2020 INSC 0605
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1229 OF 2017
Chaman Lal …Appellant
Versus
The State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 14.09.2016/19.09.2016 passed by the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.
36 of 2014, by which the High Court has allowed the said appeal
preferred   by   the   State   and   has   quashed   and   set   aside   the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court
acquitting the appellant herein – original accused for the offences
under   Sections   376   and   506   of   the   IPC   and   consequently   has
convicted   the   appellant   –   accused   for   the   aforesaid  offences   and
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has   sentenced   him   to   undergo   seven   years   R.I.   with   fine   of   Rs.
10,000/­   and   in   default   of   payment   of   fine,   further   six   months
R.I.   under   Section   376   IPC   and   four   years   R.I.   with   fine   of
Rs.5,000/­   and   in   default   of   payment   of   fine,   further   three
months   R.I.   under   Section   506   IPC,   the   original   accused   has
preferred the present appeal.
2. The   facts   leading   to   the   present   appeal   in   nutshell   are   as
under:
That the father of the prosecutrix lodged an FIR against the
accused   with   the   allegations   that   on   1.4.2008,   his   wife
Dhaneshwari   Devi   telephonically   informed   him   at   Shimla   that
their  daughter   (prosecutrix)  is  pregnant.    It  was  alleged  that   the
prosecutrix told her mother that when she used to go to jungle to
graze goats and cattle, accused also used to go to jungle to graze
cattle and goats.  The prosecutrix told her mother that three­four
months   ago,   accused   had   sexual   intercourse   with   her   forcibly
and   without   her   consent.     That   the   accused   threatened   the
prosecutrix   not   to   disclose   the   incident   to   anyone.     That   due   to
fear   and   due   to   forgetting   the   same   and   further   due   to   mental
weakness,   she   did   not   disclose   about   the   incident   to   anyone
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including   her   mother.     That   the   prosecutrix   was   got   medically
examined   and   as   per   the   Medical   Officer   the   prosecutrix   was
carrying  a  pregnancy  of  31  weeks.    Her   age  was  stated  to  be  19
years.  Prosecutrix was alleged to be mentally retarded.  She was
medically examined at IGMC, Shimla as well as PGI, Chandigarh.
Prosecutrix   gave   birth   to   a   female   child   on   19.6.2008   at   KNH,
Shimla.     Blood   samples   of   the   prosecutrix,   the   baby   and   the
accused were taken for DNA test.  As per report, accused was the
biological   father   of   the   female   child.     The   accused   was   arrested.
After   completion   of   the   investigation,   the   Investigating   Officer
submitted   the   chargesheet   against   the   accused   for   the   offences
under Sections 376 and 506 IPC.  The accused pleaded not guilty
and   therefore   he   came   to   be   tried   by   the   learned   trial   Court   for
the aforesaid offences.
2.1 To   prove   the   case   against   the   accused,   the   prosecution
examined   as   many   as  23   witnesses   including   the   parents   of   the
prosecutrix (PW 1 & 2), Prosecutrix (PW3), Laboratory Technician
–   Jitender   Kumar   (PW8),   Dr.   Sarla   Chand   (PW9),   Dr.   Rakesh
Kumar,   Radiologist   (PW10),   Dr.   Ramesh   Kumar,   Assistant
Professor,   Department   of   Psychiatry   (PW11),   Dr.   Jeeva   Nand
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Chauhan (PW12), Nand Singh, Sr. Lab Technician, KNH, Shimla
(PW13), Dr. Monika Sharma (PW14), ASI Takpa Dorje (PW17), SI
Sunder   Singh   (PW19),   Dr.   Rama   Malhotra,   PGI,   Chandigarh
(PW22)   and   other   witnesses.     That   after   closure   of   the   evidence
on   behalf   of   the   prosecution,   statement   of   the   accused   under
Section   313   Cr.P.C.   was   recorded.     He   pleaded   total   innocence.
The   learned   trial   Court   acquitted   the   accused   mainly   on   the
ground   of   delay   in   lodging   the   FIR   and   also   on   the   ground   that
the   prosecutrix   was   not   mentally   unsound   to   understand   the
consequences and what was happening.
3. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment   and
order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   the   State
preferred   appeal   before   the   High   Court   and   by   the   impugned
judgment and order and on re­appreciation of the entire evidence
on record, more particularly the medical evidence, the High Court
has reversed the order of acquittal and has convicted the accused
for   the   offences   under   Sections   376   and   506   IPC   by   observing
that the prosecutrix was not in a position to understand the good
and bad aspect of the sexual assault.   On re­appreciation of the
entire evidence on record, the High Court came to the conclusion
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that   the   IQ   of   the   prosecutrix   was   62   and   that   she   had   mild
mental retardation.
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment   and   order   of   conviction   and   sentence   passed   by   the
High Court convicting the accused for the aforesaid offences, the
original accused has preferred the present appeal.
5. Ms.   Radhika   Gautam,   learned   Advocate   has   appeared   for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   Sarthak   Ghonkrokta,   Advocate   has
appeared for the respondent­State.
5.1 Ms. Radhika Gautam, learned Advocate appearing on behalf
of the appellant – accused has vehemently submitted that in the
facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court   has
materially   erred   in   reversing   the   acquittal   and   convicting   the
accused   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal.     It   is   submitted   that
cogent reasons were given by the learned trial Court, which were
on appreciation of the evidence on record, and therefore the same
were   not   required   to   be   interfered   with   by   the   High   Court   in
exercise   of   the   appellate   jurisdiction   in   an   appeal   against
acquittal.   
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5.2 Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­accused   has   made   the
following submissions:
i) there was a delay of four months in registering the FIR from
the   time   the   prosecution   claimed   the   incident   occurred   and
therefore the learned trial Court rightly acquitted the accused;
ii) even the father of the prosecutrix (PW1) clearly deposed that
the appellant – accused was called to discuss the matter and he
offered   to   take   care   of   the   child   but   refused   to   marry   the
prosecutrix.   It is submitted therefore that the FIR was filed only
as a vengeful act.  It is submitted that the appellant­accused was
not   in   a   position   to   marry   the   prosecutrix   as   the   appellant   was
married and was having the children of his own;
iii) as   such   there   is   a   delay   of   8   months   from   the   date   of
incident   in   filing   the   FIR.     It   is   submitted   that   the   prosecutrix
when examined the day after registering the FIR dated 22.4.2008
is found to be carrying a foetus of 8 months.  It is submitted that
it   is   not   believable   that   the   parents   were   not   aware   of   the
pregnancy of the prosecutrix;
iv) as such the prosecutrix was not suffering from mild mental
retardation   as   claimed   by   the   prosecution.     It   is   submitted   that
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two psychiatrists gave a different account of which language the
prosecutrix   seems   to   know.     It   is   submitted   that   one   says   she
knew  ‘Hindi’ and  other  says she knew ‘Phari’ and  he had to  use
the   interpreter.    It is  submitted that  this  is  a  major   discrepancy
in   the   prosecution’s   case   when   one   Doctor   who   is   supposed   to
have   assessed   her   for   mental   faculties   and   therefore   must   have
asked   her   many   questions   which   she   spoke   in   Hindi   and   the
other Doctor who is also supposed to ask her a lot of questions in
Phari   and   he   had   to   use   the   interpreter.     It   is   submitted   that
therefore either both of them or at least one of them is not stating
the true facts;
v) even   there   are   material   contradictions   in   the   deposition   of
the   prosecutrix   as   well   as   the   mother,   sister   and   father   of   the
prosecutrix   inasmuch   as   the   prosecutrix   said   that   she   came   to
know   about   her   pregnancy   from   her   family   members   when   they
told her about it, whereas the testimony of the mother, sister and
father reveal that it was clearly the prosecutrix who informed her
sister about the pregnancy;
vi) the High Court has mainly relied upon the medical evidence
of PW22 while coming to the conclusion that the prosecutrix was
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having mild mental retardation.  It is submitted that deposition of
PW22  is  compared with  the  deposition  of  other  family  members.
As   rightly   observed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   the   prosecutrix
was   a   person   capable   of   understanding   her   welfare   and   quite
intelligent.
5.3 Making   the   above   submissions   and   relying   upon   the
decision of this Court in the case of  Krishna v. State of Karnataka
(2014)   15   SCC   596,   it   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has
clearly   erred   in   reversing   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the
learned trial Court which was based on appreciation of evidence
on   record   and   the   view   taken   by   the   learned   trial   Court   was   a
plausible view.
5.4 It is further submitted by the learned Advocate appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellant   –   accused   that   out   of   seven   years
imprisonment,   the   accused   has   already   undergone   four   years
and therefore it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash
and   set   aside   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the
High   Court   and   in   the   alternative   to   reduce   the   sentence   to   the
period already undergone by the accused.
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6. While   opposing   the   present   appeal,   the   learned   Advocate
appearing   on   behalf   of   the  State   has   vehemently   submitted   that
in   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   the   High   Court   has
rightly reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial
Court   and   has   rightly   convicted   the   accused   for   the   offences
under   Sections   376   and   506   IPC,   more   particularly   when   the
prosecutrix   was   suffering   from   mental   disease   and   as   per   the
medical   evidence   she   was   not   in   a   position   to   understand   the
good and bad aspect of sexual assault.
6.1 Learned   counsel   for   the   State   has   made   the   following
submissions:
i) as   the   first   appellate   court   the   High   Court   was   well   within
its jurisdiction to re­appreciate the entire evidence on record and
to   come   to   the   right   conclusion.     It   is   submitted   that   in   the
present case the High Court has rightly re­appreciated the entire
evidence on record, more particularly the medical evidence;
ii) the aspect of delay in lodging the FIR has already been dealt
with   and   considered  by   the   High   Court.     It   is  submitted   that  as
such   the   accused   had   taken   undue   advantage   of   the   mental
condition   of   the   prosecutrix   and   therefore   even   if   there   is   any
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material   contradiction,   the   benefit   shall   not   go   to   the   accused
and   the   benefit   must   go   in   favour   of   such   a   victim   who   is
suffering   from   a   mental   disease   and   not   in   a   position   to
understand the good and bad aspect of sexual assault;
iii) that in the present case even the conduct on the part of the
accused is also required to be appreciated.  It is submitted that it
is an admitted position that the accused had sexually intercourse
with   the   prosecutrix   and   because   of   that   the   prosecutrix   was
pregnant   and   delivered   a   baby   child.     Accused   is   not   now
disputing   that   the   child   does   not   belong   to   him.     Despite   the
above, in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement his case was of a total denial
and innocence and it was not even his case that the prosecutrix
was a consenting party and that he had sexually intercourse with
the   consent   of   the   prosecutrix.     It   is   submitted   that   thus   the
accused in his 313 statement came out with a false case and did
not state the true facts;
iv) now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
out   of   seven   years   RI,   the   accused   has   undergone   four   years   RI
and   therefore   the   same   may   be   considered   in   favour   of   the
accused is concerned, it is submitted that the minimum sentence
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provided for the offence under Section 376 is seven years and the
same   can   be   reduced   only   by   giving   a   special   reasons.     It   is
submitted that in the present case, as such, the High Court has
already taken a lenient view by awarding seven years RI only.   It
is submitted that when it is a case of sexual assault on a person
suffering   from   mental   sickness   and   the   accused   has   taken
disadvantage   of   the   mental   condition   of   the   victim,   such   cases
should   be   dealt   with   an   iron   hand   and   no   leniency   should   be
shown to such accused.
6.2 Making   the   above   submissions,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the
present appeal.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
at length.
At   the   outset,   it   is   required   to   be   noted   that   by   the
impugned judgment and order the High Court has convicted the
accused   for   the   offences   under   Section   376   and   506   IPC.     It   is
also required to be noted that on re­appreciation of the evidence,
the High Court found that the IQ of the victim was very low and
she   was   suffering   from   mental   illness   and   she   was   not   in   a
position to understand good and bad aspect of sexual assault.  It
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is   also   required   to   be   noted   and   it   is   not   in   dispute   that   the
accused   had   sexually   intercourse   with   the   victim   and   that   the
victim delivered a baby child and that the accused is found to be
the biological father of the baby child delivered by the victim.   It
is also required to be noted that in the 313 statement the case of
the accused was of a total denial.  It was not his case that it was
a case of consent.  Thus, the accused, as such, came with a false
defence.
8. It is true that the learned trial Court acquitted the accused.
However, the High Court on re­appreciation of the entire evidence
on   record   has   found   the   accused   guilty   for   the   offences   under
Sections   376   &   506   IPC   and   has   reversed   the   order   of   acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court.   It is the case on behalf of the
appellant­accused   that   in   an   appeal   against   order   of   acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court, the High Court has committed
a grave error in convicting the accused and reversing the order of
acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court.     Therefore,   the   first
thing   which   is   required   to   be   considered   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case is, whether the High Court is justified
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in   interfering   with   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   learned
trial Court and thereby convicting the accused?
9. Before   considering   the   appeal   on   merits,   the   law   on   the
appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378
Cr.P.C.   and   the   interference   by   the   High   Court   in   an   appeal
against acquittal is required to be considered.  
9.1 In   the   case   of   Babu   v.   State   of   Kerala,   (2010)   9   SCC
189),  this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an
appeal   against   acquittal   under   Section   378   Cr.P.C.     In
paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:
12.  This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the
High   Court   to   interfere   with   the   judgment   and   order   of   acquittal
passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily
set   aside   a   judgment   of   acquittal   in   a   case   where   two   views   are
possible,   though   the   view   of   the   appellate   court   may   be   the   more
probable   one.   While   dealing   with   a   judgment   of   acquittal,   the
appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as
to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were
perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled
to  consider   whether   in   arriving   at   a   finding   of   fact,   the   trial   court
had   failed   to   take   into   consideration   admissible   evidence   and/or
had   taken   into   consideration   the   evidence   brought   on   record
contrary   to   law.   Similarly,   wrong   placing   of   burden   of   proof   may
also   be   a   subject­matter   of   scrutiny   by   the   appellate   court.   (Vide
Balak   Ram   v.   State   of   U.P   (1975)   3   SCC   219 ,   Shambhoo   Missir   v.
State   of   Bihar   (1990)   4   SCC   17,   Shailendra   Pratap   v.   State   of   U.P
(2003)   1   SCC   761 ,   Narendra   Singh   v.   State   of   M.P   (2004)   10   SCC
699 ,   Budh Singh   v.   State  of  U.P (2006)  9 SCC 731 ,   State  of  U.P.   v.
Ram   Veer   Singh   (2007)   13   SCC   102 ,   S.   Rama   Krishna   v.   S.   Rami
Reddy   (2008)   5   SCC   535 ,   Arulvelu   v.   State   (2009)   10   SCC   206 ,
13

Perla   Somasekhara   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P   (2009)   16   SCC   98   and
Ram Singh  v.  State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 )
13.   In   Sheo   Swarup   v.   King   Emperor   AIR   1934   PC   227,   the   Privy
Council observed as under: (IA p. 404)
“…  the   High  Court   should   and  will  always   give   proper   weight   and
consideration to such matters as ( 1 ) the views of the trial Judge as
to the credibility of the witnesses; ( 2 ) the presumption of innocence
in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by
the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; ( 3 ) the right of the
accused   to   the   benefit   of   any   doubt;   and   ( 4 )   the   slowness   of   an
appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge
who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”
14.  The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by
this Court. (See  Tulsiram Kanu  v.  State AIR 1954 SC 1 ,  Balbir Singh
v.   State   of   Punjab   AIR   1957   SC   216 ,   M.G.   Agarwal   v.   State   of
Maharashtra   AIR   1963   SC   200 ,   Khedu   Mohton   v.   State   of   Bihar
(1970) 2 SCC 450 ,  Sambasivan  v.  State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 ,
Bhagwan Singh   v.   State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85   and   State of Goa   v.
Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 )
15.   In   Chandrappa   v.   State   of   Karnataka   (2007)   4   SCC   415,   this
Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)
“( 1 )   An   appellate   court   has   full   power   to   review,   reappreciate   and
reconsider   the   evidence   upon   which   the   order   of   acquittal   is
founded.
( 2 )   The   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   puts   no   limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both
on questions of fact and of law.
( 3 )   Various   expressions,   such   as,   ‘substantial   and   compelling
reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’,
‘distorted   conclusions’,   ‘glaring   mistakes’,   etc.   are   not   intended   to
curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against
acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes
of   language’   to   emphasise   the   reluctance   of   an   appellate   court   to
interfere   with   acquittal   than   to   curtail   the   power   of   the   court   to
review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
( 4 ) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal,   there   is   double   presumption   in   favour   of   the   accused.
Firstly , the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle  of  criminal jurisprudence  that   every   person
shall   be   presumed   to   be   innocent   unless   he   is   proved   guilty   by   a
competent  court  of  law.   Secondly ,  the  accused  having  secured  his
acquittal,   the   presumption   of   his   innocence   is   further   reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
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( 5 )   If   two   reasonable   conclusions   are   possible   on   the   basis   of   the
evidence   on   record,   the   appellate   court   should   not   disturb   the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
16.   In   Ghurey   Lal   v.   State   of   U.P   (2008)   10   SCC   450,   this   Court
reiterated   the   said   view,   observing   that   the   appellate   court   in
dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the
accused,   should   bear   in   mind   that   the   trial   court’s   acquittal
bolsters   the   presumption   that   he   is   innocent.   The   appellate   court
must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial
court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the
demeanour   of   the   witnesses,   and   was   in   a   better   position   to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17.   In   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Naresh   (2009)   9   SCC   368,   the   Court
again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down
that: (SCC p. 374, para 20)
“ 20 .   …   an   order   of   acquittal   should   not   be   lightly   interfered   with
even if the  court  believes that  there  is some  evidence pointing  out
the finger towards the accused.”
18.   In   State   of   U.P.   v.   Banne   (2009)   4   SCC   271,   this   Court   gave
certain   illustrative   circumstances   in   which   the   Court   would   be
justified   in   interfering   with   a   judgment   of   acquittal   by   the   High
Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28)
“( i ) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of
law by ignoring the settled legal position;
( ii )   The   High   Court’s   conclusions   are   contrary   to   evidence   and
documents on record;
( iii )   The   entire   approach   of   the   High   Court   in   dealing   with   the
evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
( iv )   The   High   Court’s   judgment   is   manifestly   unjust   and
unreasonable   based   on   erroneous   law   and   facts   on   the   record   of
the case;
( v ) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to
the findings of the High Court;
( vi )   This   Court   would   be   extremely   reluctant   in   interfering   with   a
case   when   both   the   Sessions   Court   and   the   High   Court   have
recorded an order of acquittal.”
A   similar   view   has   been   reiterated   by   this   Court   in   Dhanapal   v.
State (2009) 10 SCC 401 .
19.   Thus,   the   law   on   the   issue   can   be   summarised   to   the   effect
that   in   exceptional   cases   where   there   are   compelling
circumstances,   and   the   judgment   under   appeal   is   found   to   be
perverse,   the   appellate   court   can   interfere   with   the   order   of
acquittal.   The   appellate   court   should   bear   in   mind   the
presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial
15

court’s   acquittal   bolsters   the   presumption   of   his   innocence.
Interference   in   a   routine   manner   where   the   other   view   is   possible
should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.”
9.2 When   the   findings   of   fact   recorded   by   a   court   can   be
held   to   be   perverse   has   been   dealt   with   and   considered   in
paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:
“20.   The   findings   of   fact   recorded   by   a   court   can   be   held   to   be
perverse   if   the   findings   have   been   arrived   at   by   ignoring   or
excluding   relevant   material   or   by   taking   into   consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible   material.   The   finding   may   also   be   said   to
be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding
so   outrageously   defies   logic   as   to   suffer   from   the   vice   of
irrationality.   (Vide   Rajinder   Kumar   Kindra   v.   Delhi   Admn   (1984)   4
SCC   635 ,   Excise   and   Taxation   Officer­cum­Assessing   Authority   v.
Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 ,  Triveni Rubber & Plastics
v.   CCE   1994   Supp.   (3)   SCC   665 ,   Gaya   Din   v.   Hanuman   Prasad
(2001) 1 SCC 501 ,   Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206   and   Gamini
Bala Koteswara Rao  v.  State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC 636 ).”
(emphasis supplied)
9.3 It   is   further   observed,   after   following   the   decision   of
this Court in the case of   Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police
(1999) 2 SCC 10 , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no
evidence   or   thoroughly   unreliable   evidence   and   no   reasonable
person   would   act   upon   it,   the   order   would   be   perverse.     But   if
there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which
could   be   relied   upon,   the   conclusions   would   not   be   treated   as
perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.
16

9.4 In   the   recent   decision   of   Vijay   Mohan   Singh   v.   State   of
Karnataka,  (2019)   5  SCC   436,   this   Court  again   had   an   occasion
to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference
by   the   High   Court   in   an   appeal   against   acquittal.     This   Court
considered   catena   of   decisions   of   this   Court   right   from   1952
onwards.  In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:
“31.  An identical question came to be considered before this Court
in   Umedbhai  Jadavbhai  (1978)  1   SCC  228 .   In  the   case   before   this
Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed
by the learned trial court on re­appreciation of the entire evidence
on  record. However,  the  High Court,  while  reversing  the  acquittal,
did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while
acquitting   the   accused.   Confirming   the   judgment   of   the   High
Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.
233)
“ 10 . Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of
acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire
evidence   independently   and   come   to   its   own   conclusion.
Ordinarily,   the   High   Court   would   give   due   importance   to   the
opinion   of   the   Sessions   Judge   if   the   same   were   arrived   at   after
proper   appreciation   of   the   evidence.   This   rule   will   not   be
applicable   in   the   present   case   where   the   Sessions   Judge   has
made   an   absolutely   wrong   assumption   of   a   very   material   and
clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.”
31.1.  In  Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , the High
Court   reversed   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial
court   and   held   the   accused   guilty   on   re­appreciation   of   the  entire
evidence   on   record,   however,   the   High   Court   did   not   record   its
conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court
in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions
arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed
by   the   High   Court   convicting   the   accused   on   reversal   of   the
acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial   court,   after   being   satisfied
that   the   order   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial   court   was
perverse   and   suffered   from   infirmities,   this   Court   declined   to
interfere   with   the   order   of   conviction   passed   by   the   High   Court.
17

While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court,
this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)
“ 8 .   We   have   perused   the   judgment   under   appeal   to   ascertain
whether   the   High   Court   has   conformed   to   the   aforementioned
principles.   We   find   that   the   High   Court   has   not   strictly
proceeded   in   the   manner   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   Ramesh
Babulal   Doshi   v.   State   of   Gujarat   (1996)   9   SCC   225   viz.   first
recording   its   conclusion   on   the   question   whether   the   approach
of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal
or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which
alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the
High   Court   has   rendered   a   well­considered   judgment   duly
meeting   all   the   contentions   raised   before   it.   But   then   will   this
non­compliance   per   se   justify   setting   aside   the   judgment   under
appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach
of the court which is considering  the validity of the judgment of
an   appellate   court   which   has   reversed   the   order   of   acquittal
passed   by   the   trial   court,   should   be   to   satisfy   itself   if   the
approach   of   the   trial   court   in   dealing   with   the   evidence   was
patently   illegal  or   conclusions   arrived  at  by  it   are   demonstrably
unsustainable   and   whether   the   judgment   of   the   appellate   court
is   free   from   those   infirmities;   if   so   to   hold   that   the   trial   court
judgment   warranted   interference.   In   such   a   case,   there   is
obviously   no   reason   why   the   appellate   court’s   judgment   should
be   disturbed.   But   if   on   the   other   hand   the   court   comes   to   the
conclusion   that   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   does   not   suffer
from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by
the   appellate   court   in   the   order   of   acquittal   was   not   justified;
then   in   such   a   case   the   judgment   of   the   appellate   court   has   to
be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of
the   acquittal   alone   has   to   stand.   Having   regard   to   the   above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial
court in this case.”
31.2.  In  K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC
309 ,   after   observing   that   though   there   is   some   substance   in   the
grievance   of   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
accused   that   the   High   Court   has   not   adverted   to   all   the   reasons
given   by   the   trial   Judge   for   according   an   order   of   acquittal,   this
Court   refused   to   set   aside   the   order   of   conviction   passed   by   the
High   Court   after   having   found   that   the   approach   of   the   Sessions
Judge   in   recording   the   order   of   acquittal   was   not   proper   and   the
conclusion   arrived   at   by   the   learned   Sessions   Judge   on   several
aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the
Sessions   Judge   was   not   justified   in   discarding   the
relevant/material   evidence   while   acquitting   the   accused,   the   High
18

Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and
record   its   own   conclusion.   This   Court   scrutinised   the   evidence   of
the   eyewitnesses   and   opined   that   reasons   adduced   by   the   trial
court  for   discarding   the  testimony  of the eyewitnesses were not  at
all   sound.   This   Court   also   observed   that   as   the   evaluation   of   the
evidence   made   by   the   trial   court   was   manifestly   erroneous   and
therefore   it   was   the   duty   of   the   High   Court   to   interfere   with   an
order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
31.3.   In   Atley   v.   State   of   U.P.   AIR   1955   SC   807 ,   in   para   5,   this
Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809­10)
“ 5 . It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that
the   judgment   of   the   trial   court   being   one   of   acquittal,   the   High
Court   should   not   have   set   it   aside   on   mere   appreciation   of   the
evidence   led   on   behalf   of   the   prosecution   unless   it   came   to   the
conclusion   that   the   judgment   of   the   trial   Judge   was   perverse.   In
our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court
in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that
the   judgment   of   acquittal   under   appeal   was   perverse   it   could   not
set aside that order.
It   has   been   laid   down   by   this   Court   that   it   is   open   to   the   High
Court   on   an   appeal   against   an   order   of   acquittal   to   review   the
entire   evidence   and   to   come   to   its   own   conclusion,   of   course,
keeping   in   view   the   well­established   rule   that   the   presumption   of
innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the
judgment   of   acquittal   passed   by   the   trial   court   which   had   the
advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of
appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal
as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject
to   the   riders   that   the   presumption   of   innocence   with   which   the
accused   person   starts   in   the   trial   court   continues   even   up   to   the
appellate   stage   and   that   the   appellate   court   should   attach   due
weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of
acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles
in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot
be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases
cited   at   the   Bar,   namely,   Surajpal   Singh   v.   State  AIR  1952  SC  52 ;
Wilayat Khan  v.  State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122 ) In our opinion, there
is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant
that   the   High   Court   was   not   justified   in   reviewing   the   entire
evidence and coming to its own conclusions.
19

31.4.   In   K.   Gopal   Reddy   v.   State   of   A.P.   (1979)   1   SCC   355 ,   this
Court   has   observed   that   where   the   trial   court   allows   itself   to   be
beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender
reasons   and   takes   a   view   of   the   evidence   which   is   but   barely
possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the
interest   of   justice,   lest   the   administration   of   justice   be   brought   to
ridicule.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Having   gone   through   the   impugned   judgment   and   order
passed   by   the   High   Court   and   also   the   judgment   and   order   of
acquittal   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Court,   we   are   of   the   firm
opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the High
Court   is   justified   and,   as   such,   has   not   committed   any   error   in
reversing the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court
and   convicting   the   accused   for   the   offences   under   Sections   376
and   506   IPC.     Being   the   first   appellate   Court   and   as   observed
hereinabove   in   the   aforesaid   decisions   the   High   Court   was
justified in re­appreciating the entire evidence on record and the
reasoning   given   by   the   learned   trial   Court.     In   the   facts   and
circumstances   of   the   case,   the   High   Court   has   acted   within   the
parameters   of   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the   decisions,
referred to hereinabove.
20

11. So   far   as   the   merit   of   the   appeal   is   concerned,   on   re­
appreciation   of   the   entire   evidence   on   record,   more   particularly
the   deposition   of   doctors   examined   as   PW11   –   Dr.   Ramesh
Kumar   and   PW22   –   Dr.   Rama   Malhotra,   the   High   Court   has
specifically   found   that   the   IQ   of   the   victim   was   62   which   was
based on the history and mental state examination of the victim.
The   High   Court  has   also   come   to   the  conclusion   that  the   victim
was  not  in  a  position  to   understand  the  good  and  bad  aspect  of
the sexual assault.   Merely  because the victim was in a position
to do some household works cannot discard the medical evidence
that the victim had mild mental retardation and she was not in a
position   to   understand   the   good   and   bad   aspect   of   sexual
assault.     It  appears   that   the   accused   had  taken   disadvantage  of
the mental illness of the victim.   It is required to be appreciated
coupled   with   the   fact   that   the   accused   is   found   to   be   the
biological father of the baby child delivered by the victim.  Despite
the above, in his 313 statement the case of the accused was of a
total   denial.     It   was   never   the   case   of   the   accused   that   it   was   a
case   of   consent.     Therefore,   considering   the   evidence   on   record,
more particularly the deposition of PW11 and PW22 and even the
deposition of the other prosecution witnesses, the High Court has
21

rightly  observed that  case  would fall  under  Section 375 IPC   and
has   rightly   convicted   the   accused   for   the   offence   under   Section
376 IPC.  Even as per clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC, “a man is
said   to   commit   rape”,   if   with   her   consent   when,   at   the   time   of
giving   such   consent,   by   reason   of   unsoundness   of   mind,   is
unable   to   understand   the   nature   and   consequences   of   that   to
which she gives consent.  As observed hereinabove, even it is not
the   case  on   behalf   of  the   accused   that   it   was  a   case   of  consent.
On   evidence,   it  has   been   established  and   proved   that   the   victim
was   mentally   retarded   and   her  IQ   was   62   and  she  was  not   in  a
position   to   understand   the   good   and   bad   aspect   of   sexual
assault.     The   accused   has   taken   disadvantage   of   the   mental
sickness and low IQ of the victim.
12. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
there are contradictions in the statement of PW11 – Dr. Ramesh
Kumar and PW22 – Dr. Rama Malhotra that she was not knowing
‘Hindi’   and   that   she   was   only   knowing   ‘Phari’   and   therefore   in
view of such contradictions the benefit of doubt must go in favour
of   the   accused   is   concerned,   the   aforesaid   aspect   has   been
explained   by   PW22   in   her   cross­examination.     In   the   cross­
examination,   PW22­   Dr.   Rama   Malhotra   has   specifically   stated
22

that   the   language   is   not   material   in   the   tests   because   these   are
independent of language.   From the medical evidence, it emerges
that   IQ   62   falls   in   the   category   of   ‘mild   mental   retardation’.     It
has   also   emerged  that  the  mental   status  and   IQ  are   determined
on the basis of the injuries and activities.   IQ of a person can be
known on the basis of the questions, activities and the history of
a patient.   Therefore, even if there might be some contradictions
with respect to language known by the victim, in that case also, it
cannot   be   said   to   be   the   major   contradictions   to   disbelieve   the
entire   medical   evidence   on   the   mental   status   of   the   victim.
Therefore,   the   High   Court   is   justified   in   reversing   the   order   of
acquittal   and   convicting   the   accused   for   the   offences   under
Sections 376 & 506 IPC.
13. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that
he   has   already   undergone   four   years   RI   out   of   seven   years   RI
awarded   to   him   and   is   married   and   has   two   children   and
therefore a lenient view may be taken is concerned, it is required
to   be   noted   that   as   such   the   High   Court   has   also   taken   a   very
lenient   view   by   imposing   the   minimum   sentence   of   seven   years
RI.  It is required to be noted that it is a case of sexual assault on
a   victim   whose   IQ   was   62   and   was   mentally   retarded   and   that
23

accused   has   taken   undue   advantage   of   the   mental
sickness/illness   of   the   victim.     A   person   suffering   from   mental
disorder   or   mental   sickness   deserves   special   care,   love   and
affection.   They are not to be exploited.   In the present case, the
accused   has   exploited   the   victim   by   taking   disadvantage   of   her
mental sickness/illness.   Therefore, no interference of this Court
against   the   impugned   judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High
Court convicting the accused is called for.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove,
the   present   appeal   fails   and   deserves   to   be   dismissed   and   is
accordingly dismissed.
………………………………..J.
[ASHOK BHUSHAN]
……………………………….J.
[R. SUBHASH REDDY]
NEW DELHI; ………………………………J.
DECEMBER 03, 2020. [M.R. SHAH]
24