2019 INSC 0649
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANJIT KAUR & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.8332­8333 OF 2014
RADHAKRISHNA REDDY (D) THROUGH LRS. …PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
G. AYYAVOO & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G  M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The   question   of   law   involved   in   the   present   matters   is   quite
significant.     Whether   a   person   claiming   the   title   by   virtue   of   adverse
possession can maintain a suit under Article 65 of Limitation Act, 1963
(for   short,   “the   Act”)   for   declaration   of   title   and   for   a   permanent
injunction   seeking   the   protection   of   his   possession   thereby   restraining
the   defendant   from   interfering   in   the   possession   or   for   restoration   of
possession in case of illegal dispossession by a defendant whose title has
been   extinguished   by   virtue   of   the   plaintiff   remaining   in   the   adverse

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possession   or   in   case   of   dispossession   by   some   other   person?   In   other
words,   whether   Article   65   of   the   Act   only   enables   a   person   to   set   up   a
plea   of   adverse   possession   as   a   shield   as   a   defendant   and   such   a   plea
cannot   be   used   as   a   sword   by   a   plaintiff   to   protect   the   possession   of
immovable property or to recover it in case of dispossession.  Whether he
is   remediless   in   such   a   case?     In   case   a   person   has   perfected   his   title
based on adverse possession and property is sold by the owner after the
extinguishment of his title, what is the remedy of a person to avoid sale
and   interference   in   possession   or   for   its   restoration   in   case   of
dispossession? 
2. Historically, adverse possession is a pretty old concept of law. It is
useful   but   often   criticised   concept   on   the   ground   that   it   protects   and
confers   rights   upon   wrongdoers.   The   concept   of   adverse   possession
appeared   in   the   Code   of   Hammurabi   approximately   2000   years   before
Christ  era. Law 30  contained a provision “If  a chieftain or a man leaves
his house, garden, and field …. and someone else takes possession of his
house,   garden   and   field   and   uses   it   for   three   years;   if   the   first   owner
returns  and claims his house, garden, and field, it shall  not be given  to
him, but he who has taken possession of it and used it shall continue to
use   it.”   However,   there   was   an   exception   to   the   aforesaid   rule:   for   a
soldier captured or killed in battle and the case of the juvenile son of the

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owner.    In  Roman   times,  attached  to  the  land,  a  kind  of  spirit that was
nurtured by the possessor. Possessor or user of the land was considered
to   have   a   greater   “ownership”   of   the   land   than   the   titled   owner.   We
inherited the Common Law concept, being a part of the erstwhile British
colony. William in 1066 consolidated ownership of land under the Crown.
The   Statute   of   Westminster   came   in   1275   when   land   records   were   very
often   scarce   and   literacy   was   rare,   the   best   evidence   of   ownership   was
possession.   In   1639,   the   Statute   of   Limitation   fixed   the   period   for
recovery   of   possession   at   20   years.   A   line   of   thought   was   also   evolved
that   the   person   who   possesses   the   land   and   produces   something   of
ultimate   benefit   to   the   society,   must   hold   the   best   title   to   the   land.
Revenue   laws   relating   to   land   have   been   enacted   in   the   spirit   to   confer
the   title   on   the   actual   tiller   of   the   land.   The   Statute   of   Wills   in   1540
allowed lands to be passed down to heirs. The Statute of Tenures enacted
in 1660 ended the feudal system and created the concept of the title. The
adverse possession remained as a part of the law and continue to exist.
The concept of adverse possession has a root in the aspect that it awards
ownership of land to the person who makes the best or highest use of the
land.   The   land,   which   is   being   used   is   more   valuable   than   idle   land,   is
the   concept   of   utilitarianism.   The   concept   thus,   allows   the   society   as   a
whole   to   benefit   from   the   land   being   held   adversely   but   allows   a
sufficient   period   for   the   “true   owner”   to   recover   the   land.   The   adverse

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possession   statutes   permit   rapid   development   of   “wild”   lands   with   the
weak   or   indeterminate   title.   It   helps   in   the   Doctrine   of   Administration
also as it can be an effective and efficient way to remove or cure clouds of
title which with memories grow dim and evidence becomes unclear. The
possessor  who maintains and improves the land has a more valid claim
to   the   land   than   the   owner   who   never   visits   or   cares   for   the   land   and
uses it, is of no utility. If a former owner neglects and allows the gradual
dissociation between himself and what he is claiming and he knows that
someone else is caring by doing acts, the attachment which one develops
by   caring   cannot   be   easily   parted   with.   The   bundle   of   ingredients
constitutes adverse possession. 
3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for  the parties at length
and also the Amicus Curiae, Shri P.S. Patwalia and Shri Huzefa Ahmadi,
senior   counsel.     Various   decisions   of   this   Court   and   Privy   Council   and
English   Courts   have   been   cited   in   which   the   suit   filed   by   the   plaintiff
based   on   adverse   possession   has   been   held   to   be   maintainable   for
declaration of title and protection of the possession or the restoration of
possession.     Nature   of   right   acquired   by   adverse   possession   and   even
otherwise   as   to   the   right   to   protect   possession   against   unlawful
dispossession   of   the   plaintiff   or   for   its   recovery   in   case   of   illegal
dispossession. 

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4. Before dilating upon the issue, it is necessary to refer the decision
in   Gurudwara   Sahab   v.   Gram   Panchayat   Village   Sirthala   (2014)   1   SCC
669   in   which   this   court   has   referred   to   the   decision   of   the   Punjab   and
Haryana   High   Court   in   Gurudwara   Sahib   Sannauli   v.   State   of   Punjab
since reported in (2009) 154 PLR 756, to opine that no declaration of title
can be sought by a plaintiff on the basis of adverse possession inasmuch
as adverse possession can be used as a shield by a defendant and not as
a   sword   by   a   plaintiff.   This   Court   while   deciding   the   question   gave   the
only   reason   by   simply   observing   that   there   is   “no   quarrel”   with   the
proposition   to   the   extent   that   suit   cannot   be   based   by   the   plaintiff   on
adverse   possession.     Thus,   this   point   was   not   contested   in   Gurudwara
Sahib  v.  State  Gram Panchayat  Village,  Sirthala   (supra)  when  this Court
expressed said opinion.
5. It is pertinent to mention here that before the aforesaid decision of
this   court,   there   was   no   such   decision   of   this   court   holding   that   suit
cannot be  filed  by  a  plaintiff  based  on  adverse  possession.  The  views  to
the   contrary   of   larger   and   coordinate   benches   were   not   submitted   for
consideration   of   the   Two   Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   which   decided   the
aforesaid matter.
6. A   Three­Judge   Bench   decision   in   Sarangadeva   Periya   Matam   &
Anr.   v.   Ramaswami   Gondar   (Dead)   by   Lrs.   AIR   1966   SC   1603   of   this

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Court in which the decision of Privy Council in   Musumut Chundrabullee
Debia v. Luchea Debia Chowdrain  1865 SCC Online PC 7 had been relied
on,   was   not   placed   for   consideration   before   the   division   bench   deciding
Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, Sirthala .  
7. Learned  Amicus pointed out that in   Sarangadeva  Periya Matam &
Anr.   v.   Ramaswami   Goundar   (Dead)   by   Lrs.   ( supra )   the   plaintiff   was   in
the   possession   of   the   suit   land   until   January   1950   when   the   ‘mutt’
obtained   possession   of   the   land.   On   February   18,   1954,   plaintiff
instituted   the   suit   against   the   ‘mutt’   for   “recovery   of   possession”   of   the
suit   land   o   based   on   an   acquisition   of   title   to   land   by   way   of   “adverse
possession”.   A   Three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   has   held   that   the
plaintiff acquired the title by his adverse possession and was entitled to
recover the possession.  Following is the relevant discussion: 
“1.   Sri   Sarangadevar   Periya   Matam   of   Kumbakonam   was   the   inam
holder   of   lands   in   Kannibada   Zamin,   Dindigul   Taluk,   Madurai
District. In 1883, the then mathadhipathi granted a perpetual lease
of   the   melwaram   and   kudiwaram   interest   in   a   portion   of   the   inam
lands   to   one   Chinna   Gopiya   Goundar,   the   grandfather   of   the
plaintiff­respondent on an annual rent of Rs. 70. The demised lands
are the subject­matter of the present suit. Since 1883 until January
1950   Chinna   Gopiya   Goundar   and   his   descendants   were   in
uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit lands. In 1915,
the   mathadhipathi   died   without   nominating   a   successor.   Since
1915,  the  descendants  of  Chinna  Gopiya  Goundar  did  not pay any
rent   to   the   math.   Between   1915   and   1939   there   was   no
mathadhipathi.   One   Basavan   Chetti   was   in   management   of   the
math   for   a   period   of   20   years   from   1915.   The   present
mathadhipathi was elected by the disciples of the Math in 1939. In
1928, the Collector of Madurai passed an order resuming the inam
lands and directing the full assessment of the lands and payment of
the   assessment   to   the   math   for   its   upkeep.   After   resumption,   the

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lands were transferred from the "B" Register of inam lands to the "A"
Register of ryotwari lands and a joint patta was issued in the name
of   the   plaintiff   and   other   persons   in   possession   of   the   lands.   The
plaintiff   continued   to   possess   the   suit   lands   until   January   1950
when   the   math   obtained   possession   of   the   lands.   On   February   18,
1954,  the  plaintiff  instituted  the  suit   against the  math  represented
by   its   present   mathadhipathi   and   an   agent   of   the   math   claiming
recovery   of   possession   of   the   suit   lands.   The   plaintiff   claimed   that
he   acquired   title   to   the   lands   by   adverse   possession   and   by   the
issue   of   a   ryotwari   patta   in   his   favour   on   the   resumption   of   the
inam.   The   Subordinate   Judge   of   Dindigul   accepted   the   plaintiff's
contention   and   decreed   the   suit.   On   appeal,   the   District   Judge   of
Madurai   set   aside   the   decree   and   dismissed   the   suit.   On   second
appeal, the High Court of Madras restored the judgment and decree
of the Subordinate Judge. The defendants now appeal to this Court
by   special   leave.   During   the   pendency   of   the   appeal,   the   plaintiff­
respondent died and his legal representatives have been substituted
in his place. 
2.   The   plaintiff   claimed   title   to   the   suit   lands   on   the   following
grounds  :  (1) Since 1915 he and his predecessors­in­interest were in
adverse   possession   of   the   lands,   and   on   the   expiry   of   12   years   in
1927,   he   acquired   prescriptive   title   to   the   lands   under   s.   28   read
with   Art.   144   of   the   Indian   Limitation   Act,   1908;   (2)   by   the
resumption   proceedings   and   the   grant   of   the   ryotwari   patta   a   new
tenure was created in his favour and he acquired full ownership in
the lands; and (3)  in any event, he was in adverse possession of the
lands since 1928, and on the expiry of 12 years in 1940 he acquired
prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28 read with Art. 134­B of the
Indian   Limitation   Act,   1908 .   We   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   first
contention   of   the   plaintiff   should   be   accepted,   and   it   is,   therefore,
not necessary to consider the other two grounds of his claim.
6. We are inclined to accept the respondents' contention. Under Art.
144   of   the   Indian   Limitation   Act,   1908,   limitation   for   a   suit   by   a
math or by any person representing  it  for possession of immovable
properties belonging to it runs from the time when the possession of
the   defendant   becomes   adverse   to   the   plaintiff.   The   math   is   the
owner  of  the   endowed   property.   Like   an   idol,   the  math  is   a  juristic
person   having   the   power   of   acquiring,   owning   and   possessing
properties   and   having   the   capacity  of   suing  and   being   sued.   Being
an  ideal   person,   it  must  of   necessity  act   in   relation   to  its   temporal
affairs   through  human  agency.   See  Babajirao  v.   Laxmandas  (1904)
ILR  28 Bom 215 (223).   It may acquire property by prescription and
may likewise lose property by adverse possession. If the math while
in possession of its property is dispossessed or if the possession of a
stranger  becomes  adverse,  it  suffers  an  injury and  has  the  right  to
sue   for   the   recovery   of   the   property.   If   there   is   a   legally   appointed
mathadhipathi, he may institute the suit on its behalf; if not, the de
facto mathadhipathi  may do so, see Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia
Bharti   62   Ind   App   47   at   p.51   and   where,   necessary,   a   disciple   or

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other beneficiary of the math may take steps for vindicating its legal
rights   by   the   appointment   of   a   receiver   having   authority   to   sue   on
its behalf, or by the institution of a suit in its name by a next friend
appointed   by   the   Court.   With   due   diligence,   the   math   or   those
interested   in   it   may   avoid   the   running   of   time.   The   running   of
limitation against the math under Art. 144 is not suspended by the
absence   of   a   legally   appointed   mathadhipathi;   clearly,   limitation
would   run   against   it   where   it   is   managed   by   a   de   facto
mathadhipathi.   See   Vithalbowa   v.   Narayan   Daji,   (1893)   I.L.R   18
Bom   507   at   p.511,   and   we   think   it   would   run   equally   if   there   is
neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi.
10.   We hold that by the operation of Art. 144 read with s. 28 of the
Indian   Limitation   Act,   1908   the   title   of   the   math   to   the   suit   lands
became extinguished in 1927, and the plaintiff acquired title to the
lands by prescription. He continued in possession of the lands until
January   1950.   It   has   been   found   that   in   January   1950   he
voluntarily delivered possession of the lands to the math, but such
delivery of possession did not transfer any title to the math. The suit
was instituted in 1954 and is well within time.
(emphasis supplied)”
8. In   Balkrishan vs. Satyaprakash & Ors.,   2001 (2) SCC 498, decided
by a Coordinate Bench, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title on
the   ground   of   adverse   possession   and   a   permanent   injunction.     This
Court   considered   the   question,   whether   the   plaintiff   had   perfected   his
title   by   adverse   possession.     This   Court   has   laid   down   that   the   law
concerning adverse possession is well settled, a person claiming adverse
possession has to  prove three classic requirements i.e.   nec   –   nec vi ,   nec
clam   and   nec   precario .     The   trial   court,   as   well   as   the   First   Appellate
Court,   decreed   the   suit   while   the   High   Court   dismissed   it.     This   Court
restored   the   decree   passed   by   the   trial   court  decreeing   the   plaintiff   suit
based on adverse possession and observed: 

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“6.  The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is:
whether the High Court erred in holding that the appellant had not
perfected   his   title   by   adverse   possession   on   the   ground   that   there
was an order of a Tahsildar against him to deliver possession of the
suit land to the auction purchasers.
7.   The   law   with   regard   to   perfecting   title   by   adverse   possession   is
well   settled.   A   person   claiming   title   by   adverse   possession   has   to
prove   three   "neck"   ­   nec   vi,   nec   clam   and   nec   precario.   In   other
words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity
in   publicity   and   in   extent.   In   S.M.   Karim   vs.   Bibi   Sakina   [1964]   6
SCR   780  speaking  for this  Court  Hidayatullah,  J.  (as  he  then  was)
observed thus:
"Adverse   possession   must   be   adequate   in   continuity,   in
publicity   and   extent   and   a   plea   is   required   at   the   least   to
show   when   possession   becomes   adverse   so   that   the   starting
point of limitation against the party affected can be found."
14. In Sk. Mukbool Ali vs. Sk. Wajed Hossein, (1876) 25 WR 249 the
High Court held:
"Whatever   the   decree   might   have   been,   the   defendant's
possession   could   not   be   considered   as   having   ceased   in
consequences   of   that   decree,   unless   he   were   actually
dispossessed. The fact that there is a decree against him does
not prevent the statute of limitation from running."
15. In our view, the Madras High Court correctly laid down the law
in the aforementioned cases.
17.   From   the   above   discussion,   it   follows   that   the   judgment   and
decree of the High Court under challenge cannot be sustained. They
are   accordingly  set  aside   and  the  judgment  and  decree   of  the   First
Appellate   Court   confirming   the   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial
court   is   restored.   The   appeal   is   accordingly   allowed   but   in   the
circumstances of the case without costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. In  Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors.,  (2007) 9
SCC 641, a suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration of title and also for a
permanent   injunction   based   on   adverse   possession.   The   Courts   below
decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of adverse possession.  The
same   was   affirmed   by   this   Court.     This   Court   considered   the   change

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brought   about  in   the   Act   by   Articles   64   and   65   vis­à­vis   to   Articles   142
and 144. Issue No.1 was framed whether the plaintiff becomes the owner
of   the   suit   property   by   way   of   adverse   possession?     This   Court   has
observed that a plea of adverse possession was indisputably be governed
by   Articles   64   and   65   of   the   Act.   This   Court   has   discussed   the   matter
thus : 
“ 20.   A   plea   of   adverse   possession   or   a   plea   of   ouster   would
indisputably   be   governed   by   Articles   64   and   65   of   the   Limitation
Act.
22.   The mere assertion of title by itself may not be sufficient unless
the   plaintiff   proves   animus   possidendi.   But   the   intention   on   the
part of the plaintiff to possess the properties in suit exclusively   and
not for and on behalf of other co­owners also is evident from the fact
that   the   defendants­appellants   themselves   had   earlier   filed   two
suits.   Such   suits   were   filed   for   partition.   In   those   suits   the
defendants­appellants   claimed   themselves   to   be   co­owners   of   the
plaintiff. A bare perusal of the judgments of the courts below clearly
demonstrates   that   the   plaintiff   had   even   therein   asserted   hostile
title claiming ownership in himself. The claim of hostile title by the
plaintiff   over   the   suit   land,   therefore,   was,   thus,   known   to   the
appellants.   They   allowed   the   first   suit   to   be   dismissed   in   the   year
1977.   Another   suit   was   filed   in   the   year   1978   which   again   was
dismissed in the year 1984. It may be true, as has been contended
on behalf of the appellants before the courts below, that a co­owner
can bring about successive suits for partition as the cause of action,
therefor,   would   be   a   continuous   one.   But,   it   is   equally   well­settled
that   pendency   of   a   suit   does   not   stop   running   of   'limitation'.   The
very   fact   that   the   defendants   despite   the   purported   entry   made   in
the revenue settlement record of rights in the year 1953 allowed the
plaintiff   to   possess   the   same   exclusively   and   had   not   succeeded   in
their   attempt   to   possess   the   properties   in   Village   Samleu   and/or
otherwise enjoy the usufruct thereof, clearly goes to show that even
prior to institution of the said suit the plaintiff­respondent had been
in hostile possession thereof. 
24.   In   any  event   the  plaintiff   made   his  hostile  declaration  claiming
title   for   the   property   at   least   in   his   written   statement   in   the   suit
filed   in   the   year   1968.   Thus,   at   least   from   1968   onwards,   the

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plaintiff   continued   to   exclusively   possess   the   suit   land   with   a
knowledge of the defendants­appellants.
26. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, would in a case
of   this   nature   have   its   role   to   play,   if   not   from   1953,   but   at   least
from   1968.   If   that   be   so,   the   finding   of   the   High   Court   that   the
respondent   perfected   his   title   by   adverse   possession   and   ouster
cannot be said to be vitiated in law.
28.   We   are   also   not   oblivious   of   a   recent   decision   of   this   Court   in
Govindammal   v.   R.   Perumal   Chettiar   and   Ors.,   (2006)   11   SCC   600
wherein it was held: (SCC p. 606, para 8)
“In order to oust by way of adverse possession, one has to lead
definite   evidence   to   show   that   to   the   hostile   interest   of   the
party that a person is holding possession and how that can be
proved will depend on facts of each case.”
31. We, having regard to the peculiar facts obtaining in the case, are of
the   opinion   that   the   plaintiff­respondent   had   established   that   he
acquired title by ousting the defendant­appellants by declaring hostile
title in himself which was to the knowledge of his co­sharers .”
(emphasis supplied)
10. In   Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi,   (1981) 2 SCC
103   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   considered   the   question   of
adverse   possession   by   a   plaintiff.     The   plaintiff   has   filed   a   suit   for
declaration of title and recovery of possession based on Hukumnama and
adverse possession  for  more than  30 years.   The  trial  court decreed the
suit   on   both   the   grounds,   ‘title’   as   well   as   of   ‘adverse   possession’.     The
plaintiff's appeal was allowed by this Court.  It has been observed by this
Court   that   adverse   possession   had   been   established   by   a   consistent
course   of   conduct   of   the   plaintiff   in   the   case,   possession   was   hostile   to
the  full  knowledge  of  the  municipality.     Thus,  the  High  Court  could  not

12
have  interfered  with   the   finding   as  to   adverse  possession   and  could  not
have   ordered   remand   of   the   case   to   the   Judicial   Commissioner.
The order of remand and the proceedings thereafter were quashed.  This
court   restored   decree   in   favour   of   plaintiff   for   declaration   of   title   and
recovery   of   possession   and   also   for   a   permanent   injunction,   has   dealt
with the matter thus:
“ 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of
possession   and   also   a   permanent   injunction   restraining   the
defendant   municipality   from   disturbing   the   possession   of   the
plaintiff. It appears that prior to the suit, proceedings under Section
145 were started between the parties in which the Magistrate found
that the plaintiff was not in possession but upheld the possession of
the defendant on the land until evicted in due course of law.
3.   In   the   suit   the   plaintiff   based   his   claim   in   respect   of   plot   No.
1735, Ward No. 1 of Ranchi Municipality on the ground that he had
acquired title to the land by virtue of a hukumnama granted to him
by the landlord as far back as April 17, 1912 which is Ex.18. Apart
from   the   question   of   title,   the   plaintiff   further   pleaded   that   even   if
the   land   belonged   to   the   defendant   municipality,   he   had   acquired
title   by   prescription   by   being   in   possession   of   the   land   to   the
knowledge of the municipality for more than 30 years, that is to say,
from 1912 to 1957.
10.   Lastly,   the   High   Court   thought   that   as   the   land   in   question
consisted   of   a   portion   of   the   tank   or   a   land   appurtenant   thereto,
adverse possession could not be proved. This view also seems to be
wrong.   If   a   person   asserts   a   hostile   title   even   to   a   tank   which   as
claimed   by   the   municipality,   belonged   to   it   and   despite   the   hostile
assertion   of   title   no   steps   were   taken   by   the   owner,   (namely,   the
municipality   in   this   case),   to   evict   the   trespasser,   his   title   by
prescription would be complete after thirty years.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. In   Nair   Service   Society   Ltd.   v.   K.C.   Alexander ,   AIR   1968   SC   1165,
the   plaintiff   filed   a   suit   claiming   to   be   in   possession   for   over   70   years.
The   plaintiff   claimed   possession   of   the   excess   land   from   the   society,   its

13
Manager and Defendants Nos.3 to 6.  The society denied the rights of the
plaintiff   to   bring   a   suit   for   ejectment   or   its   liability   for   compensation.
Alternatively,   the   society   claimed   the   value   of   improvements.   The   main
controversy   decided   by   the   High   Court   was   whether   the   plaintiff   can
maintain a suit for possession without proof of title. This court observed
that in case the rightful owner  does not come forward within the period
of   limitation   his   right   is   lost,   and   the   possessory   owner   acquires   an
absolute title.   The plaintiff was in   de  facto   possession and was entitled
to   remain   in   possession   and   only   the   State   could   evict   him.     The   State
was not impleaded as a party in the case.  The action of the society was a
violent   invasion   of   his   possession   and   in   the   law,   as   it   stands   in   India,
the   plaintiff   can   maintain   a   possessory   suit   under   the   provisions   of   the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.  The plaintiff has asserted that he had perfected
his title by “adverse possession” but he did not join the State in a suit to
get   a   declaration.     He   may   be   said   to   have   not   rested   the   suit   on   the
acquired title.   The suit was thus limited to recovery of possession from
one   who   had   trespassed   against   him.     The   Court   observed   that   for   the
plaintiff to  maintain  suit based on adverse possession,  it was  necessary
to implead the State Government   i.e.   the owner of the land as a party to
the suit.   A plaintiff can maintain a suit based on adverse possession as
he acquires absolute title.  The Court observed:

14
“(17)   In   our   judgment   this   involves   an   incorrect   approach   to   our
problem. To express our meaning we may begin by reading 1907 AC
73   to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but
the   true   owner   has   in   any   way   been   departed   from.   1907   AC   73
reaffirmed the principle by stating quite clearly:
“It   cannot   be   disputed   that   a   person   in   possession   of   land   in
the  assumed   character  of  owner  and   exercising  peaceably  the
ordinary  rights  of  ownership  has  a  perfectly good  title  against
all  the  world  but  the  rightful  owner.  And   if   the  rightful  owner
does   not   come   forward   and   assert   his   title   by   the   process   of
law   within   the   period   prescribed   by   the   provisions   of   the
statute of Limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever
extinguished,   and   the   possessory   owner   acquires   an   absolute
title. ”
Therefore,   the   plaintiff   who   was   peaceably   in   possession   was
entitled to remain in possession and only the State could evict him.
The   action   of   the   Society   was   a   violent   invasion   of   his   possession
and   in   the   law,   as   it   stands   in   India   the   plaintiff   could   maintain   a
possessor   suit   under   the   provisions   of   the   Specific   Relief   Act   in
which   title   would   be   immaterial   or   a   suit   for   possession   within   12
years   in   which   the   question   of   title   could   be   raised.   As   this   was   a
suit   of   latter   kind   title   could   be   examined.   But   whose   title?
Admittedly   neither   side   could   establish   title.   The   plaintiff   at   least
pleaded the statute of Limitation and asserted that he had perfected
his   title   by   adverse   possession.   But   as   he   did   not   join   the   State   in
his suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not rested  his
case   on   an   acquired   title.   His   suit   was   thus   limited   to   recovering
possession  from  one  who   had  trespassed   against   him.   The  enquiry
thus  narrows  to  this:  did   the   Society  have  any title  in  itself,   was  it
acting under  authority  express or implied of the true owner or was
it just pleading a title in a third party? To the first two questions we
find   no   difficulty   in   furnishing   an   answer.   It   is   clearly   in   the
negative. So the only question is whether the defendant could plead
that   the   title   was   in   the   State?   Since   in   every   such   case   between
trespassers   the   title   must   be   outstanding   in   a   third   party   a
defendant will be placed in a position of dominance. He has only to
evict  the  prior  trespasser  and  sit  pretty pleading that  the title  is  in
someone else. As Erle J put it in Burling v. Read (1848) 11 QB 904
‘parties   might   imagine   that   they   acquired   some   right   by   merely
intruding upon land in the night, running up a hut and occupying it
before morning'. This will be subversive of the fundamental doctrine
which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in 1907 AC 73. The
law   does   not,   therefore,   countenance   the   doctrine   of   'findings
keepings’. 
(22) The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but
we   approve   of   the   dictum  in   1907   AC  73.   No   subsequent   case   has
been   brought   to   our   notice   departing   from   that   view.   No   doubt   a
great controversy exists over the two cases of (1849) 13 QB 945 and

15
(1865)   1   QB   1   but   it   must   be   taken   to   be   finally   resolved   by   1907
AC 73. A similar view has been consistently taken in India and the
amendment   of   the   Indian   Limitation   Act   has   given   approval   to   the
proposition   accepted   in   1907   AC   73   and   may   be   taken   to   be
declaratory   of   the   law   in   India.   We   hold   that   the   suit   was
maintainable.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. In   Lallu   Yashwant   Singh   (dead)   by   his   legal   representative   v.   Rao
Jagdish   Singh   &   Ors.,   AIR   1968   SC   620,   this   Court   has   observed   that
taking forcible possession is illegal. In India, persons are not permitted to
take   forcible   possession.     The   law   respect   possession.   The   landlord   has
no   right   to   re­enter   by   showing   force   or   intimidation.     He   must   have   to
proceed   under   the   law   and   taking   of   forcible   possession   is   illegal.     The
Court   affirmed   the   decision   of   Privy   Council   in   Midnapur   Zamindary
Company   Ltd.   V.   Naresh   Narayan   Roy   AIR   1924   PC   144   and   other
decisions and held: 
"10.   In   Midnapur   Zamindary   Company   Limited   v.   Naresh   Narayan
Roy,   51   Ind   App   293   =   at   p.   299   (AIR   1924   PC   144   at   p.147),   the
Privy Council observed:
“In   India   persons   are   not   permitted   to   take   forcible   possession;
they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through
a Court.”
11. In K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani (AIR 1954 Bom 358 at p.
360)   Chagla   C.J.,   stated   that   the   law   in   India   was   essentially
different from the law in England. He observed:
“Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has
ceased   to   be   a   tenant   is   protected   by   law.   Although   he   may  not
have   a   right   to   continue   in   possession   after   the   termination   of
the   tenancy   his   possession   is   juridical   and   that   possession   is
protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act a
tenant   who   has   ceased   to   be   a   tenant   may   sue   for   possession
against   his   landlord   if   the   landlord   deprives   him   of   possession

16
otherwise   than   in   due   course   of   law,   but   a   trespasser   who   has
been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under Section
9 and claim possession against the true owner.”
12.  In  Yar Mohammad  v.  Lakshmi  Das  (AIR  1959  All  1 at  p.4),  the
Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed:
“No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can
be   raised   or   gone   into   in   that   case   (under   Section   9   of   the
Specific   Relief   Act).   The   plaintiff   will   be   entitled   to   succeed
without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the
defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to
establish   the   best   of   all   titles.   The   restoration   of   possession   in
such a suit is, however, always subject to a regular title suit and
the  person who  has  the real  title  or  even the  better  title cannot,
therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It
will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit
and to recover back possession.”
The High Court further observed:
“Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It
will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and
to   dispossess   a   person   in   actual   possession   without   having
recourse to a Court. No person can be allowed to become a Judge
in his own cause . As observed by Edge C.J., in  Wali Ahmad Khan
v. Ayodhya Kundu  (1891)   ILR 13 All. 537 at p.556:
“The object of the section was to drive the persons who wanted to
eject   a   person   into   the   proper   Court   and   to   prevent   them   from
going with a high hand and ejecting such persons.”
14. In Hillava Subbava v. Narayanappa, (1911) 13 Bom. LR 1200 it
was observed:
“No   doubt,   the   true   owner   of   property   is   entitled   to   retain
possession, even though he has obtained it from a trespasser by
force or other unlawful means: Lillu v. Annaji, (1881) ILR 5 Bom.
387 and Bandu v. Naba, (1890) ILR 15 Bom 238.”
We   are   unable   to   appreciate   how   this   decision   assists   the
respondent.   It   was   not   a   suit   under   Section   9   of   the   Specific
Relief   Act.   In   (1881)   ILR   5   Bom   387,   it   was   recognised   that   "if
there   is   a   breach   of   the   peace   in   attempting   to   take   possession,
that   affords   a   ground   for   criminal   prosecution,   and,   if   the
attempt   is   successful,   for   a   summary   suit   also   for  a   restoration
to possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act I of 1877­
Dadabhai   Narsidas   v.   The   Sub­Collector   of   Broach,   (1870)   7
Bom.   HC  AC  82.”   In  (1890)   ILR   15   Bom  238   it   was   observed   by
Sargent C J., as follows:
“The Indian Legislature  has, however, provided for the summary
removal of anyone who dispossesses another, whether peaceably

17
or   otherwise   than   by   due   course   of   law;   but   subject   to   such
provision there is no reason for holding that the rightful owner so
dispossessing the other is a trespasser, and may not rely for the
support of his possession on the title vested in him, as he clearly
may   do   by   English   law.   This   would   also   appear   to   be   the   view
taken by West J., in (1881) ILR 5 Bom 387.”
15.   In   our   opinion,   the   law   on   this   point   has   been   correctly   stated
by the Privy Council, by Chagla C.J.,  and by  the Full  Bench of the
Allahabad High Court, in the cases cited above .”
(emphasis supplied)
This   Court   has   approved   the   decision   of   the   Privy   Council   as   well
as   Full   Bench   of   the   Allahabad   High   Court   in   Yar   Mohammad   v.   Laxmi
Das  AIR 1959 All. 1.
13. In   Somnath  Berman  v.  Dr.  S.P.  Raju  & Anr . AIR 1970 SC  846,  this
Court   has   recognized   the   right   of   a   person   having   possessory   title   to
obtain a declaration that he was the owner of the land in a suit and an
injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession.
This Court has further observed that section 9 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963 is in no way inconsistent with the position that as against a wrong­
doer,   prior   possession   of   the   plaintiff,   in   an   action   of   ejectment   is
sufficient title even if the suit is brought more than six months after the
act   of   dispossession   complained   of   and   that   the   wrong­doer   cannot
successfully   resist   the   suit   by   showing   that   the   title   and   the   right   to
possession vested in a third party. This Court has observed:
"10.   In   Narayana   Row   v.   Dharmachar,   (1903)   ILR   26   Mad   514   a
bench of the Madras  High Court consisting  of  Bhashyam Ayyangar
and Moore, JJ. held that possession is, under the Indian, as under

18
the English law, good title against all but the true owner. Section 9
of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent with the position
that as against a wrongdoer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an
action   of   ejectment,   is   sufficient   title,   even   if   the   suit   be   brought
more   than   six  months   after  the  act   of  dispossession  complained   of
and   that   the   wrong­doer   cannot   successfully   resist   the   suit   by
showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person.
The same view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Krishnarao
Yashwant   v.   Vasudev   Apaji   Ghotikar,   (1884)   ILR   8   Bom   871.   That
was   also   the   view   taken   by   the   Allahabad   High   Court­see   Umrao
Singh   v.   Ramji   Das,   ILR   36   All   51,   Wali   Ahmad   Khan   v.   Ahjudhia
Kandu, (1891) ILR 13 All 537.  In Subodh Gopal Bose v. Province of
Bihar, AIR 1950 Pat 222 the Patna High Court adhered to the view
taken   by   the   Madras,   Bombay   and   Allahabad   High   Courts.   The
contrary   view   taken   by   the   Calcutta   High   Court   in   Debi   Churn
Boldo v. Issur Chunder Manjee, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 39; Ertaza Hossein
v. Bany Mistry, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 130, Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brijo
Lall   Chowdhry,   (1890)   ILR   17   Cal   256   and   Nisa   Chand   Gaita   v.
Kanchiram Bagani, (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579, in our opinion  does not
lay down the law correctly."
(emphasis supplied)
It is  apparent from  the  aforesaid  decision that a person is entitled
to   bring   a   suit   of   possessory   title   to   obtain   possession   even   though   the
title may vest in a third person. A person in the possessory title can get
injunction   also,   restraining   the   defendant   from   interfering   with   his
possession.
14. Given the aforesaid, a question to ponder is when a person having
no   title,   merely   on   the   strength   of   possessory   title   can   obtain   an
injunction and can maintain a suit for ejectment of a trespasser.  Why a
person   who   has   perfected   his   title   by   way   of   adverse   possession   cannot
file   a   suit   for   obtaining   an   injunction   protecting   possession   and   for
recovery   of   possession  in   case  his  dispossession   is  by   a  third  person  or
by   an   owner   after   the   extinguishment   of   his   title.   In   case   a   person   in

19
adverse   possession   has   perfected   his   title   by   adverse   possession   and
after   the   extinguishment   of   the   title   of   the   true   owner,   he   cannot   be
successfully   dispossessed   by   a   true   owner   as   the   owner   has   lost   his
right, title and interest.
15. In   Padminibai   v.   Tangavva   &   Ors .,   AIR   1979   SC   1142,   a   suit   was
filed   by   the   plaintiff   for   recovery   of   possession   on   the   basis   that   her
husband   was   in   exclusive   and   open   possession   of   the   suit   lands
adversely   to   the   defendant   for   a   period   exceeding   12   years   and   his
possession   was   never   interrupted   or   disturbed.   It   was   held   that   he
acquired ownership by prescription. The suit filed within 12 years of his
death   was   within   limitation.   Thus,   the   plaintiff   was   given   the   right   to
recover   possession   based   on   adverse   possession   as   Tatya   has   acquired
ownership by adverse possession. This Court has observed thus:
 “1. Tatya died on February 2, 1955.  The respondents, Tangava and
Sundra   Bai   are   the   co   widows   of   Tatya.   They   were   co­plaintiffs   in
the original suit.
11.   We   have,   therefore,   no   hesitation   in   holding  in   agreement   with
the   courts   below   that   Tatya   had   acquired   title   by   remaining   in
exclusive   and   open   possession   of   the   suit   lands   adversely   to
Padmini Bai for a period far exceeding 12 years, and this possession
was   never   interrupted   or   disturbed.   He   had   thus   acquired
ownership by prescriptions .”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In  State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute Society,  AIR 1970
SC   1778,   this   Court   considered   the   question   of   adverse   possession   of
Dalhousie   Institute   Society   based   on   invalid   grant.   It   was   held   by   this

20
Court   that   title   was   acquired   by   adverse   possession   based   on   invalid
grant   and   the   right   was   given   to   the   claimant/applicant   to   claim
compensation.   This   Court   held   that   a   person   acquires   title   by   adverse
possession and observed:
"16.   There   is   no   material   placed   before   us   to   show   that   the   grant
has   been   made   in   the   manner   required   by   law   though   as   a   fact   a
grant   of   the   site   has   been   made   in   favour   of   the   Institute.   The
evidence   relied   on   by   the   Special   Land   Acquisition   Judge   and   the
High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in
open,   continuous   and   uninterrupted   possession   and   enjoyment   of
the site for over 60 years. In this respect, the material documentary
evidence   referred   to   by   the   High   Court   clearly   establishes   that   the
respondent   has   been   treated   as   owner   of   the   site   not   only   by   the
Corporation   but   also   by   the   Government.   The   possession   of   the
respondent   must   have   been   on   the   basis   of   the   grant   made   by   the
Government,  which,  no  doubt,  is  invalid  in  law.  As  to  what  exactly
is   the   legal   effect   of   such   possession   has   been   considered   by   this
Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay, [1952] SCR 43 as follows:
“...the   position   of   the   respondent   Corporation   and   its
predecessor   in   title   was   that   of   a   person   having   no   legal   title
but   nevertheless   holding   possession   of   the   land   under   colour
of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent
for   the   purpose   of   a   market.   Such   possession   not   being
referable   to   any   legal   title   it   was   prima   facie   adverse   to   the
legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very
moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation
took   possession   of   the   land   under   the   invalid   grant.   This
possession   has   continued   openly,   as   of   right   and
uninterruptedly   for   over   70   years   and   the   respondent
Corporation   has   acquired   the   limited   title   to   it   and   its
predecessor   in   title   had   been   prescribing   for   during   all   this
period,   that   is   to   say,   the   right   to   hold   the   land   in   perpetuity
free from rent but only for the purposes of a market in terms of
the Government Resolution of 1865....”
17. The above extract establishes   that a person in such possession
clearly   acquires   title   by   adverse   possession .   In   the   case   before   us,
there   are   concurrent   findings   recorded   by   the   High   Court   and   the
Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the respondent on this
point and we agree with those findings ."
(emphasis supplied)

21
It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that title is acquired by
adverse possession. 
17. In   Mohammed Fateh Nasib v. Swarup Chand Hukum Chand & Anr .
AIR   1948   PC   76,   Privy   Council   considered   the   question   of   adverse
possession   by   a   plaintiff.   In   the   plaint,   his   case   was   based   upon
continuous, open, exclusive and undisturbed possession. He averred that
he   had   acquired   an   indefeasible   title   to   the   suit   property   by   adverse
possession   against   the   whole   world.   In   1928,   he   was   surreptitiously
dispossessed from the suit property. The question arose for consideration
whether   the   plaintiff   remained   in   adverse   possession   for   12   years   and
whether   it   was   adverse   to   the   wakf.   The   Privy   Council   agreed   with   the
findings   of   the   High   Court   that   the   “plaintiff”   and   his   predecessors­in­
interest had remained in possession of the suit property for more than 12
years before 1928 to acquire a title under section 28 of the Act and the
plaintiff   was   not   a   mere   trespasser.   The   court   further   held   that   title   by
the   adverse   possession   can   be   established   against   wakf   property   also.
The Privy Council observed:­    
“On   that   basis   the   first   question   to   be   determined   is   whether   the
plaintiff   proved   continuous,   open   exclusive   and   undisturbed
possession  of  the property in suit  for  12  years  and  upwards  before
1928  when he was dispossessed, that being the relevant date under
Article 142 of the Limitation Act. If that question is answered in the
affirmative   then   the   further   question   arises   whether   such
possession was adverse to the wakf. 

22
Their   Lordships   agree   that   this   is   the   correct   test   to   apply   and,
having   examined   the   evidence,   oral   and   documentary,   they   agree
with   the   finding   of   the   High   Court   that   the   plaintiff   and   his
predecessors­in­interest had been in possession of the suit property
for more than 12 years  prior to 1928 so  as to acquire a title under
Section 28 of the Limitation Act. It is no doubt true, as the learned
Subordinate Judge held, that the claim of a mere trespasser to title
by   adverse   possession   will   be   confined   strictly   to   the   property   of
which   he   has  been   in  actual  possession.  But  that   principle  has  no
application   in   the   present   case.   The   plaintiff   is   not   a   mere
trespasser;   he   himself   purchased   the  property  for  a   large   sum  and
Aberjan, upon whose possession the claim ultimately rests, was put
into possession by an order of the Court, whether or not such order
was   rightly   made.   Apart   from   this,   their   Lordships   think   that   the
character   of   the   possession   established   by   the   plaintiff   was
adequate to found title even in a trespasser.  
Their   Lordships   feel   no   hesitation   in   agreeing   with   the   High
Court that adverse possession by the plaintiff and his predecessors­
in­interest has been proved for the requisite period .
The   only   question   which   then   remains   is   whether   such
possession was adverse to the wakf. It is not disputed that in law a
title   by   adverse   possession   can   be   established   against   wakf
property,   but   it   is   clear   that   a   trustee   for   a   charity   entering   into
possession   of   property   belonging   to   the   charity   cannot,   whilst
remaining   a   trustee,   change   the   character   of   his   possession,   and
assert that he is in possession as a beneficial owner.”  
(emphasis supplied)
The plaintiff's title was declared based on adverse possession.
18. The question of perfecting title by adverse possession again came to
be   considered   by   the   Privy   Council   in   Gunga   Govind   Mundul   &   Ors.   v.
The   Collector   of   the   Twenty­Four   Pergunnahs   &   Ors .   11   M.I.A.   212,   it
observed that there is an extinguishment of title by the law of limitation.
The practical effect is the extinction of the title of the owner in favour of
the  party   in  possession  and  this  right  is  an   absolute  interest.  The  Privy
Council has observed thus:

23
“4. The title to sue for dispossession of the lands belongs, in such a
case,   to   the   owner   whose   property   is   encroached   upon   ;   and   if   he
suffers his right to be barred by the Law of Limitation, the practical
effect   is   the   extinction   of   his   title   in   favour   of   the   party   in
possession ; see Sel. Rep., vol. vi., p. 139, cited in Macpherson, Civil
Procedure, p. 81 (3rd ed.). Now, in this case, the family represented
by the Appellants is proved to have been upwards of thirty years in
possession.   The   High   Court   has   decided   that   the   Prince's   title   is
barred, and the effect of that bar must operate in favour of the party
in possession.
Supposing that, on the extinction of the title of a person having a
limited   interest,   a   right   to   enter   might   arise   in   favour   of   a
remainderman   or   a   reversioner,   the   present   case   has   no
resemblance to that.” 
8.  It  is  of the  utmost  consequence  in India  that  the  security  which
long   possession   efforts   should   not   be   weakened.     Disputes   are
constantly arising about boundaries and about the identity of lands,
­­   contiguous   owners   are   apt   to   charge   one   another   with
encroachment.     If   twelve   years’   peaceable   and   uninterrupted
possession of lands, alleged to have been enjoyed by encroachment
on the adjoining lands, can be proved, a purchaser may taken that
title in safety; but, if the party out of possession could set up a sixty
years’   law   of   limitation,   merely   by   making   common   cause   with   a
Collector,   who   could  enjoy  security  against   interruption?    The  true
answer to such a contrivance is; the legal right of the Government is
to   its   rent;   the   lands   owned   by   others;   as   between   private   owners
contesting inter see the title of the lands, the law has   established a
limitation of twelve years; after that time, it declares not simply that
the   remedy   is   barred,   but   that   that   the   title   is   extinct   in   favour   of
the   possessor .     The   Government   has   no   title   to   intervene   in   such
contests, as its title to its rent in the nature of jumma is unaffected
by transfer simply of proprietary right in the lands.   The liability of
the lands of Jumma is not affected by a transfer of proprietary right,
whether such transfer is affected  simply by transfer of  title,  or less
directly by adverse occupation and the law of limitation.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. In   S.M.   Karim   v.   Mst.   Bibi   Sakina ,   AIR   1964   SC   1254,   a   question
arose   under   section   66   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   which
provides   that   no   suit   shall   be   maintained   against   a   certified   purchaser.
The question arose for consideration that in case possession is disturbed

24
whether   a   plaintiff   can   take   the   alternative   plea   that   the   title   of   the
person   purchasing   benami   in   court   auction   was   extinguished   by   long
and   uninterrupted   adverse   possession   of   the   real   owner.   If   the
possession   of   the   real   owner   ripens   into   title   under   the   Act   and   he   is
dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession. This Court has held that
in such a case it would be open for the plaintiff to take such a plea but
with full particulars so that the starting point of limitation can be found.
A   mere   suggestion   in   the   relief   clause   that   there   was   an   uninterrupted
possession   for   several   12   years   or   that   the   plaintiff   had   acquired   an
absolute title was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession was
not   necessarily   an   adverse   possession   and   the   prayer   clause   is   not   a
substitute for a plea of adverse possession. The opinion expressed is that
plaintiff   can   take   a  plea   of   adverse   possession   but   with   full   particulars.
The Court has observed:
“5.   As   an   alternative,   it   was   contended   before   us   that   the   title   of
Hakir   Alam   was   extinguished   by   long   and   uninterrupted   adverse
possession of Syed Aulad Ali and after him of the plaintiff. The High
Court did not accept this case.   Such a case is, of course, open to a
plaintiff to make if his possession is  disturbed. If  the possession of
the   real   owner   ripens   into   title   under   the   Limitation   Act   and   he   is
dispossessed, he can sue to obtain possession, for he does not then
rely   on   the   benami   nature   of   the   transaction.   But   the   alternative
claim   must   be   clearly   made   and   proved .   The   High   Court   held   that
the   plea   of   adverse   possession   was   not   raised   in   the   suit   and
reversed   the   decision   of   the   two   courts   below.   The   plea   of   adverse
possession   is   raised   here.   Reliance   is   placed   before   us   on   Sukhan
Das v. Krishanand, ILR 32 Pat 353 and Sri Bhagwan Singh v. Ram
Basi   Kuer,   AIR   1957   Pat   157,   to   submit   that   such   a   plea   is   not
necessary  and   alternatively,   that   if   a   plea   is   required,   what   can   be
considered   a  proper   plea.   But   these   two   cases   can   hardly   help   the
appellant.   No   doubt,   the   plaint   sets   out   the   fact   that   after   the

25
purchase   by  Syed  Aulad  Ali,  benami  in  the  name   of  his  son­in­law
Hakir Alam, Syed Aulad Ali continued in possession of the property
but it does not say that this possession was at any time adverse to
that   of   the   certified   purchaser.   Hakir   Alam   was   the   son­in­law   of
Syed Aulad Ali and was living with him. There is no suggestion that
Syed  Aulad  Ali  ever  asserted  any  hostile  title  against  him or  that  a
dispute   with   regard   to   ownership   and   possession   had   ever   arisen.
Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and
extent and a plea is  required at  the least to  show when possession
becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the
party   affected   can   be   found.     There   is   no   evidence   here   when
possession became adverse if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in
the   relief   clause   that   there   was   an   uninterrupted   possession   for
"several   12   years"   or   that   the   plaintiff   had   acquired   "an   absolute
title"   was   not   enough   to   raise   such   a   plea.   Long   possession   is   not
necessarily   adverse   possession   and   the   prayer   clause   is   not   a
substitute   for   a   plea.     The   cited   cases   need   hardly   be   considered
because  each case must  be determined  upon the  allegations in the
plaint in that case. It is sufficient to point out that in Bishun Dayal
v.   Kesho  Prasad,   AIR   1940   PC  202   the   Judicial   Committee   did   not
accept   an   alternative   case   based   on   possession   after   purchase
without a proper plea."
(emphasis supplied)
20. There is an acquisition of title by adverse possession as such, such
a person in the capacity of a plaintiff can always use the plea in case any
of his rights are infringed including in case of dispossession.   In   Mandal
Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah & Anr.,  (2010) 2 SCC 461 this Court
has   referred   to   the   decision   in   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Harphool   Singh
(2000)   5   SCC   652   in   which   the   suit   was   filed   by   the   plaintiff   based   on
acquisition   of   title   by   adverse   possession.   This   Court   has   referred   to
other   decisions   also   in   Annakili   v.   A.   Vedanayagam   (2007)   14   SCC   308
and  P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma  (2007) 6 SCC 59. It has been
observed that there can be an acquisition of title by adverse possession.
It   has   also   been   observed   that   adverse   possession   effectively   shifts   the

26
title   already   distanced   from   the   paper   owner   to   the   adverse   possessor.
Right thereby accrues in favour of the adverse possessor. This Court has
considered the matter thus: 
"48.   In   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Harphool   Singh,   2000   (5)   SCC   652,
this   Court   considered   the   question   whether   the   respondents   had
acquired   title   by   adverse   possession   over   the   suit   land   situated   at
Nohar­Bhadra   Road   at   Nohar   within   the   State   of   Rajasthan.   The
suit   filed   by   the   respondent   against   his   threatened   dispossession
was decreed by the trial court with the finding that he had acquired
title   by  adverse   possession .   The   first   and   second   appeals   preferred
by   the   State   Government   were   dismissed   by   the   lower   appellate
court   and   the   High   Court   respectively.   This   Court   reversed   the
judgments and decrees of the courts below as also of the High Court
and   held   that   the   plaintiff­respondent   could   not   substantiate   his
claim   of   perfection   of   title   by   adverse   possession.   Some   of   the
observations   made   on   the   issue   of   acquisition   of   title   by   adverse
possession   which   have   bearing   on   this   case   are   extracted   below:
(SCC p. 660, para 12)
            “12.   So   far   as   the   question   of   perfection   of   title   by   adverse
possession   and   that   too   in   respect   of   public   property   is
concerned, the question requires to be considered more seriously
and   effectively   for   the   reason   that   it   ultimately   involves
destruction  of  right/title  of  the  State  to  immovable   property and
conferring   upon   a   third­party   encroacher   title   where   he   had
none.   The   decision   in   P.   Lakshmi   Reddy   v.   L.   Lakshmi   Reddy,
AIR 1957 SC 314, adverted to the ordinary classical requirement
­   that   it   should   be   nec   vi,   nec   clam,   nec   precario   ­   that   is   the
possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity,
and   in   extent   to   show   that   it   is   possession   adverse   to   the
competitor.   It   was   also   observed   therein   that   whatever   may   be
the   animus   or   intention   of   a   person   wanting   to   acquire   title   by
adverse   possession,   his   adverse   possession   cannot   commence
until he obtains actual possession with the required animus.”
50.   Before   concluding,   we   may   notice   two   recent   judgments   in
which   law   on   the   question   of   acquisition   of   title   by   adverse
possession   has   been   considered   and   reiterated.   In   Annakili   v.   A.
Vedanayagam,   2007   (14)   SCC   308,   the   Court   observed   as   under:
(SCC p. 316, para 24)
        “24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the
possession   of   the   defendant   should   become   adverse   to   the
plaintiff;   and   (2)   the   defendant   must   continue   to   remain   in
possession   for   a   period   of   12   years   thereafter.   Animus
possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse

27
possession.   It   is   now   a   well­settled   principle   of   law   that   mere
possession  of  the land  would  not ripen into  possessory  title  for
the  said  purpose.  Possessor  must  have  animus  possidendi   and
hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner . For the said
purpose,   not   only   animus   possidendi   must   be   shown   to   exist,
but  the  same   must  be   shown   to  exist  at  the   commencement   of
the   possession.   He   must   continue   in   the   said   capacity   for   the
period   prescribed   under   the   Limitation   Act.   Mere   long
possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without
anything more does not ripen into a title.”
51.   In   P.T.   Munichikkanna   Reddy   v.   Revamma,   2007   (6)   SCC   59,
the Court considered various facets of the law of adverse possession
and   laid   down   various   propositions   including   the   following:   (SCC
pp. 66 & 68, paras 5 & 8)
x x x
8.   … to   assess  a claim of  adverse possession, two­pronged
enquiry  is required:
         1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially
"wilful neglect" element on part of the owner established. Successful
application   in   this   regard   distances   the   title   of   the   land   from   the
paper­owner.
               2.   Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the
adverse   possessor   effectively   shifts   the   title   already   distanced   from
the paper­owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in
favour   of   adverse   possessor   as   intent   to   dispossess   is   an   express
statement   of   urgency   and   intention   in   the   upkeep   of   the   property.
(emphasis in original) ”
(emphasis supplied)
21. In  P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma,  (2007) 6 SCC 59, this 
Court has observed as under:
2. The defendant­respondents in their written statement denied and
disputed the aforementioned assertion of the plaintiffs and pleaded
their  own   right,   title   and   interest   as   also   possession   in   or  over  the
said 1 acre 21 guntas of land.  The learned trial Judge decreed the
suit   inter   alia   holding   that   the   plaintiff­appellants   have
acquired   title   by   adverse   possession   as   they   have   been   in
possession of the lands in question for a period of more than 50
years .   On   an   appeal   having   been   preferred   thereagainst   by   the
respondents   before   the   High   Court,   the   said   judgment   of   the   trial
court was reversed holding:

28
“(i)   …   The   important   averments   of   adverse   possession   are
twofold. One is to recognise the title of the person against whom
adverse   possession   is   claimed.   Another   is   to   enjoy   the   property
adverse to the title­holder’s interest after making him known that
such enjoyment is against his own interest. These two averments
are basically absent in this case both in the pleadings as well as
in the evidence….
(ii)   The   finding   of   the   court   below   that   the   possession   of   the
plaintiffs   became   adverse   to   the   defendants   between   1934­36   is
again   an   error   apparent   on   the   face   of   the   record.   As   it   is   now
clarified before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that
the plaintiffs’ claim in respect of the other land of the defendants
is based on the subsequent sale deed dated 5­7­1936.
It is settled law that mere possession even if it is true for any
number of years will not clothe the person in enjoyment with the
title   by   adverse   possession.   As   indicated   supra,   the   important
ingredients of adverse possession should have been satisfied.”
6. Efficacy of adverse possession  law in most jurisdictions depends
on   strong   limitation   statutes   by   operation   of   which   right   to   access
the   court   expires   through   efflux   of   time.   As   against   rights   of   the
paper­owner,   in   the   context   of   adverse   possession,   there   evolves   a
set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has,
for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against
the   owner   of   the   property   who   has   ignored   the   property.   Modern
statutes   of   limitation   operate,   as   a   rule,   not   only   to   cut   off
one’s right to bring an action for the recovery of property that
has   been   in   the   adverse   possession   of   another   for   a   specified
time   but   also   to   vest   the   possessor   with   title.   The   intention   of
such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but
to protect those who have maintained the possession of property for
the   time   specified   by   the   statute   under   claim   of   right   or   colour   of
title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81.) It is important
to   keep   in   mind   while   studying   the   American   notion   of   adverse
possession,   especially   in   the   backdrop   of   limitation   statutes,   that
the   intention   to   dispossess   cannot   be   given   a   complete   go­by.
Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the
success of an adverse possession claim.
8.   Therefore,   to   assess   a   claim   of   adverse   possession,   two­pronged
enquiry is required:
1.   Application   of   limitation   provision   thereby   jurisprudentially
“wilful   neglect”   element   on   part   of   the   owner   established.
Successful   application   in   this   regard   distances   the   title   of   the
land from the paper­owner.
2.  Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the
adverse   possessor   effectively   shifts   the   title   already
distanced   from   the   paper­owner,   to   the   adverse   possessor.
Right   thereby   accrues   in   favour   of   adverse   possessor   as

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intent to dispossess is an express  statement of urgency and
intention in the upkeep of the property.
30. In Karnataka Wakf Board the law was stated, thus: (SCC p. 785,
para 11)
“11.   In   the   eye   of   the   law,   an   owner   would   be   deemed   to   be   in
possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non­use
of the property by the owner even for a long time won’t affect his
title. But  the position  will  be altered  when another person  takes
possession   of   the   property   and   asserts   a   right   over   it.   Adverse
possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile
title   in   denial   of   the   title   of   the   true   owner.   It   is   a   well­
settled   principle   that   a   party   claiming   adverse   possession
must   prove   that   his   possession   is   ‘nec   vi,   nec   clam,   nec
precario’,   that   is,   peaceful,   open   and   continuous.   The
possession   must   be   adequate   in   continuity,   in   publicity,   and   in
extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner.
It   must   start   with   a   wrongful   disposition   of   the   rightful   owner
and   be   actual,   visible,   exclusive,   hostile   and   continued   over   the
statutory   period.   (See   S.M.   Karim   v.   Bibi   Sakina,   Parsinni   v.
Sukhi and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka.) Physical
fact   of   exclusive   possession   and   the   animus   possidendi   to   hold
as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important
factors   that   are   to   be   accounted   in   cases   of   this   nature.   Plea   of
adverse   possession   is   not   a   pure   question   of   law   but   a   blended
one   of   fact   and   law.   Therefore,   a   person   who   claims   adverse
possession   should   show:   (a)   on   what   date   he   came   into
possession,   (b)   what   was   the   nature   of   his   possession,   (c)
whether the factum of possession was known to the other party,
(d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession
was   open   and   undisturbed.   A   person   pleading   adverse
possession   has   no   equities   in   his   favour.   Since   he   is   trying   to
defeat   the  rights  of   the  true   owner,   it   is   for  him  to  clearly  plead
and   establish   all   facts   necessary   to   establish   his   adverse
possession.”
22. In   State   of   Haryana   v.   Mukesh   Kumar   &  Ors.,   (2011)  10  SCC   404,
the   court   considered   the   question   whether   the   plaintiff   had   become   the
owner of the disputed property by way of adverse possession and in that
context considered the decisions in  Revamma  (supra) and  Fairweather v.
St.   Marylebone   Property   Co.   Ltd.   (1962)   2   AER   288   (HL)   and   Taylor   v.

30
Twinberrow   1930   All   ER   Rep   342   (DC)   and   observed   that   adverse
possession   confers   negative   and   consequential   right   effected   only   as
somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation
of   law.   Right   of   the   paper   owner   is   extinguished   and   that   competing
rights   evolve   in   favour   of   adverse   possessor   as   he   cared   for   the   land,
developed   it   as   against   the   owner   of   the   property   who   had   ignored   the
property. This Court has observed thus:
  “32.   This   Court   in   Revamma   (2007)   6   SCC   59   observed   that   to
understand the true nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v. St
Marylebone   Property   Co.   Ltd.   (1962)   2   All   ER   288   (HL)   can   be
considered   where   the   House   of   Lords   referring   to   Taylor   v.
Twinberrow   (1930)   2   K.B.   16   termed   adverse   possession   as   a
negative   and   consequential   right   effected   only   because   somebody
else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law.
As   against   the   rights   of   the   paper­owner,   in   the   context   of   adverse
possession,  there   evolves  a  set   of   competing  rights   in  favour  of  the
adverse  possessor who  has,  for a  long  period  of  time,  cared  for  the
land,   developed   it,   as   against   the   owner   of   the   property   who   has
ignored the property .”
(emphasis supplied)
23. In  Krishnamurthy S. Setlur (dead) by LRs. v. O.V. Narasimha Setty &
Ors.,   (2007)   3   SCC   569,   the   Court   pointed   out   that   the   duty   of   the
plaintiff   while   claiming   title   based   on   adverse   possession.   The   suit   was
filed by the plaintiff on 11.12.1981. The trial court held that the plaintiff
has perfected the title in the suit lands based on adverse possession, and
decreed   the   suit.   This   Court   has   observed   that   the   plaintiff   must   plead
and   prove   the   date   on   and   from   which   he   claims   to   be   in   exclusive,
continuous   and   undisturbed   possession.   The   question   arose   for

31
consideration   whether   tenant's   possession   could   be   treated   as
possession of the owner for computation of the period of 12 years under
the provisions of the Act. What is the nature of pleading required in the
plaint to constitute a plea of adverse possession has been emphasised by
this   Court   and   another   question   also   arose   whether   the   plaintiff   was
entitled to get back the possession from the defendants? This Court has
observed thus:
"12.   Section   27   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   operates   to   extinguish
the right to property of a person who does not sue for its possession
within   the   time   allowed   by   law.   The   right   extinguished   is   the   right
which   the   lawful   owner   has   and   against   whom   a   claim  for   adverse
possession   is   made,   therefore,   the   plaintiff   who   makes   a   claim   for
adverse   possession   has   to   plead   and   prove   the   date   on   and   from
which   he   claims   to   be   in   exclusive,   continuous   and   undisturbed
possession .   The   question   whether   possession   is   adverse   or   not   is
often one of simple fact but it may also be a conclusion of law or a
mixed   question  of  law  and  fact.   The  facts  found   must  be   accepted,
but   the   conclusion   drawn   from   them,   namely,   ouster   or   adverse
possession   is   a   question   of   law   and   has   to   be   considered   by   the
court.
13. As stated, this civil appeal arises from the judgment of the High
Court in RFA No. 672 of 1996 filed by the original defendants under
Section   96   CPC.   The   impugned   judgment,   to   say   the   least,   is   a
bundle of confusion. It quotes depositions of witnesses as findings.
It quotes findings of the courts below which have been set aside by
the   High   Court   in   the   earlier   round.   It   criticizes   the   findings   given
by   the   coordinate   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   earlier   round   of
litigation.   It   does   not   answer   the   question   of   law   which   arises   for
determination   in   this   case.   To   quote   an   example,   one   of   the   main
questions   which   arises   for   determination,   in   this   case,   is   whether
the tenant's possession could be treated as possession of the owner
in computation of the period of twelve years under Article 64 of the
Limitation   Act,   1963.   Similarly,   as   an   example,   the   impugned
judgment  does  not  answer the  question  as   to  whether  the   decision
of   the   High   Court   dated   14.8.1981   in   RSA   No.   545   of   1973   was   at
all   binding   on   the   LRs.   of   Iyengar/their   alienees.   Similarly,   the
impugned   judgment   does   not   consider   the   effect   of   the   judgment
dated 10.11.1961 rendered by the trial court in Suit No. 94 of 1956
filed   by   K.S.   Setlur   against   Iyengar   inter   alia   for   reconveyance   in
which   the   court   below   did   not   accept   the   contention   of   K.S.   Setlur

32
that the conveyance executed by Kalyana Sundram Iyer in favour of
Iyengar   was   a   benami   transaction.   Similarly,   the   impugned
judgment has failed to consider the effect of the observations made
by   the   civil   court   in   the   suit   filed   by   Iyengar   for   permanent
injunction   bearing   Suit   No.   79   of   1949   to   the   effect   that   though
Shyamala Raju was in possession and cultivation, whether he was a
tenant   under   Iyengar   or   under   K.S.   Setlur   was   not   conclusively
proved. Similarly, the impugned judgment has not at all considered
the effect of Iyengar or his LRs. not filing a suit on title despite being
liberty   given   to   them   in   the   earlier   Suit   No.   79   of   1949.   In   the
matter   of   adverse   possession,   the   courts   have   to   find   out   the   plea
taken   by   the   plaintiff   in   the   plaint.   In   the   plaint,   the   plaintiff   who
claims   to   be   owner   by   adverse   possession   has   to   plead   actual
possession. He has to plead the period and the date from which he
claims to be in possession. The plaintiff has to plead and prove that
his   possession   was   continuous,   exclusive   and   undisturbed   to   the
knowledge   of   the   real   owner   of   the   land.   He   has   to   show   a   hostile
title. He has to communicate his hostility to the real owner. None of
these   aspects   have   been   considered   by   the   High   Court   in   its
impugned   judgment.   As   stated   above,   the   impugned   judgment   is
under Section 96 CPC, it is not a judgment under Section 100 CPC.
As stated  above, adverse possession  or ouster is an inference to be
drawn  from  the facts  proved  (sic)  that work  is  of  the first  appellate
court.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. In  P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma,  (2007) 6 SCC 59, the
plaintiff   claimed   the   title   based   on   adverse   possession.   The   court
observed:
“5.   Adverse   possession   in   one   sense   is   based   on   the   theory   or
presumption   that   the   owner   has   abandoned   the   property   to   the
adverse   possessor   on   the   acquiescence   of   the   owner   to   the   hostile
acts   and   claims   of   the   person   in   possession.   It   follows   that   sound
qualities   of   a   typical   adverse   possession   lie   in   it   being   open,
continuous   and   hostile.   [See   Downing   v.   Bird   100   So.   2d   57   (Fla.
1958); Arkansas Commemorative  Commission  v.  City of Little Rock
227 Ark. 1085: 303 S.W. 2d 569 (1957); Monnot v. Murphy 207 N.Y.
240   100   N.E.   742   (1913);   City   of   Rock   Springs   v.   Sturm   39   Wyo.
494: 273 P. 908: 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929).
6.   Efficacy   of   adverse   possession   law   in   most   jurisdictions   depend
on   strong   limitation   statutes   by   operation   of   which   right   to   access
the   court   expires   through   efflux   of   time.   As   against   rights   of   the
paper­owner,   in   the   context   of   adverse   possession,   there   evolves   a

33
set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor who has,
for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against
the   owner   of   the   property   who   has   ignored   the   property.   Modern
statutes   of   limitation   operate,   as   a   rule,   not   only   to   cut   off   one's
right to bring an action for the recovery of property that has been in
the   adverse   possession   of   another   for   a   specified   time   but   also   to
vest the possessor with title.  The intention of such statutes is not to
punish   one   who   neglects   to   assert   rights   but   to   protect   those   who
have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by
the   statute   under   claim   of   right   or   colour   of   title.   (See   American
Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, Page 81). It is important to keep in mind
while   studying   the   American   notion   of   Adverse   Possession,
especially in the backdrop of Limitation Statutes, that the intention
to dispossess cannot be given a complete go by. Simple application
of   limitation   shall   not   be   enough   by   itself   for   the   success   of   an
adverse possession claim.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. In   Halsbury’s   Laws   of   England,   4 th
  Edn.,   Vol.   28,   para   777
positions of person in adverse possession has been discussed and it has
been   observed   on   the   basis   of   various   decisions   that   a   person   in
possession   has   a   transmissible   interest   in   the   property   and   after
expiration of the statutory period, it ripens as good a right to possession.
Para 777 is as under: 
“777.   Position   of   person   in   adverse   possession :   While   a   person
who   is   in   possession   of   land   without   title   continues   in   possession ,
then,   before   the   statutory   period   has   elapsed,   he   has   a
transmissible  interest   in  the  property   which  is  good   against  all  the
world   except   the   rightful   owner ,   but   an   interest   which   is   liable   at
any moment to be defeated by the entry of the rightful owner; and, if
that person is succeeded in possession by one claiming through him
who holds until the expiration of the statutory period, the successor
has   then   as   good   a   right   to   the   possession   as   if   he   himself   had
occupied for the whole period .”
(emphasis supplied)
26. In  Halsbury's Laws of England , extinction of title by the effect of the
expiration of the period of limitation has also been discussed in Para 783

34
and once right is lost to recover the possession, the same cannot be re­
vested by any re­entry or by a subsequent acknowledgment of title. Para
783 is extracted hereunder:
“783.   Extinction   of   title:   At   the   expiration   of   the   periods
prescribed   by   the   Limitation   Act   1939   for   any   person   to   bring   an
action   to   recover  land   (including   a   redemption   action)   or  an   action
to   enforce   an   advowson,   the   title   of   that   person   to   the   land   or
advowson   is   extinguished.   This   is   subject   to   the   special   provisions
relating to settled land and land held on trust and the provisions for
constituting   the   proprietor   of   registered   land   a   trustee   for   the
person   who   has   acquired   title   against   him.   The   extinguished   title
cannot afterward be revested either by re­entry or by a subsequent
payment   or   acknowledgment   of   title.   A   rent­charge   is   extinguished
when the remedy to recover it is barred ." 
(emphasis supplied)
27. Nature   of   title   acquired   by   adverse   possession   has   also   been
discussed   in   the   Halsbury’s   Laws   of   England   in   Para   785.     It   has   been
observed that adverse possession leaves the occupant with a title gained
by   the   fact   of   possession   and   resting   on   the   infirmity   of   the   rights   of
others to eject him. Same is a “good title”, both at law and in equity. Para
785 is also extracted hereunder:
“785 .   Nature   of   title   acquired :   The   operation   of   the   statutory
provision for the  extinction of title is merely negative; it extinguishes
the   right   and   title   of   the   dispossessed   owner   and   leaves   the
occupant with a title gained by the fact of possession and resting on
the infirmity of the right of others to eject him . 
                    A title gained by the operation of the statute is a good title,
both   at   law   and   in   equity,   and   will   be   forced   by   the   court   on   a
reluctant   purchaser .   Proof,   however,   that   a   vendor   and   those
through   whom   he   claims   have   had   independent   possession   of   an
estate   for   twelve   years   will   not   be   sufficient   to   establish   a   saleable
title without evidence to show the state of the  title at the  time that
possession commenced. If the contract for purchase is an open one,
possession for twelve years is not sufficient, and a full length of the
title is required. Although possession of land is prima facie evidence
of   seisin   in   fee,   it   does   not   follow   that   a   person   who   has   gained   a
title   to   land   from   the   fact   of   certain   persons   being   barred   of   their

35
rights   has   the   fee   simple   vested   in   himself;   for,   although   he   may
have gained an indefeasible title against those who had an estate in
possession, there may be persons entitled in reversion or remainder
whose rights are quite unaffected by the statute.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. In an article published in Harvard Law Review on "Title by Adverse
Possession"   by   Henry   W.   Ballantine,   as   to   the   question   of   adverse
possession   and   acquisition   of   title   it   has   been   observed   on   strength   of
various   decisions   that   adverse   possession   vests   the   possessor   with   the
complete   title   as   effectually   as   if   there   had   been   a   conveyance   by   the
former   owner.   As   held   in   Toltec   Ranch   Co.   v.   Cook ,   191   U.S.   532,   542
(1903). But the title is independent, not derivative, and “relates back” to
the   inception   of   the   adverse   possession,   as   observed.   (see   Field   v.
Peoples ,   180   Ill.   376,   383,   54   N.E.   304   (1899);   Bellefontaine   Co.   v.
Niedringhaus ,   181   Ill.   426,   55   N.E.   184   (1899).   Cf.   La   Salle   v.   Sanitary
District ,   260   Ill.   423,   429,   103   N.E.   175   (1913);   AMES,   LECTURES   ON
LEGAL   HIST .   197;   3   ANGLO­AMERICAN   ESSAYS ,   567).     The   adverse
possessor does not derive his title from the former owner, but from a new
source   of   title,   his   possession.   The   "investitive   fact”   is   the   disseisin   and
exercise of possession as observed in  Camp v. Camp , 5 Conn. 291 (1824);
Price   v.   Lyon,   14   Conn.   Conn.   279,   290   (1841);   Coal   Creek,   etc.   Co.   v.
East  Tenn.  I. & C. Co.,   105 Tenn. 563; 59 S.W. 634, 636 (1900).   It has
also   been   observed   that   titles   to   property   should   not   remain   uncertain

36
and   in   dispute,   but   that   continued   de   facto   exercise   and   assertion   of   a
right should be conclusive evidence of the  de jure  existence of the right.
29. In   Lala Hem Chand v. Lala Pearey Lal & Ors.,   AIR 1942 PC 64, the
question   arose   of   the   adverse   possession   where   a   trustee   had   been   in
possession for more than 12 years under a trust which is void under the
law, the Privy Council observed that if the right of a defendant owner is
extinguished   the   plaintiff   acquires   it   by   adverse   possession.   In   case   the
owner suffers his right to be barred by the law of limitation, the practical
effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the party in possession. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder: 
“…. The inference from the evidence as a whole is irresistible that it
was  with  his  knowledge  and  implied  consent that the building was
consecrated   as   a  Dharmasala   and   used   as   such  for  charitable   and
religious   purposes   and   that   Lala   Janaki   Das,   and   after   him,
Ramchand,   was   in   possession   of   the   property   till   1931.   As   forcibly
pointed out by the High Court in considering the merits of the case,
"during   the   course   of   more   than   20   years   that   this   building
remained   in   the   charge   of   Janaki   Das,   and   on  his   death  in   that  of
his   son,   Ramchand,   the   defendant   had   never   once   claimed   the
property   as   his   own   or   objected   to   its   being   treated   as   dedicated
property."   This   Board   held   in   ('66)   11   M.I.A.   345:   7   W.R.   21:   1
Suther.   676:   2   Sar.   284   (P.C.),   Gunga   Gobindas   Mundal   v.   The
Collector   of   the   Twenty   Four   Pergunnahs,   at   page   361,   that   if   the
owner   whose   property   is   encroached   upon   suffers   his   right   to   be
barred by the law of limitation the practical effect is the extinction of
his title in favour of the party in possession." Section 28, Limitation
Act, says : 
       “At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person
for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such
property   shall   be   extinguished."   Lala   Janaki   Das   and   Ramchand
having   held   the   property   adversely   for   upwards   of   12   years   on
behalf   of   the   charity   for   which   it   was   dedicated,   it   follows   that   the
title to it, acquired by prescription, has become vested in the charity
and that of the defendant, if he had any,  has become  extinguished
by operation of S. 28, Limitation Act. Their Lordships have no doubt

37
that the Subordinate Judge would also have come to the conclusion
that the title of the defendant has become barred by limitation, had
he not been of the view that Lala Janaki Das retained possession of
the suit property as trustee  for the benefit of the author of the trust
and his legal representatives, and that presumably S. 10, Limitation
Act, would apply to the case, though he does not specifically refer to
the   section.   For   the   above   reasons,   their   Lordships   hold   that   the
plaintiffs have established their title to the suit property by adverse
possession   for   upwards   of   12   years   before   the   defendant   obtained
possession   of   it;   and   since   the   suit   was   brought   in   January   1933 ,
within   so   short   a   time   as   two   years   of   dispossession,   the   plaintiffs
are entitled to recover it from the defendant, whose title to hold it if
he had any has become extinct by limitation, in whichever manner
he may have obtained possession permissively or by trespass.” 
(emphasis supplied)
30. In   Tichborne   v.   Weir,   (1892)   67   LT   735,   it   has   been   observed   that
considering   the  effect  of  limitation   is  not  that   the   right  of  one   person  is
conveyed to another, but that the right is extinguished and destroyed. As
the mode of conveying the title is not prescribed in the Act, the Act does
not   confer   it.   But   at   the   same   time,   it   has   been   observed   that   yet   his
“title under the Act is acquired” solely by the extinction of the right of the
prior   rightful   owner;   not   by   any   statutory   transfer   of   the   estate.   In   the
said case question arose for transfer of the lease formerly held by Baxter
to   Giraud   who   for   over   20   years   had   been   in   possession   of   the   land
without any acknowledgment to Baxter who had equitably mortgaged the
lease   to   him.   The   question   arose   whether   the   statute   transferred   the
lease   to   Giraud   and   he   became   the   tenant   of   the   landlord.   In   that
context,   the   aforesaid   observations   have   been   made.   It   has   been   held
what   is   acquired   would   depend   upon   what   right   person   has   against

38
whom   he   has   prescribed   and   acquisition   of   title   by   adverse   possession
would not more be than that. The lease is not transferred under a statute
but   by   the   extinguishment   of   rights.   The   other   person   ripens   the   right.
Thus,   the  decision   does   not  run   counter  to   the  various   decisions  which
have been discussed above and deals with the nature of title conferred by
adverse possession.
31. The   decision   in   Taylor   v.   Twinberrow,   (1930)   2   K.B.   16   has   also
been referred to submit to the contrary. In that case, also it was a case of
a   dispute   between   the   tenant   and   sub­tenant.   The   Kings   Bench
considered   the   effect   of   the   expiration   of   12   years'   adverse   possession
under section 7 of the Act of 1833 and observed that that does confer a
title, whereas its effect is merely negative to destroy the power of the then
tenant   Taylor   to   claim   as   a   landlord   against   the   sub­tenant   in
possession.   It   would   not   destroy   the   right   of   the   freeholder,   if   Taylor's
tenancy   was   determined,   by   the   freeholder,   he   could   eject   the   sub­
tenant.   Thus,   Taylor's   right   would   be   defeated   and   not   that   of   the
freeholder   who   was   the   owner   and   gave   the   land   on   the   tenancy   to
Taylor. In our opinion, the view is in consonance with the law of adverse
possession   as   administered   in   India.   As   the   basic   principle   is   that   if   a
person is having a limited right, a person against him can prescribe only
to acquire that limited right which is extinguished and not beyond that.

39
There is a series of decisions laying down this proposition of law as to the
effect of adverse possession as against limited owner if extinguishing title
of   the   limited   owner   not   that   of   reversion   or   having   some   other   title.
Thus,   the   decision   in   Taylor   v.   Twinberrow   (supra)   does   not   negate   the
acquisition of title by way of adverse possession but rather affirms it. 
32. The operation of the  statute of limitation  in giving a title is merely
negative; it extinguishes the right and title of the dispossessed owner and
leaves   the   occupant   with   a   title   gained   by   the   fact   of   possession   and
resting   on   the   infirmity   of   the   right   of   others   to   eject   him.   Perry   v.
Clissold   (1907) AC 73 has been referred to in   Nair Service Society Ltd. v.
K.C.   Alexander   (supra)   in   which   it   has   been   observed   that   it   cannot   be
disputed that a person in possession of   land in the assumed character
of   owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has
a perfectly  good title  against all  the world but the original  owner, and if
the   original   owner   does   not   come   forward   and   assert   his   title   by   the
process   of   law   within   the   period   prescribed   under   the   statute   of
limitation applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished and the
possessory owner acquires an absolute title. In  Ram Daan (Dead) through
LRs.   v.   Urban   Improvement   Trust,   (2014)   8   SCC   902,   this   Court   has
observed thus:

40
“11.   It   is   settled   position   of   law   laid   down   by   the   Privy   Council   in
Perry v. Clissold 1907 AC 73 (PC) (AC p. 79)
      “It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in
the   assumed   character   of   owner   and   exercising   peaceably   the
ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all
the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does
not   come   forward   and   assert   his   title   by   the   process   of   law
within the period  prescribed  by  the provisions of the Statute of
Limitations   applicable   to   the   case,   his   right   is   forever
extinguished,   and   the   possessory   owner   acquires   an   absolute
title.”
The above statement was quoted with the approval by this Court in
Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander , AIR 1968 SC 1165. Their
Lordships at para 22 emphatically stated: (AIR p. 1175)
      “22.  The   cases  of  the  Judicial  Committee   are   not  binding  on
us but we approve of the dictum in  Perry v. Clissold  1907 AC 73
(PC).””
33. The   decision   in   Fairweather   v.   St.   Marylebone   Property   Co.   Ltd .
(1962) 2 AER 288 (HL) has also been referred, to submit that adverse
possession is a negative concept where the possession had been taken
against the tenant, its operation was only to bar his right against men
in   possession.   As   already   discussed   above,   it   was   a   case   of   limited
right possessed by the tenant and a sub­tenant could only perfect his
right   against   the   tenant   who   inducted   him   as   sub­tenant   prescribed
against   the   tenant   and   not   against   the   freeholder.   The   decision   does
not run counter to any other decision discussed and is no help to hold
that plaintiff cannot take such a plea or hold that no right is conferred
by adverse possession. It may be a negative right but an absolute one.

41
It   confers   title   as   owner   in   case   extinguishment   is   of   the   right   of
ownership.
34. The plaintiff’s right to raise the plea of adverse possession has been
recognized   in   several   decisions   of   the   High   Court   also.   If   such   a   case
arises on the facts stated in the plaint and the defendant is not taken by
surprise as held in   Nepen Bala Debi v. Siti Kanta Banerjee , (1910) 8 Ind
Cas 41 (DB) (Cal),   Ngasepam Ibotombi Singh v. Wahengbam Ibohal Singh
& Anr ., AIR 1960 Manipur 16,  Aboobucker s/o Shakhi Mahomed Laloo v.
Sahibkhatoon , AIR 1949 Sindh 12,   Bata  Krista Pramanick  v. Shebaits  of
Thakur Jogendra Nath Maity & Ors ., AIR 1919 Cal. 339,  Ram Chandra Sil
&   Ors.   v.   Ramanmani   Dasi   &   Ors .   AIR   1917   Cal.   469,   Shiromani
Gurdwara   Parbhandhak   Committee,   Khosakotla   &   Anr.   v.   Prem   Das   &
Ors ., AIR 1933 Lah 25,  Rangappa Nayakar v. Rangaswami Nayakar , AIR
1925 Mad. 1005;  Shaikh Alimuddin v. Shaikh Salim , 1928 IC 81 (PC).
35. In   Pannalal   Bhagirath   Marwadi   v.   Bhaiyalal   Bindraban   Pardeshi
Teli ,   AIR   1937   Nagpur   281,   it   has   been   observed   that   in­between   two
trespassers,   one   who   is   wrongly   dispossessed   by   the   other   trespasser,
can   sue   and   recover   possession.   A   person   in   possession   cannot   be
dispossessed   otherwise   than   in   due   course   of   law   and   can   sue   for
injunction   for   protecting   the   possession   as   observed   in   Krishna   Ram

42
Mahale (dead) by L.Rs v. Shobha Venkat Rao , (1989) 4 SCC 131,  State of
U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh , (1989) 2 SCC 505.
36. In   Radhamoni Debi v. The Collector of Khulna & Ors . (1900) ILR 27
Cal. 943 it was observed that to constitute a possessory title by adverse
possession,   the   possession   required   to   be   proved   must   be   adequate   in
continuity in publicity, and in the extent to show for a period of 12 years.
37. In   Somnath   Burman   v.   S.P.   Raju,   (1969)   3   SCC   129,   the   Court
recognized the right of the plaintiff to such declaration of title and for an
injunction.  Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent,
the wrongdoer cannot resist suit on the ground that title and right are in
a third person.  Right to sue is available to the plaintiff against owners as
well as others by taking the plea of adverse possession in the plaint.
38. In   Hemaji   Waghaji   Jat   v.   Bhikhabhai   Khengarbhai   Harijan   &   Ors.,
(2009)   16   SCC   517,   relying   on   T.   Anjanappa   v.   Somalingappa   (2006)   7
SCC   570,   observed   that   title   can   be   based   on   adverse   possession.   This
Court has observed thus:
“23. This Court had an occasion to examine the concept of adverse
possession in  T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa,  2006 (7) SCC 570.
The   court   observed   that   a   person   who   bases   his   title   on   adverse
possession   must   show   by   clear   and   unequivocal   evidence   that   his
title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title
to   the   property   claimed.   The   court   further   observed   that:   (SCC
p.577, para 20)

43
“20….   The   classical   requirements   of   acquisition   of   title   by
adverse   possession   are   that   such   possession   in   denial   of   the
true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The
possession  must   be  open  and   hostile  enough  to  be  capable   of
being known by the parties interested in the property, though
it   is   not   necessary   that   should   be   evidence   of   the   adverse
possessor   actually   informing   the   real   owner   of   the   former's
hostile action.””
At   the   same   time,   this   Court   has   also   observed   that   the   law   of
adverse   possession   is   harsh   and   Legislature   may   consider   a   change   in
the law as to adverse possession.
39. In   the   light   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   when   we   consider   the
decision   in   Gurdwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat   Village   Sirthala   &   Anr .,
(2014) 1 SCC 669 decided by two­Judge Bench wherein a question arose
whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the suit land this Court
referred   to   the   Punjab   &   Haryana   High   Court   decision   on   Gurdwara
Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab   (2009) 154 PLR 756 and observed that
there cannot be ‘any quarrel’ to the extent that the judgments of courts
below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found
to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that
such   adverse   possession   has   matured   into   ownership.     The   discussion
made is confined to para 8 only.  The same is extracted hereunder:
“4. In so far as the first issue is concerned, it was decided in favour
of   the   plaintiff   returning   the   findings   that   the   appellant   was   in
adverse possession of the suit property since 13.4.1952 as this fact
had   been   proved   by   a   plethora   of   documentary   evidence   produced
by   the   appellant.   However,   while   deciding   the   second   issue,   the
court   opined   that   no   declaration   can   be   sought   on   the   basis   of
adverse possession inasmuch as adverse possession can be used as

44
a shield and not as a sword. The learned Civil Judge relied upon the
judgment   of   the   Punjab   and   Haryana   High   Court   in   Gurdwara
Sahib   Sannuali   v.   State   of   Punjab   (2009)   154   PLR   756   and   thus,
decided the issue against the plaintiff. Issue 3 was also, in the same
vein, decided against the appellant.
8.   There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of
the   courts   below   are   correct   and   without   any   blemish.   Even   if   the
plaintiff   is   found   to   be   in   adverse   possession,   it   cannot   seek   a
declaration  to  the effect that such adverse possession  has matured
into   ownership.   Only   if   proceedings   are   filed   against   the   appellant
and   the   appellant   is   arrayed   as   defendant   that   it   can   use   this
adverse possession as a shield/defence .”
(emphasis supplied)
It is apparent that the point whether the plaintiff can take the plea
of   adverse   possession   was   not   contested   in   the   aforesaid   decision   and
none out of the plethora of the aforesaid decisions including of the larger
Bench   were  placed   for   consideration   before   this  Court.  The   judgment  is
based upon the proposition of law not being questioned as the point was
not   disputed.   There   no   reason   is   given,   only   observation   has   been
recorded in one line.
40. It   is   also   pertinent   to   mention   that   the   decision   of   this   court   in
Gurudwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat   Village,   Sirthala   (supra)   has   been
relied upon in   State of Uttarakhand v.  Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj,
(2017) 9 SCC  579.   In the  said  case, no plea  of  adverse  possession was
taken nor issue was framed as such this Court held that in the absence
of pleading, issue and evidence of adverse possession suit could not have
been decreed on that basis.  Given the aforesaid, it was not necessary to
go into the question of whether the plaintiff could have taken the plea of

45
adverse   possession.   Nonetheless,   a   passing   observation   has   been   made
without   any   discussion   of   the   aspect   that   the   court   below   should   have
seen that declaration of ownership rights over the suit property could be
granted   to   the   plaintiff   on   strength   of   adverse   possession   (see:
Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, Sirthala ).  The Court observed:
“24. By no stretch of imagination, in our view, such a declaration of
ownership  over  the   suit  property  and  right  of  easement   over  a  well
could  be granted  by  the trial  court  in the plaintiff’s favour because
even   the   plaintiff   did   not   claim   title   in   the   suit   property   on   the
strength   of   “adverse   possession”.   Neither   were   there   any   pleadings
nor   any   issue   much   less   evidence   to   prove   the   adverse   possession
on   land   and   for   grant   of   any   easementary   right   over   the   well.   The
courts   below   should   have   seen   that   no   declaration   of   ownership
rights over the suit property could be granted to the plaintiff on the
strength   of   “adverse   possession”   (see      Gurdwara   Sahib      v.      Gram
Panchayat Village Sirthala,     (2014) 1 SCC 669.  The courts below also
should   have   seen   that   courts   can   grant   only   that   relief   which   is
claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint and such relief can be granted
only   on   the   pleadings   but   not   beyond   it.   In   other   words,   courts
cannot   travel   beyond   the   pleadings   for   granting   any   relief.   This
principle   is   fully   applied   to   the   facts   of   this   case   against   the
plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Again   in   Dharampal   (Dead)   through   LRs   v.   Punjab   Wakf   Board,
(2018)   11   SCC   449,   the   court   found   the   averments   in   counterclaim   by
the defendant do not constitute plea of adverse possession as the point of
start of adverse possession was not pleaded and Wakf Board has filed a
suit  in   the  year   1971  as   such   perfecting   title   by   adverse   possession   did
not   arise   at   the   same   time   without   any   discussion   on   the   aspect   that
whether   plaintiff   can   take   plea   of   adverse   possession.   The   Court   held

46
that in the counterclaim the defendant cannot raise this plea of adverse
possession.     This   Court   at   the   same   relied   upon   to   observe   that   it   was
bound   by   the   decision   in   Gurdwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat   Village
Sirthala   (supra) ,   and   logic   was   applied   to   the   counterclaim   also.     The
Court observed:
“28. In the first place, we find that this Court in  Gurdwara Sahib   v.
Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala,     (2014) 1 SCC 669        has held in para
8 that a plea of adverse possession cannot be set up by the plaintiff
to   claim   ownership   over   the   suit   property   but   such   plea   can   be
raised  by the defendant by way of defence  in his written statement
in answer to the plaintiff’s claim. We are bound by this view.
34. Applying the aforementioned principle of  law to the facts of the
case on hand, we find absolutely no merit in this plea of Defendant
1 for the following reasons:
34.1.   First,   Defendant   1   has   only   averred   in   his   plaint
(counterclaim) that he, through his father, was in possession of the
suit   land   since   1953.   Such   averments,   in   our   opinion,   do   not
constitute   the   plea   of   “adverse   possession”   in   the   light   of   law   laid
down by this Court quoted supra.
34.2. Second, it was not pleaded as to from which date, Defendant
1’s possession became adverse to the plaintiff (the Wakf Board).
34.3.   Third,   it   was   also   not   pleaded   that   when   his   adverse
possession was completed and ripened into the full ownership in his
favour.
34.4.   Fourth,   it   could   not   be   so   for   the   simple   reason   that   the
plaintiff   (Wakf   Board)   had   filed   a   suit   in   the   year   1971   against
Defendant   1's   father   in   relation   to   the   suit   land.   Therefore,   till   the
year   1971,   the   question   of   Defendant   1   perfecting   his   title   by
"adverse   possession"   qua   the   plaintiff   (Wakf   Board)   did   not   arise.
The plaintiff then filed present suit in the year 1991 and, therefore,
again the question of perfecting the title up to 1991 qua the plaintiff
did not arise.”
(emphasis supplied)

47
 42. In   State   of   Uttarakhand   v.   Mandir   Shri   Lakshmi   Siddh   Maharaj
(supra) and  Dharampal (dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board  (supra),
there is no discussion on the aspect whether the plaintiff can later take
the plea of adverse possession.   It does not appear that proposition was
contested   and   earlier   binding   decisions   were   also   not   placed   for
consideration of the Court.   As there is no independent consideration of
the question, we have to examine mainly the decision in  Gurdwara Sahib
v.   Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala  (supra).  
43. When   we   consider   the   decision   rendered   by   Punjab   &   Haryana
High Court in  Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli  (supra), which has been referred
by   this   Court   in   Gurudwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat,   Sirthala   (supra) ,
the   following   is   the   discussion   made   by   the   High   Court   in   the   said
decision: 
“10.   I   have   heard   learned   Counsel   for   the   parties   and   perused   the
record   of   the   appeal.   I   find   force   in   the   contentions   raised   by
learned   counsel   for   the   respondents.   In   Bachhaj   Nahar   v.   Nillima
Mandal   and   Anr.   J.T.   2008   (13)   S.C.   255   the   Hon'ble   Supreme
Court   has   authoritatively   laid   down   that   if   an   argument   has   been
given   up   or   has   not   been   raised,   same   cannot   be   taken   up   in   the
Regular   Second   Appeal.   It   is   also   relevant   to   mention   here   that   in
Bhim Singh and Ors. v. Zile Singh and Ors., (2006) 3 RCR Civil 97,
this Court has held that no declaration can be sought by a plaintiff
about   ownership   based   on   adverse   possession   as   such   plea   is
available   only   to   a   defendant   against   the   plaintiff.   Similarly,   in
R.S.A.   No.   3909   of   2008   titled   as   State   of   Haryana   v.   Mukesh
Kumar and Ors. (2009) 154 P.L.R. 753, decided on 17.03.2009 this
Court   has   also   taken   the   same   view   as   aforesaid   in   Bhim   Singh's
case (supra).”

48
There   is   no   independent   consideration.     Only   the   decision   of   the
same   High   Court   in   Bhim   Singh   &   Ors.     v.   Zila   Singh   &   Ors .   AIR   2006
P&H 195 has been relied upon to hold that no declaration can be sought
by the plaintiff based on adverse possession. 
44. In   Bhim   Singh   &   Ors.   (supra)   the   plaintiffs   had   filed   a   suit   for
declaration   and   injunction   claiming   ownership   based   on   adverse
possession. Defendants contended that plaintiffs were not in possession.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court in   Bhim Singh & Ors. v. Zila Singh &
Ors.  (supra) has assigned the reasons and observed thus:
"11. Under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, as suit for possession of
immovable   property   by   a   plaintiff,   who   while   in   possession   of   the
property   had   been   dispossessed   from   such   possession,   when   such
suit is based on previous possession and not based on title, can be
filed   within   12   years   from   the   date   of   dispossession.   Under   Article
65 of the Limitation Act, a suit for possession of immovable property
or   any   interest   therein,   based   on   title,   can   be   filed   by   a   person
claiming   title   within   12   years.   The   limitation   under   this   Article
commences   from   the   date   when   the   possession   of   the   defendant
becomes   adverse   to   the   plaintiff.   In   these   circumstances,   it   is
apparent that to contest a suit for  possession, filed by  a person on
the basis of his title, a plea of  adverse possession can be taken by a
defendant who is in hostile, continuous and open possession, to the
knowledge   of   the   true   owner,   if   such   a   person   has   remained   in
possession   for   a   period   of   12   years.   It,   thus,   naturally   has   to   be
inferred   that   plea   of   adverse   possession   is   a   defence   available   only
to   a   defendant.   This   conclusion   of   mine   is   further   strengthened
from   the   language   used   in   Article   65,   wherein,   in   column   3   it   has
been specifically mentioned : "when the possession of the defendant
becomes   adverse   to   the   plaintiff."   Thus,   a   perusal   of   the   aforesaid
Article   65   shows   that   the   plea   is   available   only   to   a   defendant
against   a   plaintiff.   In   these   circumstances,   natural   inference   must
follow that when such a plea of adverse possession is only available
to a defendant, then no declaration can be sought by a plaintiff with
regard to his ownership on the basis of an adverse possession.
12.   I   am   supported   by   a   judgment   of   Delhi   High   Court   in   1993   3
105   PLR   (Delhi   Section)   70,   Prem   Nath   Wadhawan   v.   Inder   Rai
Wadhawan.

49
13. The following observations made in the Prem Nath Wadhawan's
case (supra) may be noticed:
“I   have   given   my   thoughtful   consideration   to   the   submissions
made   by   the   learned   Counsel   for   the   parties   and   have   also
perused   the   record.   I   do   not   find   any   merit   in   the   contention   of
the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff has become
absolute   owner   of   the   suit   property   by   virtue   of   adverse
possession   as   the   plea   of   adverse   possession   can   be   raised   in
defence   in   a   suit   for   recovery   of   possession   but   the   relief   for
declaration that the plaintiff has become absolute owner, cannot
be granted on the basis of adverse possession.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has proceeded on the basis that
as per Article 65, the plea of adverse possession is available as a defence
to a defendant. 
45. Article 65 of the Act is extracted hereunder:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which
period begins to run
65. For   possession   of
immovable   property   or
any   interest   therein
based on title.
Explanation .—   For   the
purposes of this article—
(a) where the suit is by a
remainderman,   a
reversioner   (other   than   a
landlord)   or   a   devisee,
the   possession   of   the
defendant   shall   be
deemed   to   become
adverse   only   when   the
estate   of   the
remainderman,
reversioner or devisee, as
the   case   may   be,   falls Twelve years. When   the   possession
of   the   defendant
becomes   adverse   to
the plaintiff.

50
into possession; 
(b) where the suit is by a
Hindu or Muslim entitled
to   the   possession   of
immovable   property   on
the   death   of   a   Hindu   or
Muslim   female,   the
possession   of   the
defendant   shall   be
deemed   to   become
adverse   only   when   the
female dies;
(c)  where  the  suit  is  by  a
purchaser   at   a   sale   in
execution   of   a   decree
when   the   judgment­
debtor   was   out   of
possession   at   the   date   of
the   sale,   the   purchaser
shall   be   deemed   to   be   a
representative   of   the
judgment­debtor   who
was out of possession.
46. The   conclusion   reached   by   the   High   Court   is   based   on   an
inferential   process   because   of   the   language   used   in   the   III rd
  Column   of
Article 65.   The expression is used, the limitation of 12 years runs from
the   date   when   the   possession   of   the   defendant   becomes   adverse   to   the
plaintiff. Column No.3 of Schedule of the Act nowhere suggests that suit
cannot   be   filed   by   the   plaintiff   for   possession   of   immovable   property   or
any interest therein based on title acquired by way of adverse possession.
There   is   absolutely   no   bar   for   the   perfection   of   title   by   way   of   adverse
possession whether a person is suing as the plaintiff or being sued as a
defendant. The inferential process of interpretation employed by the High

51
Court is not at all permissible. It does not follow from the language used
in the statute.    The large number of decisions of this Court and various
other   decisions   of   Privy   Council,   High   Courts   and   of   English   courts
which   have   been   discussed   by   us   and   observations   made   in   Halsbury
Laws   based   on   various   decisions   indicate   that   suit   can   be   filed   by
plaintiff on the basis of title acquired by way of adverse possession or on
the basis of possession under Articles 64 and 65.  There is no bar under
Article   65   or   any   of   the   provisions   of   Limitation   Act,   1963   as   against   a
plaintiff who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession to sue
to   evict   a   person   or   to   protect   his   possession   and   plethora   of   decisions
are to the effect that by virtue of extinguishment of title of the owner, the
person   in   possession   acquires   absolute   title   and   if   actual   owner
dispossesses another  person after  extinguishment of his title, he can be
evicted   by   such   a   person   by   filing   of   suit   under   Article   65   of   the   Act.
Thus,   the   decision   of   Gurudwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat,   Sirthala
(supra)   and   of   the   Punjab   &   Haryana   High   Court   cannot   be   said   to   be
laying down the correct law. More so because of various decisions of this
Court to the contrary.
47. In   Gurudwara   Sahib   v.   Gram   Panchayat,   Sirthala   (supra)
proposition was not disputed.    A decision based upon concession cannot
be   treated   as   precedent   as   has   been   held   by   this   Court   in   State   of

52
Rajasthan   v.   Mahaveer   Oil   Industries ,   (1999)   4   SCC   357,   Director   of
Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao , (2002) 4 SCC 638,  Uptron India Limited
v.   Shammi   Bhan   (1998)   6   SCC   538.     Though,   it  appears   that   there   was
some expression of opinion since the Court observed there cannot be any
quarrel   that   plea   of   adverse   possession   cannot   be   taken   by   a   plaintiff.
The fact remains that the proposition was not disputed and no argument
to   the   contrary   had   been   raised,   as   such   there   was   no   decision   on   the
aforesaid aspect only an observation was made as to proposition of law,
which is palpably incorrect. 
48. The statute does not define adverse possession, it is a common law
concept,   the   period   of   which   has   been   prescribed   statutorily   under   the
law of limitation Article 65 as 12 years.  Law of limitation does not define
the   concept   of   adverse   possession   nor   anywhere   contains   a   provision
that   the   plaintiff   cannot   sue   based   on   adverse   possession.   It   only   deals
with limitation to sue and extinguishment of rights. There may be a case
where   a   person   who   has   perfected   his   title   by   virtue   of   adverse
possession is sought to be ousted or has been dispossessed by a forceful
entry   by   the   owner   or   by   some   other   person,   his   right   to   obtain
possession   can   be   resisted   only   when   the   person   who   is   seeking   to
protect his possession, is able to show that he has also perfected his title
by adverse possession for requisite period against such a plaintiff. 

53
49. Under Article 64 also suit can be filed based on the possessory title.
Law never intends a person who has perfected title to be deprived of filing
suit under Article 65 to recover possession and to render him remediless.
In   case   of   infringement   of   any   other   right   attracting   any   other   Article
such   as   in   case   the   land   is   sold   away   by   the   owner   after   the
extinguishment   of   his   title,   the   suit   can   be   filed   by   a   person   who   has
perfected   his   title   by   adverse   possession   to   question   alienation   and
attempt of dispossession.
50. Law of adverse possession does not qualify only a defendant for the
acquisition of title by way of adverse possession, it may be perfected by a
person who is filing a suit. It only restricts a right of the owner to recover
possession   before   the   period   of   limitation   fixed   for   the   extinction   of   his
rights   expires.     Once   right   is   extinguished   another   person   acquires
prescriptive   right   which   cannot   be   defeated   by   re­entry   by   the   owner   or
subsequent   acknowledgment   of   his   rights.     In   such   a   case   suit   can   be
filed by a person whose right is sought to be defeated.
51. In   India,   the   law   respect   possession,   persons   are   not   permitted   to
take   law  in   their   hands   and   dispossess   a   person   in   possession   by   force
as observed in   Late Yashwant Singh   (supra) by this Court.   The suit can
be filed only based on the possessory title for appropriate relief under the
Specific Relief Act by a person in possession.  Articles 64 and 65 both are

54
attracted in such cases as held by this Court in  Desh Raj v. Bhagat Ram
(supra).     In   Nair   Service   Society   (supra)   held   that   if   rightful   owner   does
not   commence   an   action   to   take   possession   within   the   period   of
limitation,   his   rights   are   lost   and   person   in   possession   acquires   an
absolute title. 
52. In  Sarangadeva Periya Matam v. Ramaswami Gounder , (supra), the
plaintiff’s suit for recovery of possession was decreed against Math based
on the perfection of the title by way of adverse possession, he could not
have been dispossessed by Math.  The Court held that under Article 144
read   with   Section   28   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1908,   the   title   of   Math
extinguished in 1927 and the plaintiff acquired title in 1927.  In 1950, he
delivered possession, but such delivery of possession did not transfer any
title   to   Math.     The   suit   filed   in   1954   was   held   to   be   within   time   and
decreed.
53.   There   is   the   acquisition   of   title   in   favour   of   plaintiff   though   it   is
negative conferral of right on extinguishment of the right of an owner of
the   property.     The   right   ripened   by   prescription   by   his   adverse
possession is absolute and on dispossession, he can sue based on ‘title'
as  envisaged  in the  opening  part under Article 65 of  Act.   Under  Article
65,   the   suit   can   be   filed   based   on   the   title   for   recovery   of   possession
within  12  years  of  the   start  of  adverse  possession,  if  any,  set  up  by  the

55
defendant.     Otherwise   right   to   recover   possession   based   on   the   title   is
absolute   irrespective   of   limitation   in   the   absence   of   adverse   possession
by   the   defendant   for   12   years.   The   possession   as   trespasser   is   not
adverse nor long possession is synonym with adverse possession.
54. In   Article   65   in   the   opening   part   a   suit   “for   possession   of
immovable property or any interest therein based on title” has been used.
Expression “title” would include the title acquired by the plaintiff by way
of   adverse   possession.     The   title   is   perfected   by   adverse   possession   has
been held in a catena of decisions.
55. We   are   not   inclined   to   accept   the   submission   that   there   is   no
conferral   of   right   by   adverse   possession.     Section   27   of   Limitation   Act,
1963 provides for extinguishment of right on the lapse of limitation fixed
to   institute   a   suit   for   possession   of   any   property,   the   right   to   such
property shall stand extinguished.  The concept of adverse possession   as
evolved   goes   beyond   it   on   completion   of   period   and   extinguishment   of
right   confers   the   same   right   on   the   possessor,   which   has   been
extinguished and not more than that.  For a person to sue for possession
would indicate that right has accrued to him in   presenti   to obtain it, not
in   futuro .     Any   property   in   Section   27   would   include   corporeal   or
incorporeal property.  Article 65 deals with immovable property.  

56
56. Possession   is   the   root   of   title   and   is   right   like   the   property.     As
ownership   is   also   of   different   kinds   of   viz.   sole   ownership,   contingent
ownership, corporeal ownership, and legal equitable ownership.   Limited
ownership or limited right to property may be enjoyed by a holder.  What
can   be   prescribable   against   is   limited   to   the   rights   of   the   holder.
Possession confers enforceable right under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act.    It has  to  be  looked  into  what kind   of  possession  is  enjoyed  viz.  de
facto   i.e.,   actual,   ‘de   jure   possession’,   constructive   possession,
concurrent possession over a small  portion of the property.   In case the
owner is in symbolic possession, there is no dispossession, there can be
formal,   exclusive   or   joint   possession.     The   joint   possessor/co­owner
possession is not presumed to be adverse.  Personal law also plays a role
to construe nature of possession.
57. The  adverse  possession  requires  all   the  three  classic  requirements
to   co­exist  at   the   same   time,   namely,   nec­vi   i.e.   adequate   in   continuity,
nec­clam   i.e. ,   adequate   in   publicity   and   nec­precario   i.e.   adverse   to   a
competitor,   in   denial   of   title   and   his   knowledge.     Visible,   notorious   and
peaceful so that if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts,
knowledge is attributed to him on the basis that but for due diligence he
would   have   known   it.     Adverse   possession   cannot   be   decreed   on   a   title
which is not pleaded.    Animus possidendi   under hostile colour of title is

57
required.     Trespasser’s   long   possession   is   not   synonym   with   adverse
possession.   Trespasser’s possession is construed to be  on behalf of the
owner,   the   casual   user   does   not   constitute   adverse   possession.     The
owner   can   take   possession   from   a   trespasser   at   any   point   in   time.
Possessor looks after the property, protects it and in case of agricultural
property   by   and   the   large   concept   is   that   actual   tiller   should   own   the
land who works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable.
The legislature in various States confers rights based on possession.
58. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of adverse
possession by two or more persons as the right is transmissible one.   In
our   opinion,   it   confers   a   perfected   right   which   cannot   be   defeated   on
reentry   except   as   provided   in   Article   65   itself.     Tacking   is   based   on   the
fulfillment   of   certain   conditions,   tacking   maybe   by   possession   by   the
purchaser,   legatee   or   assignee,   etc.   so   as   to   constitute   continuity   of
possession, that person must be claiming  through  whom  it is sought to
be tacked, and would depend on the identity of the same property under
the same right.  Two distinct trespassers cannot tack their possession to
constitute   conferral   of   right   by   adverse   possession   for   the   prescribed
period.  
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another
person   except   by   due   procedure   of   law   and   once   12   years'   period   of

58
adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and
the   possessory   owner   acquires   right,   title   and   interest   possessed   by
the   outgoing   person/owner   as   the   case   may   be   against   whom   he   has
prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or
interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as
a  shield  by   the  defendant  within  ken   of   Article   65  of  the   Act  and  any
person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a
suit   for   restoration   of   possession   in   case   of   dispossession.   In   case   of
dispossession   by   another   person   by   taking   law   in   his   hand   a
possessory   suit   can   be   maintained   under   Article   64,   even   before   the
ripening of title by way of adverse possession.  By perfection of title on
extinguishment of the owner’s title, a person cannot be remediless.  In
case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right
by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the
plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have
dispossessed   the   plaintiff   having   perfected   title   by   way   of   adverse
possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has
perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly,
under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a
plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and
maintain a suit.

59
60. When  we  consider the  law of adverse possession  as has  developed
vis­à­vis   to   property   dedicated   to   public   use,   courts   have   been   loath   to
confer the  right by adverse possession.    There  are instances  when  such
properties are encroached upon and then a plea of adverse possession is
raised.     In   Such   cases,   on   the   land   reserved   for   public   utility,   it   is
desirable   that   rights   should   not   accrue.     The   law   of   adverse   possession
may   cause   harsh   consequences,   hence,   we   are   constrained   to   observe
that   it   would   be   advisable   that   concerning   such   properties   dedicated   to
public   cause,   it   is   made   clear   in   the   statute   of   limitation   that   no   rights
can accrue by adverse possession.  
61. Resultantly,   we   hold   that   decisions   of   Gurudwara   Sahab   v.   Gram
Panchayat   Village   Sirthala   (supra)   and   decision   relying   on   it   in   State   of
Uttarakhand   v.   Mandir   Shri   Lakshmi   Siddh   Maharaj   (supra)   and
Dharampal   (dead)   through   LRs   v.   Punjab   Wakf   Board   (supra)   cannot   be
said to be laying down the law correctly, thus they are hereby overruled.
We   hold   that   plea   of   acquisition   of   title   by   adverse   possession   can   be
taken   by   plaintiff   under  Article   65   of   the  Limitation   Act  and  there  is   no
bar   under   the   Limitation   Act,   1963   to   sue   on   aforesaid   basis   in   case   of
infringement of any rights of a plaintiff.

60
62. Let   the   matters   be   placed   for   consideration   on   merits   before   the
appropriate Bench.
……………………..J.
(Arun Mishra)
 ……………………..J.
 (S. Abdul Nazeer)
New Delhi; .…………………….J.
August 07, 2019. (M.R. Shah)