2019 INSC 0081 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4527 OF 2009 POONA RAM ...APPELLANT VERSUS MOTI RAM (D) TH. LRS. & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. The   judgment   dated   28.08.2006   passed   by   the   High   Court of Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Civil Second Appeal No. 97   of   1984   and   the   concurrent   judgment   dated   10.10.2006   in Civil   Review   Petition   No.   18   of   2006,   dismissing   the   same,   are called in question in this appeal by the unsuccessful defendants. 2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as under:   A   suit   came   to   be   filed   for   declaration   of   title   and   for possession   by   Respondent   No.   1   herein.   Undisputedly,   the plaintiff     Moti   Ram   had   no   document   of   title   to   prove   his possession,   but   claimed   possessory   title   based   on   prior 1 possession   for   a   number   of   years.     However,   according   to   the plaintiff,   he   had   been   wrongly   dispossessed   by   defendants   on 30.04.1972,     which   was   within   the   12  years  preceding  the  filing of the present suit. The Trial Court decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Trial Court. The First Appellate   Court   dismissed   the   said   suit   on   the   ground   that   the defendants   had   proved   their   title   and   possession   over   the   suit property. 3 As mentioned supra, the plaintiff did not have any title deed with   respect   to   the   suit   property.   He   based   his   claim   mainly   on his   alleged   long   possession   over   the   property,   and   claimed   that there   was   nobody   with   better   title   over   it   than   him.   Per   contra, the   defendants   relied   on   two   sale   deeds,   viz.,   Ex.   A­6   dated 06.02.1956,   executed   by   the   original   owner   Khoom   Singh   in favour   of   Purkha   Ram,   and   Ex.   A­2   dated   21.06.1966,   executed by   Purkha   Ram   in   favour   of   the   appellant/Defendant   No.   1.   It was   also   not   disputed   that   the   plaintiff   did   not   have   possession as   on   the   date   of   filing   of   the   suit,   inasmuch   as   he   has   alleged that   he   was   wrongly   dispossessed   by   the   defendant   on 30.04.1972, prior to filing the suit. 2 4. The only questions to be decided in this appeal are whether the plaintiff had better title over the suit property and whether he was   in   settled   possession   of   the   property,   which   required dispossession in accordance with law.   5. Ms.   Christi   Jain,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the appellant/Defendant   No.   1,   taking   us   through   the   material   on record, contends that there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff   was   in   possession   of   the   property   at   any   point   of   time, much   less   for   a   longer   time   lawfully.     There   is   no   material   to show that the plaintiff has possessory title over the suit property. Additionally,   she   argues   that   the   sale   deeds   mentioned   supra relied   upon   by   the   defendants   would   clearly   reveal   that   the defendants   were   in   possession   of   the   property   as   owner   thereof, from the date of purchase of the suit property. 6. Undisputedly   and   as   duly   admitted   by   both   parties,   the property in question originally belonged to Jagirdar Khoom Singh of  Barmer.   The property  in question is part of a larger  property under the Jagirdari system, a few parts of which were rented out or  sold. After  the system  of Jagirdari was abolished, these jagirs were   resumed   in   the   year   1955­56.   While   a   few   persons continued   in   illegal   possession,   others   had   purchased   parts   of 3 the land from the Jagirdar, and the remaining land vested in the State Government and municipalities. After the resumption of the jagir,   it   seems   that   the   Barmer   Municipality   established   a planned   and   well­managed   colony   named   Nehru   Nagar   on   the said land.   Ex.12, Ex. 13 and Ex. 14 are the survey maps of the Municipality.   A perusal of Ex. 12 (first survey) reveals that Moti Ram was in possession of the land, the plot to the east of which was   possessed   by   Nawala   Harijan   and   in   the   east   of   Nawala Harijan’s plot, possession of  Purkha Ram  (to recall, predecessor­ in­interest   of   the   defendants)   on   the   site   has   been   indicated. Further,   the   possession   of   Purkha   Ram   has   also   been   indicated on   a   plot   to   the   south   of   the   land   duly   possessed   by   Moti   Ram. Thus, it is clear that the plots of land owned by Khoom Singh, in possession   of   these   persons,   were   not   uniformly   situated. However,   after   the   Municipality   took   over   possession,   it   seems that orderly formation of the plots was undertaken. Though there was   some   confusion   raised   by   the   plaintiff   with   regard   to   the boundaries of the property in question, the First Appellate Court being   the   final   court   of   fact,   on   due   appreciation   of   the   entire material   on   record,   gave   a   definite   finding   that   the   Trial   Court was not justified in decreeing the suit, and observed that Purkha 4 Ram was in possession of the property  in question even prior  to 1966,   and   had   sold   the   same   through   registered   sale   deed   in June 1966 vide Ex. A­2. This sale deed shows the measurement of   the   land,   which   corresponds   to   the   plots   in   question approximately. The judgment of the First Appellate Court reveals that the Municipality had let out only three plots to the Jagirdar, and   those   three   plots   together   measured                                   32   x   66 hands   (unit   of   measurement).   Thus,   each   plot   measured 32   x   22   hands.     These   were   numbered  as   Plot   No.   4,   Plot   No.   5 and Plot No. 7. The disputed site is Plot No. 7.  7. The official record (survey map), Ex. 14, which relates to the plot   in   question,   i.e.,   Plot   No.   7,   reveals   that   it   was   owned   by Poona Ram, who is Defendant No. 1 and the appellant herein. It is  also   relevant  to   note  that   sanction   for  constructing   the   house was   given   to   Purkha   Ram   in   the   year   1957.     Obviously,   such sanction would have been accorded only on the basis of title and possession of the property.  8. Section   64   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   contemplates   a   suit for   possession   of   immovable   property   based   on   previous possession  and   not  on   title,   if   brought   within   12   years   from   the date   of   dispossession.       Such   a   suit   is   known   in   law   as   a   suit 5 based   on   possessory   title   as   distinguishable   from   proprietary title.     It   cannot   be   disputed   and   is   by   now   well   settled   that ‘settled   possession’   or   effective   possession   of   a   person   without title   entitles   him   to   protect   his   possession   as   if   he   were   a   true owner. 9. The   law   in   India,   as   it   has   developed,   accords   with jurisprudential   thought   as   propounded   by   luminaries   like Salmond.   Salmond   on   Jurisprudence   (12   Edn.   at   paras   59­60) states:­ "These   two   concepts   of   ownership   and   possession, therefore,   may   be   used   to   distinguish   between   the de   facto   possessor   of   an   object   and   its   de   jure owner,   between   the   man   who   actually   has   it   and the   man   who   ought   to   have   it.   They   serve   also   to contract   the   position   of   one   whose   rights   are ultimate,  permanent   and   residual   with   that   of   one whose rights are only of a temporary nature.  x x x x x In   English   law   possession   is   a   good   title   of   right against   any   one   who   cannot   show   a   better.   A wrongful possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except earlier possessors and except   the   true   owner   himself.   Many   other   legal systems,   however,   go   much   further   than   this,   and treat possession as a provisional or temporary title even   against   the   true   owner   himself.   Even   a wrongdoer,   who   is   deprived   of   his   possession,   can recover it from any person whatever, simply on the ground   of   his   possession.   Even   the   true   owner, who   takes   his   own,   may   be   forced   in   this   way   to 6 restore   it   to   the   wrongdoer,   and   will   not   be permitted to set up his  own superior  title  to  it. He must first give up possession, and then proceed in due   course   of   law   for   the   recovery   of   the   thing   on the   ground   of   his   ownership.   The   intention   of   the law   is   that   every   possessor   shall   be   entitled   to retain and recover his possession, until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.  Legal remedies thus appointed for the protection of possession   even   against   ownership   are   called possessory , while those available for the protection of   ownership   itself   may   be   distinguished   as proprietary .   In   the   modern   and   medieval   civil   law the   distinction   is   expressed   by   the   contrasted terms   petitorium   (a   proprietary   suit)   and possessorium  (a possessory suit)."  10. As   far   back   as   1924,   in   the   case   of   Midnapur   Zamindary Co. Ltd.   v . Naresh Narayan Roy , AIR 1924 PC 144, the learned Judge   observed   that   in   India,   persons   are   not   permitted   to   take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled   to   through   a   court.       Later,   in   the   case   of   Nair   Service Society   Ltd.   v .   K.C.   Alexander ,   AIR   1968   SC   1165,   this   Court ruled   that   when   the   facts   disclose   no   title   in   either   party, possession alone decides.   It was further held that if Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (corresponding to the present Section 6) is employed, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant   does   not   avail   him.   When,   however,   the   period   of   six 7 months   has   passed,   questions   of   title   can   be   raised   by   the defendant, and if he does so the plaintiff must establish a better title   or   fail.     In   other   words,   such   a   right   is   only   restricted   to possession   in   a   suit   under   Section   9   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act (corresponding   to   the   present   Section   6)   but   does   not   bar   a   suit on   prior   possession   within   12   years   from   the   date   of dispossession, and title need not be proved unless the defendant can provide one.  11. It was also observed by this Court in   Nair Service Society Ltd   (supra)   that   a   person   in   possession   of   land   in   assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership   has   a   perfectly   good   title   against   the   entire   world except   the   rightful   owner.   In   such   a   case,   the   defendant   must show in himself or his predecessor a valid legal title and probably a   possession   prior   to   the   plaintiff’s,   and   thus   be   able   to   raise   a presumption prior in time.  12. In   the   case   of   Rame   Gowda   (dead)   by   Lrs.   v .     M. Varadappa   Naidu   (dead)   by   Lrs.   and   another ,   (2004)   1   SCC 769,   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court,   while   discussing   the Indian law on the subject, observed as under:­ 8 “8.   It   is   thus   clear   that   so   far   as   the   Indian   law   is concerned   the   person   in   peaceful   possession   is entitled   to   retain   his   possession   and   in   order   to protect   such   possession   he   may   even   use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may   retake   possession   if   he   can   do   so   peacefully and   without   the   use   of   unreasonable   force.   If   the trespasser   is   in   settled   possession   of   the   property belonging   to   the   rightful   owner,   the   rightful   owner shall   have   to   take   recourse   to   law;   he   cannot   take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere   with   his   possession.   The   law   will   come   to the   aid   of   a   person   in   peaceful   and   settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by   restoring   him   in   possession   even   from   the rightful   owner   (of   course   subject   to   the   law   of limitation),   if   the   latter   has   dispossessed   the   prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better   title,   possession   or   prior   peaceful   settled possession   is   itself   evidence   of   title.   Law   presumes the   possession   to   go   with   the   title   unless   rebutted. The   owner   of   any   property   may   prevent   even   by using   reasonable   force   a   trespasser   from   an attempted   trespass,   when   it   is   in   the   process   of being   committed,   or   is   of   a   flimsy   character,   or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has   just   been   committed,   while   the   rightful   owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the   last   of   the   cases,   the   possession   of   the trespasser, just entered into would  not  be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.” 13. The   crux   of   the   matter   is   that   a   person   who   asserts possessory  title over  a particular  property  will have to show  that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such 9 a   right   against   the   true   owner.     Settled   possession   means   such possession   over   the   property   which   has   existed   for   a   sufficiently long   period   of   time,   and   has   been   acquiesced   to   by   the   true owner.     A   casual   act   of   possession   does   not   have   the   effect   of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner.     A stray act of trespass,   or   a   possession   which   has   not   matured   into   settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force.   Settled possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket   formula   to   determine   settled   possession.   Occupation of   a  property   by   a   person   as  an   agent   or   a   servant   acting   at   the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of   animus possidendi . The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.  14. As   mentioned   supra,   Purkha   Ram   had   purchased   three plots   from   Jagirdar   Khoom   Singh.     In   sale   deed   Ex.   A­6,   three plots have been mentioned as plots of three houses. One of these, being   Plot   No.   7,   was   sold   by   Purkha   Ram   to   the   appellant,   one 10 plot   being   Plot   No.   4   was   sold   to   Teja   Ram   and   the   third   plot being Plot No. 5 was retained by Purkha Ram.   15. In   order   to   prove   possession   of   the   property,   the   plaintiff relied   upon   the   rent   note   Ex.   1,   which   shows   that   the   plot   in question was let out by the plaintiff to one Joga Ram in the year 1967.   On   12.05.1967,   a   fire   broke   out   and   the   entire   fodder stored on the plot got burnt. Thereafter, the plot was kept vacant. DW­7, who has been referred to in order to establish spreading of the fire, stated that the fire started due to sparks coming from a railway   engine.   But   there   was   no   railway   line   adjacent   to   the disputed   land   which   could   have   caused   a   fire.     Even   otherwise, the rent note Ex. 1 does not refer to the plot in question, and its boundaries   have   also   not   been   mentioned.     Merely   on   doubtful material and cursory evidence, it cannot be held that the plaintiff was   ever   in   possession   of   the   property,   and   that   too   in   settled possession. 16. The plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 makes much of the old body of   a   motor   vehicle   belonging   to   him   lying   on   the   property.   Ex.   2 clearly reveals that one part of the motor vehicle was lying on the disputed   property   and   another   part   was   lying   on   the   plot   of   the plaintiff.  The said body of the motor vehicle is about 3 to 4 feet in 11 length   only   and   the   same   was   lying   on   the   boundary   of   the disputed   property.     But   the   plaintiff/Respondent   No.   1   claims possession   of   the   entire   plot   based   on   such   fact.   Absolutely   no material is found to show that the plaintiff/Respondent No. 1 was in   actual   possession,   much   less   continuous   possession,   of   the property   for   a   longer   period   which   may   be   called   settled possession  or  established  possession.  As  mentioned  supra,  mere casual possession, that too relying on a motor vehicle body lying on   a   part   of   the   property,   would   not   prove   settled   possession   of the plaintiff. 17. The  plaintiff  has   to  prove  his  case  to  the   satisfaction  of  the Court.   He   cannot   succeed   on   the   weakness   of   the   case   of   the defendant.   Even otherwise, there is no confusion at all regarding the   identity   of   the   property   in   question   and   on   the   basis   of material   on   record,   the   First   Appellate   Court   has   correctly   ruled that   the   appellant/Defendant   No.   1   has   proved   his   title   and possession over the suit property since the date of his purchase of the   property.     Prior   to   the   purchase,   his   predecessor­in­interest was in possession of the same. 18. Having   regard   to   the   position   of   law   and   facts   of   the   case, we   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   High   Court   was   not 12 justified   in   interfering   with   the   judgment   of   the   First   Appellate Court,   which   has   come   down   very   heavily   on   the   procedure adopted   by   the   trial   Judge   in   deciding   the   matter,   more particularly   when   no   fault   can   be   found   on   facts   with   the judgment of the First Appellate Court.   Generally, it is not open to the High Court to interfere with the   findings   of   fact   recorded   by   the   First   Appellate   Court   when such   findings   are   based   on   the   evidence   on   record,   and   are   not perverse or against the material on record. 19. The   conclusion   arrived   at   by   the   High   Court   and   the reasons assigned for the same are not correct inasmuch as there is   absolutely   no   material   in   favour   of   the   case   of   the   plaintiff   to show   possessory   title.   In   order   to   claim   possessory   title,   the plaintiff   will   have   to   prove   his   own   case,   and   also   will   have   to show that he has better  title than any other person. Since there is   no   documentary   proof   that   the   plaintiff   was   in   possession   of the suit property, that too for a long period, he cannot be allowed to   succeed   based   on   minor   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the defendants.  Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. 20. The   impugned   judgment   of   the   High   Court   dated 28.08.2006  and   its  review   stands  set  aside  and   the   judgment   of 13 the   First   Appellate   Court   is   restored.   Consequently,   suit   stands dismissed.  ………………………………..J. [ N.V. Ramana]         ………………………………..J.     [Mohan M. Shantanagoudar]    New Delhi; January 29, 2019. 14