2019 INSC 0191
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.180 OF 2019
Deep Narayan Chourasia            ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Bihar     ….Respondent(s)
                 
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.  
1. This   appeal   is  filed  against   the  final   judgment
and   order   dated   14.11.2017   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Judicature   at   Patna   in   Criminal   Appeal
(DB)   No.77   of   1994   whereby   the   High   Court
dismissed the appeal filed by  the appellant   herein.
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2.  In   order   to   appreciate   the   short   question
involved   in   this   appeal,   a   few   relevant   facts   need
mention  infra .
3. Five   persons,   namely,   (1)   Lukho   Prasad
Chourasia, (2) Birendra Prasad Chourasia, (3) Binod
Prasad Chourasia, (4) Deep Narayan Chourasia and
(5)   Kanhai   Prasad   Chourasia   were   tried   for
commission of offence of murder of  Kaushalya Devi
on   06.02.1992   under   Section   302/149   of     the
Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
“IPC”)   and     Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   by   the
Additional   Sessions   Judge,     Munger   in   Sessions
Case No. 264/1992. 
4. By judgment dated 08.02.1994, the Additional
Sessions   Judge   convicted   the   accused­Kanhai
Prasad   Chourasia   for   the   commission   of   offence
under   Section   302   IPC   and   Section   27   of   the   Arms
Act   and   he   was   accordingly   sentenced   to   undergo
life   imprisonment   under   Section   302   IPC   and
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rigorous   imprisonment   for   seven   years   under
Section 27 of the Arms Act. Both the sentences were
to run concurrently.
5. So far as co­accused­Lukho Prasad Chourasia,
Birendra   Prasad   Chourasia,   Binod   Prasad
Chourasia   and   Deep   Narayan   Chourasia   are
concerned,   all   the   four   were   acquitted   from   the
charge   of   commission   of   offence   under   Section   302
IPC.   However,   all   the   four   accused   were   convicted
for   commission   of   offence   under   Section   27   of   the
Arms   Act   and   accordingly   sentenced   to   undergo
rigorous   imprisonment   for   five   years.     The
concluding   para   of   the   order   of   Sessions   Judge
reads as under:
“ Accordingly,   on   the   basis   of   my   findings,
accused   Kanhai   Prasad   Chaurasia,   who   is   in
custody, is convicted u/ss 302 IPC and 27 of
Arms   Act   and   is   again   remanded   to   custody
to   serve   his   sentence   and   accused   Lukho
Prasad Chaurasia, Birendra Prasad Chaurasia,
Binod   Prasad   Chaurasia   and   Deep   Narain
Chaurasia; who are on bail; are convicted u/s
27   of   Arms   Act   and,   consequently,   their   bail
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bonds   are   cancelled   and   are   taken   into
custody to serve their sentences.”
6. All the five accused named above felt aggrieved
by   their   respective   conviction   and   the   award   of   jail
sentence and filed two criminal appeals in the High
Court. 
7. So   far   as   Kanhai   Prasad   Chourasia   is
concerned,   he   filed   Criminal   Appeal(DB)
No.112/1994   whereas   the   remaining   four   accused
are   concerned,   they   jointly   filed   Criminal
Appeal(DB)  No.77/1994 in the High Court of Patna.
Both the Criminal Appeals were clubbed together for
hearing.
8. So   far   as   Criminal   Appeal   No.112/1994   filed
by   the   accused   Kanhai   Prasad   Chourasia   is
concerned,   the   question   to   be   considered   therein
was   only   one,   namely,   whether   the   Additional
Sessions   Judge   was   justified   in   convicting   him
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(Kanhai   Prasad   Choursia)   under   Section   302   IPC
read with Section 27 of the Arms Act.
9. So far as Criminal Appeal No.77/1994 filed by
remaining   four   accused,   namely,   Lukho   Prasad
Chourasia,   Birendra   Prasad   Chourasia,   Binod
Prasad   Chourasia   and   Deep   Narayan   Chourasia   is
concerned,   the   question   involved   therein   was
whether the Additional Sessions Judge was justified
in convicting these four accused under Section 27 of
the   Arms   Act   and   sentenced   them   to   undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years.
10. The   High   Court,   however,   was   completely
under   misconception   and   misdirected   itself   by
forming   an   opinion   as   if   all   the   five   accused   were
convicted   under   Section   302/149   IPC   and
accordingly  went  on  to appreciate the evidence and
while   dismissing   both   the   appeals   by   a   common
judgment   convicted   four   accused   under   Section
302/149 IPC along with Kanhai Prasad Chourasia. 
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11. This   is   clear   from   the   first   and   concluding
paras   of   the   impugned   judgment,   which   are
reproduced below:
First Para
“ As   both   these   appeals   arise   out   of   a
judgment dated 8 th
 February, 1994, passed by
the 12 th
 Additional Sessions Judge, Munger in
Sessions   Trial   No.   264/92,   convicting   the
appellants   under   Section   302   of   I.P.C.   with
life   imprisonment   and   the   other   accused   for
offence  under Sections 302/149 I.P.C.  to  life
imprisonment,   so   also   each   of   them   for
offence 27 of the Arms Act to five years’ R.I. ,
these   appeals   have   been   filed   by   the
appellants   and   they   are   being   disposed   of   by
this common judgment.”  (Emphasis supplied)
Concluding Paras
  “ Even   though   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants by taking us through the evidence
tried to point out minor contradictions in the
same,   but   we   find   that   considering   the
complete   reading   of   the   evidence,   the   story
as   is   narrated   by   the   witnesses   and   as   it   is
recorded   in   the   fardbeyan   by   P.W.5   Sundar
Tanti   is   proved.   It   is   a   case   where   the
appellants   after   the   incident   that   took   place
in the morning, with an intention to commit
the crime, armed with rifles and pistols came
to the spot, committed the offence and while
fleeing   away,   to   threaten   the   villagers   who
had   assembled   there,   firing   in   the   air   ran
away.   It   is   a   case   where   they   formed   an
unlawful   assembly,   committed   the   offence
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and, therefore, conviction under Section 302
and   302/149   of   I.P.C.   is   proper   and   as   the
entire   conviction   is   based   on   the   evidence
that   came   on   record,   we   see   no   reason   to
interfere   into   the   matter   and   allow   this
appeal.   The   prosecution   has   proved   its   case
and   the   conviction,   in   our   considered   view,
does not suffer from any infirmity.  
Accordingly,   we   see   no   reason   to
interfere   into   the   matter.   The   appeals   being
devoid of merit are dismissed. The appellants
are   on   bail.   Their   bail­bonds   are   cancelled.
They   are   directed   to   be   arrested   and   taken
into   custody   for   undergoing   the   remaining
part of their sentence.”  (Emphasis supplied)
12. The effect of the judgment of the High Court is
three­fold.   First,   both   criminal   appeals   stand
dismissed;   Second,   conviction   and   sentence   of
Kanhai   Prasad   Choursia   under   Section   302   IPC
read with Section 27 of the Arms Act is upheld; and
Third,   the   remaining   four   accused   ­   Lukho   Prasad
Chourasia,   Birendra   Prasad   Chourasia,   Binod
Prasad   Chourasia   and   Deep   Narayan   Chourasia
also   stand   convicted   under   Section   302   IPC   read
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with   Section   149   IPC   and   Section   27   of   the   Arms
Act.
13. It   is   against   this   judgment,   only   one   accused­
Deep Narayan Chourasia has felt aggrieved and filed
this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
14. So,   the   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   this   appeal,   is   whether   the   High
Court was right in dismissing the appeal filed by the
appellant herein.
15. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   constrained   to   allow   the   appeal,   set   aside   the
impugned   judgment   of  the   High  Court   and  remand
the   case   to   the   High   Court   for   re­hearing   of   the
appeal   in   question   on   merits   in   accordance   with
law.
16. In   our   opinion,   the   Division   Bench   failed   to
apply its judicial mind and committed fundamental
jurisdictional errors as detailed below.
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17. The   first   error   was   that   the   High   Court
proceeded on wrong factual premise that all the five
accused   have   suffered   conviction   under   Section
302/149   IPC   read   with   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act
by the Additional Sessions Judge. It was not so.
18. The second error was that the appellant (Deep
Narayan Chourasia) along  with other three accused
(Lukho   Prasad   Chourasia,   Birendra   Prasad
Chourasia   and   Binod   Prasad   Chourasia)   were
acquitted   from   the   charge   of   commission   of   offence
under   Section   302/149   IPC   by   the   Additional
Sessions   Judge   but   were   convicted   only   under
Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   and   were   sentenced   to
undergo   rigorous   imprisonment   for   five   years.
However, as a result of the High Court’s order, they
were  convicted  under  Section  302/149  IPC   without
there being any appeal filed by the State against the
order of their acquittal and without there being any
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notice   of   enhancement   of   their   sentence   issued   by
the High Court  suo motu  to these four accused.
19. In   other   words   and   as   mentioned   above,   the
question   before   the   High   Court   was   whether   the
appellant   herein   (Deep   Narayan   Chourasia)   and
other   three   accused   were   rightly   convicted   and
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
years   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   by   the
Additional   Sessions   Judge   or   not.   Instead   of
recording any finding of affirmation of the conviction
or   acquittal,   as   the   case   may   be,   the   High   Court
convicted   all   the   four   accused   under   Section
302/149 IPC also.
20. The third error  was that  the High  Court  failed
to   see   that   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge   had
acquitted all the accused under Section 149 IPC, yet
the High Court proceeded to convict all the accused
under   Section   149   IPC   without   there   being   any
appeal filed by the State on this issue. 
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21. The   fourth   error   was   that   though   the   High
Court   wrongly   convicted   the   appellant   along   with
three   others   for   the   offence   punishable   under
Section   302/149   IPC,   yet   did   not   award   any
sentence   to   any   of   the   four   accused   under   Section
302/149 IPC. 
22. Since   the   appellant   and   other   three   accused
were acquitted of the charge under Section 302/149
IPC   by  the   Additional  Sessions  Judge,  yet   the   High
Court   convicted   them   under   Section   302/149   IPC
for   the   first   time,   the   sentence   prescribed   under
Section   302/149   IPC   was   mandatorily   required   to
be   awarded   to   each   convicted   accused   as   provided
under   Section   354(3)   of   the   Code   of   Criminal
Procedure, 1973. 
23. The   effect   of   the   impugned   judgment,
therefore,   is   that   though   the   appellant   along   with
three   accused   have   suffered   conviction   under
Section 302/149 IPC but without sentence.
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24. Now,   the   next   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   though   not   urged   by   any   parties,   is
whether   we   should   set   aside   the   entire   impugned
order or set aside only  qua  the sole appellant herein
because   the   other   four   accused   though   suffered
conviction   under   Section   302/149   IPC   alike   the
appellant herein did not file any appeal against their
conviction and secondly, the other accused ­ Kanhai
Prasad   Chourasia   whose   conviction   and   sentence
under Section 302/149 IPC read with Section 27 of
the   Arms   Act   was   upheld   has   also   not   filed   any
appeal in this Court.
25. The Constitution Bench of this Court in  Durga
Shankar Mehta  vs  Thakur   Raghuraj Singh & Ors.,
AIR   1954   SC   520   examined   the   question   as   to
whether   the   powers   conferred   upon   this   Court
under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   can   be
exercised   suo   motu   to   meet   the   ends   of   justice   in
favour of non­appealing accused. 
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26. The learned Judge B.K. Mukherjea (as he then
was   and   later   became   CJI)   speaking   for   the   Bench
in   his   distinctive   style   of   writing   answered   the
question in affirmative holding that:  
“ The powers given by   Article 136   of the
Constitution   however   are   in   the   nature   of
special   or   residuary   powers   which   are
exercisable   outside   the   purview   of   ordinary
law,   in   cases   where   the   needs   of   justice
demand interference by the Supreme Court of
the   land.   The   article   itself   is   worded   in   the
widest  terms possible.  …….  The  Constitution
for   the   best   of   reasons   did   not   choose   to
fetter or  circumscribe  the powers exercisable
under this article in any way………. 
This   overriding   power,   which   has   been
vested   in   the   Supreme   Court   under   Article
136   of   the   Constitution,   is   in   a   sense   wider
than   the   prerogative   right  of   entertaining   an
appeal   exercised   by   the   Judicial   Committee
of the Privy Council in England.”
27. This   Court   has   since   then   consistently
extended   the   benefit   of   the   order   passed   in   appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution   also to those
accused   who   had   not   preferred   the   appeal   against
their   conviction   in   the   light   of   the   aforementioned
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principle   in   appropriate   cases.[see   Harbans   Singh
vs.   State   of   U.P.   &   Ors. ,   (1982)   2   SCC   101, Raja
Ram   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   M.P .,   (1994)   2   SCC   568,
Chellappan Mohandas & Ors.   vs.   State of Kerala ,
1995 Supp(1) SCC 259,   Dandu Lakshmi Reddy   vs.
State of A.P. , (1999) 7 SCC 69,    Anil Rai   vs.   State
of   Bihar ,   (2001)   7   SCC   318,     Bijoy   Singh   &   Anr.
vs.   State of  Bihar , (2002) 9 SCC 147,   Gurucharan
Kumar   &   Anr.   vs.   State   of   Rajasthan ,   (2003)   2
SCC   698,   Suresh   Chaudhary   vs.   State   of   Bihar ,
(2003)   4   SCC   128,   Akhil   Ali   Jehangir   Ali   Sayyed
vs.   State   of   Maharashtra ,   (2003)   2   SCC   708   and
Pawan   Kumar  vs.  State of Haryana  (2003) 11 SCC
241]. 
28. Having given our anxious consideration to this
question   and   keeping   in   view   the   aforementioned
principle   of   law   laid   down   in   decided   cases,   we   are
of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   entire   impugned
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order   deservers   to   be   set   aside   against   all   the   five
accused.
29. In   our   view,   an   order,   which   is   based   entirely
on   wrong   factual   premise   once   held   illegal   by   a
superior   Court   at   the   instance   of   one   accused,
cannot   be   allowed   to   stand   against   other   non­
appealing accused persons also.
30. It   is   a   fundamental   principle   of   law   that   an
illegality committed by a Court cannot be allowed to
be   perpetuated   against   a   person   to   a   Lis   merely
because he did not bring such illegality to the notice
of   the   Court   and   instead   other   person   similarly
placed   in   the   Lis   brought   such   illegality   to   the
Court’s notice and succeed in his challenge.
31. It   will   be   a   travesty   of   justice   delivery   system
where   an   accused,   who   is   convicted   of   a   lesser
offence   (Section   27  of   the  Arms  Act  alone)   and  was
acquitted  of   a  graver  offence  (Section   302/149  IPC)
is   made   to   suffer   conviction   for   commission   of   a
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graver   offence   (Section   302/149   IPC)   without
affording   him   of   any   opportunity   to   defend   such
charge   at   any   stage   of   the   appellate   proceedings.
32. Needless  to  say, if  the  other   four  accused  had
filed the appeals in this Court, they too would have
got   the   benefit   of   this   order.   A   fortiori ,   merely
because they did not file the appeals and the case is
now   remanded   for   re­hearing   of   the   appeal   at   the
instance of one accused, the benefit of re­hearing of
the appeal cannot be denied to other co­accused. In
other words, the non­appealing co­accused are also
entitled to get benefit of  the order of this Court  and
are,   therefore,   entitled   for   re­hearing   of   their
appeals along with the present appellant. 
33. It is for  all these reasons, the impugned order
stands   set   aside   also   qua   all   the   accused   persons.
34. In   the   light   of   the   foregoing   discussion,   the
appeal   succeeds   and   is   accordingly   allowed.   The
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impugned order is set aside in its entirety. Both the
Criminal   Appeals,   i.e.,   Criminal   Appeal(DB)   No.
77/1994   and   Criminal   Appeal(DB)   No.   112/1994
are   restored   to   their   original   numbers   before   the
High Court for their analogues hearing.
35. We   request   the   High   Court   to   decide   both   the
Criminal   Appeals   on   their   respective   merits   in
accordance with law. 
36. Since   the   appellant­Deep   Narayan   Chourasia
out of his total jail sentence of five years awarded by
the   Additional   Sessions   Judge   for   commission   of
offence   under   Section   27   of   the   Arms   Act   has
already   undergone   jail   sentence   of   five   months,   we
release him (Deep Narayan Chourasia) on bail to the
satisfaction   of   the   concerned   Trial   Court   pending
Criminal Appeals before the High Court. 
37. We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   we   have   not
expressed   any   opinion   to   the   factual   aspect   of   the
case   on   their   respective   merits,   which   is   subject
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matter   of   the   two   criminal   appeals   and,   therefore,
the High Court will decide both the appeals on their
respective   merits   uninfluenced   by   any   observations
made by this Court.
38. A   copy   of   this   order   be   sent   to   other   four
accused   persons   by   the   Registry   of   this   Court   to
enable   them   to   appear   before   the   High   Court   for
prosecuting their appeals.
39. The   High   Court   will   issue   notice   to   other   four
accused   persons   before   hearing   the   appeals,   if
anyone   fails   to   appear.     The   High   Court   may   also
consider   appointing   a   lawyer   for   providing   them
legal assistance.        
                                  .………...................................J.
                                 [ ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE ]   
                            
 … ...……..................................J.
                  [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
February 25, 2019
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