2019 INSC 0655
                                      REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.30404­30442/2017
Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. …Petitioners
and others etc. etc.
versus
State of U.P. and others …Respondents
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.30455­30460/2017
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.23522­23530/2018
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Delay   of   193,   224   and   142   days   respectively   in   refiling   the
special leave petitions is condoned.
2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common
impugned   judgment   and   order   dated   2.4.1996   passed   by   the
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High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in   First   Appeal   No.
919/1993   and   other   allied   first   appeals,   the   respective   original
claimants – land owners have preferred the present special leave
petitions.
3. At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   there   is   an
inordinate   delay   of   7534,   7542   and   7886   days   respectively
(approximately   21   years)   in   preferring   the  special   leave   petitions
before   this   Court   challenging   the   impugned   common   judgment
and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court.   There   is   a   further   delay  of
193,   224   and   142   days   respectively   in   refiling   the   special   leave
petitions.
3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are
vehemently   opposed   by   the   respondents   herein.     Therefore,   this
Court   is   first   required   to   consider   and   decide   the
application/applications   submitted  by  the  petitioners/applicants
praying to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days
respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.
4. Shri   Rishi   Malhotra,   learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf
of   the   respective   petitioners   has   vehemently   submitted   that   the
lands   of   the   respective   petitioners   have   been   compulsorily
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acquired   under   the   provisions   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   and
therefore, they are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands
acquired.   It is submitted that the dispute is with respect to the
lands  acquired  of  village  Gulsitapur  and  Tilpta  which   are  only  4
kms.   away   from   village   Kasna.    It   is   submitted   that   the   location
wise the lands of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta were better located
and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – Dadri Road.
It   is   submitted   that   village   Kasna   is   4   kms.   behind   village
Gulsitapur.   It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village
Kasna,   Section   4   notification   was   issued   on   1.3.1989   and   the
compensation   was   awarded   @   Rs.65/­   per   square   yard,   which
has been confirmed by this Court vide order dated 05.12.2016.  It
is submitted that therefore the respective petitioners are entitled
to   the   fair   compensation   for   the   lands   acquired   of   village
Gulsitapur   and   Tilpta   at   par   with   the   land   owners   of   village
Kasna,   i.e.,   at   Rs.65/­   per   square   yard.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore   the   agriculturists/farmers   are   entitled   to   the   fair
compensation for the lands acquired.  It is submitted that for the
lands   compulsorily   acquired,   the   delay   should   not   defeat   the
valuable   rights   of   the   petitioners   to   get   fair   compensation.     It   is
submitted   that   the   petitioners   may   not   be   awarded   the   interest
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and   other   statutory   benefits   under   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   for
the period of delay.
4.1 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decisions of this Court in the cases of  Market Committee, Hodal v.
Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; Dhiraj Singh v. State
of  Haryana  reported   in  (2014)  14  SCC  127;  and  K.  Subbarayudu
v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12
SCC   840 ,   it   is   prayed   to   condone   the   delay   and   consider   the
special leave petitions on merits.
5. All   these   applications   are   vehemently   opposed   by   the
learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar
Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and
on   behalf   of   respondent   no.4   –   Greater   Noida   Industrial
Development Authority.     Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of
respondent   nos.   3   and   4   opposing   the   present   applications   for
condonation of delay.
5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delay of
approximately   21   years   in   preferring   the   special   leave   petitions.
It   is   submitted   that   at   no   point   of   time   earlier   the   respective
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petitioners made any grievance with respect to inadequacy of the
compensation as awarded by the High Court.  
5.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   respondents   that   as   such   no   sufficient   cause   has
been shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years.
It   is   submitted   that   merely   because   in   view   of   the   subsequent
decision   in   the   case   of   lands   acquired   of   another   village,   relying
upon   which   the   petitioners   have   preferred   the   present   petitions,
huge delay of approximately 21 years may not be condoned.
5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for
the respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed upon the
decisions   of   the   High   Court   and   this   Court   is   with   respect   to
entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too in respect
of   the   land   which   was   acquired   after   about   four   years   of
acquisition of the petitioners’ land.  It is submitted that therefore
the lands acquired of village Kasna are not comparable at all with
respect to the lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta.
5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned common
judgment   and   order   dated   2.4.1996   is   concerned,   as   such,   the
same   has   attained   finality.     It   is   submitted   that   not   only   the
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petitioners   accepted   the   compensation   but   after   the   said
judgment   was   delivered   by   the   High   Court   no   special   leave
petition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.
It   is   submitted   that   therefore   they   have   acquiesced   with   the
impugned common judgment and order of the High Court.
5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   respondents   that   any   attempt   by   the   present
petitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascading effect
where   every   one   whose   land   has   been   acquired   by   the   said
notification   with   respect   to   the   land   acquired   at   village
Gulsitapur   and   Tilpta   would   start   demanding   enhanced
compensation   @   Rs.65/­   per   square   yard.     It   is   submitted   that
similarly   the   other   land   owners   whose   land   has   been   acquired
though   at   different   villages   between   the   years   1985­1989,   too
start demanding the same rate of compensation.
5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   respondents   that   after   the   acquisition,   the   land   is
developed,   infrastructure   and   amenities   are   laid.   They   are
maintained. The developed land has been allotted decades ago.  It
is   submitted   that   the   rate   of   allotment   is   based   on   the   cost   of
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acquisition   and   the   amounts   spent   on   development,   laying   out
the infrastructure.   It is submitted that if the cost of acquisition
is increased, then how this cost would now be recovered from the
allottees after decades of allotment.  It is submitted therefore that
to   entertain   the   present   petitions   now   after   a   period   of
approximately   21   years   and   to   increase   the   amount   of
compensation would have a cascading effect.
5.7 It   is   further   submitted   that   it   is   disputed   and   denied   that
the   land   in   village   Gulsitapur   is   superior   to   the   land   in   village
Kasna. It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna is
located   on   the   main   road,   which   connects   Greater   Noida   to
Sikanderabad,   District   Bulandshar,   unlike   the   land   of   village
Gulsitapur which is in the interiors.
5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
Court   by   the   learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
petitioners,   referred   to   hereinabove,     is   concerned,   it   is
vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisions of
this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand.  It
is submitted that in the present case there is an inordinate delay
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of   approximately   21   years.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present
case the petitioners have failed to make out a sufficient cause to
condone   the   huge   delay   of   approximately   21   years   in   preferring
the special leave petitions. It is submitted that in the relied upon
cases this Court was satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay.  It
is submitted that in the relied upon cases the parity was claimed
with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and
it   was   pointed   out   that   due   to   poverty   and   financial   difficulty
some   of   the   land   owners   whose   land   was   acquired   under   the
same   notification   could   not   prefer   the   appeals   earlier   and   they
preferred   the   appeals   subsequently   and   claimed   parity   of
compensation   at   par   with   the   lands   acquired   under   the   very
notification.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the   present   case   the
petitioners   are   claiming   the   parity   in   compensation   with   respect
to   the   land   acquired   of   another   village   and   that   too   the   land   in
the   said   village   was   acquired   after   a   period   of   four   years   and
location   wise   etc.   the   lands   are   different.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to the facts of
the case on hand.
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5.9 Making   the   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the
present   applications   for   condonation   of   delay   and   consequently
dismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.
6. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
respective parties at length.
6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is
an   inordinate   delay   of   approximately   21   years   in   preferring   the
special   leave   petitions   before   this   Court   challenging   the
impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court
which   has   been   passed   in   the   year   1996.     It   is   required   to   be
noted   that   the   notification   under   Section   4   of   the   Land
Acquisition   Act   with   respect   to   the   land   situated   in   village
Gulsitapur   and   Tilpta   was   issued   in   the   year   1985;   possession
was   taken   over   in   the   month   of   January,   1987;   the   Land
Acquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988 awarding
compensation   at   the   rate   of   Rs.8­10   per   square   yard.     At   the
instance   of   the   petitioners   herein   ­   the   original   land   owners,
reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made
to the reference Court.  By judgment and award dated 22.3.1993,
the   reference   Court   enhanced   the   compensation   to   Rs.30/­   per
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square  yard.     However,  on   appeals  and   considering   the   material
on   record,   by   the   impugned   common   judgment   and   order,   the
High   Court   reduced   the   amount   of   compensation   to   Rs.   22­20
per square yard.   That thereafter, after a period of approximately
21 years, now the petitioners have preferred the present petitions
claiming compensation at par with the compensation awarded for
the   land   owners   of   another   village   Kasna.     It   is   required   to   be
noted   that   so   far   as   the   land   acquisition   of   village   Kasna   is
concerned,   notification   under   Section   4   of   the   Land   Acquisition
Act was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of four years and
it appears that in between certain developments have also taken
place.
7. Having   considered   the   averments   made   in   the
application/applications   for   condonation   of   delay,   we   are   of   the
opinion   that   as   such   the   petitioners   have   miserably   failed   to
make out a case to condone the huge delay of approximately  21
years.   No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge
delay   of   approximately   21   years.     It   is   required   to   be   noted   that
as such in the application itself it is submitted by the petitioners
that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court.   The
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only   explanation  in  approaching   this  Court  after  about   21  years
is given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:
“That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble
Court in time was the fact that it was only in December,
2016,   the   claimants   pertaining   to   village   Kasana   got   the
enhanced   compensation   from   this   Hon’ble   Court   to   the
tune of Rs.65/­ per sq. yard.  The petitioners herein came
to   know   about   the   said   fact   in   the   month   of   January,
2017   causing   not   only   lots   of   heartburn   but   spelling
miseries   over   them.     It   took   not   only   lots   of   courage   in
mustering   support   from   number   of   affected   families   but
also it took time for the petitioners to collectively file the
instant   special   leave   petition   claiming   not   only   the
enhanced   compensation   but   also   parity   with   regard   to
the   compensation   awarded   to   their   co­villagers   at   village
Kasana.”
7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there
is   a   reasonable   case   made   out   by   the   petitioners   to   get   the
enhanced   compensation   to   the   tune   of   Rs.65/­   per   square   yard,
but   fairly   enough  in   order   to   balance  the   equity,  this   Court  may
not grant interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court
i.e., 2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this
Court.     Except   the   explanation   in   paragraph   3,   reproduced
hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining
the huge delay of approximately 21 years.   Neither any poverty is
pleaded   nor   any   financial   difficulty   is   pleaded.     Nothing   is   on
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record   that   after   the   impugned   common   judgment   and   order   is
passed   by   the   High   Court,   the   petitioners   made   any
grievance/objection   with   respect   to   inadequacy   of   the
compensation determined by the High Court.  On the contrary, all
the   petitioners   have   accepted   the   compensation   as   per   the
judgment   and   award   passed   by   the   reference   Court   determining
the   compensation   at   the   rate   of   Rs.30/­   per   square   yard.     It
appears   that   with   respect   to   some   of   the   land   owners   even   the
execution   petitions   are   pending   with   respect   to   recovery   of   the
differential amount of compensation, determined by the reference
Court and the High Court as by the impugned common judgment
and   order   the   High   Court   has   reduced   the   compensation   from
Rs.30­/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/­ per sq. yard.   Be that as it may,
the fact remains that after the impugned common judgment and
order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at all is made by
the   petitioners   with   respect   to   inadequacy   of   the   compensation
determined   by   the   High   Court.   Thus,   it   can   be   said   that   for   a
period   of   approximately   21   years   no   grievance   was   made   by   the
petitioners.     Therefore,   considering   the   terms   of   doctrine   of
acquiescence,   the   petitioners   lose   their   right   to   complain.     This
principle   is   based   on   the   doctrine   of   acquiescence   implying   that
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in   such   a   case   the   party   who   did   not   make   any   objection
acquiesced   into   the   alleged   wrongful   act   of   the   other   party   and
therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.
8. The   matter   requires   examination   from   another   aspect,   viz.,
laches   and   delay.     It   is   a   very   recognised   principle   of
jurisprudence   that   a   right   not   exercised   for   a   long   time   is   non­
existent.     Even   when   there   is   no   limitation   period   prescribed   by
any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts
have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of
acquiescence   and   non­suited   the   litigants   who   approached   the
court   belatedly   without   any   justifiable   explanation   for   bringing
the   action   after   unreasonable   delay.     In   those   cases,   where   the
period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be
brought before the court,  if the action is not brought within that
prescribed   period,   the   aggrieved   party   loses     remedy   and   cannot
enforce   his   legal   right   after   the   period   of   limitation   is   over,
however,   subject   to   the   prayer   for   condonation   of   delay   and   if
there is a justifiable explanation for  bringing  the action after  the
prescribed   period   of   limitation   is   over   and   sufficient   cause   is
shown,   the   court   may   condone   the   delay.     Therefore,   in   a   case
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where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not
brought   within   the   period   of   limitation   and   subsequently
proceedings are initiated after  the  period of limitation  along  with
the   prayer   for   condonation   of   delay,   in   that   case,   the   applicant
has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay
with a  proper  explanation.    It  is not  that in  each  and  every   case
despite   the   sufficient   cause   is   not   shown   and   the   delay   is   not
properly   explained,   the   court   may   condone   the   delay.     To   make
out   a   case   for   condonation   of   delay,   the   applicant   has   to   make
out   a   sufficient   cause/reason   which   prevented   him   in   initiating
the proceedings within the period of limitation.  Otherwise, he will
be   accused   of   gross   negligence.     If   the   aggrieved   party   does   not
initiate   the   proceedings   within   the   period   of   limitation   without
any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of
unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such
person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order.   These
principles   are   based   on   the   principles   relatable   to   sound   public
policy that if a person does not exercise his right for  a long  time
then such right is non­existent.
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9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this
Court   in   the   cases   of   Market   Committee,   Hodal   (supra);   Dhiraj
Singh   (supra);   and   K.   Subbarayudu   (supra) ,   relied   upon   by   the
learned   Advocate   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   petitioners   is
concerned, having gone through the said decisions, we are of the
opinion that none of the said decisions shall be applicable to the
facts   of   the   case   on   hand   and/or   the   said   decisions   shall   be   of
any   assistance to  the  petitioners.   First  of  all, in  the relied  upon
cases,   there   was   no   such   inordinate   delay   of   approximately   21
years.     In   the   relied   upon   cases,   this   Court   was   satisfied   on   the
sufficient   cause   for   delay.     In   the   relied   upon   cases,   parity   was
claimed   with   respect   to   the   land   acquired   under   the   very
notification   and   it   was   pointed   out   that   due   to   poverty   and
financial   difficulty   some   of   the   land   owners   whose   land   was
acquired under the same notification could not prefer the appeals
earlier   and   thereafter   they   preferred   the   appeals   subsequently
and claimed parity of compensation at par with the land acquired
under  the same notification.    It is  also required  to  be  noted  that
as   such   in   none   of   the   aforesaid   decisions,   this   Court   had   dealt
with   and/or   considered   the   adverse   impact/effect   on   the
State/acquiring   body   if   after   inordinate   delay/laches   the
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State/acquiring   body   is   directed   to   pay   the   enhanced   amount   of
compensation.     In   the   present   case,   lands   were   acquired   as   far
back   as   in   the   year   1985   and   the   award   by   the   Special   Land
Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988.   The reference
Court   enhanced   the   amount   of   compensation   to   Rs.30/­   per
square yard, which came to be reduced by the High Court by the
impugned   common   judgment   and   order   in   the   year   1996.     It   is
required   to   be   noted   that   the   lands   were   acquired   for   Industrial
development   purposes.     That   after   the   acquisition,   the   land   has
been   developed,   infrastructure   and   amenities   are   laid   and   the
developed   land   has   been   allotted   approximately   before   30   years.
It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that the rate of
allotment   was   based   on   the   cost   of   acquisition   and   the   amount
spent on development, laying out the infrastructure.  Therefore, if
the   cost   of   acquisition   is   increased   now   and   the   State/acquiring
body   is   directed   to   pay   enhanced   compensation,   in   that   case,   it
would   be   very   difficult   to   recover   the   difference   of   amount   of
compensation   from   the   allottees   after   decades   of   allotment.     The
acquiring   body   will   have   to   make   additional   budgetary   provision
and   as   observed   hereinabove   it   would   be   very   difficult   for   the
acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from the
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allottees after so many years.  All these aspects and the cascading
effect on the State/acquiring  body if they  are directed to pay  the
additional   compensation   after   number   of   years,   have   not   been
considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by
the   learned   Advocate   for   the   petitioners.     Even   if   the   petitioners
are denied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the
delayed   period   as   requested   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioners, in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to
pay the enhanced amount of compensation after number of years
(21   years)   would   be   unreasonable   and   would   have   a   financial
burden upon them and as observed hereinabove it would be very
difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover the same from the
allottees.     Under   the   circumstances,   none   of   the   aforesaid
decisions   shall   be   applicable   to   the   facts   of   the   case   on   hand
and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.
10. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   we
refuse   to   condone   the   huge   delay   of   7534,   7542   and   7886   days
respectively   in  filing   the special leave petitions.   Accordingly, the
applications   for   condonation   of   delay   stand   dismissed.
Consequently,   all   these   special   leave   petitions   are   dismissed   on
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the   ground   of   limitation.     However,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………..J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
……………………………………J.
[S. ABDUL NAZEER]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J.
AUGUST 08, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]
  
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