2019 INSC 0625
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                   REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5937  OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO. 30953 OF 2018]
ANJANA MITTAL              …..APPELLANT
VERSUS
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION 
LIMITED                  ……RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5938    OF 2019
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO. 548 OF 2019]
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION 
LIMITED                                …..APPELLANT
VERSUS
ANJANA MITTAL                       ……RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
VINEET SARAN, J.
      Leave granted.

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2. Special Leave Petition (c) No.30953 of 2018 is treated
as a lead petition.  
3. This   case   has   a   chequered   history .   The   appellant   was
appointed   as   a   temporary   Assistant   Grade ­ III   in   the
respondent­Corporation in the year 1983. Up to the year 1986 ,
she     worked   on   the   said   post   and   had   taken   normal
permissible leaves.   However, from the year 1987 to 1993 she
was   absent   for   1968   days   in   those   seven   years.   The   said
absence was   ex­post facto   sanctioned as medical leave. In the
meantime,   on   06.01.1990,   the   appellant   was   promoted   as
temporary   Assistant   Grade­II.   Then     on   0 1.12.1992,   Medical
Board   was   constituted   by   the   Corporation   which   found   that
the   period   of   leave   granted   on   the   basis   of   many   of   the
medical   certificates   submitted   by   the   appellant   was
disproportionate   to   the   severity   of   the   ailments.     Then   on
26. 0 5.1994, a notice was issued to the appellant requiring her
to   show   cause   as   to   why   action   under   Regulation   24   of   the

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Terms and Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulation,
1975   (for   short   “1975   Regulation”)   relating   to   termination   of
services   of   a   temporary   employee   be   not   taken   by   the
respondent­Corporation   on   her   continued   absence.     In
response   thereto,   the   appellant   submitted   her   reply   on
01.06.1994.     Then   on   01.07.1994,   holding   her   reply   to   be
unsatisfactory,   the   respondent­Corporation   terminated   her
services w.e.f. 01.12.1993.
4 . Challenging the said order dated 01.07.1994 passed by
the   respondent­Corporation,   the   appellant   filed   Writ   Petition
No.6742   of   2001   before   the   Allahabad   High   Court,   which   was
subsequently   transferred   to   the   Uttarakhand   High   Court   at
Nainital.     By   the   judgment   and   order   dated   26.08.2004,   the
High   Court   dismissed   the   writ   petition   filed   by   the   appellant
and upheld the validity of the termination order.   Against the
said order, Special Appeal No. 55 of 2004 was filed before the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court ,   which   was   dismissed   on

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29.06.2006 on the ground of maintainability, holding that the
appellant   was   a   Workman   and   the   case   would   be   one   of   an
Industrial   dispute.     Consequently,   on   22.10.2008,   the
appellant   made   a   reference   of   the   dispute   to   the   Central
Government   Industrial   Tribunal­cum­Labour   Court   (for   short
“Labour Court”).  The said dispute was registered as Industrial
Dispute No. 53 of 2009 with the Labour Court, New Delhi.  The
reference   was   to   the   effect   as   to   whether   the   action   of   the
management   of     the                             respondent­Corporation   to
terminate   the   services   of   appellant,   was   legal   and   justified .
The reference was decided by the Labour Court on 07.08.2018,
whereby   it   was   held   that   the   termination   of   the   appellant   by
the   respondent­Corporation   was   illegal   and   void.     It   was   also
held   that   the   appellant   had   worked   in   the   respondent­
Corporation for more than eleven years and thus could not be
treated   as   temporary   employee,   as   such   the   provisions   of
Regulation 24 of 1975 Regulation were not attracted and thus

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the   respondent­Corporation   was   directed   to   reinstate   the
appellant with full back wages and all consequential benefits .
5 . Challenging   the   said   order,   the   respondent­
Corporation   filed   a   Writ   Petition   No.3015   of   2017   before   the
High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   at   Nainital ,   which   was   partly
allowed   to   the   extent   that   termination   of   the   appellant   was
held to be illegal ,  but instead of full back wages ,   the appellant
was   found   entitled   to   back   wages   only   to   the   extent   of   30%
with all other consequential benefits in terms of the Award of
the Labour Court. 
6 . Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has filed
this   Special   Leave   Petition   No.   30953   of   2018.     The
respondent­Corporation has also filed a separate Special Leave
Petition No. 548 of 2019.
7 . The   facts ,   as   stated   above ,   are   not   disputed   by   the
parties.     Shri   P.S.   Patwalia,   learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing
for the appellant has submitted that the appellant ,   before her

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termination ,   had   worked   with   the   respondent­Corporation   for
more than eleven years and thus she could not be treated as a
temporary employee especially when in the year 1990 she was
promoted   from   the   post   of   Assistant   Grade­III   to   Assistant
Grade­II.     It   has   thus   been   contended   that   Regulation   24   of
the   1975   Regulation   relating   to   services   of   temporary
employee could not be applicable to the present case and has
rightly been held to be so.  It has also been contended that the
period   of   absence   of             the   appellant   from   the   year   1987   to
1993,   though   on   the   higher   side,   was   duly   ex ­ post   facto
sanctioned   as   leave   by   the   respondent­   Corporation   and   as
such   the   same   could   not   be   the   ground   for   termination.   He
has   also   emphasized   the   fact   that   during   this   period,   the
appellant   was   in   fact   also   promoted   in   the   year   1990   as
Assistant   Grade­II .     Mr.   Patwalia   has   contended   that   the
impugned   termination   order   was   wholly   unjustified   and   has
rightly  been   set  aside   by  the  Tribunal   after  granting  full   back
wages and consequential benefits.   He has submitted that the

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order of the High Court, insofar as it provides for only 30% of
back wages  instead  of 100%  back wages,  is  wholly  unjustified
and   no   such   deduction   in   back   wages   was   warranted   in   the
facts of the present case.
8 . Per   contra,   Shri   J.P.   Cama ,   learned   Senior   Counsel
appearing   for   the   respondent­Corporation   vehemently
submitted     that   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   where   the
appellant   admittedly   remained   absent   for   1968   days   between
1987   to   1993   (seven   years),   the   termination   order   of   the
appellant   was   fully   justified   and   since   the   appellant   was   a
temporary   employee,   the   Regulation   24   of   1975   Regulation
would   be   attracted.     He   has   contended   that   the   appointment
letter   of   the   appellant   was   as   temporary   Assistant   Grade ­ III
and   even   promotion   order   dated   06.01.1990   categorically
states   that   the   same   was   also   as   temporary   Assistant   Grade ­
II.   He   has   contended   that   the   Medical   Board   constituted   on
01.12.1992   has   clearly   found   that   she   had   taken   excessive

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leave   on   basis   of   medical   certificates   submitted   by   the
appellant   and   as   such ,   after   a   show   cause   notice   was   issued
and   her   reply   not   having   been   found   satisfactory,   she   was
rightly terminated w.e.f. 01.12.1993.   It has been vehemently
urged   that   when   the   appellant   had   remained   absent   for   a
substantial   period   during   the   period   of   seven   years   1987   to
1993,   the   question   of   reinstatement   would   not   arise ,   as   the
respondent­Corporation   cannot   be   saddled   to   take   work   from
an employee who does not work and at best, if the termination
order   is   not   to   be   sustained,   she   could   be   awarded   any   lump
sum   amount   in   lieu   of   back   wages,   and   also   as   compensation
in   place   of   reinstatement.     The   counsel   for   both   the   parties
have   submitted   that   the   appellant   would ,   in   any   case,   be
retiring in May, 2020.  
9 .       Having   heard   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   parties   at
length   and   on   perusal   of   record,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the
High   Court   has   rightly   held   that   the   termination   of   the

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appellant   in   terms   of   Regulation   24   of   the   1975   Regulations,
treating   the   appellant   as   a   temporary   employee ,   was   not
justified   in   law   and   thus   could   not   be   sustained,   as   she   had
been in  employment for over eleven years.   The delay of over
14   years   in   making   the   reference   has   been   condoned   by   the
High   Court   holding   that   she   was   agitating   her   rights   as   she
had   approached   the   High   Court   by   filing   the   writ   petition
against her termination.   This aspect shall be dealt by us at a
later stage.
1 0. The   finding   of   the   High   Court ,   that   in   a   case   of
termination   formal   domestic   enquiry   is   not   required   is
misconceived ,   is also correct ,   as the order of termination has
serious   civil   consequences   to   an   employee ,   and   thus   such
termination should not be without following the process of law
and   holding  an  inquiry.    In  our  view,  the   High  Court  has  also
rightly   held   that   since   the   period   of   absence   was   regularized
by the Management by converting the same as period of leave ,

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and   as       such   the   same   could   not   be   the   ground   for
termination.
11 . The last question which the High Court has decided is
with   regard   to   the   payment   of   back   wages.     It   has   been   held
that instead of full back wages, the appellant would be entitled
to only 30% back wages ,   along with all consequential benefits
as has been awarded by the Labour Court.  In our opinion, this
issue   requires   consideration   of   this   Court.     Admittedly,   the
appellant continued to remain absent for long periods between
the   years   1987   to   1993.     There   is   no   dispute   about   the   fact
that during this period of seven years, the appellant remained
absent for 1968 days ,   which comes to an average  of over 281
days   per   year.     In   effect,   in   this   seven   years   period,   she
remained   absent   for   nearly   5.4   years.     This   would   clearly
indicate that the appellant was a habitual absentee .    Even if it
is  taken  that  the  appellant  was  not  temporary  but   deemed   to
be   permanent,   yet   an   employee   who   remained   absent   from

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duty   for   such   long   periods ,   averaging   to   over   281   days   in   a
year,   continuously   for   seven   years ,   would   not   be   entitled   to
any substantial back wages. The Medical Board constituted by
the Corporation also found that the period of leave granted on
the basis of many of the medical certificates submitted by the
appellant was disproportionate to the severity of the ailments.
12 . We   say   so   also   because,   by   choosing   a   wrong   forum   of
filing   a   writ   petition,   the   appellant   had   spent   more   than   fourteen
years   in   approaching   the   correct   forum ,   which   was   the       Labour
Court.     The   appellant   ought   to   have   known   that   she   was   a
workman and would be covered under the Industrial Disputes Act,
but   had   initially   chosen   not   to   approach   the   Labour   Court .
Challenging   the   termination   order   which   was   passed   in   the   year
1994,   she   approached   the   Labour   Court   only   in   the   year   2008,
which was after fourteen years. We have also to take into account
that the appellant remained on leave during seven years preceding
her termination for an average period of 281 days in a year.  Even
though   the   said   absence   was   converted   as   leave   (which   was   ex ­

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post facto   granted in her favour) yet the fact remains that she was
a   habitual   absentee ,   which   would   be   a   material   fact   while
considering the question of payment of back wages to her.
13 . Though, we are not interfering with the setting aside of the
termination order ,  but in the facts and circumstances of this case,
in   our   considered   view ,   the   ends   of   justice   would   be   met   if   the
appellant   is   paid   10%   back   wages,   along   with   the   benefit   of
reinstatement and all other consequential benefits.   It is, however,
made   clear ,   that   considering   the   conduct   of   the   appellant,   the
respondent­Corporation   would   not   be   obliged   to   take   work   from
her, and in lieu thereof she may be paid her salary from this date
till the date of her superannuation ,  which according to the learned
counsel   for   the   parties   would   be   in   May   2020 .   We   make   it   clear
that   the   appellant   may   be   treated   as   reinstated   but   may   not   be
required to work in the Organisation of respondent­Corporation. 
15. With   the   aforesaid   modifications   in   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   dated   14.06.2018,   we
dispose of both the appeals. No order as to costs.

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………………………..J.
           [Uday Umesh Lalit]
………………….…….J.
              [Vineet Saran]
 New Delhi
 Dated: July 30, 2019