2020 INSC 0648
REPORTABLE 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2077 OF 2020
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)No. 8550 OF 2019]
Sadhna Chaudhary ..... Appellant
                  VERSUS
State of U.P. & Anr.  .....Respondents
JUDGMENT
Leave Granted.
2. This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   Sadhana   Chaudhary,   being
aggrieved,   against   an   order   dated   12.12.2018   passed   by   the   High
Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   by   which   her   writ   petition,   seeking
judicial review of her dismissal from the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial
Services by Respondent No. 1, had been rejected. 
F ACTUAL  M ATRIX
3. The   appellant   was   recruited   into   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Judicial
Services   on   05.06.1975   and   was   posted   as   Additional   Munsif,
Dehradun.   She   was   subsequently   promoted   to   the   Chief   Judicial
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Magistrate   Cadre   in   1981,   and   again   to   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Higher
Judicial Services on 21.03.1987.
4. A  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court of  Judicature   at Allahabad,
while   seized   of   the   first   appeal   against   a   Land   Acquisition   Reference,
made   certain   observations   on   05.03.2004   with   regard   to   the   manner
in   which   some   other   land   acquisition   cases   of   similar   nature   were
being adjudicated by subordinate judicial officers in the state of Uttar
Pradesh. 1
  A   copy   of   the   judgment   was   placed   by   the   Registrar   before
the   Administrative   Committee   of   High   Court   for   appropriate   action.
The   Administrative   Committee   constituted   a   committee   comprising   of
two   Judges   to   probe   into   complaints   of   collusion   in   land   acquisition
matters.   This   enquiry   committee   after   visiting   numerous   districts   of
western   Uttar   Pradesh   (UP)   and   examination   of   many   judgments,
submitted   a   report   on   19.09.2004   recommending   initiation   of
disciplinary   action   against   certain   judicial   officers,   including   the
appellant.
5. Accordingly, a Charge Sheet was served upon the appellant with
regard   to   two   judicial   orders   delivered   by   her   during   her   stint   as
Additional   District   Judge   at   Ghaziabad.   Following   were   the   charges
attributed to the appellant:
“ Charge   No.1   ­ That  you  on  10.02.2003  while  posted  as IInd
Additional District Judge Ghaziabad decided Land Acquisition
Reference   No.193/1996   Lile   Singh   Vs.   State   of   U.P.   and   35
1  
Agra Development Authority v. State of UP, 2004 All LJ 1853.
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others   illegally   and   against   all   judicial   norms   and   propriety
awarding   to   the   claimants   solatium,   additional   amount   and
interest over and above the rate at which two other claimants
had   entered   into   compromise   which   was   inclusive   of   such
other benefits at an enhanced rate of Rs.265/­ per sq. yard as
against Rs.74.40 determined by the S.L.A.O. for land area 276
Bighas   12   Biswas   and   15   Biswansi,   unduly   awarded   an
additional   amount   of   Rs.47,73,39,903.86   which   leads   to   an
inference   that   you   were   actuated   by   extraneous
considerations   and   you   thereby   failed   to   maintain   absolute
integrity   and   complete   devotion   to   duty   and   you   thus
committed   misconduct   within   the   meaning   of   Rule   3   of   UP
Govt. Servants Conduct rules 1956.
Charge   No.2   ­   That   you   on   7.11.2003   posted   as   Additional
District   Judge,   Court   No.1,   Ghaziabad,   while   deciding   Land
Acquisition   Reference   No.91   of   2001   Umesh   Chandra   Vs.
State   of   UP   and   66   other   cases   enhanced   the   rate   of
compensation   from   Rs.100/­   per   square   yard   determined   by
the S.L.A.O to Rs.160/­ per square yard, illegally disregarding
the   exemplars   filed   by   the   defendants   including   your   own
award   in   Land   Acquisition   Reference   No.1   of   1992,   Surendra
Vs State of UP decided on 24.03.1993, for land acquired in the
same   year,   in   the   same   area   and   under   the   same   scheme   in
order   to   award   an   additional   amount     of   Rs.28,53,24,896.80
to   the   claimants   for   land   area   483   Bighas,   14   Biswas   and   8
Biswansis   leading   to   inference   that   you   were   actuated   by
extraneous considerations and you thereby failed to maintain
absolute   integrity   and   complete   devotion   to   duty,   and   you
thus   committed   misconduct   within   the   meaning   of   Rule   3   of
UP Government Servants Conduct Rules 1956.  ”
(Emphasis applied)
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6. The   appellant   submitted   detailed   reply   to   the   chargesheet,   as
well   as   additional   written   arguments.   Subsequently,   an   enquiry   was
conducted   and   the   Enquiry   Committee   through   its   report   dated
09.09.2005 held that both the charges had been proved for these were
errors   apparent   in   both   cases   which   were   such   `shocking   blunders’
that   they   could   not   be   attributed   to   mere   misjudgment,   and
consequently were proved to be ‘deliberate’. The said report was placed
before   the   Administrative   Committee   which   accepted   the   same   vide
resolution dated 29.11.2005, and referred the matter to the Full Court
for determination of quantum of punishment. The Full Court resolved
to   dismiss   the   appellant   from   service   and   consequently   forwarded   its
recommendation   to   the   State   (Respondent   No.   1),   which   through   an
office   memorandum   issued   by   its   Appointments   Department   on
17.01.2006,   dismissed   the   appellant   from   service   with   immediate
effect. The appellant challenged the order of dismissal before the High
Court on judicial side invoking the writ jurisdiction.
7. The   Division   Bench   of   the   HC   took   note   of   the   two   land
acquisition references which had been decided by the appellant. With
regards   to   the   first   case   of   Lile   Singh   v.   State 2
  it   held   that   the
appellant   had   wrongly   relied   upon   a   compromise   deed   of   two   other
claimants   to   enhance   compensation   from   Rs   74.40/sq   yd   (as
determined  by   the  Special   Land  Acquisition  Officer)  to  Rs  264/sq  yd.
2    
Land Acquisition Reference No. 193 of 2006, delivered on 10.02.2003.
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Additionally,   she   had   awarded   solatium   and   interest   over   and   above
the said determined rate, which led to a steep escalation to Rs 720/sq
yd.   Holding   such   reliance   on   compromise   deeds   as   being
incomprehensible   owing   to   the   statutory   bar   of   Section   11(3)   of   the
Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894,   the   escalation   was   deemed
disproportionate and against judicial propriety. 
8. With   regard   to   the   second   reference   in   Umesh   Chandra   v.
State 3
,   the   Court   observed   that   the   appellant   as   a   judge   illegally
disregarded exemplars filed by the State­respondents, particularly, an
award   of   Rs   108/sq   yd   passed   only   a   few   months   ago   by   her   in   a
similar case. Notwithstanding such evidence, the appellant was said to
have increased the compensation from Rs 100/sq yd to Rs 160/sq yd,
in contravention of all judicial norms.
9. The Bench opined that it was settled law that although the final
decision made by a judicial officer was of no relevance for purposes of
disciplinary   enquiry,   however,   the   legality   and   correctness   of   the
decision­making   process   as   well   as   the   conduct   of   the   officers   in
discharge   of   their   duties   ought   to   be   considered.   The   High   Court
accordingly   endorsed   the  Respondent’s  plea  that  the  decision­making
process   of   the   appellant   while   deciding   the   aforementioned   two   land
acquisition   references   was   bereft   of   judicial   propriety,   settled   judicial
norms   and   was   actuated   by   extraneous   considerations.   Additionally,
the High Court placed emphasis on the windfall gain made available to
3  
 Land Acquisition Reference No. 91 of 2001, delivered on 07.11.2003.
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the   claimants   as   being   evidence   of   the   deliberate   lapses   made   by   the
appellant   in   response   to   extraneous   considerations,   and   not   merely
errors   of   judgment.   This,   the   High   Court   noted,   amounted   to
misconduct as opined by the Enquiry Committee.  
10. Furthermore, the Court noted that, even otherwise, strict rules of
evidence were inapplicable to departmental enquiries, and the scope of
judicial review in such matters also being very limited, findings of the
disciplinary   enquiry   could   be   interfered   with   only   in   the   complete
absence of material, which was not the case at hand. 
C ONTENTIONS   OF  P ARTIES
11. Counsel   for   the   appellant   made   a   spirited   argument   that
although   the   High   Court   undoubtedly   expounded   the   correct   law,
however   it   failed   to   appropriately   apply   it   to   the   facts   of   the   present
case.   He   argued   that   the   chargesheet   made   no   allegation   of   the
‘decision­making   process’   being   illegal,   and   the   same   could   not   be
made   a   ground   for   the   appellant’s   dismissal   later.   Taking   the   Court
through   the   charge   sheet   on   record,   it   was   highlighted   that   no
allegation of receipt of any illegal gratification or being swayed by any
specific extraneous factor was even levelled against her, let alone being
proved.   No   witnesses   or   material   to   cast   doubts   upon   the   decision­
making   process   were   adduced,   except   for   merely   the   two   land
acquisition   reference   orders.   This,   as   per   PC   Joshi   v.   State   of   UP 4
,
4
 (2001) 6 SCC 491.
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was   clearly   impermissible.   Even   otherwise,   determining
appropriateness of the substance of the judicial orders was said to be
the domain of appellate courts and not the enquiry committees. 
12. Even   on   merits,   it   was   contended   that   the   High   Court   erred   in
holding that the appellant   had illegally relied upon compromise deeds
while authoring the order in   Liley Singh , for the supposed bar under
Section   11(3)   of   the   LA   Act   was   applicable   only   to   awards   by
Collectors.   Reference   Courts   were   guided   by   distinct   legal   provisions
under   Sections   23   and   24,   per   which   compromise   deeds   were   not
excluded. The escalations were also shown as not being arbitrary, but
rather   founded   upon   the   Compromise   Policy   of   the   New   Okhla
Industrial   Development   Authority,   which   was   tweaked   to   grant
statutory dues of solatium and interest instead of the additional  10%
developed   land   being   granted   by   the   State   authorities.   Hence,   it   was
pleaded,  that if  anything,  the  net compensation  of  Rs  720/sq  yd  was
effectively   lower   in   cost   to   the   State   than   the   Rs   1120/sq   yd   being
borne under their own policy. 
13. Qua  Umesh Chand,  it was submitted that the deviation from the
appellant’s very own judgment rendered five months ago, was a result
of the substantial development and increase in prices which took place
in   the   interregnum.   This   was   duly   backed   up   by   documentary
evidence produced by the vigilant claimants, and hence compensation
was enhanced by a factor of 60% to Rs 160/sq yd. Glaringly, this very
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compensation,   which   was   found   as   being   a   shocking   blunder   by   the
enquiry committee, was further enhanced by the Apex Court in an SLP
filed   by   some   other   claimants   to   Rs   297/sq   yd.,   and   appeals   filed   by
the   Local   Development  Authority   had   been   dismissed.   Thus,   the   very
basis   of   the   inference   of   misconduct   was   claimed   as   not   having
survived.
14. Reiterating the position of law expounded by the High Court, the
appellant   argued   that   it   was   the   conduct   of   a   judicial   officer   in
discharge   of   her   duties,   and   not   the   legality/correctness   of   her
decision, could be subjected to disciplinary  action. Given the detailed
reasons   in   both   references   by   the   appellant,   there   was   no   ‘reckless
discharge   of   duties’   either.  Even  if   there   were  to   be   such   omission  in
duty,   in   the   absence   of   any   charge   of   illegal   gratification,   it   would
amount to  ‘negligence’  and not ‘misconduct’  as per this  Court’s order
in   Union   of   India   v.   J   Ahmed 5
.   The   charges   were   said   to   be   based
merely   upon   unfounded   suspicion,   and   any   possible   errors   in   the
judicial orders were contended not to  be grounds  for action, owing to
long­settled   principles   of   judicial   immunity   tracing   back   to   the
Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.
15. The enquiry itself was stated to be roving in nature, without any
rational basis for selecting those two cases only. The order of the High
Court   in   Agra   Development   Authority   (supra)   was   to   be   applicable
5   
AIR 1979 SC 1022. 
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only   to   instances   where   complaints   of   judicial   impropriety   or
allegations of collusion in land acquisition reference cases were made
against   judicial   officers,   which   was   not   the   present   case.
Notwithstanding   guilt,   the   appellant   urged   that   the   quantum   of
punishment   was   unfair.   Having   rendered   almost   thirty   years   of
unblemished   service,   dismissing   her   on   the   strength   of   abovestated
charges, was prayed as being disproportionate.
16. On   the   other   hand,   Learned   Counsel   for   the   High   Court
(Respondent   No.   2)   contended   that   judicial   officers   are   not   ordinary
government servants, and that they must adhere to a higher standard
of   probity   and   ought   to   be   above   suspicion.   Persons   occupying   such
high posts should have high integrity, honesty, moral vigour, fairness
and   must   be   impervious   to   corrupt   or   venial   influences.     The   limited
scope   of   interference   in   matters   of   domestic   enquiry   where   the
allegations   founded   upon   specific   facts   have   been   proved,   was   also
highlighted.
17. The   scope   of   the   present   proceedings,   thus   was   sought   to   be
restricted,   by   drawing   attention   to   constitutional   provisions   which
bestowed     exclusive   control   of   the   High   Court   over   the   subordinate
judges,   with   the   aim   of   preserving   independence   of   judiciary.   Given
the   fact   that   opportunities   of   being   heard   and   placing   on   record
written   submissions   were   duly   accorded   to   the   appellant,   and   her
detailed replies had been considered and rejected, it was not open for
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her to seek re­determination of her case through this Court.  Both the
enquiry committee and the Full Court were contended to have applied
their minds and passed reasoned orders wherein it was unequivocally
found that the appellant had  utterly  failed  to justify  her conduct and
had acted in a most reckless and arbitrary manner, which was bereft
of   all   judicial   propriety.   This   was   pleaded   to   undoubtedly   amount   to
‘gravest misconduct’, justifying the dismissal of services for preserving
public trust in the judiciary.
A NALYSIS  
18. Undoubtedly,  the High  Court is  correct  in  its  observation  of  the
applicable law. Indeed, the end result of the judicial process does not
matter,   and   what   matters   is   only   the   decision­making   process
employed  by  the  delinquent officer.  Clearly,   it  is  a principle  since  the
nineteenth century that judges cannot be held responsible for the end
result or the effect of their decisions. 6
 This is necessary to both uphold
the   rule   of   law,   and   insulate   judicial   reasoning   from   extraneous
factors. 
19. Even   furthermore,   there   are   no   two   ways   with   the   proposition
that   Judges,   like   Caesar’s   wife,   must   be   above   suspicion.   Judicial
officers   do   discharge   a   very   sensitive   and   important   constitutional
role. They not only keep in check excesses of the executive, safeguard
6
  See    Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.
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citizens’ rights and maintain law and order. Instead, they support the
very framework of civilised society. It is courts, which uphold the law
and   ensure   its   enforcement.   They   instil   trust   of   the   constitutional
order   in   people,   and   ensure   the   majesty   of   law   and   adherence   to   its
principles.   Courts   hence   prevent   people   from   resorting   to   their
animalistic   instincts,   and   instead   provide   them   with   a   gentler   and
more­civilised   alternative   of   resolving   disputes.   In   getting   people   to
obey   their   dicta,   Courts   do   not   make   use   of   guns   or   other
(dis)incentives, but instead rely on the strength of their reasoning and
a   certain   trust   and   respect   in   the   minds   of   the   general   populace.
Hence,   it   is   necessary   that   any   corruption   or   deviation   from   judicial
propriety   by   the   guardians   of   law   themselves,   be   dealt   with   sternly
and swiftly. 
20. It   has   amply   been   reiterated   by   this   Court   that   judicial   officers
must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and
probity. Very recently in   Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of
Maharashtra 7
,  a Division Bench of this Court very succinctly collated
these principles and reiterated that:
“5.   The   first   and   foremost   quality   required   in   a   Judge   is
integrity.   The   need   of   integrity   in   the   judiciary   is   much
higher   than   in   other   institutions.   The   judiciary   is   an
institution   whose   foundations   are   based   on   honesty   and
integrity.   It   is,   therefore,   necessary   that   judicial   officers
7
 (2019) 9 SCC 144.
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should   possess   the   sterling   quality   of   integrity.   This   Court
in   Tarak Singh   v.   Jyoti Basu   [ Tarak Singh   v.   Jyoti Basu , (2005)
1 SCC 201] held as follows: (SCC p. 203)
“ Integrity   is   the   hallmark   of   judicial   discipline,   apart
from   others.   It   is   high   time   the   judiciary   took   utmost
care   to   see   that   the   temple   of   justice   does   not   crack
from   inside,   which   will   lead   to   a   catastrophe   in   the
justice­delivery   system   resulting   in   the   failure   of
public   confidence   in   the   system.   It   must   be
remembered   that   woodpeckers   inside   pose   a   larger
threat than the storm outside. ”
6.   The   behaviour   of   a   Judge   has   to   be   of   an   exacting
standard,   both   inside   and   outside   the   court.   This   Court
in   Daya   Shankar   v.   High   Court   of   Allahabad   [ Daya
Shankar   v.   High Court of Allahabad , (1987) 3 SCC 1:1987 SCC
(L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC p.1)
“ Judicial   officers   cannot   have   two   standards,   one   in
the   court   and   another   outside   the   court.   They   must
have   only   one   standard   of   rectitude,   honesty   and
integrity. They cannot  act  even remotely unworthy of
the office they occupy. ”
7.   Judges   are   also   public   servants.   A   Judge   should   always
remember   that   he   is   there   to   serve   the   public.   A   Judge   is
judged   not   only   by   his   quality   of   judgments   but   also   by   the
quality   and   purity   of   his   character.   Impeccable   integrity
should   be   reflected   both   in   public   and   personal   life   of   a
Judge.   One   who   stands   in   judgments   over   others   should
be incorruptible . That is the high standard which is expected
of Judges.
8.   Judges must remember that they are not merely employees
but   hold   high   public   office.   In   R.C.   Chandel   v.   High   Court   of
M.P.   [R.C.   Chandel   v.   High   Court   of   M.P.,   (2012)   8   SCC   58   :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012) 2 SCC
Page  |  12

(L&S)   469]   ,   this   Court   held   that   the   standard   of   conduct
expected   of   a   Judge   is   much   higher   than   that   of   an
ordinary person.   The following observations of this Court are
relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)
“ 29.   Judicial   service   is   not   an   ordinary   government
service   and   the   Judges   are   not   employees   as   such.
Judges   hold   the   public   office;  their   function   is   one   of
the   essential   functions   of   the   State.   In   discharge   of
their   functions   and   duties,   the   Judges   represent   the
State.   The   office   that   a   Judge   holds   is   an   office   of
public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable
integrity  and   unimpeachable   independence.   He   must
be honest to the core with high moral values. When a
litigant   enters   the   courtroom,   he   must   feel   secured
that   the   Judge   before   whom   his   matter   has   come,
would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by
any consideration. The standard of conduct expected
of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This
is   no   excuse   that   since   the   standards   in   the   society
have   fallen,   the   Judges   who   are   drawn   from   the
society   cannot   be   expected   to   have   high   standards
and   ethical   firmness   required   of   a   Judge.   A   Judge,
like   Caesar's   wife,   must   be   above   suspicion.   The
credibility   of   the   judicial   system   is   dependent   upon
the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and
the   rule   of   law   to   survive,   justice   system   and   the
judicial   process   have   to   be   strong   and   every   Judge
must   discharge   his   judicial   functions   with   integrity,
impartiality and intellectual honesty. ”
9.   There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide
the case  only  on  the  basis  of  the facts  on  record and  the  law
applicable   to   the   case.   If   a   Judge   decides   a   case   for   any
extraneous  reasons  then   he  is  not  performing  his  duty   in
accordance with law.
10.   In   our   view   the   word   “gratification”   does   not   only   mean
monetary   gratification.   Gratification   can   be   of   various   types.  It
can   be   gratification   of   money,   gratification   of   power,
gratification of lust etc., etc. ... ”
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(emphasis supplied)
21. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion cannot
constitute   ‘misconduct’.   Any   ‘probability’   of   misconduct   needs   to   be
supported   with   oral   or   documentary   material,   even   though   the
standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal
trial.     While   applying   these   yardsticks,   the   High   Court   is   expected   to
consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst
different   judges.   There   are   innumerable   instances   of   judicial   officers
who are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under  MACT
or   for   acquired   land,   backwages   to   workmen   or   mandatory
compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief­oriented
judicial   approaches   cannot   by   themselves   be   grounds   to   cast
aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer. 
22. Furthermore,   one   cannot   overlook   the   reality   of   ours   being   a
country  wherein countless complainants are readily  available without
hesitation to tarnish the image of the judiciary, often for mere pennies
or   even   cheap   momentary   popularity.   Sometimes   a   few   disgruntled
members   of   the   Bar   also   join   hands   with   them,   and   officers   of   the
subordinate judiciary are usually the easiest target. It is, therefore, the
duty   of   High   Courts   to   extend   their   protective   umbrella   and   ensure
that upright and  straightforward  judicial  officers  are   not  subjected  to
unmerited onslaught.  
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23. It   is   evident   in   the   case   in   hand   that   the   High   Court   itself   was
cognizant of this settled proposition of law. Learned senior counsel for
the   appellant   also   finds   no   fault   with   these   principles,   and   instead
only seeks for their application to the facts of the present case.
24. It is a matter of record that at the time when the High Court was
seized of this matter, writ petitions against both of the appellant’s land
acquisition judgments had been dismissed by its coordinate benches.
The   High   Court   has,   nevertheless,   rightly   observed   that   dismissal   of
writ   petitions   against   the   appellant’s   orders   did   not   serve   as
vindication   or   confirmation   of   her   orders.     Indeed,   as   correctly   noted
by   the   High   Court,   the   scope   of   judicial   review   under   Article   226   is
limited.   The   standards   to   be   met   prior   to   interference   in   exercise   of
writ jurisdiction are very high, and there needs to be gross substantive
injustice through the conclusion, glaring irregularities in procedure or
the   need   to   resolve   important   questions   of   law   for   a   writ   court   to
overturn the Reference Court’s order. Hence, dismissal of writ petition
merely   signifies   the   failure   to   demonstrate   any   of   these   high
standards, in a particular case, and not the endorsement of the orders
passed by a subordinate authority. 
25. However, the facts of the present case are distinct. This Court, in
fact,   entered   into   the   merits   of   one   of   the   allegedly   erroneous   orders.
Not only was the judgment affirmed, but rather the compensation was
further enhanced. It hence can no longer be stated that the appellant’s
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order was wrong in conclusion. This fact is significant as it establishes
that the increase in compensation by the appellant was not abhorrent.
26. Had   the   charge   been   specific   that   the   decision­making   process
was effectuated by extraneous considerations, then the correctness of
the   appellant’s   conclusions   probably   would   not   have   mattered   as
much.   However,   a   perusal   of   the   charges   extracted   above   makes   it
evident that the exclusive cause of enquiry, inference of dishonesty as
well as imposition of penalty was only on the basis of the conclusion of
enhancement   of   compensation.   Given   how   the   challenge   to   one   of
those two orders had been turned down at the High Court stage, and
the  other  was  both affirmed  and furthered in  principle  by  this Court,
the very foundation of the charges no longer survives.
27. We   can   find   no   fault   in   the   proposition   that   the   end   result   of
adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officer
had   taken   illegal   gratification   (monetary   or   otherwise)   or   had   been
swayed  by  extraneous considerations  while conducting  the  process is
of relevance.  Indeed, many­a­times it is possible that a judicial officer
can   indulge   in   conduct   unbecoming   of   his   office   whilst   at   the   same
time   giving   an   order,   the   result   of   which   is   legally   sound.   Such
unbecoming conduct can either be in the form of a judge taking a case
out   of   turn,   delaying   hearings   through   adjournments,   seeking   bribes
to   give   parties   their   legal   dues   etc.   None   of   these   necessarily   need   to
affect   the   outcome.   However,   importantly   in   the   present   case,   a
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perusal   of   the   chargesheet   shows   that   no   such   allegation   of   the
process having been vitiated has been made against the appellant. 
28. There   is   no   explicit   mention   of   any   extraneous   consideration
being   actually   received   or   of   unbecoming   conduct   on   the   part   of   the
appellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of ‘misbehaviour’ is the
end result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that it
gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the
appellant.   Although   this   might   be   right   in   a   vacuum,   however,   given
how the end  result itself has  been  untouched by superior courts  and
instead in  one  of  the  two  cases, the  compensation  only  increased,  no
such   inference   can   be   made.   Thus,   the   entire   case   against   the
appellant collapses like a house of cards.
C ONCLUSION
29. In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   the   appeal   is   allowed.   The
judgment of the High  Court is  set aside  and the  writ petition filed  by
the   appellant   is   allowed.   The   order   of   dismissal   dated   17.01.2006
passed  by   Respondent  No.   1  is   set­aside,   and  the   appellant’s  prayers
for   reinstatement   with   consequential   benefits   including   retiral
benefits, is accepted. No order as to costs. 
………………………….CJI
(S.A. BOBDE)
  
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……..……………………..J.
(B.R. GAVAI)
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 06.03.2020
 
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