2019 INSC 0586 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s).1070 OF 2017 SANJAY RAJAK ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF BIHAR     ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The   appellant   assails   his   sentence   and   conviction   under Section 364(A) I.P.C to rigorous imprisonment for life with a default stipulation.     Co­accused   Balram   convicted   by   the   Trial   Court   has been acquitted by the High Court.  Consequently, the appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 120B I.P.C. 2. The   victim,   according   to   the   prosecution   case   was   a   school going child aged about 5­6 years.  According to the allegations, he is said   to   have   been   kidnapped   from   the   school   on   12.04.2007   at 1 about 12:15 pm. by the co­accused Balram.  The appellant and the co­accused   were   last   seen   together   along   with   the   victim.   In   their confessional   statement   both   the   accused   disclosed   that   after kidnapping   the child  they  had  killed  him  and  buried the  corpse  in the   bed   of   river   Saryu   at   Chhapra.     The   police   did   not   make   any effort   to   recover   the   body.     The   belongings   of   the   deceased   victim were recovered from the house of the appellant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that according to PW­10,   the   classmate   of   the   deceased,   co­accused   Balram   had kidnapped him from the school.   PW­11 and PW­12, the parents of the   victim   had   further   deposed   that   ransom   calls   were   made   by Balram.     Acquittal   of   the   co­accused   makes   the   conviction   of   the appellant   unsustainable.     Reliance   on   PWs.   5,   8   and   9   that   the victim was last seen with the appellant is based on a preponderance of probabilities only.   PW­5 had deposed having seen the appellant along with Balram and the victim. The prosecution case against the appellant   is   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   with   the   link   in   the chain   of   events   being   incomplete.     The   failure   to   take   any   step   for 2 recovery of the dead body leaves it open to doubt whether any such incident  of kidnapping  had occurred or  not. Reliance in support of the   submissions   was   placed   on   Sattatiya   alias   Satish   Rajanna Kartalla   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra,   (2008)   3   SCC   210,   Lohit Kaushal vs. State of Haryana,  (2009) 17 SCC 106 and  Iqbal and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,  (2015) 6 SCC 623.    4. Learned   counsel   for   the   State   submitted   that   the   acquittal   of co­accused   Balram   is   irrelevant   in   the   nature   of   the   evidence available against the appellant.  His conviction therefore calls for no interference.  5. We   have   considered   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the   parties and carefully perused the materials on record.   PW­10, aged about 8   years   and   a   classmate   of   the   victim   deposed   that   while   both   of them were standing at the gate of the school at about 12 o’clock, a man with his face covered with a napkin approached the victim and told him that his father was calling him.  The victim addressed him as “uncle uncle”.   The man took the school bag  of the child on his 3 shoulder, fed him ice­cream and took the victim away.   PW­11 and PW­12   Manoj   Kumar,   the   parents   of   the   victim   have   deposed   that the   acquitted   accused   Balram   had   worked   as   a   servant   in   their house   earlier.   In   the   aforesaid   facts,   the   significance   of   the   victim addressing   Balram   as   “Uncle!   Uncle!”,   cannot   be   lost   sight   of   and unfortunately did not fall for consideration by the High Court at all. Being   acquainted   with   the   co­accused,   the   child   naturally   went along without any qualms in this background.   6.  PW­11   and   PW­12   deposed   that   Balram   had   made   calls   on mobile   demanding   ransom.     Balram   having   worked   earlier   in   the house   of   the   witness,   we   find   no   infirmity   in   their   statement   of having recognised his voice.  Every individual has a distinctive style of   speaking   which   makes   identification   by   those   acquainted possible.  Identification of a known person by voice in the darkness has   been   well   recognized   in   criminal   jurisprudence.     Even   if   a person tries to camouflage his voice in one call, given the limitations of human nature there will be a tendency to state certain words or sentences   in   an   inimitable   style   exposing   the   identity.     The   High 4 Court   without   considering   the   aforesaid   factors,   unfortunately granted   acquittal   opining   that   no   recorded   voice   sample   was available.  7.  PW   5,   the   liquor   shop   owner   deposed   that   on   the   day   of occurrence itself the appellant and Balram had come to his shop to purchase   liquor.   The   appellant   introduced   Balram   as   his   relative. They were accompanied by a boy aged 5­6 years wearing pink shirt, blue pant, blue socks, black belt, red tie.   They consumed liquor at his   shop   for   about   two   hours   and   then   left   along   with   the   child. Nonetheless   Balram   has   been   acquitted   by   the   High   Court   on   the reasoning that his identity as the abductor could not be established as   PW­10   stated   that   the   abductor   had   his   face   covered   with   a napkin   and   therefore   the   dock   identification   was   doubtful.   The prosecution   has   not   chosen   to   challenge   the   acquittal.     The   mere acquittal of a co­accused in the facts and circumstances of the case can be of no benefit to the appellant.  5 8. PW­8 deposed that the appellant had come to his hotel with a child aged 5­6 years and requested for food to be served.  Likewise, PW­9   also   deposed   having   seen   the   appellant   with   the   child. Subsequently   in   the   evening   when   he   saw   the   photograph   of   the missing   child   on   the   television,   he   was   able   to   identify   the   child accompanying   the   appellant.   The   witness   then   went   to   the   police station to give information.   The house of the appellant was raided in   presence   of   seizure   witnesses   PW­6   and   PW­7.   The   black coloured   school   bag  of  the   victim   was   recovered  from   the   house  of the appellant.  The school diary and copies inside the same bore the name of the victim. The school diary also contained his home phone number and the mobile number of his father.   The recovered items were   identified   by   PW­12,   the   father   of   the   victim.     The   appellant offered   no   explanation   about   the   aforesaid   recoveries,   except   for denying the same.   9. It   is   not   an   invariable   rule   of   criminal   jurisprudence   that   the failure   of   the   police   to   recover   the   corpus   delecti   will   render   the prosecution   case   doubtful   entitling   the   accused   to   acquittal   on 6 benefit   of   doubt.   It   is   only   one   of   the   relevant   factors   to   be considered   along   with   all   other   attendant   facts   and   circumstances to   arrive   at   a   finding   based   on   reasonability   and   probability   based on   normal   human   prudence   and   behavior.   In   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   present   case,   the   failure   of   the   police   to recover the dead body is not much of consequence in the absence of any explanation by the appellant both with regard to the victim last being seen with him coupled with the recovery from his house of the belongings   of  the   deceased.   Rama   Nand   and   others   vs.   State   of Himachal   Pradesh ,   (1981)   1   SCC   511, was   a   case   of circumstantial   evidence   where   the   corpus   delicti   was   not   found. This court upholding the conviction observed: “28…..But   in   those   times   when   execution   was   the only   punishment   for   murder,   the   need   for   adhering to   this   cautionary   rule   was   greater.   Discovery   of   the dead body  of  the  victim  bearing  physical evidence  of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving  the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead body is impossible. A blind adherence to this   old   “body”   doctrine   would   open   the   door   wide open   for   many   a   heinous   murderer   to   escape   with impunity   simply   because   they   were   cunning   and clever   enough   to   destroy   the  body   of   their   victim.   In the context of our law, Sir Hale’s enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where 7 the   dead   body   of   the   victim   in   a   murder   case   is   not found,   other   cogent   and   satisfactory   proof   of   the homicidal   death   of   the   victim   must   be   adduced   by the   prosecution.   Such   proof   may   be   by   the   direct ocular account of an eyewitness, or by circumstantial evidence,   or   by   both.   But   where   the   fact   of   corpus delicti   i.e.   “homicidal   death”   is   sought   to   be established   by   circumstantial   evidence   alone,   the circumstances   must   be   of   a   clinching   and   definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim   concerned   has   met   a   homicidal   death.   Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be   had   in   this   imperfect   world,   and   absolute certainty   is   a   myth.   That   is   why   under   Section   3   of the Evidence Act, a fact is said to be “proved”, if the court considering the matters before it, considers its existence   so   probable   that   a   prudent   man   ought, under   the   circumstances   of   the   particular   case,   to act   upon   the   supposition   that   it   exists.   The   corpus delicti   or   the   fact   of   homicidal   death,   therefore,   can be   proved   by   telling   and   inculpating   circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned….” 10.  Sevaka   Perumal   and   another   vs.   State   of   Tamil   Nadu , (1991) 3 SCC 471, was also a case where the corpus delicti was not found yet conviction was upheld observing:  “5….In   a   trial   for   murder   it   is   not   an   absolute necessity   or   an   essential   ingredient   to   establish corpus delicti . The fact of death of the deceased must be   established   like   any   other   fact.   Corpus   delicti   in 8 some   cases   may   not   be   possible   to   be   traced   or recovered.   Take   for   instance   that   a   murder   was committed   and   the   dead   body   was   thrown   into flowing   tidal   river   or   stream   or   burnt   out.   It   is unlikely   that   the   dead   body   may   be   recovered.   If recovery   of   the   dead   body,   therefore,   is   an   absolute necessity   to   convict   an   accused,  in   many   a   case   the accused   would   manage   to   see   that   the   dead   body   is destroyed etc. and would afford a complete immunity to   the   guilty   from   being   punished  and   would   escape even   when   the   offence   of   murder   is   proved.   What, therefore,   is   required   to   base   a   conviction   for   an offence of murder is that there should be reliable and acceptable   evidence   that   the   offence   of   murder,   like any   other   factum   of   death   was   committed   and   it must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body may not be traced…” 11. Sattatiya   (supra)   is   completely   distinguishable   on   its   own facts as   there was no credible evidence with regard to the last seen theory.     The   recovery   of   the   weapon   of   the   offence   was   disbelieved as   no   disclosure   statement   under   Section   27   of   the   Evidence   Act was   brought   on   record   and   the   recoveries   were   effected   from   an open   place.     Likewise   in   Lohit   Kaushal   (supra)   the   appellant   was made   an   accused   on   confession   of   a   co­accused.   But   the   vehicle allegedly recovered from the appellant was found not to be involved in   the   kidnapping.   There   was   no   evidence   with   regard   to   the 9 appellant  having   been  involved  in the  kidnapping  and  taking   away of the child.   In   Iqbal   (supra) it   was held that identification parade was not substantive evidence and apart from the same there was no other   incriminating   evidence   like   recovery   of   articles   from   the appellant.  12. We   therefore   find   no   merit   in   this   appeal.   The   appeal   is dismissed.  . ……………………….J.         (Ashok Bhushan)     ………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)           New Delhi, July 22, 2019. 10