2020 INSC 0364 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2624 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 13964 of 2018) RAJENDRA SINGH AND OTHERS ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY  LIMITED AND OTHERS ..RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2625 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP (Civil) No(s). 16261 of 2018) RAJENDRA SINGH ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY  LIMITED AND OTHERS ..RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The   High   Court   by   the   impugned   order   dismissed   two appeals   arising   from   separate   orders   of   the   Motor   Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’) deciding 1 two   accident   compensation   claims.   The   appellants   had   claimed further enhancement of compensation. 3. The deceased in the first appeal was a housewife aged about 30 years.   The second deceased was her daughter aged about 12 years. The claimants are the husband/father of the deceased and three   minor   siblings.   The   two   deceased   on   25.12.2012   were travelling   in   a   horse   cart   along   with   some   others   to   a   religious congregation.   The   horse   cart   was   hit   by   a   bus   resulting   in   their death.     The   Tribunal   assessed   the   notional   income   of   the   first deceased   at   Rs.36,000/­   per   annum   and   after   1/4 th   deduction towards   personal   expenses,   with   a   multiplier   of   17   awarded   a compensation of Rs.4,59,000/­. The Tribunal then deducted 50% on ground of contributory negligence as the horse cart was stated to   have   been   in   the   middle   of   the   road   when   the   accident   took place.   A   sum   of   Rs.1,00,000/­   was   then   added   as   loss   of consortium and Rs.25,000/­ towards funeral expenses leading to an award total of Rs.3,54,500/­ with interest at the rate of 7.5%. 4. In   so   far   as   the   minor   child   is   concerned,   the   notional income was assessed at Rs.36,000/­ per annum, applying a 50% 2 deduction towards personal expenses with a multiplier of 15, the compensation   was   awarded   at   Rs.2,70,000/­   out   of   which   50% was   again   deducted   towards   contributory   negligence.     A   sum   of Rs.25,000/­   was   added   towards   funeral   expenses,   leading   to   an award total of Rs.1,60,000/­ with interest at the rate of 7.5%. 5. The appeal for enhancement of compensation was dismissed by the High Court and thus the present appeals.  6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the notional income of the first deceased has been wrongly fixed ignoring her income   of   Rs.5000/­   per   month   from   dairy   farm   business. Nothing   has   been   awarded   towards   future   prospects.     With regard   to   the   second   deceased   it   was   submitted   that   she   was studying   in   a   school   and   her   notional   income   should   have   been assessed   at   Rs.54,000/­   per   year.   Nothing   has   been   awarded towards   loss  of   estate,   loss  of   consortium   and  funeral   expenses. The common submission in both the appeals was that deduction on   ground   of   contributory   negligence   was   unsustainable   and unjustified.     Reliance   was   placed   on   Kajal   vs.   Jagdish   Chand &   Ors. ,   AIR   2020   SC   776,   to   contend   that   the   income   of   the 3 deceased   child   should   have   been   assessed   at   Rs.4846/­   per month.     7. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   submitted   that   the present   appeals   do   not   merit   interference.     There   is   no  evidence with regard to the claimed business income of the first deceased. The finding of contributory negligence merits no interference.   In absence of any proof of income, the question of future prospects simply   does   not   arise.     Similarly,   the   second   deceased   was   a minor   school   going   child   who   also   had   no   income   and   therefore the question for grant of future prospects with regard to her also does not arise. 8. We have considered the submission on behalf of the parties. No   evidence   has   been   led   by   the   appellant   with   regard   to   any income   of   the   first   deceased   from   dairy   business.   The   deceased were   travelling   in   a   horse   cart   along   with   others   to   a   religious congregation.   It   is   not   the   case   of   the   respondents   that   the   first deceased   was   driving   the   horse   cart   or   was   the   owner   of   the same, much less that it was being driven under her supervision. The   deceased   were   travelling   as   passengers   along   with   others. 4 The fact that the horse cart may have been in middle of the road at   the   time   of   the   accident,   no   fault   can   be   attributed   to   the deceased   holding   them   liable   to   contributory   negligence   and denial   of   full   compensation.   We   fail   to   understand   how   the deceased   who   were   passengers   in   the   horse   cart   can   be   held liable in any manner. The deduction of 50% towards contributory negligence   in   both   the   appeals   is   therefore   held   to   be   totally unjustified   and   unsustainable.   The   finding   with   regard   to contributory   negligence   against   both   the   deceased   are   therefore set aside.  9. The first deceased was a housewife aged about 30 years.  In Lata Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar ,   (2001) 8 SCC 197, this court had observed that considering the multifarious services rendered by   housewives,   even   on   a   modest   estimation,   the   income   of   a housewife   between   the   age   group   of   34   to   59   years   who   were active   in   life   should   be   assessed   at   Rs   36,000   per   annum.   A distinction was also drawn with regard to elderly ladies in the age group   of   62   to   72   who   would   be   more   adept   in   discharge   of housewife duties by age and experience, and the value of services rendered by them has been taken at Rs 20,000 per annum.  5 10. In   Arun   Kumar   Agrawal   vs.   National   Insurance   Co. Ltd. ,   (2010)   9   SCC   218,   the   Tribunal   assessed   the   notional income   of   the   housewife   at   Rs.5,000/­   per   month,   but   without any  rational or  reasoning  concluded that she was a non­earning member and reduced the same to Rs.2,500/­, which was affirmed by   the   High   Court.     Disapproving   the   same   and   restoring   the assessed   income,   this   Court   observed   at   Paragraphs   26   and   27 as follows: “26.   In   India   the   courts   have   recognised   that   the contribution   made   by   the   wife   to   the   house   is invaluable   and   cannot   be   computed   in   terms   of money. The gratuitous services rendered by the wife with true love and affection to the children and her husband   and   managing   the   household   affairs cannot   be   equated   with   the   services   rendered   by others.   A   wife/mother   does   not   work   by   the   clock. She   is   in   the   constant   attendance   of   the   family throughout   the   day   and   night   unless   she   is employed   and   is   required   to   attend   the   employer’s work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements   of   the   husband   and   children including   cooking   of   food,   washing   of   clothes,   etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance   to   them   for   their   future   life.   A housekeeper   or   maidservant   can   do   the   household work,   such   as   cooking   food,   washing   clothes   and utensils, keeping the house clean, etc., but she can never   be   a   substitute   for   a   wife/mother   who renders   selfless   service   to   her   husband   and children. 6 27. It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of   the   services   rendered   by   the   wife/mother   to   the family   i.e.   the   husband   and   children.   However,   for the   purpose   of   award   of   compensation   to   the dependants,   some   pecuniary   estimate   has   to   be made   of   the   services   of   the   housewife/mother.   In that   context,   the   term   “services”   is   required   to   be given   a   broad   meaning   and   must   be   construed   by taking   into   account   the   loss   of   personal   care   and attention given by the deceased to her children as a mother   and   to   her   husband   as   a   wife.   They   are entitled   to   adequate   compensation   in   lieu   of   the loss   of   gratuitous   services   rendered   by   the deceased.   The   amount   payable   to   the   dependants cannot   be   diminished   on   the   ground   that   some close   relation   like   a   grandmother   may   volunteer   to render some of the services to the family which the deceased was giving earlier.” 11. The notional income of the first deceased is therefore held to be Rs.5000/­ per month at the time of death. The compensation on  that   basis  with   a  deduction  of  1/4 th   i.e. Rs.15,000/­  towards personal   expenses   with   a   multiplier   of   17   is   assessed   at Rs.7,65,000/­.   If   the   deceased   had   survived,   in   view   of observations   in   Lata   Wadhwa   ( supra ),   her   skills   as   a   matured and   skilled   housewife   in   contributing   to   the   welfare   and   care   of the family and in the upbringing of the children would have only been   enhanced   by   time   and   for   which   reason   we   hold   that   the appellants shall be entitled to future prospects at the rate of 40% in addition to the loss of consortium and future expenses already 7 granted.   We  therefore  assess  the  total  compensation   payable  to the appellants in the first appeal at Rs.11,96,000/­. 12. The   second   deceased   was   a   school   going   child   aged   about 12 years. She had a  whole  future to  look  forward  in  life  with  all normal   human   aspirations.     She   died   prematurely   due   to   the accident at a very tender age for no fault of hers even before she could  start  to   understand   the  beauty  and  joys of  life  with   all  its ups   and   downs.   The   loss   of   a   human   life   untimely   at   childhood can   never   be   measured   in   terms   of   loss   of   earning   or   monetary loss alone.   The emotional attachments involved to the loss of the child can have a devastating  effect on the family which needs to be visualised and understood.   Grant of non­pecuniary  damages for   the   wrong   done   by   awarding   compensation   for   loss   of expectation in life is therefore called for.   Undoubtedly the injury inflicted   by   deprivation   of   the   life   of   the   child   is   very   difficult   to quantify.  The future also abounds with uncertainties. Therefore, the   courts   have   used   the   expression   “just   compensation”   to   get over   the   difficulties   in   quantifying   the   figure   to   ensure consistency   and   uniformity   in   awarding   compensation.   This 8 determination   shall   not   depend   upon   financial   position   of   the victim   or   the   claimant   but   rather   on   the   capacity   and   ability   of the   deceased   to   provide   happiness   in   life   to   the   claimants   had she   remained   alive.     The   compensation   is   for   loss   of   prospective happiness which the claimant would have enjoyed had the child not   died   at   the   tender   age.     Since   the   child   was   studying   in   a school   and   opportunities   in   life   would   undoubtedly   abound   for her   as   the   years   would   have   rolled   by,   compensation   must   also be   granted   with   regard   to   future   prospects.       It   can   safely   be presumed   that   education   would   have   only   led   to   her   better growth and maturity with better prospects and a bright future for which   compensation   needs   to   be   granted   under   non­pecuniary damages.  (See  R.K. Malik vs. Kiran Pal ,  (2009) 14 SCC   1).   13.  The   income   of   the   minor   girl   child   is   incapable   of   precise fixation.  We find no reason to interfere with the assessed notional income   of   the   second   deceased.   In   R.K.   Malik   vs.   Kiran   Pal , (2009)   14   SCC   1,   considering   grant   of   future   prospects   for   the deceased child aged about 10 years it was observed as follows: “32.   A   forceful   submission   has   been   made   by   the learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   appellant 9 claimants   that   both   the   Tribunal   as   well   as   the High   Court   failed   to   consider   the   claims   of   the appellants   with   regard   to   the   future   prospects   of the   children.   It   has   been   submitted   that   the evidence with regard to the same has been ignored by the courts below. 33.   On   perusal   of   the   evidence   on   record,   we   find merit   in   such   submission   that   the   courts   below have   overlooked   that   aspect   of   the   matter   while granting   compensation.   It   is   well­settled   legal principle   that   in   addition   to   awarding compensation   for   pecuniary   losses,   compensation must   also   be   granted   with   regard   to   the   future prospects of the children. It is incumbent upon the courts   to   consider   the   said   aspect   while   awarding compensation…”   14.  In   New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Satender ,   (2006) 13 SCC 60, the deceased victim of the accident was a nine year old school   going   child.   Considering   the   claim   for   loss   of   future prospects   in   absence   of   a   regular   income,   it   was   observed   that the  compensation so  determined had  to  be just and  proper  by  a judicious   approach   and   not   fixed   arbitrarily   or   whimsically.   The uncertainties of a young life were noticed in the following terms:­ “12.   In   cases   of   young   children   of   tender   age,   in view of uncertainties abound, neither  their  income at the time of death nor the prospects of the future increase   in   their   income   nor   chances   of advancement   of   their   career   are   capable   of   proper determination   on   estimated   basis.   The   reason   is that   at   such   an   early   age,   the   uncertainties   in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in 10 career   and   thereafter   advancement   in   life   are   so many   that   nothing   can   be   assumed   with reasonable certainty. Therefore, neither the income of   the   deceased   child   is   capable   of   assessment   on estimated   basis   nor   the   financial   loss   suffered   by the   parents   is   capable   of   mathematical computation.”   15.  T he   deduction   on   account   of   contributory   negligence   has already   been  held by  us  to be unsustainable.  The determination of a just and proper compensation to the appellants with regard to   the   deceased   child,   in   the   entirety   of   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case   does   not   persuade   us   to   enhance   the same   any   further   from   Rs.2,95,000/­   by   granting   any   further compensation under the separate head of “future prospects”.     It may   only   be   noticed   that   R.K.   Malik   ( supra )   does   not   consider Satender   ( supra )   on   the   grant   of   future   prospects   as   far   as children are concerned. 16.   Kajal  (supra ) is distinguishable on its own facts. The victim of   the   accident   was   a   nine   month   old   child,   whose   disability certificate   reflected   that   she   would   grow   up   to   be   an   adult   lying on   the   bed   with   all   the   physical   and   biological   attributes   of   a 11 woman on attaining adulthood, but her mind would remain of a nine   month   old   child   because   of   the   accident.     The   case   is completely distinguishable on its own facts and did not arise out of   a   death   claim,   leading   to   award   of   compensation   towards expenses   for   frequent   treatment,   hospitalization,   transportation, loss of future earnings, attendant charges, pain, suffering, loss of amenities,   loss   of   marriage   prospects   and   future   medical treatment etc.  17.   The Civil Appeal  arising out of SLP (C) No. 13964 of 2018  is allowed and the Civil Appeal   arising out of SLP (C) No. 16261 of 2018  is allowed to the extent indicated only. ………………………..J.    (Navin Sinha)   ………………………..J.    (B.R. Gavai)   New Delhi, June 18, 2020 12