2019 INSC 0430
                                Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10482 OF 2013
Sameer Kapoor and another ..Appellants
Versus
The State through Sub­Division Magistrate
South, New Delhi and others ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Delhi   at   New
Delhi in F.A.O(OS) No. 11 of 2009, by which a Division Bench of
the High Court has dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed
the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   refusing   to   reject
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the   plaint   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC,   the   original
defendants have preferred the present appeal.
2. The brief facts leading to this appeal are, that one Smt.
Kailash Kapoor, a permanent resident of England, executed a will
dated 16.05.1990 bequeathing thereunder all her assets to two of
her   grand­children.     That   the   said   Smt.   Kailash   Kapoor   died   in
England   on   10.09.2001.   According   to   the   appellants,   they   acted
upon the said will and disposed of all the immovable properties of
the   aforesaid   testatrix,   possessed   in   India   between   6.9.2000   to
March,  2001.     That   after   the   death  of   late   Smt.  Kailash   Kapoor,
the   High   Court   of   Justice,   District   Probate   Registry   of
Birmingham,   England   and   Wales   issued   a   probate   in   respect   of
the   said   will   vide   order   dated   21.11.1997.     It   appears   that
thereafter   in   the   year   2001,   respondent   no.2   herein,   at   whose
instance   the   will   was   probated   in   England,   applied   for   letters   of
administration   for   property   situated   in   Delhi   by   filing   a
Testamentary   Case   under   Section   228   of   the   Indian   Succession
Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) being Testamentary Case
No. 15 of 2001.
2.1 That  the  appellant  herein  filed I.A.  No. 13895 of  2006
before   the   learned   Single   Judge   of   the   High   Court,   praying   to
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reject   the   plaint   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC   on   the
ground that the said Testamentary Case under Section 228 of the
Act, considering Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is barred
by   the   law   of   limitation.     It   was   the   case   on   behalf   of   the
appellants that though no limitation would apply seeking grant of
probate   so   long   as   a   person   has   not   approached   the   court   and
will   is   probated,   however,   once   the   court   at   England   and   Wales
had   been   approached   and   a   probate   had   been   granted,   no
petition for letters of administration could have been filed after a
lapse   of   a   period   of   three   years.     The   said   application   was
opposed   by   respondent   no.2   herein   –   the   original   applicant.     It
was   submitted   that   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   would   not
apply.  
3. The learned Single Judge vide order dated 24.09.2008
dismissed   the   said   application   and   refused   to   reject   the   plaint
under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC   by   observing   that   Section
228 of the Act is akin to provisions of Section 222 and 276 of the
Act   and,   therefore,   when   there   is   no   period   of   limitation
prescribed   for   submitting   an   application   under   Section   222
and/or   Section   276   of   the   Act,   for   submitting   an   application
under Section 228 of the Act, the period of limitation shall not be
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applicable. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was of the opinion
that Article 137 of the Limitation Act shall have no application. 
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   order
passed   by   the   learned   Single   Judge   rejecting   the   application   to
reject   the   plaint   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC,   the
appellants   herein   approached   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court   by   way   of   F.A.O(OS)   No.   11   of   2009.     By   the   impugned
judgment   and   order,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   has
dismissed the said appeal and has confirmed the order passed by
the   learned   Single   Judge   rejecting   the   application   under   Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
5. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High
Court,   the   appellants   –   applicants­   original   defendants   have
preferred the present appeal.
6. Mr.   Divyakant   Lahoti,   learned   Advocate   has   appeared
for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   M.A.   Krishna   Moorthy,   learned
Advocate has appeared for respondent no.2.
6.1 Mr.   Divyakant   Lahoti,   learned   Advocate   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   appellants   has   vehemently   submitted   that   in   the
facts and circumstances of the case, both the Division Bench as
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well   as   the   learned   Single   Judge   have   materially   erred   in   not
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
6.2 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   Article   137   of   the
Limitation   Act   applies   to   any   petition   or   application   filed   under
any   Act   before   a   Civil   Court.     It   is   submitted   that   it   is   not
confined   to   applications   contemplated   by   or   under   the   Code   of
Civil Procedure.   It is submitted that therefore, Article 137 of the
Limitation   Act   shall   be   applicable   to   the   petitions   under   the
provisions of the Indian Succession Act also.
6.3 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   till   the   will   is   un­
probated,   right   to   apply   for   probate   is   a   continuous   cause   of
action,   therefore,   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall   not   be
applicable   on   petitions   for   grant   of   probate   and   letters   of
administration of a will, filed under Section 276 of the Act.   It is
submitted that, however, once the will is probated, Article 137 of
the Limitation Act will apply to any right which arises on account
of   probate   of   will.     It   is   submitted   that   in   such   a   case   the   right
accrues on the date of grant of probate, and therefore, the period
of   limitation   will   commence   from   such   date.     In   support   of   the
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above  submissions,  learned  Advocate  appearing  on  behalf  of  the
appellants   has   heavily   relied   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in
the   case   of   Kunvarjeet   Singh   Khandpur   v.   Kirandeep   Kaur,
reported in (2008) 8 SCC 463 (Paragraphs 15 & 16).
6.4 It   is   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate   appearing   on
behalf of the appellants that in the present case respondent no.2
had   applied   for   grant   of   probate   of   will   dated   16.05.1990,
executed   by   late   Smt.   Kailash   Kapoor,   before   the   High   Court   of
Justice,   District   Probate   Registry,   Birmingham   (UK),   which   was
granted   by   the   High   Court   vide   order   dated   21.11.1997.     It   is
submitted that therefore, the right to apply under Section 228 of
the Act can be said to have accrued in favour of respondent no.2
on   21.11.1997.     It   is   submitted   that   whereas   respondent   no.2
had preferred an application for grant of letters of administration
of   the   aforesaid   will   dated   16.05.1990   under   Section   228   of   the
Act,   by   a   Probate   Case   No.   15/2001,   after   a   lapse   of   period   of
three years as prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
i.e.,   on   28.02.2001.     It   is   submitted   therefore   the   application
submitted   by   respondent   no.2   under   Section   228   of   the   Act   is
clearly barred by law of limitation and therefore the same is liable
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to   be   rejected   considering   Order   VII   Rule   11(d)   of   the   CPC  –   the
applicant’s application being barred by limitation.
6.5 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   the   learned   Single
Judge   has   materially   erred   in   observing   that   Section   228   of   the
Act is akin to provisions of Sections 222 and 276 of the Act.  It is
submitted   that   while   coming   to   the   aforesaid   conclusion,   the
learned   Single   Judge   has   not   property   construed   and/or
considered   the   language   of   the   two   provisions,   i.e.,   Section   228
and Section 276 of the Act.  It is submitted that Sections 228 and
276   of   the   Act   are   totally   different   and   operate   under   different
circumstances.  It is submitted that an application under Section
228 of the Act would be maintainable only in a case where a will
has been proved/probated and deposited in a court of competent
jurisdiction.     It   is   submitted   that   therefore   a   valid   application
under   Section   228   has   to   be   necessarily   filed   on   the   basis   of   a
will that has already been proved, authenticated and probated by
a competent court in foreign jurisdiction.  It is submitted that no
such   pre­condition   or   pre­requisite   has   been   prescribed   under
Section 276 of the Act.  It is submitted that unlike Section 228 of
the Act, an application under Section 276 of the Act is to be filed
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on the basis of a will which is un­probated and is being produced
before the court for the first time.
6.6 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that even the learned Single
Judge has also materially erred in observing  that the object and
purpose of the two provisions is same, i.e., “to seek recognition in
respect   of   will   in   question”.     It   is   submitted   that   language   of
Section   228   of   the   Act   makes   it   clear   that   a   will   in   respect   of
which letters of administration is sought to be granted under that
Section   is   an   already   recognized,   proved   or   authenticated   will,
unless rebutted.  It is submitted that whereas the will in question
in   an   application   under   Section   276   of   the   Act   is   an   un­
recognised   will   which   is   being   produced   before   the   court   for   the
first time and which is yet to be proved.
6.7 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   even   the   scope   of
enquiry under Sections 228 and 276 of the Act is distinguishable
and different.   It is submitted that will under  Section 276 of the
Act is unauthenticated and yet to be proved.  It is submitted that
however   the   will   under   Section   228   of   the   Act   is   already   proved
and   authenticated   before   a   foreign   court   or   a   competent   court
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mentioned   in   Section   228   of   the   Act.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore  the   scope  of   enquiry   under   Section   228  of   the  Act   is  a
limited exercise.
6.8 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Division Bench of
the  High  Court has  erred in its reasoning  that  Probate  Case No.
15/2001 is not barred by limitation because it is the first Probate
Petition filed in India, as the earlier  Probate proceedings were in
the   Court   of   England   and   Wales.     It   is   submitted   that   the
Division Bench has materially  erred in not properly  appreciating
the   fact   that   the   administration   of   an   estate   in   probate   is   an   in
rem  proceedings.  It is submitted therefore the law of limitation is
applicable even if the previous probate proceedings were initiated
in  a foreign jurisdiction as the same are   in rem .   It is submitted
that   therefore,   both   the   learned   Single   Judge   as   well   as   the
Division   Bench   have   materially   erred   in   dismissing   the
application filed by the appellants herein under Order VII Rule 11
of the CPC.
6.9 In support of his above submissions, learned Advocate
appearing for the appellants has heavily relied upon the decision
of   the   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Estate   of
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Late Shri Gurcharan Dass Puri, reported in AIR 1987 P&H 122 , as
well   as,   the   decision   of   the   Patna   High   Court   in   the   case   of
Ramanand   Thakur   v.   Parmanand   Thakur,   reported   in   AIR   1982
Patna 87.
6.10 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
aforesaid  decisions   of  this   Court,  Punjab   &  Haryana   High   Court
and   Patna   High   Court,   it   is   prayed   to   allow   the   present   appeal
and quash and set aside the orders passed by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench and consequently reject the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.
7. The   present   appeal   is   vehemently   opposed   by   the
learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   respondent   no.2.     It   is
vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate   that   in   the   facts
and   circumstances   of   the   case,   both   the   learned   Single   Judge
and  the  Division  Bench  of  the High  Court  have  rightly  held  that
an application under Section 228 of the Act would not be barred
by   limitation,   inasmuch   as   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act
would not be applicable.
7.1 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of  respondent   no.2   that   the   decision   of   this
Court in the case of   Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra)  shall not
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be   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand,   as   before   this
Court   the   petition   was   under   Section   218/278   of   the   Act,
however,   in   the   present   case,   the   petition   is   under   Section
228/276 of the Act.
7.2 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on  behalf  of  respondent  no.2  that  in   the  present  case
as such the probate proceedings before the court in England was
never objected and there was no objection to the grant of probate.
It   is   submitted   that,   in   fact,   the   father   of   the   appellants   and
respondent no.2 had given ‘No Objection’ to the said probate.   It
is   submitted   that   in   law,   respondent   no.2   is   not   obligated   to
apply   for  letters of   administration  in  Delhi.    It  is submitted  that
in the case where the probate is not objected to, respondent no.2
had   no   reason   to   seek   the   same   as   well.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore ‘right to apply’ under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, if
any, never accrued against respondent no.2.  It is submitted that
both the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench have
rightly   dismissed   the   application   under   Order   VII   Rule   11(d)   of
the CPC and have rightly refused to reject the plaint.
7.3 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss
the present appeal.
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8. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respective
parties at length.
9. Two questions arise for consideration before this Court
in the present appeal:
i) Whether   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall   be
applicable   for   application   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration?;
ii) Whether   the   application   under   Section   228   of   the
Indian Succession Act shall be barred by the period of limitation
prescribed   under   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act,   and   whether
the   period   of   limitation   for   application   under   Section   228   of   the
Act   would   start   to   run   from   the   date   of   grant   of   probate   by   a
court  of  competent  jurisdiction  situated  beyond  the  limits  of  the
State, whether within or beyond the limits of India?
10. Now so far as the first question is concerned, the same
is now not   res integra   in view of the direct decision of this Court
in the case of   Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra)  and in the case
of   Krishan   Kumar   Sharma   v.   Rajesh   Kumar   Sharma   reported   in
(2009)   11   SCC   537.     In   both   the   aforesaid   decisions,   this   Court
has   specifically   observed   and   held   that   Article   137   of   the
Limitation   Act   shall   be   applicable   to   the   petitions   for   grant   of
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probate   or   letters   of   administration   also.     Therefore,   question
no.1   is   answered   in   the   affirmative   and   it   is   observed   and   held
that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to
the applications for grant of probate or letters of administration.  
11. Now   so   far   as   question   no.2   is   concerned,   it   is   the
specific   case   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   the   application
submitted by respondent No.2 for letters of administration under
Section   228   of   the   Act   is   barred   by   the   law   of   limitation   as
provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. As observed and
held   hereinabove,   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act   shall   be
applicable   to   the   application   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration   submitted   under   Section   276   of   the   Act.
Similarly, even the application under Section 228 of the Act shall
also be covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.  Therefore, it
is  observed   and   held  that   Article  137  of   the  Limitation   Act  shall
be   applicable   to   the   applications   under   Section   228   of   the   Act
also.
12. However,   the   next   question   which   is   posed   for
consideration   before   this   Court   is,   when   the   ‘right   to   apply’   can
be said to have accrued?
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12.1 As   per   Article   137   of   the   Limitation   Act,   the   period   of
limitation   prescribed   is   three   years   and   the   three   years   begin   to
run   when   the   ‘right   to   apply’   accrues.     The   crucial   expression
under Article 137 of the Limitation Act is ‘right to apply’.  It is the
case on behalf of the appellants that in the present case the ‘right
to   apply’   for   letters   of   administration   had   accrued   in   the   year
1997,   more   particularly   on   21.11.1997   when   the   High   Court   of
Justice,   District   Probate   Registry,   Birmingham   (UK)   passed   an
order   for   grant   of   probate   of   will   dated   16.05.1990   in   favour   of
respondent   no.2.     It   is   the   case   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that
therefore   ‘right   to   apply’   under   Section   228   of   the   Act   had
accrued   in   favour   of   respondent   no.2   on   21.11.1997   and,
therefore, respondent no.2 was required to submit an application
for   letters   of   administration   within   a   period   of   three   years   from
21.11.1997.     However,   the   application   for   letters   of
administration   has   been   submitted   on   28.02.2001,   i.e.,   after   a
lapse of limitation of three years as prescribed under Article 137
of the Limitation Act and therefore Probate Case No. 15/2001 is
clearly   barred   by   law   of   limitation   and,   therefore,   the   same   was
required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC.  It is also the case on behalf of the appellants that
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so long as the will is not probated, the period of limitation would
not   start   running.     However,   once   the   will   is   probated,   in   that
case, the period of limitation as provided under Article 137 of the
Limitation Act would begin to run from the date on which the will
is probated.
13. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respective
parties.
14. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   the
relevant   provisions   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration   with   the   will   would   be   Section   276   of   the   Act.
Section 276 of the Act reads as under:
“276.Petition   for   probate   –   (1)   Application   for   probate
or   for   letters   of   administration,   with   the   Will   annexed,
shall   be   made   by   a   petition   distinctly   written   in   English
or   in  the  language  in  ordinary   use  in  proceedings  before
this Court in which the application is made, with the Will
or, in the cases mentioned in sections 237, 238 and 239,
a   copy,   draft,   or   statement   of   the   contents   thereof,
annexed, and stating—
(a) the time of the testator’s death,
(b)             that   the   writing   annexed   is   his   last   Will   and
testament,
(c) that it was duly executed,
(d) the   amount   of   assets   which   are   likely   to   come   to
the petitioner’s hands, and 
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(e) when   the   application   is   for   probate,   that   the
petitioner is the executor named in the Will.
(2)   In   addition   to   these   particulars,   the   petition   shall
further state –
(a)  when the application is  to the District Judge,  that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed place of
abode,   or   had   some   property,   situate   within   the
jurisdiction of the Judge; and
(b) when the application is to a District Delegate, that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed place of
abode within the jurisdiction of such Delegate.
(3) Where the application is to the District Judge and nay
portion   of   the   assets   likely   to   come   to   the   petitioner’s
hands   is   situate   in   another   State,   the   petition   shall
further state the amount of such assets in each State and
the District Judges within whose jurisdiction such assets
are situate.”
 
14.1 When   an   application   under   Section   276   of   the   Act   is
submitted for probate or for letters of administration with will, if
any   objection   is   raised   by   any   body   with   respect   to   execution   of
the   will,   in   that   case,   the   applicant   is   required   to   prove   the   will
and thereafter the will shall be probated and the court may pass
an order for letters of administration.  However, in a case where a
will   has   been   proved   or   deposited   in   a   court   of   competent
jurisdiction   situated   beyond   the   limits   of   the   State,   whether
within   or   beyond   the   limits   of   India,   in   that   case,   as   provided
under Section 228 of the Act, when a properly authenticated copy
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of   the   will   is   produced,   the   letters   of   administration   may   be
granted   in   favour   of   such   person.     Meaning   thereby,   in   such   a
situation, the will is not required to be proved again and it shall
be   conclusive.     Therefore,   Section   228   of   the   Act   shall   be   an
enabling  provision and it confers an additional right to apply for
letters of administration on the basis of such authenticated copy
of   the   will.     Therefore,   as   rightly   observed   by   the   learned   Single
Judge and the Division Bench that Section 228 is akin to Section
276 of the Act.
15. Now   the   next   question   which   may   arise   for
consideration would be, whether for an application for probate or
letters of  administration  with  will, the  period  of limitation  would
begin to run from which date?
16. While   considering   the   issue   involved,   the   decision   of
this   Court   in   the   case   of   Kunvarjeet   Singh   Khandpur(supra)   is
required   to   be   referred   to   and   considered.     In   the   said   decision,
this  Court considered the  decision  of  the  Bombay  High Court  in
the   case   of   Vasudev   Daulatram   Sadarangani   v.   Sajni   Prem
Lalwani reported in AIR 1983 Bom. 268 , as well as, the decision of
the   Madras   High   Court   in   the   case   of   S.   Krishnaswami   v.   E.
Ramiah, reported in AIR 1991 Mad. 214 .  In the said decision, this
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Court referred to and considered paragraph 17 of the decision of
the   Madras   High   Court   in   the   case   of   S.   Krishnaswami(supra) ,
which reads as under:
“17. In a proceeding, or in other words, in an application
filed   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of   administration,   no
right   is   asserted   or   claimed   by   the   applicant.   The
applicant only seeks recognition of the court to perform a
duty.   Probate   or   letters   of   administration   issued   by   a
competent court is conclusive proof of the legal character
throughout   the   world.   An   assessment   of   the   relevant
provisions   of   the   Indian   Succession   Act,   1925   does   not
convey a meaning  that by the proceedings filed for grant
of   probate   or   letters   of   administration,   no   rights   of   the
applicant   are   settled   or   secured   in   the   legal   sense.   The
author of the testament has cast the duty with regard to
the   administration   of   his   estate,   and   the   applicant   for
probate   or   letters   of   administration   only   seeks   the
permission   of   the   court   to   perform   that   duty.   There   is
only   a   seeking   of   recognition   from   the   court   to   perform
the   duty.   That   duty   is   only   moral   and   it   is   not   legal.
There   is   no   law   which   compels   the   applicant   to   file   the
proceedings for probate or letters of administration. With
a   view   to   discharge   the   moral   duty,   the   applicant   seeks
recognition from the court to perform the duty. It will be
legitimate to conclude that the proceedings filed for grant
of probate or letters of administration is not an action in
law. Hence, it is very difficult to and it will not be in order
to construe the proceedings for grant of probate or letters
of   administration   as   applications   coming   within   the
meaning   of   an   ‘application’   under   Article   137   if   the
Limitation Act, 1963.”  
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16.1 This   Court   approved   the   observations   made   in
paragraph   17   by   the   Madras   High   Court   in   the   case   of   S.
Krishnaswami   (supra)   insofar   as   the   nature   of   the   petition   for
grant   of   probate   or   letter   of   administration   is   concerned.
However,   this   Court   did   not   agree   with   the   finding   that   the
application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not
covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
16.2 In   the   aforesaid   decision,   this   Court   also   considered
and referred to paragraph 16 of the decision of the Bombay High
Court   in   the   case   of   Vasudev   Daulatram   Sadarangani   (supra)   in
paragraph 15, which reads as follows:
“16.   Rejecting   Mr.   Dalpatrai’s   contention,   I   summarise
my conclusions thus – 
(a) Under   the   Limitation   Act   no   period   is   advisedly
prescribed   within   which   an   application   for   probate,
letters of administration or succession certificate must be
made;
(b) The assumption that under Article 137 the right to
apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the
deceased, is unwarranted;
(c) Such an application is for the court’s permission to
perform a legal duty created by a will or for recognition as
a   testamentary   trustee   and   is   a   continuous   right   which
can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased,
as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the
trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to
be executed;
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(d) The   right   to   apply   would   accrue   when   it   becomes
necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3
years from the date of the deceased’s death;
(e) Delay   beyond   3   years   after   the   deceased’s   death
would   arouse   suspicion   and   greater   the   delay,   greater
would be the suspicion;
(f) Such   delay   must   be   explained,   but   cannot   be
equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and
(g) Once   execution   and   attestation   are   proved,
suspicion of delay no longer operates.”
 
This   Court   did  not   agree   with/approve   conclusion  (b).
However, approved conclusion (c), reproduced hereinabove.
17. Therefore, considering the law laid down by this Court
in   the  case  of   Kunvarjeet   Singh  Khandpur  (supra) ,  it  can  be  said
that in a proceeding, or in other words, in an application filed for
grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted
or claimed by the applicant.  The applicant only seeks recognition
of   the   court   to   perform   a   duty.   Probate   or   letters   of
administration issued by a competent court is conclusive proof of
the   legal   character   throughout   the   world.     That   the   proceedings
filed   for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of   administration   is   not   an
action in law but it is an action   in rem .   As held by this Court in
the   case   of   Kunvarjeet   Singh   Khandpur   (supra),   an   application
for   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of   administration   is     for   the
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court’s   permission   to   perform   a   legal   duty   created   by   a   will
or   for   recognition   as   a     testamentary   trustee   and   is   a
continuous   right   which   can   be   exercised   any   time   after   the
death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives
and  the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if
created, remains to be executed.   
          Therefore,   even   if   the   will   is   probated   by   any   court
mentioned   in   Section   228   of   the   Act,   right   to   get   the   letters   of
administration is a continuous right which can be exercised any
time, as long as  the right to do so survives and the object of the
trust   exists   or   any   part   of   the   trust,   if   created,   remains   to   be
executed. 
18. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid   decision   and   the   observations   made   hereinabove,   the
submission   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   that   Probate   Case   No.
15/2001   filed   by   respondent   no.2   for   letters   of   administration
under Section 228 of the Act, read with Section 276 of the Act is
barred by law of limitation, cannot be accepted.   At this stage, it
is   required   to   be   noted   that   even   in   the   plaint,   it   is   specifically
pleaded that after passing away of the father of the parties in the
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year   2000,   the   appellants   started   intermeddling   with   properties
bequeathed   to   respondent   no.2,   which   were   situated   in   Delhi
and, therefore, left with no option, he was compelled to apply for
letters of administration.  Therefore, even as per the pleadings in
the   application,   the   cause   of   action   started   from   the   date   on
which   the   appellants   started   intermeddling   with   the   properties
bequeathed  to  respondent  no.2, after  passing  away  of  the  father
of   the   parties   in   the   year   2000.   Therefore,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, both the learned Single Judge and the
Division   Bench   have   rightly   refused   to   reject   the   application   in
exercise   of   powers   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   CPC.     In   the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   as   observed
hereinabove,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   application   for   letters   of
administration was  clearly  barred by  the  law  of limitation which
was required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order VII
rule   11(d)   of   the   CPC.     We   are   in   complete   agreement   with   the
view taken by the High Court.
19. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the   present   appeal   fails   and   the   same   deserves   to   be   dismissed
and   is   accordingly   dismissed.     However,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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……………………………………J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
NEW DELHI; …………………………………….J.
APRIL 29, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
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