2020 INSC 0615
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.10678 OF 2020
SARITHA S. NAIR                                                 … PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
HIBI EDEN                                                         …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. As against a common order passed by the High Court of Kerala
throwing   out   2   election   petitions   filed   by   the   petitioner   herein,   on
the ground of incurable defects, the election petitioner has come up
with   the   above   Special   Leave   Petition.   This   SLP   arises   out   of
Election Petition No.4 of 2019. Another Election Petition filed by the
very   same   petitioner   against   the   very   same   common   order,   but
arising out of Election Petition No.3 of 2019 was dismissed by this

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Court   on   02.11.2020   for   non­prosecution.   Therefore,   this   order
covers Election Petition No.4 of 2019.
2. Heard Ms. D. Geetha, learned counsel for the petitioner.
3. In the elections held to the Lok Sabha in April­May, 2019, the
petitioner   filed   her   nomination   on   04.04.2019   in   the   Ernakulam
Constituency.   The   petitioner   was   to   contest   as   an   independent
candidate.
4. On   06.04.2019   the   nomination   of   the   petitioner   was   rejected
on the ground that she was convicted in 2 criminal cases, one in CC
No.1300   of   2013   on   the   file   of   the   JFMC­I,   Pathanamthitta   and
another   in   CC   No.102   of   2014   on   the   file   of   the   JFMC­I,
Perumbavoor.   In   the   first   case   the   petitioner   was   imposed   with   a
punishment of imprisonment for 3 years, with a fine of Rs.45 lakhs,
by   a   judgment   dated   08.06.2015.   In   the   second   case   she   was
imposed with a punishment of imprisonment for 3 years, with a fine
of Rs.10 lakhs, by a judgment dated 16.02.2016.
5. The   petitioner   filed   Criminal   Appeal   No.87   of   2015   before   the
Sessions   Court,   Pathanamthitta,   against   her   conviction   in   CC
No.1300 of  2013. But the  appeal was dismissed and the petitioner

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filed a revision before the High Court in Criminal R.P.No.9 of 2018.
On 04.01.2018, the High Court merely suspended the execution of
the   sentence   and   enlarged   the   petitioner   on   bail,   subject   to   her
executing   a   bond   for   Rs.5   lakhs   with   2   solvent   sureties   and   also
upon her depositing Rs.10 lakhs towards the fine amount.
6. Similarly,   the   petitioner   filed   Criminal   Appeal   No.25   of   2017
before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam against her conviction in CC
No.102   of   2014.   The   Appellate   Court   stayed   the   execution   of   the
sentence   on   condition   of   the   appellant   executing   a   bond   for   Rs.1
lakh with 2 sureties.
7. The   Returning   Officer,   noted   in   his   order   dated   06.04.2019
that the petitioner stood disqualified in terms of Section 8(3) of the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951,   as   the   period   of
disqualification had not lapsed.
8. Aggrieved   by   the   order   of   rejection   of   the   nomination,   the
petitioner   filed   an   appeal   to   the   Chief   Electoral   Officer.   Thereafter,
the   petitioner   moved   a   writ   petition   in   W.P.(C)No.11282   of   2019.
But   the  Writ   Petition   was  dismissed  on   09.04.2019.  The  petitioner
filed a writ appeal but the same was also dismissed on 12.04.2019.

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9. Therefore, after the elections were over, the petitioner filed an
election   petition   in   Election   Petition   No.4   of   2019,   primarily
contending   that   the   rejection   of   her   nomination   was   illegal   and
unjustified   and   that   such   rejection   materially   altered   the   outcome
of the election in which the Respondent herein was declared elected.
The   main   contention   of   the   petitioner   in   her   election   petition   was
that   she   had   simultaneously   filed   a   nomination   in   the   Amethi
Constituency   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   that   despite   disclosure   of   the
very   same   information   about   her   conviction   and   pendency   of
appeals,   her   nomination   was   accepted   there.   Therefore,   she
contended that 2 different yardsticks cannot be applied and that in
any   case,   so   long   as   the   sentence   of   imprisonment   remained
suspended,   the   disqualification   under   Section   8(3)   of   the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, may not be attracted.
10. It   is   to   be   noted   at   this   stage   that   the   petitioner   filed   her
nomination   from   one   more   constituency,   namely   Wayanad
Constituency   and   her   nomination   was   rejected   even   in   the   said
Constituency,   for   the   very   same   reasons.   Therefore,   she   filed

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another   election   petition   in   Election   Petition   No.3   of   2019   as
regards the election from the Wayanad Constituency.
11. It   appears   that   lot   of   defects   were   noticed   by   the   Registry   of
the High Court in both the election petitions. The defects noticed in
both the election petitions were more or less the same. But in so far
as   Election   Petition   No.4   of   2019   is   concerned,   out   of   which   the
present SLP arises, the Registry noted one additional defect namely
that the prayer of the petitioner was incomplete.
12. Therefore,   both   the   election   petitions   were   posted   before   the
Court without being numbered. However, the Court, by order dated
29.07.2019   directed   the   election   petitions   to   be   numbered   subject
to   the   condition   that   the   petitioner   should   address   arguments   on
the   question   of   curability   of   the   defects.   Thereafter,   notices   were
issued   to   the   Election   Commission,   the   respective   Returning
Officers and the respective returned candidates.
13. It   may   be   relevant   to   note   at  this   stage   that   the   fact   that   the
petitioner   was   convicted   in   2   independent   criminal   cases   and
sentenced   to   imprisonment   for   3   years   in   each   of   those   cases   and
the   fact   that   though   the   execution   of   the   sentence   was   suspended

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in   both   the   cases,   the   conviction   was   not   suspended,   were   all
admitted   by   the   petitioner   herself.   The   case   of   the   petitioner   was
that it is enough if an appellate/revisional court had suspended the
sentence and not the conviction.
14. In view of the aforesaid stand of the petitioner, the High Court
framed   a   preliminary   issue   on   01.10.2019   as   to   whether   the
election   petitions   were   maintainable,   when   the   conviction   was   not
suspended in appeal or revision. The High Court decided to take up
this preliminary issue also for consideration along with the question
relating to curability of defects noticed in the election petitions.
15. Thereafter,   the   High   Court   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioner   and   learned   counsel   for   the   returned   candidates   and
passed   an   order   dated   31.10.2019   rejecting   both   the   election
petitions on 2 grounds namely:­
(i) that   there   were   incurable   defects   in   the   election
petitions   in   terms   of   Section   86(1)   of   the   Representation
of the People Act, 1951; and
(ii) that   the   petitioner   was   disqualified   in   view   of   the
inhibitions contained in Section 8(3) of the Act read with
Article 102(1)(e) of the Constitution.

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16. Aggrieved   by   the   common   order   passed   on   31.10.2019   in
Election   Petition   Nos.   3   and   4   of   2019,   the   petitioner   filed   SLP(C)
Diary   No.4200   of   2020   and   SLP(C)   No.10678   of   2020.   The   SLP   in
SLP(C)   Diary   No.4200   of   2020,   arising   out   of   the   order   in   Election
Petition   No.3   of   2019,   was   dismissed   for   non­prosecution   on
02.11.2020. The present SLP arising out of Election Petition No. 4 of
2019 came up thereafter for hearing.
17. As pointed out above, the election petition of the petitioner was
dismissed   on   2   grounds   namely   (i)   that   it   contained   incurable
defects; and (ii) that in any case, the petitioner admittedly suffered
from   a   disqualification.   Let   us   now   examine   the   correctness   of   the
findings of the High court in regard to these 2 issues.
Issue­1 (Incurability of defects)
18. On   the   first   issue,   the   High   court   noted   that   some   of   the
defects   in   the   election   petition   are   covered   by   Sections   81   and   82
and   that   there   was   no   semblance   of   any   verification   in   terms   of
section 83 (1) (c) read with Order VI, Rule 15 of the CPC. The High
court   held   that   there   were   3   defects   which   were   incurable.   They
were:

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(i)   Petitioner has not signed in the declaration portion of
verification of the election petition;
(ii)   In   verification   portion,   in   respect   of   Annexures,
affidavits   and   petitions,   it   is   stated   that   the   index   has
been   verified   instead   of   Annexures,   affidavits   and
petitions;
(iii)   Annexures   are   not   verified   by   the   petitioner   as
mandated and instead of verification, annexures are seen
certified as true copies by the petitioner and the counsel.
19. In   addition   to   the   above   3   defects,   which   the   High   Court
considered   as   incurable   in   both   the   election   petitions,   the   High
Court  noted  that  in   Election  Petition   No.  4  of  2019,  even   the  relief
sought   was   incomplete   and   meaningless.   Prayer   (a)   made   in   the
election   petition   was   “ To   declare   that   the   election   of   the   5 th
respondent   from   Ernakulam   Lok   Sabha   Constituency ”.   It
actually   meant   nothing,   unless   the   word   “void”   had   been   added
thereto. Since the word “void” was not there in prayer (a), the High
Court thought that the election petition had been prepared and filed
in   a   casual   manner.   Coupled   with   this,   was   the   fact   that   the
election   petition   also   contained   some   allegations   of   serious   nature
against   the   former   Chief   Minister   of   Kerala.   Therefore,   the   High

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Court thought that the petitioner had malafide intentions to malign
the reputation of third parties, through the election petition without
proper   verification   and   prayer   and   that   this   is   nothing   but   a   ruse
for   the   petitioner   to   escape   at   a   later   stage   from   owning   up   the
pleadings.
20. In other words, what weighed with the High Court were:­
(i) Lack of proper verification;
(ii) An incomplete prayer; and
(iii) Allegations   of   serious   nature   made   against   the
former Chief Minister with a possible leverage not to own
up the pleadings.  
To hold that the defects stated above are incurable, the High Court
relied   upon   Sections   81,   82   and   83   read   with   Section   86   of   the
Representation   of   the   People   Act,   1951.   Let   us   now   test   the
correctness   of   the   approach   of   the   High   Court,   with   regard   to   the
statutory provisions.
21. Chapter­II,   Part­VI   of   the   Representation   of   the   People   Act,
1951,   contains   provisions   for   “Presentation   of   election   petitions   to
High Court” and Chapter III contains provisions for “Trial of election
petitions”. Section 86(1), with which Chapter­III begins, obliges the

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High   Court   to   dismiss   an   election   petition   which   does   not   comply
with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117. The
dismissal   of   an   election   petition   under   Section   86(1)   is   deemed   by
the Explanation under Section 86(1) to be a decision under Section
98(a).   Section   98   speaks   about   3   types   of   orders   that   could   be
passed   at   the   conclusion   of   the   trial   of   an   election   petition.     They
are:­
(i) The dismissal of the election petition; or
(ii) A   declaration   that   the   election   of   the   returned
candidate is void; or
(iii) A   declaration   not   only   that   the   election   of   the
returned candidate is void, but also that the petitioner or
any other candidate was duly elected.
22. It   is   important   to   note   that   the   above   3   different   types   of
decisions under Section 98, can be rendered by the High Court only
at the conclusion of the trial. But the dismissal under Section 86(1)
is an exception.  The reference in the Explanation under Section
86(1)   to   Section   98(a),   makes   it   clear   that   the   power   of   the
High   Court   to   dismiss   an   election   petition   which   does   not

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comply   with   the   provisions   of   Section   81   or   Section   82   or
Section 117, is available at the pre­trial stage.
23. As   stated   earlier,   the   procedure   for   presentation   of   election
petitions   to   the   High   Court   are   dealt   with   in   Sections   80   to   84
falling   in   Chapter­II   of   Part­VI.   For   our   present   purpose,   Sections
81(3), 83(1), 83(2) and 84 are relevant.
24. Section 81(3) makes it mandatory for every election petition to
be accompanied by as many copies as there are respondents. Every
such copy is required to be attested by the petitioner under his own
signature   to   be   a   true   copy   of   the   petition.   Section   81(3)   reads   as
follows:­
“ 81. Presentation of petitions .­ (1)….
(2) Omitted
(3)  Every  election  petition  shall be  accompanied by  as
many   copies   thereof   as   there   are   respondents
mentioned   in   the   petition,   and   every   such   copy   shall
be   attested   by   the   petitioner   under   his   own   signature
to be a true copy of the petition.”
25. Section 83 speaks about:­
(i) The contents of the election petition;
(ii) The   signature   and   verification   of   the   election
petition; and

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(iii) The   signature   and   verification   of   any   schedule   or
annexure to the election petition.
Section 83 reads as follows :­
“ 83. Contents of petition .— (1    )   An election petition—
(a)   shall   contain   a   concise   statement   of   the   material
facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b)   shall   set   forth   full   particulars   of   any   corrupt
practice   that   the   petitioner   alleges   including   as   full   a
statement   as   possible   of   the   names   of   the   parties
alleged   to   have   committed   such   corrupt   practice   and
the   date   and   place   of   the   commission   of   each   such
practice; and
(c)   shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the
manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings: 
[Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt
practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by  an
affidavit   in   the   prescribed   form   in   support   of   the
allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars
thereof.]
(2)   Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also
be   signed   by   the   petitioner   and   verified   in   the   same
manner as the petition.”
26. Section 84 indicates the relief/reliefs that could be claimed in
an election petition. It reads as follows:­
“ 84. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner. —
A petitioner may, in addition to claiming a declaration
that   the   election   of   all   or   any   of   the   returned
candidates is void, claim a further declaration that he
himself or any other candidate has been duly elected . ”
27. In the trial of an election petition, the High Court is bound to
follow   the   procedure   as   applicable   to   the   trial   of   suits   under   the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as nearly as may be. This is by virtue

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of   Section   87(1).   The   provisions   of   Indian   Evidence   Act,   1872   are
made applicable in all respects to the trial of all elections petitions,
under Section 87(2).  Section 87 reads as follows:­
“ 87.   Procedure   before   the   High   Court .— (1)   Subject
to   the   provisions   of   this   Act   and   of   any   rules   made
thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the
High   Court,   as   nearly   as   may   be,   in   accordance   with
the   procedure   applicable   under   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure,   1908   (5   of   1908)   to   the   trial   of   suits:
Provided that the High Court shall have the discretion
to   refuse,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded   in   writing,   to
examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion
that   the   evidence   of   such   witness   or   witnesses   is   not
material   for   the   decision   of   the   petition   or   that   the
party   tendering   such   witness   or   witnesses  is   doing   so
on   frivolous   grounds   or   with   a   view   to   delay   the
proceedings.
(2)   The  provisions  of  the  Indian Evidence  Act,  1872  (1
of 1872), shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be
deemed   to   apply   in   all   respects   to   the   trial   of   an
election petition.”
28. It   is   relevant   to   note   that   the   Act   keeps   in   two   separate
compartments­
(i) the presentation of election petitions; and
(ii) the trial of election petitions.
The   presentation   of   election   petitions   is   covered   by   Sections   80   to
84 falling in Chapter­II. The trial of election petitions is covered by
Sections 86 to 107 and they are contained in Chapter­III.
29. This   compartmentalization,   may   be   of   significance,   as   seen
from 2 facts namely:­

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(i) That under Section 80 no election shall be called in
question   except   by   an   election   petition   presented   in
accordance with the provisions of “ this part ”; and
(ii) That a limited reference is made to the provisions of
the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   in   Chapter­II,   only   in
places where signature and verification are referred to.
30. In   so   far   as   presentation   of   election   petitions   is   concerned,
Chapter­II   is   a   complete   code.   This   is   because,   the   various
provisions   of   Chapter­II   cover   all   aspects   of   the   presentation   of   an
election petition, such as:­
(i) The person(s) who is/are entitled to file;
(ii) Person(s) who could be joined as respondents;
(iii) The types of different reliefs that can be sought;
(iv) The grounds on which such reliefs could be sought;
(v) Period of limitation for filing an election petition;
(vi) The court where the petition could be filed;
(vii) Contents of such petition; and
(viii) Format   of   the   election   petition   and   the   manner   in
which it is to be signed and verified.
31. Some   of   the   rules   contained   in   Chapter   II   are   inflexible   and
inviolable.   But   some   may   not   be.   Whether   the   manner   of   signing

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and verifying an election petition is an inflexible rule, is what is to
be seen here.    
32. Section   83   (1)   (c)   mandates   that   an   election   petition   shall   be
signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the
Code   of   Civil   Procedure   for   verification   of   pleadings.   Signing   a
petition   and   verifying   the   petition   are   2   different   aspects.   While
Order   VI,   Rule   14   deals   with   the   signing   of   the   petition,   Order   VI,
Rule   15   deals   with   the   verification   of   pleading.   Rule   14   mandates
that   every   pleading   shall   be   signed   by   the   party   as   well   as   the
pleader,   if   any.   But   the   proviso   carves   out   an   exception   by
stating  that   where  a  party  is   unable   to  sign  the  pleading,   by
reason of absence or for other good cause, it may be signed by
any  person duly  authorized by him  to  sign the same   or  to sue
or defend on his behalf. Order VI, R.14 reads as follows:­
“ 14.   Pleading   to   be   signed. ­Every   pleading   shall   be
signed by the party and his pleader(if any):
Provided   that   where   a   party   pleading   is,   by   reason   of
absence   or   for   other   good   cause;   unable   to   sign   the
pleading,   it   may   be   signed   by   any   person   duly
authorized by him to sign the same or to sue or defend
on his behalf.”

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33. Order   VI,   R.15   which   speaks   about   verification   of   pleadings
reads as follows:­
“15. Verification of pleadings.­   (1) Save as otherwise
provided   by   any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force,   every
pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by
one   of   the   parties   pleading   or   by   some   other   person
proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted
with the facts of the case.
(2)   The   person   verifying   shall   specify,   by   reference   to
the   numbered   paragraphs   of   the   pleading,   what   he
verifies   of   his   own   knowledge   and   what   he   verifies
upon information received and believed to be true.
(3)   The   verification   shall   be   signed   by   the   person
making   it   and   shall   state   the   date   on   which   and   the
place at which it was signed.
(4) The person verifying the pleading shall also furnish
an affidavit in support of his pleadings.”
34. It is  to be noted that  Sub­rule (1) of  Rule 15 of  Order   VI   also
permits   the   verification   of   pleading   to   be   done   by   a   person
other   than   the   party   pleading ,   provided   it   is   proved   to   the
satisfaction   of   the   Court   that   such   other   person   was   acquainted
with the facts of the case. 
35. Section 86(1) empowers the High Court to dismiss an election
petition   which   does   not   comply   with   the   provisions   of   Section   81,
Section 82 or Section 117 and it does not include Section 83 within
its   ambit.   Therefore,   the   question   whether   or   not   an   election

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petition which does not satisfy the requirements of Section 83, can
be dismissed at the pre­trial stage under section 86(1), has come up
repeatedly for consideration before this Court. We are concerned in
this   case   particularly   with   the   requirement   of   Clause   (c)   of   Sub­
section   (1)   of   Section   83   and   the   consequence   of   failure   to   comply
with the same.
36. In   Murarka   Radhey   Shyam   Ram   Kumar   vs .   Roop   Singh
Rathore 1
,   a   preliminary   objection   to   the   maintainability   of   the
election petition was raised on the ground that the verification was
defective.  The   verification   stated   that   the   averments  made  in   some
paragraphs   of   the   petition   were   true   to   the   personal   knowledge   of
the   petitioner   and   the   averments   in   some   other   paragraphs   were
verified to be true on advice and information received from legal and
other   sources.   There   was   no   statement   that   the   advice   and
information received by the election petitioner were believed by him
to   be   true.   Since   this   case   arose   before   the   amendment   of   the   Act
under   Act   47   of   1966,   the   election   petition   was   dealt   with   by   the
Tribunal.   The   Tribunal   held   the   defect   in   the   verification   to   be   a
curable defect. The view of the Tribunal was upheld by this Court in
1  AIR (1964) SC 1545

18
Murarka   Radhey   Shyam   Ram   Kumar   (supra).   This   Court   held
that   “ it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in
verification   which   is   to   be   made   in   the   manner   laid   down   in
the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of pleadings as
required   by  Clause   (c)   of   Sub­section   (1)   of   Section  83   is   fatal
to the maintainability of the petition ”.
37. T he   ratio   laid   down   in   Muraraka   was   reiterated   by   a   three
member   Bench   of   this   Court   in   F.A.   Sapa   vs.   Singora 2
  holding
that  “the mere defect in the verification of the election petition
is   not   fatal   to   the   maintainability   of   the   petition   and   the
petition   cannot   be   thrown   out   solely   on   that   ground” .   It   was
also   held  in   F.A.   Sapa   that   “since   Section   83   is   not   one   of   the
three   provisions   mentioned   in   Section   86(1),   ordinarily   it
cannot be construed as mandatory unless it is shown to be an
integral part of the petition under Section 81” .
38. In   F.A.   Sapa   (supra)   this   Court   framed   two   questions   in
paragraph   20   of   the   Report,   as   arising   for   consideration.   The   first
2   (1991) 3 SCC 375

19
question   was   as   to   what   is   the   consequence   of   a   defective   or
incomplete   verification.   While   answering   the   said   question,   this
Court formulated the following principles: –
(i) A defect in the verification, if any, can be cured 
(ii) It is not essential that the verification clause at the foot
of   the   petition   or   the   affidavit   accompanying   the   same
should   disclose   the   grounds   or   sources   of   information   in
regard to the averments or allegations which are based on
information believed to be true 
(iii) If the respondent desires better particulars in regard to
such   averments   or   allegations,   he   may   call   for   the   same,
in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the
same and
(iv)   The   defect   in   the   affidavit   in   the   prescribed   Form   25
can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of
the   petition,   in   which   case   the   defect   concerning   material
facts   will   have   to   be   dealt   with,   subject   to   limitation,
under   section 81(3)   as indicated earlier.”
39. It was also held in  F.A. Sapa  (supra) that though an allegation
involving   corrupt   practice   must   be   viewed   very   seriously   and   the
High   Court   should   ensure   compliance   with   the   requirements   of
Section 83 before the parties go to trial,  the defective verification

20
of   a   defective   affidavit   may   not   be   fatal .   This   Court   held   that
the   High  Court   should   ensure   its   compliance   before   the   parties  go
to trial. This decision was followed by another three­member Bench
in  R.P. Moidutty   vs.   P.T. Kunju Mohammad 3
.
40. In   Sardar   Harcharan   Singh   Brar   vs.   Sukh   Darshan
Singh 4
, this Court held that   though the proviso to Section 83(1)
is couched in a mandatory form, requiring a petition alleging
corrupt   practice   to   be   accompanied   by   an   affidavit,   the
failure to comply with the requirement cannot be a ground for
dismissal of an election petition  in limine  under Section 86(1) .
The   Court   reiterated   that   non­compliance   with   the   provisions   of
Section 83 does not attract the consequences envisaged by Section
86(1) and that  the defect in the verification and the affidavit is
a   curable   defect .   The   following   portion   of   the   decision   is   of
significance:
“14.  xxxx
Therefore,   an   election   petition   is   not   liable   to   be
dismissed   in   limine   under   Section   86   of   the   Act,   for
alleged   non­compliance   with   provisions   of   Section
3  (2000) 1 SCC 481
4  (2004) 11 SCC 196

21
83(1)   or   (2)   of  the  Act   or   of  its  proviso.   The  defect   in
the   verification   and   the   affidavit   is   a   curable
defect.   What   other   consequences,   if   any,   may   follow
from an allegedly "defective" affidavit, is required to be
judged   at   the   trial   of   an   election   petition   but   Section
86(1)   of the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a
case.”
41. In   K.K.   Ramachandran   Master   vs.   M.V.   Sreyamakumar 5
,
this   Court   followed   F.A.   Sapa   (supra)   and   Sardar   Harcharan
Singh Brar   (supra) to hold that  defective verification is curable .
The   Court   again   reiterated   that   the   consequences   that   may   flow
from  a  defective affidavit is required  to be judged at  the trial  of an
election   petition   and   that   such   election   petition   cannot   be
dismissed under Section 86(1).
42. Though   all   the   aforesaid   decisions   were   taken   note   by   a   two­
member Bench in  P.A. Mohammed Riyas   vs.   M.K. Raghavan 6
, the
Court held in that case that the absence of proper verification may
lead   to   the   conclusion   that   the   provisions   of   Section   81   had   not
been   fulfilled   and   that   the   cause   of   action   for   the   election   petition
would   remain   incomplete.   Such   a   view   does   not   appear   to   be   in
conformity   with   the   series   of   decisions   referred   to   in   the   previous
5  (2010) 7 SCC 428
6  (2012) 5 SCC 511

22
paragraphs  and   hence   P.A.   Mohammed   Riyas   cannot   be  taken  to
lay   down   the   law   correctly.   It   appears   from   the   penultimate
paragraph   of   the   decision   in   P.A.   Mohammed   Riyas   (supra)   that
the Court was pushed to take such an extreme view in that case on
account of the fact that the petitioner therein had an opportunity to
cure the defect, but he failed to do so. Therefore,   P.A. Mohammed
Riyas   (supra)   appears   to   have   turned   on   its   peculiar   facts.   In   any
case  P.A. Mohammed Riyas  was overruled in  G.M.Siddeshwar  vs.
Prasanna   Kumar 7
on   the   question   whether   it   is   imperative   for   an
election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4)
of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908   in   support   of   the   averments
made   in   the   election   petition   in   addition   to   an   affidavit   (in   a   case
where   resort   to   corrupt   practices   have   been   alleged   against   the
returned candidate) as required by the proviso to   Section 83(1) .  As a
matter of fact, even the filing of a defective affidavit, which is not in
Form 25 as prescribed by the Rules, was held in   G.M. Siddeshwar
to   be   a   curable   defect   and   the   petitioner   was   held   entitled   to   an
opportunity to cure the defect.
7  (2013) 4 SCC 776

23
43. The   upshot   of   the   above   discussion   is   that   a   defective
verification   is   a   curable   defect.   An   election   petition   cannot   be
thrown out  in limine , on the ground that the verification is defective.
44. Therefore,   the  High   Court   committed   a   grave   error   in   holding
the 3 defects mentioned in paragraph 18 hereinabove as incurable.
The   defects   are   curable   and   as   rightly   contended   by   the   learned
counsel for the petitioner, an opportunity to cure the defects ought
to have been given. Instead, the election petition was posted before
Court without numbering, in view of the defects noticed. The Court
directed   the   petition   to   be   numbered   subject   to   arguments   on   the
curability   of   defects.   Thereafter   notices   were   issued   to   the
respondents in the election petition and finally the order impugned
herein was passed after hearing both sides. The High Court did not
even rely upon any rule framed by the High court to follow the said
procedure. 
45.   The   Rules   of   the   High   Court   of   Kerala,   1971   contains   a   set   of
Rules from Rule Nos.207 to 219 in Chapter XVI. These Rules govern
the procedure for institution and trial of election petitions. Rule 210
of these rules reads as follows:­

24
“ 210.Summons .­Immediately   after   registering,   the
petition   shall   be   placed   before   the   Judge   for   such
orders as may be required to be passed under Section
86   of   the   Act.     If   the   petition   is   not   dismissed   under
Section  86(1)  of  the  Act,  a  summons,  on the  direction
of   the   Judge   shall   be   issued   to   the   respondents   to
appear   before   the   High   Court   on   a   fixed   date   and
answer the claim or claims made in the petition.  Such
date   shall   not   be   earlier   than   three   weeks   from   the
date of the issue of the summons.  The summons shall
be  for   written  statement   and  settlement   of   issues  and
shall be served on the respondents by the process staff
of the High Court or the District Courts, all steps being
taken to effect service with the utmost expedition.”
46. The   manner   in   which   Rule   210   has   been   worded   gives   an
impression   as   though   an   election   petition   should   be   placed   before
the   Judge,   immediately   after   it   is   registered,   for   passing   Orders
under   Section   86(1).   If   the   petition   is   not   dismissed   under   Section
86(1),   summons   should   be   issued   to   the   respondents   on   the
direction of the Judge. In the case on hand the learned designated
Judge   before   whom   the   election   petition   was   listed   as   defective,
chose  to   issue  summons   to  the   respondents,  calling   upon   them   to
argue   on   the   curability   of   defects   as   well   as   the   maintainability   of
the   petition.   There   is   nothing   to   indicate   in   the   Rules   that   the
learned   designated   Judge   was   powerless   to   return   the   petition   to
the petitioner for curing the defects.

25
 47. The procedure adopted by the High Court of Kerala cannot be
approved. The High Court was wrong in thinking that the defective
verification of the election petition was a pointer to the game plan of
the   election   petitioner   to   disown   the   pleadings   at   a   later   stage,
especially after making serious allegations against the former Chief
Minister.   If   only   the   High   Court   had   given   an   opportunity   to   the
petitioner to cure the defects in the verification and if, despite such
an   opportunity,  the  petitioner  had   failed  to  come  up  with  a  proper
verification,   the   High   Court   could   have   then   held   the   petitioner
guilty of playing hide and seek. The failure of the High Court to give
an opportunity to cure the defects is improper.
48. The   defect   in   the   prayer   made   by   the   petitioner   was   also   a
curable defect, as the words   “as void ” were omitted to be included,
making   the   prayer   as   it   existed,   meaningless.   It   is   true   that   the
election   petitioner   should   have   been   more   careful   and   diligent   in
incorporating an appropriate relief and making a proper verification.
But   no   motives   could   have   been   attributed   to   the   petitioner,   only
because   she   made   serious   allegations   against   someone.   Hence   we
hold on the first issue that the defects in the verification and prayer

26
made   by   the   petitioner   were   curable   and   an   opportunity   ought   to
have been given to the petitioner to cure the defects.
Issue­2 (effect of punishment by criminal court)
49. That   takes   us   to   the   next   issue   regarding   the   punishments
imposed   upon   the   petitioner   in   two   criminal   cases   and   the
suspension   of   execution   of   sentence   alone   granted   by   the
appellate/revisional Courts.
50. Admittedly   the   petitioner   was   imposed   with   a   punishment   of
imprisonment   for   a   period   not   less   than   two   years   in   two
independent   criminal   cases.   Therefore,   her   case   is   covered   by
Section 8(3) of the Act.
51. What   was   suspended   by   the   appellate   Court   in   one   case   and
the   revisional   Court   in   another   case   was   only   the   execution   of   the
sentence of imprisonment and not the conviction. The contention of
the petitioner is that the suspension of the sentence was sufficient
to save her from the applicability of Section 8(3).
52. But we do not think so.  Section 8(3) reads as follows:
“Disqualification on conviction for certain offences .­
(1)  …
(2)  …

27
(3) A person convicted of any offence and sentenced to
imprisonment   for   not   less   than   two   years   [other   than
any   offence   referred   to   in   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­
section (2)] shall be disqualified from  the date of such
conviction   and   shall   continue   to   be   disqualified   for   a
further period of six years since his release.” 
53. It is seen from a reading of Section 8(3) that it deals with two
aspects   namely   (i)   the   conditions   for   disqualification;   and   (ii)   the
period   of   disqualification.   The   conditions   for   disqualification   are   (i)
conviction for any offence other than an offence referred to in Sub­
sections   (1)   and   (2);   and   (ii)   sentence   of   imprisonment   for   not   less
than two years.
54. In so far as the period of disqualification is concerned, Section
8(3)   says   that   the   disqualification   will   commence   from   the   date   of
conviction.   This   is   made   clear   by   the   usage   of   the   words   “shall   be
disqualified from the date of such conviction”.   It is needless to state
that   the   words   “the   date”   appearing   in   Section   8(3)   refers   to   the
event   of   conviction   and   it   is   post   facto.   The   disqualification   which
commences from the date of conviction, continues till the expiry of a
period of six years from the date of his release.

28
55. In   other  words,   the   date   of  conviction   is   what   determines
the   date   of   commencement   of   the   period   of   disqualification.
However,   it   is   date   of   release   which   determines   the   date   on
which the disqualification will cease to have effect .
56. When   viewed   in   that   context,   it   will   be   clear   that   the   mere
suspension of the execution of the sentence is not sufficient to take
the rigour out of Section 8(3).
57. In fact, a Constitution Bench of this Court held in  B.R. Kapur
vs.   State of Tamil Nadu 8
  that an order of the appellate/revisional
Court   suspending   the   sentence   of   imprisonment   has   to   be   read   in
the   context   of   Section   389   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   and
that   under   the   said   provision,   what   is   suspended   is   only   the
execution   of   the   sentence   and   not   the   sentence   itself.   The
Constitution   Bench   made   it   clear   that   the   suspension   of   the
execution   of   the   sentence   would   not   alter   or   affect   the   conviction
and   that   therefore   such   a   person   would   remain   disqualified   under
Section   8(3).   In   fact,   in   B.R.   Kapur   (supra)   a   person   whose
nomination   was   rejected   on   the   ground   of   disqualification,   got
8  (2001) 7 SCC 231

29
elected   as   the   leader   of   the   party   which   secured   majority   in   the
elections and became the Chief Minister and hence Article 164 was
pressed into service. But even the same was rejected on the ground
that   a   person   who   was   disqualified   from   contesting   the   elections,
cannot take the route of Article 164.  
58. A contention was raised in  B.R. Kapur  (supra) that the sitting
members   of   Parliament   or   Legislatures   are   granted   by   Section   8(4)
of the Act, with a protection against removal from office, during the
pendency of their appeal or revision against conviction and that it is
violative  of the guarantee of  equality  under   the Constitution, if the
class   of   persons   getting   convicted   before   elections   are   placed   at   a
disadvantageous   position   than   the   class   of   persons   who   are
convicted   after   getting   elected   to   the   Parliament   or   the   State
Legislatures. But the Constitution Bench rejected this contention in
B.R. Kapur  (supra) on the ground that the constitutional validity of
Sub­section (4) of Section 8 was not in question. 
59. Possibly taking cue from what was observed in  B.R. Kapur   (in
Para 38 and 39 of the Report), a challenge was made to Section 8(4)

30
in   Lily Thomas   vs.   Union of India 9
, on the ground that it is   ultra
vires   the   Constitution.   While   declaring   the   said   provision   to   be
unconstitutional,   this   Court   held   in   Lily   Thomas   (supra)   that   a
Member   of   Parliament   or   the   State   Legislature   who   suffers   a
frivolous   conviction,   will   not   be   remediless.   Taking   note   of   the
decisions   in   Rama   Narang   vs .   Ramesh   Narang 10
  and   Ravikant
S.   Patil   vs.   Sarvabhouma   S.   Bagali 11
,   this   Court   held   in   Lily
Thomas   (supra)   that   the   appellate   Court   has   ample   powers   under
Section   389(1)   of   the   Code,   to   stay   the   conviction   as   well   as   the
sentence   and   that   wherever   a   stay   of   conviction   itself   has   been
granted, the disqualification will not operate.
60. Just as the observations made in   B.R. Kapur   (supra) led to a
challenge   to   Section   8(4)   of   the   Act   in   Lily   Thomas   (supra),   the
discussion in  Lily Thomas   (supra) about the power of the appellate
Court   to   stay   the   conviction   as   well   as   the   execution   of   sentence,
led   to   another   bout   of   litigation.   In   Lok   Parhari   vs.   Election
Commissioner   of  India 12
,   the  petitioner  sought   a  declaration   that
9   (2013) 7 SCC 653
10  (1995) 2 SCC 513
11  (2007) 1 SCC 673
12  (2018) AIR 4675

31
even   a   stay   of   conviction   by   the   appellate   Court   will   not   have   the
effect   of   wiping   out   the   disqualification.   The   contention   of   the
petitioner  was  that  the  law   does  not  provide  for  stay   of  conviction.
But   this   Court   rejected   the   challenge   on   the   ground   that   the
decisions   in   Rama   Narang   (supra)   and   Lily   Thomas   (supra)
clinched the issue in this regard.
61. Therefore, in effect, the disqualification under Section 8(3) will
continue   so   long   as   there   is   no   stay   of   conviction.   In   the   case   on
hand,   the   petitioner   could   not   obtain   a   stay   of   conviction   but
obtained   only   a   stay   of   execution   of   the   sentence.   Hence   her
nominations   were   validly   rejected   by   the   Returning   Officer.   Merely
because   the   Returning   Officer   in   Amethi   Constituency   committed
an   error   in   overlooking   this   fact,   the   petitioner   cannot   plead
estoppel against statutory prescription.
CONCLUSION
62. Therefore, in fine, we hold that the petitioner was disqualified
from contesting the elections in terms of Section 8(3) of the Act. In
such   circumstances,   she   could   not   have   maintained   an   election
petition   as   “a   candidate   at   such   election”   in   terms   of   Section

32
81(1) . Therefore, the High Court was right in not venturing into an
exercise   in   futility,   by   taking   up   the   election   petition   for   trial,
though  the  High  Court was  wrong  in  rejecting  the election  petition
on the ground of existence of incurable of defects.
63. In   view   of   the   above,   the   Special   Leave   Petition   is   dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
…………………………..CJI
(S.A. Bobde)
…………………………….J.
(A.S. Bopanna)
……………………………..J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
December 9, 2020