2020 INSC 0611 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  3976­3977 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 13384­13385/2019) The Project Director, Project  Implementation Unit   …Appellant(s) Versus P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors.      …Respondent(s) With CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3978­3980  OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 16098­16100/2019) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3981­3984 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 18577­18580/2019) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3985­3991 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 19160­19166/2019) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3992  OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) No. 18586/2019) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3993­3994 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1775­1776/2020) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3995­3998 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1777­1780/2020) 2 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3999­4001 OF 2020 (arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 1781­1783/2020) J U D G M E N T A. M. Khanwilkar, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. These   appeals   emanate   from   the   common   judgment   and order 1   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras 2   holding   the notifications issued under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act,   1956 3   for   acquisition   of   specified   lands   for development/construction   of   Chennai­Krishnagiri­Salem (National Corridor) 8 Lanes new National Highway 4  (NH­179A and NH­179B) being part of the larger project ­ “Bharatmala Pariyojna – Phase I 5 ”, as illegal and bad in law on the grounds stated in the impugned judgment.   THE PROJECT 1 dated 8.4.2019 in W.P. Nos. 16146/2018, 16630/2018, 16961/2018, 19063/2018, 19385/2018, 20014/2018, 20194/2018, 20625/2018, 20626/2018, 20627/2018, 20647/2018, 20764/2018, 20969/2018, 21242/2018, 22334/2018 and 22371/2018 – for short, “the impugned judgment” 2 for short, “the High Court” 3 for short, “the 1956 Act” 4 for short, “C-K-S (NC)” 5 for short, “the Project” 3 3. The   Project   (Bharatmala   Pariyojna   ­   Phase   I)   has   been conceived   as   a   new   umbrella   program   for   the   highways   sector that   focuses   on   optimising   efficiency   of   freight   and   passenger movement   across   the   country   by   bridging   critical   infrastructure gaps   through   effective   interventions   like   development   of Economic   Corridors,   Inter   Corridors   and   Feeder   Routes   (ICFR), National   Corridor   Efficiency   Improvement,   Border   and International   connectivity   roads,   Coastal   and   Port   connectivity roads   and   Green­field   expressways,   traversing   across   around 24,800   kms   in       Phase­I.     In   addition,   Phase   I   also   includes 10,000   kms.   of   balance   road   works   under   National   Highways Development Program 6 .  The estimated outlay for Phase I came to be   specified   as   Rs.5,35,000   crores   spread   over   5   years.     The objective  of   the   Program   is  stated  as   optimal  resource   allocation for   a   holistic   highway   development/improvement   initiative.     The two distinguishing features are said to be ­ effective delegation in appraisal/approval   of   individual   project   stretches   and encouraging State Governments to participate in the development process   through   ‘Grand   Challenge’.     This   Project   intends   to further the objective of the NHDP, which was being implemented 6 for short, “NHDP” 4 in the past and had reached level of maturity.  Resultantly, it was thought   appropriate   to   redefine   road   development   and   have   a macro   approach   while   planning   expansion   of   the   national highways   network   with   focus   on   recasting   road   development   by bridging   critical   infrastructure   gaps.     The   Program   envisages   a corridor   approach   in   place   of   the   existing   package­based approach   which   has,   in   many   cases,   resulted   in   skewed development referred to therein, causing impediment in seamless freight and passenger movement.   4. The   components   and   outlay   of   the   Project,   as   approved   by the   Cabinet   Committee   on   Economic   Affairs 7   to   be   implemented over a period of 5 years i.e. 2017­2018 to 2021­2022, provide for the breakup of length of the different components and the outlay therefor.     Although   the   Project   stretches   had   been   identified taking   into   account   integration   of   economic   corridors   with   the ongoing   projects   under   NHDP   and   infrastructure   asymmetry   in major   corridors,   an   express   discretion   has   been   bestowed   on Minister – Road Transport & Highways to substitute/replace upto 15% length of 24,800 kms. for the Project (Phase­I of program) by other   suitable   projects,   if   development   of   certain   identified 7 for short, “the CCEA” 5 stretches cannot be taken  up on account of issues pertaining  to alignment   finalisation,   land   availability   and   other   unforeseen factors whilst retaining the target and budget proposed for Phase I.   5. In   furtherance   of   the   Project,   a   meeting   was   held   on 19.1.2018 under the Chairmanship of Secretary (Road Transport &   Highways)   for   optimising   Economic   Corridors   in   the   State   of Karnataka,   Andhra   Pradesh,   Tamil   Nadu   and   Kerala   identified under   the   Project,   which   was   also   attended   by   Member   (P), National   Highway   Authority   of   India 8 ,   Joint   Secretary   of   the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways 9  and CGM (T), NHAI.  The members   deliberated   upon   the   micro   aspects   of   the   section delineated   as   Chennai­Madurai   in   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu,   as was   done   in   respect   of   other   sections   of   the   concerned   State. After   due   deliberations   and   considering   all   aspects,   the Committee proceeded to record its unanimous opinion in respect of   stretch/section   referred   to   in   the   Project   –   C­K­S   (NC)   and Chennai­Madurai   (Economic   Corridor) 10   in   the   State   of   Tamil Nadu, as follows: ­ 8 for short, “the NHAI” 9 for short, “the MoRTH” 10 for short, “C-M (EC)” 6 “2.4 Chennai­Krishnagiri­Salem   (National   Corridor)   & Chennai­Madurai (Economic Corridor): (i) The   traffic   from   Chennai   bound   to Salem/Coimbatore   and   Pallakad   (Kerala)   currently use   the   Chennai­Krishnagiri   section   of   the   Golden Quadrilateral   (Chennai­Bengaluru)   and   the Krishnagiri­Salem   section   of   the   North­South corridor   or   the   Chennai­Tindivanam­Ulundurpet section   of   the   Chennai­Madurai   Economic   corridor and   the   Ulunderpet­Salem   Inter­corridor   route, thereby   congesting   Chennai­Krishnagiri   section   of Golden   Quadrilateral   and   Chennai­Tindivanam (72,000 PCU) – Ulundurpet (47,000 PCU) section of the   Chennai­Madurai   Economic   Corridor. Accordingly,   it   was   decided   that   instead   of   6/8 laning   of   Tindivanum   Trichy   section,   a   crow­flight green­field   alignment   be   developed   between Chennai   and   Salem   via   Harur   under   National Corridor Efficiency Improvement.  This will not only reduce   the   distance   between   Chennai   and Salem/Coimbatore   by   40  km   but   also   diversify   the traffic   from   the   congested   Chennai­Krishnagiri section   of   Golden   Quadrilateral   and   Chennai­ Ulundurpet   section   of   the   Chennai­Madurai Economic Corridor. (ii) It   was   also   observed   that   instead   of   6/8 laning   of   Tovarankuruchi­Melur­Madurai   section (64   km)   of   the   Chennai­Madurai   Economic Corridor,   it   would   be   better   to   develop Tovarankuruchi­Natham   section   (27   km)   as   the Madurai­Natham stretch is already being developed as   a   feeder­route,   which   will   reduce   the   Trichy­ Madurai   distance   by   8   km   and   would   result   into diversification   of   traffic   from   Tovarankuruchi   to Madurai via Natham and via Melur.”  It   was   also   decided   in   the   said   meeting   that   the   CCEA   shall   be apprised   of   the   proposed   alignment   in   the   upcoming   biannual update.   6. In the backdrop of this decision, notifications under Section 2(2)   of   the   1956   Act   came   to   be   issued,   declaring   the 7 stretch/section  from  Tambaram  (Chennai) to  Harur  as NH­179B and   from   Harur   to   Salem   as   NH­179A.     Consequent   to   such declaration,   notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956   Act specifying   the   lands   proposed   to   be   acquired   for   the   national highway(s),   came   to   be   issued   for   the   concerned stretches/sections,   which   was   also   duly   published   in   the   local newspapers. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 7. The   notifications   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   were challenged by the affected land owners and also by way of public interest litigation.   In addition, in Writ Petition No. 21242/2018, the   notifications   issued   under   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act declaring   the   concerned   stretches/sections   being   NH­179A   and NH­179B respectively, came to be challenged.   8. The   High   Court   considered   challenges   to   the   stated notifications   on   diverse   counts   by   way   of   a   common   judgment, which is impugned in these appeals.   The High Court formulated 15  questions,  which  arose  for  its  consideration  in  the  context  of 8 the   challenge   to   the   respective   notifications.     The   same   read thus:­ “(i)  Whether   the  Writ   Petitions  are  maintainable,   since  all that   has   been   done   by   the   respondents   is   to   notify   their intention   to   acquire   the   lands   by   publishing   a   notification under Section 3A(1) of the Act and the petitioners cannot be stated to be aggrieved; (ii)  Whether   the   entire   land   acquisition   proceedings   are wholly   without   jurisdiction   as   a   declaration   under   Section 2(2)   of   the   Act   enables   only   to   declare   an   existing   highway, as   a   National   Highway   and   not   for   creating   a   National Highway from a non­existing road or a plain land; (iii)  Whether   if   the   project   is   allowed   to   be   implemented without   prior   environmental   clearance,   would   it   be   against the  principles  of   sustainable  development   and  would  violate the   provisions   of   the   Articles   19,   46,   48A   and   51A   of   the Constitution of India; (iv)  Whether   there   is   a   need   for   the   proposed   project Highway   given   the   statistics   regarding   the   Passenger   Car Units in the existing three highways; (v)  Whether   there   is   any   hidden   agenda   for   the   proposed project and whether it was intended to benefit a chosen few; (vi)  Whether   Chennai­Salem   proposed   highway   project was not even considered as a viable proposal, when lots were invited   under   Bharat   Mala   Priyojana   and   Chennai­Madurai proposal was  found to be  viable  resulting  in appointment  of the consultant (Feedback), could there have been a change of the   project   after   appointment   of   the   Consultant   for   a different project; (vii)  Whether   the   respondents   who   had   originally   notified the   project   between   the   Chennai   and   Madurai   could   have changed   the   same   after   the   tender   for   awarding   the consultancy   contract   was   finalised   for   Chennai­Madurai Section; (viii)  What   would   be   the   impact   of   the   proposed   project   on Forest   lands,   Water   Bodies,   Wild   Life,   flora   and   fauna   as admittedly  the proposed alignment  passes through all these areas; (ix)  Whether public hearing is a pre­requisite and should it precede any step that may be taken under the provisions of the Act; 9 (x)  Whether   public   consultation   which   includes   public hearing   at   site   should   have   preceded   the   land   acquisition proceedings or at what stage it is required to be done; (xi)  If   the   notification   as   initially   notified   by   the   Central Government   (Chennai­Madurai)   was   modified   is   the   draft feasibility   report   liable   to   be   scrapped,   as   the   award   of consultancy contract was entirely for a different project; (xii)  Whether   the   report   prepared   by   the   Consultant (Feedback)   contains   plagiarized   contents,   whether   it   was prepared in great haste, replete with errors apparent  on the face   of   the   record   and   should   the   report   be   held   to   be   an outcome of non­application of mind; (xiii)  Whether   guidelines   prescribed   in   the   Indian   Highway Capacity   Manual   were   ignored   while   preparing   the   draft feasibility report; (xiv)  Whether   on   account   of   the   reduction   of   the   right   of way   in   various   sections   including   the   proposed   alignment, which passes through Forest area, whether the scope of the project   stood   totally   amended   and   whether   the   respondents can proceed in the manner they propose to do. (xv)  Whether the feasibility report has failed to analyse the financial   consequences   of   the   Chennai­Salem   express   way becoming   an   additional   toll   way   or   competing   road   to   the existing   toll   way   and   thus   triggering   a   series   of   contractual obligations   under   the   present   concessional   agreements   that would get extended by 50 to 100% of the remaining period. …..” 9. The   High   Court,   at   the   outset   considered   the   preliminary objection   regarding   maintainability   of   writ   petitions   being premature,   as   raised   by   the   NHAI   and   the   Union   of   India.     In that,   the   stated   notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   were   only expression of intention to acquire lands and all objections thereto could   be   considered   by   the   designated   authority   at   the appropriate stage.  Further, the challenge to the said notifications under Section 3A could be entertained by the High Court only if 10 the   competent   authority   had   taken   recourse   to   that   option   as   a colourable exercise of power.  And it was not open to the Court to substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the Government as   to   what   constitutes   public   purpose.     The   High   Court   noted that   ordinarily,   the   constitutional   Courts   would   be   loath   to interdict any land acquisition process at the inception.  However, it   then   went   on   to   observe   that   the   same   is   a   self­imposed restriction.     Whereas,   the   circumstances   of   the   present   case would   warrant   interference   at   the   very   threshold.     Further,   the land owners/losers cannot be made to wait till the final outcome of the decision of the competent authority and more so, when it is a   case   of   high­handed   action   of   the   officials.     The   High   Court noting   the   decision   in   State   of   Bombay   vs.   R.S.   Nanji 11   and Somawanti & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 12 ,  observed that if   the   constitutional   Court   is   convinced   that   the   impugned notifications   are   the   outcome   of   colourable   exercise   of   power   by the   authorities   concerned   and   the   decision   being   replete   with irrationality,   unreasonableness   and   arbitrariness,   ought   to intervene at the threshold.   11 AIR 1956 SC 294 = 1956 SCR 18 12 AIR 1963 SC 151 = (1963) 2 SCR 774 11 10. The   High   Court   then   proceeded   to   examine   the   next   point pertaining   to   the   validity   of   notifications   issued   under   Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act.  The challenge on this count was founded on the argument that the pre­requisite for issuing such notifications to   declare   a   highway   as   a   “National   Highway”,   is   that,   it   should be   a   pre­existing   State   highway.     For,   in   terms   of   powers conferred   in   Entry   23   of   List   I   (Union   List)   of   the   Seventh Schedule, the Parliament is empowered to make a law limited to declaring   an   existing   highway   to   be   a   “National   Highway”. Whereas,   the   State   legislature   has   exclusive   power   to   notify   a new   highway,   as   it   alone   is   competent   to   enact   laws   concerning roads,  bridges,  ferries  etc.  not   specified  in   List  I.   The  argument regarding stated notifications under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act being   violative   of   Articles   257(2)   and   254(4)   of   the   Constitution, has been referred to in paragraph 43 of the impugned judgment. To wit, only the State Government is empowered to declare a land or  a road to be a highway  in terms of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 13   and only such notified highway could be declared as a National Highway by the Central Government.  At any rate, the Central   Government   cannot   declare   an   open   land   passing 13 For short, “the 2001 Act” 12 through   the   green­fields   as   a   National   Highway   in   exercise   of power  under   Section   2(2)  of  the  1956  Act  and  consequently,  the power   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   cannot   be   invoked   in respect   of   such   open   lands.     The   High   Court   negatived   this argument of the writ petitioners by relying on the decision of the same   High   Court   in   B.   Nambirajan   &   Ors.   vs.   District Collector,   Kanyakumari   District,   Nagercoil   &   Ors. 14 ,   which had  followed  the  exposition  in   Jayaraman  &   Ors.   vs.   State  of Tamil   Nadu   &   Ors. 15 .     The   High   Court   opined   that   where   the Central Government is satisfied that for public purpose, any land is   required   for   building,   maintenance,   management   or   operation of a National Highway or part thereof, it may, by a notification in the official gazette in exercise of powers under Section 2(2) of the 1956   Act   issue   declaration   and   also   initiate   follow   up   action including  notification under Section 3A.   In substance, it is held that the Central Government had sufficient power to acquire even open   green­fields   land   for   the   purposes   of   construction   of National Highways or part thereof.  (This part of the decision has 14 CDJ 2018 MHC 2862 15 2014 SCCOnline Madras 430 13 been challenged by  the appellant in appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18586/2019). 11. The High Court then proceeded to examine point No. (iii) as to   whether   prior   environmental   clearance   was   imperative   before issuing   notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   and   at   what   stage   of acquisition   proceedings   such   environmental   clearance   ought   to be   made   pre­condition.     For   dealing   with   this   contention,   the High   Court   noticed   decision   of   the   Division   Bench   in   J. Parthiban & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 16  and of this Court in   Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board vs. C. Kenchappa & Ors. 17 .  The decision of the same High Court in M. Velu vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 18   was also noticed, as also,   the   notification   issued   by   the   Ministry   of   Environment, Forest and Climate Change 19 , dated 14.9.2006, to hold that prior environmental clearance/permission ought to have been obtained before issuance of notifications under Section 3A of the 1956 Act. The   High   Court   then   noted   the   principles   expounded   by   this Court   concerning   doctrine   of   “public   trust”   in   M.C.   Mehta   vs. 16 AIR 2008 Mad 203 17 (2006) 6 SCC 371 18 2010 SCCOnline Madras 2736 19 for short, “the MoEF” 14 Kamal   Nath   &   Ors. 20   and   M.C.   Mehta   vs.   Union   of   India   & Ors. 21 .  It also noticed another decision of this Court in   Raghbir Singh   Sehrawat   vs.   State   of   Haryana   &   Ors. 22   and   the exposition   of   Courts   in   the   United   States   of   America   in Commonwealth   of   Massachusetts   vs.   James   G.   Watt 23 , California   vs.   Watt 24 ,   Roosevelt   Lathan   and   Pearline Lathan, his wife, vs. John A. Volpe, Secretary of the United States   Department   of   Transportation 25 ,   Arlington   Coalition on   Transportation   vs.   John   A.   Volpe,   Secretary   of Transportation 26   and   Jones   vs.   District   of   Columbia 27 ,   and concluded   that   being   a   welfare   State,   the   authorities   while implementing   the   project   which,   in   the   opinion   of   the Government,   is   in   public   interest,   cannot   turn   a   nelson’s   eye   to reality  and   forget   that   protecting  agriculture   is   equally   in   public interest.     It   went   on   to   observe   that   the   interpretation   of   the 20 (1997) 1 SCC 388 21 (2004) 12 SCC 118 22 (2012) 1 SCC 792 23 716 F.2d.946 (1938) 24 683 F.2d 1253 (9 th Cir. 1982) 25 455 F.2d 1111 26 458 F.2d.1323 (1972) 27 499 F.2d.502 (1974) 15 relevant   provisions   in   Indian   context   should   lean   towards protecting  agriculturists and for  that reason, went on to observe that   if   the   Project   is   allowed   to   be   implemented   without   prior environmental   clearance,   it   would   be   a   gross   violation   of   the principle of sustainable development and in particular, provisions of Articles 19, 21, 46, 48A and 51A of the Constitution of India.   12. The High Court then proceeded to consider point Nos. (iv) to (vi)  together.   It  noted  the  contention   of  the  writ  petitioners  that until   the   Project   (Bharatmala   Pariyojna   –   Phase   I)   was   reviewed on 24.1.2018 and when the Minister of State – MoRTH replied to questions   in   Rajya   Sabha   about   new   highway   projects   under various   stages   including   Detailed   Project   Reports 28   stage   on 5.3.2018, there was no inkling about the proposed Project made applicable   to   stretch/section   –   C­K­S   (NC).   Whereas,   the stretch/section   identified   in   the   Project   was   –   C­M   (EC),   which was   completely   different.     Moreover,   there   was  no  tangible   basis before the  members  of  the  Committee  on   19.1.2018,  to  abruptly change   the   Chennai­Madurai   (Economic   Corridor)   ­   C­M   (EC) project   to   one   as   Chennai­Krishnagiri­Salem   (National   Corridor Efficiency   Improvement)   –   C­K­S   (NC)   or   as   green­field 28 f or short, “the DPR” 16 expressways.     No   document/material   had   been   produced   before the   Court   in   support   of   the   Minutes   recorded   on   19.1.2018   ­   to justify   C­K­S   (NC)   section.     If   the   authorities   intended   to   make such   a   change,   they   ought   to   have   obtained   prior approval/clearance   from   the   Public   Investment   Board 29   and   in­ principle approval of the Ministry of Finance and the Comptroller and   Auditor   General 30   in   that   regard.     No   audit   of   project formulation   by   CAG   was   done   nor   the   alignment   report   and approval   given   was   as   per   the   DPR   guidelines   of   the   MoRTH. Further,   the   Consultant   –   M/s.   Feedback   Infra   Pvt.   Ltd. appointed   for   the   original   Project   concerning   section   C­M   (EC), was continued for  the changed stretch/section without following the   tendering  process  as  predicated  by  the  MoRTH  and  the  Post Award   Portal   Guidelines   for   procurement,   preparation,   review and   approval   of   DPR   etc.     The   High   Court   noted   that   the appellants   herein   (State   authorities/NHAI/Union   of   India)   had supported their action regarding the changed/modified project on three grounds – (i) existing capacity is fully utilised; (ii) there will be   economic   development   in   general;   and   (iii)   there   will   be 29 For short, “the PIB” 30 for short, “the CAG” 17 reduction   in   carbon   foot   print,   as   the   length   of   subject stretch/section was at least 40 kms. less than the corresponding section falling under C­M (EC), as originally conceived.  The High Court   noted   that   the   Central   Government   had   not   filed   any counter affidavit on the subject matter.  The counter affidavit was filed   by   the   NHAI,   which   did   not   touch   upon   the   factual   matrix pointed   out   by   the   writ   petitioners   regarding   the   circumstances in   which   the   stretch/section   was   changed   to   C­K­S   (NC)   except asserting   that   it   was   a   policy   decision.     The   High   Court   was conscious of the fact that the issues raised by the writ petitioners were   quasi­technical   issues,   but   clarified   that   as   to   whether   the stretch­section   was   part   of   the   Project   (Bharatmala   Pariyojna   – Phase I) at the first instance, is a question of fact, which ought to have   been   answered   and   clarified   by   MoRTH.     The   Court,   after referring   to   the   original   Project,   noted   that   C­K­S   (NC)   section does   not   find   place   therein.     Instead,   C­M   (EC)   had   been mentioned at S.No. 19 of the original Project.  Further, there was nothing   on   record   to   indicate   that   the   changed   stretch/section had   been   approved   by   the   Cabinet   Committee   or   the   Public Private   Partnership   Appraisal   Committee 31 ,   as   mandated   in   the 31 for short, “the PPPAC” 18 guidelines   issued   by   the   CAG.     Thus,   the   High   Court   held   that the   decision   was   taken   by   the   Committee   in   hot   haste   and without   following   necessary   formalities   and   standard   operating procedures   specified   in   that   regard.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   no proper   scrutiny   of   all   relevant   facts   and   more   particularly, possible alternatives had been explored before a final decision to implement   such   a   major   project   was   taken   (costing   around Rs.10,000 crores, covering around 277 kms. and construction of a new National Highway traversing through green­fields).   At the same   time,   the   High   Court   rejected   the   allegation   about   the hidden   agenda   for   such   a   change   of   stretch/section   from   C­M (EC)   to   C­K­S   (NC).     The   High   Court   found   that   the   allegations regarding   hidden   agenda   to   favour   a   private   limited   company remained unsubstantiated.   13. The   High   Court   then   proceeded   to   examine   point   No.   (vii) regarding the continuation and appointment of the Consultant in respect   of   the   changed   stretch/section   i.e.   C­K­S   (NC),   although its   initial   appointment   was   in   respect   of   the   stretch/section originally   conceived   i.e.   C­M   (EC).     The   High   Court   recorded disparaging   and   condemnatory   remarks   in   reference   to 19 continuation   of   the   same   Consultant   for   the   changed stretch/section   without   following   proper   procedure.     The   High Court   also   accepted   the   criticism   regarding   Draft   Feasibility Report 32   prepared by  the Consultant being  bereft of any  credible material/information,   but   was   replete   with   mechanical reproduction   of   contents   resembling   with   some   other   projects. The   argument   of   the   Consultant   that   no   other   bidder (Consultant)   had   challenged   its   appointment   in   respect   of changed   stretch/section  ­   C­K­S   (NC),   came   to  be   rejected.     The High Court proceeded to hold that the authorities ought to have invited fresh tenders and offers from the qualified Consultants as per   the   standard   operating   procedure   and   ought   not   to   have continued   with   the   same   Consultant   for   the   entirely   different stretch/section – C­K­S (NC). 14. The   High   Court   then   considered   point   No.   (viii)   regarding impact assessment and in­principle approval to study the impact of   the   Project   on   flora   and   fauna.     The   High   Court   noticed   that the changed stretch/section was to pass through the forest areas to   the   extent   of   10   kms.,   yet   no   prior   permission   of   the   Forest Department had been obtained.   Further, no impact assessment 32 For short, “the DFR” 20 analysis was done before taking decision to change the project to C­K­S   (NC).     Also   that   in   the   name   of   the   subject   project,   100 trees were unauthorizedly felled from the lands in close proximity with   the   proposed   alignment   in   the   guise   of   allowing   some persons  to  remove  the  damaged  trees.    The  Court  also  took   into account the inaction of the authorities in some other locations in the neighbourhood, failing to remove encroachments in the forest area   and   the   firm   stand   of   the   Forest   Department   for   denying permission  to   erect   even   a   small   bridge   to   facilitate   the   villagers to   cross   Moiyar   river   to   reach   their   residence.     Taking   judicial notice   of   that   fact,   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   assume   that   it was most unlikely  that  permission  will be given  for  construction of a new National Highway passing through the forest area.  This aspect   had   not   been   seriously   considered   by   the   appropriate authority.     The   decision,   however,   was   based   on   a   report   which was prepared mechanically  on the basis of geo­mapping without physical   verification   on   site.     Similarly,   the   proposed   alignment was   without   collecting   data   of   Passenger   Carrying   Units 33   or ascertaining   the   correctness   of   data   (referred   to   in   the   report) collated   from   the   toll   plazas.     At   the   end,   the   High   Court   noted 33 for short, “the PCUs” 21 that the procedure adopted by the NHAI in asking the Consultant to   carry   out   the   work,   which   was   never   the   scope   of   the   bid document,   by   an   oral   arrangement,   was   unacceptable.     It   then observed   that   if  the   Central   Government   was   still  of   the  opinion that   the   subject   project   concerning   section   –   C­K­S   (NC)   is required   to   be   implemented,   then   it   must   comply   with   the required   formalities   of   obtaining   requisite   environmental   and forest   clearances/permissions,   after   undertaking   comprehensive study of the environmental impact.   15. The   High   Court   then   proceeded   to   examine   point   Nos.   (ix) and (x) together and concluded that a fair procedure ought to be adopted and the fact that there would be delay if such procedure is   followed,   will   be   of   no   avail.     Prior   environmental   clearance must be obtained after a public hearing is held, before the project is   implemented.     The   High   Court   then   went   on   to   examine   the remaining   points  for  consideration   separately;   and   concluded  as follows: ­  “101.  For   all   the   above   reasons,   we   are   of   the   considered view   that   the   project   highway   as   conceived   and   sought to   be   implemented   is   vitiated   on   several   grounds   as mentioned   above   and   consequently,   the   notifications issued   for   acquisition   of   lands   under   Section   3A(1)   are liable to be quashed . 22 102.  In   the   result,   the   Writ   Petitions   are   allowed   and   the land acquisition proceedings are quashed. 103.  In   view   of   the   above,   Crl.O.P.   No.   22714   of   2018   is closed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. There shall be no order as to costs. 104.  During the pendency of these Writ  Petitions, when we heard   the   cases,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   land   owners pointed   out   that   the   revenue   records   were   mutated   and stood   transferred   as  Government   lands.   This   had   happened even   much   prior   to   issuance   of   the   Notification   under Section   3D   of   the   Act.   We   had   pointed   out   that   such   an action   could   not   have   been   initiated,   as,   by   issuance   of   a Notification   under   Section   3A   of   the   Act,   the   Government only conveyed its intention to acquire the lands. 105.  The  learned  Government   Pleader   sought   to  explain  by contending that those entries were only temporary in nature and   that   in   the   event   of   the   lands   get   excluded   from   the project, the entries would stand reverted back. 106.  We   do   not   agree   with   the   said   stand   taken   by   the learned Government Pleader at that juncture itself.  Now that we   had   allowed   the   writ   petitions,   all   the   entries   in   the revenue records, which stood mutated, shall be reversed in   the   names   of   the   respective   land   owners   and   fresh orders   be   issued   and   communicated   to   the   respective land   owners   within   two   weeks   thereafter.   This   direction shall   be   complied   with   within   a   period   of   eight   weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment .” (emphasis supplied) 16. The High Court in the impugned judgment also took note of other   decisions 34 ,   presumably   referred   to   by   the   parties   during 34 State of U.P. & Ors. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751; Col. A.S. Sangwan vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1545; Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd. & Ors., (1986) 1 SCC 264; Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293; State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Vs. A. Mohammed Yousef & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 224; Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Raj Kumar Johri & Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 328; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596; 23 argument   before   it.     However,   in   the   impugned   judgment,   no analysis thereof is found. THE CHALLENGE 17. Aggrieved,   three   sets   of   appeals   have   been   filed   before   this Court.     First,   by   the   NHAI,   second   by   the   Union   of   India   and State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. vs. L. Krishnan & Ors., (1996) 1 SCC 250; Secretary, Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers, Government of India vs. Cipla Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 1; Delhi Development Authority & Anr. Vs. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 672; Sooraram Pratap Reddy & Ors. vs. District Collector, Ranga Reddy District & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 552; Bondu Ramaswamy & Ors. vs. Bangalore Development Authority & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 129; K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1; Union of India vs. Kushala Shetty & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 69; Alaknanda Hydropower Company Limited vs. Anuj Joshi & Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 769; Jal Mahal Resorts Private Ltd. vs. K.P. Sharma & Ors., (2014) 8 SCC 804; Rajendra Shankar Shukla & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., (2015) 10 SCC 400; The Industrial Development and Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1989 Bom 156; O. Fernandes vs. Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board & Ors., (2005) 1 L.W. 13; George Joseph and Ors. vs. Union of India, 2008 (2) KLJ 196; New Kattalai Canal and Aerie Pasana Vivasayigal Welfare Association vs. Union of India & Ors., (2012) 1 MLJ 207; Madan Malji Kambli & Ors. vs. State of Goa & Ors., 2012 SCCOnline Bom 694; and Prithvi Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. – of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP 689/2012, dated 16.5.2013. 24 third, by the land owner(s) in reference to rejection of challenge to notifications   under   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act.     The   grounds urged in the concerned appeals are more or less recapitulation of the   points   canvassed   before   the   High   Court   and   exhaustively dealt   with   in   the   impugned   judgment.     Besides   the   oral arguments, the concerned parties have filed written submissions as per the liberty given to them by this Court upon conclusion of the   oral   arguments   through   video   conferencing   (virtual   Court hearing). 18. The   arguments  were   opened   by   Mr.   Tushar   Mehta,   learned Solicitor   General   of   India.     The   gist   of   the   points   urged   by   him can be stated thus.  Writ Petitions filed to assail the notifications under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   including   Section   2(2)   were premature.     In   that,   the   question   whether   the   acquisition   is   for public   purpose   is   a   matter   to   be   dealt   with   by   the   appropriate authority in light of the objections filed by the aggrieved persons in   response   to   the   notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956 Act,   which   is   merely   an   expression   of   intent   to   acquire   the specified   land   for   construction   of   national   highway   under   the Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna – Phase I).  He would contend that 25 the High Court also committed manifest error in concluding that such   notifications   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   could   be issued   only   after   prior   environmental   and   forest clearances/permissions   are   granted   in   that   behalf.     The   High Court   has   misread   and   misapplied   the   decision   of   this   Court   in support   of   that   view.     It   is   urged   that   the   acquisition   process initiated   under   the   1956   Act,   which   is   a   self­contained   code,   is completely   independent   and   cannot   be   fusioned   with   the formalities   and   procedure   to   be   complied   with   before commencement   of   the   Project   construction   work,   in   reference   to the environment or forest laws.  The appellants – NHAI and MoEF had   unambiguously   stated   before   the   High   Court   and   reiterate before  this   Court  that   all   formalities  will  be   complied   with   in   its letter   and   spirit   before   the   construction   work   of   the   stated national   highway   actually   commences.     It   is   essential   to authoritatively decide as to at what stage the appellant – NHAI is required   to   obtain   the   environmental   or   forest   clearance   as   per the   extant   laws   including   the   notification   and   Office Memorandum   dated   14.9.2006   and   7.10.2014,   respectively,   of the   MoEF.     The   applicable   notification/Office   Memorandum explicitly   excludes   the   need   for   a   prior   environmental   clearance 26 for   “securing   the   land”.     It   is   urged   that   prior   environmental clearances   have   been   ordained   before   any   construction   work   of specified   project   including   for   preparation   of   land   by   the   project management   (except   for   securing   the   land)   is   started   on   the project.     Indeed,   before   commencement   of   such   work   or preparation, as the case may be, the concerned agency is obliged to  make application  in Form­1.   That  may  be possible only  after identification   of   prospective   site   for   the   Project   and/or   activities to which the application relates.  The identification of site for the construction   of   national   highways   becomes   possible   only   upon completing   the   process   of   public   hearing   consequent   to publication   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act.     It   is   then   urged that   the   High   Court   justly   rejected   the   argument   of   the   land owners   that   open   lands   cannot   be   acquired   for   construction   of national highways or that national highway can be declared only in   reference   to   an   existing   highway.     He   submits   that   there   is ample   power   bestowed   in   the   appellant   –   NHAI   and   the   Central Government   in   particular,   in   terms   of   the   1956   Act   and   the National   Highway   Authority   of  India   Act,   1988 35   to   acquire   open land for the purposes of construction of national highway, as may 35 f or short, “the 1988 Act” 27 be   declared   under   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act.     These legislations   have   been   enacted   well   within   the   legislative competence  of   the   Parliament   being   subject   specified   in   List   I   of the   Seventh   Schedule.     Similarly,   the   argument   of   notifications being in violation of constitutional provisions relating to executive powers is misplaced.  On the other hand, the notifications issued under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act and the follow up notifications issued   under   Section   3A   of   the   same   Act,   proposing   to   acquire the subject lands, were fully compliant of the legal requirements. No   violation   of   any   nature   can   be   attributed   to   the   issuance   of these notifications including that the same were not in good faith. He submits that the question whether the subject land referred to in   the   notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956   Act   is required for public purpose or otherwise can be and ought to be answered   in   reference   to   the   objections   taken   by   the   land owners/aggrieved   persons   during   public   hearing.     The   authority considering  such objection can also consider  the question about the viability and feasibility of the Project.  He would contend that the land acquisition proceedings under the 1956 Act and grant of environmental clearance are two different and distinct processes. They   operate   in   different   fields.     The   High   Court,   therefore, 28 completely   misled   itself   in   confusing   the   issue   by   holding   that prior   environmental   and   forest   clearances   ought   to   be   obtained even   before   issuing   notifications   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956 Act.  The High Court also completely glossed over the mandate of Section 3D of the 1956 Act, predicating that the final declaration thereunder   ought   to   be   issued   within   one   year   from   the   date   of publication   of   notifications   under   Section   3A,   else   the commenced   process   would   be   deemed   to   have   lapsed.     The provisions such as Sections 3A to 3J of the 1956 Act, have been enacted   by   way   of   amendment   Act   of   1997   to   ensure   speedy conclusion   of   acquisition   proceedings   and   prompt   execution   of highway projects.   By interpretative process, the High Court has in   fact,   created   an   artificial   barrier   for   issue   of   Section   3D notification   and   has   re­written   the   amended   provisions   of   1997. He   would   submit   that   the   principle   expounded   by   the   American Courts   have   no   bearing   in   the   context   of   the   express   statutory scheme propounded under the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act or for that   matter,   under   the   environmental   and   forest   laws   including the   notifications   issued   thereunder.     The   latter   enactments (environmental/forest laws) would get triggered when the project work was to actually commence.  In other words, execution of the 29 Project could  commence  only  after  such  clearances  are  in place. It   is   contended   that   the   High   Court   proceeded   to   examine   the need   and   viability   of   proposed   C­K­S   (NC)   sector   on   erroneous basis   and   on   assumptions.     It   proceeded   to   examine   the comparative   merits   of   different   routes,   which   cannot   be countenanced   as   it   is   beyond   the   scope   of   judicial   review.     As   a matter   of   fact,   the   High   Court   has   interfered   with   the   policy decision   of   the   competent   authority   (the   MoRTH)   dated 19.1.2018, completely overlooking the discretion bestowed in the Ministry   vide   Project   (Bharatmala   Pariyojna   –   Phase   I)   itself, empowering   it   to   replace/substitute   upto   15%   length   of   24,800 kms.   of   Phase­I   of   the   Project   by   other   suitable stretches/sections.  The sector of C­K­S (NC) was finalized by the Committee   in   the   meeting   dated   19.1.2018   for   the   reasons recorded   in   the   minutes,   including   the   general   principles governing development of national highways and also reckoned in the   Project.     It   is   contended   that   the   High   Court   ought   not   to have   interfered   with   the   judicious   and   well­considered   decision taken by the competent authority.  He would contend that even if the   section/project   finalised   vide   minutes   dated   19.1.2018   was not   referred   to   in   the   original   Project,   however,   as   the   decision 30 was   taken   by   the   competent   authority   about   the replacement/substitution to the extent permissible, it forms part of Phase I of Bharatmala Pariyojna (the Project) ­ in place of the originally  envisaged sector  of C­M (EC).   The change was for  the betterment  of  the area covered under  the  Project  and  would  pay dividends   in   posterity   at   the   micro   levels   in   different   ways   of providing   access   and   new   opportunities   and   strengthening   the national   road   network   at   the   macro   level.     As   regards   the observation   made   in   reference   to   the   Consultant   appointed   for the   subject   Project,   it   is   urged   that   the   same   was   completely misplaced   and   in   any   case,   extraneous   for   answering   the challenge regarding validity of notifications under Section 3A(1) of the   1956   Act   or   for   that   matter,   Section   2(2)   of   the   same   Act issued by the competent authority.   As a matter of fact, no relief was claimed in the concerned writ petitions filed before the High Court   against   the   Consultant   nor   its   appointment   order   issued by the competent authority was under challenge.  The Consultant was   duly   appointed   for   the   stated   Project   to   be   paid   on   per kilometre basis, vide contract dated 22.2.2018.   Indisputably, no financial   loss   will   be   caused   to   public   exchequer   as   the Consultant fees is fixed on kilometre basis only.  For, the subject 31 stretch/section   [C­K­S   (NC)]   involves   only   277   kms.   as   against the stretch/section originally conceived [C­M (EC)] of around 350 kms.     Thus,   it   would   entail   in   less   consultant   fees   than   was envisaged  for   the   originally   conceived  section   for   the   Project.     In substance,   it   is   urged   that   the   High   Court   was   persuaded   to undertake   a   roving   inquiry   despite   the   official   record   indicating that necessary formalities and procedure has been complied with before   declaration   of   C­K­S   (NC)   section   as replacement/substitution of the originally conceived section, and duly   approved   by   the   competent   authority.     The   High   Court should   have   dismissed   the   writ   petitions.     In   support   of   his submissions,   he   has   relied   on   the   decisions   of   this   Court   in Akhil   Bharat   Goseva   Sangh   vs.   State   of   A.P.   &   Ors. 36 , Sooraram   Pratap   Reddy   (supra),   K.T.   Plantation   Pvt.   Ltd. (supra),   Kushala   Shetty   (supra)   and   Somawanti   (supra);     He has   also   invited  our   attention   to   decisions   of   Punjab  &   Haryana High Court in   Diljit Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 37 and   of   the   Madras   High   Court   in   B.   Nambirajan   (supra)   and Jayaraman  (supra). 36 (2006) 4 SCC 162 37 2010 SCC Online P&H 11847 32 19. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel appearing for the land   owners/aggrieved   persons,   who   had   filed   writ   petitions before   the   High   Court,   urged   that   notifications   under   Section 3A(1)   of   the   1956   Act   issued   without   obtaining   prior environmental   clearance   from   the   MoEF   in   terms   of   the notification dated 14.9.2006 are void and bad in law.   Moreover, as   per   the   recommendation   of   the   Environment   Assessment Committee 38 ,   no   environment   clearance   could   be   given   to   the subject   section   (Chennai­Salem)   of   the   Project   and   in   absence thereof, it must follow that no construction will be permissible on the   specified   lands   and   thus   it   cannot   be   used   for   the   stated public   purpose   within   the   meaning   of   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956 Act.  On this count alone, no interference with the decision of the High Court in setting aside the notifications under Section 3A of the 1956 Act is necessary.  According to him, the High Court has justly   interpreted   the   sweep   of   notification   dated   14.9.2006, which   has   a   statutory   force   and   mandates   that   prior clearance/permission   ought   to   be   taken   before   the commencement   of   acquisition   process   including   issuing notifications   under   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956   Act.     In   that,   the 38 For short, “the EAC” 33 satisfaction   reached   by   the   competent   authority   that   the   land referred   to   in   such   notification   is   required   for   public   purpose, could  be   taken   forward   only   upon  grant   of   environmental/forest clearances.     He   has   placed   reliance   on   the   exposition   of   this Court   in   Karnataka   Industrial   Areas   Development   Board (supra) and of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in  M. Velu (supra),   to   buttress   his   submission.     He   then   submits   that   the competent   authority   under   the   1956   Act   and   the   1988   Act   are different.     Thus,   the   application   for   environmental   clearance cannot   be   pursued   by   the   competent   authority   under   the   1956 Act,   as   in   law,   such   application   ought   to   be   made   by   the competent   authority   under   the   1988   Act   before   the commencement   of   the   acquisition   process.     In   other   words,   the competent authority under the 1956 Act cannot hasten issuance of   notification   under   Section   3A(1)   in   anticipation.     He   submits that   harmonious   reading   of   the   provisions   of   the   1956   Act   and the 1988 Act go to show that the competent authority under the 1988   Act   (NHAI)   is   expected   to   initiate   the   process   by undertaking   survey   of   the   land   and   identifying   the   land   under Section   16(2)   of   the   1988   Act;   and   then   submit   application   for environment/forest   clearance.     Further,   only   after   securing 34 essential   permission(s)   therefor,   the   notification   under   Section 3A(1) of the 1956 Act could be issued by the Central Government to   commence   the   acquisition   process   of   such   identified   land. This   course   is   not   only   desirable,   but   should   be   made compulsory   by   interpretative   process   ­   in   absence   of   any provision in the 1956 Act authorising the Central Government to return the unutilised land (due to refusal of essential clearances), to the erstwhile owner (unlike the provisions in the Right to Fair Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition, Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013 39 ).     He   would   submit that   the   role   of   the   MoRTH,   the   MoEF   and   the   NHAI   is   well defined.     In   the   alternative,   it   is   submitted,   that   the   authority under   the   1956   Act   may   be   permitted   to   continue   with   the acquisition   process   until   the   stage   of   notification   under   Section 3D(1)   of   the   1956   Act   and   to   issue   such   notification   only   upon grant of permission/clearance by the competent authority under the environment and forest laws.  This is because upon issuance of   notification   under   Section   3D(1)   of   the   1956   Act,   the   land would   vest   absolutely   in   the   Central   Government   free   from   all encumbrances.     For   that   purpose,   the   expression   “shall” 39 f or short, the “the 2013 Act” 35 occurring in Section 3D(1) of the 1956 Act be construed as “may” and by interpretative process, liberal meaning be ascribed to the proviso in Section 3D(3) of the 1956 Act.   Such  approach  would preserve the interest of the land owners, as well as, effectuate the public purpose underlying the acquisition process. 20. Even   Mr.   Sanjay   Parikh,   learned   senior   counsel   espousing the   cause   of   the   land   owners   and   aggrieved   persons   would submit   that   the   conclusion   reached   by   the   High   Court   in   the impugned judgment that the acquisition process in question was vitiated because of the reasons noted in the judgment, needs no interference.  He would submit that the subject section i.e. C­K­S (NC) was not part of the original Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna ­ Phase I) and no tangible reason is forthcoming as to why such a change   was   approved   by   the   competent   authority,   especially when the State Government was keen on developing the existing C­M   (EC)   section   as   a   priority   project.     He   submits   that   the selection   of   C­K­S   (NC)   section   is   arbitrary   and   violative   of guidelines/rules for selection of a national highway.  Further, the stated   section   traverses   through   the   green­fields   and   the agricultural   lands   including   the   forest   area   to   the   extent   of   10 36 kms.  Hence, the High Court was justified in concluding that the decision to change the section from  C­M (EC) to C­K­S (NC) was flawed and unsustainable.   The selection of the said section was in violation of the original Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna – Phase I)   itself,   which   was   based   on   scientific   survey   and   research envisaging   development   of   C­M   (EC)   section.     The   Project conceived   after   scientific   process   had   the   approval   of   CCEA   and the   authorities   specified   in   ‘Section   E’   of   the   original   Project (Bharatmala   Pariyojna)   document.     It   mandates   that   CCEA approval is mandatory for projects involving expenditure of more than Rs.2,000 crores in respect of Public­Private Partnership and if   it   is   an   Engineering   Procurement   &   Construction   project   – involving   expenditure   of   more   than   Rs.1,000   crores.     No   such approval   has   been   obtained   in   respect   of   the   subject   changed section/project,   although   it   would   involve   expenditure   upto Rs.10,000   crores.     Moreover,   the   proposed   change   would   be permissible only if the State was ready to bear at least 50% cost of   the   land   acquisition.     Even   that   condition   is   not   fulfilled. Similarly,   no   survey   of   PCUs   was   undertaken   in   respect   of   the subject   section   unlike   it   was   done   in   respect   of   the   C­M   (EC) section.     No   justification   is   forthcoming   as   to   why   C­M   (EC) 37 section has been completely shelved by the authorities concerned in terms of the minutes dated 19.1.2018.   As per  the prescribed norms   in   the   Project,   a   new   green­field   highway   is   to   be constructed   only   when   the   PCUs   of   the   existing   road   exceeds 50,000.     In   the   present   case,   as   per   the   detailed   origin– destination   studies,   the   combined   PCUs   of   the   three   routes between   Chennai­Salem   do   not   meet   the   threshold   of   50,000 PCUs.     Despite   that,   the   change   recorded   in   the   minutes   dated 19.1.2018   predicates   construction   of   highway   through   green­ fields   and   that   too   without   prior   environmental   approvals therefor.     It   is   clear   from   the   record   that   the   authorities   were aware   of   the   need   to   obtain   CCEA   approval   when   they   changed the scope of the Project from brown­field expansion to green­field section between Chennai­Salem.   The said change is in violation of the NHAI Works Manual, 2006 40 .   It is in breach of paragraph 1.8.1, which is to be followed uniformally by all units of the NHAI and   can   be   modified   only   by   the   Chairman,   after   recording reasons.   No modification in the application of the NHAI Manual in respect of the Project is done.  Similarly, paragraph 2.7 thereof postulates   that   a   package   scheme   such   as   the   present   one, 40 for short, “the NHAI Manual” 38 should   receive   approval   of   the   Central   Government   and individual   projects   will   be   approved   after   the   DPR   and   cost estimates become available.  Further, no fresh tender was issued by   the   NHAI   for   appointment   of   new   Consultant   despite   the change of scope of the earlier Project.   The Consultant, who was appointed for the C­M (EC) section, was entrusted with the work of changed section i.e. C­K­S (NC).  The issue regarding improper appointment   of   the   Consultant   has   bearing   on   the   challenge   to the   subject   section   of   the   Project   being   illegal.     Reliance   was placed   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   K.   Lubna   &   Ors.   vs. Beevi & Ors. 41 .  It has been held therein that question of law can be   raised   at   any   stage,   as   long   as   factual   foundation   had   been laid.   This decision is pressed into service to support the finding and   observations   recorded   by   the   High   Court   concerning   the improper appointment of Consultant for the said section i.e. C­K­ S (NC).  His argument was focussed on the improper appointment of   the   Consultant   for   the   subject   section   of   C­K­S   (NC)   and supported   the   observations   made   by   the   High   Court   in   the impugned   judgment   in   that   regard.     To   that   end,   reliance   is 41 (2020) 2 SCC 524 39 placed   on   Shrilekha   Vidyarthi   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   U.P.   & Ors. 42 .     In   substance,   it   is   argued   that   the   action   of   the competent   authority   is   replete   with   undue   haste   and   non­ application   of   mind   besides   being   in   violation   of   the   standard operating   procedures   applicable   to   such   Project   including   of   not obtaining   prior   environmental/forest   clearances   before   issuing notifications under Section 3A of the 1956 Act.   Such clearances are necessary at the stage of appraisal under notification of 2006, as   the   Project   pertains   to   green­fields   and   being   a   category­A Project.     The   learned   counsel   elaborately   took   us   through   the procedure   to   be   adopted   by   the   Expert   Appraisal   Committee before according in­principle approval for the project.   He invited our   attention   to   the   MoEF   Office   Memorandum   (O.M.)   dated 7.10.2014   to   buttress   his   argument   that   all   environmental clearances   are   site­specific   and   are   required   to   be   obtained beforehand.   He would submit that only after such permission is granted,   the   acquisition   process   be   commenced   by   issuing notification under  Section  3A of  the 1956 Act in respect of such lands   for   construction   of   national   highway.     Alternatively,   he submits   that   the   Court   may   also   consider   exempting/excluding 42 (1991) 1 SCC 212 40 the   time   taken   in   obtaining   environmental   clearance   from   the period of one year specified in Section 3D(3) of the 1956 Act.  He has highlighted the points taken note of by the High Court in the impugned   judgment   and   supported   the   conclusion   reached   by the High Court in setting aside notifications under Section 3A(1) of   the   1956   Act.     The   learned   counsel   had   relied   upon   the decisions   of   this   Court   in   Karnataka   Industrial   Areas Development   Board   (supra)   and   State   of   Uttaranchal   vs. Balwant   Singh   Chaufal   &   Ors. 43 .     Similarly,   of   the   Madras High   Court   in   M.   Velu   (supra),   of   the   Punjab   &   Haryana   High Court   in   Diljit   Singh   (supra)   and   of   the   American   Courts   in Commonwealth   of   Massachusetts   (supra),   California   (supra), Roosevelt   Lathan   and   Pearline   Lathan,   his   wife   (supra), Arlington   Coalition   on   Transportation   (supra)   and   Jones (supra) .   21. Mr.   Nikhil   Nayyar,   learned   senior   counsel   espousing   the cause   of   land   owners/aggrieved   persons   adopted   the aforementioned   arguments   and   also   supported   the   conclusion reached   by   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment.     Most   of 43 (2010) 3 SCC 402 41 the   points   made   during   his   oral   submissions   have   been articulated  by  him   in his  written  submissions.   He submits  that the  impugned notifications under  Section  3A as issued, have, in any   case,   lapsed   by   operation   of   law.     On   merits,   he   contends that the original Project including C­M (EC) section, had received approval   of   the   CCEA.     However,   the   changed   section   i.e.   C­K­S (NC) had no such prior approval of the CCEA.  There is nothing in the   Project   document   to   authorise   swapping   of   project/section, as done in the present case in the guise of discretion of 15%.  He submits   that   reliance   placed   on   the   original   approved   project enabling exercise of discretion by the Minister­RTH is completely misplaced.   That discretion cannot be invoked for provisioning a completely   different   project/section,   as   in   this   case   between Chennai­Salem,   and   moreso   when   admittedly,   three   alternative routes   are   already   available.     He   invited   our   attention   to   the specific   grounds   articulated   in   the   writ   petition(s)   filed   by   the aggrieved   persons   before   the   High   Court,   pointing   out   gross defects   and   flaws   in   regard   to   the   changed   section.     He   would contend that the authorities cannot walk away with the argument of   policy   decision   and   the   limited   scope   for   intervention   by   the Courts   in   that   regard.     He   invited   our   attention   to   Bengaluru 42 Development   Authority   vs.   Sudhakar   Hegde   &   Ors. 44   to support   the   argument   that   notification   under   Section   3D   of   the 1956 Act can be issued after appraisal for grant of environmental clearance   under   the   notification,   2006.     He   submits   that   this interpretation   would   be   consistent   with   the   scheme   of   the   1956 Act,   as   hearing   of   objection   under   Section   3C   is   a   mandatory requirement and must precede the declaration under Section 3D. In the alternative, he submits that notification under Section 3D should   not   be   issued   until   environmental   and   forest   clearances are   obtained   in   respect   of   the   subject   project.     He   submits   that the   decision   in   Diljit   Singh   (supra)   does   not   enunciate   the correct legal position.  On the other hand, the requirement of law is   that   the   environmental   clearance   must   be   obtained beforehand.   He submits that the Punjab & Haryana High Court did   not   have   the   benefit   of   MoEF   O.M.   dated   7.10.2014,   which makes   the   position   amply   clear   about   the   stage   of   obtaining environmental   clearance.     He   had   relied   on   paragraph   100   of Karnataka   Industrial   Areas   Development   Board   (supra)   and also   the   High   Court   decision   in   M.   Velu   (supra).     He   also contended   that   the   subject   section   of   the   Project   has   not   been 44 2020 SCCOnline SC 328 43 sanctioned   by   the   competent   authority,   as   required   in   terms   of the   NHAI   Manual.     He   submits   that   the   change   of   section   is without any tangible basis and is not supported by data required for justifying such change.  The change is brought about contrary to   the   guidelines   issued   by   the   MoRTH.     In   substance,   the argument   is   that   the   change   has   been   effected   hastily   and without application of mind, as has been justly concluded by the High Court.  He submits that no interference with the High Court decision is warranted. 22. The   next   in   line   to   argue   was   Ms.   Anita   Shenoy,   learned senior   counsel.     She   espouses   the   cause   of   the   land owners/aggrieved   persons.     She   has   supported   the   conclusion reached   by   the   High   Court   and   also   adopted   the   submissions made by learned counsel preceding her.   She has commended to us   that   environmental   clearances   must   precede   the commencement   of   acquisition   process.     That   is   because   the   EIA process   involves   steps   such   as   details   of   alternative   sites examined,   status   of   clearances,   details   of   forest   land   and   the physical changes to topography, land use, change in water bodies because of construction and operation of the project, etc.   Public 44 consultation   also   highlights   the   impact   of   the   project   on   the people in the area and on the environment.  Only on the basis of such empirical data, an informed decision can be taken for grant of environmental clearance.   This process ought not to be viewed as   any   impediment   in   the   project,   such   as   construction   of national   highways,   but   as   a   tool  for   taking   just   and   appropriate decision   including   to   uphold   the   doctrines   of   “public   trust”, “precautionary principle” and “sustainable development”.  That is the   requirement   also   under   the   notification   of   2006   and   MoEF O.M.   dated   7.10.2014.     Reliance   has   been   placed   by   her   on Hanuman   Laxman   Aroskar   vs.   Union   of   India 45   to   highlight the   significance   of   notification,   2006.     She   has   also   placed reliance on the exposition in   Kamal Nath   (supra) to submit that the   Courts   are   free   to   examine   whether   the   project   fulfils   the requirements   of   good   faith,   for   the   public   good   and   in   public interest   and   does   not   encroach   upon   the   natural   resources   and convert   them   into   private   ownership.     According   to   her, notifications   under   Section   3A   have   been   justly   quashed   at   the threshold   stage   itself   because   of   serious   errors   in   the   decision­ making   process,   which   had   vitiated   the   entire   process   and   not 45 (2019) 15 SCC 401 45 merely   because   of   lack   of   prior   environmental   clearance.     She also   highlighted   the   circumstances   emanating   from   the   record, which   according   to   her,   clearly   go   to   show   that   the   change   of section   was   a   hasty   decision   and   not   backed   by   any study/enquiries   which   ordinarily   ought   to   precede   such declaration.     In   that,   the   project   stretches   under   the   original Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna – Phase I) had been identified after a   thorough   and   scientific   exercise,   carried   out   on   the   basis   of detailed   origin­destination   studies,   freight   flow   projections   and verification   of   the   identified   infrastructure   gaps   through   geo­ mapping,   using   data   from   Bhaskaracharya   Institute   for   Space Applications  and  Geo­Informatics  (BISAG),  as  well  as from   other sources, and also integration of economic corridors with ongoing projects under the NHDP and infrastructure asymmetry in major corridors.     For   changing   such   a   well­informed   decision,   very strong   evidence   ought   to   have   been   produced   by   the   authority deciding   to   change   the   same   in   the   short   span   (i.e.   24.10.2017, when the Cabinet had approved the Phase I of the original Project consisting of section C­M (EC); and the decision of MoRTH dated 19.1.2018   concerning   C­K­S   (NC)   section).     Not   even   DPR   was placed   before   the   MoRTH   when   such   decision   regarding   change 46 was   taken   on   19.1.2018.     Further,   approval   accorded   by   the Cabinet/CCEA   for   the   changed   section   of   the   Project,   valued   at more   than   Rs.500   crores   was   not   forthcoming.     In   fact,   the Central   Government   did   not   file   any   counter   affidavit   to   justify why the change was adopted in the meeting dated 19.1.2018.   It merely   relied   upon   the   counter   affidavit   of   NHAI   wherein   it   is asserted  that  it was  a policy  decision.   The  learned  counsel also commented upon the manner in which the Consultant appointed for   the   earlier   section   of   the   Project   was   continued   for   the changed   section   without   following   necessary   fresh   tendering procedure.     She   then   commented   about   the   DPR   submitted   by the Consultant consisting of inaccurate and plagiarised contents. She   submitted   that   good   quality   roads   are   essential   for development of the area and all concerned, but there are already three   existing   highways   between   Chennai­Salem.     Resultantly, the   new   section/project   passing   through   the   fertile   agricultural land   between   Chennai­Salem   was   bound   to   impact   the environment   and   also   the   livelihood   of   the   land   owners/farmers without   any   tangible   advantage   or   gains   accruing   to   them. Judicial   review   of   such   a   decision   was   imperative   and   has   been rightly struck down by the High Court. 47 23. The   next   learned   counsel   espousing   the   cause   of   land owner(s)/aggrieved person(s) is Mr. Kabilan Manoharan.   He had appeared in the cross­appeal filed to challenge the opinion of the High   Court   rejecting   assail   to   the   notifications   issued   under Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act,   declaring   NH­179A   and   NH­179B traversing   through   non­existent   roads   and   on   open   green­field lands.     He   would   contend   that   the   High   Court   failed   to comprehend the core aspects agitated by the writ petitioners.  He has articulated the ground as follows: ­   “…..   That,   the   Petitioner   had   sought   to   Quash   the   1 st Respondent   MoRTH’s   Sec.   2(2)   Declaration   dated   01­03­ 2018   under   the   National   Highways   Act,   1956   on   the GROUND     that   it   was   issued   without   an   enabling   provision of law, as Sec. 2(2) of the National Highways Act, 1956 only enables   an   existing   Highway   to   be   declared   as   a   National Highway   and   thus   the   G.O.   was   issued   in   “Arbitrariness” and   in   violation   of   Art.   14   of   the   Constitution   and   which   is ultra vires   the Constitution derived Legislative Powers of the Union (w.r.t. Roads under  Entry 23 of the Union List  in the VII  Schedule  under  Art.  246  seen  in contract  with  Entry  13 of the State List) and also  ultra vires  the Constitution derived Executive Powers of the Union (w.r.t. Roads under Art. 257).” And again: ­ “(10) That, the Petitioner will now go on with submissions to demonstrate how the Policy Decision of the Respondents will be subject to Judicial Review given the evident facts that the Sec. 2(2) Declaration of new National Highway NH­179B over Non­existent   road   and   on   plain   land,   that   which   is   a Decision/Declaration in furtherance of the Policy Decision to implement the Chennai­Salem Expressway Project, is in fact A. Issued   in   violation   of   Constitutional   Provisions relating   to   Legislative   Powers   of   the   Union   w.r.t. 48 Roads   as   seen   from   Entry   23   of   the   Union   List   in the   VII   Schedule   under   Art.   246   seen   in   contracts with Entry 13 of the State List B. Issued   in   violation   of   Constitutional   Provisions relating   to   Executive   Powers   of   the   Union   w.r.t. Roads as seen from Art. 257 C. Issued in violation of  Statutory  Provisions  (i.e.  Sec. 2(2) of National Highways Act, 1956) D. Issued by the Delagatee (1 st   Respondent MoRTH) in an   Act   beyond   the   delegated   powers   (without   all required   PIB   approval,   PPPAC   Approval,   CCEA Clearance that was mandated) E. Issued   in   violation   of   a   larger   Policy   (Bharatmala Pariyojna Phase – I; “Bharatmala­I”) F. Issued without any demonstrable Public Purpose as evident   from   the   instances   of   Non­application   of mind over available data on  (i) Characteristics of the project (ii) Traffic Analysis (iii) Study of Alternatives (iv) Economic Analysis (v) Financial Analysis (vi) Sensitivity Analysis (vii) Burden to Exchequer (viii) Benefits   to   existing   Tollway Concessionaires (ix) Development tied to new Roads (x) Carbon Foot­print  reduction from  cheaper ways” These   salient   points   have   been   elaborated   in   the   written submissions   drawn   by   Mr.   Kabilan  Manoharan,   learned   counsel assisted by Mr. P. Soma Sundaram, Advocate­on­Record.   In his submission,   this   Court   should   be   slow   in   interfering   with   the conclusion   recorded   by   the   High   Court   in   reference   to notifications under Section 3A of the 1956 Act.   Learned counsel 49 though has supported the conclusion reached by the High Court, yet   assailed   the   adverse   findings   and   conclusion   in   reference   to the   impugned   notifications   under   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act. According   to   him,   the   challenge   to   the   stated   notifications   had been answered without reference to the points specifically raised by   the   writ   petitioners.     The   same   were   only   adverted   to   in paragraph 43 of the impugned judgment while dealing with point No. (ii).   He would submit that the High Court ought to have set aside the notifications issued under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act declaring new national highways, namely, NH­179A and NH­179­ B,   as   they   would   traverse   through   non­existent   roads   and   on green­field   lands,   being   without   authority   of   law.   Therefore,   the entire   process   was   null   and   void.     Learned   counsel   has   relied upon  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in   Col.   A.S.   Sangwan   (supra), Dwarkadas   Marfatia   &   Sons   (supra),   Synthetics   and Chemicals   Ltd.   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   U.P.   &   Ors. 46   and   Cipla Ltd.  (supra). 24. Two   more   written   submissions   have   been   filed   by   the learned   counsel   espousing   the   cause   of   land   owners/aggrieved 46 (1990) 1 SCC 109 (paragraph 54) 50 persons,   namely,   by   learned   counsel   ­   Mr.   T.V.S.   Raghavendra Sreyas and Mr. S. Thananjayan.   More or less, same points have been   urged   in   their   respective   written   submissions.     Even according   to   them,   considering   the   availability   of   three   existing routes between Chennai­Salem and which have not achieved the maximum traffic, there was no need for a new project in the garb of connecting industries along the Chennai­Salem route.  In that, there   are   no   existing,   approved   or   proposed   industrial zones/SEZs   along   this   route   as   per   Government   data.     Further, the   change   recorded   in   the   minutes   of   the   meeting   dated 19.1.2018 is not  supported by  any   survey  reports or   documents containing   empirical   data   to   justify   new   national   highway.     The Consultant,   who   was   appointed   for   the   original   Project concerning   C­M   (EC)   section,   presented   alignments   for   the changed section i.e. C­K­S (NC) in the meeting held on 19.2.2018 even   though   the   intimation   regarding   change   of   scope   of   the Project   was   made   known   on   22.2.2018.     As   the   decision   was taken on the basis of the DPR prepared by the Consultant on the basis   of   incorrect   facts   mechanically   copied   from   other   reports and which was made the base document for consideration by the MoEF for issuance of Terms of Reference, the entire EIA process 51 was   vitiated.     They   have   adopted   the   reasons   and   findings recorded   by   the   High   Court   for   quashing   of   the   notifications under Section 3A(1) of the 1956 Act and pray for dismissal of the appeals preferred by the NHAI and the Union of India. 25. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also considered   the   relevant   pleadings   and   documents   including written   submissions   filed   by   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for the concerned parties. LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE UNION 26. The   threshold   issue,   we   propose   to   answer   at   the   outset   is about the legislative competence of the Parliament to enact a law for   declaring   open   green­field   lands   as   national   highway. Notably,   no   declaration   was   sought   by   the   writ   petitioners   in reference to the provisions of the 1956 Act, the 1988 Act and in particular,   Section   2   of   the   1956   Act,   to   be   ultra   vires   as   such. The argument is that since only the State legislature is competent to   make   a   law   for   construction   of   new   roads   traversing   through the open green­fields, where no road exists and only in case of an existing   road/highway,   would   the   Central   Government   have 52 power   to   declare   it   as   a   national   highway.     To   buttress   this submission, reliance is placed on Entry 13 of List II (State List) of the Seventh Schedule dealing with the subject on which the State legislature has exclusive power to make a law, namely: ­ “13. Communications,   that   is   to   say,   roads,   bridges, ferries,   and   other   means   of   communication   not   specified in   List   I;   municipal   tramways;   ropeways;   inland waterways and traffic thereon subject to the provisions of List I and List III with regard to such waterways; vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles.” In contradistinction, Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule in respect of which the Parliament has exclusive power to make law, is “highways declared by or under law made by Parliament to be national   highways”.     It   is,   therefore,   urged   that   the   Central Government had no power to invoke Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act, as   it   merely   enables   the   Central   Government   to   declare   an existing highway to be a national highway.  Resultantly, the issue of   impugned   notifications   by   the   Central   Government   under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act declaring the section between C­K­S (NC), traversing through non­existent road/highway and through open   green­fields,   is   arbitrary   exercise   of   power   and   violates Article   14   of   the   Constitution.     It   is,   therefore,   ultra   vires   the Constitution.     It   is   also   ultra   vires   the   Constitution   derived executive powers of the Union (w.r.t. “Roads” under Article 257).   53 27. As aforesaid, we shall first deal with the legislative power of the   Union.     Is   it   limited   to   making   law   in   exercise   of   powers ascribable to Entry 23 of List I in respect of an existing highway to be declared as a national highway, as is contended before us? The   legislative   power   of   the   Parliament   can   be   traced   to   Article 246, which reads thus: ­ “ 246.   Subject­matter   of   laws   made   by   Parliament   and by   the   Legislatures   of   States. ­   (1)   Notwithstanding anything   in   clauses   (2)   and   (3),   Parliament   has   exclusive power   to   make   laws   with   respect   to   any   of   the   matters enumerated   in   List   I   in   the   Seventh   Schedule   (in   this Constitution referred to as the “Union List”).  (2) Notwithstanding   anything   in   clause   (3),   Parliament and,   subject   to   clause   (1),   the   Legislature   of   any   State also, have power  to make laws with respect  to any  of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).  (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any   part   thereof   with   respect   to   any   of   the   matters enumerated   in   List   II   in   the   Seventh   Schedule   (in   this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).  (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any   mater   for   any   part   of   the   territory   of   India   not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” Indisputably, law  made by  the  Parliament  in  the present  case is the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act in reference to Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.   If the stated law made by the Parliament is   ascribable   to   Entry   23   of   List   I   of   the   Seventh   Schedule,   the Parliament has the  exclusive power  to make law  on that subject 54 and   for   matters   connected   therewith.     The   fact   that   Entry   13   of List II bestows exclusive power  upon the legislature of any  State concerning subject “roads”, cannot be the basis to give restricted meaning to Entry 23 in List I, dealing with all matters concerning “national highways”.  It is well­established position that if the law made   by   the   Parliament   is   in   respect   of   subject   falling   under Union   List,   then   the   incidental   encroachment   by   the   law   under the State list,  per se , would not render it invalid.  The doctrine of pith   and   substance   is  well­established   in   India.     The   doctrine   is invoked upon ascertaining the true character of the legislation.  It may   be   useful   to   advert   to   Article   248   of   the   Constitution, bestowing   legislative   powers   on   the   Parliament   to   make   a   law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or   the   State   List.     Concededly,   the   expression   “highways”   as such, is not mentioned either in the State List or the Concurrent list.     While   making   law   on   the   subject   falling   under   the   Union List in  terms of Entry  97 thereof, it is open to  the  Parliament to make law on any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists.   55 28. Indisputably,   the   entries   in   the   legislative   lists   are   not sources   of   legislative   powers,   but   are   merely   topics   or   fields   in respect of which concerned legislative body is free to make a law. The   entries   must   receive   a   liberal   and   expansive   construction, reckoning   the   wide   spirit   thereof   and   not   in   a   narrow   pedantic sense.   Entry 23 in List I refers generally to “highways” declared or to be declared by the Parliament as national highways and all matters   connected   therewith.     This   empowers   the   Parliament   to declare   any   stretch/section   across   any   State   as   a   highway   for being designated as a national highway.  There is no indication in the   Constitution   to   limit   the   exercise   of   that   power   of   the Parliament   only   in   respect   of   an   existing   “highway”.     Further, whenever  and wherever  the question of legislative competence is raised, the test is whether the law enacted, examined as a whole, is  substantially  with   respect  to  the  particular  topic  of  legislation falling   under   the   concerned   list.     If   the   law   made   by   the Parliament   or   the   legislature   of   any   State   has   a   substantial   and not merely a remote connection with the Entry under which it is made,   there   is   nothing   to   preclude   the   concerned   legislature   to make law  on  all matters concerning   the topic covered  under   the Union   List   or   the   State   List,   as   the   case   may   be.     Reliance   has 56 been   justly   placed   on   the   dictum   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of this   Court   in   K.T.   Plantation   Pvt.   Ltd.   (supra),   that   the   test   is identicalness  or  diversity  between  dominant  intention  of  the two legislations.     Moreover,   power   of   law­making   itself   would   be rendered   otiose   if   it   does   not   provide   for   suitable   coverage   of matters   that   are   incidental   as   well   as   intrinsically   connected   to the expressly granted power.  Further, Chapter II of Part XI of the Constitution   dealing   with   administrative   relations   between   the Union   and   the   States   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the   executive power   of   every   State   shall   be   so   exercised   as   to   ensure compliance   with   the   laws   made   by   Parliament   and   any   existing laws which applied in that State, and the executive power of the Union  shall extend to  the giving  of such directions to  a  State as may  appear   to  the  Government  of  India  to   be  necessary  for   that purpose.     Article   257   expounds   about   the   control   of   the   Union over States in certain cases.  The same reads thus: ­ “ 257. Control   of   the   Union   over   States   in   certain cases. ­ (1) The executive power  of every State shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power  of the Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving  of such directions to a   State   as   may   appear   to   the   Government   of   India   to   be necessary for that purpose.  (2) The  executive   power   of  the  Union  shall  also   extend to the giving of directions to a State as to the construction 57 and maintenance of means of communication declared in the direction to be of national or military importance. Provided   that   nothing   in  this   clause   shall  be  taken as restricting the power of Parliament to declare highways or   waterways   to   be   national   highways   or   national waterways   or   power   of   the   Union   with   respect   to   the highways   or   waterways   so   declared   or   the   power   of   the Union   to   construct   and   maintain   means   of communication   as   part   of   its   functions   with   respect   to naval, military and air force works.  (3) The  executive   power   of  the  Union  shall  also   extend to the giving of directions to a State as to the measures to be   taken   for   the   protection   of   the   railways   within   the State.  (4) Where in carrying out any direction given to a State under clause (2) as to the construction or maintenance of any means of communication or under clause (3) as to the measures   to   be   taken   for   the   protection   of   any   railway, costs  have   been  incurred   in  excess   of  those  which  would have been incurred in the discharge of the normal duties of   the   State   if   such   direction   had   not   been   given,   there shall   be   paid   by   the   Government   of   India   to   the   State such   sum   as may   be  agreed,  or,   in  default   of  agreement, as   may   be   determined   by   an   arbitrator   appointed   by   the Chief   Justice   of   India,   in   respect   of   the   extra   costs   so incurred by the State.”  Clause (2) predicates that the executive power of the Union shall also   extend   to   the   giving   of   directions   to   a   State   as   to   the construction   and   maintenance   of   means   of   communication declared   in   the   direction   to   be   of   national   and   military importance.  The proviso makes it further clear that the power of the   Parliament   is   not   restricted   in   any   way   to   the   matters specified   therein.     The   seven­Judge   Constitution   Bench   in Synthetics   and   Chemicals   Ltd.   (supra)   had   observed   that constitutional   provisions   specifically   dealing   with   delimitation   of 58 powers   in   a   federal   polity   must   be   understood   in   a   broad common­sense   point   of   view,   as   understood   by   common   people for whom the Constitution is made. 29. Suffice it to observe that there is nothing in the Constitution which   constricts   the   power   of   the   Parliament   to   make   a   law   for declaring any stretch/section within the State not being a road or an   existing   highway,   to   be   a   national   highway.     Whereas,   the provisions   in   the   Constitution   unambiguously   indicate   that   the legislative   as   well   as   executive   power   regarding   all   matters concerning  and  connected  with  a highway  to  be  designated  as a national   highway,   vests   in   the   Parliament   and   the   laws   to   be made   by   it   in   that   regard.     For   the   same   reason,   the   complete executive power also vests within the Union.   30. The   seminal   question   is   whether   the   1956   Act   is   a   law ascribable   to   Entry   23   of   the   Union   List   and   it   provides   for construction   of   a   national   highway   on   a   non­existing road/highway   traversing   through   green­field   lands.     It   may   be useful   to   advert   to   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   for enacting the 1956 Act.  The same reads thus: ­ “ Statement of Objects and Reasons 59 1. Under   an   agreement   entered   into   with   the   then existing   Provinces,   the   Government   of   India   provisionally accepted   entire   financial   liability,   with   effect   from   the   1 st April,   1947,   for   the   construction,   development   and maintenance   of   certain   highways   in   the   Provinces   which were   considered   suitable   for   inclusion   in   a   system   of national highways. Upon the creation of the Part B States and   the   new   Part   C   States   under   the   Constitution,   the National   Highways   scheme   was   extended   to   those   States also.  2. Under entry 23 of the Union List. Parliament has exclusive   power   of   legislation   with   respect   to highways   which   are   declared   to   be   national   highways by   or   under   law   made   by   Parliament .   It   is,   therefore, proposed   that   the   highways   comprised   in   the   Schedule annexed   to   this   Bill   should   be   declared   to   be   national highways.   Such   a   declaration   would   help   the   Central Government   in   exercising   its   powers   with   respect   to the   development   and   maintenance   of   these   highways more  effectively.  Power is  also  sought to be  vested  in the   Central   Government   to   declare   by   notification other  highways  to  be  national  highways .  Power  should also   be   given   to   the   Central   Government   to   enter   into agreements   with   the   State   Governments   or   municipal authorities   with   respect   to   the   development   or maintenance   of   any   portion   of   any   national   highway   and fees   may   have   to   be   levied   in   respect   of   certain   types   of services rendered on national highways.  3. The   present   Bill   is   designed   to   achieve   the   objects set forth above.”  (emphasis supplied) In   the   present   case,   we   have   to   consider   the   sweep   of   the   1956 Act   in   light   of   the   amended   provisions,   which   came   into   force with effect from 24.1.1997.  The 1956 Act extends to the whole of India and has come into force on 15.4.1957.  Section 2(1) thereof is in the nature of declaration by the Parliament that each of the highways  specified  in  the  schedule  appended to  the  1956  Act  to 60 be a national highway.   The Schedule appended in the end gives the   description   of   such   highways.     Sub­Section   (2)   of   Section   2, however, empowers the Central Government to declare “any other highway” to be a national highway by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette in that behalf and upon such publication, the highway  shall   be  deemed  to  be  specified in   the  stated  Schedule. This provision contains a legal fiction. 31. This   provision   annunciates   that   the   Parliament   has entrusted   the   power   in   the   Central   Government   or   the   Union   to declare   from   time   to   time   and   when   required,   any   other stretch/section   in   any   State   to   be   a   national   highway,   which power   could   be   exercised   exclusively   by   the   Parliament   itself under   the   Constitution.     Sub­Section   (3)   of   Section   2   empowers the  Central Government to  omit  any  highway  from  the Schedule and   upon   such   publication,   it   would   cease   to   be   a   national highway.     In   other   words,   Section   2,   as   enacted   by   the Parliament, declared the highways referred to in the Schedule to be national highways and empowered the Central Government to add other highways to be a national highway and including omit the   scheduled   highways   from   time   to   time   as   per   the   evolving 61 exigencies and administrative concerns.   There is nothing in this Act   to   constrict   the   power   of   the   Central   Government   to   notify any   stretch/section   (not   being   an   existing   road/highway)   within any State, to be a national highway.   32. A priori , the Central Government is free to construct/build a new   national   highway   keeping   in   mind   the   obligations   it   has   to discharge under  Part IV of the Constitution for securing a social order   and   promotion   of   welfare   of   the   people   in   the   concerned region,   to   provide   them   adequate   means   of   livelihood,   distribute material resources as best to subserve the common good, create new   opportunities,   so   as   to   empower   the   people   of   that   area including   provisioning   new   economic   opportunities   in   the   area through   which   the   national   highway   would   pass   and   the country’s   economy   as   a   whole.     The   availability   of   a   highway   in any part of the State paves way for sustainable development and for   overall   enhancement   of   human   well­being   including   to facilitate   the   habitants   thereat   to   enjoy   a   decent   quality   of   life, creation   of   assets   (due   to   natural   increase   in   market   value   of their   properties)   and   to   fulfil   their   aspirations   of   good   life   by provisioning access to newer and present­day opportunities. 62 33. Sections   3A   to   3J   of   the   Act   expound   the   procedure   for acquisition   of   the   land   for   the   purpose   of   building   a   national highway.  The same are set out hereunder: ­ 3A.   Power   to   acquire   land,   etc. —(1)   Where   the   Central Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any land is required   for   the   building,   maintenance,   management   or operation   of   a   national   highway   or   part   thereof,   it   may,   by notification   in   the   Official   Gazette,   declare   its   intention   to acquire such land.  (2) Every  notification under sub­section (1) shall give a brief description of the land.  (3) The competent authority shall cause the substance of the notification   to   be   published   in  two   local   newspapers,   one   of which will be in a vernacular language.  3B.   Power   to   enter   for   survey,   etc. —On   the   issue   of   a notification   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section   3A,   it   shall   be lawful for any person, authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, to—  (a)  make   any   inspection,   survey, measurement, valuation or enquiry;  (b)  take levels;  (c)  dig or bore into sub­soil;  (d)  set   out   boundaries   and   intended   lines   of work; (e)  mark   such   levels,   boundaries   and   lines placing marks and cutting trenches; or  (f)  do such other acts or things as may be laid down   by   rules   made   in   this   behalf   by   that Government.  3C. Hearing of objections. —(1) Any person interested in the land   may,   within   twenty­one   days   from   the   date   of publication   of   the   notification   under   sub­section   (1)   of section   3A,   object   to   the   use   of   the   land   for   the   purpose   or purposes mentioned in that sub­section.  (2)   Every   objection   under   sub­section   (1)   shall   be   made   to the   competent   authority   in   writing   and   shall   set   out   the grounds   thereof   and   the   competent   authority   shall   give   the objector   an   opportunity   of   being   heard,   either   in   person   or by   a   legal   practitioner,   and   may,   after   hearing   all   such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as 63 the   competent   authority   thinks   necessary,   by   order,   either allow or disallow the objections.  Explanation.—For   the   purposes   of   this   sub­section,   “legal practitioner”   has   the   same   meaning   as   in   clause   (i)   of   sub­ section   (1)   of   section   2   of   the   Advocates   Act,   1961   (25   of 1961).  (3)   Any   order   made   by   the   competent   authority   under   sub­ section (2) shall be final.  3D.   Declaration   of   acquisition. —(1)   Where   no   objection under   sub­section   (1)   of   section   3C   has   been   made   to   the competent   authority   within   the   period   specified   therein   or where   the   competent   authority   has   disallowed   the   objection under subsection (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central   Government   and   on   receipt   of   such   report,   the Central   Government   shall   declare,   by   notification   in   the Official   Gazette,   that   the   land   should   be   acquired   for   the purpose or purposes mentioned in sub­section (1) of section 3A.  (2)   On   the   publication   of   the   declaration   under   sub­section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances.  (3)   Where   in   respect   of   any   land,   a   notification   has   been published   under   sub­section   (1)   of   section   3A   for   its acquisition   but   no   declaration   under   sub­section   (1)   has been  published within  a period of one  year  from  the date of publication   of   that   notification,   the   said   notification   shall cease to have any effect:  Provided   that   in   computing   the   said   period   of   one   year,   the period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub­ section (1) of section 3A is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.  (4)   A   declaration   made   by   the   Central   Government   under sub­section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by any other authority.  3E.   Power   to   take   possession. —(1)   Where   any   land   has vested   in   the   Central   Government   under   sub­section   (2)   of section   3D,   and   the   amount   determined   by   the   competent authority   under   section   3G   with   respect   to   such   land   has been deposited under sub­section (1) of section 3H, with the competent   authority   by   the   Central   Government,   the competent   authority   may   by   notice   in   writing   direct   the owner as well as any other person who may be in possession 64 of such land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent   authority   or   any   person   duly   authorised   by   it   in this behalf within sixty days of the service of the notice. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any direction made   under   sub­section   (1),   the   competent   authority   shall apply—  (a)  in the case of any land situated in any area falling   within   the   metropolitan   area,   to   the Commissioner of Police;  (b)   in   case   of   any   land   situated   in   any   area other   than   the   area   referred   to   in   clause   (a),   to the Collector of a District,  and   such   Commissioner   or   Collector,   as   the   case   may   be, shall   enforce   the   surrender   of   the   land,   to   the   competent authority or to the person duly authorised by it. 3F. Right to enter into the land where land has vested in the   Central   Government. —Where   the   land   has   vested   in the Central Government under section 3D, it shall be lawful for any person authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, to enter and do other act necessary upon the land for carrying   out   the   building,   maintenance,   management   or operation   of   a   national   highway   or   a   part   thereof,   or   any other work connected therewith.  3G.   Determination   of   amount   payable   as   compensation. —(1) Where any land is acquired under  this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority.  (2)   Where   the   right   of   user   or   any   right   in   the   nature   of   an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right   of   enjoyment   in   that   land   has   been   affected   in   any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated  at  ten  per  cent,  of  the  amount  determined  under sub­section (1), for that land.  (3)   Before   proceeding   to   determine   the   amount   under   sub­ section   (1)   or   sub­section   (2),   the   competent   authority   shall give   a   public   notice   published   in   two   local   newspapers,   one of   which   will   be   in   a   vernacular   language   inviting   claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired.  (4)   Such   notice   shall   state   the   particulars   of   the   land   and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub­section (2) of section 3C, before the competent authority, 65 at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land.  (5)   If   the   amount   determined   by   the   competent   authority under   sub­section (1) or  sub­section  (2) is  not  acceptable  to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either   of   the   parties,   be   determined   by   the   arbitrator   to   be appointed by the Central Government.  (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration   and   Conciliation   Act,   1996   (26   of   1996)   shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.  (7)   The   competent   authority   or   the   arbitrator   while determining the amount under sub­section (1) or sub­section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration—  (a) the market  value  of the land  on  the  date  of publication of the notification under section 3A;  (b)  the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land;  (c)  the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land,   by   reason   of   the   acquisition   injuriously affecting   his   other   immovable   property   in   any manner, or his earnings;  (d)  if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land,   the   person   interested   is   compelled   to change   his   residence   or   place   of   business,   the reasonable   expenses,   if   any,   incidental   to   such change.  3H.   Deposit   and   payment   of   amount. —(1)   The   amount determined   under   section   3G   shall   be   deposited   by   the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules   made   in   this   behalf   by   that   Government,   with   the competent authority before taking possession of the land.  (2)  As  soon  as may  be  after  the  amount  has  been  deposited under   sub­section   (1),   the   competent   authority   shall   on behalf   of   the   Central   Government   pay   the   amount   to   the person or persons entitled thereto.  (3)   Where   several   persons   claim   to   be   interested   in   the amount   deposited   under   sub­section   (1),   the   competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them.  66 (4)   If   any   dispute   arises   as   to   the   apportionment   of   the amount   or   any   part   thereof   or   to   any   person   to   whom   the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall   refer   the   dispute   to   the   decision   of   the   principal   civil court   of   original   jurisdiction   within   the   limits   of   whose jurisdiction the land is situated.  (5)   Where   the   amount   determined   under   section   3G   by   the arbitrator   is   in   excess   of   the   amount   determined   by   the competent   authority,   the   arbitrator   may   award   interest   at nine   per   cent,   per   annum   on   such   excess   amount   from   the date   of   taking   possession   under   section   3D   till   the   date   of the actual deposit thereof. (6)Where   the   amount   determined   by   the   arbitrator   is   in excess   of   the   amount   determined   by   the   competent authority,   the   excess   amount   together   with   interest,   if   any, awarded   under   sub­section   (5)   shall   be   deposited   by   the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules   made   in   this   behalf   by   that   Government,   with   the competent authority and the provisions of subsections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit.  3I.   Competent   authority   to   have   certain   powers   of   civil court. —The   competent   authority   shall   have,   for   the purposes   of   this   Act,   all   the   powers   of   a   civil   court   while trying   a   suit   under   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   (5   of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:—  (a)  summoning   and   enforcing   the   attendance of  any person and examining him on oath;  (b)  requiring   the   discovery   and   production   of any document;  (c)  reception of evidence on affidavits;  (d)  requisitioning   any   public   record   from   any court or office;  (e)  issuing   commission   for   examination   of witnesses.  3J.   Land   Acquisition   Act   1   of   1894   not   to   apply. — Nothing  in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply  to an acquisition under this Act.” 34. Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   inserted   by   way   of   an amendment   in   1997,   empowers   the   Central   Government   to declare its intention to acquire “any land”.   It need not be linked 67 to   an   existing   road   or   State   highway.     For,   the   expression   “any land”   ought   to   include   open   green­fields   for   construction   or building  of  a  national   highway,  consequent   to  declaration  under Section 2(2) of the same Act in that regard.  The central condition for   exercise   of   such   power   by   the   Central   Government   is   that   it should   be   satisfied   that   such   land   is   required   for   the   public purpose   of   building  a  national   highway   or   part   thereof.     Section 3B   of   the   1956   Act   empowers   the   person   authorised   by   the Central   Government   to   enter   upon   the   notified   lands   for   the limited   purpose   of   survey   etc.,   to   ascertain   its   suitability   for acquisition   for   the   stated   purpose   or   otherwise.     The   final declaration of acquisition is then issued under Section 3D of the Act   after   providing   opportunity   to   all   persons   interested   in   the notified   land   to   submit   their   objections   and   participate   in   a public hearing under Section 3C.   The contour of issues debated during this public hearing are in reference to matters relevant for recording satisfaction as to whether the notified land is or is not required   for   a   public   purpose   for   building,   maintenance, management   or   operation   of   a   national   highway   or   part   thereof. Be   it   noted   that   consequent   to   publication   of   declaration   under Section   3D,   the   land   referred   to   in   the   notification   vests 68 absolutely   in   the   Central   Government,   free   from   all encumbrances.     Possession   of   such   land   is   then   taken   under Section 3E of the Act, upon depositing the compensation amount in   the   manner   provided   in   Section   3H   of   the   Act   and   as determined under Section 3G.   Section 3F empowers the Central Government   to   enter   upon   the   land   after   the   same   is   vested   in terms of Section 3D of the Act.  Notably, Section 3J of the Act is a non­obstante  provision and it predicates that nothing in the Land Acquisition   Act,   1894   shall   apply   to   an   acquisition   under   the 1956   Act.     The   national   highways   vest   in   the   Union   in   terms   of Section 4 of the 1956 Act and the responsibility for development and   maintenance   thereof   is   primarily   that   of   the   Central Government   in   terms   of   Section   5.     The   Central   Government   is competent to issue directions to the Government of any State in respect   of   matters   specified   in   Section   6   of   the   Act.     Section   9 empowers   the   Central   Government   to   make   rules   in   respect   of matters   provided   therein   for   carrying   out   the   purposes   of   the 1956 Act.  35. It   is   not   necessary   to   dilate   on   the   other   provisions   of   the 1956 Act for the time being.  As aforesaid, Sections 3A to 3J have 69 been   inserted   by   way   of   amendment   of   1997.     On   close examination,   the   1956   Act,   as   amended   and   applicable   to   the present   case,   is   an   Act   to   authorise   Central   Government   to declare the notified stretches/sections in the State concerned as a   highway   to   be   a   national   highway;   and   for   matters   connected therewith   including   acquisition   of   “any   land”   for   building   or construction   of   a   new   highway   (which   need   not   be   an   existing road/highway).   The substance of this Act is ascribable to Entry 23 of the Union List and matters connected therewith.   36. Having said thus, we have no hesitation in concluding that the challenge to the notifications issued under Section 2(2) of the 1956   Act   on   the   argument   of   lack   of   legislative   competence,   is devoid of merits.   The High Court justly negatived the same and we uphold that conclusion. EXECUTIVE POWERS OF THE UNION 37. A   fortiori,   even   the   challenge   to   the   stated   notifications   on the ground of being   ultra vires   the Constitution derived executive powers of the Union, must fail.  That challenge is founded on the purport   of   Article   257,   which   has   been   reproduced   above.     It   is 70 urged that Article 257 pointedly refers to the sphere of executive powers   of   the   Union.     Article   257   of   the   Constitution,   as aforesaid, deals with administrative relations between the States and the Union.  In the first place, having said that the Parliament has   exclusive  legislative  competence  to  make  a  law  in   respect  of national   highways   and   all   matters   connected   therewith,   which includes declaring any stretch/section within the State (not being existing   roads/highways)   as   a   national   highway,   it   must   follow that   the   Central   Government   alone   has   the   executive   powers   to construct/build a new national highway in any State and to issue directions   to   the   Government   of   any   State   for   carrying   out   the purposes of   the  1956  Act.    It  is  incomprehensible as  to   how  the argument   of   lack   of   executive   power   of   the   Central   Government despite   such   a   law,   can   be   countenanced.     Concededly,   the validity of Section 2 of the 1956 Act, which empowers the Central Government   to   notify   any   other   highway   (other   than   the scheduled   national   highways)   as   a   national   highway,   has   not been   put   in   issue.     No   declaration   is   sought   that   the   said provision is  ultra vires  the Constitution or the law.  Therefore, the argument   essentially   requires   us   to   examine   the   question   as   to whether   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act   enables   the   Central Government   to   declare   a   national   highway   in   respect   of   a   non­ 71 existing   road(s)/highway(s)  and   on   open   green­fields  land   within the State.  Suffice it to observe that the challenge to notifications issued by the Central Government under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act   on   the   ground   of   being   ultra   vires   the   Constitution   derived executive powers, is also devoid of merits. SCOPE OF SECTION 2(2) 38. We   may   revert   to   the   argument   that   the   Central Government,   even   if  is  competent   to  declare  any  stretch/section as   a   national   highway,   can   do   so   only   in   respect   of   an   existing road/highway within the State and not in respect of non­existent road,   much   less   traversing   through   the   open   green­field   lands. Somewhat   similar   question   was   dealt   with   by   the   same   High Court   (Madras   High   Court)   in   reference   to   the   provisions   of   the Tamil   Nadu   Highways   Act,   2001   in   Jayaraman   (supra). However,   we   are   called   upon   to   examine   the   question   under consideration   in   reference   to   the   1956   Act   and   the   1988   Act. Hence,   we   proceed   to   examine   Section   2   of   the   1956   Act,   which reads thus: ­ “ 2. Declaration   of   certain   highways   to   be   national highways. ­   (1)   Each   of   the   highways   specified   in   the Schedule is hereby declared to be a national highway.  72 (2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official   Gazette,   declare   any   other   highway   to   be   a national   highway   and   on   the   publication   of   such notification such highway shall be deemed to be specified in the Schedule.  (3) The   Central   Government   may,   by   like   notification, omit   any   highway   from   the   Schedule   and   on   the publication   of   such   notification,   the   highway   so   omitted shall cease to be a national highway.” We have briefly adverted to the scope of sub­Section (1), which is in   the   nature   of   declaration   by   the   Parliament   that   each   of   the highways   specified   in   the   Schedule   appended   to   the   1956   Act shall  be a  national  highway.   For  building   a new  highway, as  in the   present   case,   between   stretch/section   C­K­S   (NC)   NH­179A and NH­179B respectively, the Central Government can do so in exercise   of   power   conferred   upon   it   under   Section   2(2)   of   the 1956 Act.   That empowers the Central Government to notify any other highway (not forming part of the Schedule appended to the Act)   as   a   national   highway   and   upon   such   publication   of notification in the official gazette, the said highway  is deemed to be specified in the Schedule as a national highway.  This power is not constricted or circumscribed by any other inhibition, such as to declare only an existing road or highway within the State as a national highway.   The requirement of a national highway within the   country   as   a   whole   and   State­wise,   in   particular,   is   to alleviate   evolving   socio­economic   dynamics,   for   which   such   a 73 wide   power   has   been   bestowed   upon   the   Central   Government. The   Central   Government   is   obliged   to   do   so   to   facilitate   it   to discharge its obligations under Part IV of the Constitution.  There is   nothing   in   the   Constitution   of   India   or   for   that   matter,   the 1956   Act   to   limit   that   power   of   the   Central   Government   only   in respect   of   existing   roads/highways   within   the   State.     To   say   so would   be   counter­productive   and   would   entail   in   a   piquant situation   that   the   Central   Government   cannot   effectively discharge   its   obligations   under   Part   IV   of   the   Constitution   unto the remote inaccessible parts of the country until the concerned State   Government   constructs   a   road/highway   within   the   State. On the other hand, if the concerned State, due to reasons beyond its   control   or   otherwise,   is   unable/flounder   to   provision   a road/highway   in   a   given   segment   of   the   State;   despite   being imperative to do so to assuage the perennial difficulties faced by the   locals   in   that   belt   due   to   lack   of   access,   the   Central Government   may   come   forward   and   step   in   to   construct   a national highway and connect the area with the other parts of the country.   By its very nomenclature, a national highway is to link the   entire   country   and   provide   access   to   all   in   every   remote corner   of   the   country   for   interaction   and   to   promote   commerce and   trade,   employment   and   education   including   health   related 74 services.     This   approach   would   enhance   and   further   the   federal structure.  This is because, the existence of a national highway in the  neighbourhood  paves  way   for  the  fulfilment  of aspirations of the   locals   and   their   empowerment.     It   not   only   brings   with   it opportunity to travel across, but also propels the economy of that region and the country as a whole.  It gives impetus to myriads of social,   commerce   and   more   importantly,   access   to   other activities/facilities essential for the health, education and general well­being of the locals, in particular. 39. The expression “highway” has not been defined in the 1956 Act   or   even   in   the   1988   Act.     Dictionary   meaning   of   the   term “highway” as per Venkataramaiya’s Law Lexicon (Second Edition) is as follows: ­ “ Highway. ­   A   highway   is   the   physical   track   along   which   a vehicle   travels.   [See   Kelani   Valley Motor   Transit   Co.   Ltd. v.  Colombo, etc. Ltd. , A.I.R. 1946 P.C. 137. Public roads, which every subject of the kingdom has right to use. Wharton’s Law Lexicon.]   The   common   definition   of   highway   which   is   given in   all   the   text­books   of   authority   is   that   it   is   a   way   leading from   one   market   town   or   inhabited   place   to   another inhabited place, which is common to all the Queen’s subjects ( per Coleridge, C.J. Bailey v. Jamieson , 34 L.T. 62) but if the dedication   to   the   public   is   clear,   a   thoroughfare   is   not essential   to   a   highway,   e.g.   cul   desac   may   be   a   highway.   – Rugby Trustees v. Merryweathers , 103 E. R. 109. The   common   definition   of   a   “highway”   is   that   it   is   a way   leading   from   one   marked   town   or   inhabited   place   to another   inhabited   place,   and   which   is   common   to   all   the 75 subjects of the sovereign. Public bridges are highways so far as   the   right   of   passage   is   concerned.   [ Halsbury’s   Laws   of England , Vol. 16, para. 1] A bridge is not the private property of   an   individual,   but   is   the   property   of   the   State,   and   is   a public   bridge.   –   K.K.   Wadhwani,   Mrs.  V.   State   of   Rajasthan , I.L.R. (1967) Raj. 850 at p. 852 : A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 138.  The right  of the public in a highway  is merely  to pass and   repass.   Such   right   can   be   restricted   at   the   time   of   the dedication   and   whether   the   right   is   restricted   or   not   is generally   established   by   the   nature   of   the   user.   The presumption   generally   is   that   the   dedication   is   for   the ordinary and reasonable user of the road as a highway. It is well settled that the question of the kind of traffic for which a highway   is   dedicated   is   a   question   of   fact   and   it   has   to   be answered having  regard to the character of the way and the nature   of   the   user.   It   is   also   settled   that   a   right   of   passage once   acquired   will   extend   to   “more   modern   forms   of   traffic reasonably   similar   to   those   for   which   the   highway   was originally   dedicated,   so   long   as   they   do   not   impose   a substantially   greater   burden   on   the   owner   of   the   soil,   nor substantially   inconvenience   persons   exercising   the   right   of passage in the manner originally contemplated”.  The   right   of   the   public   is   a   right   to   “pass   along”   a highway   for   the   purpose   of   legitimate   travel   not   to   be   on   it except so far as their presence is attributable to a reasonable and   proper   user   of   the   highway   as   such.   A   person   who   is found   using   the   highway   for   other   purposes   must   be presumed to have gone there for such purposes and not with a legitimate object and as against the owner of the soil he is to   be   treated   as   a   trespasser   –   Moti   Lal   v.   Uttar   Pradesh Government , A.I.R. 1951 All. 257 at p.267. In   order   to   constitute   a   valid   dedication   to   the   public of a highway by the owner of the soil, it is clearly settled that there   must   be   an   intention   to   dedicate   –   there   must   be   an animus   dedicandi   ;   of   which   the   user   by   the   public   is evidence,   and   no   more   ;   and   a   single   act   of   interruption   by the   owner   is   of   much   more   right,   upon   a   question   of intention, than many acts of enjoyment.  There   may   be   a   dedication   to   the   public   for   a   limited purpose   ;   as   for   a   boot­way,   house­way   or   drift­way   ;   but there  cannot   be  a  dedication to  a  limited  part  of  the  public. Muhammad   Rustam   Ali   Khan   v.   Municipal   Committee   of Karnal City , 38 M.L.J. 455 at p.460.  The normal use of the word “highway” includes “road”, particularly when the reference is to places where “there is a 76 public   right   of   travel”.   –   R.   ex   rel.   Johnson   v.   Johansen , (1962) 38 W.W.R. 381, per manning, J. at p. 383;  Words and Phrases Legally Defined , 2 nd  Ed., Vol. II, p. 360.” 40. The  meaning  of  expression  “highway”, as  expounded  in the P.   Ramanatha   Aiyar’s   Advanced   Law   Lexicon   (6 th   Edition)   reads thus:­ “ Highway.   Means   a   National   Highway   declared   as   such under   section   2   of   the   National   Highways   Act,   1956   and includes   any   Expressway   or   Express   Highway   vested   in the Central Government, whether surfaced or unsurfaced, and also includes­ (i) all   lands   appurtenant   to   the   Highway, whether   demarcated   or   not,   acquired   for   the purpose   of   the   Highway   or   transferred   for   such purpose   by   the   State   Government   to   the   Central Government; (ii) all   bridges,   culverts,   tunnels,   causeways, carriageways   and   other   structures   constructed   on or across such Highway; and  (iii) all   trees,   railings,   fences,   posts,   signs, signals,   kilometre   stone   and   other   Highway accessories   and   materials   on   such   Highways. [Control of National Highways and Land Traffic Act, 2002 (13 of 2003), section 2(e)]” The expression “national highway” has been defined in the same Law Lexicon as follows: ­ “ National   Highway.   National   highway   is   invariably   a metalled  road  and  it   could  be  a   road   within  the  meaning of   section   2(6)   of   the   Act   if   it   is   maintained   by   the   State Government. Bhulli v. State, MLJ : QD (1961­1965) Vol V C1769  : 1964  All WR  (HC) 512  :  1964 All Cr  R  379 [U.P. Road Side Land Control Act (10 of 1965), section 2(6)] “NATIONAL HIGHWAYS” means the highways specified in the   Schedule   to   the   National   Highways   Act,   1956   or   any other   highway   declared   as   national   highway   under   sub­ section   (2)   of   Section   2   of   the   said   Act.   [Motor   Vehicles (Driving) Regulations, 2017, Regn.2(1)(i)]” 77 41. The   Central   Government,   whilst   exercising   power   under Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act   creates   a   right   in   the   locals   of   the concerned   area   to   pass   and   repass   along   a   highway   from   one marked   town   or   inhabited   place   to   another   inhabited   place   for the   purpose   of   legitimate   travel.     Such   highway   is   dedicated   for the   ordinary   and   reasonable   user   of   the   road   as   a   national highway  from   one  designated  town  (Chennai)  upto  another  town (Salem), which will be common to all the subjects.  As expounded hitherto, the Central Government is fully competent to notify “any land”   (not   necessarily   an   existing   road/highway)   for   acquisition, to construct a highway to be a national highway. MODIFICATION   OF   PROJECT   AND   EXTENT/SCOPE   OF REVIEW 42. It   was   next   contended   that   the   decision   to   change   the stretch/section  to C­K­S  (NC) was arbitrary  and was not backed by  scientific study.   The original Project (Bharatmala  Pariyojna  ­ Phase I) included section – C­M (EC), as approved by the CCEA in October,   2017.     It   is   true   that   the   Project   (Bharamala   Pariyojna Phase   I)   was   conceived   after   a   scientific   study   as   a comprehensive   project   at   the   macro   (national)   level   for   24,800 78 kms.   in   Phase   I,   spanning   over   a   period   of   5   years   (2017­18   to 2021­22)   at   an   estimated   outlay   of   INR   5,35,000   crores   with   an objective   to   improve   the   efficiency   of   freight   and   passenger movement   across   the   country   by   bridging   critical   infrastructure gaps   through   effective   interventions   like   development   of Economic   Corridors,   Inter   Corridors   and   Feeder   Routes   (ICFR), National   Corridor   Efficiency   Improvement,   Border   and International   connectivity   roads,   Coastal   and   Port   connectivity roads and Green­field expressways.   This Project, being  a  macro level   project,   does   not   reckon   the   nuanced   imperatives   of   a particular   region   or   area,   which   may   only   be   a   miniature   of   the whole   Project   traversing   across   around   24,800   kms.   in   Phase   I. For   that   reason,   the   approved   Project   itself   bestows   discretion upon   the   MoRTH   to   substitute/replace   up   to   15%   length   of 24800 kms., of the Project (Phase I), by other suitable projects.  It is so provided in clause III, which reads thus: ­ “III. Minister   ­RTH   is   authorized   to   substitute/replace up   to   15%   length   of   24,800   kms   for   Phase   I   of   the program   by   other   suitable   projects,   if   development   of certain   identified   stretches   under   the   program   cannot   be taken   up   on   account   of   issues   pertaining   to   alignment finalization, land availability and other unforeseen factors. MoRTH shall retain the same target and budget proposed above.”  79 It could thus  be understood that alteration  to the  extent of 15% is   permissible,   if   development   of   certain   identified   stretches under   the   program   cannot   be   taken   up   on   account   of   issues pertaining   to   alignment   finalisation,   land   availability   and   other unforeseen factors and concerns relating to congestion, reduction of   distance,   operational   efficiency   are   some   of   the   factors   which may   attract   such   alteration,   as   we   shall   see.     In   the   meeting convened   on   19.1.2018,   chaired   by   the   Secretary,   MoRTH   for examining   the   micro   level   implementation   of   the   comprehensive Project   and   keeping   in   mind   the   pressing   requirements   of   the concerned   State,   the   Committee   opted   for substitution/replacement   of   the   original   stretch/section   [C­M (EC)]   for   the   reasons   recorded   in   the   minutes.     It   decided   to change the  section ­  C­M  (EC) to  C­K­S (NC) as regards State  of Tamil Nadu.   It was a well­considered decision taken by the said Committee   set   up   under   the   aegis   of   the   MoRTH.     It   must   be assumed that  the  broad­based  committee of  experts  in the field, was   fully   aware   of   the   governing   policies   and   criteria   for designating   national   highways.     It   was   also   cognizant   of   the requirements and priorities of the concerned area and the norms specified for prioritising the stretches/sections.   In that, national 80 highways are regarded as arteries of the country’s economy.  That there   is   marked   distinction   and   importance   of   being   a   National Corridor,   in   preference   to   the   Economic   Corridor   which   is   for connection   of   economically   important   production   and consumption   centres   (44   identified)   under   the   Project (Bharatmala   Pariyojna   ­   Phase   I).     Hence,   it   was   unanimously resolved   by   the   Committee   to   opt   for   National   Corridor   for   the stretch/section Chennai­Salem inter alia because it would be the shortest   route   with   very   minimal   logistical   issues   in   completion thereof.     That   was   also   for   efficiency   improvement   of   existing Economic   Corridor   [C­M   (EC)]   and   for   decongestion   of   corridor network with seamless connectivity with National corridor.  Even the Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna ­ Phase I) focuses on enhanced effectiveness   of   already   built   infrastructure,   multimodal integration,   bridging   infrastructure   gaps   for   seamless   movement and   integrating   National   and   Economic   Corridors.     As   per   this project,  the   Golden   Quadrilateral   and  NS­EW   Corridors  carrying 35%   of   India’s   freight   were   to   be   declared   National   Corridors. The   criteria   for   selection   of   corridors   has   been   spelt   out thereunder as follows: ­ 81 “ I. Criteria for selection of corridors Selection   criteria   for   projects   to   be   taken   up   under Bharatmala Phase­I are to be as follows: ­ Sl. No. Component   of Bharatmala Pariyojana Inter­se   priority   determination criteria for selection of stretches 1. Economic   Corridor Development Economic   corridor   development program   focuses   on   developing   new corridors,   in   addition   to   existing Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) and North South­East   West   corridors   (NS­EW). It   is   planned   to   develop   these corridors   end   to   end   to   ensure seamless   and   speedy   travel   and   to ensure   uniformity   in   standards   in terms   of   speed,   design   of   various elements   of   roads,   control   of accesses,   way   side   amenities,   road safety   features,   etc.   Once   upgraded it will ensure substantial increase in speed   and   time   of   travel   for   both freight and passenger traffic at large across the country.  Criteria : Stretches   with   higher   freight flow;  Stretches   with   overall   higher traffic;  Stretches   with   ease   of   Land Acquisition   and   pre­construction activities and DPR preparation;  Capacity   augmentation   from   4 to   6   lane   would   be   taken   in   2 nd phase.  2. Inter   Corridor   and feeder   roads development Stretches   of   roads   connecting  more than   2   corridors   are   classified   as inter­corridors   routes,   while   other routes   connecting   to   1   or   2 corridors   are   termed   as   feeder routes.  Selection Criteria :  Stretches with less than 4 lane infrastructure   leading   to infrastructure   asymmetry   on the corridor;  Higher traffic in terms of PCU; 82  Stretches   with   ease   of   Land Acquisition   and   pre­ construction   activities   and DPR preparation; 3. National   Corridors Efficiency Improvement National   Corridor   Efficiency Improvement   program   will   focus   on improving   the   efficiency   of   the existing   corridors   (GQ   and   NS­EW), by   removing   the   congestion   points on   the   corridor   to   improve   the average   speed   on   the   corridor. Interventions   such   as   controlling access   on   the   corridor,   uniform corridor   tolling,   development   of bypasses,   ring   roads,   fly   overs   at choke   points   will   be   taken   up   to improve   the   average   speed   on   the existing   corridors   in   line   with   the best in class corridors.  Criteria : Congestion records;  Road safety consideration  Higher traffic would be prioritized;  Focus   on   Ring   roads; mobilization/acquisition   of   land by State Governments;  Connectivity of Logistics Parks; 4. Border   and International Connectivity roads Criteria : Synergy   with   development   of Integrated check post,  Government   priority; IMT/BIN/BIMSTEC MVAs Stretches   of   ease   of   Land Acquisition   and   pre­construction activities and DPR preparation  5. Coastal   and   Port connectivity roads Criteria :  Development status of Ports;  Equity   Participation   by   Stake holders;  Synchronization   with   other   port development under Sagarmala;  Ease   of   Land   Acquisition   and pre­construction   activities   and DPR preparation; 6. Expressways Criteria :  Constraint   in   capacity augmentation   of   important   NHs 83 where PCU>50,000;  Nigher   traffic   would   be prioritized;  Synchronization   with   rapidly growing Industrial Activities;  Stretches   with   ease   of   Land Acquisition   and   pre­construction activities and DPR preparation. ( emphasis supplied in italics) 43. Be   that   as   it   may,   one   of   the   reasons   recorded   in   the minutes   is   that   instead   of   opting   for   expansion   of   the   existing stretch/section [C­M (EC)], a crow­flight green­field alignment be preferred   and   developed   between   Chennai   and   Salem   via   Harur under National Corridor Efficiency Improvement, so as to reduce the   distance   between   Chennai   and   Salem/Coimbatore   by   40 kms.   and   also   diversify   the   traffic   from   the   congested   Chennai­ Krishnagiri   section   of   Golden   Quadrilateral   and   Chennai­ Ulundurpet   section   of   the   C­M   (EC).     At   the   outset,   it   had   been noted that  the traffic from  Chennai bound  to Salem/Coimbatore and   Pallakad   (Kerala)   currently   uses   the   Chennai­Krishnagiri section of the Golden Quadrilateral (Chennai­Bengaluru) and the Krishnagiri­Salem   section   of   the   North­South   corridor   or   the Chennai­Tindivanam­Ulundurpet section of the C­M (EC) and the Ulunderpet­Salem   Inter­corridor   route,   thereby   congesting Chennai­Krishnagiri   section   of   Golden   Quadrilateral   and 84 Chennai­Tindivanam   (72,000   PCU)   –   Ulundurpet   (47,000   PCU) section   of   the   C­M   (EC).     It   is   well   settled   that   the   findings   of expert   bodies   in   technical   and   scientific   matters   would   not ordinarily   be   interfered   with   by   the   Courts   –   as   observed   in paragraphs   59   to   62   of   Akhil   Bharat   Goseva   Sangh   (supra)   ­ (also   see   –   K.   Vasudevan   Nair   &   Ors.   vs.   Union   of   India   & Ors. 47   and   Systopic   Laboratories   (Pvt.)   Ltd.   vs.   Dr.   Prem Gupta & Ors. 48 ).   Again, in   Kushala Shetty   (supra), this Court analysed the provisions of the 1956 Act (Sections 3A to 3D) and opined   that   it   is   not   open   to   the   Court   to   castigate   the   reasons weighed   with   the   competent   authority.     As   we   are   dealing   with this   decision,   we   may   note   with   approval   dictum   about   the functions   of   the   NHAI,   as   adverted   to   in   paragraph   28   of   the reported judgment.  The same reads thus: ­ “ 28.   Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a pro ­ fessionally   managed   statutory   body   having   expertise   in   the field of development  and maintenance of national highways. The   projects   involving   construction   of   new   highways   and widening   and   development   of   the   existing   highways,   which are vital for the development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of   persons   having   vast   knowledge   and   expertise   in   the   field of   highway   development   and   maintenance.   NHAI   prepares and   implements   projects   relating   to  development   and   main ­ tenance   of   national   highways   after   thorough   study   by   ex ­ 47 1991 Supp (2) SCC 134 (paragraphs 19 and 20) 48 1994 Supp (1) SCC 160 85 perts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping   in   view   the   relative   factors   including   intensity   of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest.  The courts are   not   at   all   equipped   to   decide   upon   the   viability   and feasibility  of the  particular project and  whether  the par ­ ticular alignment would subserve the larger public inter ­ est. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited.   The   court   can   nullify   the   acquisition   of   land and, in the rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither has any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act been estab ­ lished  nor  has the  charge   of  malice  in  fact  been  proved . Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained.” (emphasis supplied) 44. Thus   understood,   there   is   no   substance   in   the   argument that   the   change   of   stretch/section   to   C­K­S   (National   Corridor) was   not   based   on   any   tangible   material   to   sustain   the   stated decision of the Committee.   Indeed, the necessity to enhance the existing   section   of  Economic  Corridor   between   Chennai­Madurai was   taken   note   of   in   the   principal   Pariyojna.     However,   the Committee,   as   per   the   discretion   bestowed   in   it   in   terms   of   the approved   Pariyojna,   whilst   reckoning   the   imperatives   of   the region under consideration for micro level implementation, took a conscious   decision   to   opt   for   C­K­S   (National   Corridor)   being relatively more beneficial and to strengthen the National Corridor; and at the same time increase efficiency of the existing economic corridor.     Such   decision,   obviously,   partakes   the   colour   of   a 86 policy  decision  of the  Central Government, which  is  also  backed by   the   guidelines   issued   on   26.2.2018   by   the   competent authority   of   the   same   Ministry   of   the   Government   of   India, MoRTH   (Planning   Zone).     This   communication   refers   to   the approval   of   the   Project   (Bharatmal   Pariyojna   Phase   I)   by   the CCEA   in   October,   2017   recording   obstructions/difficulties   faced during upgradation of the existing road arteries.   After reckoning those issues, it is observed as follows: ­ “Annexure – 1.1 No. NH­15017/21/2018 – P&M Government of India Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (Planning Zone) Transport Bhawan, 1, Parliament Street, New Delhi – 110001 Dated: February 26, 2018 To,  1. The Chief Secretaries of all the State Government/ UTs 2. The Principal Secretaries/Secretaries of all States/UTs Public   Works   Department   dealing   with   National Highways, other centrally sponsored schemes. 3. All   Engineers­in­Chief   and   Chief   Engineers   of   Public Works   Department   of   States/UTs   dealing   with National   Highways,   other   centrally   sponsored schemes.  4. The   Chairman,   National   Highways   Authority   of   India, G­5 & 6, Sector­10, Dwarka, New Delhi­110075.  5. The   Managing   Director,   NHIDCL,   PTI   Building,   New Delhi­110001 6. All CE­Ros, Ros and ELOs of the Ministry 7. The   Director   General   (Border   Roads),   Seema   Sadak Bhawan, Ring Road, New Delhi­110010 Subject: Determination   of   Alignment/route   for   widening of National Highways – approach reg.  87 1. The  Ministry  of  Road  Transport  &  Highways has  been undertaking   development   of   National   Highways   across   the country   through   its   various   project   executing   agencies, namely,   the   NHAI,   NHIDCL,   the   State   PWDs   and   the   BRO. The   programme   for   construction   and   development   of National   Highways   acquired   a   new   dimension   with   the construction   of   Golden   Quadrilateral   (GQ)   and   the   North­ South   and   East­West   Corridors   in   the   country.   Though   the National   Highways   account   for   only   about   2%   of   the   total road   network   of   the   country,   it   is   primarily   because   of construction   of   national   corridors   that   the   NHs   today   carry and support movement of more than 40% of the road traffic.  2. With   the   exception   of   GQ   and   the   North­South   and East­West   Corridors   and   a   few   more   prominent   green­field Highways/Expressways,   the   Central   Government   has   been generally taking up development of NH Projects through up­ gradation   of   the   existing   State   Highways,   major   district roads and other roads, which, in other words, are known as the   brown­field   projects.   The   configuration   of   National Highways   varies   from   –   Two­Lane   with   paved   shoulders (largely   covering   the   NHs   connecting   interiors,   backward   & tribal areas, tourist destinations, and the roads constructed in   the   hill   states   of   North­west   and   North­east),   to   up­ gradation   from   the   existing   2­lane   roads   to   four­lane/six­ lane and eight­lane, depending upon traffic volumes between the origin, intervening and destination points.  3. Approval of the Bharatmala Pariyojana by the CCEA in October   2017,   marks   a   major   shift   in   approach,   with   focus on   corridor   approach,   wherein   it   is   planned   to   optimize   the efficiency   of   existing   National   Corridors,   develop   Economic Corridors   and   new   Expressways,   take   up   roads   for   inter­ connectivity,   apart   from   construction   of   ring   roads/ bypasses   around   28   major   towns   to   remove   the   congestion and   choke   points.   The   ultimate   intended   objective   is   to construct major road corridors with improved geometry, which   reduce   travel   time   and   costs,   and   help   in   faster movement   of   people   and   goods   with   attendant   road safety parameters .  4. The   lower   categories   of   existing   roads   contain   several inherent   deficiencies   especially   in   conformance   to   design standards,   alignment/   geometry,   land   width   etc.   which   at times   also   become   road   safety   hazards   and   which   are   not addressed   before   declaration   of   these   roads   as   National Highways.   Up­gradation   of   the   existing   road   arteries   to 88 National   Highways   has   been   found   to   be   sub­optimal   in many cases due to the following factors: (i) Existing   roads   have   been   developed   with greater   focus   on   connecting   the   en­route   towns and   places,   which   is   often   seen   to   be compromising   on   the   road   geometry   and   leading to   longer   distance   between   the   major   origin­ destination   points.   A   majority   of   these   roads follow   serpentine   alignments   as   compared   to crow­flight alignments; (ii) Expansion   of   an   existing   road   necessarily involves:   (a)   acquisition   of   additional   land   for   the required   Right   of   Way   (RoW),   (b)   shifting   of utilities,   and   (c)   felling   of   trees   along   the   existing alignment.   Further,   as   road   arteries   are considered   to   create   huge   value   to   the   land abutting   the   road   and   the   adjoining   areas,   the land   situated   along/   abutting   any   existing   road artery (including a rural road) costs at least twice as much as the land under a greenfield alignment would do; (iii) Serious   constraints   have   been   faced   in acquisition   of   land   for   widening   of   an   existing road   especially   in   areas   where habitations/commercial   activities   have   come   up over time, which necessitate demolition of existing structures   in   such   inhabited   areas,   which   often leads to compromise on the required uniform RoW and entail associated costs & time; (iv) Removal/demolition   of   existing   built­up structures   along   the   required   RoW   makes   it   not only difficult but also far more expensive in terms of   the   associated   costs.   It   becomes   all   the   more challenging   when  it   comes   to  removal  of  religious structures   (e.g.   temples,   mosques   churches   etc. which   are   again   found   to  be   in   existence   in   large numbers along the existing roads); (v) Widening   of   existing   roads   further necessarily   requires   shifting   of   the   utilities (electrical,   water   supply   and   other   utilities)   laid along   the   existing   RoW,   entailing   considerable costs and time; (vi) Further,   in   the   same   vein,   widening   of   the existing   roads   require   felling   of   trees,   requiring forest   related   approvals   and   associated   costs   in 89 terms of payment of NPV and felling charges apart from   damage   to   the   existing   green   cover   and   the time taken in completion of these processes.  5. As   such,   the   determination   of   proper   alignment   of a   NH   project   has   become   very   critical.   While   selecting the   route/alignment   of   the   National   Highways,   various factors   are   to   be   considered   such   as   the   cost   of   land, cost   of   building/establishment,   cost   of   shifting   of utilities, construction cost of the road, cost of the safety features,   transportation   cost/road   user   cost, maintenance cost etc. In such a situation, there is every likelihood of achieving a better alternative in the form of a green­field alignment, a few km away, to the left/right or north/south of the existing alignment . A few test cases have shown that most of these challenges are effectively met. If   we   take   up   construction   of   green­field   NH   arteries, especially where the traffic volumes justify up­gradation of a two­lane   road   to   higher   configurations,   which   offer   the following advantages: (i) Typically, the available RoW in an existing 2­lane   road   varies   between   12   mtrs   to   24  mtrs maximum.   As   per   the   NH   norms   for   a   4/6/8 lane Highway, we require a minimum RoW of 60 mtrs. (the norm for an Expressway is 90 mtrs.). It   has   been   found   that   it   is   eminently   feasible to   acquire   a   RoW   of   60   to   70   mtrs   for   the green­field   in   the   same   cost   as   involved   in expansion   of   an   existing   road,   especially   when we   take   into   account   the   associated   costs   and time   taken   in   utility   shifting,   tree­felling, additional   compensation   for   demolition   of structures coming in the expanded RoW; (ii) A green­field Highway with a RoW of 60 to 70 mtrs. would cater to the traffic­flows and up­ gradation   of  such  Highway  up   to 8­lanes,   along with   service   roads,   wherever   required   (say,   it gives   a   long   term  perspective   of   about   next  30 to 40 years); (iii) Offers   the   choice   of   a   near­perfect   (crow­ flight)   road   geometry,   with   reduced   distance and   savings   on   travel­time   and   fuel   costs.   The towns   situated   in   close   vicinity   to   such 90 alignments   can   always   be   connected   to   the Highway with spurs: (iv) The   land   acquisition   is   faster,   with minimal resistance and cost­effective; (v) It  opens   up   the   potential   for  development of   new   areas   and   wealth   creation   for   the   less developed areas .  6. It   has   also   been   observed   that   in   case   National Highways are developed along the existing roads alignments, the problems of traffic hazards are not substantially resolved especially   in   the   city/town   area,   which   may   lead   to   delays and congestion costs also.  In case of green­field alignment, it   becomes   feasible   to   avoid   such   delays   and congestions.   As   such,   in   carrying   out   the   cost­benefit analysis   of   both   the   options,   factors   such   as environmental and social impact may also be considered besides carrying out cost comparison towards delays and congestion removal .  7. Accordingly, the Consultants involved in preparation of DPRs   for   development   of   National   Highways,   especially where   it   is   proposed   to   upgrade   an   existing   two­lane Highway to a higher configuration of 4/6/8 lane, and where Notification   under   Section   3D   of   the   NH   Act,   1956   has   not yet   been   issued,   shall   necessarily   carry   out   a   comparative cost­benefit   analysis   while   recommending   the route/alignment   of   highway   development   along   the   existing alignment,   with   the   alternate   option   of   a   green­field alignment,   which   is   a   few   kms   away   from   the   existing alignment.   While   carrying   out   the   cost   benefit   analysis   of both the options, the following factors shall be considered: (i) Extant of land acquisition and the associated costs; (ii) Number of structures required to be acquired along their extant and costs.  (iii) The   quantum   of   utilities   and   costs   required for their shifting.  (iv) The   extent   of   tree­felling   and   the   associated cost & time for obtaining the requisite permissions.  8. Keeping   the   aforesaid   in   view,   agencies   executing the NH projects on behalf on MoRTH, are hereby advised to: 91 (i) Require   their   DPR   consultants   for   each project  (especially  wherein   it   is   envisaged   to   be upgraded to 4­lane and above configurations and in   respect   of   which   Notification   under   Section 3D   has   not   been   issued),   to   examine   the feasibility of development of a green­field NH in each case; (ii) While examining the feasibility of a green­ field   alignment   between   the   origin   and destination   points,   it   should,   as   far  as   possible, follow a crow­flight route alignment with a little distance   from   the   existing   habitations/towns and   identify   the   towns   that   need   to   be connected through spurs.  (iii) Clearly   bring   out   in   its   report   the advantages   in   terms   of   reduction   in length/distance,   geometric   improvements   and other   advantages   along   with   the   cost­benefit analysis so as to enable the competent authority to take considered decisions in this behalf.  9. Approach to development of NH along a Green­field alignment: In   case   the   green­field   alignment   option   works out to be a preferred option, then – (i) The   entire   RoW   (60m­70m)   may   be acquired for a maximum capacity of 8 lane main carriage­way with provision for service roads. In case   of   Expressways,   90m   RoW   shall   be acquired.  (ii) Initially   4­lane   carriage­way   with   4­lane structures   shall   be   developed   with   additional land left in the median for future expansion.  (iii) The   highway   shall   have   provision   for service   roads,   preferably   of   10   mtrs   width,   with maximum   access­control   for   the   main   carriage­ way.  (iv) Access to  the  towns/cities/establishments located   on   the   existing   National   Highway,   may be   provided   through   spurs   from   the   green­filed route .  10. It   has,   therefore,   been   decided   with   the   approval   of competent   authority   that   such   analysis   is   to   be   made   an 92 integral   part   of   the   DPR   preparation.   Accordingly,   the contents   of   this   circular   may   be   incorporated   in   the   TOR   of the   DPR   consultancy.   All   the   executive   agencies   are requested to adhere to these guidelines.” (emphasis supplied) 45. There   is   no   challenge   to   these   guidelines.     Indeed,   these guidelines have been issued after the decision was already taken on   19.1.2018   in   respect   of   section   ­   C­K­S   (NC)   in   lieu   of   C­M (EC)   section.     However,   it   needs   to   be   understood   that   the decision  was  taken   by   the  broad­based  Committee  of  experts, of which   the   Secretary   of   the   same   Ministry   (MoRTH)   which   had issued   the   guidelines   on   26.2.2018,   was   the   Chairperson alongwith  the other  officials including  the officials of NHAI.   The decision   regarding   change   is  a  policy   decision.     Moreso,   keeping in mind that the change in alignment and the purpose of such a change  is  stated  to   be  for  strengthening   the   national   corridor  in preference to the economic corridor in the region, it is not open to disregard   this   opinion   of   the   Central   Government   based   on   the recommendation   of   the   Committee   constituted   by   it   for   that singular purpose.   46. This   Court   in   Sooraram   Pratap   Reddy   (supra)   had   held that   it   is   the   primary   duty   of   the   competent   authority   to   decide whether there exists public purpose or not.   The Courts may not 93 ordinarily interfere with that unless the power is being exercised malafide   or   for   collateral   purposes   or   the   decision   is   dehors   the Act, irrational  or  otherwise unreasonable or  so­called purpose is no   public   purpose   at   all   and   fraud   of   statute   is   manifest. Further,   it   is   not   for   the   Courts   to   sit   over   such   decision   as   a Court(s)   of   appeal   and   to   disregard   it   merely   because   another option would have been more beneficial.  We may usefully advert to   the   dictum   of   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in Somawanti   (supra).   In paragraph 36 (of SCCOnline), the Court observed thus: ­ “ 36.   Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land   is   needed   is   a   public   purpose   or   not   is   for   the   State Government   to   be   satisfied   about.   If   the   purpose   for   which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legisla ­ tive   competence   of   the   State   the   declaration   of   the   Govern ­ ment   will   be   final   subject,   however,   to   one   exception.   That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration   will   be   open   to   challenge   at   the   instance   of   the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the   Act   is   a   limited   power   in   the   sense   that   it   can   be   exer ­ cised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the   Government   is   satisfied   about   is   not   a   public   purpose but   a  private  purpose   or   no  purpose  at   all  the   action  of  the Government   would   be   colourable   as   not   being   relatable   to the   power   conferred   upon   it   by   the   Act   and   its   declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will be final.” In   the   present   case,   it   is   seen   that   the   basis   for   taking   such informed   decision   by   the   Committee   is   ascribable   to   tangible 94 aspects   referred   to   in   the   minutes   of   the   meeting   held   on 19.1.2018   (as   is   manifest   from   the   factual   aspects   recorded therein).   The decision of this Court in   Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons  (supra) will be of no avail, because we find that the decision of   the   Committee   was   well­informed   and   backed   by   reasons guided by public interest.  We must remind ourselves of the word of caution noted by this Court in  Col. A.S. Sangwan  (supra) that the   Courts   should   be   loath   in   dealing   with   policy   and administrative reasons.  The Court observed thus: ­ “ 4.   ….  A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to   the   compulsions   of   circumstances   and   the   impera ­ tives   of   national   considerations.   We   cannot,   as   court, give   directives   as   to   how   the   Defence   Ministry   should function except to state that the obligation not to act ar ­ bitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union   of   India   because   it   functions   under   the   Constitu ­ tion and not   over   it . … So, whatever policy is made should be   done   fairly   and   made   known   to   those   concerned.   So,   we make   it   clear   that   while   the   Central   Government   is   beyond the forbiddance of the court from making or changing its pol ­ icy   in   regard   to   the   Directorate   of   Military   Farms   or   in   the choice or promotion of Brigadiers, it has to act fairly as every administrative act must be done.” (emphasis supplied) We   may   usefully   advert   to   yet   another   decision   of   this   Court   in Cipla Ltd.  (supra), wherein the Court observed thus: ­ 95 “ 4.1.   It   is   axiomatic   that   the   contents   of   a   policy   docu ­ ment cannot be  read  and interpreted  as statutory provi ­ sions.   Too   much   of   legalism   cannot   be   imported   in   un ­ derstanding   the   scope   and   meaning   of   the   clauses   con ­ tained   in   policy   formulations .   At   the   same   time,   the   Cen ­ tral   Government   which   combines   the   dual   role   of   policy­ maker   and   the   delegate   of   legislative   power,   cannot   at   its sweet will and pleasure give a go­by  to the policy  guidelines evolved  by   itself  in the  matter  of  selection  of  drugs  for   price control. …    It is nobody's case that for any good reasons, the   policy   or   norms   have   been   changed   or   have   become impracticable   of   compliance.   That   being   the   case,   the Government   exercising   its   delegated   legislative   power should make a real and earnest attempt to apply the cri ­ teria laid down by itself . The delegated legislation that fol ­ lows  the policy   formulation should  be  broadly   and  substan ­ tially   in   conformity   with   that   policy,   otherwise   it   would   be vulnerable to attack on the ground of arbitrariness resulting in violation of Article 14. 4.2.   In   Indian  Express  Newspapers  (Bom)  (P)  Ltd.   v.   Union  of India   [(1985) 1 SCC  641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] the grounds on   which   subordinate   legislation   can   be   questioned   were outlined   by   this   Court.   E.S.   Venkataramiah,   J.   observed thus: (SCC p. 689, para 75) “ 75 .   A   piece   of   subordinate   legislation   does   not carry   the   same   degree   of   immunity   which   is   en ­ joyed   by   a   statute   passed   by   a   competent   legisla ­ ture. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary  legislation is questioned.   In   addition   it   may   also   be   questioned on   the   ground   that   it   does   not   conform   to   the statute   under   which   it   is   made.   …   It   may   also   be questioned   on   the   ground   that   it   is  unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reason ­ able,   but   in   the   sense   that   it   is   manifestly   arbi ­ trary.   In   England,   the   Judges   would   say   ‘Parlia ­ ment never intended authority to make such rules. They are unreasonable and ultra vires’.” 4.3.   True,   the   breach   of   policy   decision   by   itself   is   not   a ground   to   invalidate   delegated   legislation.   …     No   doubt,   in such   matters,   wide   latitude   is   conceded   to   the   legisla ­ ture or its delegate. Broadly, the subordinate law­making authority   is   guided   by   the   policy   and   objectives   of   the primary   legislation   disclosed   by   the   preamble   and   other provisions.   The   delegated   legislation   need   not   be   mod ­ 96 elled   on   a   set   pattern   or   prefixed   guidelines .   However, where   the   delegate   goes   a   step   further,   draws   up   and   an ­ nounces a rational policy in keeping with the purposes of the enabling   legislation   and   even   lays   down   specific   criteria   to promote the policy, the criteria so evolved become the guide ­ posts   for   its   legislative   action.   In   that   sense,   its   freedom   of classification   will   be   regulated   by   the   self­evolved   criteria and there  should be demonstrable justification for  deviating therefrom.   Though   exactitude   and   meticulous   conformance is  not what  is  required, it  is  not  open  to the  Government  to go haywire and flout or debilitate the set norms either by giv ­ ing   distorted   meaning   to   them   or   by   disregarding   the   very facts   and   factors   which   it   professed   to   take   into   account   in the interest of transparency and objectivity. …”   (emphasis supplied) 47. Be   it   noted   that   the   notifications   under   Section   2(2)   to declare the C­K­S (NC) section as NH­179A and NH­179B, as the case   may   be,   were   issued   only   after   due   deliberation   by   the broad­based committee of experts, which decision we find is also in   conformity   with   the   guidelines   contemporaneously   issued   by the   concerned   department   on   the   same   subject   matter.     Such   a decision   cannot   be   labelled   as   manifestly   arbitrary,   irrational   or taken in undue haste as such.  As a result, it was not open to the High   Court   to   interfere   with   the   change   so   articulated   in   the meeting   held   on   19.1.2018   or   the   notifications   issued   under Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act   declaring   C­K­S   (NC)   as   a   national highway   (i.e.   NH­179A   and   NH­179B).     The   declaration   of   a highway being a national highway is within the exclusive domain 97 of   the   Central   Government   in   terms   of   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956 Act.  The argument of the land owners that prior approvals ought to   have   been   obtained   from   the   CCEA   and   regarding   budgetary arrangement,   is   premised   on   the   manuals   which   govern   the functioning   of   the   executing   agency   (NHAI).     As   the   decision regarding   change   of   stretch/section   has   been   taken   by   the concerned   department   of   the   Central   Government   itself   and   the approved Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna ­ Phase I) also recognises that such change in the form of substitution/replacement of the stretch/section   can   be   done   by   the   Ministry   upto   15%   length   of 24,800   kms.,   so   long   as   it   does   not   entail   in   incurring   of additional   costs,   it   becomes   integral   part   of   the   originally approved   project   (for   Phase   I)   for   all   purposes.     In   the   present case,   the   costs   for   construction   of   C­K­S   (NC)   were   bound   to   be less than  the originally  conceived  C­M (EC), as the  length  of the road is reduced significantly.  In other words, it would operate as minor   change   to   the   original   plan   with   deemed   approval   thereof and   get   interpolated   therein.     Further,   the   minutes   recorded   on 19.1.2018   do   indicate   that   the   decision   was   to   be   placed   before the   CCEA   in   the   ensuing   biannual   meeting,   where   it   would   be duly ratified.   Suffice it to observe that the decision taken by the 98 Committee   which   culminated   with   the   issuance   of   notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act is in complete conformity with the governing provisions and guidelines and founded on tangible and   objective   facts   noted   in   the   minutes   dated   19.1.2018.     The Central Government had full authority to adopt such a change of stretch/section,   by   way   of   substitution/replacement   whilst ensuring   that   there   is   no   need   for   higher   budgetary   allocation than   envisaged   in   the   already   approved   programme   for   Phase   I. Thus,   there   is   no   legal   basis   to   doubt   the   validity   of   the notification   under   Section   2(2)   and   ex   consequenti   Section   3A   of the 1956 Act as well. 48. The   High   Court   has   completely   glossed   over   these   crucial aspects and entered into the domain of sufficiency and adequacy of   material   including   the   appropriateness   of   the   route   approved by the competent authority.  Such enquiry, in exercise of judicial review is forbidden.  Furthermore, the High Court, despite noting that   judicial   interference   in   acquisition   matters   is   limited,   went on   to   interfere   in   the   guise   of   extra­ordinary   circumstances obtaining   in   this   case.     On   a   thorough   perusal,   the   impugned judgment does not reveal any just circumstance for invoking the judicial   review   jurisdiction.     In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we 99 hold   that   challenge   to   the   decision   of   the   Committee   and   ex consequenti   of   the   Central   Government,   regarding   change   of section   –   C­M   (EC)   to   C­K­S   (NC)   at   the   micro   level   for   the implementation   of  the  original  Project  as  approved,  ought   not   to have   been   doubted   by   the   High   Court.     Notably,   in   the   final conclusion   and   declaration   issued   by   the   High   Court,   it   has justly not struck down the notifications under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act.  In other words, so long as Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act was   to   remain   in   force   and   the   decision   regarding   change   of stretch/section   to   C­K­S   (NC)   being   the   foundation   for   issue   of notification   under   Section   3A,   would   continue   to   bind   all concerned   and   in   particular,   the   officials   of   NHAI   being   the executing agency. PRIOR ENVIRONMENTAL/FOREST CLEARANCE: STAGE 49. That   takes   us   to   the   next   challenge   premised   on   the argument   that   notification   under   Section   3A(1)   of   the   1956   Act could   not   have   been   issued   without   prior   permission   of   the competent   authority   under   the   environmental/forest   laws.     This argument   is   based   on   the   dictum   of   this   Court   in   Karnataka Industrial   Areas   Development   Board   (supra).     In   paragraph 100 100   of   the   said   decision,   a   general   direction   came   to   be   issued that   in   future,   before   acquisition   of   lands   for   development,   the consequence and adverse impact of development on environment must   be   properly   comprehended   and   the   lands   be   acquired   for development   that   they   do   not   gravely   impair   the   ecology   and environment.     Paragraphs   100   and   101   of   the   reported   decision are extracted hereunder: ­ “ 100. The   importance   and   awareness   of   environment   and ecology   is   becoming   so   vital   and   important   that   we,   in   our judgment, want the appellant to insist on the conditions em ­ anating from the principle of “Sustainable Development”: ( 1 ) We direct that, in future, before acquisi ­ tion   of   lands   for   development,   the   conse ­ quence   and   adverse   impact   of   development on   environment   must   be   properly   compre ­ hended   and   the   lands   be   acquired   for   devel ­ opment   that   they   do   not   gravely   impair   the ecology and environment . ( 2 ) We also direct the appellant to incorporate the   condition   of   allotment   to   obtain   clearance from   the   Karnataka   State   Pollution   Control Board   before   the   land   is   allotted   for   develop ­ ment.   The   said   directory   condition   of   allotment of   lands   be   converted   into   a   mandatory   condi ­ tion   for   all   the   projects   to   be   sanctioned   in   fu ­ ture. 101.   This has been an interesting judicial pilgrimage for the last four decades. In our opinion, this is a significant contri ­ bution   of   the   judiciary   in   making   serious   endeavour   to  pre ­ serve   and   protect   ecology   and   environment,   in   consonance with the provisions of the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) Support is also drawn from the notification/Office Memorandum issued by the MoEF dated 14.9.2006 and 7.10.2014 respectively. Our   attention   is   also   invited   to   exposition   in   M.   Velu   (supra), following the aforementioned decision of this Court. 101 50. The   question   as   to   whether   the   competent   authority   under the   1956   Act   is   obliged   to   take   prior   permission   before   issuing notification   under   Section   3A   of   the   Act,   must   be   answered primarily   on   the   basis   of   the   scheme   of   the   enactments   under consideration.   As regards power to acquire land for the purpose of   building,   maintenance,   management   and   operation   of   a national highway or part thereof, the same has been bestowed on the  Central Government  in terms  of Section  3A of  the 1956 Act. There   is   nothing   in   the   1956   Act,   which   impels   the   Central Government   to   obtain   prior   environment   clearance   before exercise   of   that   power   and   in   issuing   notification   under   Section 2(2), much less Section 3A expressing its intention to acquire the designated land.   51. The   Central   Government   has   framed   rules   in   exercise   of power   under   Section   9   of   the   1956   Act,   titled   as   the   National Highways Rules, 1957 49 .   These rules are required to be followed by  the executing  agency.   There is nothing, even  in these Rules, to   remotely   suggest   that   the   Central   Government   is   obliged   to obtain   prior   permission(s)   under   environmental/forest   laws before   issuing   notification   under   Section   3A.     The   executing 49 For short “the 1957 Rules” 102 agency is none else, but established under the 1988 Act, namely, the NHAI.   Before NHAI commences the execution of any original work,   it   has   to   abide   by   the   norms   specified   in   the   1957   Rules regarding   preparation   of   estimate   of   work   etc.     The   Schedule   of the   1957   Rules   stipulates   conditions   for   the   issue   of   technical approval   and   financial   sanction   to   plan   and   estimate   for execution of any  original work on a national highway costing  an amount   not   exceeding   Rs.50   lakhs   by   the   executing   agency concerned.     Neither   the   1956   Act,   the   Rules   framed   thereunder i.e.   the   1957   Rules   nor   the   1988   Act   and   the   Rules   made thereunder   have   any   bearing   on   the   question   under consideration.     None   of   these   enactments/rules   specify   any express   condition   requiring   Central   Government   to   obtain   prior environmental/forest   clearance   before   issuing   notification   under Section   2(2)   declaring   the   stretch/section   to   be   a   national highway   or   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   to   express   intention   to acquire   land   for   the   purpose   of   building,   maintenance, management or operation of a national highway, as the case may be.   52. Reverting   to   the   notification   issued   by   the   MoEF   dated 14.9.2006, even  this  notification  does  not   constrict  the  power   of 103 Central   Government   to   issue   notification   under   Section   2(2)   or Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act.     There   is   nothing   to   suggest   that before expressing intention to acquire any land for the purpose of the   1956   Act,   prior   environmental/forest   clearance   is   required. The   environmental/forest   clearance,   however,   is,   required   to   be obtained   by   the   executing   agency   in   terms   of   this   notification “before   commencing   the   actual   work   or   executing   the   proposed work/project”.     That   would   happen   only   after   the   land   is   vested in   the   NHAI   or   the   NHAI   was   to   be   entrusted   with   the development work of concerned national highway by the Central Government   in   exercise   of   powers   under   Section   5   of   the   1956 Act read with Section 11 of the 1988 Act.  The land would vest in the   Central   Government   under   the   1956   Act   only   after publication  of   declaration   of  acquisition   under   Section  3D.     And until   then,   the   question   of   Central   Government   vesting   it   in favour of NHAI under Section 11 of the 1988 Act would not arise. However,   until   the   vesting   of   the   land,   the   Central   Government and   its   authorised   officer   can   undertake   surveys   of   the   notified lands   by   entering   upon   it   in   terms   of   Section   3B   of   the   Act. Pertinently,   the   activities   predicated   in   Section   3B   are   of exploration   for   verifying   the   feasibility   and   viability   of   land   for 104 construction of a national highway.  These are one­time activities and   not   in   the   nature   of   exploitation   of   the   land   for   continuous commercial/industrial   activities   as   such.     There   is   remote possibility of irretrievable wide spread environmental impact due to   carrying   out   activities   referred   to   in   Section   3B   for   assessing the   worthiness   of   the   land   for   using   it   as   a   national   highway. Thus,   the   question   of   applying   notification   of   2006   at   this   stage does   not   arise,   much   less   obligate   the   Central   Government   to follow directives thereunder. 53. We   may   now   revert   to   Section   4   of   the   1956   Act.     That provides   for   vesting   of   the   national   highway   in   the   Union   and after   such   vesting,   the   primary   responsibility   of   developing   and maintaining   the   national   highway   is   that   of   the   Central Government.     In   terms   of   Section   5,   it   is   open   to   the   Central Government   to   call   upon   the   Government   of   the   State   within which   the   national   highway   is   situated   or   by   any   officer   or authority subordinate to the Central Government or to the State Government.  Section 5 reads thus: ­ “ 5. Responsibility for development and maintenance of national   highways .   –   It   shall   be   the   responsibility   of   the Central   Government   to   develop   and   maintain   in   proper repair   all   national   highways;   but   the   Central   Government may,   by   notification   in   the   Official   Gazette,   direct   that   any 105 function   in   relation   to   the   development   or   maintenance   of any   national   highway   shall,   subject   to   such   conditions,   if any,   as   may   be   specified   in   the   notification,   also   be exercisable by the Government of the State within which the national   highway   is   situated   or   by   any   officer   or   authority subordinate   to   the   Central   Government   or   to   the   State Government.” As   per   Section   6,   the  Central  Government   is  competent  to  issue directions   to   the   Government   of   any   State   for   carrying   out   the provisions of the Act within the State.   54. It is indisputable that NHAI is an authority appointed by the Central   Government   under   the   1988   Act.     This   authority   is   a functional   body   constituted   under   Section   3   of   the   1988   Act. Chapter   III   of   the   1988   Act   provides   for   the   manner   of   dealing with the contracts to be entered into by NHAI.  Sections 11 to 13 deal   with   the   power   of   the   Central   Government   to   vest   in   or entrust   to   the   Authority   (NHAI),   transfer   of   assets   and   liabilities of   the   Central   Government   to   the   Authority   (NHAI)   and   the compulsory acquisition of land for the Authority.   The same read thus: ­ “ 11. Power of the Central Government to vest or entrust any   national   highway   in   the   Authority.   —The   Central Government   may,   from   time   to   time,   by   notification   in   the Official   Gazette,   vest   in,   or   entrust   to,   the   Authority,   such national highway  or any  stretch thereof as may  be specified in such notification. 106 12.   Transfer   of   assets   and   liabilities   of   the   Central Government  to   the   Authority.   —(1)   On   and   from   the  date of publication of the notification under section 11,—  (a)  all   debts,   obligations   and   liabilities   incurred,   all contracts entered into and all matters and things engaged to be   done   by,   with,   or   for,   the   Central   Government, immediately   before   such   date   for   or   in   connection   with   the purposes   of   any   national   highway   or   any   stretch   thereof vested  in, or  entrusted  to,  the  Authority  under  that  section, shall   be   deemed   to   have   been   incurred,   entered   into   and engaged to be done by, with, or for, the Authority;  (b)  all   non­recurring   expenditure   incurred   by   or   for   the Central   Government   for   or   in   connection   with   the   purposes of any national highway or any stretch thereof, so vested in, or entrusted to, the Authority, up to such date and declared to   be   capital   expenditure   by   the   Central   Government   shall, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed, be treated as capital provided by the Central Government to the Authority;  (c)  all   sums   of   money   due   to   the   Central   Government   in relation   to   any   national   highway   or   any   stretch   thereof,   so vested   in,   or   entrusted   to,   the   Authority   immediately   before such date shall be deemed to be due to the Authority;  (d)  all   suits   and   other   legal   proceedings   instituted   or which   could   have   been   instituted   by   or   against   the   Central Government immediately before such date for any matter  in relation to such national highway or any stretch thereof may be continued or instituted by or against the Authority.  (2)   If  any   dispute   arises   as  to   which   of   the   assets,   rights   or liabilities   of   the   Central   Government   have   been   transferred to   the   Authority,   such   dispute   shall   be   decided   by   the Central Government.  13.   Compulsory   acquisition   of   land   for  the   Authority.   — Any   land   required   by   the   Authority   for   discharging   its functions under  this Act shall be deemed to be land needed for a public purpose and such land may be acquired for the Authority under the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956). Chapter   IV   of   the   1988   Act,   in   particular,   Section   16   thereof, deals with the functions of the Authority (NHAI).  The same reads thus:­ 107 “ 16. Functions of the Authority.  — (1) Subject to the rules made   by   the   Central   Government   in   this   behalf,   it   shall   be the   function   of   the   Authority   to   develop,   maintain   and manage   the   national   highways   and   any   other   highways vested in, or entrusted to, it by the Government.  (2)   Without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of   the   provisions contained   in   sub­section   (1),   the   Authority   may,   for   the discharge of its functions—  (a)  survey, develop, maintain and manage highways vested in, or entrusted to, it;  (b)  construct   offices   or   workshops   and   establish and   maintain   hotels,   motels,   restaurants   and   rest­ rooms at or near the highways vested in, or entrusted to, it;  (c)  construct   residential   buildings   and   townships for its employees; (d)  regulate and control the plying of vehicles on the highways   vested   in,   or   entrusted   to,   it   for   the   proper management thereof;  (e)  develop   and   provide   consultancy   and construction services in India and abroad and carry on research   activities   in   relation   to   the   development, maintenance   and   management   of   highways   or   any facilities thereat; (f)  provide   such   facilities   and   amenities   for   the users  of the highways vested  in, or  entrusted to, it  as are,   in   the   opinion   of   the   Authority,  necessary   for   the smooth flow of traffic on such highways;  (g)  form   one   or   more   companies   under   the Companies   Act,   1956   (1   of   1956)   to   further   the efficient   discharge   of   the   functions   imposed   on   it   by this Act;  (h)  engage,   or   entrust   any   of   its   functions   to,   any person   on   such   terms   and   conditions   as   may   be prescribed; (i)  advise   the   Central   Government   on   matters relating to highways; (j)  assist, on such terms and conditions as may be mutually   agreed   upon,   any   State   Government   in   the formulation   and   implementation   of   schemes   for highway development;  (k)  collect fees on behalf of the Central Government for services or benefits rendered under section 7 of the 108 National Highways Act, 1956 (48 of 1956), as amended from time to time, and such other fees on behalf of the State   Governments   on   such   terms   and   conditions   as may be specified by such State Governments; and  (l)  take   all   such   steps   as   may   be   necessary   or convenient for, or may be incidental to, the exercise of any   power   or   the   discharge   of   any   function   conferred or imposed on it by this Act.  (3)  Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as —  (a)  authorising   the   disregard   by   the   Authority   of any law for the time being in force; or  (b)  authorising   any   person   to   institute   any proceeding in respect of a duty or liability to which the Authority   or   its   officers   or   other   employees   would   not otherwise be subject under this Act.” 55. On   plain   and   harmonious   construction   of   the   provisions   of the   two   enactments   (i.e.   the   1956   Act   and   the   1988   Act),   it   is amply   clear   that   at   the   stage   of   issuing   notifications   under Section 2(2) or for that matter, Section 3A of the Act, there is no need to seek prior permission (by the Central Government) under environmental   laws   or   the   forest   laws,   as   the   case   may   be. Further,   the   purpose   of   public   hearing   in   the   concerned enactments   (namely,   the   1956   and   1988   Acts   on   the   one   hand and   the   1986   Act   or   forest   laws,   on   the   other)   is   qualitatively different and contextual to matters relevant under the concerned enactment.     The   competent   authority   in   the   former,   may   be satisfied   that   the   acquisition   of   land   in   question   is   for   public purpose,   but   if   the   competent   authority   under   the   latter 109 legislations   is   of   the   view   that   the   execution   of   the   project   in question   (construction   of   a   national   highway)   or   any   portion thereof   may   cause   irretrievable   comprehensive   impact   on   the environment   or   the   forests,   as   the   case   may   be,   would   be competent   to   deny   permission   to   such   a   project   as   a   whole   or part   thereof.     That   decision   must   then   prevail,   being   in   public interests.     This   is   not   to   say   that   one   competent   authority   is superior   to   the   other,   but   such   balancing   becomes   essential   to effectuate the public purposes under the stated enactments.  It is quite   possible   that   the   executing   agency   (NHAI)   may   be   able   to convince   the   competent   authority   under   the   latter   enactments that   certain   remedial   steps   can   minimise   or   mitigate   the environmental   impact   or   to   the   forest,   as   the   case   may   be,   and commend it to accord conditional approval/permission to execute the   project   so   as   to   conform   to   the   tenets   of   sustainable development.     If   that   suggestion   commends   to   the   competent authority   under   the   environmental/forest   laws,   such clearance/permission can be granted after the public hearing.   56. As   regards   the   decision   in   Raghbir   Singh   Sehrawat (supra), the  same  may  have  relevance at  the  time  of considering 110 the objections to be dealt with by the competent authority under the   1956   Act   during   the   public   hearing   under   Section   3C.     The dictum   in   this   decision   cannot   be   the   basis   to   doubt   the   well­ considered   decision   dated   19.1.2018   nor   the   notification   issued by   the   Central   Government   under   Section   2(2)   of   the   1956   Act declaring the stretch between C­K­S (NC) as a national highway.   57. Even   in   the   case   of   R.S.   Nanji   (supra),   the   Constitution Bench   highlighted   the   sweep   of   expression   “public   purpose”   in the context of challenge to the order of the competent authority to requisition   the   premises.     As   noted   earlier,   the   satisfaction regarding   public   interests   or   necessity   to   acquire   the   land   in question   for   public   purpose   for   construction   of   a   new   national highway,   is   a   matter   which   needs   to   be   considered   by   the competent authority during the public hearing under Section 3C of   the   1956   Act.     The   challenge   before   the   High   Court   in   the present case was before that stage had reached, for which reason we do not wish to dilate on this reported decision any further. 58. Suffice   it   to   observe   that   the   subject   notification   of   2006 and   Office   Memorandum   dated   7.10.2014   ordain   that   such permission   is   required   to   be   obtained   (only)   before 111 commencement of the work of the new project or activities or on the   expansion   or   improvisation   of   the   project   or   activities   based on   their   potential   environment   impact.     The   notification   dated 14.9.2006 reads thus:­ “ (Published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part­ II, and Section 3, Sub­section (ii) MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS New Delhi 14 th  September, 2006  Notification         S.O.   1533     Whereas,   a   draft   notification   under   sub­rule   (3) of   Rule   5   of   the   Environment   (Protection)   Rules,   1986 for   imposing   certain   restrictions   and   prohibitions   on   new projects or activities, or on the expansion or modernization of existing   projects   or   activities   based   on   their   potential environmental   impacts   as   indicated   in   the   Schedule   to   the notification,   being   undertaken   in   any   part   of   India 1 ,   unless prior   environmental   clearance   has   been   accorded   in accordance   with   the   objectives   of   National   Environment Policy   as   approved   by   the   Union   Cabinet   on   18 th   May, 2006   and the procedure specified in the notification,   by the Central   Government   or   the   State   or   Union   territory   Level Environment   Impact   Assessment   Authority   (SEIAA),   to   be constituted  by   the  Central Government   in consultation with the   State   Government   or   the   Union   territory   Administration concerned   under   sub­section   (3)   of   section   3   of   the Environment   (Protection)   Act,   1986   for   the   purpose   of   this notification,   was     published   in   the   Gazette   of   India ,Extraordinary,   Part   II,   section   3,   sub­section   (ii)   vide number   S.O.   1324   (E)   dated   the   15 th   September   ,2005 inviting objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be   affected   thereby   within   a   period   of   sixty   days   from   the date   on   which   copies   of   Gazette   containing   the   said notification were made available to the public;  And   whereas,   copies   of   the   said   notification   were   made available to the public on 15 th  September, 2005;  112 And   whereas,   all   objections   and   suggestions   received   in response to the above mentioned draft notification have been duly considered by the Central Government;   Now,   therefore,   in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by   sub­ section   (1)   and   clause     (v)  of   sub­section    (2)   of   section   3   of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, read with clause (d) of   sub­rule   (3)   of   rule   5   of   the   Environment   (Protection) Rules,   1986   and   in  supersession   of   the   notification   number S.O.   60   (E)   dated   the   27 th   January,   1994,   except   in   respect of   things   done   or   omitted   to   be   done   before   such supersession,   the Central  Government  hereby directs that  on and  from  the  date  of  its  publication the  required   construction of   new   projects   or           activities   or     the   expansion   or modernization   of   existing   projects   or   activities   listed   in   the Schedule   to   this   notification     entailing   capacity   addition   with change   in   process   and   or   technology   shall   be   undertaken   in any part of India   only after the prior environmental clearance from   the   Central   Government   or   as   the   case   may   be,   by   the State   Level   Environment   Impact   Assessment   Authority,   duly constituted   by   the   Central   Government   under   sub­section   (3) of section 3 of the said Act, in accordance with the procedure specified hereinafter in this notification .  2. Requirements of prior Environmental Clearance (EC): ­ The   following   projects   or   activities   shall   require   prior environmental   clearance   from   the   concerned   regulatory authority,   which   shall   hereinafter   referred   to   be   as   the Central   Government   in   the   Ministry   of   Environment   and Forests for matters falling under Category ‘A’ in the Schedule and at State level the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority   (SEIAA)   for   matters   falling   under   Category   ‘B’   in the   said   Schedule,   before   any   construction   work,   or preparation   of   land   by   the   project   management   except   for securing the land , is started  on the project or activity:  (i) All new projects or activities listed in the Schedule to this notification;  (ii) Expansion   and   modernization   of   existing   projects or   activities   listed   in   the   Schedule   to   this notification   with   addition   of   capacity   beyond   the limits   specified   for   the   concerned   sector,   that   is, projects   or   activities   which   cross   the   threshold limits   given   in   the   Schedule,   after   expansion   or modernization;  (iii) Any   change   in   product   ­   mix   in   an   existing manufacturing   unit   included   in   Schedule   beyond the specified range.   113 3.     State   Level   Environment   Impact   Assessment Authority:­ ….. 4.      Categorization of projects and activities: ­   (i) All   projects   and   activities   are   broadly   categorized   in   to   two categories ­ Category A and Category B, based on the spatial extent of potential impacts and potential impacts on human health and natural and man made resources.  (ii) All   projects   or   activities   included   as   Category   ‘A’   in   the Schedule, including expansion and modernization of existing projects   or   activities   and   change   in   product   mix,   shall require   prior   environmental   clearance       from   the   Central Government   in   the   Ministry   of   Environment   and   Forests (MoEF)   on   the   recommendations   of   an   Expert   Appraisal Committee   (EAC)   to   be   constituted   by   the   Central Government for the purposes of this notification;  (iii) All   projects   or   activities   included   as   Category   ‘B’   in   the Schedule, including expansion and modernization of existing projects   or   activities   as   specified   in   sub   paragraph   (ii)   of paragraph   2,   or   change   in   product   mix   as   specified   in   sub paragraph   (iii)   of   paragraph   2,   but   excluding   those   which fulfill   the   General   Conditions   (GC)   stipulated   in   the Schedule,   will   require   prior   environmental   clearance   from the   State/Union   territory   Environment   Impact   Assessment Authority   (SEIAA).   The   SEIAA   shall   base   its   decision   on  the recommendations   of   a   State   or   Union   territory   level   Expert Appraisal  Committee   (SEAC)  as to  be   constituted  for  in   this notification.     In   the   absence   of   a   duly   constituted   SEIAA   or SEAC,   a   Category   ‘B’   project   shall   be   treated   as   a   Category ‘A’ project;  5.    Screening, Scoping and Appraisal Committees :­                The same Expert Appraisal Committees (EACs) at the Central   Government   and   SEACs   (hereinafter   referred   to   as the (EAC) and (SEAC) at the State or the Union territory level shall   screen,   scope   and   appraise   projects   or   activities   in Category   ‘A’   and   Category   ‘B’   respectively.   EAC   and   SEAC’s shall meet at least once every month.      ….. 114 6.               Application   for   Prior   Environmental   Clearance (EC):­              An   application   seeking   prior   environmental   clearance   in all   cases   shall   be   made   in   the   prescribed   Form   1   annexed herewith and Supplementary Form 1A, if applicable, as given in   Appendix   II,   after   the   identification   of   prospective   site(s) for   the   project   and/or   activities   to   which   the   application relates,   before   commencing   any   construction   activity,   or preparation   of   land,   at   the   site   by   the   applicant.   The applicant shall furnish, along with the application, a copy of the   pre­feasibility   project   report   except   that,   in   case   of construction projects or activities (item 8 of the Schedule) in addition to Form 1 and the Supplementary Form 1A, a copy of the conceptual plan shall be provided, instead of the pre­ feasibility report.  7.         Stages   in   the   Prior   Environmental   Clearance   (EC) Process for New Projects:­   7(i)        The environmental clearance process for new projects will comprise of a maximum of four stages, all of which may not   apply   to   particular   cases   as   set   forth   below   in   this notification. These four stages in sequential order are:­  • Stage   (1)   Screening   (Only   for   Category   ‘B’ projects and activities)  • Stage  (2) Scoping  • Stage (3) Public Consultation  • Stage (4) Appraisal    I. Stage (1) ­  Screening :              …  II. Stage (2) ­  Scoping :   …..    III.  Stage (3) ­ Public Consultation :   (i) “Public   Consultation”   refers   to   the   process   by   which   the concerns   of   local   affected   persons   and   others   who   have plausible   stake   in   the   environmental   impacts   of   the   project or activity are ascertained with a view to taking into account all  the  material  concerns  in  the  project  or  activity  design  as appropriate.   All   Category   ‘A’   and   Category   B1   projects   or 115 activities   shall   undertake   Public   Consultation,   except   the following: ­ (a) modernization of irrigation projects (item 1(c) (ii) of the Schedule).  (b) all   projects   or   activities   located   within   industrial estates   or   parks   (item   7(c)   of   the   Schedule) approved by the concerned authorities, and which are not disallowed in such approvals.  (c) expansion of Roads and Highways (item 7 (f) of the Schedule)   which   do   not   involve   any   further acquisition of land. (d) all   Building   /Construction   projects/Area Development projects and Townships (item 8).  (e) all Category ‘B2’ projects and activities.  (f) all   projects   or   activities   concerning   national defence   and   security   or   involving   other   strategic considerations   as   determined   by   the   Central Government.    (ii) The   Public   Consultation   shall   ordinarily   have   two components comprising of: ­  (a) a   public   hearing   at   the   site   or   in   its   close proximity­   district   wise,   to   be   carried   out   in   the manner   prescribed   in   Appendix   IV,   for ascertaining concerns of local affected persons;   (b) obtain   responses   in  writing   from   other   concerned persons   having   a   plausible   stake   in   the environmental aspects of the project or activity.   (iii) the   public   hearing   at,  or   in   close   proximity   to,   the   site(s)   in all   cases   shall   be   conducted   by   the   State   Pollution   Control Board   (SPCB)   or   the   Union   territory   Pollution   Control Committee   (UTPCC)   concerned   in   the   specified   manner   and forward   the   proceedings   to   the   regulatory   authority concerned within 45(forty five) of a request to the effect from the applicant.     (iv) in   case   the   State   Pollution   Control   Board   or   the   Union territory   Pollution   Control   Committee   concerned   does   not undertake   and   complete   the   public   hearing   within   the specified   period,   and/or   does   not   convey   the   proceedings   of the   public   hearing   within   the   prescribed   period   directly   to the   regulatory   authority   concerned   as   above,   the   regulatory authority   shall   engage   another   public   agency   or   authority which   is   not   subordinate   to   the   regulatory   authority,   to 116 complete   the   process   within   a   further   period   of   forty   five days,.    (v) If   the   public   agency   or   authority   nominated   under   the   sub paragraph     (iii)     above   reports   to   the   regulatory   authority concerned that owing to the local situation, it is not possible to conduct the public hearing in a manner which will enable the   views   of   the   concerned   local   persons   to   be   freely expressed, it shall report the facts in detail to the concerned regulatory   authority,   which   may,   after   due   consideration   of the   report   and   other   reliable   information   that   it   may   have, decide   that   the   public   consultation   in   the   case   need   not include the public hearing.    (vi) For   obtaining   responses   in   writing   from   other   concerned persons   having   a   plausible   stake   in   the   environmental aspects   of   the   project   or   activity,   the   concerned   regulatory authority   and   the   State   Pollution   Control   Board   (SPCB)   or the Union territory Pollution Control Committee  (UTPCC) shall invite responses from such concerned persons by   placing   on   their   website   the   Summary   EIA   report prepared   in   the   format   given   in   Appendix   IIIA     by   the applicant   along   with     a   copy   of   the   application   in   the prescribed form , within seven days of the receipt of a written request   for   arranging   the   public   hearing   .   Confidential information   including   non­disclosable   or   legally   privileged information   involving   Intellectual   Property   Right,   source specified   in   the   application   shall   not   be   placed   on   the   web site .   The regulatory authority concerned may also use other appropriate   media   for   ensuring   wide   publicity   about   the project   or   activity.   The   regulatory   authority   shall,   however, make   available   on   a   written   request   from   any   concerned person the Draft EIA report for inspection at a notified place during normal office hours till the date of the public hearing. All the responses received as part of this public consultation process   shall   be   forwarded   to   the   applicant   through   the quickest available means.  (vii) After   completion   of   the   public   consultation,   the applicant   shall   address   all   the   material   environmental concerns   expressed   during   this   process,   and   make appropriate changes in the draft EIA and EMP. The final EIA report, so prepared, shall be submitted by the applicant     to the   concerned   regulatory   authority   for   appraisal.   The applicant   may   alternatively   submit   a   supplementary   report to draft EIA and EMP addressing all the concerns expressed during the public consultation.      IV.   Stage (4) ­ Appraisal :    117 (i) Appraisal   means   the   detailed   scrutiny   by   the   Expert Appraisal   Committee   or   State   Level   Expert   Appraisal Committee   of   the   application   and   other   documents   like   the Final   EIA   report,   outcome   of   the   public   consultations including   public   hearing   proceedings,   submitted   by   the applicant   to   the   regulatory   authority   concerned   for   grant   of environmental clearance. … …..   7(ii).     Prior   Environmental   Clearance   (EC)   process   for Expansion or Modernization or Change of product mix in existing projects :    …   8. Grant   or   Rejection   of   Prior   Environmental Clearance (EC):     (i) The   regulatory   authority   shall   consider   the recommendations of the EAC or SEAC concerned and convey its   decision   to   the   applicant   within   forty   five   days   of   the receipt   of   the   recommendations   of   the   Expert   Appraisal Committee   or   State   Level   Expert   Appraisal   Committee concerned   or   in   other   words   within   one   hundred   and   five days   of   the   receipt   of   the   final   Environment   Impact Assessment   Report,   and   where   Environment   Impact Assessment   is   not   required,   within   one   hundred   and   five days of the receipt of the complete application with requisite documents, except as provided below.    …..  9. Validity of Environmental Clearance (EC):  …   10. Post Environmental Clearance Monitoring:  …..  11. Transferability of Environmental Clearance (EC):   … 12. Operation   of   EIA   Notification,   1994,   till       disposal of pending cases:   …                [No. J­11013/56/2004­IA­II (I)]    (R.CHANDRAMOHAN)  JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 118 SCHEDULE (See paragraph 2 and 7) LIST OF PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES REQUIRING PRIOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEARANCE Project or Activity Category with threshold limit Conditions if any A B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) xxx xxx 7 Physical Infrastructure including Environmental Services xxx xxx 7(f) Highways i) New National  Highway; and ii) Expansion of  National High ways  greater than 30 KM,  involving additional  right of way greater  than 20m involving  land acquisition and  passing through more  than one State i) New State  High ways;  and ii) Expansion  of National /  State  Highways  greater than  30 km  involving  additional  right of way  greater than  20m involving land  acquisition. General  condition  shall apply Note:­      General Condition (GC):  Any project or activity specified in Category ‘B’ will be treated as   Category   A,   if   located   in   whole   or   in   part   within   10   km from   the   boundary   of:   (i)   Protected   Areas   notified   under   the Wild   Life   (Protection)   Act,   1972,   (ii)   Critically   Polluted   areas as notified by the Central Pollution Control Board from time to   time,   (iii)   Notified   Eco­sensitive   areas,   (iv)   inter­State boundaries and international boundaries.  Specific Condition (SC):   119 If   any   Industrial   Estate/Complex   /   Export   processing Zones   /Special   Economic   Zones/Biotech   Parks   /   Leather Complex with homogeneous type of industries such as Items 4(d),   4(f),   5(e),   5(f),   or   those   Industrial   estates   with   pre   – defined   set   of   activities   (not   necessarily   homogeneous, obtains   prior   environmental   clearance,   individual   industries including   proposed   industrial   housing   within   such   estates /complexes  will not  be  required  to take  prior  environmental clearance,   so   long   as   the   Terms   and   Conditions   for   the industrial   estate/complex   are   complied   with   (Such estates/complexes   must   have   a   clearly   identified management   with   the   legal   responsibility   of   ensuring adherence   to   the   Terms   and   Conditions   of   prior environmental   clearance,   who   may   be   held   responsible   for violation   of   the   same   throughout   the   life   of   the complex/estate).” (emphasis supplied in italics and underline) 59. The view that we have taken is reinforced from the opening part   of   this   notification.     It   expounds   that   no   project   involving potential   environmental   impact   “shall   be   undertaken”   or “commenced”   in   any   part   of   India   without   obtaining   prior environmental   clearance   in   the   manner   provided   for.     Same position   obtains   from   the   recitals   of   this   notification,   namely, prior   environmental   clearance   is   required   “before”   any construction   work   or   preparation   of   land   by   the   project management,   except   for   securing   the   land,   is   started   on   the project   or   the   activity.     A   priori,   the   decision   in   Delhi Development   Authority   (supra),   does   not   take   the   matter   any further   in   the   present   case.     Therefore,   no   interference   is warranted   with   the   decision   of   the   Committee   regarding   the 120 change   of   stretch/section   to   be   implemented   during   Phase   I between C­K­S (NC); including  the impugned notifications under Sections 2(2) and 3A of the 1956 Act. 60. Be it noted that  the notification  of 2006 is in the nature of guidelines/directives   issued   by   the   Central   Government   in exercise   of   its   statutory   powers.     These   directions   need   to   be adhered   by   the   executing   agency   (NHAI)   whilst   undertaking   the work in furtherance of the approved project.  To put it differently, it   is   incomprehensible   that   the   stated   2006   notification   obliges the Central Government to take prior permission even before the stage of “planning” and “finalisation of the project(s)” such as   in terms   of   the   minutes   dated   19.1.2018   followed   by   notifications under Sections 2(2) and 3A of the 1956 Act, as the case may be. 61. Much   emphasis   was   placed   on   expression   “securing   the land”,   to   contend   that   expression   of   intent   to   acquire   the   land referred to in Section 3A of the 1956 Act does not come under the excepted category.  We reject this plea.  In our view, the activities required   to   be   undertaken   in   furtherance   of   notification   under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, referred to in Section 3B of the same Act   are   only   to   explore   the   feasibility   and   viability   of   the 121 stretch/section to be used as a national highway and no further. These activities are outside the purview of notification of 2006. 62. The   High   Court   had   adverted   to   decisions   of   other jurisdictions,   namely,   of   American   Courts,   to   buttress   the   view that   prior   permission   ought   to   be   taken   even   before   issuing notification   under   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act.     Considering   the legislative   scheme   and   upon   giving   proper   meaning   and perspective to the directives issued by the Central Government in the   form   of   2006   notification,   we   are   of   the   considered   opinion that the dictum in those decisions will be of no avail.  For, we are of the view that it is not necessary for the Central Government or for   that   matter,   NHAI,   to   apply   for   prior   environmental/forest clearances   or   permissions,   as   the   case   may   be,   at   the   stage   of planning   or   taking   an   in­principle   decision   to   formalize   the Project   of   constructing   a   new   national   highway   manifested   in notification   under   Section   2(2),   including   until   the   stage   of issuing notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act. 63. If   we   accept   the   argument   of   the   writ   petitioners   that   the Central Government must follow comprehensive procedure under the   environmental   laws   and   forest   laws   articulating   its   final decision and to issue notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 122 Act to declare any stretch/land not being a highway as a national highway,   such   approach   would   be   counter­productive   and   the functioning of the departments responsible for timely execution of such   projects   would   be   completely   paralysed   and   depend   solely on the outcome of the processes under the environmental laws or forest laws, as the case may be.  It cannot be overlooked that the role   of   the   competent   authority   under   the   environmental   law   or forest law is limited to scrutiny of the formalized project brought before   it   prior   to   its   implementation   by   the   executing   agency,   to ascertain   whether   it   may   have   any   environmental   impact   and   if so,   to   impose   such   conditions   by   way   of   remedial   steps   to minimise and mitigate the impact while keeping in mind the need to fulfil the State’s obligation of sustainable development.  64. Be that as it may, one cannot be oblivious of the qualitative difference   between   a   project   necessitating   acquisition   of   a   large chunk   of   land   at   one   place   for   continual   commercial/industrial activities to be carried out thereon as opposed to acquisition of a small   strip   of   land   in   the   area   for   construction   of   a road/highway.     The   purpose   of   road/highway   is   merely   to facilitate free passage through the same.  It would have a floating population   unlike   in   the   case   of   a   big   project   at   one   place 123 occupying   several   square   metres   of   land   and   engaging   in continual   commercial/industrial   activities   thereon.     The environmental   impact   would   be   and   ought   to   be   measured   in relative   terms   and   at   the   local   level   and   site   specific.     Whereas, the   requirement   for   road/national   highway   would   essentially   be in larger national interest. 65. For   the   purpose   of   considering   the   question   posed   before us, suffice it to observe that the prior environmental clearance in terms   of   2006   notification   issued   under   Section   3   of   the Environment   (Protection)   Act,   1986   Act   read   with   Rule   5   of   the Environment   (Protection)   Rules,   1986,   is   required   to   be   taken before   commencement   of   the   “actual   construction   or   building work”   of   the   national   highway   by   the   executing   agency   (NHAI). That will happen only after the acquisition proceedings are taken to   its   logical   end   until   the   land   finally   vests   in   the   NHAI   or   is entrusted   to   it   by   the   Central   Government   for building/management   of   the   national   highway.     This   position   is reinforced   and   explained   in   the   Office   Memorandum   issued   by the MoEF dated 7.10.2014, which reads thus: ­ “F.No.22­76/2014­IA­III Government of India Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change Impact Assessment Division Indira Paryavaran Bhavan, Jor Bagh Road, Aliganj, 124 New Delhi – 110 003 Dated the 7 th  October, 2014 OFFICE MEMORANDUM Subject: Status   of   land   acquisition   w.r.t.   project   site while   considering   the   case   for   environment   clearance   under EIA Notification, 2006­regarding 1. It has been brought to the notice of this Ministry that in   absence   of   any   guidelines,   different   EACs/SEACs   adopt different criteria about the extent to which the land w.r.t. the project   site   should   be   acquired   before   the   consideration   of the   case   for   environment   clearance   (EC).   Some   of   the Ministers   in   the   Government   of   India   and   some   industrial associations have represented that full acquisition of land for the   project   site   should   not   be   insisted   upon   before consideration   of   the   case   for   EC   and   instead   initiation   of land   acquisition   process   should   be   sufficient   for   the consideration of such cases.  The argument being that land acquisition   process   can   go   on   in   parallel   and   that consideration of EC need not await full land acquisition .  2. The matter has been examined the in the Ministry. The EC   granted   for   a   project   or   activity   under   the   EIA Notification,   2006,   as   amended,   is   site   specific.   While   full acquisition   of   land   may   not   be   pre­requisite   for   the consideration   of   the   case   for   EC,   there   should   be   some credible document to show the status of land acquisition w.r.t.   project   site   when   the   case   is   brought   before   the concerned   EAC/SEAC   for   appraisal .   It   has   been accordingly decided that the following documents relating to acquisition   of   land   w.r.t.   the   project   site   and   may   be considered   as   adequate   by   EACs/SEACs   at   the   time   of appraisal of the case for EC: (i) In   case   of   land   w.r.t.   the   project   site   is proposed   to   be   acquired   through   Government Intervention,   a   copy   of   preliminary notification   issued   by   the   concerned   State Government   regarding   acquisition   of   land   as per   the   provision   of   Land   Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 . (ii) In   case   the   land   is   being   acquired   through private negotiations with the land owners, credible document showing the intent of the land owner to sell the land for the proposed project.  3. It  may,   however,   be  noted   that  the   EC  granted   for a   project   on   the   basis   of   aforesaid   documents   shall become   invalid   in   case   the   actual   land   for   the   project site turns out to be different from the land considered at 125 the time of the appraisal of project and mentioned in the EC .  4. This   issue   with   the   approval   of   the   competent authority.” (emphasis supplied) Applying   the   tenet   underlying   this   notification,   it   is   amply   clear that   before   the   process   of   acquisition   of   land   is   ripe   for declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act, it would be open to the   executing   agency   (NHAI)   to   make   an   application   to   the competent   authority   for   environmental   clearance.     That   process can be commenced parallelly or alongside the acquisition process after a preliminary notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, for acquisition is issued.   66. As   in   this   case,   after   notification   under   Section   3A   of   the 1956   Act   came   to   be   issued,   NHAI   must   have,   and   in   fact   has, moved   into   action   by   making   application   to   the   competent authorities under the environmental laws, as well as, forest laws to accord necessary permissions.   67. Considering   the   provisions   of   the   1956   Act   and   the   1988 Act,   NHAI   can   take   over   the   work   of   development   and maintenance   of   the   concerned   national   highway   only   if   the notified land is vested in it or when the same is entrusted to it by 126 the Central Government.   From the scheme of the enactments in question, as soon as notification under Section 3A is issued, it is open to the Central Government to issue direction/notification in exercise   of   power   under   Section   5   of   the   1956   Act   read   with Section   11   of   the   1988   Act   so   as   to   entrust   the   development   of the proposed national highway to NHAI.  Upon such entrustment, NHAI   assumes   the   role   of   an   executing   agency   and   only thenceforth   can   move   into   action   to   apply   for   requisite permissions/clearances   under   the   environmental/forest   laws including   as   provided   in   terms   of   notification/Office Memorandum dated 14.9.2006 and 7.10.2014 respectively.   68. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   environmental/forest   clearance   is always   site   specific   and,   therefore,   until   the   site   is   identified   for construction   of   national   highways   manifested   vide   Section   3A notification,   the   question   of   making   any   application   for permission under the environmental/forest laws would not arise, as  predicated  in  Office  Memorandum   dated  7.10.2014.   The  site is identified only in reference to the notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, giving description of the land which is proposed 127 to   be   acquired   for   public   purpose   of   building,   maintenance, management or operation of the national highway or part thereof. 69. Considering   the   interplay   of   provisions   empowering   the Central   Government   coupled   with   the   purport   of   the notification/Office   Memorandum   issued   by   the   MoEF   dated 14.9.2006   and   7.10.2014   respectively,   it   will   be   paradoxical   to countenance   the   argument   that   the   Central   Government   is obliged   to   seek   prior   approval/permission   of   the   competent authorities   under   the   environment/forest   laws,   as   the   case   may be, even before issuing notification under Section 2(2) or for that matter, Section 3A of the 1956 Act. RE: DEEMED LAPSING AND THE WAY FORWARD 70. Reverting   to   the   dictum   of   this   Court   in   Karnataka Industrial   Areas   Development   Board   (supra),   it   must   be understood   to   mean   that   the   declaration   under   Section   3D regarding   acquisition   of   notified   land,   be   made   only   after environmental/forest   clearance   qua   the   specific   land   is   granted. To   put   it   differently,   the   necessity   of   prior   environmental/forest clearance   would   arise   only   if   finally,   the   land   in   question   (site 128 specific) is to be notified under Section 3D, as being acquired for the purposes of building, maintenance, management or operation of   the   national   highway   or   part   thereof.     Such   interpretation would further  the cause and objective of environment and forest laws,   as   also   not   impede   the   timeline   specified   for   building, maintenance,   management   or   operation   of   the   national   highway or   part   thereof,   which   undeniably   is   a   public   purpose   and   of national   importance.     This   would   also   assuage   the   concerns   of the   land   owners   that   even   if   eventually   no   environment permission   or   forest   clearance   is   accorded,   the   land   cannot   be reverted   to   the   original   owner   as   it   had   de   jure   vested   in   the Central Government upon issue of notification under Section 3D of   the   1956   Act   and   no   power   is   bestowed   on   the   Central Government under this Act to withdraw from acquisition. 71. We are conscious of the fact, as has been rightly argued by the   appellants­authorities,   that   it   is   essential   to   issue   a declaration   under  Section  3D  of  the  1956  Act  within  a  period  of one   year   from   the   date   of   publication   of   the   notification   under Section   3A   in   respect   of   the   notified   land,   failing   which notification   under   Section   3A   ceases   to   have   any   effect.     It   is 129 possible   that   whilst   pursuing   the   proposal   for environmental/forest   clearance   after   notification   under   Section 3A,   some   time   may   be   lost,   even   though   the   process   under   the 1956 Act for acquisition of the land had become ripe for issue of declaration   of  acquisition   under  Section  3D.    It  is  also  true  that time   spent   for   obtaining   environmental   clearance   or   permission under   the   forest   laws   has   not   been   explicitly   excluded   from   the period of one year to be reckoned under Section 3D(3) of the Act. The   extension  of  time   or   so   to   say   suspension   of   time   is   only  in respect of period during which the action of the proceedings to be taken   in  pursuance  of   notification  under  Section   3A(1) is  stayed by   an   order   of   Court.     In   other   words,   there   is   no   express provision in the 1956 Act, which excludes the time spent by  the Central   Government   or   the   executing   agency   in   obtaining   prior environmental clearance or  permission under  forest laws, as the case may  be.   To  get  over   this predicament,  by  an  interpretative process and also by invoking plenary powers of this Court under Article   142   of   the   Constitution,   we   hold   that   the   dictum   in paragraph   100(1)   of     Karnataka   Industrial   Areas Development Board   (supra), shall operate as a stay by an order of   the   Court   for   the   purposes   of   Section   3D(3)   in   respect   of   all 130 projects under the 1956 Act, in particular for excluding the time spent   after   issue   of   Section   3A   notification,   in   obtaining   the environmental   clearance   as   well   as   for   permissions   under   the forest   laws.     Only   this   approach   would   further   the   cause   of environment   and   forest   laws,   as   also,   the   need   to   adhere   to   the timeline specified under Section 3D(3) for speedy execution of the work   of   construction   of   national   highway,   which   is   also   for   a public   purpose   and   of   national   importance.     In   other   words, balancing of competing  public interests/public purposes need to be kept in mind as being the only way forward for accomplishing the goal of sustainable development. 72. The   argument   of   the   writ   petitioners   that   the   expression “shall” occurring in Section 3D(1) be interpreted as “may”, though attractive   on   the   first   blush,   deserves   to   be   rejected.     If   that interpretation is accepted, it would render the efficacy of Section 3D(3)   of   lapsing   of   the   acquisition   process   otiose.     It   is   a mandatory provision.  Instead, we have acceded to the alternative argument   to   give   expansive   meaning   to   the   proviso   in   Section 3D(3)   of   the   1956   Act   by   interpretative   process,   including   by invoking   plenary   powers   of   this   Court   under   Article   142   of   the 131 Constitution to hold that the dictum of this Court in  Karnataka Industrial   Areas   Development   Board   (supra)   be   regarded   as stay   granted   by   the   Court   to   all   notifications   issued   under Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act   until   the   grant   or   non­grant   of permissions   by   the   competent   authorities   under   the environmental   and   forest   laws,   as   the   case   may   be,   including until the stated permissions attain finality.   In other words, time spent   by   the   executing   agency/Central   Government   in   pursuing application   before   the   concerned   authorities   for   grant   of permission/clearance under the stated laws need to be excluded because   of   stay   by   the   Court   of   actions   (limited   to   issue   of notification   under   Section   3D),   consequent   to   notification   under Section   3A.     Thus,   the   acquisition   process   set   in   motion   upon issue   of   Section   3A   notification   can   go   on   in   parallel   until   the stage   of   publication   of   notification   under   Section   3D,   which   can be issued after grant of clearances/permissions by the competent authority   under   the   environment/forest   laws   and   attaining finality thereof. 73. In   the   present   case,   it   is   noticed   that   the   NHAI   being   the executing agency, had soon submitted Terms of Reference to the 132 MoEF   after   publication   of   notification   under   Section   2(2)   of   the 1956 Act dated 1.3.2018, declaring the section ­ C­K­S (NC) as a national   highway.     That   was   submitted   on   19.4.2018   and   the approval   in   furtherance   thereof   was   granted   by   the   MoEF   on 8.6.2018,   consequent   to   the   recommendation   made   by   the   EAC on 7.5.2018.   Indeed, the NHAI thereafter submitted amendment to the Terms of Reference on 5.7.2018 and 21.8.2018.   The EAC after examining the amendment in Terms of Reference, submitted its recommendation on 30.8.2018.  It is also matter of record and stated   on   affidavit   by   the   EAC   that   no   lapses   have   been committed  by   the  NHAI  in  complying   with  necessary  formalities. Similarly,   NHAI   had   submitted   application   on   12.5.2018   to Conservator   of   Forests   for   grant   of   permissions   under   the   forest laws   in   respect   of   lands   forming   part   of   the   notification   under Section 3A of the 1956 Act.  That application was duly processed and   the   permission   was   granted   by   the   competent   authority under   the   forest   laws   on   8.6.2018.     Concededly,   these permissions/clearances   have   been   issued   by   the   concerned authorities   under   the   environment   and   forest   laws   after notification under   Section  3A and  before  issuance of  declaration under   Section   3D   of   the   1956   Act.     In   terms   of   this   decision, 133 therefore, the time spent for obtaining such clearances including till   the   pronouncement   of   this   decision   and   until   the   stated permissions/clearances   attain   finality,   whichever   is   later,  as   the matter had remained  sub judice , need to be excluded.  Even after excluding   such   period,   if   any   notification   under   Section   3A impugned   before   the   High   Court   is   not   saved   from   the   deemed lapsing   effect   predicated   in   Section   3D(3),   the   Central Government may have to issue fresh notification(s) under Section 3A of the 1956 Act and recommence the process of acquisition, if so   advised.     We   are   not   expressing   any   final   opinion   in   that regard.   However, such fresh notifications may be issued only in respect   of   land   forming   part   of   permissions/clearances   given   by the   competent   authority   under   the   environment/forest   laws, being site specific. OTHER CONTENTIONS 74. That   takes   us   to   the   grievance   regarding   the   same Consultant   being   continued   for   the   changed   section   i.e.   C­K­S (NC).  Indeed, the eligibility of the Consultant was in reference to the   originally   conceived   project   concerning   C­M   (EC).     It   was 134 found   eligible   to   undertake   the   consultancy   work   for   the   said project  and   letter   dated  29.9.2017  was  also   issued  by   NHAI.    In the   Committee’s   meeting   chaired   by   the   Secretary   of   MoRTH   on 19.1.2018,   new   alignment   was   finalised   thereby   deviating   from the   original   project   of   C­M   (EC).     Instead,   section   ­   C­K­S   (NC) was   finalised.     However,   the   same   Consultant   had   been continued by execution of a contract agreement dated 22.2.2018 for the changed stretch/section.  This was done as the terms and conditions   were   same.     Indeed,   it   was   vehemently   contended before us that the authorities should have followed the procedure stipulated for appointment of Consultant for the changed project afresh.    However,   we   find   that   in   none  of   the   writ   petitions   filed before the High Court, express declaration had been sought or for that   matter,   the   contract   agreement   dated   22.2.2018   executed between   NHAI   and   the   Consultant   came   to   be   challenged. Moreover,   the   terms   and   conditions   of   appointment   of   the Consultant   would   have   no   financial   ramifications,   considering the   fact   that   the   consultancy   charges   were   to   be   paid   on   per kilometre   basis;   and   in   fact   due   to   change   of   alignment,   the length   of   proposed   national   highway   stood   reduced   to   only around 277 kms. (instead of original stretch [C­M (EC)] of around 135 350   kms.)     Further,   no   challenge   is   set   forth   regarding   the qualification   and   eligibility   of   the   Consultant   as   such.     Notably, the   decision   to   change   the   stretch/section   from   Economic Corridor to National Corridor was that of the Committee.   It was not   founded   on   the   recommendation   of   the   Consultant,   as   has been   assumed  by   the   writ   petitioners  and   so   propounded  before the   high   Court.     The   decision   of   the   Committee   was   backed   by tangible reasons as recorded in the minutes and also intrinsic in it   its   vast   experience   about   the   efficacy   of   governing   policies   for developing   seamless   national   highway   connectivity   across   the country.     In   any   case,   irregularity,   if   any,   in   the   appointment   of the Consultant cannot be the basis to quash and set aside a well­ considered   decision   taken   by   the   Committee   after   due deliberations,   much   less   the   impugned   notifications   under Section 2(2) or Section 3A(1) of the 1956 Act.  We therefore, hold that   the   High   Court   should   have   eschewed   from   expressing   any opinion   on   the   manner   of   appointment   of   the   same   Consultant for   the   changed   section/stretch   [C­K­S   (NC)],   as   no   relief challenging  its appointment was sought and thus it was not the matter in issue before it; and for the same reason, we do not wish to   dilate   on   this   aspect   any   further.     Thus   understood,   the 136 dictum   of   this   Court   in   decisions   relied   upon   by   the respondents/writ petitioners in  K. Lubna  (supra) and  Shrilekha Vidyarthi  (supra) will be of no avail in this case. 75. Having dealt with the merits of the controversy  in extenso , it is unnecessary to dilate on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions being premature. CONCLUSION 76. Before   we   conclude   and   for   the   completion   of   record,   we may   advert   to   the   direction   issued   by   the   High   Court   in paragraph   106   of   the   impugned   judgment   as   reproduced hitherto.     The   High   Court   directed   the   concerned   revenue authorities   to   restore   the   mutation   entries   effected   in   favour   of the   acquiring   body/NHAI   merely   on   the   basis   of   notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act.  By virtue of notification under Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act,   neither   the   acquiring   body   nor   the NHAI had come in possession of the concerned land nor the land had   vested   in   them,   so   as   to   alter   the   mutation   entry   in   their favour.     To   that   extent,   we   agree   with   the   High   Court   that   until the   acquisition   process   is   completed   and   possession   of   land   is 137 taken, the question of altering  the mutation entry  merely  on the basis of notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act cannot be countenanced   and,   therefore,   the   earlier   entries   ought   to   be restored.  That direction of the High Court needs no interference. 77. While   parting,   we   must   place   on   record   that   we   have   not expressed any opinion either way on the correctness and validity of   the   permissions/clearances   accorded   by   the   competent authorities   under   the   environment   and   forest   laws,   as   the   case may be.   For, those orders were not the subject matter or put in issue  before  the   High   Court.   Therefore,   it  would  be  open   to   the affected   persons   to   question   the   validity   thereof   on   grounds,   as may   be   permissible,   before   the   appropriate   forum.     All contentions available to parties in that regard are left open. 78. We   need   to   place   on   record   that   we   have   not   dilated   on other   decisions   adverted   to   and   relied   upon   before   us   by   the learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   concerned   parties,   to   avoid prolixity   and   also   because   the   same   have   no   bearing   on   the questions dealt with by us hitherto.  In our opinion, appeals filed by   the   authorities   ought   to   succeed   merely   on   the   issues answered   by   us   for   dismissing   the   challenge   to   notifications 138 under   Section   2(2)   and   Section   3A   of   the   1956   Act,   in   the concerned   writ   petitions.     Further,   we   do   not   wish   to   deal   with the   decisions   relied   upon,   that   the   Project   of   this   nature   may have   environmental   impact   and   ought   not   to   be   taken   forward. As   aforesaid,   we   have   not   examined   the   efficacy   of   the permissions/clearances   granted   by   the   competent   authority under   the   environment   or   forest   laws,   as   the   case   may   be.     If those   permissions/clearances   are   assailed,   only   then   the decisions   in   Hanuman   Laxman   Aroskar   (supra),   M.C.   Mehta (supra)  and   Bengaluru   Development   Authority   (supra)  may   be looked   at.     Inasmuch   as   in   those   cases,   the   Court   was   called upon   to   examine   the   challenge   in   the   context   of   permissions given by the competent authority under the environment laws.  79. Needless to observe that if any decision of the High Courts, which   had   been   relied   upon   is   not   in   consonance   with   the   view taken by us, the same be treated as impliedly overruled in terms of this decision.  We do not wish to multiply the authorities of the High Courts as commended to us on the issues answered in this judgment. 139 80. In view of the above, the appeals filed by the Union of India and   NHAI   (Civil   Appeals   arising   out   of   SLP(C)   Nos.   13384­ 85/2019,   16098­16100/2019,   18577­18580/2019,   19160­ 19166/2019,   1775­1776/2020,   1777­1780/2020   and   1781­ 1783/2020) are partly  allowed  in the  aforementioned  terms; but the   appeal   filed   by   the   land   owner(s)/aggrieved   party(ies)   (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 18586/2019) stands dismissed. The   impugned   judgment   and   order   is   modified   to   the   extent indicated   in   this   judgment.     The   challenge   to   impugned notifications   under   Sections   2(2)   and   3A   of   the   1956   Act, respectively, is negatived.  The direction issued (in paragraph 106 of   the   impugned   judgment)   to   the   concerned   authorities   to restore the subject mutation entries is, however, upheld. 81. The Central Government and/or NHAI  may proceed further in   the   matter   in   accordance   with   law   for   acquisition   of   notified lands   for   construction   of   a   national   highway   for   the   proposed section/stretch ­ C­K­S (NC), being NH Nos. 179A and 179B. 82. There   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs.     Pending   interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. 140 83. We place on record our appreciation for the able assistance given by the learned counsel for the parties and for being brief in their   presentations   despite   the   complexity   of   the   issues   and bulky record due to batch of cases being heard together including the   daunting   task   of   interacting   through   video   conferencing (virtual Court) due to ongoing pandemic. ................................., J.     (A.M. Khanwilkar)       ….............................., J.             (B.R. Gavai)    ................................., J.     (Krishna Murari)    New Delhi; December 08, 2020.