2019 INSC 0425
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8109 OF 2010
GOLI VIJAYALAKSHMI & ORS.     ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
YENDRU SATHIRAJU(DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. ….Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 8110 OF 2010
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. The   aforesaid   civil   appeals   arise   from   the   impugned
judgment   dated   22 nd
  November,   2005   passed   by   the   High   Court
of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal No. 1146 of 1996(and
cross  objections)  confirming   the   judgment   and   decree   passed  by
the learned trial Court dated 12 th
  October, 1995 in Original Suit
No. 175 of 1987 whereby the Courts below have inter alia decreed
the   suit   schedule   ‘A’   and   ‘B’   properties   and   have   dismissed   the
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suit   qua   schedule   ‘C’   property   filed   by   the
respondent(s)/plaintiff(s).
2. When   the   aforesaid   civil   appeals   were   taken   up   for
adjudication,   the   respondents/plaintiffs   raised   a   preliminary
objection to the prosecution of the appeals on the ground that the
civil appeals have abated in toto.   It is to be further noticed that
the   defendant   no.   2   Goli   Sathiraju   died   on   21 st
  February,   2006
and his legal heirs have not chosen to come on record and when
the matter was listed before the Chamber Judge, it was observed
vide Order dated 24 th
 July, 2009 as follows:­
“IA No. 2 in SLP(C ) No. 9401/2006 is for deletion of
petitioner   no.   2   who   is   stated   to   have   died   on
21/2/2006   and   his   LRs   have   not   chosen   to   come   on
record.   Hence, the matter abates insofar as petitioner
no. 2 is concerned.  I.A. No. 2 is allowed.
Petitioner   no.   2   in   SLP(C   )   No.   9401/2006   is   the
respondent   no.   2   in   the   connected   SLP(C   )   No.
19919/2006.     SLP(C   )   No.   9401/2006   insofar   as
petitioner   no.   2   is   concerned   stands   abated.     In   view
thereof, petitioner is permitted to delete respondent no.
2 from the array of parties.  I.A. No. 3 is allowed.”
3. When the matter came before  the  Court on 10 th
 May, 2018,
taking  note  of  the  view  expressed   by   the  Chamber   Judge  dated
24 th
  July, 2009, it was observed that in view of the appeal stood
abated qua  the appellant no. 2, therefore, the  appeal in entirety
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stands abated.  Learned counsel for the appellants sought time to
examine   the   issue   regarding   the   abatement   of   the
proceedings in view of the fact that the appeal stood abated qua
appellant no. 2 in terms of order dated 24 th
 July, 2009.
4. The   seminal   facts   which   are   relevant   for   the   present
purpose are that the original plaintiff Yendru Sathiraju filed O.S.
No. 175 of  1987  before the  learned trial Court praying  inter  alia
declaration   of   title   in   respect   of   schedule   ‘A’,’B’   &   ‘C’   properties
and   for   recovery   of   possession   from   the   defendants/appellants.
The prayer is as follows:­
“18. Plaintiff therefore prays that the Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to pass a decree in his favour:
a) Declaring his absolute title to the plaint A,
B   and   C   schedule   properties   and   for
recovery of possession thereof after evicting
the defendants there from;
b) Granting   a   mandatory   injunction  directing
the   defendants   to   restore   opening   in   the
northern compound wall in between plaint
B   and   C   schedule   properties   and   put   up
the doorway in its former position;
c) for costs of the suit; and
d) for such other  relief’s as may deem  fit and
proper   under   the   circumstances   of   the
case.”
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5. Written   statement   came   to   be   filed   by   the   defendant   no.   1
which was adopted by the defendant nos. 2 and 3 before the trial
Court.     Although   an   averment   was   made   in   the   written
statement   that   the   suit   schedule   ‘A’   property   fell   to   the  share   of
defendant   no.   1   and   the   Suit   schedule   ‘B’   property   fell   to   the
share   of   defendant   no.   2.     The   trial   Court  after   adjudicating   the
matter was pleased to pass a partial decree declaring the title and
ownership of the plaintiff/respondent to Suit schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’
properties   and   directing   the   defendants/appellants   to   deliver
possession   of   the   same   to   the   plaintiff/respondent.     Against
schedule   ‘C’   property,   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff/respondent   was
rejected vide judgment and decree dated 12 th
 October, 1995.  The
decree passed by the trial Court is as under:­
“In   the   result,   the   suit   is   decreed   in   part   with
proportionate   costs   (1)   declaring   the   title   and
ownership of the plaintiff to plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule
properties   (2)   directing   the   defendants   to   deliver
possession of the plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties
to   the   plaintiff   (3)   granting   a   mandatory   injunction
directing the defendants to restore the door­way in the
compound   wall   situated   to   between   plaint   ‘A’   and   ‘B’
schedule properties; and (4) directing the defendants to
pay future profits from the date of filing  of the suit till
the   date   of   delivering   possession   of   the   plaint   ‘A’   and
‘B’ schedule properties to the Plaintiff, the quantum of
which has to be ascertained in separate proceedings on
an application by the plaintiff.  Rest of the suit claim is
dismissed.”
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6. The   defendants/appellants   preferred   Appeal   no.   1146   of
1996   before   the   High   Court   (and   cross   objections   were   filed   by
the   plaintiffs/respondents   herein),   both   came   to   be   dismissed
and   a   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   Court   came   to   be
confirmed by the High Court vide judgment dated 22 nd
 November,
2005.
7. It   reveals   from   the   record   that   the   defendants/appellants
jointly   filed   SLP(C   )   No.   9401   of   2006   before   this   Court   on   30 th
March,   2006.     At   the   same   time,   plaintiffs/respondents   also
preferred SLP (C ) No. 19919 of 2006 against the rejection of suit
schedule   ‘C’   properties.     The   factum   of   the   death   of   appellant
no.   2   was   brought   to   the   notice   of   this   Court   on   7 th
  May,   2007
and   learned   counsel   sought   time   to   bring   on   record   his   legal
representatives   but   on   failure   to   bring   on   record   the   legal
representatives   of   the   appellant   no.   2,   the   Chamber   Judge   vide
order   dated   24 th
  July,   2009   pleased   to   treat   the   special   leave
petition/appeal as abated so  far  as appellant no.  2 is concerned
and this Court vide order dated 6 th
  September, 2010 rejected the
application filed to implead the legal representatives of appellant
no.   2   as   proforma   respondents.     Further,   it   was   specifically
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observed   that   the   consequence   of   the   abatement   of   the   appeal
qua   the   appellant   no.   2   was   left   open   for   consideration   at   the
time of final hearing of the appeal.
8. This   Court   granted   leave   and   accordingly   the   special   leave
petitions were converted into Civil Appeal Nos. 8109 and 8110 of
2010   vide   order   dated   6 th
  September,   2010.     This   Court   vide
order   dated   14 th
  August,   2018   was   pleased   to   dismiss   the
application   for   condonation   of   delay   in   bringing   on   record   the
legal representatives of the appellant no. 2 as also the application
for bringing the legal representatives on record on account of the
inordinate   delay   with   liberty   to   raise   the   issue   of   abatement   of
appeal at the time of hearing of the appeal.
9. To examine the question of abatement of appeals, it may be
relevant to take note of the fact that initially the suit was filed by
the   plaintiffs/respondents   for   declaration   of   title   in   respect   of   3
schedule properties ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ and the trial Court as well as
the   High   Court   have   partly   decreed   the   suit   holding   the
entitlement   of   the   title   of   the   plaintiffs/respondents   in   reference
to   suit   schedule   ‘A’   and   ‘B’   properties.     All   the   three
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defendants/appellants   to   the   suit   are   real   brothers   and   written
statement was filed by the first defendant/appellant and adopted
by other two defendants/appellants set up a rival title to the suit
schedule properties by claiming to have succeeded to them from
one   common   ancestor   Smt.   Gole   Sattemma(foster   daughter   of
Yendru Kannayya­father of the plaintiff).
10. Taking   note   of   the   pleadings   of   the   parties   and   the   claims
set   up   by   the   defendants   that   they   are   co­owners   of   the   suit
schedule   properties(each   being   entitled   to   an   equal   and
undivided   share),   having   derived   their   title   from   one   common
ancestor and are similarly placed and identically situated.
11. From   the   factual   backdrop   of   matter,   what   has   emerged   is
that   the   judgment   and   decree   passed   by   the   trial   Court   has
become   final   qua   the   appellant   no.   2(defendant   no.   2)   on   the
appeal   stood   abated   qua   him   vide   order   dated   24 th
  July,   2009
passed by this Court.
12. The   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents/plaintiffs   is   to   permit   the   remaining   appellants   to
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prosecute   the   civil   appeals   and,   in   the   event,   they   were   to
succeed, there would be two mutually inconsistent/contradictory
decrees   inasmuch   as   the   suit   has   already   been   decreed  qua   the
appellant   no.   2(defendant   no.   2)   on   the   one   hand   and   the   suit
would stand dismissed qua appellant nos. 1 & 3(defendant nos. 1
& 3) on the other and without clear demarcation and delineation
of   the   properties(which   has   not   yet   happened),   it   would   be
impossible   for   the   plaintiffs/respondents   to   enforce   decree   qua
the   defendant   no.   2   without   impinging   on   the   rights   of   the
defendant nos. 1 and 3(appellant nos. 1 & 3).
13. To   counter   the   submission,   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants submit that the appellant nos. 1 & 3(defendant nos. 1
& 3) are the real brothers of appellant no. 2 and they have their
distinct   shares   and   rights   regarding   title   in   the   suit   properties
which they   had  inter  se divided and  settled amongst  themselves
and was the subject matter of the suit which was decreed by the
trial   Court   dated   12 th
  October,   1995.     Learned   counsel   further
submits that the judgment of the trial Court recognises separate
and distinct rights of the appellant nos. 1, 2 & 3(defendant nos.
1, 2 & 3) and the High Court while dismissing the appeal filed by
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the   appellants   and   the   plaintiffs/respondents   having   preferred
cross   objections   with   regard   to   non­grant   of   reliefs   prayed   for
declaration   of   title   of   schedule   ‘C’   properties   itself   makes   it
evident   that   the   defendants   had   their   own   distinct   and
substantive   rights   in   the   schedule   ‘A’,   ‘B’   and   ‘C’   properties   as
claimed   in   the   plaint   especially   in   view   of   the   fact   that   both   the
appellants   and   the   respondents   herein   having   preferred   their
respective   appeals   before   the   High   Court   and   also   before   this
Court   and   in   support   of   his   submission   placed   reliance   on   the
judgment   of   this   Court   in   Sardar   Amarjit   Singh   Kalra(Dead)
by LRs and Others   Vs.   Pramod Gupta(Smt)(Dead) by LRs and
Others  reported in 2003(3) SCC 272.
14. For the sake of repetition, learned counsel for the appellants
further submits that appellant nos. 1 & 3(defendant nos. 1 & 3)
had   a   distinct   and   separate   right   which   cannot   be   said   to   have
extinguished   on   account   on   non­substitution   of   the   legal
representatives of appellant no. 2 and  their  right to  substitution
could not be taken away by taking note of technicalities and this
Court   has   ample   power   under   Order   41   Rule   4   of   Code   of   Civil
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Procedure(hereinafter   being   referred   to   as   “CPC”)   to   do
substantial justice.
15. In   this   factual   background,   it   will   be   apposite   to   first   take
note   of   the   principles   laid   down   in   respect   of   abatement   of
appeals.     Order   22   Rule   4(3)   CPC   specifies   that   a   suit/appeal
shall   abate   as   against   the   deceased   defendant   where   no
application is made to bring on record the legal representatives of
the   deceased   defendant   within   the   time   stipulated.     Further,
Order 22 Rule 9 CPC specifies the effect of abatement inasmuch
as   it   is   clarified   that   no   fresh   suit   is   maintainable   in   respect   of
the same cause of action.
16. The   primary   role   of   the   Court   is   to   adjudicate   the   dispute
between   the   parties   and   to   advance   substantial   justice.
Inasmuch   as   the   abatement   results   in   denial   of   hearing   on   the
merits   of   the   case,   the   provision   of   abatement   has   to   be
construed within the strict parameters of law.  Abatement of suit
for   failure   to   move   an   application   for   bringing   the   legal
representatives   on   record   within   the   prescribed   period   of
limitation is by operation of law but once the suit has abated as a
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matter of law, though there may not have been passed on record
a   specific   order   dismissing   the   suit   as   abated,   yet   the   legal
representatives   proposing   to   be   brought   on   record   or   any   other
applicant   proposing   to   bring   the   legal   representatives   of   the
deceased   party   on   record   would   seek   for   the   setting   aside   of   an
abatement.  
17. The   question   arises   in   reference   to   the   effect   of   abatement
qua  the  appellants(plaintiffs  or  defendants), as  the case may  be,
where   the   decree   is   joint   and   indivisible,   the   appeal   against   the
other   defendants     will   be   proceeded   with   and   in   the   event   of
appeal   to   succeed,   there   will   be   two   mutually
inconsistent/contradictory   decrees   and   more   particularly   when
the suit has already been decreed qua one defendant and the suit
would stand dismissed qua the other defendants, in such a given
situation,   tests   have   been   laid   down   by   this   Court   to   determine
as to whether or not to proceed with the appeal.   
18. This Court while adverting to Order 22 Rule 4 CPC  against
the   other   respondent   in   State   of   Punjab   Vs.   Nathu   Ram     AIR
1962 SC 89 observed as under:­
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“6. The   question   whether   a   Court   can   deal   with
such   matters   or   not,   will   depend   on   the   facts   of   each
case   and   therefore   no   exhaustive   statement   can   be
made about the circumstances when this is possible or
is   not   possible.   It   may,   however,   be   stated   that
ordinarily   the   considerations   which   weigh   with   the
Court   in   deciding   upon   this   question   are   whether   the
appeal   between   the   appellants   and   the   respondents
other   than   the   deceased   can   be   said   to   be   properly
constituted   or   can   be   said   to   have   all   the   necessary
parties   for   the   decision   of   the   controversy   before   the
Court. The test to determine this has been described in
diverse   forms.   Courts   will   not   proceed   with   an   appeal
(a)   when   the   success   of   the   appeal   may   lead   to   the
Court's   coming   to   a   decision   which   be   in   conflict   with
the   decision   between   the   appellant   and   the   deceased
respondent   and   therefore   which   would   lead   to   the
Court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to
the decree which had become final with respect  to the
same   subject   matter   between   the   appellant   and   the
deceased respondent;   (b)   when the appellant could not
have brought the action for the necessary relief against
those respondents alone who are still before the Court
and   (c)   when   the   decree   against   the   surviving
respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that
is to say, it could not be successfully executed.”
19. The   exposition   of   the   Constitution   Bench   in   Sardar
Amarjit   Singh   Kalra   (Dead)   by   LRs   and   others   (supra)   is   as
under:­
“34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold:­
(1)   Wherever   the   plaintiffs   or   appellants   or   petitioners
are   found   to   have   distinct,   separate   and   independent
rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience
or   otherwise,   joined   together   in   a   single   litigation   to
vindicate   their   rights   the   decree   passed   by   the   Court
thereon   is   to   be   viewed   in   substance   as   the
combination   of   several   decrees   in   favour   of   one   or   the
other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree.
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The   same   would   be   the   position   in   the   case   of
defendants   or   respondents   having   similar   rights
contesting the claims against them.
(2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than
one   are   sought   to   be   vindicated   in   one   single
proceedings as the one now before us, under the Land
Acquisition   Act   or   in   similar   nature   of   proceedings
and/or   claims   in   assertion   of   individual   rights   of
parties   are   clubbed,   consolidated   and   dealt   with
together   by   the   Courts   concerned   and   a   single
judgment   or   decree   has   been   passed,   it   should   be
treated   as   a   mere   combination   of   several   decrees   in
favour of or against one or more of the parties and not
as joint and inseparable decrees.
(3)   The   mere  fact   that   the   claims  or   rights   asserted   or
sought   to   be   vindicated   by   more   than   one   are   similar
or   identical   in   nature   or   by   joining   together   of   more
than   one   of   such   claimants   of   a   particular   nature,   by
itself   would   not   be   sufficient   in   law   to   treat   them   as
joint   claims,   so   as   to   render   the   judgment   or   decree
passed thereon a joint and inseverable one.
(4)   The   question   as   to   whether   in   a   given   case   the
decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or
separable   has   to   be   decided,   for   the   purposes   of
abatement   or   dismissal   of   the   entire   appeal   as   not
being   properly   and   duly   constituted   or   rendered
incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires
to   be   determined   only   with   reference   to   the   fact   as   to
whether   the   judgment/decree   passed   in   the
proceedings   vis­a­vis   the   remaining   parties   would
suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees.
For   that   reason,   a   decree   can   be   said   to   be
contradictory   or   inconsistent   with   another   decree  only
when   the   two  decrees   are  incapable   of   enforcement   or
would   be   mutually   self­destructive   and   that   the
enforcement   of   one  would  negate   or   render   impossible
the enforcement of the other.”
20. It   was   further   considered   in   Budh   Ram   and   Others   Vs.
Bansi   and   Others   2010(11)   SCC   476   and   the   principle,
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therefore, emerges is to test whether the judgment/decree passed
in   the   proceedings   vis­à­vis   the   remaining   parties   would   suffer
from   the   vice   of   contradictory   or   inconsistent   decrees   inasmuch
as   the   two   decrees   are   incapable   of   enforcement   or   would   be
mutually  self­destructive and that the enforcement of one would
negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.
21. Applying   the   aforesaid   principles,   the   facts   of   the   instant
cases   on   hand   clearly   manifest   that   the   judgment   and   decree
passed   by   the   trial   Court   became   final   qua   appellant   no.
2(defendant   no.   2)   upon   abatement   of   the   appeal   qua   him   vide
order   dated   24 th
  July,   2009.     If   this   Court   would   permit   the
remaining   appellants   to   prosecute   the   appeals   and,  in   the   event
they   were   to   succeed,   indisputedly,   there   would   be   mutually
inconsistent/contradictory   decrees   inasmuch   as   the   suit   has
already been decreed qua appellant no. 2(defendant no. 2) on the
one hand and the suit would stand dismissed qua appellant nos.
1 & 3(defendant nos. 1 & 3) or decreed against them in reference
to   schedule   ‘C’   property   and   not   against   appellant   no.
2(defendant   no.   2)   due   to   dint   of   cross   appeal   filed   by   the
plaintiff.  
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22. If   the   instant   appeals   were   to   be   allowed,   the   same   would
result   in   a   situation   where   the   enforcement   of   the   two   decrees
would be in executable and the enforcement of one would negate
or render impossible the enforcement of the other and to further
simplify, the plaintiffs/respondents would be entitled to the share
of   the   appellant   no.   2(defendant   no.   2)   in   the   suit   schedule   ‘A’
and ‘B’ properties and there is no way he could enforce the same
without   negating   the   enforcement   of   the   other   decree   viz.
dismissal of the suit qua appellant nos. 1 & 3(defendant nos. 1 &
3) since the suit schedule properties each constitute a single unit
and   the   same   has   not   yet   been   demarcated   and/or   divided
amongst the defendants and without such clear demarcation and
delineation   of   the   properties,   indisputedly,   which   has   not   yet
happened,   it   would   be   impossible   for   the   plaintiffs/respondents
to   enforce   decree   qua   the   appellant   no.   2(defendant   no.   2)
without   impinging   on   the   rights   of   the   appellant   nos.   1   &
3(defendant nos. 1 & 3).
23. The   submission   of   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   that
even if the appeal stood abated qua the appellant no. 2, the other
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appellants  would  be  entitled  to   prosecute  the  appeals  relying   on
the principle of Order 41 Rule 4 & 33 CPC.  Suffice it to say that
once   the   appeal   stood   abated   against   the   appellant   no.
2(defendant   no.   2)   and   the   decree   which   stands   confirmed   qua
the   appellant   no.   2(defendant   no.   2)   cannot   indirectly   be
reopened to challenge at the behest of persons claiming through
him by relying on provisions of Order 41 R 4 & 33 CPC as prayed
for.  
24. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   has   made   efforts   to
persuade   us   that   the   plaintiff   himself   has   acknowledged   in   the
plaint   regarding   the   internal   division/demarcation   of   the   suit
schedule   properties,   the   submission   appears   to   be   factually
incorrect as nowhere in the plaint, the plaintiff has acknowledged
any   such   internal   division/demarcation   of   the   suit   schedule
properties.     Although   there   was   a   statement   made   by   the
appellants/defendants   in   para   11   of   the   written   statement   that
the schedule ‘A’ property has fallen to the share of the appellant
no. 1(defendant no. 1) and schedule ‘B’ property has fallen to the
share of appellant no. 2(defendant no. 2) but the assertion has no
foundation/basis   and   there   was   no   issue   framed   by   the   trial
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Court   and   admittedly   no   finding   has   been   rendered   in   this
regard.       In   the   absence   of   such   finding   being   rendered   by   the
trial   Court,   the   self­serving   assertion   made   by   the
defendants/appellants cannot be an evidence of the fact that the
suit   schedule   properties   have   been   divided   and   demarcated
among the defendants/appellants.
25. After   going   through   the   decree   of   the   trial   Court   and
confirmed by the High Court in appeal, of which a reference has
been made by us in detail and taking note of the tests laid down
by   this   Court,   in   our   considered   view   both   the   appeals   stand
abated in toto.
26. We find substance in the preliminary objection raised by the
respondents and both the appeals stand abated and accordingly
dismissed.
27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. 
…………………………..J.
(A.M. KHANWILKAR)
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…………………………..J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
New Delhi
April 26, 2019
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