2020 INSC 0655 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s).1836 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP (C) No(s).33445 of 2014) POONAM DEVI AND OTHERS             ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. ...RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. The   appellants   are   the   legal   heirs   of   the   deceased.   They   were granted   compensation   of   Rs.4,45,420/­   with   interest   at   the   rate   of 12   per   cent   by   the   Commissioner,   Workmen’s   Compensation   Act from  the date of accident up to  the  date of  deposit in  addition to  a penalty   imposed   on   the   employer   under   Section   4A(3)(b)   of   the Workmen’s   Compensation   Act,   1923   (hereinafter   called   “the   Act”). The   High   Court   on   09.05.2014   has   allowed   the   appeal   of   the 1 respondent   holding   that   the   death   occurred   during   the   course   of employment but did not arise out of the employment.  2.  The   deceased   was   aged   21   years,   in   the   employment   of respondent   no.2   (since   deleted),   and   was   driving   her   TATA   407 vehicle   bearing   registration   No.UP   15P   1689   on   11.06.2003   from Ambala to Meerut, a distance of approximately 200 Kms.   At about 12.30   PM,   when   he   approached   the   bridge   near   village   Fatehpur, the   deceased   went   to   the   Yamuna   canal   to   fetch   water  and   also   to have a bath.  Unfortunately, he slipped into the canal and died. The vehicle   was   insured   with   the   respondent   Insurance   Company. P.W.2, who was standing near the bridge, deposed that the deceased had gone to fetch water in a can along with the cleaner who tried to save   him,   but   both   slipped   into   the   canal.     The   Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner by order dated 12.12.2005 allowed the claim as aforesaid. 3. The High Court in appeal by the Insurance Company held that the   deceased   may   have   died   during   the   course   of   the   employment but   death   did   not   arise   out   of   the   employment,   as   bathing   in   the 2 canal was not incidental to the employment but was at the peril of the workman.  There was no casual connection between the death of the   workman   and   his   employment.   He   had   gone   to   fetch   water   for personal   consumption   and   it   was   not   his   case   that   the   truck   was over heated. 4. Mr.   Vikas   Bhadana,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants, submitted that there was a causal connection of the death with the employment.   In the extreme heat of the month of June at noon, a presumption would arise that the deceased  had gone to the canal to fetch   water  not   only   to   cool  the   truck   but   also  himself   to   ensure   a proper and safe journey of the vehicle belonging to the employer and his   own   safety.     Reliance   was   placed   on   Leela   Bai   and   anr.   vs. Seema Chouhan and anr.,  (2019) 4 SCC 325. 5.  Mr.   Ajay   Singh,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   opposing the   appeal,   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   rightly   held   that there was no  casual  connection  between  the death  of  the deceased with the employment.   Merely because death may have occurred in 3 the course of the employment will not suffice unless it is established that   it   was   incidental   and   arose   out   of   the   employment.     Reliance was   placed   on   Malikarjuna   G.   Hiremath   vs.   Branch   Manager, Oriental   Insurance   Company   Limited   and   another ,   (2009)   13 SCC 405. 6. We   have   considered   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   parties and   have   also   perused   the   impugned   orders   as   also   the   case   law cited before us. 7. The   Workmen’s   Compensation   Act,   1923   (now   christened   as “Employee’s   Compensation   Act,   1923”)   is   a   piece   of   socially beneficial   legislation.     The   provisions   will   therefore   have   to   be interpreted   in   a   manner   to   advance   the   purpose   of   the   legislation, rather   than   to   stultify   it.     In   case   of   a   direct   conflict,   when   no reconciliation   is   possible,   the   statutory   provision   will   prevail   only then. 4 8. Relevant to the discussion is Section 3 of the Act. The relevant extract reads as follows: “3. Employer' s liability for compensation.­ (1)   If   personal   injury   is   caused   to   a   workman   by accident   arising   out   of   and   in   the   course   of   his employment,   his   employer   shall   be   liable   to   pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:                                  XXXX” 9. In   Manju Sarkar & Ors. vs. Mabish Miah & Ors. , (2014) 14 SCC   21,   the   deceased   was   driving   the   employer’s   truck   from Agartala to Churaibari FCI godown.  When he reached near Dharam Nagar,   he   got   down   to   make   arrangements   for   repairing   some mechanical  problems   in  the   truck  when   he   was  hit   on  the   road  by another   vehicle   and  died   in   the   hospital.     Applying   the   principle   of notional extension, it was held that death occurred in the course of employment   relying   upon   B.E.S.T.   Undertaking   vs.   Agnes,   AIR 1964 SC 193, at paragraph 12 “Under   Section 3(1)   of the Act the injury must be caused   to   the   workman   by   an   accident   arising out of and in the course of his employment. The question,   when   does   an   employment   begin   and when   does   it   cease,   depends   upon   the   facts   of each   case.   But   the   Courts   have   agreed   that   the 5 employment   does   not   necessarily   end   when   the “down tool” signal is given or when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is working. There   is   a   notional   extension   at   both   the   entry and   exit   by   time   and   space.   The   scope   of   such extension   must   necessarily   depend   on   the circumstances   of   a   given   case.   As   employment may   end   or   may   begin   not   only   when   the employee   begins   to   work   or   leaves   his   tools   but also   when   he   used   the   means   of   access   and, egress to and from the place of employment.” 10. More recently in   Daya Kishan Joshi & Anr. vs. Dynemech Systems Pvt. Ltd. , (2018) 11 SCC 642, the deceased was employed as   an   engineer   for   promoting   sales   and   installation   of   products which   required   him   to   move   around   in   the   field.     While   returning from field work, he met with an accident resulting in death.  Holding that   his   being   on   the   road   related   to   the   nature   of   his   duties,   not only  the injury  was caused during  the currency  of the employment but also arose out of the employment. 11. Coming   to   the   facts   of   the   present   case,   the   deceased   was driving   the   truck   of   respondent   no.2   from   Ambala   to   Meerut. Indisputably he was in the course of his employment.   We can take judicial   notice   of   the   fact   that   considering   the   manufacturer’s 6 specification,   the   cabin   of   the   truck   was   not   air   conditioned   and would have been a baking oven in the middle of the afternoon in the sultry   monsoon   heat   of   June   2003,   when   the   temperature   was touching 42.6 0 C in Yamunagar (Haryana) (source: weatheronline.in). It was a compulsion for the deceased to stay fresh and alert not only to   protect   the   truck   of   respondent   no.2   from   damage   but   also   to ensure   a   smooth   journey   and   protect   his   own   life   by   safe   driving. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the possibility of the truck   also   requiring   water   to   prevent   overheating   cannot   be completely   ruled   out.     In   these   circumstances,   can   it   be   said   that the act of the deceased in going to the canal to fetch water in a can for the truck and to refresh himself by a bath before continuing the journey was not incidental to the employment?   Every action of the driver   of  a  truck   to   ensure   the   safety   of   the   truck   belonging   to   the employer and to ensure his own safety by a safe journey for himself has to  be considered as incidental  to the employment by  extension of   the   notional   employment   theory.     A   truck   driver   who   would   not keep himself fresh to drive in such heat would be a potential danger to others on the road by reason of any bonafide errors of judgement 7 by   reason   of   the   heat.   The   theory   of   notional   extension   noticed   in the   Agnes   (supra)   and   followed   in   Leela   Bai   (supra)   is   extracted hereunder: “9. In the facts of the present case and the nature of   evidence,   there   was   a   clear   nexus   between   the accident and the employment to apply the doctrine of   “notional   extension”   of   the   employment considered in Agnes (supra) as follows:   “…It   is   now   well­ settled,   however,   that   this   is subject to the theory of notional extension of the employer’s   premises   so   as   to   include   an   area which   the   workman   passes   and   repasses   in going to and in leaving the actual place of work. There may be some reasonable extension in both time and place and a workman may be regarded as in the course of his employment even though he   had   not   reached   or   had   left   his   employer’s premises.   The   facts   and   circumstances   of   each case   will   have   to   be   examined   very   carefully   in order   to   determine   whether   the   accident   arose out  of  and in the course of the employment of a workman, keeping in view at all time this theory of notional extension.” 12. In   Leela   Bai   (supra),   the   deceased   having   completed   his journey   as   a   driver   stayed   back   on   the   roof   of   the   bus   to   ensure early   scheduled   departure   the   next   morning   by   not   going   home. While he was coming down the roof of the bus he slipped and died. It was held at paragraph 7 as follows: 8 “7.   In   the   facts   of   the   case,   and   the   evidence available,   it   is   evident   that   the   deceased   was present   at   the   bus   terminal   and   remained   with the   bus   even   after   arrival   from   Indore   not   by choice,   but   by   compulsion   and   necessity, because   of   the   nature   of   his   duties.   The   route timings   of   the   bus   required   the   deceased   to   be readily   available   with   the   bus   so   that   the passenger   service   being   provided   by   Respondent 1   remained   efficient   and   was   not   affected.   If   the deceased   would   have   gone   home   every   day   after parking  the bus and returned the next  morning, the   efficiency   of   the   timing   of   the   bus   service facility   to   the   travelling   public   would   definitely have   been   affected,   dependent   on   the   arrival   of the   deceased   at   the   bus­stand   from   his   house. Naturally   that   would   bring   an   element   of uncertainty in the departure schedule of the bus and   efficiency   of   the   service   to   the   travelling public   could   be   compromised.   Adherence   to schedule   by   the  deceased   would   naturally   enure to   the   benefit   of   Respondent   1   by   enhancement of   income   because   of   timely   service.   It   is   not without   reason   that   the   deceased   would   not   go home   for   weeks   as   deposed   by   the   appellant. Merely   because   the   deceased   was   coming   down the roof of the bus after having his meal, cannot be   considered   in   isolation   and   interpreted   so myopically   to   hold   that   he   was   off   duty   and therefore would not be entitled to compensation.” 13. We see no reason why the application of the theory of notional extension   will   therefore   not   apply   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case also. 9 14. Malikarjuna  (supra) is distinguishable on its own facts as the deceased   had   completed   his   journey   from   Siraguppa   to   the Gurugunta Angreshwar temple, after which he went to the pond and while   taking   a   bath   slipped   and   drowned.   The   case   is   completely distinguishable on its own facts. 15. We,   therefore,   find   the   order   of   the   High   Court   to   be unsustainable.     It   is   set   aside.     The   order   of   the   Workmen’s Compensation   Commissioner   dated   12.12.2005   is   restored.     The payments   in   terms   of   the   order   of   the   Workmen’s   Compensation Commissioner   be   made   to   the   appellants   within   a   period   of   six weeks   from   today.     Since   respondent   no.2   stands   deleted,   the question of payment of penalty by her does not arise. 16.   The appeal is allowed. . ……………………….J.   (Ashok Bhushan)   ………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   New Delhi, March 06, 2020. 10