2020 INSC 0614
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4010­4011 of 2020 
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 32011­32012 of
2018]
Anita Sharma & Ors. ..... Appellant(s)
                                       VERSUS
The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. ..... Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J:
Leave Granted. 
2. These   two   appeals,   which   have   been   heard   through   video
conferencing,   are   directed   against   the   judgment   dated   23.07.2018
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for   Rajasthan,   Bench   at
Jaipur whereby the first appeal preferred by the New India Assurance
Co.   Ltd.   (Respondent   No.   1)   against   the   Motor   Accident   Claims
Tribunal’s   (hereinafter,   “Tribunal”)   award   dated   01.09.2012   was
allowed and the Claim  Petition  was rejected, whereas the appeal  filed
by   the   appellant­claimants   for   enhancement   of   compensation   was
consequently dismissed.
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F ACTS :
3. Sandeep   Sharma   (deceased),   was   a   resident   of   District   Sikar   in
Rajasthan.   He   was   travelling   in   a   car   bearing   registration   no.   UP   65
AA   7100   from   Ghazipur   to   Varanasi   (Uttar   Pradesh)   on   the   night   of
25.03.2009   along   with   his   friend   Sanjeev   Kapoor   (Respondent   No.   2)
and   two   other   occupants.   Sanjeev   Kapoor,   who   was   also   its   owner,
was driving the car when at about 10:20PM near village Atroli, a truck
coming  from   the  opposite  side   struck   the  car   as   a  result  of  which   all
the occupants suffered injuries. Sandeep along with the other injured­
occupants  was  rushed to the District Hospital  in Ghazipur  at around
11:55PM,   but   was   subsequently   referred   to   the   Institute   of   Medical
Sciences and S.S. Hospital, BHU, Varanasi on 26.03.2009 considering
the   severity   and   multiplicity   of   his   injuries.   Although   he   was
discharged on 16.04.2009 and brought back to Rajasthan, it appears
that   Sandeep   kept   experiencing   one   after   another   medical
complications,   and   remained   hospitalized   at   the   Jain   Hospital   in
Jaipur   and   later   the   Joshi   Nursing   Home   at   Sikar.   His   injuries
eventually got the better of him and Sandeep Sharma passed away on
10.12.2009.
4. At the time of death, the deceased was aged 34 years and was an
income   tax   assessee   with   an   Employees   Provident   Fund   (EPF)
account. He was employed in Mumbai at Kelvin Ess Vee Textiles as a
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Sales   Officer   on   regular   basis.   He   left   behind   a   widow,   two   minor
children and a mother; all of whom were dependent on him. 
5. Sandeep’s   dependents   filed   a   claim   petition   for   Rs   60,94,000
(Rupees sixty lakhs and ninety­four thousand) on 26.08.2010 alleging,
inter alia , that he died as a result of the injuries suffered in the above­
mentioned   accident   of   25.03.2009,   which   occurred   due   to   the   rash
and   negligent   driving   of   Sanjeev   Kapoor   who   was   the   owner­cum­
driver   of   the   car   in   which   Sandeep   was   travelling.   Sanjeev   Kapoor
(hereinafter,   “owner­cum­driver”)   and   the   insurer   of   the   car   ­   New
India   Assurance   Co.   Ltd.   (hereinafter,   “insurance   company”)   were
impleaded as party respondents. 
6. The owner­cum­driver in his written statement admitted that the
deceased had suffered multiple injuries in the accident while travelling
in the car with him but he disowned responsibility for the accident by
asserting   that   it   was   the   truck   which   was   coming   from   the   opposite
side at a very fast speed, and was being driven in a rash and negligent
manner. Since all the four occupants of the car had been injured, they
were unable to note the registration details of the truck which made a
hasty get­away towards Ghazipur.  
7. The   insurance   company   in   its   separate   written   statement   took
the preliminary objection that as per the police investigation and first
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information   report,   the   accident   was   caused   by   an   unknown   truck
which hit the car No. UP­65­AA­7100 and, therefore, the claim petition
filed   against   the   owner   of   the   car   or   its   insurer   was   contrary   to   law.
The   factual   averments   made   in   the   Claim   Petition   were   denied   for
want of knowledge.
8. In reaching its verdict, the Tribunal relied upon the statement of
the   eye­witness   Ritesh   Pandey   (AW­3),   according   to   whom   Sanjeev
Kapoor   was   driving   the   car   at   a   very   fast   speed   when   it   overtook   a
vehicle   and   collided   head­on   against   the   oncoming   truck.   The
Tribunal,   thus,   assigned   liability   for   the   accident   upon   the
respondents   and   partly   allowed   the   Claim   Petition   with   a
compensation   of   Rs.   16,08,000   (Rupees   sixteen   lakhs   and   eight
thousand). 
9. Both   the   insurance   company   and   the   appellant­claimants   filed
their   respective   appeals   before   the   High   Court.   Through   judgment
dated 23.07.2018, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s award and
dismissed   the   claim   petition   for   the   reasons   that   first,   Ritesh   Pandey
(AW­3) had failed to report the accident to the jurisdictional police. He
was   apparently   introduced   by   the   claimants   only   to   seek
compensation.   Second,   the   FIR   had   been   lodged   by   the   owner­cum­
driver,   Sanjeev   Kapoor,   who   would   not   have   done   so   had   he   been   at
fault   or   driving   rashly.   Third,   t he   assertion   of   Ritesh   Pandey   (AW­3)
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that he took the injured to hospital was not proved from the record of
the   Government   Hospital,   Ghazipur   which   revealed   that   Sandeep
Sharma   was   brought   to   the   hospital   by   Sub­Inspector   Sah
Mohammed.  
C ONTENTIONS :
10. We have heard learned counsel for parties and have perused the
Original Record of the Tribunal and the High Court. The two questions
which fall for determination are whether the accident was caused due
to   rash   and   negligent   driving   of   the   car   driver—Sanjeev   Kapoor   and
whether Ritesh Pandey (AW­3) is a reliable witness or not?
A NALYSIS :
11. At   the   outset,   it   may   be   mentioned   that   some   material   facts
which   have   a   direct   bearing   on   the   fate   of   this   case,   have   escaped
notice   of   the   High   Court.   The   FIR   was   not   registered   by   Sanjeev
Kapoor  (owner­cum­driver   of   the  car)  as   assumed   by   the  High   Court.
Instead, as a matter of fact, the FIR No. 120/09 (Exh 1) was registered
on   the   basis   of   information   furnished   by   one,   Pradeep   Kumar
Aggarwal,   son   of   Bal   Krishan   Das   Aggarwal   –   a   resident   of   District
Varanasi.   The   contents   of  this   report  reveal   that   Sanjeev   Kapoor   was
travelling   in   the   Wagon   R   Car   No.   UP­65­AA­7100   along   with   three
other  occupants. While  returning  from Ghazipur  to  Varanasi,  a truck
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which was being driven rashly and at a fast speed, struck against the
car   and   then   sped   away   towards   Ghazipur.   The   number   of   the   truck
could   not   be   noticed   as   it   was   dark.   The   car   was   badly   damaged.
Various people gathered at the spot who took out the injured from the
car.  It is  specifically  mentioned  that all  the injured were  taken  to  the
hospital for treatment where Rahul Singh @ Chotu Singh passed­away
whereas Sandeep Sharma was referred to BHU Varanasi for treatment.
The FIR was lodged on 27.03.2009 and a slightly illegible part thereof
indicates that Sanjeev Kapoor and the informant were known to each
other.   The   informant   himself   had   not   witnessed   the   accident   and
apparently lodged the FIR based on hearsay information.
12. Importantly,   the   owner­cum­driver   though   denied   responsibility
of   the   accident   through   his   written   statement   but   chose   not   to   enter
the witness box in his defence. The insurance company, on the other
hand,   relied   upon   the   contents   of   the   FIR   and   the   ‘Investigation
Report’ to aver that the accident took place due to rash and negligent
driving   of   the   truck   driver   alone.   But   we   find   that   the   ‘investigation
report’   (Exh.   2)   dated   05.05.2009   merely   recites   that   the   registration
number   of   the   offending   truck   could   not   be   ascertained   despite   best
efforts.
13. At this juncture, we may refer to the statement of Ritesh Pandey
(AW­3). This witness is a resident of Ghazipur in Uttar Pradesh. He is
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neither related to the deceased nor was he remotely connected to  the
family of the deceased. He hailed from a different State and lived in a
faraway   place.   There   is   nothing   to   suggest   that   the   witness   had   any
business   dealings   with   the   deceased   or   his   family.   He   has   deposed
that he was travelling in his own car on the date of the incident on the
same route when the owner­cum­driver of the Wagon R car carelessly
overtook   him   at   a   very   high   speed.   He   has   further   deposed   that   a
truck   coming   from   the   opposite   side   collided   with   the   car.   Various
persons   gathered   at   the   place   of   accident   and   four   persons   trapped
inside   the   car   were   taken   out,   three   of   whom   were   unconscious   and
the   fourth   was   its   driver   ­   Sanjeev   Kapoor.   The   witness   has   further
deposed   that   he   took   all   the   four   injured   persons   to   the   District
Hospital,   Ghazipur   where   some   of   them   were   referred   to   Institute   of
Medical Sciences and S.S. Hospital, BHU, Varanasi. 
14. Most   importantly,   the   only   question   asked   to   this   witness   in
cross­examination is whether the truck could be spotted and whether
he was able to note the registration number of the truck. The witness
has candidly admitted that he could not see the registration number of
the   truck.   No   other   question   was   asked   to   this   witness   in   the   cross­
examination.   While   the   Tribunal   believed   Ritesh   Pandey   (AW­3)   and
accepted   the   claim   petition   in   part,   the   High   Court,   for   the   reasons
which are already briefly noticed, has disbelieved him on the premise
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that  the   deceased   was   brought   to   the   hospital   by   SI   Sah   Mohammed
and   not   by   Ritesh   Pandey   (AW­3).   The   entire   case,   thus,   effectively
hinges upon the trustworthiness of the statement of this witness.
F INDINGS :
15. It   is   not   in   dispute   that   the   accident   took   place   near   Ghazipur
and that numerous people had assembled at the spot. Some bystander
would   obviously   have   informed   the   police   also.   While   the   contents   of
the   FIR   as   well   as   the   statement   of   Ritesh   Pandey   (AW­3)   leave   no
room   to   doubt   that   the   injured   were   taken   to   the   Hospital   by   private
persons   (and   not   by   the   police),   it   is   quite   natural   that   the   police
would   also   have   reached   the   Government   hospital   at   Ghazipur   and,
therefore,   it   was   mentioned   that   Sandeep   Sharma   was   brought­in   by
SI Sah Mohammed. 
16. It   is   commonplace   for   most   people   to   be   hesitant   about   being
involved   in   legal   proceedings   and   they   therefore   do   not   volunteer   to
become   witnesses.   Hence,   it   is   highly   likely   that   the   name   of   Ritesh
Pandey or other persons who accompanied the injured to the hospital
did not find mention in the medical record. There is nothing on record
to   suggest   that   the   police   reached   the   site   of   the   accident   or   carried
the injured to the hospital. The statement of AW­3, therefore, acquires
significance as, according to him, he brought the injured in his car to
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the hospital.   Ritesh Pandey (AW­3) acted  as a good samaritan and a
responsible citizen, and the High Court ought not to have disbelieved
his testimony based merely on a conjecture. It is necessary to reiterate
the   independence   and   benevolence   of   AW­3.   Without   any   personal
interest or motive, he assisted both the deceased by taking him to the
hospital   and   later   his   family   by   expending   time   and   effort   to   depose
before the Tribunal.
17. It is quite natural that such a person who had accompanied the
injured   to   the   hospital   for   immediate   medical   aid,   could   not   have
simultaneously   gone   to   the   police   station   to   lodge   the   FIR.   The   High
Court   ought   not   to   have   drawn   any   adverse   inference   against   the
witness   for   his   failure   to   report   the   matter   to   Police.   Further,   as   the
police   had   themselves   reached   the   hospital   upon   having   received
information   about   the   accident,   there   was   perhaps   no   occasion   for
AW­3 to lodge a report once again to the police at a later stage either.
18. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive
enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant­
claimants’ hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for
an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away in an
altogether   different  State.   Close   to   the   facts   of   the   case   in   hand,   this
Court in  Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand 1
,  viewed that: 
1
 (2011) 11 SCC 635
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“12.   The   other  ground   on  which  the   High   Court   dismissed   the   case
was   by   way   of   disbelieving   the   testimony   of   Umed   Singh,   PW   1.
Such   disbelief   of   the  High  Court   is   totally  conjectural.   Umed
Singh   is   not   related   to   the   appellant   but   as   a   good   citizen,
Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her
to   reach   the   doctor's   chamber   in   order   to   ensure   that   an
injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed
Singh   cannot   be   disbelieved   just   because   he   did   not   file   a
complaint   himself.   We   are   constrained   to   repeat   our
observation   that   the   total   approach   of   the   High   Court,
unfortunately,   was   not   sensitised   enough   to   appreciate   the
plight of the victim .
 xxx
15.   In   a   situation   of   this   nature,   the   Tribunal   has   rightly   taken   a
holistic view of the matter.   It was necessary to be borne in mind
that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in
a   particular   manner   may   not   be   possible   to   be   done   by   the
claimants.  The claimants were merely to establish their case on the
touchstone   of   preponderance   of   probability.   The   standard   of   proof
beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. The failure of the respondents to cross examine the solitary eye­
witness   or   confront   him   with   their   version,   despite   adequate
opportunity, must lead to an inference of tacit admission on their part.
They   did   not   even   suggest   the   witness   that   he   was   siding   with   the
claimants.   The   High   Court   has   failed   to   appreciate   the   legal   effect   of
this absence of cross­examination of a crucial witness.  
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20. The   importance   of   cross­examination   has   been   elucidated   on
several occasions by this Court, including by a Constitution Bench in
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab 2
, which laid down as follows:
“278.     Section   137   of   the   Evidence   Act   defines   what   cross­
examination means and Sections 139 and 145 speak of the mode of
cross­examination   with   reference   to   the   documents   as   well   as   oral
evidence.  It is the jurisprudence of law that cross­examination
is an acid­test of the truthfulness of the statement made by a
witness   on   oath   in   examination­in­chief ,   the   objects   of   which
are:
(1) to destroy or weaken the evidentiary value of the witness of his
adversary;
(2) to elicit facts in favour of the cross­examining lawyer's client from
the mouth of the witness of the adversary party;
(3) to show that the witness is unworthy of belief by impeaching the
credit of the said witness;
and   the   questions   to   be   addressed   in   the   course   of   cross­
examination   are   to   test   his   veracity;   to   discover   who   he   is
and   what   is   his   position   in   life;   and   to   shake   his   credit   by
injuring his character .
279.   The   identity   of   the   witness   is   necessary   in   the   normal   trial   of
cases  to   achieve  the   above  objects   and   the   right   of  confrontation  is
one   of   the   fundamental   guarantees   so   that   he   could   guard   himself
from being victimised by any false and invented evidence that may
be tendered by the adversary party.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. Relying upon   Kartar Singh   (supra) , in a MACT case this Court
2  
 (1994) 3 SCC 569
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in   Sunita   v.   Rajasthan   State   Road   Transport   Corporation 3
considered   the   effect   of   non­examination   of   the   pillion   rider   as   a
witness   in   a   claim   petition   filed   by   the   deceased   of   the   motorcyclist
and held as follows:  
“ 30.   Clearly,   the   evidence   given   by   Bhagchand   withstood   the
respondents' scrutiny and the respondents were unable to shake his
evidence.   In   turn,   the   High   Court   has   failed   to   take   note   of   the
absence   of   cross   examination   of   this   witness   by   the   respondents,
leave   alone   the   Tribunal's   finding   on   the   same,   and   instead,
deliberated   on   the   reliability   of   Bhagchand's   (A.D.2)   evidence   from
the viewpoint of him not being named in the list of eye witnesses in
the   criminal   proceedings,   without   even   mentioning   as   to   why   such
absence   from   the   list   is   fatal   to   the   case   of   the   appellants.   This
approach   of   the   High   Court   is   mystifying,   especially   in   light   of   this
Court's   observation   [as   set   out   in   Parmeshwari   (supra)   and
reiterated in   Mangla Ram   (supra)] that the strict principles of proof in
a   criminal   case   will   not   be   applicable   in   a   claim   for   compensation
under the Act and further, that the standard to be followed in such
claims   is   one   of   preponderance   of   probability   rather   than   one   of
proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   There   is   nothing   in   the   Act   to
preclude   citing   of   a   witness   in   motor   accident   claim   who   has   not
been   named   in   the   list   of   witnesses   in   the   criminal   case.   What   is
essential   is   that   the   opposite   party   should   get   a   fair
opportunity   to   cross   examine   the   concerned   witness.   Once
that   is   done,   it   will   not   be   open   to   them   to   complain   about
any   prejudice   caused   to   them.   If   there   was   any   doubt   to   be
cast   on   the   veracity   of   the   witness,   the   same   should   have
come   out   in   cross   examination,   for   which   opportunity   was
3  
 (2019) SCC Online SC 195.
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granted to the respondents by the Tribunal .
xxx 
32.   The   High   Court   has   not   held   that   the   respondents   were
successful   in   challenging   the   witnesses'   version   of   events,   despite
being given the opportunity to do so. The High Court accepts that the
said   witness   (A.D.2)   was   cross   examined   by   the   respondents   but
nevertheless reaches a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal,
by  selectively  overlooking   the   deficiencies   in  the   respondent's   case,
without any proper reasoning.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Equally,   we   are   concerned   over   the   failure   of   the   High   Court   to
be   cognizant   of   the   fact   that   strict   principles   of   evidence   and
standards   of   proof   like   in   a   criminal   trial   are   inapplicable   in   MACT
claim   cases.   The   standard   of   proof   in   such   like   matters   is   one   of
preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt.
One   needs   to   be   mindful   that   the   approach   and   role   of   Courts   while
examining   evidence   in   accident   claim   cases   ought   not   to   be   to   find
fault   with   non­examination   of   some   best   eye­witnesses,   as   may
happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to analyze the
material   placed   on   record   by   the   parties   to   ascertain   whether   the
claimant’s   version   is   more   likely   than   not   true.   A   somewhat   similar
situation   arose   in   Dulcina   Fernandes   v.   Joaquim   Xavier   Cruz 4
wherein this Court reiterated that:
“7.   It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the
part of the first respondent who was driving the pick­up van as set
4  
 (2013) 10 SCC 646.
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up by the  claimants  was   required   to  be  decided  by  the  learned
Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities
and   certainly   not   on   the   basis   of   proof   beyond   reasonable
doubt.   (Bimla  Devi   v.   Himachal   RTC   [(2009)  13  SCC   530  :  (2009)   5
SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] )”
(emphasis supplied)
23.   The observation of the High Court that the author of the FIR (as
per its  judgment, the  owner­cum­driver)  had  not been examined  as  a
witness,   and   hence   adverse   inference   ought   to   be   drawn   against   the
appellant­claimants, is wholly misconceived and misdirected. Not only
is   the   owner­cum­driver   not   the   author   of   the   FIR,   but   instead   he   is
one   of   the   contesting   respondents   in   the   Claim   Petition   who,   along
with insurance company, is an interested party with a pecuniary stake
in   the   result   of   the   case.   If   the   owner­cum­driver   of   the   car   were
setting up a defence plea that the accident was a result of not his but
the truck driver’s carelessness or rashness, then the onus was on him
to   step   into   the   witness   box   and   explain   as   to   how   the   accident   had
taken   place.   The   fact   that   Sanjeev   Kapoor   chose   not   to   depose   in
support   of   what   he   has   pleaded   in   his   written   statement,   further
suggests that he was himself at fault. The High Court, therefore, ought
not to have shifted the burden of proof.
24. Further,  little  reliance  can  be  placed  on  the  contents  of  the  FIR
(Exh.­1)   ,   and   it   is   liable   to   be   discarded   for   more   than   one   reasons.
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First , the author of the FIR, that is, Praveen Kumar Aggarwal does not
claim   to   have   witnessed   the   accident   himself.   His   version   is   hearsay
and cannot be relied upon.  Second , it appears from the illegible part of
the   FIR   that   the   informant   had   some   closeness   with   the   owner­cum­
driver of the car and there is thus a strong possibility that his version
was influenced or at the behest of Sanjeev Kapoor.   Third , the FIR was
lodged   two   days   after   the   accident,   on   27.03.2009.   The   FIR   recites
that   some   of   the   injured   including   Sandeep   Sharma   were   referred   to
BHU,   Varanasi   for   treatment,   even   though   as   per   the   medical   report
this   took   place   only   on   26.03.2009,   the   day   after   the   accident.
Therefore   the   belated   FIR   appears   to   be   an   afterthought   attempt   to
absolve Sanjeev Kapoor from his criminal or civil liabilities. Contrarily,
the statement of AW­3 does not suffer from any evil of suspicion and is
worthy of reliance. The Tribunal rightly relied upon his statement and
decided issue No. 1 in favour of the claimants. The reasoning given by
the High Court to  disbelieve Ritesh Pandey AW­3, on the other hand,
cannot sustain and is liable to be overturned. We hold accordingly.
25. Adverting   to   the   claimants’   appeal   for   enhancement   of
compensation, we are of the view that no effective argument could be
raised   on   their   behalf   as   to   how   the   compensation   assessed   by   the
Tribunal   was   inadequate,   except   that   in   view   of   the   authoritative
pronouncement   of   this   Court   in   National   Insurance   Co   Ltd   v.
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Pranay   Sethi 5
,   the   claimants   are   entitled   to   an   increase   of   40%
towards annual dependency on account of ‘future prospects’ given the
undisputed   age   of   the   deceased.   Their   appeal   to   that   extent   deserves
to be allowed. 
C ONCLUSION :
26. In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   the   judgment   under   appeal   of
the   High   Court   is   set   aside   and   the   appellants   are   held   entitled   to
compensation   as   awarded   by   the   Tribunal,   besides   40%   addition   in
the   annual   income   of   the   deceased   towards   ‘future   prospects’.     The
Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal,   Sikar   (Rajasthan)   is   directed   to   re­
calculate   the   compensation   amount   accordingly.     The   appellants   are
held   entitled   to   interest   @   8.5%,   as   per   the   Tribunal’s   award,   on   the
entire   amount   of   compensation.   The   Tribunal   shall   re­calculate   the
compensation   within   one   month   and   the   insurance   company   shall
deposit the same within one month thereafter. No order as to costs. 
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………...J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 08.12.2020
5  
 (2017) 16 SCC 680.
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