2019 INSC 0124
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL     Nos. 2450­2451 OF 2010
VARINDER KUMAR ....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH      ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
The   appellant   assails   the   order   reversing   his   acquittal   and
convicting   him   under   Section   20(ii)(c)   of   the   Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic   Substances   Act,   1985   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the
NDPS Act”), sentencing him for 20 years, along with fine of Rs.2 lacs,
with a default stipulation . 
 
2. The appellant is stated to have been apprehended on 31.03.1995
carrying   “charas”   on   his   scooter,   in   two   gunny   bags,   with   varying
quantities. The Trial Court acquitted the appellant on grounds of non­
compliance   with   Section   100(4)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,
with   regard   to   independent   witnesses.   Further,   there   had   been   non­
compliance with Sections 50, 52 and 57 of the NDPS Act, and that the
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seal prepared at the time of seizure and handed over to PW­5, Naresh
Kumar had not been produced in the court. 
3. The   High   Court,   reversing   the   acquittal   held   that   the   seals
prepared at the time of seizure, and also at the time of deposit in the
Malkhana   had   been   produced   and   marked   as   Exhibits   PH   and   PK.
The   chemical   examiners   report   confirmed   the   seized   material   as
“charas”.   The   seizure   of   the   contraband   being   from   gunny   bags,
Section   50   of   the   NDPS   Act   had   no   application.     Merely   because   the
two independent witnesses were not from the same locality, would not
ipso facto  amount to violation of Section 100(4), Cr.P.C.
4. Shri Dhruv Pall, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the   appellant   had   been   falsely   implicated   because   he   had   lodged   a
complaint   against   the   C.I.D.,   for   improper   investigation   in   the   case
relating  to his father’s death.   PW­5, Naresh Kumar, the independent
witness, had turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case
with   regard   to   search   and   seizure.     The   second   independent   witness
Jeevan   Kumar,   was   withheld   by   the   prosecution   without   any
explanation.   In   the   facts   of   the   case,   the   absence   of   independent
witnesses from the same locality as required by Section 100(4) Cr.P.C.
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assumes   importance.   PW­10   Sub­   Inspector   Prem   Singh,   being   the
informant himself, was also the Investigating Officer, and which alone
vitiates the conviction irrespective of all other issues.   Strong reliance
was placed on a recent decision of this Court in  Mohan Lal vs. State
of Punjab ,  AIR 2018 SC 3853.  
5. Shri   Abhinav   Mukerji,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State,
opposing the appeal submitted that the order of the High Court being
well   reasoned   and   considered   merits   no   interference.   The   appellant
has a previous history of convictions under the NDPS Act.  The ground
that PW­10 being the informant could not have been the investigating
officer also, had not been raised at any stage.  The order of conviction
therefore may not be tested on a ground to which the High Court had
no   occasion   to   apply   its   mind.     It   has   also   not   been   pleaded   in   the
appeal.
6. We have considered the respective submissions.  PW­10 is stated
to   have   received   secret   information   at   2.45   P.M.   on   31.03.1995.     He
immediately   reduced   it   into   writing   and   sent   the   same   to   PW­8,   Shri
Jaipal   Singh,   Dy.S.P.,   C.I.D.,   Shimla.     At   3.05   P.M.   PW­7,   Head
Constable Surender Kumar stopped PW­5, Naresh Kumar and another
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independent witness, Jeevan Kumar travelling together, whereafter the
appellant was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his
Scooter   which   contained   varying   quantities   of   ‘charas’.     PW­8,   Shri
Jaipal   Singh,   Dy.S.P.,   C.I.D.,   Shimla   who   had   arrived   by   then   gave
notice   to   the  appellant   and   obtained  his   consent   for   carrying   out   the
search. Two samples of 25 gms. each were taken from the two Gunny
Bags and sealed with the seal ‘S’, and given to PW­5.  PW­2, Jaswinder
Singh the Malkhana Head Constable resealed it with the seal ‘P’.   The
conclusion  of   the  Trial  Court  that   the  seal  had  not   been  produced  in
the   Court   is   therefore   perverse   in   view   of   the   two   specimen   seal
impressions having been marked as Exhibits PH and PK.  It is not the
case   of   the   appellant   that   the   seals   were   found   tampered   in   any
manner. 
7. Section   50   of   NDPS   Act   patently   has   no   application   since   the
recovery was not from the person of the appellant but the gunny bags
carried on the scooter.  PW­5 the independent witness who had signed
the   search   and   seizure   documents   but   turned   hostile,   was   duly
confronted   under   Section   145   of   the   Evidence   Act,   1872   with   his
earlier   statements   to   the   contrary   under   Section   161  Cr.P.C.   and  did
not deny his signatures.  The order sheet dated 08.11.1995 of the Trial
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Court reveals that independent witness Jeevan Kumar was present on
that   date   to   depose,   but   was   bound   down   on   objection   from   the
defence   side   that   he   be   examined   on   another   date   along   with   other
witnesses. It is therefore very reasonable to conclude that the witness
did  not   appear  subsequently   because  he  may  have  been  won   over  by
the   appellant.   There   is   no   material   to   conclude   that   the   witness   was
withheld   or   suppressed   by   the   prosecution   with   any   ulterior   motive.
There   is   no   material   for   us   to   conclude   that   PW­5   and   the   other
independent   witness   Jeevan   Kumar   were   not   respectable   persons.
Given the very short span of time in which events took place it is not
possible to hold any violation of Section 100(4) Cr.P.C.   In any event,
no   prejudice   on   that   account   has   been   demonstrated.     Sections   52
and   57   of   NDPS   Act   being   directory   in   nature   is   of   no   avail   to   the
appellant.  
8. The   appellant   took   a   defence   under   Section   313   Cr.P.C.   of   false
implication   but   failed   to   produce   any   evidence   with   regard   to   the
complaint lodged by him against the C.I.D. department, a fact noticed
by the Trial Court itself.   We therefore find no reason to come to any
different conclusion than that arrived at by the High Court.
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9. The   only   issue   surviving   for   consideration   is   with   regard   to   the
prosecution   being   vitiated   because   PW­10   was   the   informant   as   also
the   Investigating   Officer,   in   view   of   Mohan   Lal   (supra).     The   ground
not   having   been   raised   at   any   earlier   stage   quite   obviously,   the
prosecution never had a chance to contest the same.   It has not even
been pleaded in the appeal. Nonetheless in view of the reliance placed,
we shall examine the issue.
10. In   Mohan   Lal   (supra)   our   attention   had   been   invited   to   the
divergent views being taken on the issue with regard to the informant
and   the   investigating   officer   being   the   same   person   in   criminal
prosecutions, and the varying conclusions arrived at in respect of the
same.   The facts in   Mohan Lal   (supra), were indeed extremely telling
in so far as the defaults on part of the prosecution was concerned.  In
that   back   ground   it   was   held   that   the   issue   could   not   be   left   to   be
decided on the facts of a case, impinging on the right of a fair trial to
an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, observing as
follows:
“25.   In   view   of   the   conflicting   opinions   expressed   by
different two Judge Benches of this Court, the importance
of a fair investigation from the point of view of an accused
as   a   guaranteed   constitutional   right   under   Article   21   of
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the   Constitution   of   India,   it   is   considered   necessary   that
the   law   in   this   regard   be   laid   down   with   certainty.     To
leave   the   matter   for   being   determined   on   the   individual
facts   of   a   case,   may   not   only   lead   to   a   possible   abuse   of
powers,   but   more   importantly   will   leave   the   police,   the
accused,   the   lawyer   and   the   courts   in   a   state   of
uncertainty and confusion which has to be avoided.   It is
therefore   held   that   a   fair   investigation,   which   is   but   the
very   foundation   of   fair   trial,   necessarily   postulates   that
the  informant and the  investigator  must not  be  the same
person.   Justice must not only be done, but must appear
to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined
conclusion has to be excluded.  This requirement is all the
more   imperative   in   laws   carrying   a   reverse   burden   of
proof.”
11.   The paramount consideration being  to interpret the law so that
it   operates   fairly,   the   facts   of   that   case   did   not   show   any   need   to
visualise   what   all   exceptions   must   be   carved   out   and   provided   for.
The   attention   of   the   Court   was   also   not   invited   to   the   need   for
considering the carving out of exceptions.
12. Individual rights of the accused are undoubtedly important.  But
equally   important   is   the   societal   interest   for   bringing   the   offender   to
book and for the system to send the right message to all in the society
—be   it   the   law­abiding   citizen   or   the   potential   offender.     ‘Human
rights’ are not only of the accused but, extent apart, also of the victim,
the   symbolic   member   of   the   society   as   the   potential   victim   and   the
society as a whole.
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13. Law   has   to   cater   to   wide   variety   of   situations   as   appear   in
society.     Law   being   dynamic,   the   certainty   of   the   legislation   appears
rigid at times whenever a circumstance (set of facts) appears which is
not   catered   for   explicitly.     Expediency   then   dictates   that   the   higher
judiciary,   while   interpreting   the   law,   considers   such   exception(s)   as
are   called   for   without   disturbing   the   pith   and   substance   and   the
original intention of the legislature.   This is required primarily for the
reason   to   help   strike   a   balance   between   competing   forces   –   justice
being the end – and also because the process of fresh legislation could
take   a   long   time,   which   would   mean   failure   of   justice,   and   with   it
erosion of public confidence and trust in the justice delivery system.
14. The principle of fair trial now informs and energises many areas
of the law.   It is a constant, ongoing, evolutionary process continually
adapting   itself   to   changing   circumstances,   and   endeavouring   to   meet
the exigencies of the situation – peculiar at times – and related to the
nature   of   crime,   persons   involved,   directly   or   operating   from   behind,
and   so   many   other   powerful   factors   which   may   come   in   the   way   of
administration   of   criminal   justice,   wherefore   the   endeavour   of   the
higher courts, while interpreting the law, is to strike the right balance.
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15.  Societal   interest   therefore   mandates   that   the   law   laid   down   in
Mohan Lal  (supra) cannot be allowed to become a spring board by an
accused   for   being   catapulted   to   acquittal,   irrespective   of   all   other
considerations pursuant to an investigation and prosecution when the
law   in   that   regard   was   nebulous.     Criminal   jurisprudence   mandates
balancing  the  rights  of the  accused and  the prosecution.    If the  facts
in   Mohan   Lal   (supra)   were   telling   with  regard   to   the  prosecution,   the
facts in the present case are equally telling with regard to the accused.
There   is   a   history   of   previous   convictions   of   the   appellant   also.     We
cannot   be   oblivious   of   the   fact   that   while   the   law   stood   nebulous,
charge   sheets   have   been   submitted,   trials   in   progress   or   concluded,
and appeals pending all of which will necessarily be impacted.    
16. In  Sonu alias Amar vs. State of Haryana,  (2017) 8 SCC 570, it
was observed as follows:
“37. …… A large number of trials have been held during
the period between 4.8.2005 and 18.9.2014.   Electronic
records   without   a   certificate   might   have   been   adduced
in evidence.  There is no doubt that the judgment of this
Court  in   Anwar   P.V.   vs.   P.K.   Basheer ,  (2014)   10   SCC
473   has   to   be   retrospective   in   operation   unless   the
judicial   tool   of   “prospective   overruling”   is   applied.
However,   retrospective   application   of   the   judgment   is
not   in   the   interest   of   administration   of   justice   as   it
would   necessitate   the   reopening   of   a   large   number   of
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criminal  cases.   Criminal  cases  decided  on  the  basis  of
electronic   records   adduced   in   evidence   without
certification have to be revisited as and when objections
are   taken   by   the   accused   at   the   appellate   stage.
Attempts   will   be   made   to   reopen   cases   which   have
become final.”
  
17. That   subsequent   events   noticed,   may   require   revisiting   of   an
earlier   decision,   to   save   actions   already   taken   was   considered   in
Harsh   Dhingra   vs.   State   of   Haryana   and   Others ,   (2001)   9   SCC
550, observing as follows:
“6.  Further,   when   the   decision   of   the   High   Court   in
S.R. Dass case  
[(1999)3 SCC 362] had held the field for
nearly   a   decade   and   the   Government,   HUDA   and   the
parties   to   whom   the   allotments   have   been   made   have
acted   upon   and   adjusted   their   affairs   in   terms   of   the
said decision, to disturb that state of affairs on the basis
that   now   certain   other   rigorous   principles   are   declared
to   be   applied   in   Anil   Sabharwal   case   [(1997)   2   Punj
LR7]   would   be   setting   the   rules   of   the   game   after   the
game is over, by which several parties have altered their
position to their disadvantage.  Therefore, we think that
in   the   larger   public   interest   and   to   avoid   the
discrimination   which   this   Court   had   noticed   in   the
order   dated   5.12.1997   [(1998)   8   SCC   373]   the   decision
of   the   High   Court   in   Anil   Sabharwal   case   should   be
made  effective  from  a  prospective  date  and  in  this   case
from   the   date   on   which   interim   order   had   been   passed
on 23.4.1996.   Therefore, it would be appropriate to fix
that   date   as   the   date   from   which   the   judgment   of   the
High   Court   would   become   effective.     If   this   course   is
adopted,   various   anomalies   pointed   out   in   respect   of
different   parties   referred   to   above   and   other   instances
which   we   have   not   adverted   to   will   be   ironed   out   and
the   creases   smoothened   so   that   discrimination   is
avoided.
7. Prospective  declaration of  law  is  a device  innovated
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by this Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to
prevent   multiplicity   of   proceedings.     It   is   also   a   device
adopted   to   avoid   uncertainty   and   avoidable   litigation.
By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is
deemed   that   all   actions   taken   contrary   to   the
declaration   of   law,   prior   to   the   date   of   the   declaration
are   validated.     This   is   done   in   larger   public   interest.
Therefore,   the   subordinate   forums   which   are   bound   to
apply law declared by this Court are also duty­bound to
apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future.
Since   it   is   indisputable   that   a   court   can   overrule   a
decision   there   is   no   valid   reason   why   it   should   not   be
restricted to the future and not to the past.  Prospective
overruling is not only a part of constitutional policy but
also   an   extended   facet   of   stare   decisis   and   not   judicial
legislation.     These   principles   are   enunciated   by   this
Court   in   Baburam   vs.   C.C.   Jacob,   (1999)   3   SCC   362
and   Ashok   Kumar   Gupta   vs.   State   of   U.P. ,   (1997)   5
SCC 201.”
18. The   criminal   justice   delivery   system,   cannot   be   allowed   to   veer
exclusively   to   the   benefit   of   the   offender   making   it   uni­directional
exercise.     A   proper   administration   of   the   criminal   justice   delivery
system, therefore requires balancing the rights of the accused and the
prosecution,   so   that   the   law   laid   down   in   Mohan   Lal   (supra)   is   not
allowed to become a spring board for acquittal in prosecutions prior to
the  same, irrespective of all other  considerations.      We therefore hold
that all pending criminal prosecutions, trials and appeals prior to the
law laid down in   Mohan Lal   (supra) shall continue to be governed by
the individual facts of the case.
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19. The present appeals lack merit and are therefore dismissed.
…………...................CJI.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
…………...................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
…………...................J.
[K.M. JOSEPH]
NEW DELHI
FEBRUARY 11, 2019.
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