2019 INSC 0432 1 NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 903 OF 2018 POONAM BAI  …  APPELLANT   Versus THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH          …  RESPONDENT       J U D G M E N T MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. This   appeal   calls   into   question   the   judgment   dated 06.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in ACQA No.205 of 2010, by which the judgment of the trial court was set aside and the appellant was convicted under Section 302 of  the   Indian   Penal   Code  (in   short,   “the   IPC”)   for   committing   the murder   of   the   deceased   Vimla   Bai   and   sentenced   to   undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to a fine of Rs.500/­. 2 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as follows: The deceased Vimla Bai was the wife of Pilaram Sahu (P.W. 3).     The   appellant   Poonam   Bai   is   the   daughter   of   Balaram,   P.W. 3’s   brother,   and   thus   the   niece   of   the   deceased.     On   the   date   of the incident, i.e. 01.11.2001, around noon, the appellant Poonam Bai   came   to   the   house   of   the   deceased   when   she   was   alone, quarreled   with   her,   poured   kerosene   on   her   body   and   lit   a   fire with   a   match­stick.   Vimla   Bai   sustained   burn   injuries   and succumbed   thereto   in   the   hospital.     The   matter   was   reported   to Police Station Gurur on the same day by Lalita Sahu (P.W. 2, the daughter of the deceased) at about 12.05 p.m. 3. The   trial   court,   on   evaluation   of   the   material   on   record, acquitted   the   appellant   of   the   charges   levelled   against   her. Feeling   dissatisfied   with   the   order   of   the   trial   court,   the   State preferred   an   appeal   before   the   High   Court,   which   vide   the impugned judgment, as mentioned above, convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC.  4.               Mr.   Siddhartha   Dave,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing on   behalf   of   the   appellant,   has   taken   us   through   the   entire material   on   record.   He   submitted   that   the   prosecution   has   not proved   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   there   are   no   eye 3 witnesses   to   the   incident   in   question   and   the   case   of   the prosecution mainly rests on two dying declarations. According to the   learned   senior   counsel,   the   motive   for   the   offence   has   not been proved, and the High Court was not justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court, particularly when the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   cannot   be   said   to   be   perverse. According   to   him,   the   trial   court   was   fully   justified   in   acquitting the accused since the sole circumstance of the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution has not been proved.   5. Per   contra,   Mr.   Sumeer   Sodhi,   learned   counsel   for   the respondent­State   vehemently   argued   in   support   of   the   judgment of the High Court.   6. We   have   heard   the   rival   submissions   of   the   learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the record. 7. The prosecution mainly relies upon the dying declaration (Exhibit   P­2),   which   is   stated   to   have   been   recorded   by   the   Naib Tehsildar­cum­Executive   Magistrate  (P.W.1)  in   the   hospital.     The oral   dying   declaration   made   by   the   deceased   before   Lalita   Sahu (P.W. 2), Pilaram Sahu (P.W. 3) and Parvati Bai (P.W. 4) has also been relied on. 4 8. Undisputedly,   and   as   is   clear   from   the   evidence   of   Dr. J.S.   Khalsa   (P.W.   11),   who   conducted   the   post­mortem examination,  the deceased had sustained 100% burn injuries all over   the   body.     He   also   deposed   that   due   to   her   severe   burn injuries, the deceased was in a state of shock. 9. As   mentioned   supra,   as   compared   to   the   oral   dying declaration,   more   emphasis   was   laid   on   the   dying   declaration (Exh.P­2)   stated   to   have   been   recorded   by   the   Naib   Tehsildar­ cum­Executive   Magistrate   in   the   hospital   and   the   panchnama (Ex.P­1)   prepared   by   him   regarding   the   recording   of   this   dying declaration.   As   a   matter   of   fact,   the   case   of   the   prosecution mainly depends on the same.   10. There cannot be any dispute that a dying declaration can be   the   sole   basis   for   convicting   the   accused.   However,   such   a dying   declaration   should   be   trustworthy,   voluntary,   blemishless and reliable. In case the person recording the dying declaration is satisfied   that   the   declarant   is   in   a   fit   medical   condition   to   make the   statement   and   if   there   are   no   suspicious   circumstances,   the dying declaration may not be invalid solely on the ground that it was not certified by the doctor. Insistence for certification by the doctor is only a rule of prudence, to be applied based on the facts 5 and circumstances of the case. The real test is as to whether the dying   declaration   is   truthful   and   voluntary.   It   is   often   said   that man   will   not   meet   his   maker   with   a   lie   in   his   mouth.   However, since   the   declarant   who   makes   a   dying   declaration   cannot   be subjected to cross­examination, in order for the dying declaration to be the sole basis for  conviction, it should be of such a nature that  it inspires  the full  confidence of  the  court. In the  matter  on hand,   since   Exh.   P2,   the   dying   declaration   is   the   only circumstance   relied   upon   by   the   prosecution,   in   order   to   satisfy our   conscience,   we   have   considered   the   material   on   record keeping   in   mind   the   well­established   principles   regarding   the acceptability of dying declarations. 11. The Naib Tehsildar­cum­Executive Magistrate (P.W.1) has deposed that the police had sent a requisition to the Tehsildar (as per Exh. P­3), who in turn requested P.W.1 to go to the spot and record the statement of the injured.  P.W.1 has also deposed that he   received   such   requisition   at   12.15   p.m.   on   the   date   of   the incident, and immediately thereafter, he went to the hospital and recorded   the   statement   of   the   victim   (Exh.P­1).   He   has   also deposed that  he  drew  the panchnama  regarding   the recording   of the dying declaration in the presence of three persons. It is to be 6 noted that the dying declaration (Exh.P­2) as produced before the Trial   Court   is   only   a   photocopy,   which   is   not   admissible   in evidence. The original copy of the dying declaration has not been produced before  the  Trial  Court.  Also,  though  it  has  been  stated by   the   Naib   Tehsildar­cum­Executive   Magistrate   (P.W.1)   that   he had taken the signature of three witnesses, the photocopy  of the dying declaration does not contain the signature of any witness. It is the case of the prosecution that P.W. 1 recorded the dying   declaration   in   the   hospital.     But   he   has   admitted   in   his cross­examination  that  none of  the  doctors were present  on  that day, and that the hospital was closed since it was a Sunday.   He has   also   admitted   in   his   cross­examination   that   he   did   not   put any   question   to   the   victim   to   find   out   whether   she   was   in   a position to make a statement or not.  He also did not try to verify whether   the   victim   had   the   power   to   recollect   the   incident   in question.   Hence,   it   is   clear   that   P.W.   1   did   not   satisfy   himself about   the   fitness   of   the   victim   to   make   a   statement.   No verification   or   certification   of   the   doctor   regarding   the   fitness   of the   victim   to   make   a   statement   can   be   found   on   the   dying declaration   either.     In   addition,   absolutely   no   reasons   are forthcoming either from the Investigating Officer (P.W. 12) or from 7 the   Naib   Tehsildar­cum­Executive   Magistrate   (P.W.   1)   as   to   why the   original   dying   declaration   was   not   produced   before   the   Trial Court.   12. Moreover,   t he   records   do   not   reveal   a   clear   picture   of what   happened   at   the   time   of   occurrence   or   subsequently.     The Investigating   Officer   (P.W.   12)   has   admitted   that   he   went   to   the spot of the offence at about 12.15 p.m., immediately after getting news  of  the  incident  at  about   12  o’  clock.     When   he  arrived,  the victim was unconscious, and her skin was peeling off. He was the first   person   to   reach  the   scene   of   offence,   and   shifted   her   to   the hospital   while   she   was   still   unconscious.   If   it   is   so,   it   is   quite unbelievable   as   to   how   the   victim   could   have   made   such   a lengthy   statement   as   found   in   Exh.P­2   at   about   12.15   to   12.30 p.m., that too in an unconscious condition, before P.W.1.  To add to   this,   there   is   not   even   a   whisper   in   the   deposition   of   the Investigating   Officer   about   the   presence   of   the   Naib   Tehsildar­ cum­Executive   Magistrate   (P.W.1)   or   about   him   recording   the dying   declaration   at   about   12:15   p.m.   The   Investigating   Officer has   spoken   neither   about   the   requisition   sent   by   him   as   per Exh.P­3   nor   about   the   alleged   dying   declaration   (Exh.P­2)   which is   stated   to   have   been   recorded   by   P.W.1.     Notably,   the   Naib 8 Tehsildar   has   deposed   that   when   he   went   to   the   hospital,   the police   were   already   there.     If   it   was   so,   and   if   he   had   really recorded   the   dying   declaration   as   per   Exh.P­2,   the   Investigating Officer   would   have   deposed   about   the   same   before   the   Trial Court.     But   such   records   are   not   forthcoming.     In   such circumstances,   the   role   of   the   Naib   Tehsildar­cum­Executive Magistrate (P.W. 1) appears to be highly suspicious.  It is also curious to note that the Investigating Officer has deposed   that   he   went   to   the   spot   immediately   after   getting   the oral information about the incident, whereas the crime came to be registered based on the FIR of  Lalita Sahu  (P.W.2) at about 15:30 hours, i.e. 3.30 p.m.  13. The   trial   court   has   taken   pains   to   evaluate   the   entire material   on   record   and   has   rightly   come   to   the   conclusion   that the   so­called   dying   declaration   (Exh.P­2)   is  unbelievable   and   not trustworthy.     Valid   reasons   have   also   been   assigned   by   the   trial court for coming to such a conclusion. Per contra, the High Court while setting aside the said finding has not adverted to any of the reasons assigned by the trial court relating to the authenticity or reliability   of   the   dying   declaration.   The   view   taken   by   the   trial court, in our  considered opinion, is the only  possible view under 9 the facts and circumstances of the case.   14. As   far   as   the   oral   dying   declaration   is   concerned,   the evidence   on   record   is   very   shaky,   apart   from   the   fact   that evidence   relating   to   oral   dying   declaration   is   a   weak   type   of evidence in and of itself.   As per the case of the prosecution, the deceased   had  made   an   oral   dying   declaration   before   Lalita   Sahu (P.W. 2), Pilaram Sahu (P.W. 3), Parvati Bai (P.W. 4), and others. Though   P.Ws.   2,   3   and   4   have   deposed   that   the   deceased   did make   an   oral   dying   declaration   before   them   implicating   the appellant,   this   version   is   clearly   only   an   afterthought,   inasmuch as   the   same   was   brought   up   before   the   trial   court   for   the   first time.     In   their   statements   recorded   by   the   police   under   Section 161   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   these   witnesses   had   not made any statement relating to the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased.  These factors have been noted by the trial court in its detailed judgment.   Thus, the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 relating   to   the   oral   dying   declaration   is   clearly   an   improved version,   and   this   has   been   proved   by   the   defence   in   accordance with law. 15. Since the evidence relating to the dying declarations has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by  the prosecution, in 10 our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court   was   not   justified   in convicting   the   appellant,  inasmuch   as   there   is  no   other   material against the appellant to implicate her. The motive for the offence, as alleged by the prosecution, has also not been proved.   16. Having   regard   to   the   totality   of   the   facts   and circumstances of the case, we conclude that the judgment of the High  Court  is liable to  be set aside, and  the  same is  accordingly set aside and that of the trial court is restored. As the appellant is acquitted   of   the   charges   levelled   against   her   and   she   is   in custody, we direct that the appellant be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. 17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.       ………........................................J.                                            (N.V. RAMANA)   ….………....................................J.   (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)   …….……….................................J.   (S. ABDUL NAZEER) NEW DELHI; APRIL 30, 2019.