2019 INSC 0138
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1144 OF 2009
Mala Singh & Ors.                        …Appellants
Versus
State of Haryana           …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
 
1. This appeal is filed by the three accused persons
against  the   final   judgment  and   order   dated  11.02.2008
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   &   Haryana   at
Chandigarh   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.65­DB   of   1999
whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   allowed
the   appeal   in   respect   of   eight   accused   persons   and
acquitted   them   from   the   charges   under   Sections   148,
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302/149,   323/149   and   506/149   of   the   Indian   Penal
Code,   1860   (hereinafter   referred   to   as     “IPC”)   but
dismissed   the   appeal   in   respect   of   the   three   accused
persons   (appellants   herein)   and   convicted   them   under
Section 302/34 IPC instead of Section 302/149 IPC.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in
this appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts in detail
hereinbelow.
3. Eleven   (11)  accused   persons   (hereinafter   referred
to   as   “A­1   to   A­11”)   were   tried   for   the   offences
punishable under Sections 148, 302/149, 323/149 and
506/149   IPC   for   committing   murder   of   one   lady   ­
Mahendro Bai in Sessions Case No.19 of 1997. 
4. Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Faridabad,   by
judgment/order   dated   04.12.1998,   convicted   all   the
accused   (A­1   to   A­11)   under   Sections   148,   302/149,
323/149   and   506/149   IPC   and   accordingly   sentenced
them to undergo life imprisonment apart from imposing
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other   lesser   sentences.     The   Additional   Sessions   Judge
held   that   the   prosecution   was   able   to   prove   the   case
against   all   the   accused   persons   (A­1   to   A­11)   beyond
reasonable   doubt   and,   therefore,   all   of   them   deserve   to
be convicted accordingly.
5. All the accused persons, namely, Ranjit Singh (A­
1),   Boor Singh (A­2), Puran Singh (A­3), Balwant Singh
(A­4),   Inder   Singh   (A­5),  Bagga   Singh   (A­6),   Mala   Singh
(A­7), Phuman Singh(A­8), Kashmiro (A­9), Laxmi Bai(A­
10) and Taro Bai(A­11) were sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment   for   six   months   under   Section   148   IPC,
rigorous   imprisonment   for   life   and   to   pay   a   fine   of
Rs.2,000/­   (Rs.Two   Thousand)   under   Section   302/149
IPC,   in   default   of   payment   of   fine   to   further   undergo
rigorous   imprisonment   for   six   months,   rigorous
imprisonment for three months under Section 323/149
IPC   and   rigorous   Imprisonment   for   six   months   under
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Section   506/149   IPC.     All   the   sentences   were   to   run
concurrently.
6. All   the   accused   persons   (A­1   to   A­11)   felt
aggrieved   by   their   conviction   and   sentence   and   they
filed   one   common   criminal   appeal   in   the   High   Court   of
Punjab   &   Haryana   at   Chandigarh   (Criminal   Appeal
No.65­DB of 1999). 
7. By   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   allowed   the
appeal in respect of the eight accused persons, namely,
A­1 to A­6, A­10 & A­11 and acquitted them from all the
charges   whereas   dismissed   the   appeal   in   respect   of
three   accused   persons,   namely,   A­7   to   A­9   and
accordingly   upheld   their   conviction   by   taking   recourse
to   Section   34   IPC.     In   other   words,   the   High   Court
upheld   the   conviction   under   Section   302   read   with
Section 34 IPC in place of 302/149 IPC.
8. The   three   accused   persons,   namely,   Mala
Singh(A­7), Phuman Singh(A­8) and Kashmiro(A­9), who
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suffered   the   conviction/sentence   felt   aggrieved   by   the
aforesaid   order   of   the   High   Court   and   they   filed   the
present appeal by way of special leave in this Court. 
9. So   far   as   the   order   of   the   High   Court,   which
resulted in acquittal of eight accused, namely, A­1 to A­
6,   A­10   and   A­11   is   concerned,   the   State   did   not
challenge   their   acquittal   order   and,   therefore,   this   part
of the order of the High Court has now attained finality. 
10. We   are,   therefore,   not   required   to   examine   the
legality   and   correctness   of   this   part   of   the   impugned
order   by   which   eight   co­accused   (A­1   to   A­6,   A­10   and
A­11) were acquitted.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants, at the outset,
stated that so far as appellant No.1 ­ Mala Singh (A­7) is
concerned,   he   expired   during   pendency   of   the   appeal.
The   appeal   of   Mala   Singh   (A­7)   (appellant   No.1   herein)
therefore,   stands   abated.   His   appeal   is   accordingly
dismissed as having abated. 
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12. We are, therefore, now concerned with the case of
two   accused   persons,   namely,   Phuman   Singh(A­8)
[appellant   No.2   herein]     and   Smt.   Kashmiro(A­9)
[appellant No.3 herein]. 
13. In   other   words,   now   we   have   to   examine   in   this
appeal   as   to   whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in
upholding   the   conviction   and   the   sentence   of   appellant
No.2 (A­8) and appellant No.3 (A­9).
14. In order to examine this question, it is necessary
to set out the prosecution case in brief hereinbelow.
15. The   death   of   Mahendro   Bai   occurred   as   a   result
of   some   disputes   between   the   members   of   one   family.
One   group   consisted   of   one   branch   of   brothers,   their
sons and the wives whereas the other group consisted of
another   branch   of   brothers,   their   sons   and   the   wives.
The   dispute   was   in   relation   to   the   ownership   and
possession   of   an   ancestral   property   of   the   family
members, i.e., one agricultural land.
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16. One   Mehar   Singh   had   six   brothers.   They   owned
22   killas   of   land.   This   land   was   orally   partitioned
amongst   all   the   brothers   30   years   back   and   each
brother   was   cultivating   his   share.   Mehar   Singh   then
purchased some other land measuring 2 ½	  acres in the
same area.   His three brothers–Mala Singh (A­7), Bagga
Singh   (A­6)   and   Inder   Singh   (A­5)   then   started
demanding   their   share   in   this   2  	
½	    acres   of   land   from
Mehar Singh which he refused saying that it was not an
ancestral land and, therefore, no need to partition. This
became the cause of dispute among the brothers.
17. On 21.09.1996 at around 12 noon, Mehar Singh,
Mal   Singh   (son   of   Mehar   Singh),   Mahendro   Bai   (wife   of
Mal Singh­daughter in law of Mehar Singh), Dara Singh
(son of Mehar Singh) and Palo Devi (wife of Dara Singh)
were sitting on the land (field) and talking to each others
then, Mala Singh (A­7), Inder Singh (A­5) , Bagga Singh
(A­6)   Boor   Singh   (A­2),   Balwant   Singh   (A­4),     Puran
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Singh   (A­3),   Ranjit   Singh   (A­1),   Phuman   Singh   (A­8),
Taro   Bai   (A­11)   and   Kashmiro(A­9)   came   there   with
weapons (lathi, country made pistol, sword, ballaum) in
their hands. 
18. Mala   Singh   (A­7)   gave   "Lalkara"   saying   that   they
should   be   taught   lesson   for   non­partitioning   the   land
and   be   finished.   This   led   to   a   fight   between   the   two
groups   resulting   in   death   of   Mahendro   Bai   and   also
causing injuries to Mehar Singh and Palo Bai.
19. This   led   to   registration   of   the   FIR   (Ex­PN/2)   by
Dara   Singh   followed   by   the   investigation.   The
statements   of   several   persons   were   recorded,   evidence
was   collected,   post­mortem   report   of   the   deceased   was
obtained, weapons were seized, FSL report was obtained
which   led   to   arrest   of   the   aforementioned   eleven
persons. 
20. The   charge­sheet   was   filed   against   all   the   11
accused   persons   (A­1   to   A­11).   The   case   was   then
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committed   to   the   Sessions   Court   for   trial.   The
prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses. All the
accused   persons   (A­1   to   A­11)   were   examined   under
Section   313   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “Cr.P.C.).   They   denied   their
involvement in the crime.
21. By   judgment/order   dated   04.12.1998,   the
Additional  Sessions  Judge convicted  all the  11 accused
persons   (A­1   to   A­11)   under   Sections   148,   302/149,
323/149 & 506/149 IPC, as detailed above, which gave
rise to filing of the criminal appeal by all the 11 accused
persons (A­1 to A­11) in the High Court.
22. As   mentioned   above,   the   High   Court   acquitted
eight accused persons (A­1 to A­6, A­10 & A­11) from all
the charges by  giving  them  benefit of doubt but upheld
the conviction of the present three appellants (A­7 to A­
9)   under   Section   302/34   IPC   instead   of   302/149   IPC,
which   was   awarded   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge.
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Against this order of the High Court, the three accused
persons   (A­7   to   A­9)   have   felt   aggrieved   and   filed   this
appeal after obtaining the special leave to appeal in this
Court.
23. Heard   Mr.   Karan   Bharihoke,   learned   amicus
curiae ,   Mr.   Sunny   Choudhary,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants­accused   persons   and   Mr.   Atul   Mangla,
learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent­
State.
24. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   (accused
persons   A­7   to   A­9)   while   assailing   the   conviction   and
sentence   of     the   appellants   submitted   that   the   High
Court   erred   in   upholding   the   conviction   of   the
appellants.     His   submission   was   that   the   High   Court
should   also   have   acquitted   the   appellants   herein   along
with   other   eight   co­accused   persons.     Learned   counsel
urged   that,   in   any   case,   the   High   Court   erred   in
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upholding   the   appellants’   conviction   and   sentence
under Section 302/34 IPC. 
25. Learned counsel urged that it was not in dispute
that   the   appellants   along   with   other   eight   co­accused
were originally charged and eventually convicted also for
an   offence   punishable   under   Section   302   read   with
Section   149   IPC.     With   this   background,   when   the
matter   was   carried   in   appeal   at   the   instance   of   all   the
eleven accused persons challenging their conviction, the
only   question,   which   fell   for   consideration   before   the
High   Court,   was   whether   the   conviction   of   all   the   11
accused   persons   under   Section   302/149   is   justified   or
not. 
26. Learned   counsel   urged   that   the   High   Court   was,
therefore,   not   justified   in   altering   the   charge   from
Section   302   read   with   Section   149   IPC   to   Section   302
read   with   Section   34   IPC   suo   moto   and   then   was   not
justified   in   upholding   the   conviction   and   that   too   only
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qua   three   accused   persons   (appellants   herein)   and
acquitting other eight co­accused.
27. In other words, his submission was that once the
charges   were   framed   under   Section   302/149   IPC
against   all   the   11   accused   persons   which   resulted   in
their   conviction   under   Section   302/149   IPC,   the
Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to  suo moto  alter the
charges   and   convict   the   appellants   under   Section
302/34   IPC   without   giving   them   any   opportunity   to
meet   the   altered   charge   and   simultaneously   acquitting
remaining   eight   co­accused   from   the   charge   of   Section
302/149 IPC.
28. Learned   counsel   urged   that   assuming   that   the
Appellate Court had the jurisdiction to alter the charges
qua   the   appellants   (A­7   to   A­9)   only,   yet,   in   his
submission,   there   was   no   evidence   adduced   by   the
prosecution to split the charges only against the present
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appellants   under   Section   34   IPC   for   upholding   their
conviction under Section 302 IPC. 
29. In   substance,   the   submission   was   against   the
splitting   of   the   charges   at   the   appellate   stage   by   the
High   Court   for   convicting   the   appellants   under   Section
302/34   IPC   and   acquitting   the   remaining   eight   co­
accused   persons   under   Section   302/149   IPC   but   not
extending   the   similar   benefit   of   acquittal   to   the
appellants herein.
30. The   last   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   was
that, in a case of this nature, the Appellate Court having
acquitted   the   eight   co­accused   should   have   examined
the role of each accused (appellants herein) in the crime.
The reason being, when no case under Section 149 IPC
was   held   made   out   qua   all   the   accused   persons
inasmuch   as   when   eight   co­accused   stood   acquitted
under Section 302/149 IPC by the High Court and when
there was no evidence to sustain the plea of Section 34
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against the three appellants, the only option available to
the   Appellate   Court   was   to   examine   the   role   of   each
appellant individually in the crime in question.
31. It was, therefore, his submission that if the role of
the   present   two   appellants   is   examined   in   the
commission   of   the  crime   then   it   is  clear   that  the   death
of     Mahendro   Bai   occurred   on   account   of   gun   shot
injury hit by Puran Singh (A­3) who stood acquitted and
Farsa   injury   inflicted   by   Mala   Singh   (A­7),     who   has
since  died,  and  not  on  account   of  the  injury   caused  by
the present two appellants.
32. Learned   counsel   pointed   out   from   the   evidence
that so far as appellant No.2 ­ Phuman Singh (A­8) and
appellant No. 3­Kashmiro (lady) (A­9) is concerned, both
individually     hit   the   deceased   with   lathi   which   caused
one   simple   injury   on   the   right   hand   and   other   on   left
cheek   of   the   deceased   and   that   too   before   others   could
inflict the fatal injuries to the deceased.
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33. It   was,   therefore,   his   submission   that   in   these
circumstances, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could at best be
convicted   for   an   offence   punishable   under   Section   324
IPC but not beyond it keeping in view the law laid down
by this Court on such question in   Mohd. Khalil Chisti
vs.  State of Rajasthan & Ors.  (2013) 2 SCC 541. 
34. Lastly,   it   was   urged   that   since   both   these
appellants   (A­8   &   A­9)   have   already   undergone   around
seven   years   of   jail   sentence   and   were   also   released   on
bail   in   the   year   2009   by   this   Court   and   both   still
continue to be on bail for the last 10 years, the ends of
justice would be met, if both the appellants are awarded
the   jail   sentence   of   “already   undergone”   under   Section
324 IPC with any fine amount.
35. Mr.   Karan   Bharihoke,   learned   amicus   curiae
brought to our notice the legal position, which apply in
this   case   and   argued   ably   by   pointing   out   the  evidence
and   how   the   legal   principle   laid   down   by   this   Court
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apply   to   the   case   at   hand.     He   also   submitted   his
written note.
36. In   reply,   learned   Additional   Advocate   General   for
the   respondent   (State)   supported   the   impugned   order
and   urged   that   the   same   be   upheld   calling   for   no
interference.
37. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties
and   learned   amicus  curiae , we  are  inclined  to  allow  the
appeal   finding   force   in   the   submissions   urged   by   the
learned counsel for the appellants as detailed below.
38. Four   questions   arise   for   consideration   in   this
appeal­first,   whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in
convicting   the   appellants   under   Section   302   read   with
Section 34 IPC when, in fact, the initial trial was on the
basis   of   a   charge   under   Section   302   read   with   Section
149 IPC ?
39. Second,   whether   the   High   Court   was   justified   in
altering   the   charge   under   Section   149   to   one   under
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Section   34   in   relation   to   three   accused   (appellants
herein)   after   acquitting   eight   co­accused   from   the
charges of Section 302/149 IPC and then convicting the
three accused (appellants herein) on the altered charges
under Section 302/34 IPC?
40. Third,   whether   there   is   any   evidence   to   sustain
the   charge   under   Section   34   IPC   against   the   three
accused (appellants herein) so as to convict them for an
offence under Section 302 IPC ? 
41. And Fourth, in case the charge under Section 34
IPC   is   held   not   made   out   for   want   of   evidence   and
further   when   the   charge   under   Section   149   is   already
held not made out by the High Court, whether any case
against   three   accused   persons   (appellants   herein)   is
made   out   for   their   conviction   and,   if   so,     for   which
offence ?
42. Before   we   examine   the   facts   of   the   case,   it   is
necessary   to   take   note   of   the   relevant   sections,   which
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deal   with   alter   of   the   charge   and   powers   of   the
Court/Appellate Court in such cases.
43. Section   216   of   Cr.P.C.   deals   with   powers   of   the
Court  to alter   the charge.   Section  386 of  Cr.P.C. deals
with   powers   of   the   Appellate   Court   and   Section   464   of
Cr.P.C.   deals   with   the   effect   of   omission   to   frame,   or
absence   of,   or   error   in   framing   the   charge.   These
Sections are quoted below:
“ 216. Court may alter charge.
(1)   Any Court may alter or add  to  any charge
at any time before judgment is pronounced.
(2)   Every   such   alteration   or   addition   shall   be
read and explained to the accused.
(3)   If the alteration or addition to a charge is
such   that   proceeding   immediately   with   the
trial is not likely, in the opinion of the Court,
to prejudice the accused in his defence or the
prosecutor   in   the   conduct   of   the   case,   the
Court   may,   in   its   discretion,   after   such
alteration   or   addition   has   been   made,
proceed   with   the   trial   as   if   the   altered   or
added charge had been the original charge.
(4)   If   the   alteration   or   addition   is   such   that
proceeding   immediately   with   the   trial   is
likely,   in   the   opinion   of   the   Court,   to
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prejudice   the   accused   or   the   prosecutor   as
aforesaid,   the   Court   may   either   direct   a   new
trial   or   adjourn   the   trial   for   such   period   as
may be necessary.
(5)   If   the   offence   stated   in   the   altered   or
added   charge   is   one   for   the   prosecution   of
which   previous   sanction   is   necessary,   the
case   shall   not   be   proceeded   with   until   such
sanction   is   obtained,   unless   sanction   had
been   already   obtained   for   a   prosecution   on
the same facts as those on which the altered
or added charge is founded.
 
386.   Powers   of   the   Appellate   Court.   After
perusing   such   record   and   hearing   the
appellant   or   his   pleader,   if   he   appears,   and
the   Public   Prosecutor   if   he   appears,   and   in
case   of   an   appeal   under   section   377   or
section   378,   the   accused,   if   he   appears,   the
Appellate   Court   may,   if   it   considers   that
there   is   no   sufficient   ground   for   interfering,
dismiss the appeal, or may­
(a)   in   an   appeal   from   an   order   of
acquittal,   reverse   such   order   and   direct
that further inquiry be made, or that the
accused   be   re­tried   or   committed   for
trial,   as   the   case   may   be,   or   find   him
guilty   and   pass   sentence   on   him
according to law;
(b)   in an appeal from a conviction­
(i)   reverse   the   finding   and   sentence
and acquit or discharge the accused,
or order him to be re­tried by a Court
of   competent   jurisdiction
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subordinate   to   such   Appellate   Court
or committed for trial, or
(ii)   alter the finding, maintaining the
sentence, or
(iii)   with   or   without   altering   the
finding,   alter   the   nature   or   the
extent,   or   the   nature   and   extent,   of
the   sentence,   but   not   so   as   to
enhance the Same;
(c)   in   an   appeal   for   enhancement   of
sentence­
(i)   reverse   the   finding   and   sentence
and   acquit   or   discharge   the   accused
or order him to be re­tried by a Court
competent to try the offence, or
(ii)   alter   the   finding   maintaining   the
sentence, or
(iii)   with   or   without   altering   the
finding,   alter   the   nature   or   the
extent,   or   the   nature   and   extent,   of
the   sentence,   so   as   to   enhance   or
reduce the same;
(d)   in   an   appeal   from   any   other   order,
alter or reverse such order;
(e)   make   any   amendment   or   any
consequential   or   incidental   order   that
may be just or proper; 
Provided   that   the   sentence   shall   not   be
enhanced   unless   the   accused   has  had   an
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opportunity   of   showing   cause   against
such enhancement: 
Provided further that the Appellate Court
shall   not   inflict   greater   punishment   for
the   offence   which   in   its   opinion   the
accused has committed, than might have
been   inflicted   for   that   offence   by   the
Court   passing   the   order   or   sentence
under appeal.
464.   Effect   of   omission   to   frame,   or   absence
of, or error in, charge.
(1)   No finding, sentence or order by a Court of
competent   jurisdiction   shall   be   deemed
invalid   merely   on   the   ground   that   no   charge
was   framed   or   on   the   ground   of   any   error,
omission   or   irregularity   in   the   charge
including   any   misjoinder   of   charges,   unless,
in   the   opinion   of   the   Court   of   appeal,
confirmation   or   revision,   a   failure   of   justice
has in fact been occasioned thereby.
(2)   If   the   Court   of   appeal,   confirmation   or
revision is of opinion that a failure of justice
has in fact been occasioned, it may­
(a)   in   the   case   of   an   omission   to   frame   a
charge,   order   that   a   charge   be   framed
and   that   the   trial   be   recommenced   from
the   point   immediately   after   the   framing
of the charge;
(b)   in   the   case   of   an   error,   omission   or
irregularity   in   the   charge,   direct   a   new
trial   to   be   had   upon   a   charge   framed   in
whatever manner it thinks fit:
21

Provided   that   if   the   Court   is   of   opinion   that
the   facts   of   the   case   are   such   that   no   valid
charge could be preferred against the accused
in   respect   of   the   facts   proved,   it   shall   quash
the conviction.”
44. Combined   reading   of   Sections   216,   386   and   464
of   Cr.P.C.   would   reveal   that   an   alteration   of   charge
where   no   prejudice   is   caused   to   the   accused   or   the
prosecution   is   well   within   the   powers   and   the
jurisdiction of the Court including the Appellate Court. 
45. In   other   words,   it   is   only   when   any   omission   to
frame   the   charge   initially   or   till   culmination   of   the
proceedings or at the appellate stage results in failure of
justice   or   causes   prejudice,   the   same   may   result   in
vitiating the trial in appropriate case.
46. The   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   examined
this   issue,   for   the   first   time,   in   the   context   of   old
Criminal   Procedure   Code   in   a   case   reported   in   Willie
(William) Slaney  vs.  State of M.P.  (AIR 1956 SC 116). 
22

47. Learned   Judge   Vivian   Bose   J.   speaking   for   the
Bench in his inimitable style of writing held, “ Therefore,
when   there   is   a   charge   and   there   is   either   error   or
omission in it or both, and whatever its nature, it is not to
be   regarded   as   material   unless   two   conditions   are
fulfilled both of which are matters of fact: (1) the accused
has ‘in fact’ been misled by it ‘and’ (2) it has occasioned
a   failure   of   justice.   That,   in   our   opinion,   is   reasonably
plain language. ”    
48. In   Kantilal   Chandulal   Mehta   vs.   State   of
Maharashtra   &   Anr.   (1969)   3   SCC   166,   this   Court
again   examined   this   very   issue   arising   under   the
present   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   with   which   we   are
concerned in the present case.   Justice P. Jaganmohan
Reddy,   speaking   for   the   Bench   after   examining   the
scheme   of   the   Code   held   inter   alia   “ In   our   view     the
Criminal Procedure Code   gives ample power to the courts
23

to   alter   or   amend   a   charge   whether   by   the   trial   court   or
by the appellate court provided that the accused has not
to   face   a   charge   for   a   new   offence   or   is   not   prejudiced
either by keeping him in the dark about that charge or in
not   giving   a   full   opportunity   of   meeting   it   and   putting
forward   any   defence   open   to   him,   on   the   charge   finally
preferred against him .”
49. Now  coming  to  the  question  regarding  altering  of
the charge from Section 149 to Section 34 IPC read with
Section   302   IPC,   this   question   was   considered   by   this
Court for the first time in the case of    Lachhman Singh
& Ors.   vs.   The State   (AIR 1952 SC 167) where Justice
Fazl Ali speaking for the bench held as under:
“ It   was   also   contended   that   there   being   no
charge   under   section   302   read   with   section
34   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   the   conviction
of   the   appellants   under   section   302   read
with   section  149   could not have been altered
by   the   High   Court   to   one   under   section
302   read   with   section   34 ,   upon   the   acquittal
of   the   remaining   accused   persons.   The   facts
of   the   case   are   however   such   that   the
24

accused   could   have   been   charged
alternatively,   either   under   section   302   read
with   section   149   or   under   section   302   read
with   section   34 .   The   point   has   therefore   no
force.”
50. This   question   was   again   examined   by   this   Court
in   Karnail Singh & Anr.   vs.   State of Punjab   (AIR 1954
SC   204)   wherein   the   learned   Judge   Venkatarama
Ayyar,J.   elaborating   the   law   on   the   subject   held   as
under:
“ (7)   Then   the   next   question   is   whether   the
conviction   of   the   appellant   under   section
302   read   with   section   34 ,   when   they   had
been   charged   only,   under   section   302   read
with   section   149 ,   was   illegal   The   contention
of   the   appellants  is   that  the   scope   of   section
149   is   different   from   that  of   section   34 ,   that
while   what   section   149   requires   is   proof   of   a
common   object,   it   would   be   necessary
under   section   34   to   establish   a   common
intention and that therefore when the charge
against   the   accused   is   under   section   149 ,   it
cannot   be   converted   in   appeal   into   one
under   section   34 .   The   following   observations
of   this   court   in   Dalip   Singh   v.   State   of
Punjab,   AIR   1953   SC   364   were   relied   on   in
support of this position :­
  "Nor   is   it   possible   in   this   case   to   have
recourse   to   section   34   because   the
appellants   have   not   been   charged   with
25

that   even   in   the   alternative   and   the
common   intention   required   by   section
34   and   the   common   object   required
by   section   149   are   far   from   being   the
same thing." 
It   is   true   that   there   is   substantial   difference
between   the   two   sections   but   as   observed   by
Lord   Sumner   in   Barendra   Kumar   Ghosh   v.
Emperor ,   AIR   1925   PC   1,   they   also   to   some
extent   overlap   and   it   is   a   question   to   be
determined on the facts of each case whether
the   charge   under   section   149   overlaps   the
ground covered by   section 34 . If the common
object   which   is   the   subject   matter   of   the
charge   under   section   149   does   not
necessarily involve a common intention, then
the   substitution   of   section   34   for   section
149   might   result   in   prejudice   to   the   accused
and ought not therefore to be permitted. But
if  the  facts  to  be   proved   and  the   evidence  to
be   adduced   with   reference   to   the   charge
under   section   149   would   be   the   same   'if   the
charge   were   under   section   34 ,   then   the
failure   to   charge   the   accused   under   section
34   could   not   result   in   any   prejudice   and   in
such   cases,   the   substitution   of   section
34   for   section   149   must   be   held   to   be   a
formal matter.
We   do   not   read   the   observations   in   Dalip
Singh   v.   State,   of   Punjab(1)   as   an   authority
for   the   broad   proposition   that   in   law   there
could be no  recourse to,   section 34   when the
charge   is   only   under   section   149 .   Whether
such recourse can be had or not must depend
on   the   facts   of   each   case.   This   is   in   accord
with   the   view   taken   by   this   court
in   Lachhman   Singh   v.   The   State   (1),   where
26

the   substitution   of   section   34   for   section
149   was   upheld   on   the   ground   that  the   facts
were such 
“ that   the   accused   could   have   been
charged   alternatively   either
under   section 302   read with   section 149 ,
or   under   section   302 read   with   section
34 .”
51. The law laid down in  Lachman Singh  (supra) and
Karnail Singh  (supra) was reiterated in  Willie (William)
Slaney   (Supra)   wherein   Justice   Vivian   Bose   speaking
for the Bench while referring to these two decisions held
as under:
“ (49).  The following cases  afford no  difficulty
because   they   directly   accord   with   the   view
we have set out at length above.   In Lachman
Singh   v.   The   State ,   AIR   1952   SC   167,   it   was
held   that   when   there   is   a   charge
under   section   302   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code
read   with   section   149   and   the   charge
under   section   149   disappears   because   of   the
acquittal   of   some   of   the   accused,   a
conviction   under   section   302   of   the   Indian
Penal   Code   read   with   section   34 is   good   even
though   there   is   no   separate   charge
under   section   302   read   with   section   34 ,
provided   the   accused   could   have   been   so
charged on the facts of the case. 
The   decision   in   Karnail   Singh   v.   The
State   of   Punjab ,   AIR   1954   SC   204   is   to   the
27

same effect and the question about prejudice
was also considered.”
52. This   principle   of   law   was   then   reiterated   after
referring   to   law   laid   down   in   Willie   (William)   Slaney
(Supra) in the case reported in   Chittarmal   vs.   State of
Rajasthan  (2003) 2 SCC 266 in the following words:
“ 14. It is well settled by a catena of decisions
that   section   34   as   well   as   section   149   deal
with   liability   for   constructive   criminality   i.e.
vicarious   liability   of   a   person   for   acts   of
others.   Both   the   sections   deal   with
combinations   of   persons   who   become
punishable   as   sharers   in   an   offence.   Thus
they   have   a   certain   resemblance   and   may   to
some   extent   overlap.   But   a   clear   distinction
is   made   out   between   common   intention   and
common   object   in   that   common   intention
denotes   action   in   concert   and   necessarily
postulates   the   existence   of   a   pre­arranged
plan   implying   a   prior   meeting   of   the   minds,
while   common   object   does   not   necessarily
require   proof   of   prior   meeting   of   minds   or
pre­   concert.   Though   there   is   substantial
difference   between   the   two   sections,   they
also   to   some   extent   overlap   and   it   is   a
question   to   be   determined   on   the   facts   of
each   case   whether   the   charge   under   section
149   overlaps   the   ground   covered   by   section
34 . Thus, if several persons numbering five or
more,   do   an   act   and   intend   to   do   it,
28

both   sections   34   and   section   149   may   apply.
If   the   common   object   does   not   necessarily
involve   a   common   intention,   then   the
substitution   of   section   34   for   section
149   might   result   in   prejudice   to   the   accused
and   ought   not,   therefore,   to   be   permitted.
But   if   it   does   involve   a   common   intention
then   the   substitution   of   section
34   for   section   149   must   be   held   to   be   a
formal matter. Whether such recourse can be
had   or  not  must  depend   on  the   facts of   each
case.   The   non   applicability   of   section   149   is,
therefore, no bar in convicting the appellants
under   section   302   read   with   section   34   IPC,
if   the   evidence   discloses   commission   of   an
offence   in   furtherance   of   the   common
intention   of   them   all.   (See   Barendra   Kumar
Ghosh   Vs.   King   Emperor:   AIR   1925   PC
1;   Mannam   Venkatadari   and   others   vs.   State
of   Andhra   Pradesh   :AIR   1971   SC
1467;   Nethala   Pothuraju  and   others  vs.   State
of   Andhra   Pradesh   :   AIR   1991   SC   2214
and   Ram   Tahal   and   others   vs.   State   of   U.P .   :
AIR 1972 SC 254)”
 
53. In the light of the aforementioned principle of law
stated by this Court which is now fairly well settled, we
have   to   now   examine   the   evidence   of   this   case   with   a
view   to   find   out   as   to   whether   the   High   Court   was
justified in convicting  appellant Nos. 2 and 3 herein for
commission of offence of murder with the aid of Section
29

34 IPC which was initially not the charge framed against
the appellants herein by the Sessions Judge. 
54. Having   perused   the   entire   evidence   and   legal
position   governing   the   issues   arising   in   the   case,   we
have   formed   an   opinion   that   the   appeal   filed   by
appellant   Nos.   2   and   3   deserves   to   be   allowed   and   the
conviction   of   appellant   Nos.   2   and   3   deserves   to   be
altered to Section 324 IPC. This we say for the following
reasons:
55. First, once eight co­accused were acquitted by the
High   Court   under   Section   302/149   IPC   by   giving   them
the benefit of doubt and their acquittal attained finality,
the charge under Section 149 IPC collapsed against the
three   appellants   also   because   there   could   be   no
unlawful   assembly   consisting   of   less   than   five   accused
persons.   In   other   words,   the   appellants   (3   in   number)
could   not   be   then   charged   with   the   aid   of   Section   149
30

IPC for want of numbers and were, therefore, rightly not
proceeded with under Section 149 IPC.
56. Second, keeping in view the law laid down by this
Court   in   the   cases   referred   supra ,   the   High   Court
though   had   the   jurisdiction   to   alter   the   charge   from
Section   149   IPC   to   Section   34   IPC   qua   the   three
appellants,   yet,   in   our   view,   in   the   absence   of   any
evidence   of   common   intention   qua   the   three   appellants
so   as   to   bring   their   case   within   the   net   of   Section   34
IPC,   their   conviction   under   Section   302/34   IPC   is   not
legally sustainable.
57. In other words, in our view, the prosecution failed
to   adduce   any   evidence   against   the   three   appellants   to
prove their common intention to murder Mahendro Bai.
Even   the   High   Court   while   altering   the   charge   from
Section   149   IPC   to   Section   34   IPC   did   not   refer   to   any
evidence nor gave any reasons as to on what basis these
three   appellants   could   still   be   proceeded   with   under
31

Section   34   IPC   notwithstanding   the   acquittal   of
remaining eight co­accused.
58. It was the case of the prosecution since inception
that   all   the   eleven   accused   were   part   of   unlawful
assembly   and   it   is   this   case,     the   prosecution   tried   to
prove   and   to   some   extent   successfully   before   the
Sessions   Judge   which   resulted   in   the   conviction   of   all
the   eleven   accused   also   but   it   did   not   sustain   in   the
High Court. 
59. In   our   view,   the   evidence   led   by   the   prosecution
in   support   of   charge   under   Section   149   IPC   was   not
sufficient   to   prove   the   charge   of   common   intention   of
three   appellants   under   Section   34   IPC   though,   as
mentioned above, on principle of law, the High Court in
its   appellate   jurisdiction   could   alter   the   charge   from
Section 149 to Section 34 IPC.
60.             Section   34   IPC   does   not,   by   itself,     create   any
offence   whereas   it   has   been   held   that   Section   149   IPC
32

does. As mentioned above, the prosecution pressed their
case   since   inception   and   accordingly   adduced   evidence
against   all   the   accused   alleging   that   all   were   the
members   of   unlawful   assembly   under   Section   149   IPC
and   not   beyond   it.   The   Sessions   Court,     therefore,
rightly framed a charge to that effect. 
61. If   the   prosecution   was   successful   in   proving   this
charge   in   the   Sessions   Court   against   all   the   accused
persons, the prosecution failed in so proving in the High
Court. 
62.       The   prosecution,   in   our   view,   never   came   with   a
case that all the 11 accused persons shared a common
intention   under   Section   34   IPC   to   eliminate   Mahendro
Bai   and   nor   came   with   a   case   even   at   the   appellate
stage   that   only   3   appellants   had   shared   common
intention   independent   of   8   co­accused   to   eliminate
Mahendro Bai.
33

63.             When   prosecution   did   not   set   up   such   case   at
any stage of the proceedings against the appellants nor
adduced   any   evidence   against   the   appellants   that   they
(three)   prior   to   date   of   the   incident   had   at   any   point   of
time shared the "common intention" and in furtherance
of  sharing  such  common intention  came on the spot  to
eliminate   Mahendro   Bai   and   lastly,   the   High   Court
having   failed   to   give   any   reasons   in   support   of   altered
conviction   except   saying   in   one   line   that   conviction   is
upheld   under   Section   302/34   IPC   in   place   of   Section
302/149   IPC,   the   invoking   of   Section   34   IPC   at   the
appellate   stage   by   the   High   Court,   in   our   view,   cannot
be upheld.
64. True it is that “Lalkara” was given by Mala Singh
­ appellant No.1 (since dead) but it was not to eliminate
Mahindrao Bai ­ the deceased.  
65. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondent(State)   was
not   able   to   point   out   any   evidence   that   the   appellants
34

ever   shared   common   intention   to   eliminate   Mahendro
Bai   independent   of   acquitted   eight   accused.   We   are,
therefore,   unable   to   find   any   basis   to   sustain   the
conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with
Section   34   IPC   for   want   of   any   evidence   of   the
prosecution. 
66. Now   we   come   to   the   next   issue.   It   has   come   in
evidence   that   Mala   Singh(A­7)   hit   with   a   Farsa   and
Puran   Singh(A­3)   fired   gun   shot   which   hit   Mahendro
Bai.       As   per   post­mortem   report,   Mahendro   Bai   died
due   to   gun   shot   injury.     So   far   as   the   role   of   appellant
Nos. 2 and 3 in the crime is concerned,   both hit single
blow ­ one on hand and other on cheek of Mahendro Bai
prior to other two accused­Mala Singh and Puran Singh
inflicting their assault on her. 
67. As   per   post­mortem   report,   both   the   assault
made   by   the   appellant   Nos.   2   and   3   caused   simple
injury   to   Mahendro   Bai   which   did   not   result   in   her
35

death and nor could result in her death. (see injury Nos.
2 and 3 in the evidence of PW­3 Dr. P.S. Parihar) 
68. In   a   case   of   this   nature,   when   there   is   a   fight
between the two groups and where there are gun shots
exchanged   between   the   two   groups   against   each   other
and   when   on   evidence   eight   co­accused   are   completely
let of and where the State does not pursue their plea of
Section   149   IPC   against   the   acquitted   eight   accused
which   attains   finality   and   where   the   plea   of   Section   34
IPC   is   not   framed  against   any  accused  and   where  even
at   the   appellate   stage   no   evidence   is   relied   on   by   the
prosecution to sustain the charge of Section 34 IPC   qua
the   three   accused   appellants   independent   of   eight
acquitted co­accused and when out of two main accused
assailants, one has died and the other is acquitted and
lastly, in the absence of any reasoning given by the High
Court   for   sustaining   the   conviction   of   the   three
appellants in support of alteration of the charge, we are
36

of   the   considered   view   that   the   two   appellants   are
entitled to claim  the benefit of entire scenario and seek
alteration   of   their   conviction   for   commission   of   the
offence   punishable   under   Section   324   IPC   simplicitor
rather   than   to   suffer   conviction   under   Section   302/34
IPC,   if   not   complete   acquittal   alike   other   eight   co­
accused.
69. We   are,   therefore,   of   the   considered   opinion   that
appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could at best be convicted for an
offence   punishable   under   Section   324   IPC   and   not
beyond it on the basis of their individual participation in
the commission of the crime.
70. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   then   stated
that   out   of   the   total   jail   sentence   awarded,   appellant
Nos. 2 and 3 has already undergone around seven years
of   jail   sentence   when   both   were   released   on   bail   by
orders   of   this   Court   on   07.07.2009.   So   far   as   the
appellant No. 3 is concerned, she is an aged lady. 
37

71. Taking   into   consideration   the   fact   that   the
appellants   Nos.   2   and   3   have   already   undergone   seven
years   of   jail   sentence   and   appellant   No.   3   is   an   aged
lady   and   is   also   on   bail   for   the   last   10   years   and   that
both did not breach any condition of the bail in last the
10 years, we are inclined to allow the appeal and while
setting   aside   the   conviction   and   sentence   of   the
appellant   Nos.   2   and   3   under   Section   302/34   IPC,
convert   their   conviction   under   Section   324   IPC   and
sentence   them   to   what   they   have   “already   undergone”
and impose a fine of Rs.10,000/­ on each appellant and
in   default   in   payment   of   fine,   to   further   undergo   three
months’ simple imprisonment.
72. In   other   words,   the   appellants   (Nos.2   &   3)   need
not   undergo   any   jail   sentence   than   what   they   have
already   undergone   provided   each   of   the   appellants
deposit   Rs.10,000/­   as   fine   amount   within   three
months   from   the   date   of   this   order   else   both   the
38

appellants   will   have   to   undergo   three   months   simple
imprisonment in default of non­deposit of fine amount.
73. Before   parting,   we   place   on   record   a   word   of
appreciation   for   the   valuable   services   rendered   by   Mr.
Karan Bharihoke  amicus curiae  appointed by this Court.
He   argued   the   case   ably   and   fairly   and   also   filed
effective   written   submissions,   which   enabled   us   to
examine the issue involved in this appeal properly.
74. The appeal thus succeeds and is allowed in part.
The   impugned  order   is  modified   to   the  extent   indicated
above. 
      ………………………………..J.
  (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
              ..………………………………J.
   (R. SUBHASH REDDY)
New Delhi,
February 12, 2019
39