2019 INSC 0419
     
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 539­540 OF 2008
JAGDISHRAJ KHATTA               … APPELLANT
V ERSUS
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                  … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
N.V. R AMANA , J.   
1. These   appeals   are   directed   against   judgment   and   order   dated
09.01.2008   and   27.02.2008,   passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the
High   Court   of   Himachal   Pradesh   at   Shimla   in   Criminal   Appeal   No.
356 of 1993, whereby the appeal preferred by the State of Himachal
Pradesh was allowed, and the judgment and order dated 03.04.1993
passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Kangra,   Dharamshala,
Himachal   Pradesh,   acquitting   the   appellant­accused   for   offences
under   Sections   498A   and   306   of   the   IPC,   and   Section   30   of   the
Indian Arms Act, was set aside. 
2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   in   brief   is   that   the   appellant,   who NON­ REPORTABLE
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was   posted   as   the   Forest   Range   Officer   at   Jawalamukhi,   at   the
relevant   time,   was   residing   with   the   deceased   (his   wife)   and   two
minor children. On 07.01.1990, at about 10 a.m., within seven years
of the deceased’s marriage with the appellant, the deceased used the
appellant’s   gun   to   kill   herself.   On   receiving   information   about   her
death,   the   deceased’s   mother,   cousin,   brother   in   law   and   father’s
neighbor went to Jawalamukhi, and the inquest report was prepared
in   their   presence.   After   the   funeral   ceremonies   were   completed,   on
08.01.1990 at around 11 p.m., the deceased’s cousin lodged a report
against   the   appellant   herein,   alleging   that   the   appellant   drove   the
deceased   to   commit   suicide   as   he   continuously   subjected   the
deceased   to   cruelty,   harassment,   physical   violence   and   even
mistreated   her   and   insulted   her   in   the   presence   of   her   parents   and
relatives.   Subsequently,   on   13.01.1990,   the   father   of   the   deceased
produced a letter allegedly written to him by the deceased, which he
received   on   10.01.1990.   The   contents   of   the   letter   supported   the
allegations  made  against   the  appellant   in   the   FIR,   regarding   cruelty
and harassment towards the deceased. 
3. The appellant was charged under Sections 498A and 306 of the
IPC   and   Section   30   of   the   Indian   Arms   Act.   The   Trial   Court,   after
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considering   the   material   against   the   appellant,   acquitted   him   of   all
the   charges.   On   appeal   by   the   State,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
findings   of   the   Trial   Court   and   convicted   the   appellant   for   the
offences under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC and sentenced him
to   three   years   rigorous   imprisonment   with   a   fine   of   Rs.   10,000,   in
default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a further period of six months, for the offence under Section 306,
IPC, and one­year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000, in
default of payment of which he is to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for   a   further   period   of   three   months,   for   the   offence   under   Section
498A, IPC, with both sentences to run concurrently. Aggrieved by the
judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court,   the   appellant   has   preferred
the present appeals before us.
4. The   counsel   for   the   appellant   strongly   urged   that   the   High
Court   erred   in   relying   on   a   letter   which   was   allegedly   sent   by   the
deceased to  her  relatives in  overturning  the  well­reasoned  judgment
of the Trial Court. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the letter
was   surrounded   by   suspicious   circumstances   which   were   not
considered by the High Court, such as the fact that there was a delay
in   handing   over   the   letter   to   the   police,   which   delay   was   not
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explained,   and   that   the   family   of   the   deceased   had   never   received
any other letter from the deceased, who had a phone connection and
often   used   to   be   visited   by   her   family.   Additionally,   the   counsel
submitted   that   the   High   Court   did   not   consider   that   the   notebook,
which   was   used   as   a   handwriting   sample   of   the   deceased   for
comparison purposes, was not proved to belong to the deceased. As
such, the learned counsel for the appellant supported the findings of
the   Trial   Court   and   prayed   that   the   High   Court’s   findings   be   set
aside, and the appellant be acquitted.
5. On   the   other   hand,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent­
State   supported   the   findings   of   the   High   Court   and   submitted   that
the same do not merit any interference by this Court.
6. Heard the submissions of the learned counsels of both parties.
7. On   perusing   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   we   find   that   it
has reversed the findings of the Trial Court by mainly relying on the
following   evidences:   (1)   the   testimonies   of   the   relatives   of   the
deceased   that   the   appellant   acted   in   a   cruel   manner   against   the
deceased in front of her relatives, and   (2) the letter allegedly written
by the deceased around the time of her death to her parents. 
8. With   respect   to   the   former,   we   are   unable   to   agree   with   the
reasoning   of   the   High   Court   in   relying   on   the   testimonies   of   the
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relatives of the deceased. As highlighted by the Trial Court, not only
were the allegations in the FIR extremely general in nature, but also
the same were never raised by the family of the deceased when they
were present at the time of preparation of the inquest report or to the
investigating officer. In fact, the allegation of cruelty meted out by the
appellant against the deceased appears for the first time at the time
of filing the FIR, after a delay of nearly one and a half days. Further,
the prosecution did not even examine any  neighbor of the appellant
and the deceased to substantiate the allegation that the appellant ill­
treated the deceased. In fact, and as the High Court also recorded, it
appears   from   the   evidence   on   record   that   the   appellant   treated   the
deceased   with   love   and   affection   and   provided   for   all   her   needs.   In
these circumstances, a reliance on the general oral testimonies of the
prosecution   witnesses,   without   any   supporting   evidence,   would   be
misplaced.   Further,   as   the   High   Court   itself   indicated   somewhat
contradictorily, reliance on the instances testified to by the witnesses
would not be appropriate as the said incidents had taken place much
before   the   deceased’s   death   and   could   not   be   treated   as   conduct
which drove the deceased to commit suicide. 
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9. This brings us to the second part of the High Court’s reasoning
in convicting the appellant, relating to the letter allegedly sent by the
deceased   to   her   parents   one   day   before   her   death.   We   are   again
unable   to   accept   the   findings   of   the   High   Court   on   this   point.   We
agree   with   the   submission   of   the   counsel   for   the   appellant   that   the
letter has not been proved to have been written by the deceased and
is   surrounded   by   suspicious   circumstances.   While   the   handwriting
expert   testified   that   the   writing   in   the   letter   is   the   same   as   that   of
certain notebooks, no independent proof has been led regarding who
owned   or   wrote   in   the   aforesaid   notebook.   In   fact,   the   only   persons
who were examined for the purposes of identifying the handwriting of
the   deceased   were   her   father   and   cousin.   However,   how   either   of
them could be said to be acquainted with her writing is unclear. The
father   of   the   deceased   was   her   teacher   nearly   15   years   prior   to   the
incident,   and   the   deceased   had   admittedly   not   written   any   other
letter   to   her   father   after   her   marriage.   Similarly,   the   cousin   of   the
deceased also did not have any other letter from the deceased in his
possession. 
10. Most   importantly,   the   letter   was   received   by   the   deceased’s
father   on   10.01.1990   but   was   handed   over   to   the   police   only   on
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13.01.1990,   casting   serious   doubt   on   the   authenticity   of   the   letter.
The fact that the deceased had never written any other letter  to her
family   after   her   marriage   but   had   rather   been   in   touch   with   her
relatives   through   the   telephone,   further   strengthens   the   case   of   the
appellant.
11. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, as
well   as   the   material   placed   before   us,   we   hold   that   the   prosecution
was   not   able   to   prove   the   guilt   of   the   appellant   beyond   reasonable
doubt. Additionally, we are of the opinion that this was not a fit case
for the High Court to interfere with the well­reasoned judgment and
order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, particularly when there
existed   no   grave   infirmity   in   the   findings   of   the   Trial   Court.   [ See
Bannareddy   and   Ors.   v.   State   of   Karnataka   and   Ors. ,   (2018)   5
SCC   790].   In   the   aforesaid   circumstances,   the   appeals   are   allowed,
and   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   are   set
aside.   The   judgment   and   order   of   the   Trial   Court,   acquitting   the
appellant herein, is therefore affirmed. 
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12. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.    
..............................................J.
                                                                      (N.V. RAMANA)
 ..............................................J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 26, 2019.
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