2020 INSC 0600 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.824­825  OF 2020 (Arising from SLP(Criminal) Nos.2640­2641/2020) Jayant Etc. …Appellants Versus The State of Madhya Pradesh …Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.826  OF 2020       (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.4549/2020) State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant Versus Jayant …Respondent J U D G M E N T M.R. SHAH, J. Leave granted. 2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned common   judgment   and   order   dated   11.05.2020   passed   by   the 1 High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh,   Bench   at   Indore   in   M.Cr.C   No. 49338/2019 and M.Cr.C. No. 49972/2019, the original petitioner as   well   as   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   have   preferred   the present appeals. By   the   impugned   common   judgment   and   order,   the   High Court   has   dismissed   the   aforesaid   applications   filed   under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the respective FIRs for the offences under Sections 379 and 414, IPC, Sections 4/21 of the Mines & Minerals   (Development   &   Regulation)   Act,   1957   (hereinafter referred   to   as   the   ‘MMDR   Act’)   and   under   Rule   18   of   the   M.P. Minerals   (Prevention   of   illegal   Mining,   Transportation   and Storage) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2006 Rules’). 3. The facts in nutshell are as under: On   a   surprise   inspection,   the   respective   Mining   Inspectors checked   the   tractor/trolleys   of   the   private   appellants   along   with the minor mineral (sand/storage/yellow soil etc.) loaded in them. They   handed   over   the   tractor/trolleys   to   the   concerned   police stations   to   keep   them   in   safe   custody.     Finding   the   private appellants   indulged   in   illegal   mining/transportation   of   minor mineral,   the   mining   Inspectors   prepared   their   respective   cases under Rule 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996 2 (hereinafter   referred   to  as   the   ‘1996  Rules’)  and   submitted  them before   the   Mining   Officers   with   a   proposal   of   compounding   the same for the amount calculated according to the concerned 1996 Rules.     The   concerned   Mining   Officers   submitted   those   cases before   the   Collector,   who   approved   the   proposal.     The   violators accepted the decision and deposited the amounts determined by the   Collector   for   compounding   the   cases.     Their   tractor/trolleys along   with   the   minerals,   which   were   illegally excavated/transported, were released. 3.1 That   after   some   time,   a   news   was   published   in   a   daily newspaper   –   Bhaskar   on   8.9.2019   with   respect   to   illegal excavation/transportation of mineral sand from Chambal, Shivna and   Retam   and   other   Tributary   rivers   flow   from   District Mandsuar and in surrounding places.  It was revealed that due to illegal   transportation   of   the   minerals   and   without   payment   of royalty,   revenue   loss   is   occurring.     It   was   reported   that   illegal mining,   storage   and   transportation   of   mineral   sand   was   being carried   out   at   large   scale.     Similar   kind   of   information   was   also subsequently   published   on   3.10.2019   in   the   daily   newspaper   – Bhaskar   in   Mandsuar   edition.    It   was  also   reported  that  despite the   offences   under   Sections   379   and   414,   IPC   and   the   offences 3 under   the   MMDR   Act   and   the   2006   Rules   were   found  attracted, necessary legal action has not been taken and the violators were permitted to go on compounding the offence under Rule 53 of the 1996   Rules.     The   learned   Judicial   Magistrate,   First   Class, Mandsuar   took   note   of   the   aforesaid   information   and   having taken note of the decision of this Court in the case of   State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772  taking the view that offences under the IPC and offences under the MMDR Act are distinct and different and it is permissible to lodge/initiate the proceedings for the   offences  under  the  IPC  as  well  as under  the  MMDR  Act,  the learned Magistrate in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3),   Cr.P.C.   (suo   motu)   directed   to   register   criminal   case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for initiation of investigation and for submitting   of   report   after   due   investigation   is   conducted.     The learned   Magistrate   also   directed   the   concerned   In­charge/SHOs of   the   concerned   police   stations   to   register   the   first   information report   and   a   copy   of   the   first   information   report   be   sent   to   the learned Magistrate as per the provisions of Section 157, Cr.P.C.  3.2 That   pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   learned Magistrate,  the  In­charge/SHOs  of the  concerned police stations lodged   separate   FIRs   for   the   aforesaid   offences   for   illegal 4 mining/transportation   of   sand,   particulars   of   which   are   as under: Sr.No . MCRC NO. FIR NO/DATE POLICE STATION Date   of Incident 1 49338/2019 234/16.11.2019 Nai Abadi 27.07.2019 2 49340/2019 554/16.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 16.11.2019 3 49847/2019 564/17.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 20.04.2019 4 49856/2019 280/16.11.2019 Afzalpur 30.08.2019 5 49859/2019 563/17.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 20.04.2019 6 49861/2019 588/18.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 24.08.2019 7 49963/2019 281/16.11.2019 Afzalpur 30.08.2019 8 49972/2019 238/18.11.2019 Nai Abadi 28.08.2019 9 50602/2019 137/17.11.2019 Daloda 25.05.2019 10 50610/2019 136/16.11.2019 Daloda 25.05.2019 11 50614/2019 139/17.11.2019 Daloda 10.06.2019 12 50627/2019 591/18.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 13.06.2019 13 50636/2019 551/16.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 02.04.2019 14 05648/2019 552/16.11.2019 Y.D. Nagar 02.04.2019 3.3 That   thereafter   the   private   appellants   and   others approached   the   High   Court   to   quash   the   aforesaid   FIRs 5 registered against them  for  illegal mining/transportation of sand by submitting the applications under Section 482, Cr.P.C.  It was mainly   contended   on   behalf   of   the   private   appellants   and   other violators that in view of Bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act, the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate   directing   to   register the   FIRs   is   unsustainable   and   deserves   to   the   quashed   and   set aside.   It was also contended on  behalf of  the  private appellants and   other   violators   that   once   there   was   compounding   of   offence in   exercise   of   powers   under   Rule   53   of   the   1996   Rules   and   the violators   paid   the   amount   determined   by   permitting   them   to compound the offence, thereafter the Magistrate was not justified in   directing   to   initiate   fresh   proceedings   which   would   be   hit   by the   principle   of   “double   jeopardy”.     That   by   the   impugned common   judgment   and   order,   the   High   Court   has   dismissed   all the aforesaid applications relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of  Sanjay (supra) . 4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in refusing   to   quash   the   FIRs   filed   against   the   private   appellants and   other   violators,   the   original   petitioners   –   violators   have preferred   the   present   appeals.     Though,   before   the   High   Court, 6 the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya   Pradesh   supported   the   order   passed   by   the   learned Magistrate   directing   to   register/lodge   FIRs,   the   State   has preferred   a   separate   special   leave   petition   challenging   the impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court confirming the order passed by the learned Magistrate.  It is very surprising   that   despite   supporting   the   order   passed   by   the learned   Magistrate   before   the   High   Court,   the   State   of   Madhya Pradesh   has   preferred   the   special   leave   petition,   which   shall   be dealt with hereinbelow. 5. Shri Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the private appellants has made following submissions: i) initiation   of   criminal   proceedings   and   filing   of   respective FIRs against the private appellants which have been filed/lodged pursuant   to   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate   in exercise   of   powers   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   are   hit   by Section 22 and 23A of the MMDR Act, as well as, Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules; ii) on   a   plain   reading   of   Section   22,   cognizance   of   the   offence can   be   taken   by   the   Magistrate   only   if   there   is   a   written complaint in that regard by the Mining Officer/authorised officer. 7 In   the   present   case,   admittedly,   there   is   no   written   complaint made by the Mining Officer/authorised officer; iii) MMDR   Act   does   not   contemplate   the   taking   of   suo   motu cognizance   by   the   Magistrate.     The   Magistrate   does   not   have jurisdiction   under   the   MMDR   Act   to   direct   the   Mining Officer/police   officer   in­charge   to   register   FIR   under   the   penal provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act.     Heavy   reliance   is   placed   on   the decision of this Court in the case of  Sanjay (Supra) , as well as, in the case of  Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 1920 of 2019, decided on December 18, 2019; iv) Section   23A   of   the   MMDR   Act   contemplates   the compounding   of   offence   under   the   MMDR   Act.     Therefore,   the Rules   made   under   the   MMDR   Act   contain   provisions   for compounding   of   offence.     Sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   places   a bar   on   proceedings   or   further   proceedings,   when   the   offences have   been   compounded   under   sub­section   (1).     Therefore,   once the   proceedings   have   been   compounded   under   the   Act   or   Rules made thereunder, no further proceedings can lie.   In the present case,   the   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   as   against   the   private appellants   were   permitted   to   be   compounded   by   the   competent authority. 8 5.1 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is prayed to allow the present appals   and   quash   the   criminal   proceedings   initiated   against   the private   appellants   for   the   offences   under   Sections   379   and   414, IPC and Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh has supported the private appellants – violators and has submitted   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate directing   to   lodge/register   FIRs   for   the   offences   under   Sections 379   and   414,   IPC   and   Sections   4/21   of   the   MMDR   Act   is unsustainable, though and as observed hereinabove, the learned Public   Prosecutor   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   State   of   Madhya Pradesh   supported   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate before the High Court. One of the grounds stated in the memo of appeal is that the order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate,   confirmed   by   the   High Court,   impinges/affects   the   powers   of   the   authorised   person   to compound the offence under Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules. 7. Before submissions made on behalf of the respective parties are   considered,   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Sanjay (supra)  dealing with the provisions of the MMDR Act in which this 9 Court considered in detail the policy and object of the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder, is required to be referred to. 7.1 The   question   which   arose   for   consideration   before   this Court   was,   whether   the   provisions   contained   in   Sections   21,   22 and   other   Sections   of   the   MMDR   Act   operate   as   bar   against prosecution   of   a   person   who   has   been   charged   with   allegation which   constitutes   offences   under   Sections   379/414   and   other provisions   of   the   Penal   Code   (IPC).     The   question   which   arose was,   whether   the   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   explicitly   or impliedly exclude the provisions of the Penal Code (IPC) when the act   of   an   accused   is   an   offence   both   under   the   Penal   Code   and under the provisions of the MMDR Act.  This Court considered in detail   the   policy,   object   and   purpose   of   the   MMDR   Act   in paragraphs 32 to 39, which read as under: “32.   The   policy   and   object   of   the   Mines   and   Minerals   Act   and Rules   have   a   long   history   and   are   the   result   of   an   increasing awareness  of   the   compelling   need  to  restore  the   serious  ecological imbalance   and   to   stop   the   damages   being   caused   to   the   nature. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that adverse and destructive environmental   impact   of   sand   mining   has   been   discussed   in   the UNEP   Global   Environmental   Alert   Service   Report.   As   per   the contents   of   the   Report,   lack   of   proper   scientific   methodology   for river   sand   mining   has   led   to   indiscriminate   sand   mining,   while weak   governance   and   corruption   have   led   to   widespread   illegal mining.   While   referring   to   the   proposition   in   India,   it   was   stated that  sand trading  is  a lucrative business, and there  is evidence  of illegal   trading   such   as   the   case   of   the   influential   mafias   in   our country. 10 33.   The mining of aggregates in rivers has led to severe damage to rivers,   including   pollution   and   changes   in   levels   of   PH.   Removing sediment   from   rivers   causes   the   river   to   cut   its   channel   through the bed of the valley floor, or channel incision, both upstream and downstream  of the extraction site.  This  leads  to coarsening  of  bed material and lateral channel instability. It can change the riverbed itself.   The   removal   of   more   than   12   million   tonnes   of   sand   a   year from Vembanad Lake catchment in India has led to the lowering of the   riverbed   by   7   to   15   cm   a   year.   Incision   can   also   cause   the alluvial   aquifer   to   drain   to   a   lower   level,   resulting   in   a   loss   of aquifer   storage.   It   can   also   increase   flood   frequency   and   intensity by reducing flood regulation capacity. However, lowering the water table   is   most   threatening   to   water   supply   exacerbating   drought occurrence and severity as tributaries of major rivers dry up when sand   mining   reaches   certain   thresholds.   Illegal   sand   mining   also causes   erosion.   Damming   and   mining   have   reduced   sediment delivery   from   rivers   to   many   coastal   areas,   leading   to   accelerated beach erosion. 34.   The   Report   also   dealt   with   the   astonishing   impact   of   sand mining   on   the   economy.   It   states   that   tourism   may   be   affected through   beach   erosion.   Fishing,   both   traditional   and   commercial, can   be   affected   through   destruction   of   benthic   fauna.   Agriculture could   be   affected   through   loss   of   agricultural   land   from   river erosion and the lowering of the water table. The insurance sector is affected through exacerbation of the impact of extreme events such as floods, droughts and storm surges through decreased protection of   beach   fronts.   The   erosion   of   coastal   areas   and   beaches   affects houses   and   infrastructure.   A   decrease   in   bed   load   or   channel shortening   can   cause   downstream   erosion   including   bank   erosion and   the   undercutting   or   undermining   of   engineering   structures such   as   bridges,   side   protection   walls   and   structures   for   water supply. 35.  Sand is often removed from beaches to build hotels, roads and other   tourism­related   infrastructure.   In   some   locations,   continued construction   is   likely   to   lead   to   an   unsustainable   situation   and destruction   of   the   main   natural   attraction   for   visitors—beaches themselves.   Mining   from,   within   or   near   a   riverbed   has   a   direct impact   on   the   stream’s   physical   characteristics,   such   as   channel geometry,   bed   elevation,   substratum   composition   and   stability, instream   roughness   of   the   bed,   flow   velocity,   discharge   capacity, sediment   transportation   capacity,   turbidity,   temperature,   etc. Alteration   or   modification   of   the   above   attributes   may   cause hazardous impact on ecological equilibrium of riverine regime. This may   also   cause   adverse   impact   on   instream   biota   and   riparian habitats.   This   disturbance   may   also   cause   changes   in   channel configuration and flow paths. 11 36.   In   M.   Palanisamy   v.   State   of   T.N(2012)   4   CTC   1 ,   the   amended provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Mines   and   Minerals   Concession Rules, 1959 was challenged on the ground that the said Rules for the   purpose   of   preventing   and   restricting   illegal   mining, transportation   and   storage   of   minerals   are   ultra   vires constitutional   provisions   and   the   provisions   of   the   Mines   and Minerals   (Development   and   Regulation)   Act,   1957.   Upholding   the vires   of   the   Rules,   the   Division   Bench   (one   of   us,   Eqbal,   J.   as   he then   was)   of   the   Madras   High   Court,   elaborately   discussed   the object   of   restriction   put   in   the   illegal   mining,   transportation   and storage   of   minerals   including   sand   and   after   considering   various reports observed thus: (CTC pp. 24­25, paras 21 & 23­24) “ 21 .   In   order   to   appreciate   the   issue   involved   in   these   writ petitions, we may have to look at the larger picture — the impact of   indiscriminate,   uninterrupted   sand   quarrying   on   the   already brittle  ecological set­up of  ours.  According  to  expert   reports,  for thousands   of   years,   sand   and   gravel   have   been   used   in   the construction   of   roads   and   buildings.   Today,   demand   for   sand and   gravel   continues   to   increase.   Mining   operators,   instead   of working   in   conjunction   with   cognizant   resource   agencies   to ensure that sand mining is conducted in a responsible manner, are   engaged   in   full­time   profiteering.   Excessive   in­stream   sand and  gravel  mining  from  riverbeds and like  resources causes the degradation   of   rivers.   In­stream   mining   lowers   the   stream bottom,   which   leads   to   bank   erosion.   Depletion   of   sand   in   the stream­bed   and   along   coastal   areas   causes   the   deepening   of rivers   and   estuaries   and   enlargement   of   river   mouths   and coastal   inlets.   It   also   leads   to   saline   water   intrusion   from   the nearby  sea.  The  effect  of  mining   is compounded  by   the  effect  of sea   level   rise.   Any   volume   of   sand   exported   from   stream­beds and   coastal   areas   is   a   loss   to   the   system.   Excessive   in­stream sand   mining   is   a   threat   to   bridges,   river   banks   and   nearby structures.   Sand   mining   also   affects   the   adjoining   groundwater system and the uses that local people make of the river. Further, according   to   researches,   in­stream   sand   mining   results   in   the destruction   of   aquatic   and   riparian   habitat   through   wholesale changes   in   the   channel   morphology.   The   ill   effects   include   bed degradation,   bed   coarsening,   lowered   water   tables   near   the stream­bed   and   channel   instability.   These   physical   impacts cause degradation of riparian and aquatic biota and may lead to the   undermining   of   bridges   and   other   structures.   Continued extraction   of   sand   from   riverbeds   may   also   cause   the   entire stream­bed to degrade to the depth of excavation. * * * 23 .   The   most   important   effects   of   in­stream   sand   mining   on aquatic   habitats   are   bed   degradation   and   sedimentation,   which can have substantial negative effects on aquatic life. The stability 12 of   sand­bed   and   gravel­bed   streams   depends   on   a   delicate balance   between   stream   flow,   the   sediments   supplied   from   the watershed   and   the   channel   form.   Mining­induced   changes   in sediment supply  and channel form disrupt the channel and the habitat   development   processes.   Furthermore,   movement   of unstable   substrates   results   in   downstream   sedimentation   of habitats.   The   affected   distance   depends   on   the   intensity   of mining, particle sizes, stream flows, and channel morphology. 24 . Apart from threatening bridges, sand mining transforms the riverbeds  into  large  and deep pits;  as a  result,  the groundwater table   drops   leaving   the   drinking   water   wells   on   the embankments   of   these   rivers   dry.   Bed   degradation   from   in­ stream   mining   lowers   the   elevation   of   stream   flow   and   the floodplain water table, which in turn, can eliminate water table­ dependent   woody   vegetation   in   riparian   areas   and   decrease wetted periods in riparian wetlands. So far  as locations close to the   sea   are   concerned,   saline   water   may   intrude   into   the   fresh waterbody.” 37.  In  Centre for Public Interest Litigation   v.   Union of India (2012) 3 SCC   1 ,   this   Court,   while   observing   that   the   natural   resources   are the public property and national assets, held as under: (SCC p. 53, para 75) “ 75 .   The   State   is   empowered   to   distribute   natural   resources. However,   as   they   constitute   public   property/national   asset, while distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and ensure   that   no   action   is   taken   which   may   be   detrimental   to public   interest.   Like   any   other   State   action,   constitutionalism must   be   reflected   at   every   stage   of   the   distribution   of   natural resources.   In   Article   39( b )   of   the   Constitution   it   has   been provided   that   the   ownership   and   control   of   the   material resources   of   the   community   should   be   so   distributed   so   as   to best   subserve   the   common   good,   but   no   comprehensive legislation   has   been   enacted   to   generally   define   natural resources   and   a   framework   for   their   protection.   Of   course, environment   laws  enacted  by  Parliament   and  State  Legislatures deal with specific natural resources i.e. forest, air, water, coastal zones, etc.” 38.   In   M.C.   Mehta   v.   Kamal   Nath   (1997)   1   SCC   388 ,   this   Court while   considering   the   doctrine   of   public   trust   which   extends   to natural   resources   observed   as   under:   (SCC   pp.   407­08   &   413, paras 24­25 & 34) “ 24 . The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the ‘Doctrine of the Public Trust’. It was founded on the ideas that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore, forests and the air were held by Government  in trusteeship for the free 13 and   unimpeded   use   of   the   general   public.   Our   contemporary concern   about   ‘the   environment’   bear   a   very   close   conceptual relationship   to   this   legal   doctrine.   Under   the   Roman   law   these resources   were   either   owned   by   no   one   ( res   nullius )   or   by everyone   in   common   ( res   communious ).   Under   the   English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources but   the   ownership   was   limited   in   nature,   the   Crown   could   not grant   these   properties   to   private   owners   if   the   effect   was   to interfere   with   the   public   interests   in   navigation   or   fishing. Resources   that   were   suitable   for   these   uses   were   deemed   to   be held  in  trust  by   the Crown for  the  benefit   of  the  public.  Joseph L.   Sax,   Professor   of   Law,   University   of   Michigan—proponent   of the   Modern   Public   Trust   Doctrine—in   an   erudite   article   ‘ Public Trust   Doctrine   in   Natural   Resource   Law:   Effective   Judicial Intervention ’,  Michigan   Law   Review,  Vol.   68,   Part   1,  p.   473,  has given   the   historical   background   of   the   Public   Trust   Doctrine   as under: ‘The   source   of   modern   public   trust   law   is   found   in   a   concept that   received   much   attention   in   Roman   and   English   law—the nature   of   property   rights   in   rivers,   the   sea,   and   the   seashore. That   history   has   been   given   considerable   attention   in   the   legal literature and need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasised. First, certain interests, such as navigation and   fishing,   were   sought   to   be   preserved   for   the   benefit   of   the public;   accordingly,   property   used   for   those   purposes   was distinguished   from   general   public   property   which   the   sovereign could   routinely   grant   to   private   owners.   Second,   while   it   was understood   that   in   certain   common   properties—such   as   the seashore,   highways   and   running   water—“perpetual   use   was dedicated   to   the   public”,   it   has   never   been   clear   whether   the public   had   an   enforceable   right   to   prevent   infringement   of   those interests.   Although   the   State   apparently   did   protect   public   uses, no   evidence   is   available   that   public   rights   could   be   legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.’ 25 .   The   Public   Trust   Doctrine   primarily   rests   on   the   principle that   certain   resources  like   air,  sea,  waters   and   the   forests   have such   a   great   importance   to   the   people   as  a   whole   that   it   would be   wholly   unjustified   to   make   them   a   subject   of   private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature, they should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life.   The   doctrine   enjoins   upon   the   Government   to   protect   the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit   their   use   for   private   ownership   or   commercial   purposes. According   to   Professor   Sax   the   Public   Trust   Doctrine   imposes the following restrictions on governmental authority: ‘Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought   to   be   imposed   by   the   public   trust:   first,   the   property 14 subject   to  the   trust   must   not   only   be   used  for   a  public  purpose, but   it   must   be   held   available   for   use   by   the   general   public; second,   the   property   may   not   be   sold,   even   for   a   fair   cash equivalent;   and   third   the   property   must   be   maintained   for particular types of uses.’ * * * 34 .   Our  legal   system—based   on   English   common   law—includes the Public Trust Doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is the beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, air, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.” 39.   In   Intellectuals   Forum   v.   State   of   A.P   (2006)   3   SCC   549 ,   this Court while balancing the conservation of natural resources vis­à­ vis urban development observed as under: (SCC p. 572, para 67) “ 67 . The responsibility of the State to protect the environment is now a well­accepted notion in all countries. It is this notion that, in   international   law,   gave   rise   to   the   principle   of   ‘State responsibility’   for   pollution   emanating   within   one’s   own territories   ( Corfu   Channel   case 14 ).   This   responsibility   is   clearly enunciated   in   the   United   Nations   Conference   on   the   Human Environment , Stockholm 1972 (Stockholm Convention), to which India was a party. The relevant clause of this declaration in the present context is para 2, which states: ‘The   natural   resources   of   the   earth,   including   the   air,   water, land,   flora   and   fauna   and   especially   representative   samples   of natural   ecosystems,   must   be   safeguarded   for   the   benefit   of present   and   future   generations   through   careful   planning   or management, as appropriate.’ Thus, there is no doubt about the fact that there is a responsibility bestowed upon the Government to protect and preserve the tanks, which are an important part of the environment of the area.” 7.2 This   Court   further   observed   in   paragraphs   60   &   69   as under: “60.   There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources are the   assets   of   the   nation   and   its   citizens.   It   is   the   obligation   of   all concerned,   including   the   Central   and   the   State   Governments,   to conserve   and   not   waste   such   valuable   resources.   Article   48­A   of 15 the Constitution requires that the State shall endeavour to protect and   improve   the   environment   and   safeguard   the   forests   and wildlife of the country. Similarly, Article 51­A enjoins a duty  upon every   citizen   to   protect   and   improve   the   natural   environment including   forests,   lakes,   rivers   and   wildlife,   and   to   have compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the constitutional provisions,   the   doctrine   of   public   trust   has   become   the   law   of   the land. The said doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, water and forests are of such great importance to the people   as   a   whole   that   it   would   be   highly   unjustifiable   to   make them a subject of private ownership. 69.   Considering   the   principles   of   interpretation   and   the   wordings used in Section 22, in our considered opinion, the provision is not a   complete   and   absolute   bar   for   taking   action   by   the   police   for illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand from   the   riverbed.   The   Court   shall   take   judicial   notice   of   the   fact that   over   the   years   rivers   in   India   have   been   affected   by   the alarming   rate   of   unrestricted   sand   mining   which   is   damaging   the ecosystem   of   the   rivers   and   safety   of   bridges.   It   also   weakens riverbeds,   fish   breeding   and   destroys   the   natural   habitat   of   many organisms.   If   these   illegal   activities   are   not   stopped   by   the   State and   the   police   authorities   of   the   State,   it   will   cause   serious repercussions   as   mentioned   hereinabove.   It   will   not   only   change the river hydrology but also will deplete the groundwater levels.” 7.3 That   thereafter,   after   considering   the   relevant   provisions   of the  MMDR Act, this  Court opined  that  there is no  complete and absolute bar in prosecuting persons under the Penal Code where the   offences   committed   by   persons   are   penal   and   cognizable offence.     Ultimately,  this  Court  concluded  in  paragraphs  72  and 73 as under: “72.   From a close reading  of the provisions of the MMDR Act and the   offence   defined   under   Section   378   IPC,   it   is   manifest   that   the ingredients constituting the offence are different. The contravention of terms and conditions of mining lease or doing mining activity in violation   of   Section   4   of   the   Act   is   an   offence   punishable   under Section  21 of  the MMDR Act, whereas dishonestly  removing  sand, 16 gravel   and   other   minerals   from   the   river,   which   is   the   property   of the   State,   out   of   the   State’s   possession   without   the   consent, constitute   an   offence   of   theft.   Hence,   merely   because   initiation   of proceeding   for   commission   of   an   offence   under   the   MMDR   Act   on the basis  of  complaint  cannot   and  shall  not  debar  the  police  from taking   action   against   persons   for   committing   theft   of   sand   and minerals   in   the   manner   mentioned   above   by   exercising   power under   the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  submit   a  report   before the Magistrate for taking cognizance against such persons. In other words, in a case where there is a theft of sand and gravel from the government   land,   the   police   can   register   a   case,   investigate   the same   and   submit   a   final   report   under   Section   173   CrPC   before   a Magistrate having jurisdiction for the purpose of taking cognizance as provided in Section 190(1)( d ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 73.   After  giving   our  thoughtful consideration in the  matter,  in  the light   of   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   Act   vis­à­vis   the   Code   of Criminal   Procedure   and   the   Penal   Code,   we   are   of   the   definite opinion   that   the   ingredients   constituting   the   offence   under   the MMDR   Act   and   the   ingredients   of   dishonestly   removing   sand   and gravel from the riverbeds without consent, which is the property of the   State,   is   a   distinct   offence   under   IPC.   Hence,   for   the commission   of   offence   under   Section   378   IPC,   on   receipt   of   the police   report,   the   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   can   take cognizance   of   the   said   offence   without   awaiting   the   receipt   of complaint   that   may   be   filed   by   the   authorised   officer   for   taking cognizance   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the MMDR Act. Consequently, the contrary view taken by the different High  Courts cannot  be  sustained in law and, therefore,  overruled. Consequently,   these   criminal   appeals   are   disposed   of   with   a direction to the Magistrates concerned to proceed accordingly.” 7.4 Thus,   as   held   by   this   Court,   the   prohibition   contained   in Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act   against   prosecution   of   a   person except   on   a   written   complaint   made   by   the   authorised   officer   in this   behalf  would   be  attracted   only  when   such   person   is   sought to be prosecuted for contraventions of Section 4 of the MMDR Act 17 and   not   for   any   act   or   omission   which   constitutes   an   offence under the Penal Code.   8. However,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   in   the   case   of Sanjay   (supra),   this   Court   had   no   occasion   and/or   had   not considered  when  and  at   what  stage  the  bar  under  Section  22  of the MMDR Act would be attracted.  The further question which is required   to   be   considered   is,   when   and   at   what   stage   the Magistrate   can   be   said   to   have   taken   cognizance   attracting   the bar under Section 22 of the MMDR Act? 8.1 While   considering   the   aforesaid   issue,   Section   22   of   the MMDR Act is required to be referred to, which is as under: “ 22.   Cognizance   of   offences .—No   court   shall   take   cognizance   of any   offence   punishable   under   this   Act   or   any   Rules   made thereunder   except   upon   complaint   in   writing   made   by   a   person authorised   in   this   behalf   by   the   Central   Government   or   the   State Government.”   Reading the aforesaid provision would show that cognizance of   any   offence   punishable   under   the   MMDR   Act   or   the   Rules made   thereunder   shall   be   taken   only   upon   a   written   complaint made   by   a   person   authorised   in   this   behalf   by   the   Central Government   or   the   State   Government.     Therefore,   on   a   fair 18 reading   of   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act,   the   bar   would   be attracted when the Magistrate takes cognizance. 9. Let   us   now   consider   the   question   in   the   light   of   judicial pronouncements on the point. 9.1. In   the   case   of   Krishna   Pillai   v.   T.A.   Rajendran,   1990   (Supp) SCC   121 ,   after   considering   a   five   Judge   Bench   judgment   of   this Court   in   the   case   of   A.R.   Antulay   v.   Ramdas   Sriniwas   Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC  500, it is observed in paragraph 4 as under: “4.   Taking   cognizance   has   assumed   a   special   meaning   in   our criminal   jurisprudence.   We   may   refer   to   the   view   taken   by   a   five Judge   bench   of   this   Court   in   A.R.   Antulay   v.   Ramdas   Sriniwas Nayak   (supra)   at   p.   530   (para   31)   of   the   reports   this   Court indicated: “When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the complainant  on  oath  save  in  the  cases  set   out  in  the  proviso to Section 200 CrPC After examining the complainant on oath and examining   the   witnesses   present,   if   any,   meaning   thereby   that the   witnesses   not   present   need   not   be   examined,   it   would   be open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out   for   issuing   process.   When   it   is   said   that   court   issued process, it  means the court has taken cognizance of the offence and   has   decided   to   initiate   the   proceedings   and   a   visible manifestation   of   taking   cognizance   process   is   issued   which means   that   the   accused   is   called   upon   to   appear   before   the court.” The extract from the Constitution Bench judgment clearly indicates that   filing   of   a   complaint   in   court   is   not   taking   cognizance   and what exactly constitutes taking cognizance is different from filing of a complaint…..” 9.2 In the case of   Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani (1999) 8 SCC 737,  when the bar under Section 195 Cr. P.C. was pressed 19 into   service   and   the   High   Court   quashed   the   complaint   and enquiry   on   the   basis   of   the   FIR   registered   by   the   complainant, while   setting   aside   the   order   passed   by   the   High   Court,   this Court accepted the submission on behalf of the State that the bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C. can be gone into at the stage when the court   takes   cognizance   of   the   offence   and   investigation   on   the basis   of   the   information   received   could   not   have   been   quashed and an investigating agency cannot be throttled at this stage from proceeding   with   the   investigation   particularly   when   the   charges are serious and grave. 9.3 In   the   case   of   S.K.   Sinha,   Chief   Enforcement   Officer   v. Videocon   International   Limited,   (2008)   2   SCC   492,   in   paragraphs 19 to 34 , it is observed and held as under: “19. The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means “become aware of” and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. 20. “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case 20 and no rule of universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance. 21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals with “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. Section 190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) thereof is material and may be quoted in extenso: “190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates —(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence— ( a ) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; ( b ) upon a police report of such facts; ( c ) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.” 22. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to “Complaints to Magistrates” and covers cases before actual commencement of proceedings in a court or before a Magistrate. Section 200 of the Code requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202, however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue process against the accused as a matter of course. It enables him before the issue of process either to inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or should not be issued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is, no doubt, extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon to see is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused. 23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of proceedings before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply only after cognizance of an offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Chapter XIV. Section 204, whereunder process can be issued, is another material provision which reads as under: “204. Issue of process .—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be— ( a ) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or 21 (b ) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process- fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87.” 24. From the above scheme of the Code, in our judgment, it is clear that “Initiation of proceedings”, dealt with in Chapter XIV, is different from “Commencement of proceedings” covered by Chapter XVI. For commencement of proceedings, there must be initiation of proceedings. In other words, initiation of proceedings must precede commencement of proceedings. Without initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under Chapter XVI. The High Court, in our considered view, was not right in equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter XIV with commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI. 25. Let us now consider the question in the light of judicial pronouncements on the point. 26. In Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437, the High Court of Calcutta had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance” under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which was in pari materia with Section 190 of the present Code of 1973. Referring to various decisions, Das Gupta, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated: (AIR p. 438, para 7) “ 7 . … What is ‘taking cognizance’ has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)( a ) CrPC, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the 22 subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” 27. R.R. Chari v. State of U.P. AIR 1951 SC 207 was probably the first leading decision of this Court on the point. There, the police, having suspected the appellant-accused to be guilty of offences punishable under Sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code (IPC) as also under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, applied to the District Magistrate, Kanpur to issue warrant of arrest on 22- 10-1947. Warrant was issued on the next day and the accused was arrested on 27-10-1947. 28. On 25-3-1949, the accused was produced before the Magistrate to answer the charge-sheet submitted by the prosecution. According to the accused, on 22-10-1947, when warrant for his arrest was issued by the Magistrate, the Magistrate was said to have taken cognizance of offence and since no sanction of the Government had been obtained before that date, initiation of proceedings against him was unlawful. The question before the Court was as to when cognizance of the offence could be said to have been taken by the Magistrate under Section 190 of the Code. Considering the circumstances under which “cognizance of offence” under sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code can be taken by a Magistrate and referring to Abani Kumar Banerjee (supra) , the Court, speaking through Kania, C.J. stated: ( Chari case (supra) , AIR p. 208, para 3) “ 3 . It is clear from the wording of the section that the initiation of the proceedings against a person commences on the cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate under one of the three contingencies mentioned in the section. The first contingency evidently is in respect of non-cognizable offences as defined in CrPC on the complaint of an aggrieved person. The second is on a police report, which evidently is the case of a cognizable offence when the police have completed their investigation and come to the Magistrate for the issue of a process. The third is when the Magistrate himself takes notice of an offence and issues the process. It is important to remember that in respect of any cognizable offence, the police, at the initial stage when they are investigating the matter, can arrest a person without obtaining an order from the Magistrate. Under Section 167( b ) CrPC the police have of course to put up the person so arrested before a Magistrate within 24 hours and obtain an order of remand to police custody for the purpose of further investigation, if they so desire. But they have the power to arrest a person for the purpose of investigation without approaching the Magistrate first. Therefore, in cases of cognizable offence before proceedings are initiated and while the matter is under investigation by the police the suspected 23 person is liable to be arrested by the police without an order by the Magistrate.” 29. Approving the observations of Das Gupta, J. in Abani Kumar Banerjee(supra), this Court held that it was on 25-3-1949 when the Magistrate issued a notice under Section 190 of the Code against the accused that he took “cognizance” of the offence. Since before that day, sanction had been granted by the Government, the proceedings could not be said to have been initiated without authority of law. 30. Again in Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B.AIR 1959 SC 1118, this Court observed that when cognizance is taken of an offence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance. Issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or a warrant of arrest of the accused cannot by itself be regarded as an act of taking cognizance of an offence. It is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Section 200 and subsequent sections of Chapter XV or under Section 204 of Chapter XVI of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind and thereby had taken cognizance of an offence (see also Ajit Kumar Palit v. State of W.B. AIR 1963 SC 765 and Hareram Satpathy v. Tikaram Agarwala, (1978) 4 SCC 58 ). 31. In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam , AIR 1961 SC 986, referring to earlier judgments, this Court said: (AIR p. 989, para 7) “ 7 . … We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word ‘may’ in Section 190 to mean ‘must’. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code.” 32. In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753, the Court stated that it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)( a ) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the provisions following that section. Where, however, he 24 applies his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3) or issues a warrant for arrest of the accused, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 33. In Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra (1971) 2 SCC 654 , speaking for the Court, Shelat, J. stated that under Section 190 of the Code, a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence either ( a ) upon receiving a complaint, or ( b ) upon a police report, or ( c ) upon information received from a person other than a police officer or even upon his own information or suspicion that such an offence has been committed. As has often been said, taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance, thus, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. 34. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252, this Court said: (SCC p. 257, paras 13-14) “ 13 . It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words ‘may take cognizance’ which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with ‘must take cognizance’. The word ‘may’ gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. 14 . This raises the incidental question: What is meant by ‘taking cognizance of an offence’ by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in Clauses ( a ), ( b ) and ( c ) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV 25 of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a ). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence.” (see also M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, AIR 1967 SC 528). 9.4 In   the   case   of   Fakhruddin   Ahmad   v.   State   of   Uttaranchal, (2008) 17 SCC 157, in paragraphs 9 to 17,  it is observed and held as under: “9.   Before examining the rival contentions, we may briefly refer  to some   of   the   relevant   provisions   in   the   Code.   Chapter   XIV   of   the Code,   containing   Sections   190   to   199   deals   with   the   statutory conditions requisite for initiation of criminal proceedings and as to the powers of cognizance of a Magistrate. Sub­section (1) of Section 190   of   the   Code   empowers   a   Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   of   an offence   in   the   manner   laid   therein.   It   provides   that   a   Magistrate may   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   either   ( a )   upon   receiving   a complaint   of   facts   which   constitute   such   offence;   or   ( b )   upon   a police   report   of   such   facts;   or   ( c )   upon   information   received   from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 10.   Chapter   XV   containing   Sections   200   to   203   deals   with “Complaints to Magistrates” and lays down the procedure which is required   to   be   followed   by   the   Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of   an offence   on   complaint.   Similarly,   Chapter   XVI   deals   with “Commencement   of   Proceedings   before   Magistrates”.   Since admittedly,   in   the   present   case,   the   Magistrate   has   taken cognizance   of   the   complaint   in   terms   of   Section   190   of   the   Code, we shall confine our discussion only to the said provision. We may, however,   note   that   on   receipt   of   a   complaint,   the   Magistrate   has more than one course open to him to determine the procedure and the manner to be adopted for taking cognizance of the offence. 11.   One   of   the   courses   open   to   the   Magistrate   is   that   instead   of exercising   his   discretion   and   taking   cognizance   of   a   cognizable offence   and   following   the   procedure   laid   down   under   Section   200 or   Section   202   of   the   Code,   he   may   order   an   investigation   to   be made   by   the   police   under   Section   156(3)   of   the   Code,   which   the learned Magistrate did in the instant case. When such an order is 26 made,   the   police   is   obliged   to   investigate   the   case   and   submit   a report   under   Section   173(2)   of   the   Code.   On   receiving   the   police report, if the Magistrate is satisfied that on the facts discovered or unearthed by the police there is sufficient material for him to take cognizance   of   the   offence,   he   may   take   cognizance   of   the   offence under Section 190(1)( b ) of the Code and issue process straightaway to the accused. However, Section 190(1)( b ) of the Code does not lay down   that   a   Magistrate   can   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   only   if the   investigating   officer   gives   an   opinion   that   the   investigation makes   out   a   case   against   the   accused.   Undoubtedly,   the Magistrate   can   ignore   the   conclusion(s)   arrived   at   by   the investigating officer. 12.  Thus, it is trite that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of   the   investigating   officer   and   he   is   competent   to   exercise   his discretion   in   this   behalf,   irrespective   of   the   view   expressed   by   the police in their report and decide whether an offence has been made out  or  not. This is because  the  purpose  of the police  report  under Section 173(2) of the Code, which will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police as well as the conclusion drawn by the police   therefrom   is   primarily   to   enable   the   Magistrate   to   satisfy himself whether on the basis of the report and the material referred therein, a case for cognizance is made out or not. 13.   The   next   incidental   question   is   as   to   what   is   meant   by   the expression “taking cognizance of an offence” by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 of the Code? 14.  The expression “cognizance” is not defined in the Code but is a word of indefinite import. As observed by this Court in   Ajit Kumar Palit  v.  State of W.B., AIR 1963 SC 765  (AIR p. 770, para 19) “ 19 .   …   The   word   ‘cognizance’   has   no   esoteric   or   mystic significance   in   criminal   law   or   procedure.   It   merely   means— become   aware   of   and   when   used   with   reference   to   a   court   or Judge, to take notice of judicially.” Approving  the observations of the Calcutta High Court in   Emperor v.  Sourindra Mohan Chuckerbutty, ILR (1910) 37 Cal. 412  (at ILR p. 416), the Court said that “taking cognizance does not involve any formal action, or indeed action of any kind, but occurs as soon as a Magistrate, as such, applies his mind  to the suspected commission of an offence.” (emphasis supplied) 15.   Recently,   this   Court   in   Chief   Enforcement   Officer   v.   Videocon International   Ltd. 4   speaking   through   C.K.   Thakker,   J.,   while considering the ambit and scope of the phrase “taking cognizance” under   Section   190   of   the   Code,   has   highlighted   some   of   the observations of the Calcutta High Court in  Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs   v.   Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437   which 27 were approved by this Court in  R.R. Chari  v.  State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207.     The observations are: ( Abani Kumar Banerjee case(supra), AIR p. 438, para 7) “ 7 .   …   What   is   ‘taking   cognizance’   has   not   been   defined   in   the Criminal Procedure Code, and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that   any   Magistrate   has   taken   cognizance   of   any   offence   under Section 190(1)( a ) CrPC, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose   of   proceeding   in   a   particular   way   as   indicated   in   the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Section 200,   and   thereafter   sending   it   for   enquiry   and   report   under Section   202.   When   the   Magistrate   applies   his   mind   not   for   the purpose   of   proceeding   under   the   subsequent   sections   of   this Chapter,   but   for   taking   action   of   some   other   kind   e.g.   ordering investigation   under   Section   156(3),   or   issuing   a   search   warrant for   the   purpose   of   the   investigation,   he   cannot   be   said   to   have taken cognizance of the offence.” 16.   From   the   aforenoted   judicial   pronouncements,   it   is   clear   that being   an   expression   of   indefinite   import,   it   is   neither   practicable nor   desirable   to   precisely   define   as   to   what   is   meant   by   “taking cognizance”.   Whether   the   Magistrate   has   or   has   not   taken cognizance   of   the   offence   will   depend   upon   the   circumstances   of the particular case, including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action. 17.   Nevertheless,  it   is  well  settled   that   before  a   Magistrate  can  be said to have taken cognizance of an offence, it is imperative that he must have taken notice of the accusations and   applied his mind   to the allegations made in the complaint or in the police report or the information   received   from   a   source   other   than   a   police   report,   as the   case   may   be,   and   the   material   filed   therewith.   It   needs   little emphasis that it is only when the Magistrate   applies his mind   and is   satisfied   that   the   allegations,   if   proved,   would   constitute   an offence   and   decides   to   initiate   proceedings   against   the   alleged offender,   that   it   can   be   positively   stated   that   he   has   taken cognizance   of   the   offence.   Cognizance   is   in   regard   to   the   offence and not the offender.” 9.5 In   the   case   of   Subramanian   Swamy   v.   Manmohan   Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64 , it is observed in paragraphs 34 to 37 as under: “34.   The   argument   of   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   the question   of   granting   sanction   for   prosecution   of   a   public   servant charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage 28 of   taking   cognizance   and   not   before   that   is   neither   supported   by the plain language of the section nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him. Though, the term “cognizance” has not been defined either   in   the   1988   Act   or   CrPC,   the   same   has   acquired   a   definite meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal parlance   cognizance   is   “taking   judicial   notice   by   the   court   of   law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as   to   decide   whether   there   is   any   basis   for   initiating   proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially”. 35.   In  R.R. Chari   v.   State of U.P AIR 1951 SC 207 , the three­Judge Bench   approved   the   following   observations   made   by   the   Calcutta High   Court   in   Supt.   and   Remembrancer   of   Legal   Affairs   v.   Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR 1950 Cal. 437, : (AIR p. 438, para 7) “ 7 .   …   What   is   ‘taking   cognizance’   has   not   been   defined   in   the Criminal   Procedure   Code,   and   I   have   no   desire   now   to   attempt   to define  it. It  seems to  me clear,  however, that  before it  can be  said that   any   Magistrate   has   taken   cognizance   of   any   offence   under Section 190(1)( a ), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done   so   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   in   a   particular   way   as indicated   in   the   subsequent   provisions   of   this   Chapter,— proceeding under Section 200, and thereafter sending it for inquiry and   report   under   Section   202.   When   the   Magistrate   applies   his mind   not   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   under   the   subsequent sections   of   this   Chapter,   but   for   taking   action   of   some   other   kind e.g.   ordering   investigation   under   Section   156(3),   or   issuing   a search   warrant   for   the   purpose   of   the   investigation,   he   cannot   be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.” 36.   In  State  of  W.B.  v.   Mohd.  Khalid  (1995)   1  SCC  684 ,  the  Court referred to Section 190 CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 696, para 43) “ 43 .  … In its  broad  and  literal sense,  it   means  taking   notice  of an   offence.   This   would   include   the   intention   of   initiating   judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps   to   see   whether   there   is   any   basis   for   initiating   judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word ‘cognizance’ indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an   offence.   It   is   entirely   a   different   thing   from   initiation   of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and not of persons.” 37.   In State of Karnataka v.   Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728 , this Court   referred   to   the   provisions   of   Chapter   XIV   and   Sections   190 and 196(1­A) CrPC and observed: (SCC p. 732, para 8) “ 8 . … There is no bar against  registration of a  criminal case or investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the 29 police   on   completion   of   investigation,   as   contemplated   by   Section 173   CrPC.   If   a   criminal   case   is   registered,   investigation   of   the offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of such investigation   before   a   Magistrate   without   the   previous   sanction   of the   Central   Government   or   of   the   State   Government   or   of   the District   Magistrate,   there   will   be   no   violation   of   Section   196(1­A) CrPC and no illegality of any kind would be committed.” 9.6 In   the   case   of   Anil   Kumar   v.   M.K.   Aiyappa   (2013)   10   SCC 705,  it is observed and held in paragraphs 12 to 15 as under: “12.   We   will   now   examine   whether   the   order   directing investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC would amount to taking   cognizance   of   the   offence,   since   a   contention   was raised   that   the   expression   “cognizance”   appearing   in Section   19(1)   of   the   PC   Act   will   have   to   be   construed   as post­cognizance   stage,   not   pre­cognizance   stage   and, therefore,   the   requirement   of   sanction   does   not   arise prior   to   taking   cognizance   of   the   offences   punishable under the provisions of the PC Act. 13.   The   expression   “cognizance”   which   appears   in Section   197   CrPC   came   up   for   consideration   before   a three­Judge Bench of this Court in   State of U.P.   v.   Paras Nath   Singh   (2009)   6   SCC   372,   and   this   Court   expressed the following view: (SCC pp. 375, para 6) “ 6 .   …   ‘ 10 .   …   And   the   jurisdiction   of   a   Magistrate   to take   cognizance   of   any   offence   is   provided   by   Section 190   of   the   Code,   either   on   receipt   of   a   complaint,   or upon a police report or upon information received from any   person   other   than   a   police   officer,   or   upon   his knowledge   that   such   offence   has   been   committed.   So far as public servants are concerned, the cognizance of any   offence,   by   any   court,   is   barred   by   Section   197   of the   Code   unless   sanction   is   obtained   from   the appropriate   authority,   if   the   offence,   alleged   to   have been   committed,   was   in   discharge   of   the   official   duty. The section not only specifies the persons to whom the protection   is   afforded   but   it   also   specifies   the 30 conditions   and   circumstances   in   which   it   shall   be available   and   the   effect   in   law   if   the   conditions   are satisfied.   The   mandatory   character   of   the   protection afforded   to   a   public   servant   is   brought   out   by   the expression,   ‘no   court   shall   take   cognizance   of   such offence   except   with   the   previous   sanction’.   Use   of   the words   ‘no’   and   ‘shall’   makes   it   abundantly   clear   that the   bar   on   the   exercise   of   power   of   the   court   to   take cognizance of any offence is absolute and complete. The very   cognizance   is   barred.   That   is,   the   complaint cannot   be   taken   notice   of.   According   to   Black’s   Law Dictionary   the word ‘cognizance’ means ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘the   exercise   of   jurisdiction’   or   ‘power   to   try   and determine   causes’.   In   common   parlance,   it   means taking   notice   of.   A   court,   therefore,   is   precluded   from entertaining   a   complaint   or   taking   notice   of   it   or exercising   jurisdiction   if   it   is   in   respect   of   a   public servant   who   is   accused   of   an   offence   alleged   to   have been committed during discharge of his official duty.” 14.   In   State   of   W.B.   v.   Mohd.   Khalid   (1995)   1   SCC   684 , this Court has observed as follows: “ 13 .   It   is   necessary   to   mention   here   that   taking cognizance   of   an   offence   is   not   the   same   thing   as issuance   of   process.   Cognizance   is   taken   at   the   initial stage   when   the   Magistrate  applies  his   judicial  mind  to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or   upon   information   received   from   any   other   person that   an   offence   has   been   committed.   The   issuance   of process   is   at   a   subsequent   stage   when   after considering   the   material   placed   before   it   the   court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. The   meaning   of   the   said   expression   was   also   considered by this Court in   Subramanian Swamy case (2012) 3 SCC 64 . 15.   The   judgments   referred   to   hereinabove   clearly indicate   that   the   word   “cognizance”   has   a   wider connotation   and   is   not   merely   confined   to   the   stage   of taking   cognizance   of   the   offence.   When   a   Special   Judge refers  a  complaint  for  investigation   under  Section  156(3) 31 CrPC,   obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the offence   and,   therefore,   it   is   a   pre­cognizance   stage   and cannot   be   equated   with   post­cognizance   stage.   When   a Special   Judge   takes   cognizance   of   the   offence   on   a complaint   presented   under   Section   200   CrPC   and   the next   step   to   be   taken   is   to   follow   up   under   Section   202 CrPC.   Consequently,   a   Special   Judge   referring   the   case for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   is   at   pre­ cognizance stage.” 10. Having   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   having perused   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   law   as   also   the   judicial pronouncements, we are of the view that the High Court has not committed   any   error   in   not   quashing   the   order   passed   by   the learned Magistrate and not quashing the criminal proceedings for the   offences   under   Sections   379   and   414.     It   is   required   to   be noted   that   the   learned   Magistrate   in   exercise   of   the   suo   motu powers   conferred   under   Section   156(3),   Cr.P.C.   directed   the concerned   In­charge/SHO   of   the   police   station   to   lodge/register the   crime   case/FIR   and   directed   initiation   of   investigation   and directed   the   concerned   In­charge/SHO   of   the   police   station   to submit a report after due investigation. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   cases referred   to   hereinabove,   it   cannot   be   said   that   at   this   stage   the learned   Magistrate   had   taken   any   cognizance   of   the   alleged 32 offences   attracting   bar   under   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act.     On considering   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   and   the Rules   made   thereunder,   it   cannot   be   said   that   there   is   a   bar against   registration   of   a   criminal   case   or   investigation   by   the police   agency   or   submission   of   a   report   by   the   police   on completion   of   investigation,   as   contemplated   by   Section   173, Cr.P.C.   10.1 At   this   stage,  it   is  required  to  be  noted  that   as  per   Section 21   of   the   MMDR   Act,   the   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   are cognizable.  10.2 As specifically observed by this Court in the case   of   Anil   Kumar   (supra) ,   ‘when   a   Special   Judge   refers   a complaint   for   investigation   under   Section   156(3)   Cr.P.C., obviously,   he   has   not   taken   cognizance   of   the   offence   and, therefore, it is a pre­cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post­cognizance stage’. 10.3 Even   as   observed   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   R.R.   Chari (supra) ,   even   the   order   passed   by   the   Magistrate   ordering investigation   under   Section   156(3),   or   issuing   a   search   warrant for   the   purpose   of   the   investigation,   he   cannot   be   said   to   have taken cognizance of the offence.  As observed by the Constitution 33 Bench of this Court in the case of   A.R. Antulay(supra) , filing of a complaint   in   court   is   not   taking   cognizance   and   what   exactly constitutes   taking   cognizance   is   different   from   filing   of   a complaint.  Therefore, when an order is passed by the Magistrate for investigation to be made by the police under Section 156(3) of the   Code,   which   the   learned   Magistrate   did   in   the   instant   case, when   such   an   order   is   made   the   police   is   obliged   to   investigate the   case   and   submit   a   report   under   Section   173(2)   of   the   Code. That thereafter the investigating officer is required to send report to   the   authorised   officer   and   thereafter   as   envisaged   under Section 22 of the MMDR Act the authorised officer as mentioned in Section 22 of the MMDR Act may file the complaint before the learned   Magistrate   along   with   the   report   submitted   by   the investigating officer and at that stage the question with respect to taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate would arise. 11. Now   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   private appellants­violators   that   in   view   of   the   fact   that   violators   were permitted to compound the violation in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules or Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules and the violators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of 34 penalty   determined   by   the   appropriate   authority   for compounding   the   offences/violations,   there   cannot   be   any further criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 379 and   414   IPC   and   Sections   4/21   of   the   MMDR   Act     and   the reliance placed on Section 23A of the MMDR Act is concerned, it is   true   that   in   the   present   case   the   appropriate   authority determined the penalty under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules/Rule 18 of   the   2006   Rules,   which   the   private   appellants­violators   paid and   therefore   the   bar   contained  in   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A of   the   MMDR   Act   will   be   attracted.     Section   23A   as   it   stands today   has   been   brought   on   the   Statute   in   the   year   1972   on   the recommendations   of   the   Mineral   Advisory   Board   which   provides that   a ny   offence   punishable   under   the   MMDR   Act   or   any   rule made thereunder may, either before or after the institution of the prosecution,   be   compounded   by   the   person   authorised   under section 22 to make a complaint to the court with respect to that offence, on payment to that person, for credit to the Government, of   such   sum   as   that   person   may   specify.     Sub­section   2   of Section   23A   further   provides   that   where   an   offence   is compounded   under   sub­section   (1),   no   proceeding   or   further proceeding,   as   the   case   may   be,   shall   be   taken   against   the 35 offender   in   respect   of   the   offence   so   compounded,   and   the offender, if in custody, shall be released forthwith . Thus, the bar under   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   shall   be   applicable   with respect   to   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made thereunder.     However,   the   bar   contained   in   sub­section   2   of Section   23A   shall   not   be   applicable   for   the   offences   under   the IPC, such as, Section 379 and 414 IPC.   In the present case, as observed   and   held   hereinabove,   the   offences   under   the   MMDR Act or any rule made thereunder and the offences under the IPC are   different   and   distinct   offences.     Therefore,   as   in   the   present case, the mining inspectors prepared the cases under Rule 53 of the   1996   Rules   and   submitted   them   before   the   mining   officers with   the   proposals   of   compounding   the   same   for   the   amount calculated   according   to   the   concerned   rules   and   the   Collector approved the said proposal and thereafter the private appellants­ violators   accepted   the   decision   and   deposited   the   amount   of penalty determined by the Collector for compounding the cases in view   of   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   of   the   MMDR   Act   and   the 1996 rules and even the 2006 rules are framed in exercise of the powers   under   Section   15   of   the   MMDR   Act,   criminal complaints/proceedings   for   the   offences   under   Sections   4/21   of 36 the   MMDR   Act   are   not   permissible   and   are   not   required   to   be proceeded further in view of the bar contained in sub­section 2 of Section   23A   of   the   MMDR   Act.     At   the   same   time,   as   observed hereinabove,   the   criminal   complaints/proceedings   for   the offences under the IPC – Sections 379/414 IPC which are held to be distinct and different can be proceeded further, subject to the observations made hereinabove. However,   our   above   conclusions   are   considering   the provisions of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, as it stands today.  It might   be   true   that   by   permitting   the   violators   to   compound   the offences under the MMDR Act or the rules made thereunder, the State may get the revenue and the same shall be on the principle of   person   who   causes   the   damage   shall   have   to   compensate   the damage   and   shall   have   to   pay   the   penalty   like   the   principle   of polluters to pay in case of damage to the environment.  However, in view of the large scale damages being caused to the nature and as observed and held by this Court in the case of   Sanjay (supra) , the policy and object of MMDR Act and Rules are the result of an increasing   awareness   of   the   compelling   need   to   restore   the serious   ecological   imbalance   and   to   stop   the   damages   being 37 caused   to   the   nature   and   considering   the   observations   made   by this Court in the aforesaid decision, reproduced hereinabove, and when   the   violations   like   this   are   increasing   and   the   serious damage is caused to the nature and the earth and it also affects the   ground   water   levels   etc.   and   it   causes   severe   damage   as observed by this Court in the case of   Sanjay (supra) , reproduced hereinabove,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   violators   cannot   be permitted to go scot free on payment of penalty only.  There must be some stringent provisions which may have deterrent effect so that   the   violators   may   think   twice   before   committing   such offences and before causing damage to the earth and the nature.  It   is   the   duty   cast   upon   the   State   to   restore   the   ecological imbalance   and   to   stop   damages   being   caused   to   the   nature.     As observed by this Court in the case of  Sanjay (supra) , excessive in­ stream sand­and­gravel mining from river beds and like resources causes the degradation of rivers.  It is further observed that apart from   threatening   bridges,   sand   mining   transforms   the   riverbeds into large and deep pits, as a result, the groundwater table drops leaving   the   drinking   water   wells   on   the   embankments   of   these rivers dry.   Even otherwise, sand/mines is a public property and 38 the   State   is   the   custodian   of   the   said   public   property   and therefore   the   State   should   be   more   sensitive     to   protect   the environment   and   ecological   balance   and   to   protect   the   public property the State should always be in favour of taking very stern action   against   the   violators   who   are   creating   serious   ecological imbalance   and   causing   damages   to   the   nature   in   any   form.     As the provisions of Section 23A are not under challenge and Section 23A   of   the   MMDR   Act   so   long   as   it   stands,   we   leave   the   matter there   and   leave   it   to   the   wisdom   of   the   legislatures   and   the concerned States. 12. Now   so   far   as   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   State   on   the premise   that   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, affects the powers of the authorised person to compound the offence, in exercise of powers under Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules and Rule 18 of the 2006 Rules is concerned, the same is absolutely misconceived.  By the order passed by the learned Magistrate, confirmed by the High Court, by no stretch of imagination,   it   can   be   said   that   directing   to   file   the   first information report/crime case for the offences under the IPC and even   for   the   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   and   the   rules   made 39 thereunder, it affects any of the powers of the authorised person to   compound   the   offence.    In   fact,   in   view   of  the   decision   of  this Court   in   the   case   of   Sanjay   (supra) ,   in   which   this   Court   has specifically observed and held that so far as the offence under the IPC is concerned, there shall not be any bar under Section 22 of the   MMDR   Act   and   when   before   the   High   Court   the   State supported the order passed by the learned Magistrate and rightly so   and   when   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the High Court is in favour of the State, as such, the State ought not to have filed the special leave petition/appeal.   13. After   giving   our   thoughtful   consideration   in   the   matter,   in the   light   of   the   relevant   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   and   the Rules made thereunder vis­à­vis the Code of Criminal Procedure and  the  Penal Code, and  the  law laid  down  by   this Court  in the cases   referred   to   hereinabove   and   for   the   reasons   stated hereinabove, our conclusions are as under: i) that the learned Magistrate can in exercise of powers under Section   156(3)   of   the   Code   order/direct   the   concerned   In­ charge/SHO of the police station to lodge/register crime case/FIR even   for   the   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   and   the   Rules   made 40 thereunder   and   at   this   stage   the   bar   under   Section   22   of   the MMDR Act shall not be attracted; ii) the   bar   under   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act   shall   be attracted   only   when   the   learned   Magistrate   takes   cognizance   of the   offences   under   the   MMDR   Act   and   Rules   made   thereunder and orders issuance of process/summons for the offences under the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; iii) for   commission   of   the   offence   under   the   IPC,   on   receipt   of the   police   report,   the   Magistrate   having   jurisdiction   can   take cognizance   of   the   said   offence   without   awaiting   the   receipt   of complaint   that   may   be   filed   by   the   authorised   officer   for   taking cognizance   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder; and iv) that   in   respect   of   violation   of   various   provisions   of   the MMDR   Act   and   the   Rules   made   thereunder,   when   a   Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and directs the concerned   In­charge/SHO   of   the   police   station   to   register/lodge the   crime   case/FIR   in   respect   of   the   violation   of   various provisions   of  the   Act   and  Rules  made  thereunder   and   thereafter after   investigation   the   concerned   In­charge   of   the   police station/investigating   officer   submits   a   report,   the   same   can   be 41 sent   to   the   concerned   Magistrate   as   well   as   to   the   concerned authorised   officer   as   mentioned   in   Section   22   of   the   MMDR   Act and   thereafter   the   concerned   authorised   officer   may   file   the complaint   before   the   learned   Magistrate   along   with   the   report submitted by the concerned investigating officer and thereafter it will   be   open   for   the   learned   Magistrate   to   take   cognizance   after following   due   procedure,   issue   process/summons   in   respect   of the   violations   of   the   various   provisions   of   the   MMDR   Act   and Rules   made   thereunder   and   at   that   stage   it   can   be   said   that cognizance has been taken by the learned Magistrate. v) in   a   case   where   the   violator   is   permitted   to   compound   the offences   on   payment   of   penalty   as   per   sub­section1   of   Section 23A, considering sub­section 2 of Section 23A of the MMDR Act, there shall not be any proceedings or further proceedings against the   offender   in   respect   of   the   offences   punishable   under   the MMDR   Act   or   any   rule   made   thereunder   so   compounded. However,   the   bar   under   sub­section   2   of   Section   23A   shall   not affect   any   proceedings   for   the   offences   under   the   IPC,   such   as, Sections 379 and 414 IPC and the same shall be proceeded with further. 42 14. In   view   of   the   above   and   for   the   reasons   stated   above,   the appeals   filed   by   the   violators/private   appellants   are   partly allowed,   to   the   extent   quashing   the   proceedings   for   the   offences under the MMDR Act – Sections 4/21 of the MMDR Act only. The appeal   preferred   by   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh   stands dismissed. …………………………………..J. [ASHOK BHUSHAN] NEW DELHI; …………………………………..J. DECEMBER 03, 2020 [M.R. SHAH] 43