2020 INSC 0669
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.79 OF 2020
(arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.9618 of 2018)
MOHAMMED SIDDIQUE & ANR.  … APPELLANTS
Versus
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Aggrieved   by   the   order   of   the   High   Court   reducing   the
compensation   awarded   by   the   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal   from
the   sum   of   Rs.11,66,800/­   to   Rs.4,14,000/­,   the   parents   of   the
deceased­accident victim have come up with the above appeal.
3. We   have   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   and   the
learned counsel for the Insurance Company.

4. Admittedly,   the   son   of   the   appellants   who   was   aged   about   23
years, died on 7.09.2008 as a result of the injuries sustained in a road
traffic   accident   that   took   place   on   5.09.2008.   It   appears   that   the
victim   was   one   of   the   2   pillion   riders   on   a   motor   cycle   and   he   was
thrown   off   the   vehicle   when   a   car   hit   the   motor   cycle   from   behind.
The   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal   found   that   the   accident   was
caused   due   to   the   rash   and   negligent  driving   of   the   car.   This   finding
was confirmed by the High Court, though with a rider that the victim
was also guilty of contributory negligence, in as much as there were 3
persons   on   the   motor   cycle   at   the   time   of   the   accident,   requiring   a
reduction of 10% of the compensation awarded.
5. On   the   question   of   quantum   of   compensation,   the   appellants
claimed   that   their   son   was   aged   23   years   at   the   time   of   the   accident
and   that   he   was   employed   in   a   proprietary   concern   on   a   monthly
salary   of   Rs.9600/­.     The   employer   was   examined   as   PW­2   and   the
certificate issued by him was marked as  Ex.P­1/8 .  Finding no reason
to disbelieve the testimony of PW­2, the Tribunal applied a multiplier
of   18   and   arrived   at   a   sum   of   Rs.10,36,800/­   towards   loss   of
dependency,   after   deducting   50%   of   the   salary   towards   personal
expenses,   as   the   deceased   victim   was   a   bachelor.   In   addition,   the
2

Tribunal   also   allowed   a   sum   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   for   loss   of   love   and
affection;   Rs.20,000/­   for   the   performance   of   last   rites   and
Rs.10,000/­ towards loss of Estate.  Accordingly, the Tribunal arrived
at an amount of Rs.11,66,800/­ as the total compensation payable.
6. As   against   the   said   award,   the   Insurance   Company   filed   a
statutory   appeal   under   Section   173   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988.
The appeal was primarily on two grounds  namely  (i) that the deceased
was   guilty   of   contributory   negligence   inasmuch   as   he   was   riding   on
the pillion  of the motor cycle with two other persons and (ii) that the
employment   and   income   of   the   deceased   were   not   satisfactorily
established.
7. On the first ground, the High Court held that though the motor
cycle in which the deceased victim was riding was hit by the speeding
car   from   behind,   the   deceased   was   also   guilty   of   contributory
negligence,   as   he   was   riding   a   motor   cycle   with   two   other   persons.
Therefore,   the   High   Court   came   to   the   conclusion   that   an   amount
equivalent   to   10%   has   to   be   deducted   towards   contributory
negligence.  
8. On the second issue, the High Court held that the employer did
not produce any records to substantiate the quantum of salary paid to
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the deceased and that therefore the income of the deceased may have
to   be   assessed   only   on   the   basis   of   minimum   wages,   payable   to
unskilled   workers   at   the   relevant   point   of   time.   Accordingly   the   High
Court fixed the income of the deceased at the time of the accident as
Rs.3683/­   per   month,   which   was   the   minimum   wages   for   unskilled
workers at that time.
9. Insofar   as   the   issue   of   multiplier   is   concerned,   the   High   Court
applied   the   multiplier   of   14   instead   of   the   multiplier   of   18,   on   the
basis   of   the   ratio   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   UPSRTC   Vs.   Trilok
Chandra 1
, to the effect that the choice of the multiplier should go by
the age of the deceased or that of the claimants, whichever is higher.
As   a   result,   the   High   Court   took   Rs.3,683/­   as   the   monthly   income,
allowed   a   deduction   of   50%   on   the   same   towards   personal   expenses,
applied a multiplier of 14 and arrived at an amount of Rs.3,10,000/­.
The award of Rs.1,00,000/­ towards loss of love and affection granted
by   the   Tribunal   was   confirmed   by   the   High   Court   but  the   amount  of
Rs.10,000/­   each   awarded   towards   funeral   expenses   and   loss   of
Estate were enhanced to Rs.25,000/­ each.
1    (1996) 4 SCC 362
4

10. Thus, the High Court arrived at a total amount of Rs.4,60,000/­
(Rs.3,10,000/­   towards   loss   of   dependency;   Rs.1,00,000/­   towards
loss   of   love   and   affection;   Rs.25000/­   towards   funeral   expenses   and
Rs.25,000/­  towards loss of Estate). Out of the said amount, the High
Court   deducted   10%   towards   contributory   negligence   and   fixed   the
compensation   payable   at   Rs.4,14,000/­   (Rs.4,60,000/­   minus
Rs.46,000/­).   Aggrieved   by   this   drastic   reduction   in   the   quantum   of
compensation, the claimants are before us.
11. As   could   be   seen   from   the   above   narration,   the   High   Court
interfered   with   the   award   of   the   Tribunal,   on   3   counts,   namely   (i)
contributory   negligence;   (ii)   monthly   income   of   the   deceased   and   (iii)
the   multiplier   to   be   applied.   Therefore,   let   us   see   whether   the   High
Court was right in respect of each of these counts.
12. It is seen from the material on record that the accident occurred
at about 2:00 a.m. on 5.09.2008.   Therefore, there was no possibility
of   heavy   traffic   on   the   road.   The   finding   of   fact   by   the   Tribunal,   as
confirmed   by   the   High   Court,   was   that   the   motor   cycle   in   which   the
deceased   was   travelling,   was   hit   by   the   car   from   behind   and   that
therefore   it   was   clear   that   the   accident   was   caused   by   the   rash   and
negligent   driving   of   the   car.   In   fact,   the   High   Court   confirms   in
5

paragraph 4 of the impugned order that the motor cycle was hit by the
car from behind.  But it nevertheless holds that 3 persons on a motor
cycle   could   have   added   to   the   imbalance.   The   relevant   portion   of
paragraph 4 of the order of the High Court reads as follows:
“On   careful   assessment   of   the   evidence   led,   this   Court
finds   substance   in   the   plea   of   the   insurance   company.
While   it   is   correct   that   the   offending   car   had   no
business   to   strike   from   behind   against   the   motor­cycle
moving   ahead   of   it,   even   if   the   motor   cycle   was
changing  lane   to   allow  another  vehicle   to   overtake,  the
fact that a motor vehicle meant  for only two persons to
ride   was   carrying,   besides   the   driver,   two   persons   on
the   pillion   would   undoubtedly   have   added   to   the
imbalance.”
13. But the above reason, in our view, is flawed.   The fact that the
deceased was riding on a motor cycle along with the driver and
another,   may   not,   by   itself,   without   anything   more,   make   him
guilty   of   contributory   negligence .   At   the   most   it   would   make   him
guilty   of   being   a   party   to   the   violation   of   the   law.   Section   128   of   the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, imposes a restriction on the driver of a two­
wheeled motor cycle, not to carry more than one person on the motor
cycle.   Section   194­C   inserted   by   the   Amendment   Act   32   of   2019,
prescribes   a   penalty   for   violation   of   safety   measures   for   motor   cycle
drivers   and   pillion   riders.   Therefore,   the   fact   that   a   person   was   a
pillion   rider   on   a   motor   cycle   along   with   the   driver   and   one   more
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person on the pillion, may be a violation of the law. But such violation
by   itself,   without   anything   more,   cannot   lead   to   a   finding   of
contributory   negligence,   unless   it   is   established   that   his   very   act   of
riding   along   with   two   others,   contributed   either   to   the   accident   or   to
the impact of the accident upon the victim.   There  must  either  be a
causal   connection   between   the   violation   and   the   accident   or   a
causal   connection   between   the   violation   and   the   impact   of   the
accident   upon   the   victim .   It   may   so   happen   at   times,   that   the
accident could have been averted or the injuries sustained could have
been of a lesser degree, if there had been no violation of the law by the
victim.   What  could   otherwise   have   resulted   in   a   simple   injury,   might
have resulted in a grievous injury or even death due to the violation of
the   law   by   the   victim.   It   is   in   such   cases,   where,   but   for   the
violation of the law, either the accident could have been averted
or   the   impact   could   have   been   minimized,   that   the   principle   of
contributory  negligence could be invoked . It is not the case of the
insurer   that   the   accident   itself   occurred   as   a   result   of   three   persons
riding on a motor cycle. It is not even the case of the insurer that the
accident would have been averted, if three persons were not riding on
the motor cycle. The fact that the motor cycle was hit by the car from
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behind, is admitted. Interestingly, the finding recorded by the Tribunal
that   the   deceased   was   wearing   a   helmet   and   that   the   deceased   was
knocked   down   after   the   car   hit   the   motor   cycle   from   behind,   are   all
not   assailed.   Therefore,   the   finding   of   the   High   Court   that   2   persons
on the pillion of the motor cycle, could have added to the imbalance, is
nothing   but   presumptuous   and   is   not   based   either   upon   pleading   or
upon the evidence on record. Nothing was extracted from PW­3 to the
effect that 2 persons on the pillion added to the imbalance.
14. Therefore,   in   the   absence   of   any   evidence   to   show   that   the
wrongful   act   on   the   part   of   the   deceased   victim   contributed   either   to
the   accident   or   to   the   nature   of   the   injuries   sustained,   the   victim
could not have been held guilty of contributory negligence.  Hence the
reduction   of   10%   towards   contributory   negligence,   is   clearly
unjustified and the same has to be set aside.
15. The  second  issue  on  which  the  High  Court reversed  the  finding
of   the   tribunal,   related   to   the   employment   of   the   deceased   and   the
monthly   income   earned   by   him.   According   to   the   claimants,   the
deceased was aged 23 years at the time of the accident and he was not
even   a   matriculate.   But   he   was   stated   to   have   been   employed   in   a
proprietary   concern   named   M/s   Chandra   Apparels   on   a   monthly
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salary of Rs.9600/­.  The sole proprietor of the concern was examined
as   PW­2   and   the   salary   certificate   was   marked   as   Ex.PW­1/8.   The
Tribunal   which   had   the   benefit   of   recording   the   evidence   and   which
consequently   had   the   benefit   of   observing   the   demeanour   of   the
witness,   specifically   recorded   a   finding   that   there   was   no   reason   to
discard the testimony of PW­2.
16. But   unfortunately   the   High   Court   thought   that   the   employer
should   have   produced   salary   vouchers   and   other   records   including
income tax returns, to substantiate the nature of the employment and
the   monthly   income.   On   the   ground   that   in   the   absence   of   other
records,   the   salary   certificate   and   the   oral   testimony   of   the   employer
could not be accepted, the High Court proceeded to take the minimum
wages   paid   for   the   unskilled   workers   at   the   relevant  point  of   time   as
the benchmark.
17. But   we   do   not   think   that   the   approach   adopted   by   the   High
court could be approved.  To a specific question in cross­examination,
calling   upon  PW­2  to   produce   the  salary   vouchers,  he  seems  to  have
replied that his business establishment had been wound up and that
the   records   are   not   available.   This   cannot   be   a   ground   for   the   High
Court to hold that the testimony of PW­2 is unacceptable.  
9

18. The High Court ought to have appreciated that the Court of first
instance was in a better position to appreciate the oral testimony.  So
long   as   the   oral   testimony   of   PW­2   remained   unshaken   and   hence
believed   by   the   Court   of   first   instance,   the   High   Court   ought   not   to
have rejected his evidence. After all, there was no allegation that PW­2
was   set   up   for   the   purposes   of   this   case.   There   were   also   no
contradictions   in   his   testimony.   As   against   the   testimony   of   an
employer   supported   by   a   certificate   issued   by   him,   the   High   Court
ought   not   to   have   chosen   a   theoretical   presumption   relating   to   the
minimum   wages   fixed   for   unskilled   employment.   Therefore,   the
interference made by the High Court with the findings of the Tribunal
with regard to the monthly income of the deceased, was uncalled for.
19. Coming  to  the last issue  relating  to  the multiplier,  the Tribunal
applied the multiplier of 18, on the basis of the age of the deceased at
the time of the accident. But the High Court applied a multiplier of 14
on   the   ground   that  the   choice   of   the   multiplier   should   depend   either
upon the age of the victim or upon the age of the claimants, whichever
is higher. According to the High court, this was the ratio laid down in
General  Manager,   Kerala   SRTC   Vs   Susamma   Thomas 2
  ,  and   that
2   (1994) 2 SCC 176,
10

the same was also approved by a three Member Bench of this Court in
UPSRTC Vs. Trilok Chandra  (supra).
20. The High Court also noted that the choice of the multiplier with
reference to the age of the deceased alone, approved in   Sarla Verma
&   Ors.   Vs.   Delhi   Transport   Corporation   &   Anr. 3
,   was   found
acceptance in two subsequent decisions namely   (1)     Reshmi Kumari
&   Ors.   Vs.   Madan   Mohan   &   Anr . 4
    and   (2)     Munna   Lal   Jain     Vs.
Vipin   Kumar   Sharma 5
.   But   the   High   court   thought   that   the
decisions   in   Susamma   Thomas   and   Trilok   Chandra   were   directly   on
the point in relation to the choice of the multiplier and that the issue
as   envisaged   in   those   2   decisions   was   neither   raised   nor   considered
nor adjudicated upon in  Sarla Verma.  According to the High court, the
impact   of   the   age   of   the   claimants,   in   cases   where   it   is   found   to   be
higher than that of the deceased, did not come up for consideration in
Reshma   Kumari   and   Munnal   Lal   Jain.   Therefore,   the   High   court
thought   that   it   was   obliged   to   follow   the   ratio   laid   down   in   Trilok
Chandra. 
3    (2009) 6 SCC 121
4   (2013) 9 SCC 65
5    JT 2015 (5) SC 1
11

21.  But unfortunately the High Court failed to note that the decision
in   Susamma   Thomas   was   delivered   on   06­01­1993,   before   the
insertion   of   the   Second   Schedule   under   Act   54   of   1994.   Moreover
what the Court was concerned in   Susamma Thomas   was whether the
multiplier   method   involving   the   ascertainment   of   the   loss   of
dependency   propounded   in   Davies   v.   Powell   (1942)   AC   601   or   the
alternative   method   evolved   in   Nance   v.   British   Columbia   Electric
Supply Co. ltd (1951) AC 601  should be followed. 
22.  Trilok   Chandra   merely   affirmed   the   principle   laid   down   in
Susamma Thomas   that the multiplier method is the sound method of
assessing   compensation   and   that   there   should   be   no   departure   from
the   multiplier   method   on   the   basis   of   section   110B   of   the   1939   Act.
Trilok   Chandra   also   noted   that   the   Act   stood   amended   in   1994   with
the  introduction  of  section  163A  and  the  second  schedule.  Though  it
was   indicated   in   Trilok   Chandra   (in   the   penultimate   paragraph)   that
the selection of the multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent
on the age of the deceased, the question of choice between the age of
the deceased and the age of the claimant was not the issue that arose
directly for consideration in that case. 
12

23.  But   Sarla   Verma ,   though   of   a   two   member   Bench,   took   note   of
Susamma  as well as  Trilok Chandra  and thereafter held in paragraphs
41 and 42 as follows:
  “41.   Tribunals/   courts   adopt   and   apply   different
operative   multipliers.   Some   follow   the   multiplier   with
reference to Susamma Thomas [set out in Column (2) of
the   table   above];   some   follow   the   multiplier   with
reference to Trilok Chandra, [set out in Column (3) of the
above];   some   follow   the   multiplier   with   reference   to
Charlie [set out in Column (4) of the table above]; many
follow   the   multiplier   given   in   the   second   column   of   the
table in the Second Schedule of the MV Act [extracted in
column   (5)   of   the   table   above];   and   some   follow   the
multiplier   actually   adopted   in   the   Second   schedule
while calculating the quantum of compensation [set out
in   column   (6)   of   the   table   above].   For   example,   if   the
deceased  is  aged  38  years, the  multiplier would  be  12
as per Susamma Thomas, 14 as per Trilok Chandra, 15
as   per   Charlie,   or   16   as   per   the   multiplier   given   in
Column (2)  of the Second  schedule to  the  MV  Act  or 15
as   per   the   multiplier   actually   adopted   in   the   second
schedule to the MV Act. some Tribunals as in this case,
apply the multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of
service with reference to the retiring age. It is necessary
to   avoid   this   kind   of   inconsistency.   We   are   concerned
with   cases   falling   under   section   166   and   not   under
section   163A   of   the   MV   Act.   in   cases   falling   under
section 166 of the MV Act Davies methods is applicable.
42.  We   therefore   hold   that   the   multiplier   to   be   used
should   be   as   mentioned   in   Column   (4)   of   the   Table
above   (prepared   by  applying   Susamma  Thomas,   Trilok
Chandra   and   Charlie),   which   starts   with   an   operative
multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to
25 years), reduced by one unit for every 5 years, that is
M­17 for 26 to  30 years, M­16 to  31 to 35 years, M­15
for 36 to 40 years, M­14 for 41 to 45 years and M­13 for
46   to   50   years,   then   reduced   by   2   units   for   every   5
13

years,   i.e.,   M­11   for   51   to   55   years,   M­9   for   56   to   60
years, M­7 for 61 to 65 years, M­5 for 66 to 70 years.”
24.  What     was   ultimately   recommended   in   Sarla   Verma ,   as   seen
from   para   40   of   the   judgment,   was   a   multiplier,   arrived   at   by
juxtaposing   Susamma Thomas ,   Trilok Chandra   and   Charlie 6
  with the
multiplier mentioned in the Second Schedule. 
25.  However   when   Reshma   Kumari   v.   Madan   Mohan   came   up   for
hearing   before   a   two   member   Bench,   the   Bench   thought   that   the
question   whether   the   multiplier   specified   in   the   second   schedule
should   be   taken   to   be   a   guide   for   calculation   of   the   amount   of
compensation   in   a   case   falling   under   section   166,   needed   to   be
decided by a larger bench, especially in the light of the defects pointed
out   in   Trilok   Chandra   in   the   Second   Schedule.   The   three   member
Bench   extensively   considered   Trilok   Chandra   and   the   subsequent
decisions and approved the Table provided in  Sarla Verma . It was held
in para 37 of the report in   Reshma Kumari   that the wide variations in
the   selection   of   multiplier   in   fatal   accident   cases   can   be   avoided   if
Sarla Verma  is followed. 
6  (2005) 10 SCC 720
14

26.  In   Munna   Lal   Jain ,   which   is   also   by   a   bench   of   three   Hon’ble
judges, the Court observed in para 11 as follows: 
“  Whether the multiplier should depend on the age
of   the   dependents   or   that   of   the   deceased   has
been hanging fire for sometime: but that has been
given   a   quietus   by   another   three   judge   bench   in
Reshma   Kumari.   It   was   held   that   the   multiplier   is   to
be used with reference to the age of the deceased. One
reason appears to be that there is certainty with regard
to   the   age   of   the   deceased,   but   as   far   as   that   of
dependents is concerned, there will always be room for
dispute as to whether the age of the eldest or youngest
or even the average etc is to be taken. ”
27.  In the light of the above observations, there was no room for any
confusion   and   the   High   Court   appears   to   have   imagined   a   conflict
between   Trilok   Chandra   on   the   one   hand   and   the   subsequent
decisions on the other hand. 
28.  It   may   be   true   that   an   accident   victim   may   leave   a   90   year   old
mother   as   the   only   dependent.   It   is   in   such   cases   that   one   may
possibly   attempt   to   resurrect   the   principle   raised   in   Trilok   Chandra .
But as on date,   Munna Lal Jain , which is of a larger Bench, binds us
especially in a case of this nature. 
29. Thus,   we   find   that   the   High   Court   committed     a   serious   error
(i)  in holding the victim guilty of contributory negligence  (ii)  in rejecting
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the   evidence   of   PW­2   with   regard   to   the   employment   and   monthly
income of the deceased and  (ii)  in applying the multiplier of 14 instead
of 18.  Therefore, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the
High   Court   is   set   aside.   The   award   of   the   Tribunal   shall   stand
restored.  There shall be no order as to costs.
…..…………....................J
    (N.V. Ramana)
.…..………......................J
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
January 08, 2020 .
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