2020 INSC 0394
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 283 of 2011
Parminder Kaur @ P.P. Kaur @ Soni ..... Appellants(s)
                                           VERSUS
State of Punjab .....Respondents(s)
JUDGMENT
SURYA KANT, J.
1. The   present   Criminal   Appeal   has   been   preferred   by   Parminder
Kaur, impugning the judgment dated 30.11.2009 of the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana through which her challenge to a judgment dated
27.02.1999   passed   by   the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Barnala   was
turned down, thereby confirming her conviction of three years rigorous
imprisonment   and   fine   of   Rs.   2000   under   Sections   366A   and   506   of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”). 
F ACTS  & C ASE  H ISTORY
2. The prosecution story, as recorded in the FIR at around noon on
24.02.1996,   was   that   the   appellant   was   a   single   lady   living   with   her
child, mother and a young boy as her tenant in the neighbourhood of
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the   prosecutrix’s 1
  house.   About   a   week   prior   to   registration   of   the
police complaint, the appellant called the prosecutrix to her house and
tried to entice her to indulge in illicit intercourse with the rich tenant
boy   in   return   for   clothes   and   trips   from   him.   The   appellant   at   about
6.00   A.M.   on   19.02.1996,   allegedly   pushed   the   visiting   prosecutrix
into   the   room   occupied   by   the   tenant   boy   and   bolted   it   from   the
outside.   It   was   only   on   hearing   the   prosecutrix’s   screams   that   after
five minutes the door was unlocked, with her father (Hari Singh, PW­
2),   Bhan   Singh   and   Karnail   Singh   standing   outside.   Swiftly,   the   boy
ran   out   of   the   room   and   successfully   escaped.   Upon   the   prosecutrix
emerging   from   the   room,   her   father   protested   and   expressed   his
dismay   to   the   by­standing   appellant.   Scared   for   their   reputation,   the
prosecutrix   and   her   father   returned   to   their   home   without   reporting
the   matter   to   anyone,   except   the   prosecutrix’s   mother.   However,   on
24.02.1996 at 7.00 A.M., the appellant caught hold of the prosecutrix
outside   her   house   and   threatened   to   kill   her   brother   if   anyone   was
informed   of   the   matter.   The   prosecutrix   was   able   to   escape   the
appellant’s   clutches   and   worried   at   this   high­handedness,   proceeded
with her father towards the police station to report these two incidents
and lodged a complaint.  
3. During  trial, the prosecution examined five witnesses, including
1
  The name of the prosecutrix/victim has been withheld, in compliance with the ratio 
in  Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2003) 8 SCC 551.
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the prosecutrix (PW­1), her father (PW­2), the draftsman who prepared
the   site   plan   (PW­3),   the   headmistress   who   proved   the   prosecutrix’s
age (PW­4) and the investigating officer (PW­5). The appellant, in turn,
both   denied   all   allegations   and   examined   one   witness   of   her   own   –   a
neighbour,    Gurnail  Singh (DW­1) and  offered  an  alternate version in
her   statement   under   Section   313   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,
1973   (“CrPC”),   claiming   that   there   was   no   tenant   at   all   in   her   home
and   that   the   complaint   was   nothing   but   motivated   revenge   at   the
instance of one Bhola Singh against whom she had levelled allegations
of rape a few months ago. 
4. This alternate version was summarily rejected by the trial Court
which   concluded   that   the   appellant’s   claim   of   the   complaint   being   at
the   instance   of   Bhola   Singh   was   unlikely   both   because   malicious
prosecution of sexual abuses involving minors, at the instance of third
parties, was improbable; and even DW­1 in his cross­examination had
admitted  that Hari Singh was  a permanent employee of the Irrigation
Department and could not be a   Karinda   (employee) of Bhola Singh as
claimed by the appellant. 
5. Relying   upon   the   school   records   produced   by   DW­4,   the   Court
observed   that   the   prosecutrix   was   studying   in   Class   VII   with   date   of
birth   as   12.04.1982,   thereby   unimpeachably   making   her   a   minor.
Without   delving   into   the   elements   of   Section   366A   or   506   IPC,   or
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whether   each   individual   ingredient   had   been   satisfied   by   the
prosecution,   the   learned   Additional   Sessions   Judge   focused   on
negating   the   defences   projected   by   the   appellant.   In   response   to   the
contradictions   between   important   aspects   of   the   prosecutrix   and   her
father’s   testimonies,   like   differences   in   physical   description   and
antecedents of the male tenant and the inability of the witnesses and
the police to catch or trace the boy, the trial Court instead noted that
there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix  and her father. The
five­day   delay   in   registration   of   the   FIR   was   condoned   for   having
arisen   out   of   natural   fear   of   reputation   of   the   prosecutrix   and   her
family,   as   well   as   the   mild   severity   of   the   case.   Similarly,   the   non­
examination of the other   two independent witnesses , Bhan Singh and
Karnail Singh was ignored as being normal reluctance of bystanders in
cases where there was no rape or assault. 
6. Accordingly,   the   trial   Court   held   that   the   appellant   had
intentionally induced the prosecutrix to perform illicit intercourse with
her   male   tenant,   and   that   she   had   also   criminally   intimidated   the
prosecutrix   by   threatening   her   family   member.   Noting   the   large
number   of   dependents   that   the   appellant   had   to   support   as   a   single
lady,   and   considering   the   lack   of   commission   of   any   assault   or   rape
against   the   prosecutrix,   the   appellant   was   concurrently   sentenced   to
three years rigorous  imprisonment and fine of Rs 2,000 (or further  six
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months   rigorous   imprisonment   in   lieu   thereof)   under   Section   366A,
and one   year   rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000 (or further
three   months   rigorous   imprisonment   in   lieu   thereof)   under   Section
506 of IPC.
7. The   aggrieved   appellant   approached   the   High   Court   which   too
refused to interfere with the order of conviction. While dismissing the
appeal,   the   High   Court   observed   that   the   statement   of   the   accused
under Section 313 CrPC appeared to be an after­thought, and that in
the absence of any evidence proving enmity between the parties it was
impossible   that  anyone   would   falsely   implicate   a  woman   in   such   like
offence.   The   minority   of   the   prosecutrix   was   noted   as   having   been
proved,   and   the   testimonies   of   PW1   and   PW2   were   held   to   be
impeccable   and   corroborating   each   other   completely.   Similar   to   the
trial   Court ,   the   High   Court   also   explained­away   the   delay   in
registration   of   FIR   as   a   result   of   family   reputation   put   at   stake   in
matters   of   sexual   offence   cases.   Other   omissions   in   the   form   of   non­
examination   of   Bhan   Singh   and   Hari   Singh   and   failure   to   catch   or
trace   the   identity   of   the   male   tenant   were   deemed   insignificant   and
immaterial. 
C ONTENTIONS   OF  P ARTIES
8. The   judgments   of   the   trial   Court   and   High   Court   have   been
elegantly   assailed  before  us  by  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  who
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contended that the testimonies of the two star­witnesses, being full of
material contradictions, are far from reliable. The delay in registration
of the FIR and the lack of any attempt to catch or even later trace the
male tenant showed that the story was concocted by the prosecutrix’s
family   with   ulterior   motives.   Reliance   was   also   placed   on   the   denial
and   alternate   version   put   forth   by   the   appellant   in   her   statement
under Section 313 CrPC, and the failure of the Courts below to either
examine   such   statutory   statement   in­depth   or   for   the   prosecution   to
belie   it   effectively.   Emphasis   was   laid   on   the   statement   of   DW­1   who
volunteered during his cross­examination that PW­2 was then living in
the   house   owned   by   Bhola   Singh,   the   person   against   whom   the
appellant had alleged rape. The deleterious effect of these proceedings
on   Bhola   Singh’s   trial   and   his   subsequent   acquittal   on   grounds   that
Parminder   Kaur   (the   appellant   here)   was   a   lady   of   questionable
character   who   indulged   in   trafficking   of   minors,   was   highlighted   to
show   colourable   motive   behind   registration   of   this   case   against   the
appellant. 
9. On the contrary, learned state counsel supported the impugned
judgment(s)   by   placing   emphasis   on   the   concurrent   findings   of   the
Courts   below.   Reliance   was   also   placed   on   PW­2’s   cross­examination
wherein   he   himself   denied   knowing   Bhola   Singh,   to   counter   the
allegation of false implication by the prosecutrix. 
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A NALYSIS
I. Sweeping generalisations and superficial analysis
10. Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   at   considerable
length through video conferencing, we find from the impugned orders
that   the   Courts   below   failed   in   making   the   desired   attempt   to   delve
deep into  the factual  matrix  of this  case.  Many  aspects,  as discussed
hereunder,   have   completely   been   ignored   or   only   dealt   with   hastily.
Further, the reasoning is generic and is premised upon generalisations
which   may   not   be   necessarily   true   always.     It   is   indisputable   that
parents   would   not   ordinarily   endanger   the   reputation   of   their   minor
daughter merely to falsely implicate their opponents, but such clichés
ought not to be the sole basis of dismissing reasonable doubts created
and/or defences set out by the accused.  
11. Similarly,   the   five­day   delay   in   registration   of   the   FIR,   in   the
facts and circumstances of this case, gains importance as the father of
the victim  is an eye­witness   to a part of the occurrence. It is difficult to
appreciate   that   a   father   would   await   a   second   incident   to   happen
before moving the law into motion. Sweeping assumptions concerning
delays   in   registration   of   FIRs   for   sexual   offences,   send   a   problematic
signal   to   society   and   create   opportunities   for   abuse   by   miscreants.
Instead,   the   facts   of   each   individual   case   and   the   behaviour   of   the
parties   involved   ought   to   be   analysed   by   courts   before   reaching   a
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conclusion on the  reason and effect of delay  in registration of FIR. In
the facts of the present case, neither is Section 366A by itself a sexual
offence   in   the   strict   sense   nor   do   the   inactions   of   the   prosecutrix   or
her father inspire confidence on genuineness of the prosecution story.
No steps were taken to avail of medical examination of the victim, nor
was   the   Panchayat   or   any   social   forum   approached   for   any   form   of
redress till the occurrence of the second alleged incident.
12. Further, it is beyond comprehension that the prosecutrix’s father
and   his   two   male   associates   failed   to   stop   the   tenant   boy   who   was
allegedly about to commit a sexual offence with the minor victim  and
neither   did   they   later   make   any   attempt   to   even   register   a   complaint
against   him.   Strangely,   the   prosecution   has   acquiesced   to   such
disappearance of the boy from the scene.  Still further, the father of the
prosecutrix merely registered his protest to the appellant on the scene,
instead   of   reacting   instinctively   and   approaching   police   authorities
when   faced   with   possible   trafficking   of   his   daughter .   This   conduct   of
belatedly   proceeding   against   only   the   prosecutrix   creates   a   lurking
suspicion   against   the   prosecution   case   and   it   may   not   be   totally
improbable   to   infer   that   it   was   a   malicious   attempt   at   the   behest   of
Bhola   Singh   to   falsely   implicate   a   weak   rape   victim   and   stifle   her
ability to seek justice.
II. Shoddy investigation and prosecution
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13. The original record elucidates the lack of serious effort on part of
either   the   investigation   agency   or   the   prosecutor   to   bring   home   the
appellant’s   guilt.   Save   for   the   initiative   of   the   prosecutrix   and   her
father   to   register   the   complaint,   no   substantive   evidence   has   been
gathered   by   the   police.   Despite   the   male   tenant   having   been   residing
with the appellant allegedly for many  months, the police were  unable
to   even   discover   his   name,   let   alone   his   antecedents   or   location.
Further, DW­1 casts an impressionable doubt on the existence of the
boy in the first place. This is further buttressed by the fact that PW­1
and   PW­2   differed   in   their   physical   description   of   the   boy’s   age,
clothing and his whereabouts. If the boy was indeed a tenant and if he
did   live   there   for   months,   it   is   highly   mootable   that   he   couldn’t   have
been traced.
14. The spot map prepared by PW­3 also has glaring omissions. The
location   of   Bhan   Singh’s   house   and   the   place   where   the   appellant
allegedly   threatened   the   prosecutrix   on   24.02.1996   are   not   even
marked.   Letters   which   the   prosecutrix   alleged   in   her   examination­in­
chief   and   police   complaint   that   the   appellant   got   written   from   her,
have   not   been   produced   during   trial.   These   could   have   shed   light   on
the relationship between the accused, prosecutrix and the male tenant
prior to the incident. It is the duty of the prosecution to lead the best
evidence   in   its   possession,   and   failure   to   do   so   ought   to   lead   to   an
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adverse inference. 2
15. Non­examination   of   Bhan   Singh   and   Karnail   Singh   is   also   a
noticeable   lapse,   given   the   gaps   in   the   prosecution   story.   It   appears
that no serious attempt was made to get them examined to resolve the
contradictions   in   the   testimonies   of   PW­1   and   PW­2.   Such   lack   of
examination   of   material   independent   witnesses,   adversely   affects   the
case   of   the   prosecution.   This   Court   in   Takhaji   Hiraji   v.   Thakore
Kubersing Chamansing and others 3
,  viewed that:
“19.   …   It   is   true   that   if   a   material   witness,   who   would   unfold   the
genesis  of  the  incident  or an essential part  of the  prosecution case,
not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or
infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or
made   good   by   examining   a   witness   who   though   available   is   not
examined,   the   prosecution   case   can   be   termed   as   suffering   from   a
deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige
the   court   to   draw   an   adverse   inference   against   the   prosecution   by
holding that  if the witness would have  been examined it  would  not
have supported the prosecution case. ...”
III. Gross mis­appreciation of conflicting testimonies
16. Ordinarily,   the   Supreme   Court   ought   not   to   re­appreciate
evidence.   However,   where   the   courts   below   have   dealt   with   the
material­on­record in a cavalier or mechanical manner which is likely
to   cause   gross   injustice,   then   this   Court   in   such   exceptional
2  
Musauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, (2009) 14 SCC 541, ¶ 11­15.
3   
(2001) 6 SCC 145.
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circumstances may justifiably re­appraise the evidence to advance the
cause of justice. There is no gainsaying that such re­assessment ought
not to take place routinely and ought not to become substitution of an
otherwise plausible view taken by the Courts below. 
17. The   trial   Court   has   summarily   disregarded   the   contradictions
highlighted   by   the   defense   side,   on   the   premise   that   such
contradictions had no material bearing and that there was no reason
to disbelieve the prosecutrix. The High Court too has opined that PW­1
and   PW­2   have   completely   corroborated   each   other   and   their
testimonies   were   impeccable.   These   reasons,   in   our   considered
opinion,   are   not   only   contrary   to   the   record   but   they   also   lead   to   an
impermissible   reversal   of   the   burden   of   proof   imposed   in   criminal
trials.   There   are   numerous   clear   contradictions   between   the
testimonies   of   these   two   star­witnesses,   which   we   find   fatal   to   the
prosecution case.
18. First,   PW­1   states   that   when   the   door   was   unlocked   from
outside, only her father (PW­2) and Bhan Singh were present outside.
However,  this  contradicts   both  the  information  she  gave  in  the  police
complaint   and   the   testimony   of   her   father   (PW­2)   who   states   that
additionally   a   third   person,   Karnail   Singh,   was   also   present.   Second,
the   prosecutrix’s   description   of   the   male   tenant   differs   significantly
from  that of her father.  Whereas PW­1 estimated his age  at about  26
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years   and   described   him   as   wearing   a   pant­shirt,   PW­2   believed   the
boy to be 18­19 years’ old and wearing a banian, underwear and dirty
shirt.  Third,  on the antecedents of the anonymous boy, the prosecutrix
stated that he was residing with the appellant for a year,  whereas this
period   was   materially   less   at  only   2­3  months   per   her   father .   Fourth,
whereas   prosecutrix   claimed   that   her   father   and   Bhan   Singh
unsuccessfully   attempted   to   catch   the   tenant   while   he   was   escaping
from the room, PW­2 himself states that he was too perplexed to either
run   or   raise   any   alarm.   Fifth   and   most   notably,   on   the   point   of
recording of the FIR, the testimonies of PW­1, PW­2 and PW­5 all differ
noticeably. Whereas PW­1  claims that  the complaint was recorded by
PW­5   while   sitting   on   a  “patthar”   (stone),   PW­2   claims   that   the   same
was   recorded   by   PW­5   while   sitting   on   a   “concrete   bench”   in   the
waiting   shed   of   a   bus   stand   in   the   presence   of   two   other   policemen.
Most   intriguingly,   PW­5   gives   an   entirely   third   version,   claiming   that
he   was   present   at   the   bus   stand   with   five   other   police   officials   and
that   the   statement   was   written   not   by   him   but   by   another   ASI,   who
placed the papers on the bonnet of the jeep while standing.
19. In addition to these inconsistencies which cast a serious shadow
of   doubt   over   the   version   of   events   put   forth   by   the   prosecution,   the
accounts of PW­1 and PW­2 are superficial and lack detail. Important
links of the story, including what happened in the crucial five minutes
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when   the   girl   was   locked   inside   the   room   or   how   the   male   tenant
reacted, are missing.
20. Similarly,   other   links   of   the   story   are   grossly   inconsistent   and
don’t   fit   with   each   other.   PW­2   admits   to   being   not   at   home   and
instead   outside   Bhan   Singh’s   house   during   the   initial   part   of   the
incident,   which   as   per   the   prosecutrix’s   statement   was   a   10­minute
walk   from   the   spot   of   the   crime.   It   is   thus   unlikely   that   PW­2   could
have   heard   the   prosecutrix’s   screams   from   such   afar   or   could   have
covered   such   a   significant   distance   in   less   than   five   minutes   as
claimed   by   PW­1.   There   are,   thus,   mutual   contradictions   in   the
prosecution story.
IV. Failure to refute Section 313 CrPC statement
21. Under   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   after   the
prosecution   closes   its   evidence   and   examines   all   its   witnesses,   the
accused is given an opportunity of explanation through Section 313(1)
(b).   Any   alternate   version   of   events   or   interpretation   proffered   by   the
accused must be carefully analysed and considered by the trial Court
in compliance with the mandate of Section 313(4). Such opportunity is
a   valuable   right   of   the   accused   to   seek   justice   and   defend   oneself.
Failure   of   the   trial   Court   to   fairly   apply   its   mind   and   consider   the
defence,   could   endanger   the   conviction   itself. 4
  Unlike  the   prosecution
4  
Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289, ¶ 19.
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which   needs   to   prove   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the   accused
merely   needs   to   create   reasonable   doubt   or   prove   their   alternate
version   by   mere   preponderance   of   probabilities. 5
  Thus,   once   a
plausible   version   has   been   put   forth   in   defence   at   the   Section   313
CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such
defense plea. 
22. In the case at hand, the alternate version given by the appellant
could   not   be   lightly   brushed   aside.   Her   two­part   defence,   put
succinctly,   was   that   first   there   was   no   male   tenant  at  all   and  no   one
except   for   her   child   and   mother   lived   with   her,   and   second,   that   she
was   being   falsely   implicated   as   vengeance   for   filing   a   rape   complaint
against   one   Bhola   Singh   with   whom   the   prosecutrix’s   father   used   to
work. 
23. It is revealed that a rape complaint had indeed been made by the
appellant   against   Bhola   Singh   approximately   seven   months   previous
to the present incident. Not only did she face difficulties in registering
an FIR of rape with the police, but she also had to take pains in filing
a private complaint and prosecuting the case against such third party.
In fact, the effect of these proceedings was in line with the appellant’s
defence,   for   in   that   rape   trial   the   trial   Court   drew   a   damning
observation against her character (calling her a child trafficker) owing
to these proceedings. 
5  
M Abbas v. State of Kerala, (2001) 10 SCC 103, ¶ 10.
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24. Lastly,   DW­1,   who   lived   in   the   neighbourhood   of   the   parties,
both supported the appellant’s claim that there was no male tenant in
her   home   and   created   sufficiently   reasonable   connection   between
Bhola   Singh   and   the   prosecutrix’s   father   by   volunteering   that   PW­2
was   residing   in   Bhola   Singh’s   premises.   Reliance   on   mere   admission
by   DW­1   during   cross­examination   that   PW­2   was   a   government
employee,   neither   negates  the   defense  of  false  implication   nor   does  it
imply   that   PW­2   couldn’t   be   working   with   Bhola   Singh   in   a   part­
time/casual capacity or staying in Bhola Singh’s house. Thus, the trial
Court’s   analysis  of  the  appellant’s  Section  313  defence   ought to   have
been deeper, before concluding it as being false or untrustworthy. 
V. Charge of Criminal Intimidation 
25. Proving   the  intention  of  the  appellant  to  cause  alarm   or  compel
doing/abstaining from some act, and not mere utterances of words, is
a pre­requisite of successful conviction under Section 506 of IPC. 6
 The
trial Court has undertaken no such separate analysis or recorded any
finding   on   this   count,   thus   calling   into   question   the   conviction   for
criminal intimidation. Further, the nature of this charge is such that it
is a derivative of the main charge of ‘procuration of minor girls’. Given
the   facts   of   this   case   where   the   common   testimony   of   PW­1   on   both
6  
Manik Taneja & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., (2015) 7 SCC 423, ¶ 12.
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charges   has   been   doubted,   it   would   be   unwise   to   rely   upon   it   as   the
sole piece of evidence to convict the appellant for criminal intimidation
without any other corroboration. 7
C ONCLUSION
26. We   are   thus   of   the   considered   view   that   the   prosecution   has
failed   to   discharge   its   burden   of   proving   the   guilt   of   the   appellant
under   Section   366A   and   506   of   the   IPC   beyond   reasonable   doubt.
Thus,   for   the   reasons   aforesaid,   the   appeal   is   allowed   and   the
conviction   and   sentence   awarded   by   the   Courts   below   are   set   aside.
The appellant is acquitted and consequently set free.
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………...J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 28.07.2020
7  
Kamij Shaikh v. Emperor, AIR 1948 Pat 73, ¶ 5.
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