2020 INSC 0399
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7764 OF 2014
Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
Manjit Kaur & Ors.       ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal   emanates  from   the   judgment   and  decree  dated
27.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh 1
 in R.S.A. No. 946/2004, whereby the second appeal
filed   by   the   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   (heirs   and   legal
representatives of Mohan Singh ­ original defendant No. 1) came
to   be   allowed   by   answering   the   substantial   question   of   law
formulated as under: ­
“Whether the document Ex.P­6 required registration as by
way of said document the interest in immovable property
worth   more   than   Rs.100/­   was   transferred   in   favour   of
the plaintiff?”
1   For short, “the High Court”

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2. Briefly   stated,   the   suit   was   filed   by   the   predecessor   of   the
appellants   herein   ­   Harbans   Singh,   son   of   Niranjan   Singh,
resident   of   Sangrur,   Punjab   against   his   real   brothers   Mohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original
defendant   No.   2)   for   a   declaration   that   he   was   the   exclusive
owner   in   respect   of   land   admeasuring   11   kanals   17   marlas
comprising   khasra   Nos.   935/1   and   935/2   situated   at   Mohalla
Road   and   other   properties   referred   to   in   the   Schedule.     He
asserted that there was a family settlement with the intervention
of   respectable   persons   and   family   members,   whereunder   his
ownership   and   possession   in   respect   of   the   suit   land   including
the   constructions   thereon   (16   shops,   a   samadhi   of   his   wife   –
Gurcharan Kaur and one service station with boundary wall) was
accepted  and   acknowledged.     Structures   were   erected   by   him   in
his   capacity   as   owner   of   the   suit   land.     It   is   stated   that   in   the
year   1970   after   the   purchase   of   suit   land,   some   dispute   arose
between   the   brothers   regarding   the   suit   land   and   in   a   family
settlement   arrived   at   then,   it   was   clearly   understood   that   the
plaintiff – Harbans Singh would be the owner of the suit property
including   constructions   thereon   and   that   the   name   of   Mohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original

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defendant   No.   2)   respectively   would   continue   to   exist   in   the
revenue   record   as   owners   to   the   extent   of   half   share   and   the
plaintiff   would   have   no   objection   in   that   regard   due   to   close
relationship between the parties.  However, the defendants raised
dispute   claiming   half   share   in   respect   of   which   Harbans   Singh
(plaintiff)   was   accepted   and   acknowledged   to   be   the   exclusive
owner   and   as   a   result   of   which   it   was   decided   to   prepare   a
memorandum   of   family   settlement   incorporating   the   terms
already   settled   between   the   parties,   as   referred   to   above.     The
stated   memorandum   was   executed   by   all   parties   on   10.3.1988.
However,   after   execution   of   the   memorandum   of   family
settlement   dated   10.3.1988,   the   defendants   once   again   raised
new   issues   to   resile   from   the   family   arrangement.     As   a   result,
Harbans   Singh   (plaintiff)   decided   to   file   suit   for   declaration   on
9.5.1988,   praying   for   a   decree   that   he   was   the   owner   in
possession   of   the   land   admeasuring   11   kanals   17   marlas
comprising of khasra Nos. 935/1 and 935/2 situated at Mohalla
Road.  An alternative plea was also taken that since plaintiff was
in  possession  of the whole  suit property  to  the knowledge of the
defendants   openly   and   adversely   for   more   than   twelve   years,   he
had acquired ownership rights by way of adverse possession.  

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3. The   suit   was   resisted   by   the   defendants   by   filing   written
statement.     Harbans   Singh   (plaintiff)   filed   replications.     On   the
basis of rival pleadings, the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sangrur
in   Suit   No.   187/1988   B.T.   No.   185   of   18­1­95   (18­1­95)   framed
following issues: ­
“1. Whether   the   plaintiff   is   owner   in   possession   of   suit  
land? OPP
2. Whether  there   was  any   family   settlement   between   the
parties   on   10.3.1988   and   memo   of   family   settlement
was executed by parties on that day? OPP
3. Whether   the   plaintiff   constructed   shops,   a   service
station   and   boundary   wall   around   the   disputed
property? OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff has become owner of suit land by
adverse possession? OPP
5. Whether the property in dispute was purchased out by
the   income   of   Joint   Hindu   Family   coparcenary
property   and   construction   on   the   suit   land   was   also
purchased   by   Joint   Hindu   Family   coparcenary
property? OPD
6. Whether   Sohan   Singh,   Mohan   Singh   and   Harbans
Singh constitute a Joint Hindu Family? OPD
7. Whether the defendants are estopped from denying the
execution   of   memo   of   family   settlement   by   their   act
and conduct? OPP
8. Relief.”
During the pendency of the suit, Harbans Singh (plaintiff) expired
and,   therefore,   the   appellants   herein   were   brought   on   record
being   his   legal   heirs.     The   trial   Court   vide   judgment   and   decree
dated 19.1.2000, partly decreed the suit in the following terms: ­
“RELIEF 

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30. In   view   of   my   discussion   on   various   issues
above, the suit  of the plaintiff partly succeeds and partly
fails.     Therefore,   his   suit   is   decreed   partly   to   the   extent
that   he   is   declared   to   be   owner   in   possession   of   khasra
no.   935/1/1/2   (5­18)   and   to   the   extent   of  ½	  share   in
khasra   no.   935/1/1/1   (5­19)   with   construction   there
upon.     Keeping   in   view   the   relationship   between   the
parties and the circumstances of the case, no order as to
cost.     Decree   sheet   be   prepared   accordingly.     File   be
consigned to the record room.”
4. Aggrieved   by   this   decision,   the   appellants/plaintiffs   filed
first appeal before the District Judge, Sangrur being Civil Appeal
No. 45 of 5­2­2000 B.T. No. 60 of 11­6­2001.   The first appellate
Court, after reappreciating the pleadings and evidence on record,
was   pleased   to   allow   the   appeal   and   modify   the   judgment   and
decree   passed   by   the   trial   Court.     The   first   appellate   Court
declared the original plaintiff as owner of the suit land alongwith
constructions including 16 shops, a service station and boundary
wall with samadhi in the land.  The operative order passed by the
first appellate Court, dated 29.11.2003, reads thus: ­
“18. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal is
allowed   and   the   judgment   passed   by   the   learned   trial
court   is   modified   and   the   suit   of   the   plaintiff   is   decreed.
The   plaintiff   is   declared   owner   of   the   land   measuring   11
kanals   17   marlas   comprised   in   rectangle   and   killa   no.
935/1/1/1   (5­19),   935/1/1/2   (5­18)   situated   in   Mehlan
Road,   Sangrur   along   with   construction   including   16
shops,   a   service   station   and   boundary   wall   with   samadh
in the land.   In view of the peculiar circumstances of the
case   the   parties   are   left   to   bear   their   own   costs.     Decree
sheet be prepared and copy of the judgment be placed on
the   file   of   the   learned   trial   court   and   the   same   be
returned   immediately   to   the   successor   court   of   Smt.

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Harreet Kaur PCS, the then Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Sangrur.     This   court   file   be   consigned   to   the   record
room.”
5. The   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   being   legal   representatives   of
Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   preferred   second   appeal
before   the   High   Court   being   R.S.A.   No.   946/2004.     The   learned
single   Judge   answered   the   substantial   question   of   law
reproduced   in   paragraph   1   above   in   favour   of   the   said
respondents.     The   High   Court   was   pleased   to   set   aside   the
conclusion recorded by the first appellate Court and opined that
the document which, for the first time, creates a right in favour of
plaintiff   in   an   immovable   property   in   which   he   has   no   pre­
existing   right   would   require   registration,   being   the   mandate   of
law.   Accordingly, the second appeal came to be allowed and the
judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court was set
aside, thereby restoring the decree passed by the trial Court, vide
impugned judgment dated 27.11.2007.
6. The  appellants  have  questioned  the  correctness  of  the  view
taken   by   the   High   Court   and   in   particular,   reversing   the
conclusion   reached   by   the   first   appellate   Court.     When   the
present   appeal  was   taken   up  for   hearing,  the   Court  referred  the
matter to a larger Bench of three­Judges to answer the question

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as   to   whether   the   acquisition   of   title   by   adverse   possession   can
be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963
and is there any bar under the Limitation Act to sue on aforesaid
basis   in   case   of   infringement   of   any   rights   of   a   plaintiff.     The
appeal   accordingly   proceeded   before   the   three­Judge   Bench,
which   in   turn   answered   the   said   question   vide   judgment   dated
7.8.2019 2
  in   favour   of   the   plaintiff.     As   a   result,   the   matter   has
been placed before us for  consideration of the appeal on its own
merits.  
7. The appellants would contend that the High Court disposed
of   the   second   appeal   in   a   casual   manner   and   more   so,   without
dealing   with   the   finding   of   fact   recorded   by   the   first   appellate
Court in favour of the plaintiff.  It is urged that the first appellate
Court,   after   noticing   the   admitted   factual   position,   proceeded   to
first   examine   the   question   whether   the   document   dated
10.3.1988 (Exhibit P­6) was executed by the parties or not.  That
fact has been answered in favour of the plaintiff (appellants) after
analysing   the   evidence   on   record.     It   has   been   held   that   the
stated  document  was  indisputably  executed by  the  parties.    The
next question considered by the first appellate Court was whether
2   Reported as (2019) 8 SCC 729

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the stated document required registration or not, which has been
justly   answered   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   (appellants)   on   the
finding   that   it   was   merely   a   memorandum   of   family   settlement
and   not   a   document   containing   terms   and   recitals   of   the   family
settlement   made   thereunder.     For   that,   the   first   appellate   Court
noted that the plaintiff had constructed 16 shops and a samadhi
including boundary wall on the suit land on his own, which fact
was   indisputable   and   established   from   the   evidence   on   record.
Further,   the   plaintiff   was   in   possession   of   the   suit   land.     Even
this   finding   is   supported   by   the   evidence   on   record   and   is   well­
established.     It   is   also   established   from   record   that   as   per   the
family   settlement,   the   plot   in   Prem   Basti   belonging   to   Harbans
Singh (plaintiff) was given to Sohan Singh (original defendant No.
2),   which   was   in   possession   of   Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant
No. 1) and that another plot purchased by plaintiff in the name of
his   son   Vikramjit   Singh   was   given   to   Mohan   Singh   (original
defendant   No.   1)   and   his   wife.     Notably,   the   Defendant   Witness
No. 1 (DW­1) admitted that the said property was sold thereafter
to   one   Surjit   Kaur.     In   substance,   it   is   established   that   the
parties   had   acted   upon   the   family   settlement,   which   was
recorded   in   the   form   of   document   ­   Exhibit   P­6   being   a

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memorandum   of   family   settlement.     In   other   words,   the
concerned parties had acted upon the family arrangement as per
the   settlement   terms   decided   in   1970   and   reinforced   by   the
document Exhibit P­6 (memorandum of family settlement).  Being
a   memorandum   of   family   settlement,   it   was   not   required   to   be
registered   and,   in   any   case,   the   parties   having   acted   upon   the
terms of the said settlement to the prejudice of the other party, it
was not open to them to resile from the said arrangement.  Thus,
they   are   estopped   from   disowning   the   arrangement   already
reached,   acted   upon   and   so   recorded   in   the   memorandum   of
family   settlement.     Thus   understood,   the   plaintiff   was   accepted
and acknowledged to be the owner of the suit property by all the
family   members   who   were   also   party   to   the   memorandum   of
family   settlement   (Exhibit   P­6).     The   appellants   have   placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in  Kale & Ors. vs. Deputy
Director of Consolidation & Ors. 3
   They pray for restoration of
the   decree   passed   by   the   first   appellate   Court   and   setting   aside
the impugned judgment.
8. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondent   Nos.   1   to   3   would
contend that the High Court has rightly considered the document
3   (1976) 3 SCC 119

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Exhibit P­6 as containing terms and recitals of family settlement
and for which reason it was essential to get the same registered.
It   is   urged   that   there   was   no   pre­existing   title   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff   in   respect   of   the   suit   property,   as   the   same   was
purchased   in   the   name   of   concerned   defendant   by   way   of   a
registered sale deed.   The parties were not in possession of Joint
Hindu   Family   property   as   such   and   therefore,   the   question   of
partition of that property does not arise.  The plea that there was
no Joint Hindu Family property was taken by the plaintiff in the
replication filed before the trial Court.  This plea was taken in the
context   of   the   assertion   made   by   the   defendants   in   the   written
statement   that   the   suit   property   was   jointly   owned   by   Mohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original
defendant No. 2).  The contesting respondents have reiterated the
stand   that  there  was  no   family   settlement  in   1970,  as stated  by
the   plaintiff   and   that   the   signature   of   the   defendant   No.   2
appearing   in   document   Exhibit   P­6   is   forged   and   fabricated.
Further,   the   High   Court   has   justly   non­suited   the   plaintiff   and
preferred   to   restore   the   partial   decree   passed   by   the   trial   Court
on the conclusion that the document Exhibit P­6 is inadmissible
in   evidence,  as it  has  not   been  registered  despite the   transfer  of

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title in immovable property  worth more than Rs.100/­.   In other
words,  the   High  Court   answered   the  substantial  question   of  law
against the plaintiff and as a result of which it rightly allowed the
second   appeal   filed   by   the   defendants   (respondent   Nos.   1   to   3).
The view so taken by the High Court is unexceptionable.
9. We   have   heard   Mr.   Manoj   Swarup,   learned   senior   counsel
for   the   appellants   and   Mr.   Parveen   Kumar   Aggarwal,   learned
counsel for the respondents.
10. The   core   issue   involved   in   this   appeal   is:   whether   the
document Exhibit P­6 was required to be registered as interest in
immovable property worth more than Rs.100/­ was transferred in
favour of the plaintiff?  
11. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   parties   are   closely   related.
Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh
(original   defendant   No.   2)   were   real   brothers   of   Harbans   Singh
(original   plaintiff).     Original   defendant   No.   4   –   Harjinder   Kaur   is
the wife of Sohan Singh (original defendant No. 2).   The father of
the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 died during minority of
defendant Nos. 1 and 2.   The defendants had proved the copy of
sale   deed   dated   16.4.1970   (Exhibit   DW­3/A),   whereby   Mohan

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Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original
defendant   No.   2)   purchased   land   admeasuring   5   kanals   19
marlas comprised in khasra No. 935/1.  Harbans Singh (plaintiff)
had appeared on behalf of the purchaser at the time of execution
of   the   sale   deed.     Jamabandi   for   the   year   1984­1985   of   the
property   in   dispute   (Exhibit   D­1)   reveals   that   khasra   No.
935/1/1/1   (5­19)   shows   the   name   of   Mohan   Singh   (original
defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   2)   as
owners,  whereas  the  name  of  Harbans  Singh   (plaintiff)  is  shown
against   khasra   No.   935/1/1/2   (5­18)   as   owner.     Mohan   Singh
(original   defendant   No.   1)   had   stated   that   the   land   standing   in
the  name of  Harbans Singh (original  plaintiff)  was purchased by
him   from   the   funds   of   joint   family,   but   that   fact   has   not   been
proved   or   established   by   the   contesting   defendants.     In   that
sense, it may appear from the revenue record that the concerned
parties were owners in respect of separate properties and not as
joint   owners.     The   fact   remains   that   Harbans   Singh   (original
plaintiff),   Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   2)   are   closely   related   being   real
brothers.     Further,   although   the   ownership   of   the   suit   property
recorded in Jamabandi is of concerned defendant, Harbans Singh

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(plaintiff)   had   constructed   16   shops,   samadhi   of   his   wife   –
Gurcharan Kaur and a boundary wall on the property and was in
possession   thereof.     Pertinently,   the   trial   Court   had   opined   in
paragraph   24   of   its   judgment   that   all   the   three   brothers   –
Harbans Singh (plaintiff), Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1)
and   Sohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   2),   as   noted   in   Exhibit
P­6,   owned   various   properties,   on   which   possession   of   Harbans
Singh (plaintiff) being the eldest brother is admitted.  However, it
was  a permissive  possession.    The first  appellate  Court has  also
opined   in   paragraph   16   of   the   judgment   that   Harbans   Singh
(plaintiff)   came   in   possession   of   the   suit   property   with   the
consent   of   the   defendants.     Notably,   this   finding   of   fact   has   not
been   disturbed   by   the   High   Court.     That   apart,   it   is   established
from   the   record   that   plot   at   Prem   Basti   belonged   to   Harbans
Singh   (plaintiff),   which   was   given   to   Sohan   Singh   (original
defendant   No.   2)   after   taking   possession   thereof   from   Mohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1).     Further,   plot   purchased   by
Harbans   Singh   (plaintiff)   in   the   name   of   his   son   was   given   to
Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife.  It has been
admitted   by   DW­1   that   later   on   the   said   plot   was   sold   to   one
Surjit Kaur.  These facts clearly establish that there was not only

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univocal family arrangement between the parties, but it was even
acted upon by them without any exception.  This factual position
has not been doubted by the High Court.  
12. As a matter of fact, the High Court has not bothered to even
advert   to   this   aspect,   whilst   analysing   the   correctness   of   the
finding   of   fact   recorded   by   the   first   appellate   Court,   which   was
the   final   fact­finding   Court.    From   the   impugned  judgment,  it   is
noticed   that   after   giving   the   basic   facts,   the   High   Court   first
extracted   the   relevant   portion   from   the   trial   Court’s   judgment
(paragraphs 17­21 thereof) and thereafter adverted to the finding
and conclusion recorded by the trial Court on other issues.   The
High Court then went on to extract paragraph 16 of the judgment
of   the   first   appellate   Court   in   its   entirety,   running   into   about   8
pages and  then  formulated  the substantial  question  of law.    For
answering   the   said   substantial   question   of   law,   the   High   Court
first   adverted   to   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Bhoop   Singh   vs.
Ram   Singh   Major   &   Ors. 4
  and   reproduced   paragraphs   12,   13,
16 and 18 thereof.  After that, the relevant portion of the decision
of   the   same   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Hans   Raj   &   Ors.   vs.
4   (1995) 5 SCC 709

15
Mukhtiar   Singh 5
  has   been   extracted.     After   doing   so,   the   High
Court then referred to the contention of the appellants herein and
extracted   paragraphs   44   and   54   of   the   judgment   in   Hari
Shankar Singhania & Ors. vs. Gaur Hari Singhania & Ors. 6
The   High   Court   then   adverted   to   a   decision   of   the   same   High
Court   in   Jagdish   &   Ors.   vs.   Ram   Karan   &   Ors. 7
  and
reproduced   paragraph   14   thereof.     Only   after   reproducing   the
aforesaid   extracts   in   extenso ,   learned   single   Judge   of   the   High
Court   adverted   to   the   factual   aspects   of   the   present   case   in   the
following words, to allow the appeal: ­
“On a consideration of the matter, I find that a document
which,   for   the   first   time,   creates   a   right   in   favour   of
plaintiff   in   an   immovable   property   in   which   he   has   no
pre­existing   right,   then   registration   is   required.     The
presumption of pre­existing right can only be inferred if a
consent decree is passed where such claim is admitted by
the other party, but a document which is not disputed by
the   party   and   there   is   no   admission   regarding   the
acceptance   of   a   right   and   suit   is   based   on   such   a
document   under   which   the   right   is   transferred   to   the
plaintiff   in   a   property   in   which   he   has   no   pre­existing
right, then it would not require registration as is the ratio
of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Som Dev and others (supra).  In view of this proposition
of law if the matter is considered, the question of law, as
framed, has to be answered in favour of the appellants.
In   the   present   case,   it   may   be   noticed   that   the
property   in   dispute   was   purchased   by   way   of   two   sale
deeds and the ownership of the parties was duly reflected
in   the   revenue   record.     The   plaintiff   claimed   right   to   the
5   (1996) 3 RCR (Civil) 740 (paragraphs 7 to 9)
6   (2006) 4 SCC 658
7   PLR (2003) 133 P&H 182

16
property under the deed of family settlement Exhibit P­6.
Thus   he   claimed   that   the   defendants   had   relinquished
their right in the immovable property in his favour under
the memorandum of family settlement  which was alleged
to  have  been   executed   much   earlier.     In  any   case,   it   has
to   be   held   that   the   document   transferring   title   in   an
immovable   property   worth   more   than   Rs.100/­   rupees,
even   if   it   was   by   way   of   relinquishment,   the   same
required   registration.     Thus,   the   learned   trial   Court   was
right   in   holding   that   no   title   passed   on   to   the   plaintiff
under   Exhibit   P­6   i.e.   family   settlement   entered   into
between the parties.  This view of mine finds support from
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Hari   Chand   (dead)   through   LRs   vs.   Dharampal   Singh
Baba,   2007   (4)   Herald   (SC)   3028,   wherein   the   Hon’ble
Supreme   Court   has   been   pleased   to   lay   down   that   the
family   settlement   could   only   be   if   one   has   lawful   right
over the property and then alone family settlement could
be executed.  When there is no lawful rights of the parties
over the property, there was no occasion to file the suit on
the basis of family settlement.
In view  of what  has been stated and discussed above,
this   appeal   is   allowed   and   the   judgment   and   decree
passed   by   the   learned   lower   Appellate   Court   is   set   aside
and that of the learned trial Court is restored, but with no
order as to costs.” 
13. As   against   this,   the   first   appellate   Court   thoroughly
examined   the   pleadings   and   the   evidence,   oral   as   well   as
documentary, placed on record by the concerned parties.   In the
first   place,   it   examined   the   question   whether   the   document
Exhibit P­6 was executed by the parties or not.  After adverting to
the   relevant   evidence,   the   first   appellate   Court   opined   that   the
trial Court was right in concluding that Exhibit P­6 was executed
by the parties referred to therein.   That being concurrent finding
of   fact,   needs   no   further   scrutiny.     The   High   Court   has   not

17
reversed this finding of fact, as is noticed from the extracts of its
judgment reproduced above.   The first appellate Court then went
on to examine whether  the document required registration.   The
High Court has reproduced paragraph 16 of the judgment of the
first appellate Court in its entirety.   What is relevant to notice is
that   the   first   appellate   Court   adverted   to   the   pleadings   and   oral
and   documentary   evidence   produced   by   the   respective   parties
and found that the plaintiff had proved the compromise (Exhibit
CX)   dated   15.5.1992   between  the   plaintiff   and   defendant   Nos.   2
and 3, namely, Sohan Singh and Harjinder Kaur.  Harjinder Kaur
had   stepped   into   witness   box   and   admitted   the   said   fact.     She
also admitted the fact of execution of a family settlement.   Thus,
the   dispute   was   between   the   successors   of   Harbans   Singh
(plaintiff) and successors of Mohan Singh (original defendant No.
1).     The   first   appellate   Court   thus   accepted   the   stand   of   the
plaintiff   that   in   the   year   1970,   after   purchase   of   land,   dispute
arose   between   the   parties   regarding   the   suit   land   and   in   that
family   settlement,   plaintiff   was   held   to   be   owner   of   the   suit
property including its constructions.  The first appellate Court in
that context observed thus: ­

18
“16. …     The   specific   case   of   the   plaintiff   that   he
constructed with his personal money 16 shops on the suit
land,   one   service   station   with   boundary   wall   and   also
samadh   of   Smt.   Gurcharan   Kaur.     It   is   admitted   that
samadh of Gurcharan Kaur is in the suit property.  If the
plaintiff   was   not   acknowledged   the   owner   of   the   suit
property   then   there   was   no   question   of   construction   of
samadh of Gurcharan Kaur his wife by the plaintiff on the
suit   property.     So   the   version   of   the   defendant   that   no
dispute   arose   in   the   year   1970   and   no   family   settlement
took place can not be accepted…”
The first appellate Court then analysed the evidence of defendant
witnesses and held that the same were not reliable or trustworthy
as   they   did   not   know   any   fact   regarding   the   suit   property.     The
first   appellate   Court   then   adverted   to   another   crucial   fact   and
noted   that   Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1)   and   Sohan
Singh   (original   defendant   No.   2)   were   residing   in   house   situated
at   Prem   Basti   prior   to   1988,   which   belonged   to   Harbans   Singh
(plaintiff).     As   noted   earlier,   this   property   as   per   the   family
arrangement was given to Sohan Singh and has been so recorded
in the memorandum of family settlement (Exhibit P­6).   The first
appellate   Court   found   that   the   defendants   had   failed   to   prove
that they  were in  possession  of  the suit property  or  remained  in
possession   thereof.     On   the   other   hand,   the   evidence   on   record
clearly established that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit
property.     The   first   appellate   Court   then   interpreted   document

19
Exhibit P­6 and found that it was not with regard to khasra No.
935   (11­17),   but   it   referred   to   other   properties.     After   analysing
the   relevant  evidence,  the   first  appellate  Court  held  that  Exhibit
P­6   cannot   be   construed   as   a   document   containing   terms   and
recitals   of   a   family   arrangement,   but   only   a   memorandum   of
family arrangement.  It went on to observe as follows: ­
16. …     Document   Ex.P­6   is   not   with   regard   to
khasra   no.   395   (11­17)   but   other   property   is   also
included   in   the   said   document.     A   plot   situated   in   Prem
Basti   which   was   in   the   name   of   Harbans   Singh   and
Gurcharan   Kaur   was   already   got   vacated   from   Mohan
Singh   and   was   given   to   Sohan   Singh   and   Harjinder
Singh.  A plot measuring 17 marlas which was purchased
by Vikaramjit Singh was given to Manjit Kaur and Mohan
Singh   and   Manjit   Kaur   DW­1  has  admitted  that   she   had
already   sold   that   plot   to   Surjit   Kaur.     So   it   can   be
concluded that said document was acted upon.  Although
few   sentences   of   the   said   documents   are   in   the   present
tense but  the  court  is  to see from   the  material on  record
whether   the   said   document   created   right   in   the
immovable property or rights were already created but the
document was written by way of memorandum.  The said
document   does   not   pertain   to   khasra   no.   935/1/1/1   (5­
19)   but   entire   khasra   no.   935/1   (11­17).     Had   the   said
document   created   right   in   khasra   no.   935/1/1/1   (5­19)
then   there   was   no   question   of   throwing   khasra   no.
935/1/1/2   in   common   pool   and   other   property   of   the
parties.   There is specific recital that on the basis of sale
deeds Harbans Singh was owner in possession of the suit
property   and   was   coming   in   possession   of   the   same.
Harbans   Singh   has   constructed   16   shops   and   service
station   there.     In   other   words,   it   proves   that   Harbans
Singh was being considered as owner in possession of
the   suit   property.     Prior   to   execution   of   the   said
document on that day they compromised not to raise
any   dispute   regarding   his   ownership.     So   this
document was a writing with regard to fact which was
already being considered and admitted by the parties.
So   it   cannot   be   said   that   this   document,   copy   of

20
which is Ex.P­6 created right for the first time in the
immovable property .   …..”
(emphasis supplied)
And again, as follows: ­
“16. …..    Since  the  parties  were   closely  related  to
each other and document was executed with regard to
the fact­which they were already admitting so I am of
the   view   that   document   dated   10.3.1988   copy   of
which   is   Ex.P­6   did   not   require   registration .     In   case
Hans   Raj   cited   supra   the   matter   was   got   compromised
and document itself created right in the property.  In case
Hari   Singh   vs.   Shish   Ram   &   others   cited   supra   it   was
held   that   document   between   the   parties   was   partitioned
and consideration was passed from one party to other.  In
Shishpal   vs.   Vikram   cited   supra   it   was   held   that   during
life   time   of   Gyani   Ram   the   plaintiff   filed   suit   so   there
could   not   be   any   family   settlement.     In   case   Smt.
Karamjit Kaur and another versus Smt. Sukhjinder Kaur
and others cited supra vide compromise the plaintiff and
defendant no. 1 to 4 had agreed to take 30 bighas of land
out   of   90   bighas   left   by   Mohinder   Singh   so   it   was   held
that   said   compromise   has   created   right   in   favour   of
defendants   no.   5   and   6   to   the   property   of   more   than
Rs.100/­   So   require   registration.     All   the   above   said
authorities   cited   by   counsel   for   defendants   are
distinguishable   on   facts   and   ratio   of   said   authorities
cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.   Since
plaintiff   is   proved   to   be   in   existence   in   possession   of   the
suit   property.     So   construction   of   shops   land   service
station   on   the   said   property   was   done   by   the   plaintiff
himself   and   not   from   funds   of   joint   family.     This   fact   is
further   corroborated   by   writing   dated   10.3.1988   copy   of
which   is   Ex.   P­6.     Since   said   document   did   not   require
registration   so   plaintiff   is   proved   to   be   owner   of   the   suit
property.     The   defendants   estopped   from   denying   the
execution   of   the   family   settlement.     Defendants   have
failed   to   prove   that   Harbans   Singh,   Mohan   Singh   and
Sohan   Singh   constituted   Joint   Hindu   Family   Property
and construction of the suit property was raised from the
Joint Hindu Family Funds.  Thus, finding recorded by the
learned Trial Court on issues No. 3, 5 and 7 are set aside
and   it   is   held   that   the   plaintiff   constructed   shops   and
service   station   and   boundary   wall   on   the   suit   property
with   his   own   funds.     The   defendant   has   failed   to   prove

21
that property in dispute was purchased by the income of
the   Joint   Hindu   coparcenary   property   and   Sohan   Singh,
Mohan   Singh   and   Harbans   Singh   constituted   Joint
family.     So   these   issues   are   decided   in   favour   of   the
plaintiff.     Parties   executed   document   Ex.P­6   dated
10.3.1988   by   way   of   memorandum   of   family
settlement   and   it   did   not   require   registration.     The
defendants   are   estopped   from   denying   the   execution
of   the   said   document   and   plaintiff   is   proved   to   be
owner in possession of the suit land .   Issues No. 1 and
2 and 7 are also decided in favour of the plaintiff.   Since
the  plaintiff  came  in possession  of  the  suit  property  with
the   consent   of   the   defendants   and   his   possession   never
become   adverse   to   the   interest   of   the   defendants   so
finding   of   the   learned   trial   Court   on   issue   no.   4   is
affirmed.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. As noticed from the extracted portion of the judgment of the
High Court in paragraph 12 above, it is amply clear that the High
Court   has   not   dealt   with   the   factual   aspects   adverted   to   by   the
first   appellate   Court   to   conclude   that   the   document   Exhibit   P­6
was   only   a   memorandum   of   family   settlement   and   not   a
document   containing   the   terms   and   recitals   of   a   family
settlement.  Being the former, no registration was necessary.  For
which reason, relief claimed by the plaintiff founded on the family
settlement   between   the   real   brothers   arrived   at   in   1970,   acted
upon   without   any   exception   and   documented   on   10.3.1988,
ought to follow.  

22
15. The   first   appellate   Court   has   also   justly   opined   that   the
parties   had   acted   upon   the   stated   family   settlement   and   if   we
may   say   so,   to   the   prejudice   of   the   other   party.     In   that,   the
property   in   the   name   of   plaintiff   at   Prem   Basti   was   given   to
Sohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   2),   which   was   otherwise   in
possession   of   Mohan   Singh   (original   defendant   No.   1).     Further,
the   plot   purchased   by   the   plaintiff   in   the   name   of   his   son   was
given to Mohan Singh (original defendant No. 1) and his wife, but
that plot was admittedly sold by them to one Surjit Kaur.   Being
a   case   of   a   family   settlement   between   the   real   brothers   and
having   been   acted   upon   by   them,   it   was   not  open   to   resile   from
the  same.   They  were estopped from  contending  to the contrary.
This crucial aspect has been glossed over by the High Court and
if   we   may   say   so,   the   second   appeal   has   been   disposed   of   in   a
most   casual   manner.     Inasmuch   as,   the   impugned   judgment   of
the High Court merely contains extraction of the judgment of the
trial   Court   and   first   appellate   Court   and   of   the   relied   upon
judgments   (precedents).     The   only   consideration   is   found   in   two
concluding   paragraphs,   which   are   extracted   above   (paragraph
12).     Even   on   liberal   reading   of   the   same,   it   is   not   possible   to
conclude   that   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   appellate

23
jurisdiction (second appeal) had undertaken proper analysis and
scrutiny   of   the   judgment   of   the   first   appellate   Court   in   right
perspective,   much   less   keeping   in   mind   the   limited   scope   of
jurisdiction  to  entertain  second appeal under   Section  100  of the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908.     The   impugned   judgment   is
bordering on a casual approach by the High Court in overturning
the   well­considered   decision   of   the   first   appellate   Court.
Although   the   impugned   judgment   runs   into   36   pages,   the
manner   in   which   it   proceeds   leaves   us   to   observe   that   it   is
cryptic.     We   say   no   more.     On   this   count   alone,   impugned
judgment does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny.
16. Be that as it may, the High Court has clearly misapplied the
dictum in the relied upon decisions.   The settled legal position is
that   when   by   virtue   of   a   family   settlement   or   arrangement,
members   of   a   family   descending   from   a   common   ancestor   or   a
near   relation   seek   to   sink   their   differences   and   disputes,   settle
and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for
all   in   order   to   buy   peace   of   mind   and   bring   about   complete
harmony   and  goodwill in  the  family, such  arrangement ought to
be   governed   by   a   special   equity   peculiar   to   them   and   would   be
enforced if honestly made.   The object of such arrangement is to

24
protect the family  from long drawn litigation or  perpetual strives
which   mar   the   unity   and   solidarity   of   the   family   and   create
hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family,
as   observed   in   Kale   (supra).     In   the   said   reported   decision,   a
three­Judge Bench of this Court had observed thus: ­
“9. …..     A   family   arrangement   by   which   the   property   is
equitably divided between the various contenders so as to
achieve   an   equal   distribution   of   wealth   instead   of
concentrating   the   same   in   the   hands   of   a   few   is
undoubtedly   a   milestone   in   the   administration   of   social
justice.   That   is   why   the   term   “family”   has   to   be
understood   in   a   wider   sense   so   as   to   include   within   its
fold not only  close relations or  legal heirs but even those
persons   who   may   have   some   sort   of   antecedent   title,   a
semblance   of   a   claim   or   even   if   they   have   a   spes
successionis   so   that   future   disputes   are   sealed   for   ever
and   the   family   instead   of   fighting   claims   inter   se   and
wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile
litigation   is   able   to   devote   its   attention   to   more
constructive   work   in   the   larger   interest   of   the   country .
The   courts   have,   therefore,   leaned   in   favour   of
upholding   a  family  arrangement  instead   of   disturbing
the   same   on   technical   or   trivial   grounds.   Where   the
courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a
legal  lacuna   or  a  formal  defect  the   rule  of  estoppel  is
pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of
the   person   who   being   a   party   to   family   arrangement
seeks   to   unsettle   a   settled   dispute   and   claims   to
revoke   the   family   arrangement   under   which   he   has
himself enjoyed some material benefits . …..”
(emphasis supplied)
In   paragraph   10   of   the   said   decision,   the   Court   has   delineated
the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: ­
“10.   In other words to put the binding effect and the
essentials   of   a   family   settlement   in   a   concretised   form,

25
the matter may be reduced into the form  of the following
propositions:
“( 1 ) The   family   settlement   must   be   a   bona   fide   one
so   as   to   resolve   family   disputes   and   rival   claims   by   a
fair   and   equitable   division   or   allotment   of   properties
between the various members of the family;
( 2 )  The   said   settlement   must   be   voluntary   and
should   not   be   induced   by   fraud,   coercion   or   undue
influence;
( 3 ) The   family   arrangement   may   be   even   oral   in
which case no registration is necessary ;
( 4 )  It   is   well­settled   that   registration   would   be
necessary   only   if   the   terms   of   the   family   arrangement
are   reduced   into   writing.   Here   also,   a   distinction
should   be   made   between   a   document   containing
the   terms   and   recitals   of   a   family   arrangement
made   under   the   document   and   a   mere
memorandum   prepared   after   the   family
arrangement  had   already   been   made   either   for  the
purpose   of   the   record   or   for   information   of   the
court   for   making   necessary   mutation .   In   such   a
case   the   memorandum   itself   does   not   create   or
extinguish   any   rights   in   immovable   properties   and
therefore   does   not   fall   within   the   mischief   of   Section
17(2)   of   the   Registration   Act   and   is,   therefore,   not
compulsorily registrable;
( 5 ) The   members   who   may   be   parties   to   the   family
arrangement   must   have   some   antecedent   title,   claim
or interest even a possible claim in the property which
is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement.  Even
if  one  of  the  parties to the  settlement  has no  title
but   under   the   arrangement   the   other   party
relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such
a   person   and   acknowledges   him   to   be   the   sole
owner,  then  the  antecedent  title  must  be  assumed
and the family arrangement will be upheld and the
courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the
same ;
( 6 ) Even   if   bona   fide   disputes,   present   or   possible,
which   may   not   involve   legal   claims   are   settled   by   a
bona   fide   family   arrangement   which   is   fair   and
equitable   the   family   arrangement   is   final   and   binding
on the parties to the settlement.”
(emphasis supplied)

26
Again,   in   paragraph   24,   this   Court   restated   that   a   family
arrangement being binding on the parties, clearly operates as an
estoppel,   so   as   to   preclude   any   of   the   parties   who   have   taken
advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the
same.  In paragraph 35, the Court noted as follows: ­
“35. …   We have already pointed out  that  this Court
has widened the concept of an antecedent title by holding
that   an   antecedent   title   would   be   assumed   in   a   person
who   may   not   have   any   title   but   who   has   been   allotted   a
particular   property   by   other   party   to   the   family
arrangement by relinquishing his claim in favour of such
a   donee.   In   such   a   case   the   party   in   whose   favour   the
relinquishment   is   made   would   be   assumed   to   have   an
antecedent title. …..”
And again, in paragraph 36, the Court noted as follows: ­
“36. …     Yet   having   regard   to   the   near   relationship
which   the   brother   and   the   son­in­law   bore   to   the   widow
the Privy Council held that the family settlement by which
the   properties   were   divided   between   these   three   parties
was a valid one. In the instant case also putting the case
of  Respondents  Nos. 4  and  5 at the highest, the position
is   that   Lachman   died   leaving   a   grandson   and   two
daughters. Assuming that the grandson had no legal title,
so   long   as   the   daughters   were   there,   still   as   the
settlement   was   made   to   end   the   disputes   and   to   benefit
all the near relations of the family, it would be sustained
as a valid and binding family settlement. …”
While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle
of estoppel, the Court observed as follows: ­
“38. …   Assuming,   however,   that   the   said
document   was   compulsorily   registrable   the   courts
have   generally   held   that   a   family   arrangement   being
binding   on   the   parties   to   it   would   operate   as   an

27
estoppel  by  preventing   the  parties  after  having   taken
advantage   under   the   arrangement   to   resile   from   the
same or try to revoke it . …..”
(emphasis supplied)
And in paragraph 42, the Court observed as follows: ­
42. ..…    In these circumstances there can be no doubt
that  even   if   the   family   settlement   was   not   registered
it   would   operate   as   a   complete   estoppel   against
Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 . Respondent No. 1 as also the
High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law
in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out
by this Court in so many cases. …”
(emphasis supplied)
The   view   so   taken   is   backed   by   the   consistent   exposition   in
previous decisions 8
  referred to and duly analysed in the reported
judgment.     The   question   formulated   by   the   High   Court,   in   our
opinion, stands answered in favour of the appellants (plaintiff), in
8   Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, ILR 33 All 356
   Mt. Hiran Bibi vs. Mst. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44
   Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481
   Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323
   Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil, AIR 1966 SC 292
   Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836 
   Krishna Biharilal vs. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837
   S. Shanmugam Pillai vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312
   Ramgopal vs. Tulshi Ram, AIR 1928 All 641
   Sitala Baksh Singh vs. Jang Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 347
   Mst. Kalawati vs. Sri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1944 Oudh 49
   Bakhtawar vs. Sunder Lal, AIR 1926 All 173
   Awadh Narain Singh vs. Narain Mishra, AIR 1962 Pat 400
   Ramgouda Annagouda vs. Bhausaheb, AIR 1927 PC 227
   Brahmanath Singh vs. Chandrakali Kuer, AIR 1961 Pat 79
   Mst. Bibi Aziman vs. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62
   Kanhai Lal vs. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70
   Dhiyan Singh vs. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145
   T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities vs. M. Gaghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC 
797
   Rachbha vs. Mt. Mendha, AIR 1947 All 177
   Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Smt. Satyawati Sood, AIR 1972 Delhi 
171 (FB)
   Shyam Sunder vs. Siya Ram, AIR 1973 All 382

28
light of exposition of this Court in  Kale  (supra).  A priori, we have
no   hesitation   in   affirming   the   conclusion   reached   by   the   first
appellate Court that the document Exhibit P­6 was nothing but a
memorandum   of   a   family   settlement.     The   established   facts   and
circumstances   clearly   establish   that   a   family   settlement   was
arrived at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties.
That   finding   of   fact   recorded   by   the   first   appellate   Court   being
unexceptionable,   it   must   follow   that   the   document   Exhibit   P­6
was  merely   a  memorandum   of  a  family   settlement  so  arrived  at.
Resultantly, it was not required to be registered and in any case,
keeping   in   mind   the   settled   legal   position,   the   contesting
defendants   were   estopped   from   resiling   from   the   stated
arrangement   in   the   subject   memorandum,   which   had   recorded
the settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon
relating   to   all   the   existing   or   future   disputes   qua   the   subject
property   amongst   the   (signatories)   family   members   despite
absence of antecedent title to the concerned property.
17. As   regards   the   decision   in   Bhoop   Singh   (supra)   and   Som
Dev   &   Ors.   vs.   Rati   Ram   &   Anr. 9
,   the   same   dealt   with   the
question   of   necessity   to   register   any   decree   or   order   of   a   Court
9   (2006) 10 SCC 788

29
governed   by   clause   (vi)   of   Section   17(2)   of   the   Registration   Act,
1908 10
.   In the present case, however, clause (v) of sub­Section 2
of   Section   17   of   the   1908   Act   is   attracted.     Section   17   as
applicable when the cause of action arose (prior to amendment of
2001) reads thus: ­
“Part III
OF REGISTRABLE DOCUMENTS
17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.­
(1)   xxx xxx xxx
(2) Nothing   in   clauses   (b)   and   (c)   of   sub­section   (1)
applies to – 
(i) xxx xxx xxx
(ii) xxx xxx xxx
(iii) xxx xxx xxx
(iv) xxx xxx xxx
(v) any   document   not   itself   creating,
declaring,   assigning,   limiting   or   extinguishing
any   right,   title   or   interest   of   the   value   of   one
hundred   rupees   and   upwards   to   or   in
immovable  property,  but  merely  creating  a  right
to   obtain   another   document   which   will,   when
executed,   create,   declare,   assign,   limit   or
extinguish any such right, title or interest; or
…..”
18. In our considered view, reliance placed by the High Court on
the   decisions   of   this   Court   will   be   of   no   avail   to   alter   or   impact
the   conclusion   recorded   by   the   first   appellate   Court.     As
aforementioned,   in   Bhoop   Singh   (supra)   and   Som   Dev   (supra),
the   Court   was   dealing   with   the   issue   of   compulsory   registration
10   For short, “the 1908 Act”

30
of   a   decree   or   order   of   Court.     In   the   context   of   the   applicable
clause   (vi)   in   sub­Section   (2)   of   Section   17,   the   Court   in   Bhoop
Singh  (supra) went on to hold as follows: ­
“18. The   legal   position   qua   clause   ( vi )   can,   on   the
basis   of   the   aforesaid   discussion,   be   summarised   as
below:
(1)  Compromise   decree   if   bona   fide,   in   the   sense
that   the   compromise   is   not   a   device   to   obviate
payment   of   stamp   duty   and   frustrate   the   law   relating
to   registration,   would   not   require   registration.   In   a
converse situation, it would require registration.
(2) If   the   compromise   decree   were   to   create   for   the
first   time   right,   title   or   interest   in   immovable   property
of   the   value   of   Rs.100   or   upwards   in   favour   of   any
party   to   the   suit   the   decree   or   order   would   require
registration.
(3) If   the   decree   were   not   to   attract   any   of   the
clauses   of   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   17,   as   was   the
position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's
cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require
registration.
(4) If   the   decree   were   not   to   embody   the   terms   of
compromise,   as   was   the   position   in   Lahore   case ,
benefit   from   the   terms   of   compromise   cannot   be
derived,   even   if   a   suit   were   to   be   disposed   of   because
of the compromise in question.
(5) If   the   property   dealt   with   by   the   decree   be   not
the   “subject­matter   of   the   suit   or   proceeding”,   clause
( vi ) of sub­section (2) would not operate, because of the
amendment   of   this   clause   by   Act   21   of   1929,   which
has   its   origin   in   the   aforesaid   decision   of   the   Privy
Council,   according   to   which  the   original  clause   would
have   been   attracted,   even   if   it   were   to   encompass
property not litigated.”
In the present case, as noted earlier clause (v) of Section 17(2) is
attracted,  which   pertains   to   execution   of   any   document   creating
or  extinguishing  right, title or  interest in an immovable property

31
amongst the family members.   Thus, the dictum in   Kale   (supra)
is attracted in the fact situation of this case.
19. Considering the above, we have no hesitation in concluding
that the High Court committed manifest error in interfering with
and   in   particular   reversing   the   well­considered   decision   of   the
first appellate Court, which had justly concluded that document
dated   10.3.1988   executed   between   the   parties   was   merely   a
memorandum of settlement, and it did not require registration.  It
must follow that the relief claimed by the plaintiff in the suit, as
granted   by   the   first   appellate   Court   ought   not   to   have   been
interfered   with   by   the   High   Court   and   more   so,   in   a   casual
manner, as adverted to earlier.  
20. Having   said   that,   it   is   unnecessary   to   examine   the
alternative   plea   taken   by   the   plaintiff   to   grant   decree   as   prayed
on   the   ground   of   having   become   owner   by   adverse   possession.
For   the   completion   of   record,   we   may   mention   that   in   fact,   the
trial Court had found that the possession of the plaintiff was only
permissive possession and that finding has not been disturbed by
the  first  appellate  Court.   In  such a  case,  it is doubtful  that  the

32
plaintiff can be heard to pursue relief, as prayed on the basis of
his alternative plea of adverse possession.  
21. Be   that   as   it   may,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   set   aside   the
impugned judgment and restore the judgment and decree passed
by the first appellate Court in favour of the plaintiffs (appellants
herein).
22. Accordingly,   this   appeal   is   allowed.     Impugned   judgment
and   decree   of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside.     The   judgment   and
decree passed by the first appellate Court is restored in favour of
the plaintiff (appellants herein).  Decree be drawn up accordingly.
There   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs.     Pending   interlocutory
applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
..................................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)
..................................J.
           (Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
July 31, 2020.