2021 INSC 0045
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 98 of 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 11616 of 2019]
Union of India ..... Appellant (s)
                                       VERSUS
K.A. Najeeb ..... Respondent (s)
ORDER
Surya Kant, J:
Leave Granted.
2. The   present   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the   Union   of   India
through the National Investigation Agency (in short, “NIA”) against an
order   dated   23.07.2019   of   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   at   Ernakulam,
whereby   bail   was   granted   to   the   respondent   for   an   offence   under
Sections 143, 147, 148, 120­B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 201,
202,   153A,   212,   307,   149   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (“IPC”),
Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 16, 18,
18­B,   19   and   20   of   the   Unlawful   Activities   (Prevention)   Act,   1967
(“UAPA”).
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F ACTS
3. The   prosecution   case   in   brief   is   that   one   Professor   TJ   Joseph
while   framing   the   Malayalam  question   paper   for   the  second   semester
B.Com.   examination   at   the   Newman   College,   Thodupuzha,   had
included   a   question   which   was   considered   objectionable   against   a
particular   religion   by   certain   sections   of   society.   The   respondent   in
association   with   other   members   of   the   Popular   Front   of   India   (PFI),
decided to avenge this purported act of blasphemy. On 04.07.2010 at
about   8AM,   a   group   of   people   with   a   common   object,   attacked   the
victim­professor   while   he   was   returning   home   with   his   mother   and
sister after attending Sunday mass at a local Church. Over the course
of   the   attack,   members   of   the   PFI   forcefully   intercepted   the   victim’s
car,   restrained   him   and   chopped­off   his   right   palm   with   choppers,
knives,   and   a   small   axe.   Country­made   bombs   were   also   hurled   at
bystanders   to   create   panic   and   terror   in   their   minds   and   to   prevent
them   from   coming   to   the   aid   of   the   victim.   An   FIR   was   consequently
lodged   against   the   attackers   by   the   victim­professor’s   wife   under
Sections 143, 147, 148, 120­B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 307,
149 of IPC; and Section 3 of Explosive Substances Act. 
4. It   emerged   over   the   course   of   investigation   that   the   attack   was
part   of   a   larger   conspiracy   involving   meticulous   pre­planning,
numerous failed attempts and use of dangerous weapons. Accordingly,
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several   dozen   persons   including   the   present   respondent   were
arraigned by the police. It was alleged that the respondent was one of
the main conspirators and the provisions contained in Sections 153A,
201,   202,   212   of   IPC,   along   with   Section   16,   18,   18­B,   19   and   20   of
the UAPA were also thus invoked against him. However, owing to him
being untraceable, the respondent was declared an absconder and his
trial was split up from the rest of his co­conspirators. The co­accused
of   the   respondent   were   tried   and   most   of   them   were   found   guilty   by
the Special Court, NIA vide order dated 30.04.2015 and were awarded
cumulative   sentence   ranging   between   two   and   eight­years’   rigorous
imprisonment. 
5. The   respondent   could   be   arrested   on   10.04.2015   only   and   a
chargesheet  was   re­filed   by   the   National   Investigation   Agency   against
him,   pursuant   to   which   the   respondent   is   now   facing   trial.   The
respondent approached the Special Court and the High Court for bail
as   many   as   six   times   between   2015   and   2019,   seeking   leniency   on
grounds   of   his   limited   role   in   the   offence   and   claiming   parity   with
other co­accused who had been enlarged on bail or acquitted. Save for
the   impugned   order,   bail   was   declined   to   the   respondent,   observing
that   prima   facie   he   had   prior   knowledge   of   the   offence,   had   assisted
and   facilitated   the   attack,   arranged   vehicle   and   SIM   cards,   himself
waited   near   the   place   of   occurrence,   transported   the   perpetrators,
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sheltered,   and   medically   assisted   them   afterwards.   The   Courts   were,
therefore, of the view that the bar against grant of bail under Section
43­D (5) of the UAPA was attracted.  
6. The  respondent again  approached  the High  Court in  May, 2019
for the third time, questioning the Special  Court’s order  denying bail.
The High Court through the impugned order, released the respondent
on   bail   noting   that   the   trial   was   yet   to   begin   though   the   respondent
had been in custody for four years. Placing emphasis on the mandate
for   an   expeditious   trial   under   the   National   Investigation   Agency   Act,
2008, the High Court held that the undertrial­respondent could not be
kept in custody for too long when the trial was not likely to commence
in the near future, for not doing so would cause serious prejudice and
suffering  to   him.  The  operation  of  the   aforementioned  bail  order   was,
however, stayed by this Court. Resultantly, the respondent has spent
nearly five years and five months in judicial custody. 
C ONTENTIONS
7. Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General,   for   the   appellant,   argued
that   the   High   Court   erred   in   granting   bail   without   adverting   to   the
statutory rigours of Section 43­D(5) of UAPA. Relying upon   judgment
in  National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali 1
,
it   was   highlighted   that   bail   proceedings   under   the   special   enactment
were distinct and the Courts are duty­bound to refuse bail where the
1
(2019) 5 SCC 1.
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suspect   is   prima   facie   believed   to   be   guilty.   It   was   further   contended
that in numerous prior rounds before the Special Court and the High
Court,   there   emerged   enough   reasons   to   believe   that   the   respondent
was,   prima facie,   guilty of the accusations made against him. The fact
that the respondent had absconded for years was pressed into aid as
legitimate   apprehension   of   his   not   returning   if   set   free.   As   regard   to
the   early   conclusion   of   trial,   NIA   has   filed   an   additional   affidavit
suggesting  to  examine  276 witnesses and  at the same  time expecting
to   conduct   the   trial   on   a   day­to­day   basis   and   complete   it   within
around a year. 
8. Learned   Senior   Counsel   appearing   for   the   respondent,   on   the
other   hand,   highlighted   that   many   of   the   co­accused   had   been
acquitted,   and   although   a   few   had   been   convicted   as   well,   but   those
convicts   had   also   been   awarded   a   sentence   of   not   more   than   eight
years. Given how the respondent has already suffered incarceration of
almost   five­and­a­half   years   without   the   trial   having   even   started,   it
would   violate   his   Constitutional   liberty   and   rights   to   have   him   serve
most   of   his   sentence   without   any   adjudication   of   guilt   by   a   judicial
authority. He urged that once the High Court had exercised discretion
to   grant  bail,  the  same  ought  not  to  be  interfered  with  except  in   rare
circumstances. Relying upon  Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union
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of   India 2
  and   Hussain   v.   Union   of   India, 3
  it   was   argued   that   such
protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to speedy trial
and   access   to   justice;   in   which   case,   Constitutional   Courts   could
exercise   their   powers   to   grant   bail,   regardless   of   limitations   specified
under special enactments.
A NALYSIS
9. It   must   be   emphasised   at   the   outset   that   there   is   a   vivid
distinction   between   the   parameters   to   be   applied   while   considering   a
bail application, vis­à­vis those applicable while deciding a petition for
its cancellation. In   Puran v. Rambilas 4
,   it was re­iterated that at the
time of deciding an application for bail, it would be necessary to record
reasons,   albeit   without   evaluating   the   evidence   on   merits.   In   turn,
Puran   (supra)   cited   Gurcharan   Singh   v.   State   (Delhi   Admn.) 5
;
wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court,
could   be   cancelled   by   the   same   Court   only   in   case   of   new
circumstances/evidence,   failing   which,   it   would   be   necessary   to
approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 
10. In   State   of   Bihar   v.   Rajballav   Prasad 6
,   this   Court   ruled   that
deference must be given to the discretion exercised by Superior Courts
2
 (1996) 2 SCC 616.
3
 (2017) 5 SCC 702.
4
 (2001) 6 SCC 338.
5
 (1978) 1 SCC 118.
6   
(2017) 2 SCC 178.
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in matters of bail, save for exceptional circumstances. The afore­cited
decision holds as follows:
“14.   We may observe at the outset that we are conscious of the
limitations   which   bind   us   while   entertaining   a   plea   against
grant   of   bail   by   the   lower   court,   that   too,   which   is   a   superior
court like High Court.  It is expected that once the discretion
is exercised by the High Court on relevant considerations
and   bail   is   granted,   this   Court   would   normally   not
interfere   with   such   a   discretion,   unless   it   is   found   that
the   discretion   itself   is   exercised   on   extraneous
considerations and/or the relevant factors which need to
be taken into account while exercising such a discretion
are ignored or bypassed.     ...   There have to be very cogent
and   overwhelming   circumstances   that   are   necessary   to
interfere   with   the   discretion   in   granting   the   bail.   These
material   considerations   are   also   spelled   out   in   the
aforesaid   judgments   viz.   whether   the   accused   would   be
readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to
abuse   the  discretion   granted   in   his   favour  by   tampering
with the evidence.  …”
(emphasis supplied)
11. It   is   a   fact   that   the   High   Court   in   the   instant   case   has   not
determined   the   likelihood   of   the   respondent   being   guilty   or   not,   or
whether rigours of Section 43­D(5) of UAPA are alien to him. The High
Court instead appears to have exercised its power to grant bail owing
to   the   long   period   of   incarceration   and   the   unlikelihood   of   the   trial
being completed anytime in the near future. The reasons assigned by
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the   High   Court   are   apparently   traceable   back   to   Article   21   of   our
Constitution,   of   course   without   addressing   the   statutory   embargo
created by Section 43­D (5) of UAPA. 
12. The High Court’s view draws support from a batch of decisions of
this   Court,   including   in   Shaheen   Welfare   Association   (supra) ,
laying   down   that   gross   delay   in   disposal   of   such   cases   would   justify
the   invocation   of   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   and   consequential
necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote
the following observations from the cited case: 
“10.   Bearing   in   mind   the   nature   of   the   crime   and   the   need   to
protect   the   society   and   the   nation,   TADA   has   prescribed   in
Section   20(8)   stringent   provisions   for   granting   bail.   Such
stringent   provisions   can   be   justified   looking   to   the
nature   of   the   crime,   as   was   held   in   Kartar   Singh
case   [(1994)   3   SCC   569   :   1994   SCC   (Cri)   899]   ,   on   the
presumption that the trial of the accused will take place
without   undue   delay.   No   one   can   justify   gross   delay   in
disposal   of   cases   when   undertrials   perforce   remain   in
jail,   giving   rise   to   possible   situations   that   may   justify
invocation of Article 21 .”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Even   in   the   case   of   special   legislations   like   the   Terrorist   and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS”) which too have somewhat
rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in   Paramjit Singh v.
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State (NCT of Delhi) 7
, Babba alias Shankar Raghuman Rohida v.
State   of   Maharashtra 8
  and   Umarmia   alias   Mamumia   v.   State   of
Gujarat 9
  enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for
an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of
trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special
enactments,   has   thus   been   primarily   justified   on   the   touchstone   of
speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians. 
14. We   may   also   refer   to   the   orders   enlarging   similarly­situated
accused   under   the   UAPA   passed   by   this   Court   in   Angela   Harish
Sontakke   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 10
.   That   was   also   a   case   under
Sections   10,   13,   17,   18,   18A,   18B,   20,   21,   38,   39   and   40(2)   of   the
UAPA.   This   Court   in   its   earnest   effort   to   draw   balance   between   the
seriousness of the charges with the period of custody suffered and the
likely period within which the trial could be expected to be completed
took note of the five years’ incarceration and over 200 witnesses left to
be   examined,   and   thus   granted   bail   to   the   accused   notwithstanding
Section   43­D(5)   of   UAPA.   Similarly,   in   Sagar   Tatyaram   Gorkhe   v.
State   of   Maharashtra 11
,   an   accused   under   the   UAPA   was   enlarged
for   he   had   been   in   jail   for   four   years   and   there   were   over   147
7
(1999) 9 SCC 252.
8
(2005) 11 SCC 569.
9
(2017) 2 SCC 731.
10  
SLP (Crl.) No. 6888 of 2015, Order dated 04.05.2016.
11
 SLP (Crl.) No. 7947 of 2015, Order dated 03.01.2017.
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witnesses still unexamined. 
15. The facts of the instant case are more egregious than these two
above­cited   instances.   Not   only   has   the   respondent   been   in   jail   for
much   more   than   five   years,   but   there   are   276   witnesses   left   to   be
examined.   Charges   have   been   framed   only   on   27.11.2020.     Still
further,   two   opportunities   were   given   to   the   appellant­NIA   who   has
shown   no   inclination   to   screen   its   endless   list   of   witnesses.   It   also
deserves   mention   that   of   the   thirteen   co­accused   who   have   been
convicted, none have been given a sentence of more than eight years’
rigorous imprisonment. It can therefore be legitimately expected that if
found   guilty,   the   respondent   too   would   receive   a   sentence   within   the
same   ballpark.   Given   that   two­third   of   such   incarceration   is   already
complete, it appears  that the respondent has already  paid heavily for
his acts of fleeing from justice. 
16. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty
guaranteed   by   Part   III   of   the   Constitution   would   cover   within   its
protective  ambit not only  due  procedure  and  fairness  but also access
to   justice   and   a   speedy   trial.   In   Supreme   Court   Legal   Aid
Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India 12
,
it   was   held   that   undertrials   cannot   indefinitely   be   detained   pending
trial.   Ideally,   no   person   ought   to   suffer   adverse   consequences   of   his
acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However,
12
(1994) 6 SCC 731, ¶ 15.
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owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial
and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left
at   large   pending   trial,   Courts   are   tasked   with   deciding   whether   an
individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious
that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of time, Courts would   ordinarily
be obligated to enlarge them on bail.
17. As   regard   to   the   judgment   in   NIA   v.   Zahoor   Ahmad   Shah
Watali   (supra),   cited   by   learned   ASG,   we   find   that   it   dealt   with   an
entirely   different  factual   matrix.   In   that  case,   the   High   Court  had   re­
appreciated   the   entire   evidence   on   record   to   overturn   the   Special
Court’s  conclusion of their  being a   prima  facie   case  of conviction  and
concomitant   rejection   of   bail.   The   High   Court   had   practically
conducted   a   mini­trial   and   determined   admissibility   of   certain
evidences, which exceeded the limited scope of a bail petition. This not
only   was   beyond   the   statutory   mandate   of   a   prima   facie   assessment
under Section 43­D(5), but it was premature and possibly would have
prejudiced   the   trial   itself.   It   was   in   these   circumstances   that   this
Court intervened and cancelled the bail. 
18. It   is   thus   clear   to   us   that   the   presence   of   statutory   restrictions
like   Section   43­D   (5)   of   UAPA   per­se   does   not   oust   the   ability   of
Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of
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the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well
as   the   powers   exercisable   under   Constitutional   Jurisdiction   can   be
well   harmonised.   Whereas   at   commencement   of   proceedings,   Courts
are   expected   to   appreciate   the   legislative   policy   against   grant   of   bail
but   the   rigours   of   such   provisions   will   melt   down   where   there   is   no
likelihood   of   trial   being   completed   within   a   reasonable   time   and   the
period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial
part   of   the   prescribed   sentence.   Such   an   approach   would   safeguard
against   the   possibility   of   provisions   like   Section   43­D   (5)   of   UAPA
being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach
of constitutional right to speedy trial. 
19. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that
the   charges   levelled   against   the   respondent   are   grave   and   a   serious
threat   to   societal   harmony.     Had   it   been   a   case   at   the   threshold,   we
would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer.  However,
keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and
the   unlikelihood   of   the   trial   being   completed   anytime   soon,   the   High
Court   appears   to   have   been   left   with   no   other   option   except   to   grant
bail.   An   attempt   has   been   made   to   strike   a   balance   between   the
appellant’s   right   to   lead   evidence   of   its   choice   and   establish   the
charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights
guaranteed   under   Part   III   of   our   Constitution   have   been   well
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protected. 
20. Yet   another   reason   which   persuades   us   to   enlarge   the
Respondent   on   bail   is   that   Section   43­D(5)   of   the   UAPA   is
comparatively  less stringent than  Section 37 of the  NDPS. Unlike the
NDPS   where   the   competent   Court   needs   to   be   satisfied   that   prima
facie   the   accused   is   not   guilty   and   that   he   is   unlikely   to   commit
another offence while on bail; there is no such pre­condition under the
UAPA.   Instead,   Section   43­D   (5)   of   UAPA   merely   provides   another
possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to
the well­settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of
tampering   with   evidence,   influencing   the   witnesses   or   chance   of   the
accused evading the trial by absconsion etc. 
C ONCLUSION
21. In  light of  the above  discussion,  we  are not inclined  to  interfere
with the impugned order. However, we feel that besides the conditions
to   be   imposed   by   the   trial   Court   while   releasing   the   respondent,   it
would   serve   the   best   interest   of   justice   and   the   society­at­large   to
impose some additional conditions that the respondent shall mark his
presence   every   week   on   Monday   at   10AM   at   the   local   police   station
and inform in writing that he is not involved in any  other new crime.
The   respondent   shall   also   refrain   from   participating   in   any   activity
which  might enrage  communal  sentiments. In  case  the  respondent  is
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found to have violated any of his bail conditions or attempted to have
tampered the evidence, influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any
other way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail
forthwith. The appeal is accordingly dismissed subject to above­ stated
directions. 
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………...J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 01.02.2021    
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