2019 INSC 0147
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 2007 OF 2008
EZAJHUSSAIN SABDARHUSSAIN & ANR.    ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT       ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1.       The appellants are assailing their conviction under Section
302   read   with   section   34   IPC   and   sentenced   to   undergo
imprisonment   for   life   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court   and
confirmed by the High Court under the impugned judgment.  
2. On   dismissal  of   appeal   upholding   conviction   under   Section
302   read   with   Section   34   IPC,   accused   nos.   1   and   2   have   not
challenged their conviction and sentence and accused nos. 3 and
4(present   appellants)   have   approached   this   Court   assailing   the
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said   judgment   and   conviction   under   Section   302   read   with
Section 34 IPC.  
3. The   brief   facts   necessary   for   disposal   of   the   appeal   are   as
follows:
According   to   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   accused   no.1
Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   was   having   a   long   pending   civil
dispute   about   his   flat   with   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil
situated near  to  the scene  of  occurrence.   On  18 th
  August, 1997
at   about   11.00   a.m.,   Mohammad   Shakil(deceased)   had   operated
electric   motor   for  supply   of   water   in   the  common   overhead  tank
situated on top of the building but at that time since water taps
were kept open by accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain
in his house, the water could not reach to the tank.   The request
of   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   to   close   the   tap   was   not
acceptable to accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain, due
to   which   altercation   took   place   between   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain and deceased Mohammed Shakil
and   both   started   shouting   at   each   other.     According   to   the
prosecution,   after   hearing   hot   altercation,   members   of   the
complainant   party(Shamimbanu,   Adilahmed,   Zaidahmed)   came
there   and   started   abusing   the   member   of   their   family.     At   this
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stage accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain and accused
no.   2   Shefakathusssain   Sabdarhussain   went   into   their   house
and brought a knife and gupti in their hand and accused nos. 3
&   4(present   appellants)   caught   hold   of   Mohammad
Shakil(deceased)   and   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain
Sabdarhussain   and   accused   no.   2   Shefakathussain
Sabdarhussain   gave   a   knife   and   gupti   blow   to   deceased
Mohammad Shakil(deceased) and accused no. 2 Shefakathussain
Sabdarhussain   also   injured   Adilahmed(PW­2)   who   too   was
caught   hold   of   by   accused   nos.   3   &   4(present   appellants)   and
thereafter   they   left   the   scene   of   occurrence,   both   Mohammad
Shakil   and   Adilahmed   (being   severally   injured)     were   taken   to
V.S. Hospital and on receiving telephonic message Mr. Makwana,
Police   Inspector   rushed   to   the   hospital   where   he   came   to   know
that   Mohammad   Shakil   had   succumbed   to   injuries   and
Adilahmed   was   admitted   in   the   hospital   for   treatment   and
thereafter   recorded  the  complaint   of  Shamimbanu(PW­1),  wife  of
deceased Mohammad Shakil at 2.00 p.m. and thereafter sent the
same to Gaikwad Haveli Police Station for registration of offence.
Thereafter,   all   the   four   accused   were   registered   in   C.R.   No.
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146/1996   for   the   alleged   commission   of   offence   under   Sections
302, 307 read with Section 34 IPC.
4.    It   may   be   relevant   to   note   that   for   the   self­same   incident
happened   around   11.00   a.m.   in   the   morning   of   18 th
  August,
1997, accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain also made a
cross complaint that he was residing at House No. 521/4/5 in a
small   chawl(street)   of   Saudagar,   in   Jamalpur   area   and   the
present   complainant   party   was   living   in   front   of   his   house   and
the families are known to each other.     On 18 th
  August, 1997 at
eleven   o’   clock   in   the   morning,   he   was   in   the   bathroom   and   he
had kept the tap on, as his house was to be cleaned.  Mohammad
Shakil (deceased) came at his house and told him to turn the tap
of  water  off.     Accused  no.   1 Iftekharhussain  Sabdarhussain  told
to   do   the   same   after   the   cleaning   work   would   finish   as   he   was
cleaning   his   house   and   not   possible   for   him   to   off   the   tap.     The
members   of   the   complaint   party   started   using   abusive   language
and   attacked   on   him   and   becoming   very   excited.       He   also   got
excited   and   used   abusive   words,   then  three   of   them   had   beaten
him   with   punch   and  kick   and   Mohammad   Shakil(deceased)   had
beaten him by pipe blow on the back side by coming from behind.
The   nearby   people   had   also   come.     Thereafter,   his   brother
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Shefakathussain   took   him   to   Police   Station   by   rescuing   him
where   he   lodged   his   complaint   which   was   registered   at   12.10
p.m.     In   his   complaint,   he   has   not   recorded   the   presence   of
accused nos. 3 & 4(present appellants) when the alleged incident
took   place   on   18 th
  August,   1997.       The   complaint   of   which   the
cognizance   was   taken   for   the   offence   under   Section   302   &   307
read with Section 34 IPC was registered at             2.00 p.m. after
the   complaint   of   the   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain
Sabdarhussain   on   which   the   FIR   was   registered   at   the   instance
of the accused no.1 at 12.10 p.m. and after investigation charge­
sheet came to be filed against members of the complainant party.
5. All the four accused faced trial and held guilty on the ocular
evidence   of   PWs   1,2,3   &   4   who   are   the   family   members   of
deceased   Mohammad   Shakil.     No   independent   witness   was
examined by the prosecution despite the fact it was a holiday and
members reside in the adjacent flats as well.   Indisputedly, there
is   no   recovery   from   the   present   accused   appellants   and   their
clothes   were   also   not   recovered   in   the   course   of   investigation.
After   the   trial,   all   the   four   accused   persons   were   held   guilty
under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   IPC   and   the   appeal
preferred   against   their   conviction   and   sentence   was   also
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dismissed   by   the   High   Court   under   the   impugned   judgment
dated 29 th
 February, 2008.
6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the Courts
below   have   committed   a   serious   manifest   error   in   accepting   the
testimony   of   PWs   1,2,3   &   4   who   are   the   interested   witnesses   in
holding their conviction under Section 302 with the aid of Section
34 IPC on the said evidence and further submits that taking the
prosecution case on its face value based on the evidence of PWs
1,2, 3 & 4, there may be a case against accused nos. 1 & 2 who
could   be   charged   guilty   and   convicted   under   Section   302   read
with Section 34 IPC as there was an allegation against them that
they had stabbed the deceased by a knife and gupti.   But so far
as   present   accused   appellants   are   concerned   against   whom   the
only   allegation   was   that   both   of   them   had   caught   hold   of
deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   and   never   assaulted   either   the
deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   or   injured   Adilahmed(PW­2)   and
submitted   that   an   allegation   that   they   caught   hold   of   deceased
and   facilitated   the   two   other   accused   persons   to   commit   the
crime   in   absence   of   any   corroborating   evidence   on   record,   the
finding   which   has   been   recorded   holding   the   present   accused
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appellants  guilty   of  offence  under  Section  302  read  with  Section
34 IPC is perverse and not sustainable in law.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that for
the   self­same   incident,   FIR   came   to   be   registered   at   the   first
instance earlier by accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain
at  12.10 p.m.   Who was the  instigator  may  not  be a question to
be   examined   but   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain
in   his   complaint   has   recorded   the   presence   of   his   brother
(accused no. 2 Shefakathussain Sabdarhussain) alone at the time
of the alleged offence being committed.   The complaint on which
the   present   FIR   was   registered   at   the   instance   of   the
Shamimbanu(PW   1)   wife   of   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   was
registered   at   2.00   p.m.   and   to   settle   the   personal   scores   as   the
civil dispute was long pending between the families, all the male
members   of   their   family   were   implicated   and   there   is   no   such
overt   act   which   would   have   been   attributed   to   the   present
appellants.     In   the   absence   of   any   independent   witness   being
examined by the prosecution, which indeed was available as the
date   of   incident   being   a   holiday   and   good   number   of   families
residing   in   the   neighbouring   flats,   appears   to   be   a   case   of   over
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implication to settle their long pending civil disputes in the courts
of law. 
8. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   even   from   the
evidence   on   record,   the   presence   of   the   present   accused
appellants   is   itself   doubtful   as   the   learned   trial   Court   has
proceeded on assumption that since it was a holiday on account
of   Rakshabandhan,   their   presence   cannot   be   doubted.     The
presumption   in   itself   could   not   be   considered   to   be   sufficient   to
implicate   present   accused   appellants   of   their   common   intention
in   committing   the   commission   of   offence   in   holding   them   guilty
with   the   aid   of   Section   34   IPC   and   this   has   been   the   manifest
error   committed   in   convicting   the   appellants   under   Section   302
with the aid of Section 34 IPC.  
9. Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   even   the   presence   of
accused   appellants   together   is   not   sufficient   to   hold   that   they
shared common intention to commit the offence.   It is necessary
that   the   person   be   known   to   each   other   but   for   prosecuting   the
common   intention,   there   must   be   a   clear   and   unimpeachable
evidence to justify that inference.  There cannot be universal rule
applicable   to   cases   of   this   class   which   can   be   laid   down   as   to
what   presumption   may   be   drawn   on   any   given   state   of   facts.
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Learned   counsel   further   submits   that   common   intention   within
the meaning of Section 34 IPC implies a prearranged plan, and to
convict   the   accused   of   an   offence,   it   should   be   proved   that   the
criminal   act   was   done   in   concert   pursuant   to   the   pre­arranged
plan and that the inference of common intention should never be
reached   unless   it   is   a   necessary   inference   deducible   from   the
circumstances   of   the   case.     There   cannot   be   a   rule   of   universal
application and each case has to be looked into on its own facts
and   circumstances   and   in   support   of   his   submission,   learned
counsel   has   placed   reliance   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court
reported   in   Ramashish   Yadav   and   Others   Vs.   State   of   Bihar
1998(8) SCC 555.
10. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondent,   on   the   other   hand,
while   supporting   the   finding   recorded   by   the   learned   trial   Court
and   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   further   submits   that   the
presence   of   the   accused   appellants   stood   established   from   the
ocular evidence of PWs 1,2,3 & 4 and all are consistent that both
of   them   caught   hold   of   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   in   the
first   instance   and   thereafter   caught   hold   of   the   injured
Adilahmed(PW­2) and aware of the lethal weapons being brought
by   other   accused   persons.     They   had   the   common   intention   not
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only to injure deceased but the common intention was to commit
murder of the deceased Mohammad Shakil.  
11. Learned counsel further submits that the manner in which
the   offence   has   been   committed   and   the   role   being   assigned   to
each   of   the   accused   clearly   shows   that   the   act   was   done   in
furtherance   of   the   common   intention   of   all   and   each   of   the
accused is liable for the criminal act.   The allegation against the
present   accused   appellants   that   they   both   caught   hold   of   the
hands   of   the   deceased   shows   that   they   had   the   intention   to
disable   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil.     Moreover,   the
appellants continued holding the hands of the deceased all along
without   making   any   effort   to   prevent   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   and   accused   no.   2
Shefakathussain   Sabdarhussain   attacking   the   deceased,   proves
the   common   intention   on   their   part   and   that   can   easily   be
discern   from   the   fact   that   once   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain
Sabdarhussain   shouted   to   beat   Adilahmed   (PW­2),   the   present
accused appellants left the deceased and caught hold the hands
of Adilahmed(PW­2) and facilitated the other accused persons not
only   to   attack   the   deceased   but   to   injure   (PW­2)   Adilahmed   as
well and as both the present appellants have shared the common
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intention   with   other   accused   persons,   they   have   rightly   been
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and placed
reliance   of   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   Ramesh   Singh      alias
Photti   Vs.   State of A.P.   2004(11) SCC 305 and   Goudappa and
others  Vs.  State of Karnataka   2013(6) SCC 675.
12. Taking   assistance   thereof,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent   further   submits   that   the   injuries   may   not   be
attributed  to  present   accused  appellants  but  both  have  disabled
the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   and   immobilised   him   thereby
facilitating   the   attack   on   the   deceased   as   well   as   on   Adilahmed
(PW­2).     In   such   circumstances,   the   action   of   the   appellants   in
facilitating the attack on deceased Mohammad Shakil and by not
preventing   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   and
accused   no.   2   Shefakathussain   Sabdarhussain   from   assaulting
the deceased Mohammad Shakil leads to the conclusion that the
appellants   shared   the   common   intention   with   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   and   accused   no.   2
Shefakathussain   Sabdarhussain   and   have   rightly   been   held
guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC in committing
the offence and needs no interference by this Court.
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13. To   appreciate   the   argument   advanced   on   behalf   of   the
learned counsel for the appellants, it may be possible to first take
note   to   understand   the   object   of   Section   34   IPC   incorporated   in
the   Indian   Penal   Code   which   has   been   considered   in   Ramesh
Singh’s case (supra) as under:­
“13. Since common  intention essentially  being   a
state   of   mind   can   only   be   gathered   by   inference
drawn from facts and circumstances established in a
given   case,   the   earlier   decisions   involving   almost
similar   facts   cannot   be   used   as   a   precedent   to
determine   the   conclusions   on   facts   in   the   case   in
hand.  This view of ours finds support in a judgment
of this Court in  Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad  AIR
1955   SC   216   wherein   while   considering   the
applicability of Section 34 IPC this Court held thus :
“But   to   say   this   no   more   than   to   reproduce   the
ordinary   rule   about   circumstantial   evidence,   for
there   is   no   special   rule   of   evidence   for   this   class   of
case.  At bottom, it is a question of fact in every case
and however similar the circumstances, facts in one
case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the
conclusion   on   the   facts   in   another.     All   that   is
necessary   is   either   to   have   direct   proof   of   prior
concert, or proof of circumstances which necessarily
lead to that inference, or, as we prefer to put it in the
time honoured way, ‘the incriminating facts must be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
incapable   of   explanation   on   any   other   reasonable
hypothesis’.
As   we   have   said,   each   case   must   rest   on   its   own
facts and the mere similarity of the facts in one case
cannot   be  used  to determine  a  conclusion  of  fact  in
another.”
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14. Later, the distinction between Section 149 & Section 34 IPC
has   been   examined   by   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in
Mohan Singh  Vs.  State of Punjab  AIR 1963 SC 174 as follows:­
13 .    That inevitably takes us to the question as to
whether   the   appellants   can   be   convicted   under
Section 302/34.
Like   Section  149,   Section   34   also   deals   with
cases   of   constructive   criminal   liability.     It   provides
that   where   a   criminal   act   is   done   by   several   persons
in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of
such person is liable for that act in the same manner
as   if   it   were   done   by   him   alone.     The   essential
constituent   of   the   vicarious   criminal   liability
prescribed   by   Section   34   is   the   existence   of   common
intention.     If   the   common   intention   in   question
animates   the   accused   persons   and   if   the   said
common   intention   leads   to   the   commission   of   the
criminal offence charged, each of the persons sharing
the   common   intention   is   constructively   liable   for   the
criminal   act   done   by   one   of   them.     Just   as   the
combination   of   persons   sharing   the   same   common
object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly,
so   the  existence   of   a   combination   of   persons   sharing
the   same   common   intention   is   one   of   the   features   of
Section 34.
In   some   ways   the   two   Sections   are   similar
and   in   some   cases   they   may   overlap.     But,
nevertheless,   the   common   intention   which   is   the
basis   of   Section   34   is   different   from   the   common
object   which   is   the   basis   of   the   composition   of   an
unlawful   assembly.     Common   intention   denotes
action­in­concert   and   necessarily   postulates   the
existence of a pre­arranged plan and that must mean
a   prior   meeting   of   minds.     It   would   be   noticed   that
cases to which Section 34 can be applied disclose an
element of participation in action on the part of all the
accused   persons.       The   acts   may   be   different;   may
vary   in   their   character,   but   they   are   all   actuated   by
the   same   common   intention.     It   is   now   well­settled
that   the   common   intention   required   by   Section   34   is
different from the same intention or similar intention.
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As has been observed by the Privy Council in  Mahbub
Shah   v.   King   Emperor   I.L.R.   (1945)   IndAp   148
common   intention   within   the   meaning   of   Section   34
implies   a   pre­arranged   plan,   and   to   convict   the
accused   of   an   offence   applying   the   Section   it   should
be   proved   that   the   criminal   act   was   done   in   concert
pursuant   to   the   pre­arranged   plan   and   that   the
inference   of   common   intention   should   never   be
reached   unless   it   is   a   necessary   inference   deducible
from the circumstances of the case.
15. The   essence   of   the   joint   liability   during   the   criminal   act   in
furtherance   of   such   common   intention   has   been   discussed   by   a
two­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Ramashish   Yadav   and
Others (supra)   wherein it was held as under:­
“….Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in
the doing of a criminal act.  The essence of that liability
is   to   be   found   in   the   existence   of   common   intention
animating   the   accused   leading   to   the   doing   of   a
criminal   act   in   furtherance   of   such   intention.     The
distinct   feature   of   Section   34   is   the   element   of
participation in action.   The common intention implies
acting   in   concert,   existence   of   a   pre­arranged   plan
which   is   to   be   proved   either   from   conduct   or   from
circumstances   or   from   any   incriminating   facts.     It
requires   a   pre­arranged   plan   and   it   presupposes   prior
concert.     Therefore,   there   must   be   prior   meeting   of
minds.   The prior concert or meeting  of minds may be
determined from the conduct of the offenders unfolding
itself   during   the   course   of   action   and   the   declaration
made by them just before mounting the attack.   It can
also be developed at the spur of the moment but there
must be pre­arrangement or premeditated concert.” 
16. It is clear from the principles laid down that however similar
the  facts may  seem  to  be in  a cited precedent,  the  case  in hand
should be determined on facts and circumstances of that case in
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hand only and the mere similarity of the facts in one case cannot
be   used   to   determine   the   conclusion   of   the   fact   in   another.
Common   intention   being   the   state   of   mind   can   be   gathered   by
inference drawn from the facts and circumstances established in
a   given   case.     The   cases   involving   almost   similar   facts   and
circumstances   cannot   be   used   as   precedent   to   determine   the
conclusions on facts in the case in hand.  
17. Taking   note   of   the   law   as   laid   down   and   as   understood   by
us,   it   will   be   apposite   to   take   note   of   the   facts   of   the   case   as   to
whether   prosecution   has   been   able   to   establish   beyond
reasonable doubt the sharing of common intention to commit the
murder   of   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   by   the   accused
appellants.
18. It   has   come   on   record   that   there   was   a   long   pending   civil
dispute   in   reference   to   a   flat   nearby   between   the   parties   and
other   families   were   residing   in   the   housing   colony   and   between
11.00 a.m. and 11.15 a.m. in the morning of 18 th
  August, 1997,
when   the   altercation   took   place   between   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain and deceased Mohammad Shakil
because of the supply of water, both parties started abusing each
other.     Accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   was   also
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injured in the alleged incident and he also reported his complaint
at   12.10   p.m.   on   which   FIR   was   registered   and   after
investigation, charge­sheet was filed.  Although after the trial, the
complainant   party   was   acquitted   vide   judgment   dated   18 th
August, 1999.   Accused no. 1 Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain in
his  complaint  recorded the  presence of  his  brother(accused no.2
Shefakathussain   Sabdarhussain).     The   complaint   on   which   the
FIR   was   registered   at   the   instance   of   complainant   Shamimbanu
(PW­1), wife of the deceased Mohammad Shakil was at 2.00 p.m.,
apart   from   the   presence   of   accused   nos.   1   Iftekharhussain
Sabdarhussain   &   accused   no.   2   Shefakathussain
Sabdarhussain,   the   names   of   accused   no.   3   &   4(present
appellants) were also added but no overt act have been attributed
to   the   present   appellants   and   their   presence   could   be   recorded
with an allegation that both of them caught hold of the deceased
Mohammad   Shakil   having   common   intention   in   facilitating   the
other   accused   persons   to   stab   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil
by   knife   and   gupti   who   have   been   convicted   with   the   present
accused appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 
19. That   all   the   four   prosecution   witnesses,   i.e.   PWs   1,2,3   &   4
are   the   interested   witnesses   being   the   members   of   the   same
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family who are living in front of the family of the accused having
their civil dispute pending for a long time and this fact cannot be
ruled   out   that   after   they   came   to   know   that   the   FIR   has   been
registered   at   the   instance   of   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhusssain
Sabdarhussain against the complainant party, they have tried to
entangle all the male members of the accused party and since no
injury   could   be   attributed   to   the   accused   appellants,   the
allegation was levelled against them  that  the accused appellants
caught   hold   of   the   deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   and
Adilahmed(PW­2)   with   the   common   intention   facilitated   by   the
accused   in   committing   the   crime.     There   is   no   independent
witness in the calendar of witness to support the prosecution and
it   being   a   holiday   on   account   of   Rakshabandhan,   at   least   when
they were residing in a multi­storey building, number of families
must   have   been   residing.     There   is   no   incriminating   material
which has been placed by the prosecution to have their presence
at   the   time   of   commission   of   crime   and   to   caught   hold   of   the
deceased   Mohammad   Shakil   and   (PW­2)   Adilahmed   and   even
their clothes were not recovered in support of the ocular evidence
of the interested witnesses, their presence being a holiday do not
inspire confidence.
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20. Other   than   the   allegation   that   the   accused   persons   caught
hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil, there is no other instigating
action   or   overt   act   attributed   to   the   present   accused   appellants
actively   participating   in   the   commission   of   crime   as   alleged   and
from the conduct of the accused persons, it seems that there was
no meeting of minds to form of pre­arranged plan.  It is true that
it can be developed at the spur of the moment but there must be
pre­arrangement   and   pre­meditated   concert   which   is   the
requirement   of   law   for   applicability   under   Section   34   IPC   and
from   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   the   mere   fact   that   accused
appellants caught hold of deceased Mohammad Shakil facilitating
the   other   accused   persons   to   come   with   a   knife   and   gupti   and
gave blows,  it cannot be said that the accused appellants shared
common   intention   with   the   other   accused   persons   keeping   note
of   the   fact   that   in   the   complaint  which   was  in   the   first  instance
registered   for   the   alleged   incident   by   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain Sabdarhussain, he only recorded the presence of
accused   no.   2   Shefakathussain   Sabdarhussain   but   the   time
when the complaint was registered at the instance of the present
offence   by   the   Shamimbanu   (PW­1)   at   2.00   p.m.,   the   present
accused appellants  were also  intentionally  implicated.   Certainly
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it   creates   a   doubt   of   their   false   implication   and   their   presence
from   the   prosecution   evidence   on   record   appears   to   be   clouded
with suspicion and in our considered view, the present appellants
cannot   be   held   guilty   of   the   offence   under   Section   302   with   the
aid of Section 34 IPC.
21. The   judgment   relied   upon   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents   in   Ramesh   Singh’s   case (supra)   was   a   case   where
as per the case of prosecution, there was a death in the family of
A­2.     They   wanted   certain   “samagri”   for   the   funeral.     On   30 th
April, 1998 at about 11.00 am, since the deceased refused to give
some   samagri ,   they   became   annoyed   and   accused   persons   went
away and came back together at about 11.45 a.m. and called the
deceased   out   of   the   house   and   while   the   two   accused   persons
were   holding   the   hands   of   the   deceased,   the   other   accused
stabbed   the   deceased   on   his   chest.     They   came   with   a   common
intention   and   equally   participated   in   the   commission   of   crime.
However,   in   the   instant   case,   there   was   no   pre­arrangement   of
mind   and   altercation   took   place   between   accused   no.   1
Iftekharhussain   Sabdarhussain   with   the   deceased   Mohammad
Shakil who was accompanied with accused no.2 Shefakathussain
Sabdarhussain   and   family   members   of   deceased   and   in
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furtherance   thereof,   accused   no.   1   Iftekharhussain
Sabdarhussain   and   accused   no.   2   Shefakathussain
Sabdarhussain   brought   a   knife   and   gupti   and   stabbed   the
deceased. No presumption can be drawn of common intention by
implicating the accused appellants under Section 34 IPC.
22. Another   judgment   of   this   Court   referred   by   the   learned
counsel for the respondent in   Goudappa and Others (supra).   It
was   a   case   where   the   accused   persons   were   armed   with   lethal
weapons   assembled   at   one   place   and   the   moment   the   deceased
came out of the house to spit, one of the accused started abusing
him   and   the   other   accused   persons   held   the   deceased   and
facilitated   the   other   accused   to   give   the   fatal   blow   and   made   no
effort   to   prevent   him   from   assaulting   the   deceased   and   their
common   intention   clearly   emanates   from   the   criminal   act   in
furtherance of the intention which in the instant case may not be
of   any   assistance.     As   already   observed,   there   cannot   be   a
universal   rule   in   laying   down   the   principles   of   existence   of
common intention of prior meeting or meetings with pre­arranged
plan.     It   has   to   be   proved   either   from   the   conduct   or
circumstances of any incriminating facts which is missing in the
instant case.  
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23. In   our   considered   view,   the   High   Court   has   committed   a
manifest error in holding the appellants guilty under Section 302
read   with   Section   34   IPC   for   participating   in   the   commission   of
crime. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charges filed
against them by giving them benefit of doubt. 
24. The   appeal   is   accordingly   allowed   and   the   impugned
judgment   of   the   High   Court   qua   the   appellants   is   set   aside   and
since   the   appellants   are   already   on   bail,   their   bail   bonds   stand
discharged.
…………………………J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
………………………….J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
NEW DELHI
February 15, 2019
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