2019 INSC 0418
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 321  OF  2018
Rajan      …..Petitioner(s)
 
:Versus:
The Home Secretary, Home Department
of Tamil Nadu and Ors.     ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   writ petition  under  Article 32 of  the  Constitution  of
India   has   been   preferred   inter   alia   seeking   premature   release
of the petitioner as he has already undergone over 30 years of
actual   imprisonment.   With   remission,   the   total   sentence
undergone is above 36 years. 

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2. The petitioner claims that he is a refugee from Sri Lanka.
He   was   named   as   an   accused   in   relation   to   an   offence
committed   on   27 th
  July,   1988,   registered   as   FIR   in   Crime
No.104/88   at   Thanipadi   Police   Station.   The   prosecution   case
was   that   the   petitioner,   along   with   co­accused,   committed
dacoity at the house of one Pitchaikara Grounder and while he
was trying to escape in a Maruti Van, the police and common
public   erected   a   barricade,   upon   which   the   petitioner   fired
from   a   machine   gun   killing   three   persons   and   injuring   four.
The   petitioner   was   charged   for   offences   punishable   under
Sections   120(B),   395,   353,   506(2),   302(3   counts),   307   (4
counts)   of   IPC,   Section   302   r/w   419   of   IPC,   Section   307   r/w
149 of IPC and Section 3 read with Sections 25(1A), 27(3) and
28   of   the   Indian   Arms   Act.   After   a   full­fledged   trial   by   the
District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Thiruvannnamalai,   for   the
aforementioned   offences,   vide   judgment   and   order   dated   25 th
January, 2007, the petitioner came to be convicted for offences
punishable under Sections 395, 302 (3 counts), 307 (4 counts)
of   IPC   and   Section   3   read   with   Sections   25(1A)   and     27(3)   of

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the   Indian   Arms   Act   and   sentenced     to   undergo   7   years’
rigorous   imprisonment   for   offence   punishable   under   Section
395   of   IPC,     life   imprisonment     for   offence   punishable   under
Section  307  (4  counts)  of IPC   for  each  count  as also  awarded
capital   sentence   for   offence   punishable   under   Section   302   (3
counts)   and   further   5   years’   imprisonment   for   offences
punishable   under   Section   3   read   with   Section   25   (1A)   of   the
Indian Arms Act. The sentences awarded to the petitioner were
directed to run concurrently. 
3. The   petitioner   had   assailed   the   said   decision   before   the
High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras,   by   way   of   Criminal
Appeal   No.   653   of   2007,   which   was   heard   along   with   Death
Reference   Case   No.3/2007.   The   High   Court,   by   its   judgment
and   order   dated   26 th
  February,   2008,   affirmed   the   judgment
and   order   of   conviction   and   sentence   awarded   by   the   Trial
Court   for   the   concerned   offences   but   converted   the   death
sentence   into   life   imprisonment   on   each   of   the   3   counts.  The
High Court judgment has attained finality.
 

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4. Since the petitioner had undergone actual sentence for a
sufficiently   long   period   of   time,   he   applied   for   premature
release.   That   representation   was   considered   by   the   Advisory
Board held on 20 th
 January, 2010, but came to be rejected for
the reasons recorded in the opinion of the Advisory Board. The
same   was   duly   considered   by   the   competent   authority   of   the
State   Government   and   the   proposal   for   premature   release
came to be rejected vide order dated 14 th
  June, 2010, bearing
GO(D)   6033.   It   appears   that   the   petitioner,   after   a   gap   of
around   8   years,   once   again   made   another   representation   on
5 th
  February,   2018,     for   his   premature   release,   which   reads
thus:
“ Annexure P/6
Date:05.02.2018
MOST URGENT
To
1. The Home Secretary,
Home Department of Tamil Nadu, 
Secretariat, St. George Fort, 
Chennai.
2. The Additional Director General of Police 
and The Inspector General of Prisons, 
Wannels Road, Egmore, 
Chennai­600008.
3. The Deputy Inspector General of Prisons, 
Vellore Range, Vellore.

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4. The Superintendent of Prison,
Vellore Central Prison,
Vellore.
From
Rajan,
Convict No.       ,
Presently lodged at 
Vellore Central Prison,
Vellore.
Sir, 
Sub: Re. the  inclusion of  my name in the  list called for   the
premature   release   of   life   convict   prisoners   on   the
occasion of Birth Centenary of Bharat Ratna, Puratchi
Thalaivar   Dr.M.G.   Ramachandran,   as   per   G.O.   Ms.
No.64, Home (Pri IV) Dept., Dt. 01.02.2018.
Ref.: 1. Lr. of the Office of Inspector General of Prisons, 
    No.4369/PS1/2018­1, Dt.02.02.2018.
2. State of Punjab Vs. Dalbir Singh – 2012 (3) SCC 346
I  am a  life  convict  lodged  in Vellore  Central Prison for
the   past   30   years.   I   was   convicted   and   sentenced   by
the   Trial   Court   on   25.01.2007   and   awarded   Death
Sentence   under   section   302   IPC   and   27   (3)   of   Arms
Act.   Subsequently   on   26.02.2008,   my   sentence   was
commuted   to   Life   imprisonment   but   upholding   the
conviction rendered by the Trial Court. 
It is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in State of Punjab Vs. Dalbir Singh – 2012 (3) SCC 346
struck   down   Section   27   (3)   of   Arms   Act   as
unconstitutional   and   declared   void.   Hence   my
conviction now survive alone on Section 302 IPC.
Since   I   have   been   under   incarceration   for   about   30
years,   my   name   may   be   included  in   the   list   called   for
by the IG Prison for premature release. Please find the
enclosed   the   Supreme   Court   judgment   for   your   kind
perusal. 
Thanking You,

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Yours Faithfully, 
Rajan
Encl.
1. High Court judgment dt. 26.02.2008.
2. 2012 (3) SCC 346”
5. As   the   petitioner   did   not   get   any   response   to   the   said
representation,   he   filed   the   present   writ   petition   for   the
following reliefs:
“ PRAYER
WHEREFORE,   the   petitioner   most   humbly   pray   that   this
Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
a) Pass an appropriate Writ or order directing the release
of the petitioner from prison forthwith, and/or
b) Declare   that   the   sentence   of   life   imprisonment
imposed upon the petitioner under section 27(3) of the
Arms Act is null and void; and/or, 
c) Alternatively   direct   the   respondents   to   remit   the
remaining   sentence   and   release   the   petitioner   by
considering his representation dated 05.02.2018 while
this   present   Petition   is   pending   before   this   Hon’ble
Court. 
d) Pass   any   such   other   order   or   Orders   as   may   be
deemed fit and proper.”
6. In   support   of   the   aforesaid   reliefs,   the   petitioner   has
relied   upon   the   recent   unreported   decision   of   this   Court   in
Writ   Petition   (Criminal)   No.61   of   2016,   in   the   case   of   Ram

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Sewak   Vs.   The   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh ,   decided   on   11 th
October,   2018,   to   contend   that   he   has   already   undergone   30
years   of   actual   imprisonment   and   with   remission,   the   total
sentence   undergone   by   him   would   be   more   than   36   years,
which   is   much   more   than   the   period   undergone   by   the
petitioner   in   the   unreported   decision   (wherein   it   was   only   29
years  of  imprisonment).   Additionally,  it  is submitted  that  this
Court, in the case of   State of Punjab Vs. Dalbir Singh , 1
  has
already   struck   down   Section   27(3)   of   the   Indian   Arms   Act   as
unconstitutional, and as a consequence thereof, the conviction
and   sentence   awarded   to   the   petitioner   for   the   said   offence
cannot be reckoned any more.   It is the case of the petitioner
that he is presently  undergoing  sentence  of  life imprisonment
only in respect of offences punishable under Sections 302 and
307   of   IPC   which   were   tried   at   one   trial.     As   regards   the
conviction   and   sentence   in   relation   to   the   remaining   offences
under Section 3 read with Section 25(1A) of the Arms Act and
Section   395   of   IPC,   the   petitioner   has   already   undergone   the
1  (2012) 3 SCC 346

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same   long   back   as   the   sentences   for   those   offences   were
directed to run concurrently. 
7. The   grievance   of   the   petitioner   is   that   the   competent
authority of the State has failed to process the representation
made by the petitioner on 5 th
  February, 2018, for inexplicable
reasons,   which   it   was   obliged   to   decide   at   the   earliest
opportunity as per the mandate of law. 
8. This   writ   petition   has   been   resisted   by   the   respondents.
An   affidavit   of   Dr.   Niranjan   Mardi,   Additional   Chief   Secretary
to   Government,   Home   Department,   Secretariat,   Chennai,   has
been filed to oppose the present writ petition. According to the
respondents,   the   petitioner   was   involved   in   a   very   serious
offence and has been convicted and sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment   on   multiple   counts.   The   case   of   the   petitioner
was   duly   considered   by   the   Advisory   Board   on   20 th
  January,
2010   and   also   by   the   State   Government,   which   eventually
rejected   the   proposal   vide   order   dated   30 th
  June,   2010.     A
preliminary   objection   has   been   taken   by   the   State   that   the

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Central   Government   is   a   necessary   party,   as   the   request   for
premature   release   is   in   relation   to   offences   under   the   Arms
Act. That  request will have to  be decided by  the State only  in
consultation   with   the   Central   Government.   The   respondents
have then adverted to the recent circulars issued by the State
on   1 st
  February,   2018   and   3 rd
  May,   2018   framing   guidelines
with   regard   to   the   premature   release   of     prisoners.   According
to the respondents, the petitioner is not eligible for premature
release.  It  is  also  asserted that  the  petitioner   had indulged in
serious offences of dacoity and firing indiscriminately by use of
AK­47   machine   gun   and   hence,   no   indulgence   should   be
shown   to   the   petitioner   because   he   has   been   convicted   for
offences under Section 302 (on 3 counts) and Section 307 (on
4 counts), respectively and sentenced to life imprisonment.
9. We   have   heard   Mr.   Rakesh   Dwivedi,   learned   senior
counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna,
learned counsel for the respondents. 

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10. Reverting to the prayer clause (b), we have no difficulty in
accepting   the  stand  of  the   petitioner   that  Section  27(3)  of  the
Arms   Act   having   been   declared   ultra   vires   in   terms   of   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   State   of   Punjab   (supra),   the
conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner in   relation
to   the   said   offence     cannot   be   reckoned   in   law.   Even   so,   the
petitioner   is   faced   with   the   conviction   and   sentence   awarded
for   other   serious   offences   under   Section   395   for   7   years’
rigorous   imprisonment,   as   also   under   Section   3   read   with
Sections   25(1A)   and   27(3)   of   the   Indian   Arms   Act   with
sentence   of   rigorous   imprisonment   for   5   years   for   the   said
offences. However, in view of the exposition of the Constitution
Bench   in   Muthuramalingam   and   Ors.   Vs.   State
represented   by   Inspector   of   Police 2
,   we   must   immediately
accept the stand of the petitioner that the sentences in respect
of offences under Section 395 IPC and Section 3/25(1A) of the
Arms Act also cannot be reckoned for considering the proposal
for   premature   release   of   the   petitioner.   For,   he   has   already
2    (2016) 8 SCC 313

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undergone the sentence periods awarded for the said offences
which were to run concurrently.
11. Indeed,   the   counsel   for   the   respondents   made   a   fervent
effort to persuade us that the said sentences will also have to
be   taken   into   account   for   considering   the   proposal   for
premature   release   and   in   that   case,   consultation   with   the
Central   Government   would   be   inevitable.   We   are   not
impressed   by   this   submission.   For,   on   a   plain   reading   of   the
order   passed   by   the   Trial   Court   along   with   the   modified
sentence   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   it   is   indisputable
that the sentences for  offences punishable under  Section  395
IPC   and   Section   3   read   with   Section   25(1A)   of   the   Arms   Act,
were   to   run   concurrently.   The   petitioner   has   already
undergone   the   sentence   awarded   in   relation   to   the   said
offences   on   expiry   of   7   years   and   5   years,   respectively.   This
position   is   reinforced   from   the   exposition   of   the   Constitution
Bench   in   Muthuramalingam   (supra).     It   may   be   useful   to
reproduce paragraph 23 and the conclusion in paragraphs 34
& 35 of the said decision, which read thus:

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“23.   Parliament,   it   manifests   from   the   provisions   of   Section
427(2)   CrPC,  was  fully   cognizant   of  the  anomaly  that   would
arise   if   a   prisoner   condemned   to   undergo   life   imprisonment
is   directed   to   do   so   twice   over.   It   has,   therefore,   carved   out
an   exception   to   the   general   rule   to   clearly   recognise   that   in
the case of life sentences for two distinct offences separately
tried   and   held   proved   the   sentences   cannot   be   directed   to
run   consecutively.   The   provisions   of   Section   427(2)   CrPC
apart,   in   Ranjit   Singh   case 3
,   this   Court   has   in   terms   held
that   since   life   sentence   implies   imprisonment   for   the
remainder of the life of the convict, consecutive life sentences
cannot be awarded as humans have only one life. That logic,
in our view, must extend to Section 31 CrPC also no matter
Section 31 does not in terms make a provision analogous to
Section   427(2)   of   the   Code.   The   provision   must,   in   our
opinion,   be   so  interpreted  as  to  prevent any  anomaly  or
irrationality.   So   interpreted   Section   31(1)   CrPC   must
mean   that   sentences   awarded   by   the   court   for   several
offences   committed   by   the   prisoner   shall   run
consecutively (unless the court directs otherwise) except
where   such   sentences   include   imprisonment   for   life
which   can   and   must   run   concurrently.   We   are   also
inclined to hold that if more than one life sentences are
awarded   to   the   prisoner,   the   same   would   get
superimposed   over   each   other.   This   will   imply   that   in
case the prisoner is granted the benefit of any remission
or   commutation   qua   one   such   sentence,   the   benefit   of
such remission would not ipso facto extend to the other.
xxx  xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx  xxx xxx xxx xxx
34.   In   conclusion   our   answer   to   the   question   is   in   the
negative.   We   hold   that   while   multiple   sentences   for
imprisonment   for   life   can   be   awarded   for   multiple   murders
or   other   offences   punishable   with   imprisonment   for   life,   the
life   sentences   so   awarded   cannot   be   directed   to   run
consecutively.   Such   sentences   would,   however,   be
superimposed   over   each   other   so   that   any   remission   or
commutation granted by the competent authority in one
3   (1991) 4 SCC 304

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does   not   ipso   facto   result   in   remission   of   the   sentence
awarded to the prisoner for the other.
35.   We may, while parting, deal with yet another dimension
of this case argued before us, namely, whether the court can
direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively.
That aspect was argued keeping in view the fact that the
appellants   have   been   sentenced   to   imprisonment   for
different   terms   apart   from   being   awarded   imprisonment
for   life.   The   trial   court’s   direction   affirmed   by   the   High
Court   is   that   the   said   term   sentences   shall   run
consecutively.   It was contended on behalf of the appellants
that   even   this   part   of   the   direction   is   not   legally   sound,   for
once the prisoner  is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life,   the   term   sentence   awarded   to   him   must   run
concurrently. We do not, however, think so. The power of the
court   to   direct   the   order   in   which   sentences   will   run   is
unquestionable in view  of the language employed  in  Section
31   CrPC.   The   court   can,   therefore,   legitimately   direct
that   the   prisoner   shall   first   undergo   the   term   sentence
before   the   commencement   of   his   life   sentence.   Such   a
direction   shall   be   perfectly   legitimate   and   in   tune   with
Section 31 CrPC. The converse however may not be true
for   if   the   court   directs   the   life   sentence   to   start   first   it
would   necessarily   imply   that   the   term   sentence   would
run   concurrently.   That   is   because   once   the   prisoner
spends   his   life   in   jail,   there   is   no   question   of   his
undergoing   any   further   sentence.   Whether   or   not   the
direction   of   the   court   below   calls   for   any   modification   or
alteration is a matter with which we are not concerned. The
regular Bench hearing the appeals would be free to deal with
that aspect of the matter having regard to what we have said
in the foregoing paragraphs.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. This decision is also an authority on the proposition that
remission or commutation granted by the competent authority
for any one of the offences does not  ipso facto  result in release

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of   the   prisoners   for   other   offences   for   which   he   has   been
convicted and sentenced at one trial.
13. The   Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of   Union   of   India
Vs.   V.   Sriharan   alias   Murugan   and   Ors. 4
,   went   on   to
examine seven questions. Emphasis was placed by the counsel
for the petitioner on the exposition in reference to question No.
(vii)   regarding   the   sweep   of   expression   “consultation”.   In   the
present   case,  no   doubt  the  petitioner  has  been  convicted  and
sentenced   for   offences   punishable   under   the   Arms   Act   as   a
result   of   which   the   requirement   of   “consultation”   may   have
triggered. However, the conviction and sentence in reference to
the   offence   under   Section   27(3)   of   the   Arms   Act,   having   been
declared   ultra   vires   and   unconstitutional;   and   the   sentence
awarded to the petitioner in reference to offence under Section
3   read   with   Section   25(1A)   of   the   Arms   Act   having   already
been completed by the petitioner as it was to run concurrently
with   life   imprisonment,   even   these   offences   cannot   be
reckoned   for   considering   the   representation   made   by   the
4   (2016) 7 SCC  1

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petitioner. Resultantly, there would be no need to consult the
Central Government and, for the same reason, the presence of
Central Government in this petition is not essential. 
14. We   may   usefully   advert   to   the   dictum   in   a   separate
judgment by  Justice Uday  U. Lalit, albeit concurring with the
leading opinion by Justice Kalifulla, on issue No. (vii), as noted
in paragraph 215, as follows:
“215.   In   the   instant   case   as   per   the   order   passed   by   this
Court   in   State   v.   Nalini 5
,   the   respondent   convicts   were
acquitted   of   the   offences   punishable   under   Sections   3(3),
3(4) and 5 of the TADA Act.  Their conviction under various
Central   laws   like   the   Explosive   Substances   Act,   the
Passport   Act,   the   Foreigners   Act   and   the   Wireless
Telegraphy   Act   were   all   for   lesser   terms   which
sentences,   as   on   the   date,   stand   undergone.
Consequently, there is no reason or occasion to seek any
remission   in   or   commutation   of   sentences   on   those
counts.   The   only   sentence   remaining   is   one   under
Section   302   IPC   which   is   life   imprisonment.   It   was
submitted   by   Mr.   Rakesh   Dwivedi,   learned   Senior   Advocate
that   Section   302   IPC   falls   in   Chapter   XVI   of   IPC   relating   to
offences   affecting   the   human   body.   In   his   submission,
Sections   299   to   377   IPC   involve   matters   directly   related   to
“public   order”   which   are   covered   by   List   II   Entry   1.   It   being
in   the   exclusive   executive   domain   of   the   State   Government,
the State Government would be the appropriate Government.
It   was   further   submitted   that   assuming   Section   302   read
with   Section   120­B   IPC   are   relatable   to   Entry   1   of   List   III
being part of the Indian Penal Code itself, then the issue may
arise   whether   the   Central   Government   or   the   State
Government shall be the appropriate Government and resort
5   (1999) 5 SCC 253

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has   to   be   taken   to   provisions   of   Articles   73   and   162   of   the
Constitution to resolve the issue.”
It is, thus, amply clear that the representation of the petitioner
will have to be considered only in reference to the sentence of
life imprisonment concerning offences under Sections 302 and
307 of IPC, respectively.
15. In the present case, the petitioner has been convicted on
3   counts   for   offence   under   Section   302   IPC   and   on   4   counts
for offence under Section 307 IPC, and in relation to which he
has  been given life imprisonment  on  each  count. In that  view
of   the   matter,   keeping   in   mind   the   exposition   in
Muthuramalingam   (supra)   and   Sriharan   (supra),   the
petitioner   may   succeed   in   being   released   prematurely   only   if
the   competent   authority   passes   an   order   of   remission
concerning all the seven life sentences awarded to him on each
count.   But   that   would   be   a   matter   to   be   considered   by   the
competent authority. 

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16. The   petitioner   would,   however,   rely   on   the   unreported
decision of this Court in   Ram Sewak   (supra),   to contend that
this   Court  may   direct   the  authorities  to   release   the  petitioner
forthwith   and   that   there   is   no   point   in   directing   further
consideration   by   the   State   as   the   petitioner   had   already
undergone over 30 years of sentence and with remission, over
36   years.   The   order   passed   by   this   Court   in   Ram   Sewak
(supra),   is   obviously   in   the   facts   of   that   case.   As   a   matter   of
fact,   it   is   well   settled   by   now   that   grant   or   non­grant   of
remission   is  the   prerogative  to   be  exercised  by  the  competent
authority   and   it   is   not   for   the   Court   to   supplant   that
procedure. Indeed, grant of premature release is not a matter
of   privilege   but   is   the   power   coupled   with   duty   conferred   on
the appropriate Government in terms of Sections 432 and 433
of   Cr.P.C.,   to   be   exercised   by   the   competent   authority   after
taking   into   account   all   the   relevant   factors,   such   as   it   would
not undermine the nature of crime committed and the impact
of the remission that may be the concern of the society as well
as the concern of the State Government. 

18
17. The   petitioner   would   then   rely   on   a   three­Judge   Bench
decision  of this  Court in   State  of  Tamil   Nadu  and   Ors.   Vs.
P.   Veera   Bhaarathi 6
.   Notably,   in   this   case,   the   respondent
was   convicted   for   offence   under   Section   302   of   IPC   and
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and also convicted
under Sections 376 and 396 of IPC and sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment   for   7   years.   Since   both   the   sentences   were   to
run concurrently, the respondent therein had claimed that he
was   entitled   to   be   released   prematurely   having   already
undergone   the   actual   sentence   for   over   16   years   by   invoking
Rule   341   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Prison   Rules,   1983.     In   the
present   case,   however,   the   petitioner   has   been   convicted   for
offence   under   Section   302   (3   counts)   and   Section   307   (4
counts) and has been sentenced to life imprisonment on each
count.   The   question   as   to   whether   the   petitioner   should   be
granted  remission   and   premature  release  in   respect  of   all  the
counts   at   one   stroke,   is   a   matter   to   be   considered   by   the
appropriate   Government   in   exercise   of   power   under   Sections
6   2019 (2) SCALE 225 (Criminal Appeal No.120 of 2019 decided on 22 nd
 January, 2019)

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432   and   433   of   Cr.P.C .   We   do   not   wish   to   dilate   on   that
aspect.
18. Thus   understood,   we   cannot   countenance   the   relief
claimed   by   the   petitioner   to   direct   the   respondents   to   release
the   petitioner   forthwith   or   to   direct   the   respondents   to   remit
the   remaining   sentence   and   release   the   petitioner.   The
petitioner, at best, is entitled to the relief of having  directions
issued to the respondents to consider his representation dated
5 th
  February,   2018,   expeditiously,   on   its   own   merits   and   in
accordance   with   law.   We   may   not   be   understood   to   have
expressed any opinion either way on the merits of the claim of
the   petitioner.   The   fact   that   the   petitioner’s   request   for
premature   release   was   already   considered   once   and   rejected
by   the   Advisory   Board   of   the   State   Government,   in   our
opinion,   ought   not   to   come   in   the   way   of   the   petitioner   for
consideration   of   his   fresh   representation   made   on   5 th
February, 2018. We say so because the opinion of the Advisory
Board   merely   refers   to   the   negative   recommendation   of   the
Probation Officer, Madurai and the District Collector, Madurai.

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The   additional   reason   stated   by   the   State   Government   seems
to be as follows: 
“4) The   proceedings   of   the   Advisory   Board   held   on
20.01.2010 is as follows:­
i. The   case   is   heard   and   examined   the   relevant
records.   The   accused   is   a   Srilankan   National
and   lodged   at   Special   Camp   at   Chengalpet
before the commission of this grave offence. 
ii. The   Probation   Officer,   Madurai   and   the   District
Collector,   Madurai   have   not   recommended   the
premature release. 
iii. Also this prisoner has not repented for his act, 
iv. The   plea   for   premature   release   is   ‘Not­
Recommended’.
5) The   Government   after   careful   examination   accept   the
recommendation   of   the   Advisory   Board,   Vellore   and   the
premature   release   of   the   life   convict   No.23736,   Rajan   S/o
Robin, confined in Central Prison, Vellore is hereby rejected.”
With   the   passage   of   time,   however,   the   situation   may   have
undergone a change and, particularly, because now the claim
of   the   petitioner   for   premature   release   will   have   to   be
considered   only   in   reference   to   the   sentence   of   life
imprisonment  awarded to  him  for   offences  under  Section 302
(3 counts) and Section 307 (4 counts) of IPC, respectively.

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19. The   argument   of   the   respondents   that  the   stipulation   in
the   order   dated   1 st
  February,   2018,   issued   by   the   Home
Department   would   make   the   petitioner   ineligible   because   he
was also tried for offence of dacoity punishable under Section
395,     need   not   detain   us,   considering   the   fact   that   the
sentence   awarded   for   the   said   offence   has   already   been
completed   by   the   petitioner   and   thus   cannot   be   reckoned   for
the   purposes   of   deciding   the   representation   for   remission   of
life   sentence   and   for   premature   release   in   reference   to   the
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307, respectively.
In   other   words,   the   remission   sought   by   the   petitioner   is
presently   limited   to   offences   punishable   under   Sections   302
and 307 respectively,   for which he has been sentenced to life
imprisonment on more than one count.
20. We, therefore, dispose of this petition with a direction to
the   competent   authority   to   process   the   representation   made
by   the  petitioner  dated  5 th
  February,  2018  (Annexure­P6)  and
take   it   to   its   logical   end   expeditiously   and   preferably   within
four months, in accordance with law, without being influenced

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by   the   rejection   of   the   earlier   representation   vide   order   dated
14 th
  June,  2010,  by  the  State  Government.  We  also  hold  that
consultation   with   the   Central   Government   would   not   be
necessary   and   the   State   Government,   being   the   appropriate
Government,   must   exercise   power   conferred   upon   it   in   terms
of   Sections   432   and   433   of   Cr.P.C.   All   questions   to   be
considered by the appropriate Government are left open. 
21. The writ petition  is disposed of accordingly.   All  pending
applications are also disposed of.             
…………………………..….J.
          (A.M. Khanwilkar)
…………………………..….J.
         (Ajay Rastogi)
New Delhi;
April 25, 2019.