2019 INSC 0088
           REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5753­5754 OF 2011
Mahadev P Kambekar (D) 
TR. LRS.              ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Shree Krishna Woolen Mills
Pvt. Ltd.            …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) These   appeals   are   directed   against   the   final
judgment   and   order   dated   19.07.2007   passed   by
the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay   in   Appeal
No.169   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980   and   in
Appeal   No.199   of   1999   in   Suit   No.503   of   1980
whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
allowed   both   the   appeals   filed   by   the   appellants
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herein   (defendant)   and   the   respondent(plaintiff)
herein respectively.   
2) In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in these appeals which lies in a narrow compass, it
is   necessary   to   set   out   the   relevant   facts
hereinbelow.
3) The   appellants   are   the   legal  representatives   of
Mahadev   Pandurang   Kambekar,   who   was   the
original   defendant   whereas   the   respondent­Shree
Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd. is the plaintiff in the
Civil Suit out of which these appeal arise.
4) The   dispute   between   the   parties   relates  to   the
land bearing survey Nos.58 and 60 (re­numbered as
CTS   741,741/1   to   741/7)   situated   at   Nahur­
Bhandup   in   Bombay   suburban   District   (hereinafter
referred to as “the suit land”).
5) The plaintiff claims to be the lessee  of the suit
land   whereas   the   defendant   claims   to   be   the
owner/lessor of the suit land on the terms set out in
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the   indenture   of   the   lease   deed   dated   20.06.1958
executed between the parties.
6) A   dispute   arose   between   the   parties.   This   led
the defendant to determine the lease in question by
serving   a   quit   notice   dated   19.02.1980   to   the
plaintiff   requesting   them   to   handover   the   leased
premises,   which   was   in   their   possession,   to   the
defendant.
7) The   plaintiff   then   filed   a   Civil   Suit   (No.503   of
1980)   against   the   defendant   on   the   original   side   of
the Bombay High Court claiming therein the specific
performance   of   the   contract   (lease   deed)   in   relation
to the suit land. 
8) The   suit   was   based   essentially   on   clause   7   of
the   Lease   Deed   which,   according   to   the   plaintiff,
enabled   them   to   elect   and   exercise   their   right   to
purchase   the   suit   land   from   the   defendant   on
fulfillment of the conditions set out therein.
9) The defendant on being served filed the written
statement.   The   defendant   denied   the   claim   and   at
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the   same   time   also   filed   his   counter   claim   against
the plaintiff seeking their eviction from the suit land
and the arrears of rent.
10) The   Single   Judge   by   judgment/decree   dated
24.12.1998   decreed   the   plaintiff’s   suit   for   specific
performance of contract and directed the defendant
to   execute   the   conveyance   deed   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff   of   the   suit   land.   The   Single   Judge   also
allowed the counter claim filed by the defendant and
accordingly  passed  the  decree for  possession  of  the
suit land and arrears of rent for three years against
the plaintiff.
11) The appellants (defendant) and the respondent
(plaintiff) both felt aggrieved by the judgment/decree
passed by the Single Judge and filed their respective
appeals before the Division Bench. 
12) So   far   as   the   defendant's   (appellants   herein)
Appeal No.169/1999 was concerned, it arose out of
the   decree   passed   against   him   for   specific
performance   of   the   contract,   whereas   so   far   as   the
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plaintiff's (respondent herein) appeal (No.199/1999)
was   concerned,   it   arose   out   of   the   decree   passed
against   them   for   possession   of   the   suit   land   and
arrears of rent.
13) By   impugned   judgment,   the   Division   Bench
allowed   both   the   appeals.     So   far   as   appeal
(169/1999)   filed   by   the   appellants   (defendant)   was
concerned,   the   Division   Bench   set   aside   the
judgment /decree and remanded the suit for re­trial
to   the   Single   Judge  on  merits   afresh   in   accordance
with law.
14) So   far   as   appeal   (199/1999)   filed   by   the
respondent   (plaintiff)   was   concerned,   the   Division
Bench set aside the judgment/decree on the ground
that the counter­claim was not maintainable in view
of Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882 ( for short called “the Act 1882”) . In other
words,   the   Division   Bench   held   that   so   far   as
counter­claim   filed   by   the   defendant   against   the
plaintiff   is   concerned,   the   Single   Judge   wrongly
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entertained it as it had no jurisdiction on its original
jurisdiction to entertain counter­claim of this nature
in the light of the provisions of Section 41 of the Act
1882.
15) The   defendant   (appellants   herein),   i.e.,   lessor
felt   aggrieved   by     that   part   of   the   order   of   the
Division   Bench   which   resulted   in   dismissal   of   his
counter­claim  and  filed  the  present  appeals  by  way
of special leave in this Court.
16) So far as the order of the Division Bench which
resulted   in   setting   aside   of   the   judgment/decree   of
the   Single   Judge   and   remanding   of   the   suit   for   re­
trial on merits is concerned, it attained finality as a
result of dismissal of SLP filed by the plaintiff in this
Court.  
17) The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the
Division   Bench   was   right   in   dismissing   the
defendant's   counter­claim   as   being   not
maintainable.
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18) Heard   Mr.   Shekhar   Naphade,   learned   senior
counsel   for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   Shyam   Divan,
learned senior counsel for the respondent.
19) Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants   (defendant)   and   Mr.
Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel appearing for
the   respondent   (plaintiff)   addressed   the   Court   at
length.     However,   having   heard   both   the   learned
counsel and on perusing  the record of the case, we
find no merit in these appeals.
20) In   our   considered   opinion,   the   issue   involved
in the present appeals remains no longer  res integra
and   is   decided   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Mansukhlal   Dhanraj   Jain   &   Ors.   vs.   Eknath
Vithal Ogale  [(1995) 2 SCC 665].
21) In   Mansukhlal   case   (supra),   the   question
arose   as   to   whether   the   suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff
claiming   to   be   the   licensee   of   the   premises   on
monetary   consideration   and   seeking   permanent
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injunction   restraining   the   defendant   (licensor)   from
recovery   of   the   possession   of   the   premises   is
cognizable   by   the   City   Civil   Court,   Bombay
constituted   under   the   Bombay   City   Civil   Court   Act
or   is   cognizable   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes
Bombay as per Section 41(1) of the Act, 1882.
22) It is this question, which was examined by this
Court in detail in the light of the relevant provisions
of   the   Bombay   City   Civil   Court   Act,   the   Presidency
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   1882   and   the   Bombay
Rents,   Hotel  and   Lodging   House   Rates  Control   Act,
1947. 
23) Having examined the question, their Lordships
speaking through Majmudar, J. held that such suit
is cognizable and thus maintainable in the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay.
24) It is apposite to refer the discussion contained
in   paras   11,   12,   13,   16,   17   and   18   which   read   as
under:
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“ 11.   In   order   to   resolve   the   controversy
posed   for   our   consideration,   it   will   be
appropriate   to   note   the   relevant   statutory
provision   having   a   direct   bearing   on   this
question.   Section   41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause
Courts Act reads as under:
“ 41.   (1)   Notwithstanding   anything
contained elsewhere in this Act or in any
other law for the time being in force but
subject   to   the   provisions   of   sub­section
(2), the Court of Small Causes shall have
jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits
and   proceedings   between   a   licensor   and
licensee,   or   a   landlord   and   tenant,
relating  to  the  recovery  of  possession  of
any   immovable   property   situated   in
Greater   Bombay,   or   relating   to   the
recovery of the licence fee or charges or
rent  thereof, irrespective  of the  value of
the   subject­matter   of   such   suits   or
proceedings.”
12.   A   mere   look   at   the   aforesaid   provision
makes   it   clear   that   because   of   the   non­
obstante   clause   contained   in   the   section,
even   if   a   suit   may   otherwise   lie   before   any
other   court,   if   such   a   suit   falls   within   the
sweep   of   Section   41(1)   it   can   be   entertained
only   by   the   Court   of   Small   Causes.   In   the
present   proceedings   we   are   not   concerned
with   the   provisions   of   sub­section   (2)   of
Section   41   and   hence   we   do   not   refer   to
them. For applicability of Section 41(1) of the
Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   the   following
conditions   must   be   satisfied   before   taking
the   view   that   jurisdiction   of   regular
competent  civil   court like   City Civil   Court  is
ousted:
(i)   It   must   be   a   suit   or   proceeding
between the licensee and licensor; or
(ii) between a landlord and a tenant;
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(iii)   such   suit   or   proceeding   must   relate
to   the   recovery   of   possession   of   any
property situated in Greater Bombay; or
(iv)   relating   to   the   recovery   of   the
licence fee or charges or rent thereof.
13. In the present case, we are not concerned
with the 2nd and 4th conditions, as the only
contention   of   the   appellants   is   that   the
present  suits  do  not  satisfy  conditions 1  and
3   for   attracting   Section   41(1).   The
respondents   claim   to   the   contrary.   It   is
obvious   that   if   the   present   suits   satisfy
conditions 1 and 3 they would clearly attract
the   applicability   of   Section   41(1)   of   the   Act
and   such   suits   would   be   outside   the   purview
of regular civil court like the City Civil Court.
Therefore,   the   enquiry   which   becomes
relevant  at  this   stage   is  to  find   out   from  the
averments   in   the   plaints   whether   these   are
suits   between   a   licensor   and   a   licensee   and
whether   they   relate   to   the   recovery   of
possession of immovable property situated in
Greater Bombay.
16.   It   is,   therefore,   obvious   that   the   phrase
“relating   to   recovery   of   possession”   as  found
in   Section   41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act   is   comprehensive   in   nature   and   takes   in
its   sweep   all   types   of   suits   and   proceedings
which   are   concerned   with   the   recovery   of
possession of  suit property  from the licensee
and,   therefore,   suits   for   permanent
injunction   restraining   the   defendant   from
effecting forcible recovery of such possession
from   the   licensee­plaintiff   would   squarely   be
covered by the wide sweep of the said phrase.
Consequently in the light of the averments in
the   plaints   under   consideration   and   the
prayers   sought   for   therein,   on   the   clear
language   of   Section   41(1),   the   conclusion   is
inevitable   that   these   suits   could   lie   within
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the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   Small   Cause
Court, Bombay and the City Civil Court would
have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
17.   We   may   now   refer   to   the   relevant
decisions   of   this   Court   and   other   courts   to
which   our   attention   was   invited   by   learned
counsel   for   both   the   sides.   As   some   of   the
decisions referred to a pari materia provision
as  found  in  Section  28 of  the Bombay Rents,
Hotel   and   Lodging   House   Rates   Control   Act,
1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Bombay
Rent Act”), it will be necessary to refer to the
said   provision.   Section   28(1)   of   the   Bombay
Rent Act reads as under:
“ 28.   Jurisdiction   of   courts.—
Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in
any   law   and   notwithstanding   that   by
reason of the amount of the claim or for
any other reason, the suit or proceeding
would   not,   but   for   this   provision,   be
within its jurisdiction,—
(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small
Causes,   Bombay,   (aa)   in   any   area   for
which,   a   Court   of   Small   Causes   is
established   under   the   Provincial   Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and
(b)   elsewhere,   the   Court   of   the   Civil
Judge   (Junior   Division)   having
jurisdiction   in   the   area   in   which   the
premises   are   situate   or,   if   there   is   no
such   Civil   Judge,   the   Court   of   the   Civil
Judge   (Senior   Division)   having   ordinary
jurisdiction,
shall   have   jurisdiction   to   entertain   and
try   any   suit   or   proceeding   between   a
landlord   and   a   tenant   relating   to   the
recovery   of   rent   or   possession   of   any
premises   to   which   any   of   the   provisions
of this Part apply….”
18.   When   Section   41(1)   of   the   Small   Cause
Courts   Act   is   read   in   juxtaposition   with   the
aforesaid Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act,
it   becomes   clear   that   pari   materia   words   are
used   about   nature   of   suits   in   both   these
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provisions   for   conferring   exclusive
jurisdiction   on   Small   Cause   Courts,   namely,
they   alone   can   entertain   such   suits   or
proceedings   relating   to   recovery   of
possession   of   premises.   It   is   of   course   true
that   Section   41   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts
Act   deals   with   such   suits   between   the
licensee and  licensor while  Section  28  of the
Bombay   Rent   Act   deals   with   suits   between
landlord   and   tenant.   But   the   nature   of   such
suits as contemplated by both these sections
is   the   same,   namely,   it   should   be   the   suit
relating   to   the   recovery   of   possession   of
premises. Interpreting the phrase “relating to
recovery   of   possession”   as   found   in   Section
28 of the Bombay Rent Act, a Bench of three
learned   Judges   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of
Babulal   Bhuramal   v.   Nandram   Shivram6   held
that   a   suit   for   declaration   that   one   of   the
plaintiffs   was   the   tenant   of   the   defendant
landlord and the other plaintiffs were his sub­
tenants   and   they   were   entitled   to   be
protected   from   eviction   squarely   falls   within
the   exclusive   jurisdiction   of   the   Small   Cause
Court,   Bombay   under   Section   28   of   the
Bombay Rent Act and jurisdiction of the City
Civil   Court   for   entertaining   such   a   suit   is
excluded.   Imam,   J.   speaking   for   the   three­
Judge   Bench   in   that   case   observed   at   page
374 of the report as under:
“ The   present   suit   filed   in   the   City   Civil
Court raised in substance a claim to the
effect   that   the   plaintiffs   were   the
tenants   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning   of   the   Act.   Such   a   claim   was
one which arose out of the Act or any of
its   provisions.   The   suit   related   to
possession of the premises and the right
of   the   landlord   to   evict   any   of   the
plaintiffs  was  denied  on  the  ground  that
the first plaintiff was a tenant within the
meaning of the Act and the premises had
been   lawfully   sublet   by   him   to   the
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second   and   third   plaintiffs.   The   City
Civil   Court   was   thus   called   upon   to
decide   whether   the   first   plaintiff   was   a
tenant   of   the   premises   within   the
meaning   of   the   Act   and   whether   he   had
lawfully   sublet   the   same   to   the   second
and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court,
therefore, had to determine whether the
plaintiffs   had   established   their   claim   to
be   in   possession   of   the   premises   in
accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the
Act.”
25) In the light of the law laid down by this Court
in  Mansukhlal’s case  (supra) which was later relied
on   in   Prabhudas   Damodar   Kotecha   &   Ors.   vs.
Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr.  [(2013) 15 SCC
358],   we   have   no   hesitation   in   affirming   the   view
taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment
which   rightly   held   that   the   counter­claim   filed   by
the   defendant   (appellants   herein)   is   not
maintainable.
26) In   our   considered   view,   the   law   laid   down   in
these   two   cases   has   full   application   to   the   facts   of
this  case and  we find  no  ground  to  take a  different
view than what has been taken by the High Court.
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27) The only distinction on the facts of the case of
Mansukhlal   (supra) and the case at hand is that in
case   of   Mansukhlal   (supra),   the   dispute   was
between  the  licensee  and  the  licensor  in  relation   to
the   land,   whereas   in   the   case   at   hand,   the   dispute
is between the landlord and the tenant. 
28) This   factual   distinction,   in   our   view,   is   of   no
significance   for   deciding   the   issue   in   question
against the appellants by placing reliance on the law
laid   down   in   the   case   of   Mansukhlal   (supra)
because   both   the   category   of   cases,   i.e.,   the   one
arising   between   the   licensor   and   the   licensee   and
the   other   arising   between   the   landlord   and   the
tenant   in   relation   to   the   land   are   governed   by
Section 41 of the Small Cause Courts Act. 
29) In other words, whether it is a suit between the
licensor   and   the   licensee   or   between   the   landlord
and   the   tenant,   such   types   of   suits   fall   under
Section   41   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts   Act   and   are,
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therefore, cognizable by the Courts of Small Causes,
Bombay.
30) This   takes   us   to   deal   with   the   next   argument
of     Mr.   Naphade,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellants that once the tenancy is determined such
suits would not come within the purview of Section
41   of   the   Small   Cause   Courts   Act.   This   argument
was rejected by the Division Bench and, in our view,
rightly   by   placing   reliance   on   the   law   laid   down   by
the   Bombay   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Nagin
Mansukhlal   Dagli   vs.   Haribhai   Manibhai   Patel
(AIR 1980 Bombay 123) (Para 8 of the said decision
quoted in the impugned order).  We approve the law
laid down by the Bombay High Court in the case of
Nagin Mansukhlal Dagli  (supra) as laying down the
correct   principle   of   law.   We,   therefore,   do   not
consider   it   necessary   to   elaborate   our   reasoning
more than what we have said.
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31) Before   parting,     we   consider   it   apposite   to
make   it   clear   that   though   both   learned   senior
counsel   in   support   of   their   respective   submissions
referred extensively to the factual matrix of the case
from their respective list of dates, pleadings and the
documents   but   we   have   refrained   from   recording
any factual finding on any of the factual issues. 
32) Indeed, in the light of what we have held  supra
on legal  question, it is not  necessary.   It is now for
the parties to raise all such factual issue(s) such as
how   much   area   was   leased   out,   how   much   area   is
outside the lease, who are the owners of the leased
area   and   the   areas   adjacent   to   leased   area   and   all
incidental   questions   arising   therefrom   before   the
competent Court. 
33) It   is   apart   from   the   fact   that   these   factual
issues were also not gone into by the Division Bench
and indeed rightly.   It is for this reason, we find no
ground to deal with them for the first time in these
appeals   else   it   will   cause   prejudice   to   the   rights   of
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the parties while prosecuting their grievances before
the   competent   Court.   Now,   it   will   be   for   the
competent   Court   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion   on
their   respective   merits  and   pass   appropriate  orders
in accordance with law. 
34) In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussion   and   the
observations,   we   find   no   merit   in   these   appeals.
The appeals thus fail and are accordingly dismissed.
    
                  
       ………...................................J.
      [ ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE ]
 
                                   
   … ...……..................................J.
             [R. SUBHASH REDDY]
New Delhi;
January 31, 2019
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