2019 INSC 0144
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1665        OF  2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 33757 of 2018)
Sunita & Ors.  …Appellants 
:Versus:
Rajasthan State Road Transport 
Corporation & Anr. ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The   captioned   appeal   assails   the   decision   of   the   High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, dated 25 th
July,   2018   in   S.B.   Civil   Miscellaneous   Appeal   No.   521   of
2017,   whereby   the   appeal   filed   by   respondent   No.1   (The
Rajasthan   State   Road   Transport   Corporation)   owner   of   the
offending vehicle, was allowed. The High Court was pleased
to set aside the Award passed by the Motor Accident Claims

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Tribunal,   Sawai   Madhopur   (for   short   “ the   Tribunal ”)     in
favour   of   the   appellants/claimants   for   the   death   of   their
family   member,   Sitaram   and   consequently   dismissed   the
SBCMA   No.581/2017   filed   by   the   appellants   for
enhancement   of   the   compensation   amount   granted   by   the
Tribunal. 
3. Briefly stated, on 28 th
 October, 2011 at around 7 A.M.,
Sitaram (husband of appellant No.1 and father of appellant
Nos.2   and   3,   minor   children)   was   riding   a   motorcycle,
bearing   registration   number   RJ­25   SA   6923,   along   with   a
pillion   rider,   one   Rajulal   Khateek,   when   the   motorcycle
collided   with   a   bus   coming   from   the   opposite   direction
bearing   registration   number   RJ­26/P.A.   0042,   owned   by
respondent   No.1   and   rashly   and   negligently   driven   by
respondent   No.2.   The   accident   resulted   in   the   death   of
Sitaram   and   severe   injuries   to   the   pillion   rider,   Rajulal
Khateek.   Thereafter,   the   appellants   and   the   parents   of   the
deceased   Sitaram   filed   two   separate   petitions   before   the
Tribunal   seeking   compensation   for   the   death   of   Sitaram,
who was a senior teacher in a Government school, from the

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respondents,   to   the   tune   of   Rs.2,62,02,408/­   and
Rs.1,13,42,984/­, respectively.
4. The respondents resisted the said claim petitions. They
denied that the offending bus had caused the accident. They
contended that the accident was caused due to the mistake
and negligence on the part of the deceased Sitaram himself
as   he   was   riding   on   the   wrong   side   of   the   road   and   he   did
not   know   how   to   ride   the   motorcycle.   He   did   not   have   a
valid   driving   licence   and   was   not   wearing   a   helmet   at   the
time of the accident, which  was  in  violation of traffic rules.
The   respondents   also   doubted   the   validity   of   the   evidence
and witnesses on record.
5. The   Tribunal   in   its   judgment   dated   14 th
  December,
2016,   extensively   analysed   the   evidence   on   record.   It
considered   the   evidence   of   the   deceased’s   wife   Sunita
(appellant   No.1   herein),   who   deposed   about   the   accident
which   resulted   in   Sitaram’s   death.   The   father   of   Sitaram,
Mool Chand Kirad (A.D.3), also deposed about the accident
of  the  offending  bus with the  motorcycle  causing  the  death

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of   Sitaram   at   the   spot   of   the   accident.   The   Tribunal   also
considered   FIR   No.247/2011   (Exh.1)   and   charge­sheet
(Exh.2)   filed   against   respondent   No.2   for   offences
punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the Indian
Penal   Code   (‘ IPC ’)   and   Sections   134/187   of   the   Motor
Vehicles   Act   (for   short   “ the   Act ”).   It   noted   that   the
respondents had not challenged the FIR or the charge­sheet
before any authority.
 
6. The   Tribunal   also   examined   the   deposition   of
Bhagchand   Khateek   (A.D.2),   a   witness   to   the   incident   who
deposed   that   he  had   gone   to   his   brother’s   house   at   Shivad
village, one day prior to the date of the accident. At the time
of   the   accident,   he   had   gone   to   relieve   himself   and   was
walking   on   the   left   side   of   the   road   when   he   saw   the
motorcycle with number RJ 25 SA 6923, which was also on
the   left   side   of   the   road,   being   hit   by   the   offending   bus
bearing registration No. RJ­26/P.A. 0042, being driven at a
high   speed   coming   on   to   the   wrong   side   of   the   road,
resulting in the instant death of the rider of the motorcycle.
He   further   deposed   that   the   name   of   the   driver   of   the

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offending bus was Banwari (respondent No.2). In his cross­
examination,   Bhagchand   revealed   that   he   did   not   see
Banwari   (respondent   No.2)   after   the   accident   and   further,
that   there   was   a   pillion   rider   on   the   motorcycle   who   was   a
man, but he couldn’t identify the man’s age. 
7. The   respondents   challenged   the   evidence   of
Bhagchand   (A.D.2)   on   the   ground   that   his   name   was   not
mentioned   in   the   list   of   witnesses   set   out   in   the   charge­
sheet   (Exh.2)   and   could   not   have   been   near   the   spot   when
the   accident   occurred.   For,   he   was   a   resident   of   Pakhala
village,   which   was   3   (three)   Kilometres   away   from   the
alleged accident spot. Despite these objections, the Tribunal
accepted the veracity of Bhagchand’s deposition. It held that
not all the eye­witnesses to the incident needed to be named
in   the   charge­sheet   and   that   the   respondents   had   failed   to
ask  Bhagchand  any  question  during  the  cross  examination
so   as   to   cast   any   doubt   on   the   veracity   of   his   statement.
Further, the respondents had also failed to ask Bhagchand
about   giving   any   statement   to   the   police.   Bhagchand   had
deposed that on the day of incident, he was at his brother’s

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house   in   Shivad   village,   which   did   not   preclude   him   from
being an eye­witness to the incident. 
8. The Tribunal then noted that respondent No.2 driver of
the offending bus, Banwari Lal, had not been examined as a
witness   by   the   respondents.   Additionally,   it   found   that   the
site   map   of   the   accident   (Exh.3)   showed   that   the   accident
had occurred at a turning in the road, and yet the offending
vehicle   was   driven   at   a   high   speed.   This   aspect   was   read
with   the   unchallenged   evidence   of   the   witness   Bhagchand
Khateek   (A.D.2),   who   inter   alia   deposed   that   at   the   time   of
the   accident,  the   offending   bus  was  being   driven  recklessly
at a high speed and also that the respondents had failed to
ask   the   said   witness   Bhagchand   any   question   about   the
purported negligence of the rider of the motorcycle, Sitaram.
Further,   the   respondents   had   failed   to   show   that   they   had
challenged   the   filing   of   the   charge­sheet   (Exh.2)   against
respondent No.2 driver of the offending vehicle. Finally, the
Tribunal   adverted   to   the   post­mortem   report   (Exh.4)
wherein   it  was   recorded  that   the   deceased  had   died  due  to

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shock   arising   from   various   fractures   on   his   body.   The
Tribunal   also   took   into   account   the   notice   under   Section
134   of   the   Act   (Exh.7),   wherein   respondent   No.2   had   not
made any  statement that the accident had occurred due to
the   negligence   of   the   motorcycle   rider.   On   a   combined
reading   of   the   aforesaid   evidence,   the   Tribunal   held   that
there   was   no   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   deceased
Sitaram, while riding the motorcycle and that he was fatally
hit   by   the   bus   being   driven   recklessly   and   at   a   high   speed
by respondent No.2.
9. The   Tribunal   also   examined   the   notice   under   Section
133   of   the   Act   (Exh.6)   in   which   the   Assistant   Transport
Inspector,   Tonk   Bus   Depot,   stated   that   respondent   No.2
was   the   driver   of   the   offending   bus   bearing   registration
number   RJ­26/P.A.   0042.     It   then   examined   the   notice
under   Section   134   of   the   Act   (Exh.7),   wherein   respondent
No.2   stated   that   the   offending   bus   bearing   registration
number RJ­26/P.A. 0042 was being operated by him on the
date and place of the accident. The Tribunal thus concluded
that   respondent   No.2   was   under   the   employment   of

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respondent No.1 at the time of the accident and was driving
the offending bus which caused the accident. 
10. On   the   basis   of   the   aforesaid   findings   and
observations,   the   Tribunal   partly   allowed   the   two   claim
petitions.     After   deducting   income   tax   payable   on   the
income   received   by   Sitaram,   the   Tribunal   awarded
compensation   of   Rs.48,33,235   (Rupees   Forty   Eight   Lakh
Thirty   Three   Thousand   Two   Hundred   and   Thirty   Five   only)
jointly   and   severally   to   the   appellants   and   the   parents   of
Sitaram,   along   with   interest.   The   Tribunal   observed   that
there was evidence on record to show that Sunita (appellant
No.1)   wife   of   the   deceased   was   having   estranged   relations
with her  husband and thus ordered that the  compensation
be   divided   in   such   a   way   that   the   appellants   herein   would
receive   Rs.38,33,235   (Rupees   Thirty   Eight   Lakh   Thirty
Three Thousand Two Hundred and Thirty Five only) and the
remaining   amount  of   Rs.10,00,000 (Rupees  Ten  Lakh   only)
would be given to the parents of the deceased. 

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11. The   appellants,   aggrieved   by   the   deduction   of   income
tax   from   the   calculated   income   of   the   deceased,   filed   S.B.
Civil   Miscellaneous   Appeal   No.581   of   2017   while   the
respondents   filed   two   appeals   viz.   S.B.   Civil   Miscellaneous
Appeal No.521 of 2017  and S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal
No.522 of 2017, before the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur
Bench. Vide a common judgment dated 25 th
 July, 2018, the
High Court set aside the Tribunal’s judgment in entirety, on
the   grounds   that   non­examination   of   the   pillion   rider,
Rajulal   Khateek,   was   fatal   to   the   case   of   the     appellants,
that the witness Bhagchand (A.D. 2) was unreliable and his
evidence could not be reckoned  and that the site map of the
accident   (Exh.3)   showed   that   the   deceased   Sitaram   was
riding   his   motorcycle   on   the   wrong   side   of   the   road   at   the
time  when  the   accident   occurred,  thus,  proving  that   it  was
Sitaram,   and   not   respondent   No.2   (bus   driver),   who   was
guilty   of   negligence.   The   High   Court   thus   allowed   the   two
appeals   filed   by   the   respondents   and   set   aside   the
Tribunal’s   judgment,   and   consequently   dismissed   the
appeal filed by the appellants.

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12. We   have   heard   Mr.   Anuj   Bhandari,   learned   counsel
appearing   for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   S.K.   Bhattacharya,
learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   respondents.   Mr.
Bhandari   submits   that   the   Motor   Accident   Claims   are
summary   proceedings   so   as   to   adjudicate   the   adequate
amount   of   compensation   in   case   of   an   accident   and   that   a
claim under the Act has to be decided on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability rather than on the standard of
proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   which   applies   in   criminal
matters.   He   submits   that   evidence   of   Bhagchand   (A.D.2)
was   justly   accepted   by   the   Tribunal   and   the   High   Court
discarded   the   same   on   specious   ground   that   he   was   not
cited   as   a   witness   in   the   criminal   case   registered   by   the
local   police   in   respect   of   the   subject   accident   and   was
unable to tell the age of  the pillion rider. Further, the non­
examination of a witness cited in the charge sheet would not
be   fatal   to  the   appellant’s   claim   and   the  entire   claim   could
not   be   rejected   merely   on   such   ground.   Besides,   the
statement   of   the   pillion   rider   Rajulal   Khateek,   as   recorded
by   the   police   under   Section   161   of   the   Criminal   Procedure
Code   (‘ CrPC ’),   clearly   stated   that   the   offending   bus   was

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being   driven   in   a   rash   and   negligent   manner   and   on   the
wrong   side   of   the   road   and   although   this   witness   has   not
been   examined   in   these   proceedings,   his   statement
nevertheless   remained   on   the   record   as   part   of   the   final
report   filed   under   Section   173   CrPC   and   hence,   that   could
not be discarded merely  for  lack of examination of  the  said
witness. 
13. Mr.   Bhandari   also   submits   that   on   the   issue   of
negligence   by   the   rider   of   the   motorcycle   and   the   said
motorcycle   being   driven   on   the   wrong   side   of   the   road,   the
High   Court   came   to   a   diametrically   opposite   finding   from
the   Tribunal,   merely   by   reference   to   the   site   plan,   on   the
basis   of   conjuncture   and   surmises   and   in   complete
disregard   of   the   other   evidence   and,   in   particular,   the
factual   position   as   set   out   in   the   site   plan   (Exh.3).   He
submits   that   the   Tribunal   had   justly   opined   that   the   site
plan indicated that the offending bus was being driven at a
high speed and after hitting the motorcycle, it went further
ahead and rammed into an electricity pole off the road, well

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past the accident spot. The Tribunal’s judgment was a well­
reasoned decision and a plausible view of the matter. Thus,
the   High   Court   committed   grave   illegality   in   setting   aside
the said decision. He relied upon  Kusum Lata and Ors. Vs.
Satbir   and   Ors. 1
,   Bimla   Devi   and   Ors.   Vs.   Himachal
Road   Transport   Corporation   and   Ors. 2
,   United   India
Insurance   Company   Limited   Vs.   Shila   Datta   and   Ors. , 3
and   Dulcina   Fernandes   and   Ors.   Vs.   Joaquim   Xavier
Cruz and Anr.  4
, in support of his arguments .
14. Per contra, Mr. S.K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for
the   respondents,   argues   that   the   Tribunal’s   decision   was
wholly   untenable.   Not   only   did   the   appellants   failed   to
examine   any  independent   witness   to   the  case  but   also,  the
testimony of Bhagchand (A.D. 2) was not credible as neither
was   his   name   set   out   in   the   list   of   witnesses   nor   could   he
identify   the   age   of   the   pillion   rider   on   the   motorcycle.
However,   the   same   witness   could   clearly   identify   both,   the
1   (2011) 3 SCC 646
2  ( 2009) 13 SCC 530 
3   (2011) 10 SCC 509
4   (2013) 10 SCC 646

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number   of  the  motorcycle  and  the  number   of  the  offending
bus, thus indicative of the fact that the witness was tutored
and   not   a   natural   witness.   Mr.   Bhattacharya   submits   that
the   Tribunal’s  opinion,  that  not   all  witnesses  named  in  the
charge­sheet   were   required   to   be   presented   by   the
investigating   agency   rather,   only   the   spot   witnesses   were
required,   was   contradictory,   since   the   pillion   rider   on   the
motorcycle, Rajulal Khateek, was mentioned as a witness in
the charge­sheet but the said person was not presented for
examination.
15. Mr.   Bhattacharya   further   argues   that   the   two
principles   applicable   to   the   assessment   of   evidence   in
matters   of   reckless   driving   and   negligence   are   res   ipsa
loquitor   and   preponderance   of   probability.     That   principle
casts   a   burden   on   the   appellants/claimants   to   show   that
the   deceased   Sitaram   was   not   negligent   in   riding   his
motorcycle.   The   facts,   however,   indicate   that   the   accident
occurred   in   the   middle   of   the   road   and   although   the
offending   bus   was   being   driven   in   the   middle   of   the   road,

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the fault lay with the lighter vehicle namely, the motorcycle.
Merely   because   the   bus   was   being   driven   fast,   it   does   not
follow that  the same was also  being  driven negligently. The
evidence   on   record   lacked   basic   requirements   to   prove   the
guilt   of   respondent   No.2   driver,   let   alone   on   the
preponderance   of   probability   and   there   was   no   evidence   to
indicate   the   callousness   or   negligence   of   the   bus   driver.
There was no assessment of contributory negligence on the
part   of   the   deceased   Sitaram   and   the   appellants   failed   to
prove any negligence on behalf of the respondents.
16. Finally,   Mr.   Bhattacharya   submits   that   the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal to the parents of the
deceased Sitaram was incorrect since there was no evidence
on   record   to   show   that   the   parents   were   dependent   on   the
deceased   or   that   they   were   staying   with   him.   Sitaram   was
admittedly   not   a   bachelor   and   was   not   staying   with   his
parents.   While   the   parents   did   have   the   right   to   filial
consortium,   however,   compensation   under   such   head   was
to be awarded separately and not on a structured basis.

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17. We   have   cogitated   over   the   above   submissions   and
have   examined   the   relevant   record.   The   pivotal   question   is
about the correctness of the approach of the High Court in
setting   aside   the   findings   of   fact   recorded   by   the   Tribunal.
Further,   whether   the   circumstances   emanating   from   the
evidence   produced   by   the   parties   justify   the   conclusion
reached   by   the   High   Court   on   the   factum   of   negligence   on
the   part   of   the   motorcycle   rider,   the   deceased   Sitaram,   in
causing   the   accident   with   the   offending   bus   driven   by
respondent No.2. 
18. Indeed,   we   are   conscious   of   the   scope   of   an   appeal
under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   of   India.   This   Court
ordinarily   does   not   re­examine   or   re­appreciate   the
evidence. But it is certainly open to this Court to interfere if
the   findings   recorded   in   the   judgment   under   appeal   are
found to be manifestly wrong or perverse. 
19. We may immediately  turn to the manner in which the
well­considered   and   exhaustive   judgment   of   the   Tribunal
running into over 24 pages came to be reversed by the High

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Court, if we may say so, in a cryptic manner in 5 pages. The
relevant   portion   of   the   High   Court   judgment   under   appeal,
after recording facts and submissions of the counsel, reads
thus:
 
“In   order   to   prove   Issue   No.1,   claimants   examined   AW­2
Bhagchand.   The   said   witness   deposed   that   on
28.10.2011,   while   he   was   returning   after   answering   the
call   of  nature,  he  saw   that   a  motorcycle   was  coming  from
village   Manhapura   side.   The   Roadsways   but   came   from
opposite direction and struck against  the motorcycle. As a
result, one person, who was sitting on the motorcycle died.
In his cross­examination, he deposed that one more person
was  also  sitting on the  motorcycle. However, he  could  not
tell if the said person was young, old or a child.
FIR   Exhibit­1   was   lodged   by   Kailash   Chand   with
regard   to   the   accident   in   question.   A   perusal   of   the   same
reveals that  the motorcycle was being driven by Sita Ram
and Raju Lal Khateek was sitting on the pillion seat.  Best
eye­witness in the present case can be said to be Raju Lal
Khateek, who was travelling with the deceased at the time
of   accident.   However,   Raju   Lal   Khateek   has   not   been
examined by the claimants  before  the Tribunal. The  name
of   Bhagchand   is   not   shown   in   the   list   of   witnesses   as   an
eye­witness in the criminal case. In the criminal case, Raju
Lal Khateek has been shown as an eye­witness. A perusal
of the site plan Exhibit­3 reveals that the bus was going on
its   correct   side   of   the   road,   whereas,   the   motorcycle   was
coming  on  the  wrong  side  of   the  road,  had   struck against
the bus.
In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present   case,
no   reliance   can   be   placed   on   the   statement   of   AW­2
Bhagchand, who  had  been examined  by the  claimants  as
an eye­witness to the accident. The said witness could not
even tell in his cross­examination with regard to the age of
the   person,   who   was   sitting   on   the   pillion   seat.   Thus,   the
learned   Tribunal   fell   in   error   in   deciding   Issue   No.1   in
favour   of   the   claimants.   Accordingly,   finding   of   the

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Tribunal   on   Issue   No.1   is   reversed   and   the   said   issue   is
decided against the claimants.”
This is the only  analysis/discussion in the entire judgment
to   reverse   the   exhaustive   analysis   done   by   the   Tribunal   to
which we  have set  out  in brief  in  paragraphs  5 to  9 above.
The thrust of the reasoning given by the High Court rests on
the   unreliability   of   the   witnesses   presented   by   the
appellants:   first,   that   the   evidence   given   by   Bhagchand
(A.D.2)   was   unreliable   because   he   was   not   shown   as   a
witness   in   the   list   of   witnesses   mentioned   in   the   charge
sheet filed by the police and that the said witness could not
identify the age of the pillion rider, Rajulal Khateek. Second,
the said pillion rider himself, Rajulal Khateek, who was the
“best”   witness   in   the   matter,   was   not   presented   for
examination   by   the   appellants.   The   High   Court   also   relies
on the site map (Exh.3) to record the finding on the factum
of   negligence   of   the   deceased   Sitaram   in   causing   the
accident which resulted in his death. 
20. We have no hesitation in observing that such a hyper­
technical   and   trivial   approach   of   the   High   Court   cannot   be

18
sustained   in   a   case   for   compensation   under   the   Act,   in
connection   with   a   motor   vehicle   accident   resulting   in   the
death   of   a   family   member.   Recently,   in   Mangla   Ram   Vs.
Oriental   Insurance   Company   Limited   and   Ors. 5
,   (to
which one of us, Khanwilkar, J. was a party), this Court has
restated   the   position   as   to   the   approach   to   be   adopted   in
accident   claim   cases.   In   that   case,   the   Court   was   dealing
with a case of an accident between a motorcycle and a jeep,
where   the   Tribunal   had   relied   upon   the   FIR   and   charge­
sheet,   as   well   as   the   accompanying   statements   of   the
complainant and witnesses, to opine that the police records
confirmed   the   occurrence   of   an   accident   and   also   the
identity   of   the   offending   jeep   but   the   High   Court   had
overturned that finding  inter alia  on the ground that the oral
evidence   supporting   such   a   finding   had   been   discarded   by
the Tribunal itself and that reliance solely on the document
forming part of the police record was insufficient to arrive at
such   a   finding.   Disapproving   that   approach,   this   Court,
after adverting to multitude of cases under the Act, noted as
follows:
5   (2018) 5 SCC 656

19
“22.   The  question  is:   Whether   this  approach  of  the   High
Court   can   be   sustained   in   law?   While   dealing   with   a
similar   situation,   this   Court   in   Bimla   Devi 6
  noted   the
defence of the driver and conductor of the bus which inter
alia   was   to   cast   a   doubt   on   the   police   record   indicating
that   the   person   standing   at   the   rear   side   of   the   bus,
suffered   head   injury   when   the   bus   was   being   reversed
without blowing any horn. This Court observed that while
dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of
the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988,   the   Tribunal   stricto   sensu
is  not bound by  the pleadings  of the parties,  its  function
is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras
11­15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 533­34)
“ 11.   While   dealing   with   a   claim   petition   in   terms   of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal
stricto   sensu   is   not   bound   by   the   pleadings   of   the
parties;  its  function  being   to   determine  the  amount   of
fair compensation in the event  an accident  has  taken
place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor
vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having
regard   to   the   provisions   contained   in   Section   166   of
the   Act   is   a   sine   qua   non   for   entertaining   a   claim
petition but that would not mean that despite evidence
to   the   effect   that   death   of   the   claimant’s   predecessor
had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a
motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the
basis  of  a post­mortem  report  vis­à­vis  the  averments
made in a claim petition .
12.   The   deceased   was  a   constable.   Death  took   place
near a police station. The post­mortem report clearly
suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The
place of accident is not far from the police station. It
is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver
of   the   bus   that   he   slept   in   the   bus   and   in   the
morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If
the death of the constable had taken place earlier, it
is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town
like   Dharampur   would   remain   undetected
throughout   the   night   particularly   when   it   was   lying
at a bus­stand and near a police station. In such an
event, the Court can presume that the police officers
themselves should have taken possession of the dead
body.
13.   The   learned   Tribunal,   in   our   opinion,   has   rightly
proceeded   on   the   basis   that   apparently   there   was
6  Supra at footnote 2

20
absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents
2   and   3 .   The   claimant   was   not   at   the   place   of
occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the
details as to how the accident took place but the fact
that   the   first   information   report   had   been   lodged   in
relation to an accident could not have been ignored.
14.   Some   discrepancies   in   the   evidence   of   the
claimant’s   witnesses   might   have   occurred   but   the
core   question   before   the   Tribunal   and   consequently
before   the   High   Court   was   as   to   whether   the   bus   in
question was involved in the accident or not. For the
purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was
required to apply the principle underlying the burden
of   proof   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of   Section   106   of
the   Evidence   Act,   1872   as   to   whether   a   dead   body
wrapped   in  a  blanket   had  been  found  at  the  spot   at
such an early hour, which was required to be proved
by Respondents 2 and 3.
15.   In   a   situation   of   this   nature,   the   Tribunal   has
rightly   taken   a   holistic   view   of   the   matter.   It   was
necessary   to   be   borne   in   mind   that   strict   proof   of   an
accident   caused   by   a   particular   bus   in   a   particular
manner   may   not   be   possible   to   be   done   by   the
claimants.   The   claimants   were   merely   to   establish
their   case   on   the   touchstone   of   preponderance   of
probability. The standard of  proof  beyond  reasonable
doubt   could   not   have   been   applied.   For   the   said
purpose,   the   High   Court   should   have   taken   into
consideration   the   respective   stories   set   forth   by   both
the parties .”                            (emphasis supplied)
The   Court   restated   the   legal   position   that   the   claimants
were   merely   to   establish   their   case   on   the   touchstone   of
preponderance   of   probability   and   standard   of   proof
beyond   reasonable   doubt   cannot   be   applied   by   the
Tribunal   while   dealing   with   the   motor   accident   cases.
Even   in   that   case,   the   view   taken   by   the   High   Court   to
reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set
aside.
23.   Following   the   enunciation   in   Bimla   Devi   case ,   this
Court   in   Parmeshwari   v.   Amir   Chand 7
  noted   that   when
filing   of   the   complaint   was   not   disputed,   the   decision   of
the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High
Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of
the   SSP   to   prove   the   complaint.   The   Court   appreciated
7   (2011) 11 SCC 635

21
the   testimony   of   the   eyewitnesses   in   paras   12   &   13   and
observed thus: ( Parmeshwari case , SCC p. 638)
“ 12.   The   other   ground   on   which   the   High   Court
dismissed   the   case   was   by   way   of   disbelieving   the
testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the
High  Court   is  totally   conjectural.   Umed   Singh  is  not
related   to  the   appellant   but   as   a   good   citizen,   Umed
Singh   extended   his   help   to   the   appellant   by   helping
her to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensure
that   an   injured   woman   gets   medical   treatment.   The
evidence   of   Umed   Singh   cannot   be   disbelieved   just
because   he   did   not   file   a   complaint   himself.   We   are
constrained   to   repeat   our   observation   that   the   total
approach   of   the   High   Court,   unfortunately,   was   not
sensitised   enough   to   appreciate   the   plight   of   the
victim.
13.   The   other   so­called   reason   in   the   High   Court’s
order   was   that   as   the   claim   petition   was   filed   after
four months of the accident, the same is “a device to
grab   money   from   the   insurance   company”.   This
finding   in   the   absence   of   any   material   is   certainly
perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant
of   the   principle   that   in   a   road   accident   claim,   the
strict   principles   of   proof   in   a   criminal   case   are   not
attracted. …”
24.   It   will   be   useful   to   advert   to   the   dictum   in   N.K.V.
Bros.   (P)   Ltd.   v.   M.   Karumai   Ammal 8
,   wherein   it   was
contended by  the vehicle owner  that the criminal case in
relation   to   the   accident   had   ended   in   acquittal   and   for
which   reason   the   claim   under   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act
ought   to   be   rejected.   This   Court   negatived   the   said
argument   by   observing   that   the   nature   of   proof   required
to   establish   culpable   rashness,   punishable   under   IPC,   is
more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of
tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3 of
the   judgment   would   throw   some   light   as   to   what   should
be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases.
The same reads thus: (SCC pp. 458­59)
“ 3.   Road   accidents   are   one   of   the   top   killers   in   our
country,   specially   when   truck   and   bus   drivers
operate   nocturnally.   This   proverbial   recklessness
often persuades the courts, as has been observed by
us   earlier   in   other   cases,   to   draw   an   initial
presumption   in   several   cases   based   on   the   doctrine
of   res   ipsa   loquitur.   Accidents   Tribunals   must   take
8   (1980) 3 SCC 457

22
special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer
and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely
because of some doubt here or some obscurity there.
Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from
the   circumstances   where   it   is   fairly   reasonable.   The
court   should   not   succumb   to   niceties,   technicalities
and  mystic  maybes.  We   are  emphasising   this   aspect
because   we   are   often   distressed   by   transport
operators   getting   away   with   it   thanks   to   judicial
laxity,   despite   the   fact   that   they   do   not   exercise
sufficient   disciplinary   control   over   the   drivers   in   the
matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact
of   culpable   driving   of   public   transport   must   bring
owner   and   driver   to   their   responsibility   to   their
neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider
no­fault   liability   by   legislation.   A   second   aspect
which   pains   us   is   the   inadequacy   of   the
compensation   or   undue   parsimony   practised   by
tribunals. We must remember  that judicial tribunals
are   State   organs   and   Article   41   of   the   Constitution
lays   the   jurisprudential   foundation   for   State   relief
against   accidental   disablement   of   citizens.   There   is
no   justification   for   niggardliness   in   compensation.   A
third   factor   which   is   harrowing   is   the   enormous
delay   in   disposal   of   accident   cases   resulting   in
compensation,   even   if   awarded,   being   postponed   by
several   years.   The   States   must   appoint   sufficient
number   of   tribunals   and   the   High   Courts   should
insist   upon   quick   disposals   so   that   the   trauma   and
tragedy   already   sustained   may   not   be   magnified   by
the   injustice   of   delayed   justice.   Many   States   are
unjustly indifferent in this regard.”
25.   In   Dulcina   Fernandes 9
,   this   Court   examined   similar
situation where the evidence of claimant’s eyewitness was
discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that
case   was   acquitted   in   the   criminal   case   concerning   the
accident.   This   Court,   however,   opined   that   it   cannot   be
overlooked   that   upon   investigation   of   the   case   registered
against   the   respondent,   prima   facie,   materials   showing
negligence   were   found   to   put   him   on   trial.   The   Court
restated   the   settled   principle   that   the   evidence   of   the
claimants   ought   to   be   examined   by   the   Tribunal   on   the
touchstone   of   preponderance   of   probability   and   certainly
the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not
have been applied as noted in   Bimla Devi . In paras 8 & 9
9   Supra at footnote 4

23
of   the   reported   decision,   the   dictum   in   United   India
Insurance   Co.   Ltd.   v.   Shila   Datta 10
,   has   been   adverted   to
as under: ( Dulcina Fernandes case , SCC p. 650)
“ 8.   In   United   India   Insurance   Co.   Ltd.   v.   Shila   Datta
while   considering   the   nature   of   a   claim   petition
under   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   a   three­Judge
Bench   of   this   Court   has   culled   out   certain
propositions   of   which   Propositions   ( ii ),   ( v )   and   ( vi )
would   be   relevant   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case
and,   therefore,   may   be   extracted   hereinbelow:   (SCC
p. 518, para 10)
‘ 10.   ( ii )   The   rules   of   the   pleadings   do   not   strictly
apply   as   the   claimant   is   required   to   make   an
application   in   a   form   prescribed   under   the   Act.   In
fact,   there   is   no   pleading   where   the   proceedings   are
suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
* * *
( v )   Though   the   Tribunal   adjudicates   on   a   claim   and
determines the compensation, it does not do so as in
an adversarial litigation. …
( vi ) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary
procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more
persons possessing special knowledge of and matters
relevant   to   inquiry,   to   assist   it   in   holding   the
enquiry.’
9.   The following further observation available in para
10   of   the   Report   would   require   specific   note:   ( Shila
Datta case , SCC p. 519)
‘ 10.  … We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to
show   that   an   award   by   the   Tribunal   cannot   be   seen
as   an   adversarial  adjudication   between   the   litigating
parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of
compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after
due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.’”
In   para   10   of   Dulcina   Fernandes ,   the   Court   opined   that
non­examination   of   witness   per   se   cannot   be   treated   as
fatal   to   the   claim   set   up   before   the   Tribunal.   In   other
words,   the   approach   of   the   Tribunal   should   be   holistic
analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying
the principles of preponderance of probability.”
10  (2011) 10 SCC 509

24
It   is   thus   well   settled   that   in   motor   accident   claim   cases,
o nce   the     foundational   fact,   namely,   the   actual   occurrence
of   the   accident,   has   been   established,   then   the   Tribunal’s
role   would   be   to   calculate   the   quantum   of   just
compensation   if   the   accident   had   taken   place   by   reason   of
negligence of  the driver  of  a  motor  vehicle and, while doing
so,   the   Tribunal   would   not   be   strictly   bound   by   the
pleadings   of   the   parties .   Notably,   while   deciding   cases
arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the standard of proof
to be borne in mind must be of preponderance of probability
and   not   the   strict   standard   of   proof   beyond   all   reasonable
doubt which is followed in criminal cases.
21. In   the   present   case,   we   find   that   the   Tribunal   had
followed a just approach in the matter of appreciation of the
evidence/materials   on   record.   Whereas,   the   High   Court
adopted   a   strict   interpretation   of   the   evidence   on   the
touchstone   of   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   to   record   an
adverse   finding   against   the   appellants   and   to   reverse   the
well   considered   judgment   of   the   Tribunal   in   a   cryptic
manner.

25
22.   Reverting to the factual matrix, the actual occurrence
of   the   accident   between   the   motorcycle   driven   by   Sitaram
bearing   registration   number   RJ   25   SA   6923   coming   from
one   side   and   a   bus   belonging   to   respondent   No.1   (the
Rajasthan   State   Road   Transport   Corporation)   bearing
registration   number   RJ­26/P.A.   0042   coming   from   the
opposite   direction,   is   duly   proved.   The   Tribunal   has   relied
upon   the   uncontroverted   evidence   of   witnesses   A.D.1   and
A.D.   3,   and   the   documents   presented   by     them,   especially
FIR No. 247/2011 (Exh. 1) and charge­sheet (Exh.2) against
one   Banwari   Lal   Bairwa   (respondent   No.2),   charging   him
with offences under  Sections 279, 337 and 304A of the IPC
and   Sections   134/187   of   the   Act,   to   establish   that   on
28.10.2011   at   around   7   A.M.,   Sitaram,   along   with   pillion
rider   Rajulal   Khateek,   was   riding   on   a   motorcycle   bearing
number   RJ   25   SA   6923   from   village   Bapuee   to   Chaut   ka
Barwad   for   Daug,   to   his   sister,   when,   near   Mahapura   tri­
section,   bus   number   RJ­26/P.A.   0042   belonging   to
respondent   No.1   (the   Rajasthan   State   Road   Transport

26
Corporation)   coming   from   the   opposite   direction   hit   the
motorcycle from the front, resulting in the death of Sitaram.
 
23. The   Tribunal   had   justly   accepted   the   appellants’
contention   that   the   respondents   did   not   challenge   the
propriety of the said FIR No. 247/2011 (Exh. 1) and charge­
sheet (Exh. 2) before any authority. The only defence raised
by   the   respondents   to   this   plea   was   that   the   said   FIR   No.
247/2011   was   based   on   wrong   facts   and   was   filed   in
connivance   between   the   appellants/complainants   and   the
police, against which the respondents complained to the in­
charge of the police station and the District Superintendent
of Police but to no avail. Apart from  this bald assertion, no
evidence   was   produced   by   the   respondents   before   the
Tribunal   to   prove   this   point.   The   filing   of   the   FIR   was
followed by the filing of the charge­sheet against respondent
No.2   for   offences   under   u/Sections   279,   337   and   304A   of
the   IPC   and   Sections   134/187   of   the   Act,   which,   again,
reinforces   the   allegations   in   the   said   FIR   insofar   as   the
occurrence   of   the   accident   was   concerned   and   the   role   of
respondent   No.2   in   causing   such   accident.   Be   that   as   it

27
may, the High Court has not even made a mention, let alone
record   a   finding,   of   any   impropriety   against   FIR   247/2011
(Exh. 1) or  charge­sheet (Exh. 2) or  the conclusion reached
by the Tribunal in that regard. Yet, the FIR and the Charge­
sheet has been found to be deficient by the High Court.
 
24. Before   the   Tribunal,   respondent   No.1   has   neither
denied   that   respondent   No.2   was   in   its   employment   at   the
time of the accident nor has it denied that respondent No.2
was   driving   the   offending   bus   no.   RJ­26/P.A.   0042   at   the
time   of   the   accident.   The   Tribunal   has   also   referred   to   the
Post­mortem   report   (Exh.4)   which   establishes   that   Sitaram
died   due   to   shock   arising   from   various   fractures   on   his
body,   which,   undoubtedly,   were   rendered   due   to   his
accident with the offending bus. All of the aforesaid evidence
remained   uncontroverted.   While   the   Tribunal   has   accepted
these depositions and the evidence presented in that regard,
the   High   Court   has,   surprisingly,   not   even   referred   to   it   or
even   the   numerous   documents   presented   by   the   said
witnesses as evidence, apart from a passing reference to FIR
247/2011 (Exh.1). 

28
25. The   Tribunal’s   reliance   upon   FIR   247/2011   (Exh.   1)
and   charge­sheet   (Exh.   2)   also   cannot   be   faulted   as   these
documents   indicate   the   complicity   of   respondent   No.2.   The
FIR   and   charge­sheet,   coupled   with   the   other   evidence   on
record,   inarguably   establishes   the   occurrence   of   the   fatal
accident   and   also   point   towards   the   negligence   of   the
respondent   No.2   in   causing   the   said   accident.   Even   if   the
final   outcome   of   the   criminal   proceedings   against
respondent   No.2   is   unknown,   the   same   would   make   no
difference   atleast   for   the   purposes   of   deciding   the   claim
petition under the Act. This Court in   Mangla Ram   (supra),
noted   that   the   nature   of   proof   required   to   establish
culpability   under   criminal   law   is   far   higher   than   the
standard required under the law of torts to create liability.
26. Accordingly,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   upholding   the
finding recorded by the Tribunal that there was an accident
on   28­10­2011   at   around   7AM   between   the   motorcycle
driven   by   Sitaram   bearing   registration   number   RJ   25   SA
6923   and   a   bus   belonging   to   respondent   No.1.   (the

29
Rajasthan   State   Road   Transport   Corporation)   bearing
registration   number   RJ­26/P.A.   0042   coming   from   the
opposite   direction   and   being   driven   rashly   and   negligently
by respondent No.2, which resulted in the death of Sitaram.
27. The   next   question   is   whether   the   purported
shortcomings in the evidence of Bhagchand Khateek (A.D.2)
and   the   lack   of   evidence   of   the   pillion   rider   on   the
motorcycle,   Rajulal   Khateek,   would   be   fatal   to   the
appellants’ case. As regards the evidence of Bhagchand, the
High   Court   found   that   the   deposition   of   the   said   witness
was unreliable because his name was not mentioned in the
list   of   witnesses   in   the   criminal   proceedings   and   also
because   he   was   unable   to   tell   the   age   of   the   pillion   rider.
Besides, the said witness lived in Pakhala village, which was
3 (three) kilometres away from the accident spot and hence,
he   could   not   have   been   near   the   said   spot   when   the
accident   occurred.   The   Tribunal   had   dealt   with   these
objections quite substantially and, in our opinion, correctly,
in its judgment, wherein it records:

30
“ In  the  present  case  the  petitioners  have   got   examined
the   eye­witness   A.D.2   Bhag   Chand   son   of   Ram   Dev .
Admittedly   the   name   of   the   witness   Bhag   Chand   is   not
mentioned   in   the   list   of   witnesses   in   exhibit­2   charge
sheet   but   if   the   interrogation   with   this   witness   is
perused   then   the   opponent   in   order   of   not   considering
this   witness   as   eye­witness,   has   not   asked   about   giving
police   statement   or   not   having   his   name   in   the   list   of
witnesses.   The   witness   A.D.2   Bhag   Chand   Khateek,   in
interrogation   on   behalf   of   opponents   has   accepted   this   that
he neither knows Banwari nor after the incident he has seen
Banwari.
During   interrogation   the   statement   of   the   witness   has   been
that   I   was   near   the   place   of   incident   itself.   That   time   I   was
returning   after   relieving   myself.   The   argument   of   the
opponents   has   been   that   the   witness   Bhag   Chand   is
resident of village Pakhala whereas the place of incident
is at distance of 3 k.m. therefore, the statement of going
to toilet is false. Therefore, he should not be considered
eye­witness.   But  the  witness  A.D.2  Bhag   Chand  Khateek
has   stated   in   his   main   statement   that   one   day   from
dated 28.10.2011, he had come to his brother’s house at
village   Shivad.   In   such   a   Situation,   in   our   humble
opinion,   the   witness   being   at   a   distance   of   3   k.m.   from
spot   of   incident,   being   resident   of   Pakhala   village,   this
cannot   be   considered   that   this   witness   would   not   be
considered eye­witness.
 
Whereas   there   is   question   of   his   name   not   being   in   the
charge­sheet   as   witness,   definitely   due   to   this   fact,   each
such   witness   cannot   be   considered   eyewitness   who   gives
little statement about incident.  But the evidence which the
witness A.D.2 Bhag Chand Khateek has given on oath, in
order  to  prove that distrust  worthy,  the opponents have
not   done   any   such   interrogation   from   which   there   is
suspicion in the statements of witness. The witness Bhag
Chand   Khateek   was   not   even   this   suggestion   that   his
police   statement   was   not   taken   or   the   police   had   not
interrogated   him.   In   our   humble   opinion,   in   cases   like
accident   occurring   suddenly,   the   persons   present   near
the place of incident are eye­witness of the incident. But
during   investigation   this   is   not   necessary   that   the
investigation   agency   should   name   all   the   eye­witnesses
as witness in the charge sheet. Therefore, the statement

31
of   witness   A.D.2   Bhag   Chand   Khateek   cannot   be
considered   distrust   worthy   that   his   name   in   the   charge
sheet is not mentioned as witness. ”
(emphasis supplied)
28. Clearly,   the   evidence   given   by   Bhagchand   withstood
the respondents’ scrutiny and the respondents were unable
to shake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to
take   note   of   the   absence   of   cross   examination   of   this
witness   by   the   respondents,   leave   alone   the   Tribunal’s
finding   on   the   same,   and   instead,   deliberated   on   the
reliability   of   Bhagchand’s   (A.D.2)   evidence   from   the
viewpoint   of   him   not   being   named   in   the   list   of   eye
witnesses   in   the   criminal   proceedings,   without   even
mentioning  as to why  such absence from  the list is fatal to
the case of the appellants. This approach of the High Court
is   mystifying,   especially   in   light   of   this   Court’s   observation
[as   set   out   in   Parmeshwari   (supra)   and   reiterated   in
Mangla Ram   (supra)] that the strict principles of proof in a
criminal   case   will   not   be   applicable   in   a   claim   for
compensation under the Act and further, that the standard
to   be   followed   in   such   claims   is   one   of   preponderance   of

32
probability   rather   than   one   of   proof   beyond   reasonable
doubt.   There   is   nothing   in   the   Act   to   preclude   citing   of   a
witness in motor accident claim who has not been named in
the   list  of  witnesses  in  the  criminal  case. What  is  essential
is   that   the   opposite   party   should   get   a   fair   opportunity   to
cross examine the concerned witness. Once that is done, it
will   not   be   open   to   them   to   complain   about   any   prejudice
caused   to   them.   If   there   was   any   doubt   to   be   cast   on   the
veracity   of   the   witness,   the   same   should   have   come   out   in
cross examination, for which opportunity was granted to the
respondents by the Tribunal. 
29. The importance of cross­examining a witness has been
elucidated   by   this   Court   on   several   occasions,   notably   in
Kartar   Singh   Vs.   State   of   Punjab , 11
  where   a   Five­Judge
Bench of this Court elaborated:
“278.   Section   137   of   the   Evidence   Act   defines   what   cross­
examination  means   and   Sections   139   and   145  speak   of   the
mode   of   cross­examination   with   reference   to   the   documents
as well as oral evidence.  It is the jurisprudence of law that
cross­examination   is   an   acid­test   of   the   truthfulness   of
the   statement   made   by   a   witness   on   oath   in
examination­in­chief, the objects of which are:
11  ( 1994) 3 SCC 569

33
(1)   to   destroy   or   weaken   the   evidentiary   value   of   the
witness of his adversary;
(2)   to   elicit   facts   in   favour   of   the   cross­   examining
lawyer's   client   from   the   mouth   of   the   witness   of   the
adversary party;
(3)   to   show   that   the   witness   is   unworthy   of   belief   by
impeaching the credit of the said witness; 
and the questions to be addressed in the course of cross­
examination are to test  his veracity;  to discover who  he
is and what is his position in life; and to shake his credit
by injuring his character.
279.   The   identity   of   the   witness   is   necessary   in   the   normal
trial   of   cases   to   achieve   the   above   objects   and   the   right   of
confrontation   is   one   of   the   fundamental   guarantees   so
that he could guard himself from being victimized by any
false and invented evidence that may be tendered by the
adversary party. ”
(emphasis supplied)
The   High   Court   has   not   held   that   the   respondents   were
successful   in   challenging   the   witnesses’   version   of   events,
despite being given the opportunity to do so. The High Court
accepts that the said witness (A.D.2) was cross examined by
the   respondents   but   nevertheless   reaches   a   conclusion
different from that of the Tribunal, by selectively overlooking
the   deficiencies   in   the   respondent’s   case,   without   any
proper reasoning.
30. The   High   Court   discarded   the   evidence   of   Bhagchand
(A.D.   2)   also   because   he   could   not   recollect   the   age   of   the

34
pillion   rider.  The  inability  of  the   witness  to  identify   the  age
of   the   pillion   rider   cannot,   per   se,   be   a   militating   factor   to
discard   his   entire   version   especially   since   the   presence   of
the   witness   at   the   time   and   place   of   the   accident   has
remained   unshaken   and   including   his  deposition   regarding
the manner of occurrence of the accident and identity of the
driver   of   the   offending   vehicle.   The   filing   of   FIR
No.247/2011   (Exh.1)   and   the   subsequent   filing   of   the
charge­sheet   (Exh.2)   corroborate   the   witnesses’   evidence.
The view taken by the Tribunal therefore, on the veracity of
the evidence of A.D. 2, is unexceptionable and there was no
reason for the High Court to interfere with the same. 
31. Similarly,   the   issue   of   non­examination   of   the   pillion
rider, Rajulal Khateek, would not be fatal to the case of the
appellants.   The   approach   in   examining   the   evidence   in
accident   claim   cases   is   not   to   find   fault   with   non
examination   of   some   “best”   eye   witness   in   the   case   but   to
analyse the evidence already on record to ascertain whether
that   is   sufficient   to   answer   the   matters   in   issue   on   the
touchstone   of   preponderance   of   probability.   This   court,   in

35
Dulcina Fernandes  (supra), faced a similar situation where
the   evidence  of  claimant's  eyewitness  was  discarded  by  the
Tribunal   and   the   respondent   was   acquitted   in   the   criminal
case concerning the accident. This Court, however, took the
view that  the material on record was   prima  facie     sufficient
to   establish   that   the   respondent   was   negligent.   In   the
present case, therefore, the Tribunal was right in accepting
the   claim   of   the   appellants   even   without   the   deposition   of
the   pillion   rider,   Rajulal   Khateek,   since   the   other   evidence
on   record   was   good   enough   to   prima   facie   establish   the
manner in which the accident had occurred and the identity
of the parties involved in the accident.
32. On the issue of negligence by the deceased Sitaram in
causing the accident, the Tribunal has referred to the notice
issued under Section 134 of the Act (Exh. 7) to the driver of
the offending vehicle, respondent No.2. It records that in the
said   notice,   respondent   No.2   failed   to   give   any   statement
indicating that the accident occurred due to any mistake by
the   rider   of   the   motorcycle,   Sitaram.   The   Tribunal   has
further   relied   upon   the   evidence   of   Bhagchand   (A.D.2)   and

36
also   upon   the   site   plan   of   the   accident   (Exh.   3)   to   reach   a
conclusion   that   respondent   No.2   recklessly   drove   the
speeding   bus   on   the   wrong   side   of   the   road,   into   the
motorcycle being ridden by Sitaram, who was on the correct
side   of   the   road,   and   caused   his   death.   Whereas,   the   High
Court has disregarded the evidence of Bhagchand. Further,
the site plan (Exh. 3) cannot be read in isolation. It will have
to be examined in conjunction with the other evidence. 
33. The   site   plan   (Exh.   3)   has   been   produced   in   evidence
before   the   Tribunal   by   witness   A.D.   1   (appellant   No.1
herein)   and   the   record   seems   to   indicate   that   the   accident
occurred   in   the   middle   of   the   road.   However,   the   exact
location of the accident, as marked out in the site plan, has
not   been   explained   muchless   proved   through   a   competent
witness   by   the   respondents   to   substantiate   their   defence.
Besides, the concerned police official  who prepared the site
plan has also not been examined. While the existence of the
site   plan   may   not   be   in   doubt,   it   is   difficult   to   accept   the
theory propounded on the basis of the site plan to record a
finding   against   the   appellants   regarding   negligence

37
attributable   to   deceased   Sitaram,   moreso   in   absence   of
ocular evidence to prove and explain the contents of the site
plan.
 
34. Be   it   noted   that   the   evidence   of   witness   A.D.2
(Bhagchand)  unequivocally  states that the respondent No.2
bus   driver   was   negligent   in   driving   recklessly   at   a   high
speed   on   the   wrong   side  of   the  road,   thus,  resulting   in   the
accident which caused the death of Sitaram. It was not open
to the High Court to discard this evidence. Additionally, the
Tribunal   had   justly   placed   reliance   on   the   contents   of   FIR
No.247/2011   (Exh.   1)   and   charge­sheet   (Exh.2)   which
prima   facie   indicate   the   negligence   of   respondent   No.2   in
driving   the   bus.     We   once   again   remind   ourselves   of   the
dictum   in   Dulcina   Fernandes   (supra)   and   thereafter   in
Mangla Ram   (supra), and answer  the factum of negligence
of   the   driver   of   the   offending   vehicle   against   the
respondents. 
35. Reverting to the question of adequacy of compensation
amount determined by the Tribunal, the appellants have not

38
assailed   the   order   of   the   High   Court   rejecting   their   appeal.
Further,     in   their   appeal   before   the   High   Court   (SBCMA
No.581 of 2017), the limited grievance was about deduction
of   income   tax   from   the   calculated   income.   That   ground   is
unsustainable   in   light   of   the   decision   in   National
Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Ors . 12
We  cannot   permit  the   appellants   to   widen   the   scope   in  the
present appeal, muchless pray for enhanced compensation.
We are instead inclined to restore the Award passed by the
Tribunal   as   it   has   determined   the   just   compensation
amount,   keeping   in   mind   all   the   relevant   parameters
including   the   apportionment   thereof   between   the   family
members   of   the   deceased.   Upholding   that   Award   would   be
doing complete justice.
36. Resultantly,   this   appeal   must   succeed.   We   hold   that
the   impugned   judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court
deserves   to   be   set   aside   and   instead,   the   Award   passed   by
the Tribunal dated 14 th
 December, 2016 be restored.
12  (2017) 16 SCC 680

39
37. Appeal   is   allowed   in   the   above   terms.   No   order   as   to
costs.  
................................J
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
................................J
(Ajay Rastogi)
New Delhi.
February 14, 2019.