2019 INSC 0643
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 727 of 2015
Balwan Singh     …Appellant
Versus
The State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.     …Respondent 
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1197 of 2016
Latel Ram & Anr.     …Appellants
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh      …Respondent 
J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
 
These   appeals   arise   out   of   the   judgment   dated   10.02.2015
of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal
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No.  178 of 2011 and Criminal Appeal No. 179 of 2011 confirming
the   judgment   and   order   of   conviction   dated   20.01.2011   passed
by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Fast   Track   Court,   Pendra
Road,   District   Bilaspur   in   S.T.   No.   57   of   2010   convicting   the
appellants   and   other   accused   for   offences   punishable   under
Sections   148   and   302/149   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (for   short,
‘IPC’) and sentencing them accordingly.
2. The   case   of   the   prosecution   is   that   on   account   of   previous
enmity with Pitambar Singh (since deceased), the Accused No. 1 –
Balwan Singh (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 727 of 2015), on
22 nd
  January,   2007,   at   evening   time,   was   talking   with   the   other
accused   regarding   preparation   to   kill   Pitambar   Singh.   Their
conversation   was   heard   by   Sunderlal   Rathore   @   Sunder   Singh
Rathore   (PW­11)   and   Shatrughan   Singh   (PW­12),   who   were
passing   through   the   same   place.   Further,   it   was   the   case   of   the
prosecution   that   all   the   accused,   armed   with   deadly   weapons,
went   towards   the   field   of   one   Bhagwat   Seth   and   committed   the
murder of Pitambar Singh. PW­9 and PW­16, who were near the
scene of the occurrence, rushed to the spot after hearing the cries
of   the   injured,   and   saw   all   the   accused   assaulting   the   deceased
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with   lathis   and   tabbal   (an   agriculture   implement   made   up   of
iron). It is stated by PW­9 and PW­16 that the  tabbal  was held by
the   Accused   No.   4,   namely,   Ashok   Singh.   The   injured   died
instantaneously and the accused fled away.
The   dead   body   was   seen   by   one   Drupad   Singh   (PW­1)   at   7
o’clock the next morning, who in turn informed Nar Singh Rajput
(PW­17), the informant. Thereafter, Drupad Singh and Nar Singh
Rajput together went to the place where the dead body was lying,
and   saw   that   Pitambar   Singh   was   murdered.   The   deceased   was
the uncle of the informant.
3. The   Trial   Court   as   well   as   the   First   Appellate   Court,
believing   the   testimonies   of   PW­9   and   PW­16   who   were   the   eye
witnesses of the incident, and the testimonies of PW­11 and PW­
12   who   deposed   about   the   conspiracy   to   commit   the   murder   of
the   deceased,   convicted   the   accused   for   the   offences   punishable
under Sections 148 and 302/149 IPC. It is pertinent to state that
although   charge   was   also   framed   under   Section   120­B   IPC,   the
accused were acquitted in respect of the said offence.
4. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant Balwan Singh, and Shri Rajeev Kumar Bansal, learned
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counsel   appearing   for   appellants   Latel   Ram   and   Santu   @
Santram, drew the attention of the Court to the relevant portions
of the depositions of the important witnesses, and submitted that
the   prosecution   had   planted   the   eye   witnesses,   namely,   PW­9
and   PW­16   for   the   purpose   of   prosecuting   the   accused,   though
these   witnesses   were   not   present   near   the   scene   of   occurrence.
They   contended   that   the   statements   of   these   alleged   eye
witnesses   were   recorded   about   eight   days   after   the   incident   in
question,   though   they   were   very   much   present   in   the   village   or
though the police knew that these witnesses were the alleged eye
witnesses   of   the   incident.   According   to   the   learned   counsel   for
the   appellants,   the   evidence   of   PW­11   and   PW­12   is   also   vague,
cryptic,   and   unreliable   inasmuch   as   the   courts   below   have
acquitted the accused for the offence under Section 120­B IPC.
5. Per   contra,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State
argued in support of the judgments of the courts below. 
6. We   find   from   the   records   that   though   the   incident   took
place   on   22 nd
  January,   2007,   the   statements   of   the   alleged   eye
witnesses,   namely,   PW­9   and   PW­16,   were   recorded   after   eight
days   of   the   incident.   The   prosecution   has   tried   to   explain   the
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delay   in   recording   the   statement   of   the   eye   witnesses   by
contending   that   they   were   scared   of   the   accused,   particularly
Balwan   Singh   who   was   the   village   Sarpanch   (Panchayat
Chairman); the accused Balwan Singh was stated to be powerful
and   influential;   only   after   some   of   the   accused   were   arrested,
these witnesses came to the village and gave their statements   to
the   police   during   the   course   of   investigation;   till   such   time,   the
eye witnesses PW­9 and PW­16 did not come to the village at all
and were staying in different villages in their relatives’ houses.
We are conscious of the fact that mere delay in recording of
the   statement   of   the   eye   witness   by   the   investigating   officer
cannot   ipso facto   raise suspicion in the mind of the Court about
the veracity of the prosecution case, more particularly, about the
veracity   of   the   eye   witnesses.   In   the   normal   course,   this   Court
would have accepted the explanation offered by the witnesses or
the   prosecution   for   not   recording   the   statements   at   an   earlier
point in time, but the facts in this case are different inasmuch as
it is admitted by the prosecution witnesses, more particularly by
the investigating officer, that PW­9 was very much present in the
village.   PW­2   and   the   investigating   officer,   during   the   course   of
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the investigation, had seen PW­9, being the Patel (Patwari) of the
village. PW­2 had admitted in the cross­examination that he had
seen PW­9 at the place of the incident when the police had come
to the village after the registration of the First Information Report.
PW­2   is   none   else   but   the   younger   brother   of   PW­9,   and   they
were residing separately in one house. Thus, the evidence of PW­
2   cannot   be   disbelieved   insofar   as   it   relates   to   the   presence   of
PW­9 in the village, and on the spot when the police had started
investigation.  Furthermore,  the   investigating   officer   also   testified
that   immediately   after   reaching   the   village   Semaria,   where   the
incident   took   place,   he   had   called   the   Patel   (PW­9).   He
categorically   admitted   that   he   called   PW­9   to   the   place   of   the
occurrence and that he (PW­9) was present during  the course of
the   investigation.   PW­9,   being   the   Patel   of   the   village,   could   not
have   kept   the   fact   about   the   incident   or   about   the   complicity   of
the   accused   from   the   investigating   officer   at   the   first   instance,
had   he   really   been   an   eye   witness   to   the   incident.   The
investigating officer had proceeded to depose that, on his own, he
had recorded the statement of PW­9 on 30.01.2007, which means
that PW­9 had not informed the investigating officer that he was
an   eye   witness   to   the   incident.   The   investigating   officer,   on   his
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own accord, had recorded the statement of PW­9. It is thus clear
that the investigating officer knew very well, on the first day itself,
that PW­9 was an eye witness. There was no reason as to why the
investigating officer did not record the statement of the so­called
eye witness at the earliest point of time, more particularly when,
at   that   point   in   time,   the   investigating   officer   did   not   have   any
clue about the murderers.
PW­9   and   PW­16   are   close   friends,   and   on   the   date   of   the
incident,   had   gone   together   to   see   Panthi   dance   in   the   village
during   night,   and   at   that   point   in   time,   both   of   them   heard   the
cries of the deceased and rushed to the spot and saw the accused
committing the murder of the deceased. It is also the evidence of
PW­9   and   PW­16   that   the   accused   saw   these   witnesses   at   the
time   of   the   occurrence   of   the   murder   inasmuch   as   these
witnesses  told  all  the   accused  not   to  beat/assault  the   deceased.
On   hearing   such   utterance   of   these   witnesses,   the   accused
allegedly tried to chase them, but they fled away from the scene.
If this were true, then PW­9, who was present at the spot during
the   course   of   the   investigation   on   the   first   day   itself,   would   not
have left the police uninformed about the presence of PW­16 also.
7

It   is   also   relevant   to   note   that   PW­16   is   from   a   different   village,
namely,   Kusumkonda,   which   is   stated   to   be   75   K.M.   away   from
the place of incident, and on the date of the incident he had come
to   the   village   Semaria   where   the   incident   had   taken   place.   The
place of work of PW­16 is Takatpur, which is stated to be 70 K.M.
away   from   Semaria   village.   It   is   curious   to   note   that   PW­9   and
PW­16 met on the date of incident after a gap of about 15 years,
and   thereafter   went   to   watch   the   dance   performance.   In   our
considered   opinion,   the   story,   as   put   forth   by   the   prosecution,
that PW­9 did not tell the investigating officer about the presence
of  PW­16,  is  not  believable.  According   to  PW­16,  he  came  to   the
village   Semaria   after   eight   days,   i.e.   after   the   arrest   of   a   few
accused, and gave the statement to the police.
7. As   per   the   case   of   the   prosecution,   Balwan   Singh   is   a
powerful   and   influential   person   and   the   eye   witnesses   were
scared   of   him.   It   is   relevant   to   note   that   even  at   the   time   of  the
recording   of  the   statements  of   PW­9  and   PW­16  after   eight   days
of the incident, Balwan Singh was not arrested. He was arrested
after   about   two   months   from   the   recording   of   the   statements   of
these   witnesses.   It   is   relevant   to   note   that   these   witnesses   were
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not scared of other accused who were arrested. Be that as it may,
we   find   that   the   whole   story   of   the   prosecution   about   the
presence of PW­9 and PW­16 on the spot at the time of incident
appears to be artificial and concocted.
8. The   prosecution   also   relies   upon   the   evidence   relating   to
recovery   of   sticks   and  
tabbal   which   were   bloodstained.   Such
evidence   may   not   be   helpful   to   the   prosecution   in   this   case
inasmuch as there is no evidence to show that these articles were
stained   with   human   blood,   and   more   particularly   with   blood   of
the   same   blood   group   as   that   of   the   deceased.   As   per   the
Forensic   Science   Laboratory   Report,   the   blood   stains   were
disintegrated, and their origin could not be determined. 
In  Sattatiya   v.   State of Maharashtra ,  (2008) 3 SCC 210 ,
one   of   the   crucial   factors   that   had   led   this   Court   to   reverse   the
conviction   was   that   the   bloodstains   on   the   items   seized   in   the
recovery could not be linked with the blood of the deceased. This
factor   was   treated   as   a   serious   lacuna   in   the   case   of   the
prosecution.
Similarly,   in   Shantabai   and   Ors.   v.   State   of
Maharashtra ,   (2008)   16   SCC   354 ,   the   bloodstains   on   some   of
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the   clothes   seized   from   the   accused   in   recovery   belonged   to   a
different blood group from that of the blood group of bloodstains
found   on   the   clothes   of   the   deceased   and   on   the   sample   of   soil,
axe,   stones   etc.   which   were   taken   from   the   spot   by   the
investigating officer. As a result of this mismatch, it was held that
this circumstance was not proved against the accused.
It is also important to note the following observations made
by   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Raghav   Prapanna
Tripathi & Ors. v. State of U.P. ,  AIR (1963) SC 74 :
“21.     In   this   connection,   reference   may   also   be
made   to   circumstances   9   and   10,   relating   to   the
recovery   of   the   bloodstained   earth   from   the   house.
The   bloodstained   earth   has   not   been   proved   to   be
stained   with   human   blood.   Again,   we   are   of   opinion
that   it   would   be   far­fetched   to   conclude   from   the
mere   presence   of   bloodstained   earth   that   earth   was
stained with human blood and that the human blood
was   of   Kamla   and   Madhusudhan.   These
circumstances have, therefore, no evidentiary value.”
    (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore,   the   five­judge   bench   had   ruled   that   in   that   case
the   prosecution   needed   to   prove   that   the   bloodstains   found   on
the earth or the weapons were of a human origin and were of the
same blood group as that of the deceased.
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9. We   are   also   conscious   of   the   fact   that,   at   times,   it   may   be
very   difficult   for   the   serologist   to   detect   the   origin   of   the   blood
due to the disintegration of the serum, or  insufficiency  of blood­
stains,   or   haematological   changes   etc.   In   such   situations,   the
Court, using its judicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt to
the   accused,   depending   on   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each
case,   if   other   evidence   of   the   prosecution   is   credible   and   if
reasonable   doubt  does   not   arise   in   the   mind  of   the   Court   about
the investigation.
Thus, in the case of  R. Shaji v. State of Kerala ,  (2013) 14
SCC 266 , this Court had observed:
“31.   A   failure   by   the   serologist   to   detect   the
origin   of   the   blood   due   to   disintegration   of   the
serum   does   not   mean   that   the   blood   stuck   on   the
axe   could   not   have   been   human   blood   at   all.
Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is
insufficient   in   itself,   or   due   to   haematological
changes   and   plasmatic   coagulation,   that   a
serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood
in   question.   However,   in   such   a   case,   unless   the
doubt   is   of   a   reasonable   dimension   which   a
judicially   conscientious   mind   may   entertain   with
some   objectivity,   no   benefit   can   be   claimed   by   the
accused   in   this   regard.  Once   the   recovery   is   made
in   pursuance   of   a   disclosure   statement   made   by
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the   accused,   the   matching   or   non­matching   of
blood group(s) loses significance.”
Similar observations were made by this Court in the case of
Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan ,  (2001) 2 SCC 205 , wherein
it was observed that it was not possible to accept the submission
made on  behalf  of the  accused  that  in  the  absence  of the  report
regarding   the   origin   of     the   blood,   the   accused   could   not   have
been convicted, inasmuch as it was only  because of the lapse of
time that blood could not be classified successfully. 
In   the   case   of   Jagroop   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab ,   (2012)
11 SCC 768 , this Court had ruled that as the recovery was made
pursuant to a disclosure statement made by the accused, and the
serological report had found that the blood was of human origin,
the   non­determination   of   the   blood   group   had   lost   its
significance.
In   the   case   of   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Teja   Ram   and
Others ,   (1999)   3   SCC   507,   the   Court   had   observed   that   the
failure   of   the   serologist   to   detect   the   origin   of   the   blood,   due   to
disintegration of the serum, did not mean that the blood stuck on
the   weapon   could   not   have   been   human   blood   at   all.   In   this
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context,   it   was   noted   that   it   could   not   be   said   that   in   all   cases
where   there   was   a   failure   in   detecting   the   origin   of   blood,   the
circumstance   arising   from   recovery   of   the   weapon   would   stand
relegated to disutility. It was thus observed that unless the doubt
was   of   a   reasonable   dimension   which   a   judicially   conscientious
mind   entertained   with   some   objectivity,   no   benefit   could   be
claimed by the accused.
10. However,   we   cannot   lose   sight   of   the   fact   that   the   accused
would   be   in   a   disadvantageous   position   in   case   if   the
aforementioned   dictum   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   cases   of
R.   Shaji   (supra),     Gura   Singh   (supra),   Jagroop   Singh   (supra)
and   Teja   Ram   (supra)   relating   to   the   blood­stains   is   applied   in
each and every case. Non­confirmation of blood­group or origin of
the   blood   may   assume   importance   in   cases   where   the   accused
pleads   a   defence   or   alleges   mala   fides   on   the   part   of   the
prosecution,   or   accuses   the   prosecution   of   fabricating   the
evidence   to   wrongly   implicate   him   in   the   commission   of   the
crime.
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11. In   the   case   of   John   Pandian   v.   State   Represented   by
Inspector   of   Police,   Tamil   Nadu ,   (2010)   14   SCC   129 ,   this
Court,   on   facts,   observed   that   the   evidence   of   recovery   of
weapons   was   credible.   The   Forensic   Science   Report   (FSL)   report
had   disclosed   that   the   blood   was   of   human   origin.   The   Court
proceeded   to   conclude   that   since   the   evidence   of   recovery   of
weapon   was   proved   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   Court,   it   was
sufficient   that   the   prosecution   had   proved   that   the   bloodstains
were of human origin, even though the blood group could not be
ascertained.
12. The   cases   discussed   above   highlight   the   burden   that   the
prosecution would ordinarily have to discharge, depending on the
other   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   for   the   evidence
relating  to recovery to be considered against the accused. At the
same time, as mentioned above, we are conscious of the fact that
it may not always be possible to inextricably link the bloodstains
on the items seized in recovery to the blood of the deceased, due
to   the   possibility   of   disintegration   of   bloodstains   on   account   of
the   time­lapse   in   carrying   out   the   recovery.   For   this   reason,   in
Prabhu Dayal  v.   State of Rajasthan ,  (2018) 8 SCC 127 , where
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one   of   us   (Mohan   M.   Shantanagoudar   J.)   had   the   occasion   to
author   the   judgment,   this   Court,   relying   on   Teja   Ram   (supra),
had   held   that   the   failure   to   determine   the   blood   group   of   the
bloodstains   collected   from   the   scene   of   offence   would   not   prove
fatal   to   the   case   of   the   prosecution.   In   Prabhu   Dayal   case
(supra),   although   the   FSL   report   could   not   determine   the   blood
group of the bloodstains on account of disintegration, the report
clearly  disclosed that the bloodstains were of human origin, and
the   chain   of   circumstantial   evidence   was   completed   by   the
testimonies   of   the   other   witnesses   as   well   as   the   reports
submitted   by   the   Ballistic   Expert   and   the   Forensic   Science
Laboratory regarding the weapon used to commit murder.
13. From   the   aforementioned   discussion,   we   can   summarise
that   if   the   recovery   of   bloodstained   articles   is   proved   beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation was
not   found   to   be   tainted,   then   it   may   be   sufficient   if   the
prosecution   shows   that   the   blood   found   on   the   articles   is   of
human origin though, even though the blood group is not proved
because of disintegration of blood. The Court will have to come to
the   conclusion   based   on   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   each
15

case, and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution
has to prove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match.
14. In   the   instant   case,   then,   we   could   have   placed   some
reliance on the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that
the   blood   was   of   human   origin.   As   observed   supra,   while
discussing   the   evidence   of   PWs   9   and   16,   the   prosecution   has
tried   to   concoct   the   case   from   stage   to   stage.   Hence,   in   the
absence of positive material indicating that the stained blood was
of   human   origin   and   of   the   same   blood   group   as   that   of   the
accused,   it   would   be   difficult   for   the   Court   to   rely   upon   the
aspect of recovery of the weapons and  
tabbal,   and such recovery
does not help the case of the prosecution.
15. What   remains   is   the   evidence   of   PW­11   and   PW­12,   who
have deposed about the preparation of conspiracy of the accused
to   commit  the   murder   of  the   deceased.  As   mentioned  earlier,   all
the   accused   were   acquitted   for   the   offence   of   conspiracy,   which
means   that   there   are   concurrent   findings   of   both   the   courts
below   that   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   the   aspect   of
conspiracy of the accused to commit the murder of the deceased.
16

Once   the   conspiracy   to   commit   the   murder   of   the   deceased   is
absent,   there   is   no   material   on   record   to   show   as   to   why   the
accused had gathered in the house of Balwan Singh.
16. In   view   of   the   above   material   which   is   shaky,   suspicion
arises  in   the   mind   of   the   Court   about   the  genesis   of   the   case  of
the   prosecution.   In   our   considered   opinion,   the   Trial   Court   and
the High Court were not justified in relying upon the evidence of
the eye witnesses as well as of PW­11 and PW­12. Similarly, their
reliance   on   the   aspect   of   recovery   was   also   not   justified,   for   the
reasons mentioned earlier.
Accordingly,   the   appeals   are   allowed.   The   impugned
judgments   of   the   Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   are   set   aside.
The   appellants   are   directed   to   be   released   forthwith,   if   not
required in any other case.
We find that the appellants in these appeals are Accused 1,
Accused 2 and Accused 7. Other accused in   S.T. No. 57 of 2010
have   not   preferred   an   appeal.   Since   in   respect   of   the   appellants
herein   we   find   that   the   prosecution   has   not   proved   the   charges
beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the   benefit   of   this   judgment   should
also   enure   to   the   other   accused   who   were   convicted   in   S.T.   No.
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57   of   2010.   Accordingly,   the   other   accused   in   S.T.   No.   57   of
2010,   who   have   not   preferred   appeals   before   this   Court,   shall
also be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 
……………..…………………………..J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
 …………………………………………..J.
 (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
       …….………..…………………………J.
                          (AJAY RASTOGI)
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 06, 2019
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