2020 INSC 0585
REPORTABLE  
IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.4931 OF 2020
SKODA AUTO VOLKSWAGEN 
INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED                                      … PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.          …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Aggrieved   by   the   refusal   of   the   High   Court   to   quash   a   First
Information   Report   (FIR   for   short)   registered   against   them   for   the
offences   punishable   under   Sections   34,   471,   468,   467,   420,   419
and   406   IPC,   the   petitioner   has   come   up   with   the   above   Special
Leave Petition.
2. We   have   heard   Dr.   Abhishek   Manu   Singhvi,   learned   senior
counsel appearing for the petitioner.   Mr. Maninder  Singh, learned
senior  counsel  appears  for  the   3 rd
  Respondent,  who   is  the   de   facto
complainant.
1

3. The   petitioner   is   a   Company   headquartered   in   Pune   and   is
engaged   in   the   business   of   manufacture,   import   and   sale   of
passenger   vehicles   in   India.   It   is   claimed   that   the   petitioner   has
been   formed   by   the   amalgamation   of   three   Companies   by   name
Skoda Auto India Private Limited, Volkswagen India Private Limited
and   Volkswagen   Group   Sales   India   Private   Limited.   The   petitioner
claims that they  are responsible for the business operations of five
automobile brands namely, Skoda, Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche and
Lamborgini.
4. The   Automotive   Research   Association   of   India,   which   is   a
research   institution   of   the   automotive   industry   attached   to   the
Ministry   of   Heavy   Industries   and   Public   Enterprises   of   the
Government   of   India   issued   a   notice   dated   04.11.2015   to   the
Managing   Directors   of   Skoda   Auto   India   Private   Limited,
Volkswagen   India   Private   Limited   and   Volkswagen   Group   Sales
India   Private   Limited,   calling   upon   them   to   show   cause   as   to   why
they   should   not   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the   vehicles
manufactured   and   sold   by   them   in   India,   are   in   violation   of   the
requirements of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. It was alleged in
2

the said notice that the study carried out by them on limited vehicle
models   fitted   with   Diesel   EA   189   Engines   led   them   to   believe   that
the   vehicles   manufactured   by   Volkswagen,   when   tested   on   road,
indicate   3­9   times   more   NO
x   pollution   compared   with   the   tests
carried   out   in   the   laboratory   on   Modified   Indian   Driving   Cycle
(MIDC). It was also alleged in the  said notice that they  had  reason
to   believe   that   Diesel   EA   189   Engines   fitted   in   BS­IV   vehicles   are
equipped with what are called ‘defeat devices’.
5. At   about   the   same   time,   two   original   applications   came   to   be
filed   before   the   National   Green   Tribunal   (NGT   for   short),   Principal
Bench.   Both   the   applications   were   primarily   against   Skoda   Auto
India   Private   Limited,   Volkswagen   India   Private   Limited   and
Volkswagen   Group   Sales   India   Private   Limited.   Apart   from   these
three   companies,   the   Union   of   India   (UOI),   the   Central   Pollution
Control   Board   (CPCB)   and   a   few   others   were   also   made   parties   to
the original applications.
6. The particulars of these original applications are presented in
a tabular column for easy appreciation:­
3

O.A.No. Name of the
applicant/applicants Names of Respondents Reliefs sought
509 /2015 SaloniAilawadi 1.   Union   of   India
through   its   Secretary,
Ministry   of   Heavy
Industries   &   Public
Enterprises.
2.Ministry of 
Environment, Forest 
and Climate Change, 
Through Secretary
3.Central   Pollution
Control   Board,   Through
its Chairman
4. Volkswagen India Pvt;
Ltd.,   Through   its
Managing Director
5.Skoda   Auto   India
Private Limited, Through
its Managing Director
6.   Volkswagen   Group
Sales   India   Private
Limited,   Through   its
Managing Director
7.   Volkswagen   AG,
Through   Chairman   of
the   Board   of
Management 1.   Directing
Respondents   1­3   to
disallow   the
manufacturing,
assembly   and   sale   of
the   vehicles   of
Respondents   4­6   in
India   till   it   is
established   that   they
are   not   employing   any
deceit   devices   or
technology;
2.   To   direct   the
Respondents   1­3   to
inspect   and   check   all
the   vehicles
manufactured   and   sold
in   India   to   ensure   that
no   deceit   devices   are
used;
3.To   direct   respondents
4­7   to   stop   production,
assembly   and   sale   of
those vehicles; and
4. To direct respondents
4­7   to   rectify   the
engines   of   vehicles
already   sold   in   India   at
their cost.
527/2015 1. Mr.   Satvinder
Singh Sodhi
2. Mr.   Vellore
Ramesh Neelakantan
3. Mr.   Deepit
Singh 1. Volkswagen   India
Private   Limited,
Maharashtra
2. Volkswagen   Group
Sales   India   Private
Limited, Maharashtra 1. To   restrain
Respondents 1­6 from
selling   any   further
automobile   with   the
defeat   device   which
violated the applicable
emission norms;
4

4. Sara
International Limited 3. Volkswagen   AG,
Germany
4. Skoda   Auto   India
Limited, Maharashtra
5. Skoda Auto AS, Czech
Republic
6. Dr.Ing. h.e.F.Porsche 
AG, Germany
7. Central   Pollution
Control Board, Delhi.
8. Automotive   Research
Association   of   India,
Pune
9. Union   of   India
Through   Ministry   of
Heavy   Industries   and
Public   Enterprises,
New Delhi
10. Government   of
National   Capital
Territory   of   India,
Through   Delhi
Pollution   Control
Committee, Delhi 2.   To   direct
Respondents   106   to
disgorge   all   the   profits
made   by   selling
automobiles   with
cheat devices from  the
year 2008; and
3.   To   direct
Respondents   1­6   to
pay   damages   for
restoration   of
environment.
7. On   16.11.2018,   the   NGT   recorded   a   prima   facie   finding   that
the   claim   of   the   manufacturers   that   they   had   not   caused   any
damage   to   the   environment,   was   not   acceptable.   The   Tribunal
constituted a joint team to give an expert opinion and in the mean
5

time directed the manufacturers to deposit Rs. 100 crores with the
CPCB.
8. The manufacturers filed appeals before this Court in C.A. Nos.
11928 and 11929 of 2018, against the preliminary finding  and the
interim direction issued by the NGT. During the pendency of those
appeals, the Expert Team filed a Report.
9. Therefore,   this   Court   disposed   of   the   aforesaid   Civil   Appeals
giving liberty to the manufacturers to file objections to the Report of
the   Expert   Team   and   directed   the   Tribunal   to   consider   those
objections and to pass orders.
10. Pursuant to the said order of this Court, the NGT allowed the
manufacturers   to   file   objections   and   heard   both   the   original
applications   and   disposed   of   the   same   by   order   dated   07.03.2019.
Some of the findings and directions by the Tribunal were:­
(i) That   the   manufacturers   had   in   fact   used   cheat
devices to suppress the laboratory tests;
(ii) That NO
x   emission was higher by Portable Emission
Measurement System (PEMS);
(iii) That   Volkswagen   vehicles   gave   much   less   NO
x
emission under the Warm Test Cycles after recall;
6

(iv) That the emissions measured on PEMS were higher
than BS­IV limit;
(v) That the manufacturers are liable to pay damages to
the tune of Rs.500 crores; and
(vi) That   the   CPCB   shall   consider   initiation   of
prosecution   in   the   light   of   applicable   statutory
regime.
11. Challenging   the  said   order   dated   07.03.2019   of   the   NGT,  two
Civil   Appeals   were   filed   in   C.A.Nos.   4069   and   4086   of   2019.   On
06.05.2019   these   appeals   were   taken   up   along   with   another   Civil
Appeal filed by the Inter­Continental Association of lawyers and this
court ordered the issue of notice in the appeals. In the mean time,
this   Court   directed   that   no   coercive   steps   shall   be   taken   against
Volkswagen India Private Limited.
12. While   things   stand   thus,   the   3 rd  
Respondent   herein   lodged   a
complaint   with   the   S.H.O.,   Gautam   Budh   Nagar,   on   10.07.2020,
alleging that he had bought 7 Audi Brand cars from the authorised
dealers   of   the   manufacturing   Companies;   that   at   the   time   of
purchase,   he   got   it   clarified   from   the   Company   that   they   had   not
installed   any   cheat   devices   in   the   vehicles   sold   in   India;   that
however,   the   authorities   in   India   found   out   a   higher   emission   of
7

NO
x ;   that   even   the   NGT   imposed   a   fine;   that   the   complainant
thereafter   realised   that   he   had   been   duped   by   the   Company;   that
knowing fully well that their vehicles have been installed with cheat
devices,   the   manufacturer   had   prepared   wrong   records   and
documents;   that   the   manufacturers   and   the   officers   of   the
manufacturers are therefore guilty of various offences under the IPC
and that therefore action should be initiated against them.
13. Contending   that   as   per   the   particulars   mentioned   in   the
VAHAN   Portal   of   the   Government,   the   3 rd  
Respondent   herein   had
purchased only  3 and not 7 vehicles; that the complaint lodged by
the 3 rd
 Respondent after more than 2½	 years of the purchase of the
vehicles,   was   malicious   and   full   of   false   particulars;   and   that   the
FIR   is   based   entirely   upon   the   order   of   the   NGT,   which   is   the
subject matter of two civil appeals before this Court, the petitioner
filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.9233 of 2020 before
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. In the said Writ Petition,
the petitioners sought quashing of the FIR.
14. By   an   order   dated   01.10.2020,   the   Allahabad   High   Court
rejected   the   prayer   for   quashing   of   the   FIR.   However,   the   High
8

Court   protected   the   officers   of   the   petitioner   against   arrest   till   the
submission   of   the   Report   under   Section   173(2)   Cr.P.C.   subject
however   to   the   condition   that   they   shall   cooperate   in   the
investigation and also appear as and when called upon to assist in
the investigation.
15. Not   satisfied   with   a   mere   protection   against   arrest   and   the
refusal of the Allahabad High Court to quash the FIR, the petitioner
has come up with the above SLP.
16. The main contentions of the petitioner are:­
(i) That   the   Police   cannot   investigate   an   issue,   the
substratum of which is sub judice before this Court
in   the   civil   appeals   arising   out   of   the   order   of   the
NGT; and
(ii) That   the   High   Court   failed   to   take   note   of   the   long
delay   on   the   part   of   the   3 rd
  Respondent   in   lodging
the   complaint   and   also   the   fact   that   the   VAHAN
Portal   of   the   Government   shows   the   purchase   of
only   3   vehicles   as   against   the   claim   of   the   3 rd
Respondent to have purchased 7 vehicles.
17. Let us take up the second contention first, since it is capable
of being dealt with, without much ado. The second contention has
9

two   parts   namely   (i)   that   there   is   a   long   delay   in   lodging   the
complaint and (ii) that the 3 rd
 Respondent­complainant, appears to
have   purchased   only   3   vehicles   as   against   his   claim   to   have
purchased 7 vehicles.
18. The   question   whether   the   3 rd
  Respondent­complainant
purchased   3   vehicles   as   revealed   by   the   VAHAN   Portal   of   the
Government or 7 vehicles as claimed by him in his complaint, is a
question   of   fact   which   has   to  be   established  only   in   the   course   of
investigation/trial.   In   a   petition   for   quashing   the   FIR,   the   Court
cannot go into disputed questions of fact.
19. The mere delay on the part of the 3 rd
 Respondent­complainant
in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the
FIR.   The   law   is   too   well   settled   on   this   aspect   to   warrant   any
reference to precedents. Therefore, the second ground on which the
petitioner seeks to quash the FIR cannot be countenanced.
20. The first contention revolves around the pendency of the Civil
Appeals  arising  out   of  the  order  of  the   NGT  and  the  interim   order
passed by this Court in the Civil Appeals.
10

21. As   stated   earlier,   two   original   applications   came   to   be   filed
before the NGT in the year 2015, alleging that the manufacturers of
the vehicles in question were employing deceit devices. The filing of
the   original   applications   coincided   with   the   issue   of   notice   by   the
Automotive   Research   Association   of   India   to   the   manufacturers.
We have already indicated broadly, in paragraphs 5­10 above as to
what transpired before the NGT.
22. The   applicants   before   the   NGT   did   not   seek   any   relief   for
themselves,   as   purchasers   of   vehicles.   The   reliefs   sought   by   the
applicants before the NGT were broad and general. This is why the
NGT, by its final order dated 07.03.2019 directed only the CPCB to
consider  the  initiation  of  prosecution  in the  light  of the  applicable
statutory   regime,   while   ordering   the   manufacturers   to   deposit
Rs.500   crores   as   compensation   for   the   damage   caused   to   the
environment.
23. Therefore,   the   order   of   the   NGT,   passed   on   the   applications
filed by certain individuals not claiming as purchasers of vehicles,
cannot   be   taken   as   an   impediment   for   an   individual   who
purchased cars from the manufacturers, to lodge a complaint, if he
11

has actually suffered on account of any representation made by the
manufacturers.
24. The interim order passed by this Court on 06.05.2019 in Civil
Appeal Nos. 4069 and 4086 of 2019, while issuing notice reads as
follows:­
“In   the   meantime,   no   coercive   steps   shall   be   taken
against   the   appellant   viz.,   Volkswagen   India   Private
Limited.”
25. The   aforesaid   interim   order   correlates   only   to   the   directions
issued  by  the  NGT in   paragraphs  29,  30 and  32  of  its  order  dated
07.03.2019. The direction contained in Paragraph 30 of the order of
the NGT dated 07.03.2019 reads as follows:­
“We leave it open to the CPCB to consider initiation of
prosecution in the light of applicable statutory regime.”
26. In   paragraphs   29   and   32   of   its   order,   the   NGT   directed   the
manufacturers   to   deposit   compensation   to   the   tune   of   Rs.500
crores within 2 months.
27. Therefore,   the   interim   order   passed   by   this   Court   not   to   take
any   coercive  steps  has   to   be   understood   only  in   the   context  of   the
aforesaid directions of the NGT which became the subject matter of
the Civil Appeals. Hence it is futile to contend that the pendency of
the Civil Appeals and the interim order passed by this Court should
12

be taken as a deterrent for anyone else to lodge a police complaint
and seek an investigation.
28. Dr.   A.M.   Singhvi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the
petitioner strenuously contended that the contents of the complaint
lodged   by   the   3 rd
  Respondent­complainant   with   the   Police   were
nothing but a reproduction of the contentions made before the NGT
and that actually the substratum of the police complaint, is what is
sub judice before this court. Therefore, he contends that the police
cannot   investigate   into   the   same   set   of   allegations   which   form   the
subject   matter   of   proceedings   pending   adjudication   before   this
court. 
29. But we do not think so. A little elaboration is required to show
why   we   cannot   agree   with   the   above   contention   of   the   learned
senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. 
30. Section   110(1)   of   the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   empowers   the
Central   Government   to   make   rules,   regulating   the   construction,
equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles with respect to all or
any   of   the   matters   enumerated   in   Clauses   (a)   to   (p).   Clause   (g)   of
13

Sub­section (1) of Section  110 relates to  “ the  emission of  smoke,
visible vapour, sparks, ashes, grit, or oil ”.
31. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 110(1), the Central
Government   issued   a   set   of   rules   known   as   The   Central   Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989.
32. Rules 112 to  114 of those  Rules deal in general with  “smoke,
vapour,   spark,   ashes,   grit   and   oil”.   Rules   115   and   116   deal
specifically   with   “emissions   of   smoke,   vapour”   etc.,   from   motor
vehicles   and   “test   for   smoke   emission   level   and   Carbon   Monoxide
(CO) level for motor vehicles”. These Rules correspond to Clause (g)
of Sub­section (1) of Section 110.
33. Rule   126   mandates   every   manufacturer   or   importer   of   motor
vehicles   other   than   trailers   and   semi­trailers   to   submit   the
prototype   of   the   vehicle   manufactured   or   imported   by   him   for
testing   by   the   agencies   indicated   therein.   Rule   126A   enables   the
testing   agencies   referred   to   in   Rule   126   to   conduct   tests   on   the
vehicles   drawn   from   the   production   line   of   the   manufacturer   to
verify whether these vehicles conform to the provisions of the Rules.
14

34. In   order   to   give   effect   to   the   mandate   of   the   statutory
prescription, the  Ministry  of Road Transport and Highways, issued
a   document   bearing   No.   MoRTH/CMV/TAP­116­116,   Issue   No.4,
which   prescribes   the   test   method,   testing   equipment   and   other
related   procedure   for   the   purpose   of   testing   vehicles   for   verifying
compliance   with   Rules   115   and   126A   of   the   Rules   for   “Type
Approval   and   Conformity   of   Production”.   The   document   also
contains   the   total   procedure  for   checking  of   the   in­service  vehicles
for  idling CO/HC for  vehicles fitted with petrol/CNG/LPG Engines.
This   document   is   divided   into   15   parts.   Part­XIV   contains   the
details   of   standards   for   Tailpipe   Emissions   from   vehicles   and   Test
Procedures Effective for Mass Emission Standards.
35. Clause   No.2.27   of   Chapter­1,   Part­XIV   of   the   aforesaid
document defines  what is  called a “Defeat  Device” . It reads as
follows:­
“ Defeat   Device   means   any   element   of   design   which
senses temperature, vehicle speed, engine rotational
speed,   transmission   gear,   manifold   vacuum   or   any
other   parameter   for   the   purpose   of   activating,
modelling, delaying or deactivating the operation of
any   part   of   the   emission   control   system,   that
reduces   the   effectiveness   of   the   emission   control
15

system   under   conditions   which   may   reasonably   be
expected   to   be   encountered   in   normal   vehicle
operation   and  use . Such an element  of design may  not
be considered a defeat device if 
1. The need of the device is justified in terms of protecting
the   engine   against   damage   or   accident   and   for   safe
operation of the vehicle, or 
2. The device does not function beyond the requirements
of engine starting or, 
3.  Conditions   are   substantially   included  in  the  Type  I   or
Type VI test procedure.”      
36.   The   allegations   in   the   complaint   lodged   by   the   3 rd
  respondent
herein, are to the following effect:
(i) that “at the time of purchase and taking delivery of the vehicles,
the complainant got clarified from the accused persons whether the
vehicles in India were also fitted with cheat devices”;   
(ii)   that   despite   the   clarification   issued   by   them   that   they   had   not
installed   any   cheat   devices,   in   the   vehicles   meant   to   be   sold   in
India, the cars purchased by the complainant were found to contain
such defeat devices; and 
(iii)   that   therefore,   the   manufacturer   is   guilty   of   commission   of
various offences. 
37. The   question   whether   such   devices   are   installed   in   the   cars
purchased   by   the   3 rd
  respondent   herein   and   the   question   whether
16

there was any representation in this regard to the petitioner, are all
questions   of   fact,   peculiar   and   particular   to   the   3 rd  
respondent
herein. NGT had no occasion to examine the cars purchased by the
3 rd
  respondent   herein.   At   this   stage   no   one   can   presume   whether
the   defence   of   the   manufacturer   to   the   police   complaint   will   be
purely   on   a   question   of   fact   or   purely   on   a   question   of   law   or   on
mixed   questions   of   fact   and   law.   If   the   petitioner   takes   a   defence
that no such devices were installed in the cars purchased by the 3 rd
respondent or that there was no (mis)representation in this regard,
it   will   be   a   pure   question   of   fact,   which   cannot   be   gone   into   in   a
quash petition. If the petitioner takes a defence that the installation
of   such  devices,   though   true,  does  not   violate  any   law,  then   it  will
be   a   pure   question   of   law.   We   may   be   entitled   to   go   into   this
question in a quash petition, provided the petitioner comes up with
a categorical admission that they had installed such devices and yet
there was no violation of the law. We do not expect the petitioner to
disclose   their   defence   at   this   stage   nor   would   we   speculate   what
type of defence the petitioner would have to the prosecution. 
17

38. It   may   not   be   out   of   context   to   mention   here   that   the
European   Union   woke   up   way   back   in   2007   to   the   reality   of   car
makers   installing   a   software   that   manipulate   exhaust   emissions,
depending upon whether the car ran on a test stand or on the road.
After   the   European   Commission’s   Joint   Research   Centre   found   in
2011   that   the   levels   of   harmful   NO
x   emissions   far   exceeded   the
prescribed   levels,   a   study   conducted   by   the   International   Council
on   Clean   Transportation   (ICCT)   revealed   similar   results   in   the
United   States.   In   September­2015,   allegations   of   installation   of
manipulation   devices   by   car   manufacturers   emerged   from   the   US
Environmental   Protection   Agency   and   this   triggered   investigations
in   several   European   Union   States.   After   claims   were   lodged   and
legal   action   initiated,   the   German   Federal   Motor   Transport
Authority   appears   to   have   given   permission   in   June­2016   for   the
recall of about 2 million vehicles across Europe. In the light of these
developments, one of the manufacturers entered into an agreement
with   the   US   Environmental   Protection   Agency   in   December­2016
giving certain options to the customers. These and the subsequent
developments,   which   attained   notoriety   as   the   diesel­gate
18

scandal,   led   to   the   German   Federal   Court   of   Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof­BGH) giving a ruling on May 25, 2020 in favour
of the car owners for damages.
39. It is in the backdrop of what transpired in Europe and U.S.A.,
during the period from 2015 to 2019 that the action initiated by the
Automotive   Research   Association   of   India   in   November   2015   and
the   proceedings   that   went   on   before   the   National   Green   Tribunal
from   the   year   2015   to  the   year   2019,   have   to   be   seen.   All   of   them
were part of the global outrage that actually concerned the damage
caused to the environment by the emissions from the cars allegedly
fitted   with   manipulative   devices.   The   proceedings   before   the   NGT
were not intended to address issues relating to individuals, such as
(i)  whether any emissions manipulation software, called in common
parlance as ‘defeat devices’ were installed in the vehicles purchased
by   certain   individuals;   and   (ii)   whether   any   representation   was
made to the purchasers of the cars in which such devices had been
installed, about the emission efficiency level of the cars.
40. Therefore,   we   are   unable   to   agree   with   the   contention   of   the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the substratum of the
19

police complaint is something  that  is already  the subject matter  of
adjudication   before   this   Court   in   the   appeals   arising   out   of   the
order of the NGT. As a matter of fact, the High Court has been fair
to the petitioner, by granting protection against arrest till the filing
of the report under section 173(2) of the Code. We do not think that
the petitioner can ask for anything more. 
41. It is needless to point out that ever since the decision of the Privy
Council   in   King   Emperor   vs.   Khwaja   Nazir  Ahmed 1
,   the  law   is   well
settled   that   Courts   would   not   thwart   any   investigation.     It   is   only   in
cases   where   no   cognizable  offence   or  offence   of   any   kind   is   disclosed
in   the   first   information   report   that   the   Court   will   not   permit   an
investigation   to   go   on.     As   cautioned   by   this   Court   in   State   of
Haryana vs.  Bhajan Lal 2
, the power of quashing should be exercised
very   sparingly   and   with   circumspection   and   that   too   in   the   rarest   of
rare   cases.     While   examining   a   complaint,   the   quashing   of   which   is
sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability
or   genuineness   or   otherwise   of   the   allegations   made   in   the   FIR   or   in
the complaint.   In   S.M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat 3
, this Court again
1    AIR 1945 PC 18
2    (1992) Supp. (1) SCC 335
3    (2001) 7 SCC 659
20

cautioned   that   criminal   proceedings   ought   not   to   be   scuttled   at   the
initial stage.   Quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception
and a rarity than an ordinary rule.   In   S.M. Datta   (supra), this Court
held that if a perusal of the first information report leads to disclosure
of   an   offence   even   broadly,   law   courts   are   barred   from   usurping   the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in
two   specific  spheres   of  activities   and   one  ought   not   to   tread   over   the
other sphere.
42.   In   view   of   what   is   stated   above,   the   special   leave   petition   is
dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.
……………………………..CJI
(S.A. BOBDE)
……………………………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
………………………………..J.
(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)
New Delhi
November 26, 2020
21