court   is   not   authorized   by   the   provisions   of   the   Advocates
Act   to   frame   such   rules.     Section   34   does   not   confer   such   power   of
debarment by way of disciplinary methods or disciplinary inquiry as against

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an advocate as that has to be dealt with by the Bar Council as provided in
other sections in a different chapter of the Act.  It is only when the advocate
is found guilty of contempt of court, as provided in Rule 14 as existed in the
Madras High Court Rules, 1970 takes care of situation until and unless an
advocate who has committed contempt of court purges himself of contempt
shall not be entitled to appear or act or plead in the Court.   
Rule 14 is extracted hereunder:
“ 14. No advocate who has been found guilty of contempt of Court
shall be permitted to appear, Act or plead in any Court unless he
has purged himself of contempt.”
70. The debarment cannot be ordered by the High Court until and unless
advocate   is   prosecuted   under   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act .     It   cannot   be
resorted to by undertaking disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under
the Rules 14­A to 14­D as amended in 2016.   That is a clear usurpation of
the   power   of   the   Bar   Council   and   is   wholly   impermissible   in   view   of   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   Supreme   Court   Bar   Association   vs.   Union   of   India
(supra)   that   has   been   followed   in   all   the   subsequent   decisions   as   already
discussed.     There  is  no  doubt  about it  that the  incidents   pointed  out were
grim   and   stern   action   was   required   against   the   erring   advocates   as   they
belied the entire nobility of the lawyer’s profession.
71. It is also true that the disciplinary committee of the Bar Councils, as
observed   by   this   Court   in   Mahipal   Singh   Rana   and   Mohit   Chowdhary
(supra) , has failed to deliver the good.  It is seen that the disciplinary control
of   the   Bar   Council   is   not   as   effective   as   it   should   be.     The   cases   are   kept

71
pending   for   a   long   time,   then   after   one   year   they   stand   transferred   to   the
Bar   Council   of   India,   as   provided   under   the   Advocates   Act   and   thereafter
again the matters are kept pending for years together.   It is high time that
the   Bar   Council,   as   well   as   the   various   State   Bar   Councils,   should   take
stock  of  the  situation  and  improve  the  functioning  of  the  disciplinary   side.
It   is   absolutely   necessary   to   maintain   the   independence   of   the   Bar   and   if
the   cleaning   process   is   not   done   by   the   Bar   itself,   its   independence   is   in
danger.  The  corrupt,   unwanted,  unethical   element has  no  place  in  Bar.     If
nobility   of   the   profession   is   destroyed,   Bar   can   never   remain   independent.
Independence is constituted by the observance of certain ideals and if those
ideals   are   lost,   the   independence   would   only   remain   on   paper,   not   in   real
sense.  
72. The   situation   is   really   frustrating   if   the   repository   of   the   faith   in   the
Bar   fails   to   discharge   their   statutory   duties   effectively,   no   doubt   about   it
that   the   same   can   be   and   has   to   be   supervised   by   the   Courts.   The
obligatory   duties   of   Bar   Council   have   found   statutory   expression   in
Advocates Act and the rules framed thereunder with respect to disciplinary
control   and   cannot   be   permitted   to   become   statutory   mockery,   such   non­
performance   or   delayed   performance   of   such   duties   is   impermissible.   The
Bar Council is duty bound to protect Bar itself by taking steps against black
sheeps   and   cannot   bely   expectation   of   Bar   in   general   and   spoil   its   image.
The very purpose of disciplinary control by Bar Council cannot be permitted
to   be   frustrated.     In   such   an   exigency,   in   a   case   where   the   Bar   Council   is

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not taking appropriate action against the advocate, it would be open to the
High Court to entertain the writ petition and to issue appropriate directions
to   the   Bar   Council   to   take   action   in   accordance   with   the   law   in   the
discharge of duties enjoined upon it.  But at the same time, the High Court
and   even   this   Court   cannot   take   upon   itself   the   disciplinary   control   as
envisaged  under  the   Advocates  Act.     No  doubt  about  it  that  the   Court  has
the   duty   to   maintain   its   decorum   within   the   Court  premises,   but   that   can
be   achieved   by   taking   appropriate   steps   under   Contempt   of   Courts   Act   in
accordance   with   law   as   permitted   under   the   decisions   of   this   Court   and
even   by   rule   making   power   under   Section   34   of   the   Advocates   Act.     An
advocate can be debarred from practicing in the Court until and unless he
purges himself of contempt.
73. It   has   been   seen   from   time   to   time   that   various   attacks   have   been
made on the judicial system.   It has become very common to the members
of the Bar to go to the press/media to criticize the judges in person and to
commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to the judgments.  It
is   nothing   less   than   an   act   of   contempt   of   gravest   form.     Whenever   any
political   matter   comes   to   the   Court   and   is   decided,   either   way,   political
insinuations are attributed by unscrupulous persons/advocates.  Such acts
are   nothing,   but   an   act   of   denigrating   the   judiciary   itself   and   destroys   the
faith of the common man which he reposes in the judicial system.   In case
of genuine grievance against any judge, the appropriate process is to lodge a
complaint   to   the   concerned   higher   authorities   who   can   take   care   of   the

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situation   and   it   is   impermissible   to   malign   the   system   itself   by   attributing
political motives and by making false allegations against the judicial system
and   its  functionaries.    Judges  who   are   attacked  are   not  supposed   to   go  to
press or media to ventilate their point of view. 
 
74. Contempt   of   court   is   a   weapon   which   has   to   be   used   sparingly   as
more is power, same requires more responsibility but it does not mean that
the court has fear of taking action  and its repercussions.   The hallmark  of
the   court   is   to   provide   equal   and   even­handed   justice   and   to   give   an
opportunity   to   each   of   the   system   to   ensure   that   it   improves   upon.
Unfortunately, some advocates feel that they are above the Bar Council due
to   its  inaction  and  they   are  the  only  champion  of  the   causes.    The   hunger
for cheap publicity is increasing which is not permitted by the noble ideals
cherished   by   the   great   doyens   of   the   bar,   they   have   set   by   their   conduct
what should be in fact the professional etiquettes and ethics which are not
capable of being defined in a narrow compass.  The statutory rules prohibit
advocates from advertising and in fact to cater to the press/media, distorted
versions   of   the   court   proceedings   is   sheer   misconduct   and   contempt   of
court   which   has   become   very   common.   It   is   making   it   more   difficult   to
render justice in a fair, impartial and fearless manner though the situation
is  demoralizing  that  something   has  to  be  done  by   all   concerned   to   revamp
the image of Bar.   It is not open to wash dirty linen in public and enter in
accusation/debates,   which   tactics   are   being   adopted   by   unscrupulous
elements to influence the judgments and even to  deny justice  with ulterior

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motives.   It is  for the Bar  Council and the senior members of the Bar  who
have never forgotten their responsibility to rise to the occasion to maintain
the   independence   of   the   Bar   which   is   so   supreme   and   is   absolutely
necessary for the welfare of this country and the vibrant democracy.
75. The   separation   of   powers   made   by   the   forefathers,   who   framed   the
Constitution,   ensured   independent   functioning.   It   is   unfortunate   without
any   rationale   basis   the   independence   of   the   system   is   being   sought   to   be
protected   by   those   who   should   keep   aloof   from   it.     Independence   of   each
system   is   to   come   from   within.   If   things   are   permitted   to   be   settled   by
resorting   to   the   unscrupulous   means   and   institution   is   maligned   by
creating   pressure   of   any   kind,   the   very   independence   of   the   system   would
be endangered. Cases cannot be decided by media trial.   Bar and Bench in
order   to   protect   independence   have   their   own   inbuilt   machinery   for
redressal of grievance if any and they are supposed to settle their grievances
in   accordance   therewith   only.     No   outside   interference   is   permissible.
Considering   the   nobility,   independence,   dignity   which   is   enjoined   and   the
faith which is reposed by the common man of the country in the judiciary, it
is   absolutely   necessary   that   there   is   no   maligning   of   the   system.     Mutual
respect and reverence are the only way out.   A lot of sacrifices are made to
serve the judiciary for which one cannot regret as it is with a purpose and
to serve judiciary is not less than call of military service.  For the protection
of   democratic   values   and   to   ensure   that   the   rule   of   law   prevails   in   the
country, no one can be permitted to destroy the independence of the system

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from   within   or   from   outside.     We   have   to   watch   on   Bar   independence.   Let
each of us ensure our own institution is not jeopardized by the blame game
and   make   an   endeavor   to   improve   upon   its   own   functioning   and
independence and how individually and collectively we can deliver the good
to the citizen of this great country and deal with every tear in the eye of poor
and down­trodden as per constitutional obligation enjoined on us. 
76. Soul   searching   is   absolutely   necessary   and   the   blame   game   and
maligning   must   stop   forthwith.   Confidence   and   reverence   and   positive
thinking   is   the   only   way.   It   is   pious   hope   that   the   Bar   Council   would
improve upon the function of its disciplinary committees so as to make the
system   more   accountable,   publish   performance   audit   on   the   disciplinary
side   of   various   bar   councils.   The   same   should   be   made   public.   The   Bar
Council of India under its supervisory control can implement good ideas as
always   done   by   it   and   would   not   lag   behind   in   cleaning   process   so   badly
required.     It   is   to   make   the   profession   more   noble   and   it   is   absolutely
necessary   to   remove   the   black   sheeps   from   the   profession   to   preserve   the
rich ideals of Bar and on which it struggled for the values of freedom.   It is
basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the statutory duty of Bar
to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges and the legal system,
not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and the system which is important
pillar of democracy.

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77. We   have   no   hesitation   to  hold  that  the  High   Court  has   overstretched
and   exceeded   its   power   even   in   the   situation   which   was   so   grim   which
appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers are
much   more   in   Contempt   of   Courts   Act   to   deal   with   such   situation   court
need   not   look   for   Bar   Council   to   act.     It   can   take   action,   punish   for
Contempt   of   Courts   Act   in   case   it   involves   misconduct   done   in
Court/proceedings.     Circumstances  may  be  grim, but the  autonomy of the
Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by the Courts.   It has
other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum of Court. In case power
is   given   to   the   Court   even   if   complaints   lodged   by   a   lawyer   to   the   higher
administrative authorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct
then   also   he   may   be   punished   by   initiating   disciplinary   proceedings   as
permitted   to   be   done   in   impugned   Rules   14   A   to   D   that   would   be   making
the   Bar   too   sycophant   and   fearful   which   would   not   be   conducive   for   fair
administration   of   justice.     Fair   criticism   of   judgment   and   its   analysis   is
permissible.   Lawyers'   fearlessness   in   court,   independence,   uprightness,
honesty,   equality   are   the   virtues   which   cannot   be   sacrificed.     It   is   duty   of
the   lawyer   to   lodge   appropriate   complaint   to   the   concerned   authorities   as
observed by this Court in  Vinay Chandra Mishra  (supra), which right cannot
be totally curtailed, however, making  such allegation publicly tantamounts
to contempt of court and may also be a professional misconduct that can be
taken care of either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the
Court under the Contempt of  Courts Act.     The  misconduct as specified in

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Rule   14­A   may   also   in   appropriate   cases   tantamount  to   contempt  of  court
and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction.   
78. Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugned Rules 14­
A to 14­D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of Madras as they are
ultra vires  to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and are hereby quashed.  The
writ petition is allowed. No costs.
………………………….J.
(Arun Mishra)
New Delhi; .....……………………..J.
January 28, 2019. (Vineet Saran)  

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ITEM NO.1501               COURT NO.5               SECTION X
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Writ Petition(s)(Civil)  No(s).  612/2016
R. MUTHUKRISHNAN                                   Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL OF 
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS   Respondent(s)
Date : 28-01-2019 This petition was called on for Judgment today.  
For Petitioner(s)  Petitioner-in-person
                    
For Respondent(s)    Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, AOR
                    
 
Hon’ble   Mr.   Justice   Arun   Mishra   pronounced   the   reportable
Judgment   of   the   Bench   comprising   His   Lordship   and   Hon’ble   Mr.
Justice Vineet Saran. 
The writ petition is allowed.  
Pending   interlocutory   application(s),   if   any,   is/are   disposed
of.   
(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA)                            (JAGDISH CHANDER)
  COURT MASTER                           BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)