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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3032 OF 2010
U.A. Basheer Thr. G.P.A. Holder …Appellant(s) 
VERSUS
State of Karnataka & Anr. …Respondent(s)
J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR,  J. :
This appeal arises out of order and judgment of the Division
Bench of the High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter, ‘High Court’)
dated   26.03.2009,   dismissing   Writ   Appeal   No.   7758   of   2003
[ULC]   filed   by   the   Appellant   herein   against   the   order   dated
21.10.2003 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court
in W.P. No. 35449 of 2001.  
Factual Background:

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2.   The   facts   leading   to   this   appeal   are   as   follows:   Five
properties/Survey   Nos.   (53­3B2,   53­2A,   53­7,   53­3A,   53­9),
totally  measuring  3 acres and  11 cents, situated in Ullal village,
Mangalore   Agglomeration   (‘joint   family   property’),   originally
belonged to the joint family of two sisters, namely, Smt. Korapalu
Sapalyathi and Smt. Nemu Sapalyathi. Korapalu Sapalyathi  had
three   children   and   Smt.   Nemu   Sapalyathi   had   seven   children.
After   the   death   of   the   two   sisters,   the   Appellant’s   case   is   that
their   ten   children   benefited   through   a   registered   partition   deed
dated   9.01.1984.   Through   the   said   partition   deed,   Smt.   Leela
Sapalyathi, daughter of Smt. Korapalu Sapalyathi, allegedly came
to   hold   a   share   of   1983   sq.   mts.   of   land,   including   land   to   the
extent of 30 cents falling under Survey No. 53/3A. Likewise, the
other nine children of Smt. Korapalu Sapalyathi and Smt. Nemu
Sapalyathi are also said to have got their share of the joint family
property through the said partition deed.    
3.   The   Urban   Land   (Ceiling   and   Regulation)   Act,   1976
(hereinafter,   ‘Principal   Act’)   came   into   force   in   Karnataka   on
17.02.1976.   Padmanabha,   one   of   the   seven   children   of   Smt.
Nemu   Sapalyathi,   filed   a   statement   under   Section   6(1)   of   the
Principal Act on 15.06.1984 declaring the particulars of the joint

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family   property.   Thereafter,   the   Deputy   Commissioner   and
Competent   Authority,   Mangalore   Urban   Agglomeration
(Respondent   No.   2   herein;   hereinafter,   ‘Competent   Authority’)
issued a draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Principal Act to
the declarant, i.e., Padmanabha to surrender excess vacant land
of   9,489.48   sq.   mts,   which   included   land   falling   within   Survey
No. 53/3A. In response to the said notice, Padmanabha filed his
objections on 1.07.1985 stating that the property belonged to his
late   mother   and   her   sister   and   that   after   their   death,   the   joint
family   property   had   been   divided   through   the   aforementioned
partition deed. He further stated that the individual share of each
of the children subsequent to the partition was within the ceiling
limit prescribed under the Principal Act.  
4.   On   5.12.1994,   the   Competent   Authority   passed   an   order
holding   that   the   partition   deed   having   been   effected   on
9.01.1984,   i.e.,   subsequent   to   the   commencement   of   the
Principal Act, the same could not be considered as per Section 42
of the Principal Act. Thus, the Competent Authority directed that
an extent of 5,210.10 sq. mts. of land in Ullal village held by the
declarant   be   treated   as   excess   vacant   land   to   be   surrendered.
Subsequently,   on   16.10.1996,   the   Competent   Authority   passed

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an   award   fixing   compensation   for   the   said   excess   land   at
Rs.15,630/­.   In   the   said   award,   it   was   stated   that   Gazette
notification   was   made   in   respect   of   acquisition   of   the   land   on
27.10.1995 and 22.1.1996 as per the provisions of Section 10(1)
and 10(3) of the Principal Act.  
5. It is the Appellant’s case that he had executed a sale deed on
26.03.1994  with   Smt.   Leela   Sapalyathi   whereby  he  purchased   a
portion   of   Survey   No.   53/3A   measuring   14   cents   comprising   an
old house D. No. 20­6 (hereinafter, ‘suit property’). The Appellant
claims that he took possession of the suit property on the date of
purchase   and   has   been   in   possession   till   date.   The   Appellant
further   contends   that   after   the   said   purchase,   the   suit   property
was mutated in his name. In this regard, he has produced copies
of  the  Record of Rights,  Tenancy  and  Crops (‘RTC’) for  the years
1993­1994   and   1994­1995.   The   Appellant   states   that   he   was
unaware   of   the   Competent   Authority’s   orders   dated   5.12.1994
and   16.10.1996   mentioned   supra.   In   April   2001,   the   Appellant
wished to undertake renovation of the house on the suit property
and hence, approached the village accountant for the latest copy
of   the   RTC.   It   was   at   this   stage   that   he   noticed   that   the
Government’s name had been entered in the RTC. Upon inquiry,

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the   Appellant   was   apprised   of   the   proceedings   under   the
Principal   Act   and   the   subsequent   orders   passed   by   the
Competent Authority.  
6.  On  9.05.2001,  the  Appellant   filed  a  petition   under  Sections  4
& 5 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999
(hereinafter,   ‘Repeal   Act’)   praying   for   his   name   to   be   restored   in
the RTC, inter alia on the grounds that the Competent Authority
had   not   issued   notice   to   the   Appellant   regarding   taking   of
possession of the suit property. That, in any case, the Competent
Authority had not taken physical possession of the suit property
as on the date of commencement of the Repeal Act. Hence, as per
the provisions of the Repeal Act, the proceedings would abate and
the Competent Authority could not take further action under the
Principal   Act.   The   said   petition   was   rejected   by   the   Competent
Authority vide order dated 12.06.2001.  
7. Thereafter, the Appellant approached the High Court by way of
Writ   Petition   No.   35449/2001   which   was   dismissed   vide   order
dated   21.10.2003.   The   Appellant’s   Writ   Appeal   No.   7758/2003
[ULC]   before   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   was   also
dismissed   vide   impugned   order   dated   26.03.2009   with   certain

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observations.   Aggrieved,   the   Appellant   has   come   before   this
Court.
Appellant’s Submissions:     
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the Appellant at length.
The Appellant’s main contentions may be summarised as follows:
(i)   That   vide   partition   deed   dated   9.01.1984,   Smt.   Leela
Sapalyathi   obtained   1983   sq.   mts.   of   land   in   the   joint   family
property   which   consisted   of   a   residential   house   as   well.   As   per
Schedule  1, Category  D of the Principal  Act, a person is entitled
to   hold   2000   sq.   mts.   of   land.   In   such   case,   the   Competent
Authority   erred   in   concluding   that   the   declarant   Padmanabha
holds   excess   land   where   in   fact   Survey   No.   53/3A   has   fallen   to
the   share   of   Leela   Sapalyathi   who   is   the   Appellant’s   vendor.   In
fact, in light of the partition deed, Padmanbha, has no right to file
the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Principal Act in respect
of   the   suit   property,   and   therefore,   the   entire   proceedings   are
vitiated;
(ii) That the order dated 5.12.1994 was passed by the Competent
Authority   without   issuing   notice   to   the   Appellant   or   his   vendor,

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i.e.,   Smt.   Leela   Sapalyathi   and   that   the   said   proceedings   under
the Principal Act were carried out behind their backs;  
(iii)   That   the   declaration   under   Section   6(1)   of   the   Principal   Act
had been filed by Padmanabha way back on 15.06.1984 and his
objections   were   filed   on   1.07.1985.   However,   the   Competent
Authority passed its order dated 05.12.1994 after 9 years without
issuing notice to any of the 10 members of the joint family;
(iv) That it is not the case of the Respondents that compensation
had   been   paid.   Since   neither   compensation   had   been   paid   nor
possession   been   taken   on   the   date   of   coming   into   force   of   the
Repeal   Act,   i.e.,   on   8.07.1999,   the   orders   passed   by   the
Competent Authority under the Principal Act have abated.
Respondents’ Submissions:
9. The Competent Authority’s contentions may be summarised as
follows:
(i)   That   an   extent   of   0.57   acre   in   Survey   No.   53/3A   and   0.71¾
acre   in   Survey   No.   53/3B2   of   Ullal   Village   have   been   declared
excess as per Section 10(3) of the Principal Act on the basis of the
declaration   filed   by   Padmanabha   under   Section   6(1)   of   the
Principal   Act   on   15.06.1984.   Hence,   all   transactions   made   after
the said date, i.e., sale of suit property to the Appellant, without

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the permission of the Competent Authority  are null and void, as
per Section 42 of the Principal Act;
(ii)   That   after   the   issuance   of   notification   under   Section   10(3)   of
the   Principal   Act,   the   suit   property   vests   with   the   Government
free   from   all   encumbrances.   Accordingly,   the   necessary   entries
were   made   in   the   Government’s   name   in   the   RTC.   Hence,   the
Appellant’s contentions are baseless and may be overruled;
(iii) That the declarant Padmanabha was given the opportunity to
put   forth   his   objections   and   the   same   were   considered   by   the
Competent Authority before passing orders under Section 8(4) of
the   Principal   Act.   The   partition   deed   was   affected   on   9.01.1984,
i.e.,   subsequent   to   the   commencement   of   the   Principal   Act   and
the same cannot be considered as per Section 42 of the Principal
Act;
(iv)   Since   the   Appellant   had   not   filed   the   declaration   under
Section 6(1) of the Principal Act, the question of issue of notice to
him does not arise;
(v)  The Government had taken possession of the suit property on
12.07.1996 as per Section 10(6) of the Principal Act.
(vi)   The   order   dated   5.12.1994   passed   by   the   Competent
Authority   is   well   within   jurisdiction.   The   declaration   filed   by

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Padmanabha   was   enquired   into   properly   and   decided   on   merit.
Proper   notices   were   issued   to   the   declarant   at   all   stages.   The
Appellant does not have any right over the excess land.  
III. This Court’s Analysis
10. Having undertaken a thorough perusal of the documents and
submissions   on   record,   we   find   ourselves   unable   to   completely
affirm   the   impugned   judgment   dated   26.03.2009   of   the   Division
Bench. Before proceeding to lay down our conclusions, it may be
useful   to   first   refer   to   the   findings   of   the   learned   Single   Judge
and the learned Division Bench.
11.   The   learned   Single   Judge   dismissed   the   Appellant’s   writ
petition   on   the   sole   ground   that   the   partition   deed   dated
9.01.1984,   that   the   Appellant   had   heavily   relied   on   in
furtherance   of   his   submissions,   was   not   produced   before   the
Court.   The Single Judge observed as follows:
“4.   It   is   relevant   to   observe   here   that   the   petitioner
being the object or before the respondent no.2 did not
produce any proof of partition in respect of the subject
property fallen to the share of the vendor to succeed to
execute the sale deed in the month of March, 1994. He
would have done definitely that when he had made out
a   case   before   the   respondent   no.2.   Even   before   this
Court,   the   petitioner   had   not   filed   any   document   as

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that   of   the   partition   deed   to   show   that   the   subject
property was the subject matter of partition. Therefore,
it   appears   to   me   that   the   petition   fails   on   that   score
alone.   In   view   of  that,   the   petition   does   not  merit  any
consideration.   The   writ   petition   is   therefore   dismissed
as the same is devoid of merit; I order accordingly.”
12. The Division Bench, on the other hand, while dismissing the
Appellant’s   writ   appeal,   observed   that   regardless   of   whether   the
declarant   Padmanabha   and   his   family   members   had   effected
partition  after  the   Principal  Act  commenced,  the  concerned  land
would   still   be   subject   to   the   proceedings   initiated   under   the
Principal   Act.   The   Division   Bench   further   observed   that   the
Appellant has not established that he acquired any interest in the
suit property prior to the Principal Act’s commencement or to the
filing of the declaration by Padmanabha, and thus, there was no
obligation   on   the   Competent   Authority   to   issue   notice   to   the
Appellant and afford him a hearing before passing the order.  
13.   At   this   juncture,   it   is   pertinent   to   refer   to   Section   6   of   the
Principal Act, which requires that a statement be filed before the
Competent   Authority   by   ‘ every   person   holding   vacant   land   in
excess   of   the   ceiling   limit   at   the   commencement   of   the   Act …’
(emphasis   supplied).   Thus,   the   determination   of   ‘excess   land’   is
to   be   made   considering   the   status   of   the   land   at   the   time   of

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commencement of the Principal Act, and not at the time of filing
of   the   declaration.   In   our   considered   opinion,   since   it   is   an
admitted fact that the partition, if any, was only effected after the
Principal Act’s commencement, the Division Bench was correct in
holding that the partition deed dated 9.01.1984 would not affect
the validity of the Competent Authority’s determination of excess
land   owned   by   the   joint   family   at   the   time   of   commencement   of
the Act.   Hence, to this limited extent, we concur with the findings
of the Division Bench. 
14.   We   have   also   given   due   consideration   to   the   provisions   of
Section 8 and Section 9 of the Principal Act, and in our opinion,
the   aforementioned   Sections   make   it   incumbent   on   the
Competent Authority to issue notice to or provide an opportunity
to   be   heard   only   to   the   ‘person   concerned’,   i.e.,   the   person   who
has filed the statement under Section 6 of the Principal Act. The
claims of all other persons interested in the vacant land are to be
considered   through   issuing   a   Gazetted   notification   to   that   effect
as   per   Section   10(1)   of   the   Principal   Act.   The   Competent
Authority had duly issued such notification on 27.10.1995. 

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15.   Now,   coming   to   the   question   of   possession,   it   is   the
Appellant’s   contention   that,   subsequent   to   the   declaration,   he
acquired   the   suit   property   from   Smt.   Leela   Sapalyathi,   by   sale
agreement   dated   26.03.1994,   and   continues   to  be   in   possession
of   it.   That   Smt.   Leela   Sapalyathi   was   competent   to   sell   the   suit
property,   as   it   was   a   portion   of   the   1,983   sq.   mts.   of   the   joint
family property she acquired by virtue of the partition deed dated
9.01.1984. We  find  that this  argument  is relevant in  light  of  the
passage of  the  Repeal  Act,  with  effect  from  8.07.1999.  Section  4
of the Repeal Act provides as follows:
“4.   All   proceedings   relating   to   any   order   made   or
purported to be made under the principal Act pending
immediately   before   the   commencement   of   this   Act,
before   any   court,   tribunal   or   other   authority   shall
abate:
Provided   that   this   section   shall   not   apply   to   the
proceedings relating to sections 11,12,13 and 14 of the
principal   Act   in   so   far   as   such   proceedings   are
relatable   to   the   land,   possession   of   which   has   been
taken   over   by   the   State   Government   or   any   person
duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf
or by the competent authority.”
Section   3(1)(a)   of   the   Repeal   Act,   which   provides   for   a   savings
clause,   throws   light   on   this,   by   stating   that   the   repeal   shall   not
affect the vesting of any vacant land in the State Government by

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the Principal Act, the possession of which has been taken over by
the   concerned   State   Government.   This   is   further   qualified   in
Section   3(2)   which   states   that   vacant   land   vested   in   the   State
Government   by   the   Principal   Act,   the   possession   for   which   has
not   been   taken   over,   shall   be   restored   only   once   any
compensation paid to the land­holder has been returned.
16. It is clear from the aforementioned legislative provisions that
the   question   of   current   possession   of   the   suit   property   is
absolutely material to a full adjudication of the controversy before
us.   This   is   because,   if   the   Appellant   does   enjoy   possession,   as
claimed   by   him,   any   proceedings   for   any   excess   land   under   the
Principal Act are liable to abate, as per Section 3 and Section 4 of
the Repeal Act, and the Appellant would be entitled to ownership
and   possession   over   the   suit   property.   However,   neither   the
partition   deed   dated   9.01.1984   that   is   alleged   to   have   conferred
title   on   Smt.   Leela   Sapalyathi,   nor   the   sale   deed   dated
26.03.1994 that purportedly passed on the title to the Appellant,
have been produced before this Court. There is, thus, nothing on
record   to   establish   Appellant’s   purchase   of,   possession   of,   or
interest in the suit property.

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17. Whereas the Appellant maintains that he has   locus standi   to
pray   for   abatement   of   the   proceedings   which   are   the   subject
matter   of   this   appeal,   being   in   possession   of   the   suit   property;
the   Competent   Authority’s  order  dated   16.10.1996   declaring  the
award   of   compensation   for   the   excess   land,   states   that   the
Competent   Authority   had   taken   over   possession   of   the   suit
property   with   effect   from   12.07.1996,   i.e.,   before   the   passage   of
the   Repeal   Act.   In   our   opinion,   there   is   nothing   on   record,   that
conclusively establishes possession of the suit property either by
the   Competent   Authority   or   the   Appellant   herein.   Given   the
conflicting averments made by the parties, this is a pure question
of fact.
18. In this regard, the Division Bench in the impugned order has
observed the following:
“5.   It   is   contended   that   the   possession   of   the   land   is
not taken by the Government in spite of the said order
and   the   appellant   continues   to   be   in   possession.   It   is
clear   from   the   repealed   Act,   if   the   possession   has   not
been   taken   after   the   proceedings   initiated   under   the
Act,   the   order   is   ceased   to   have   any   effect   and   the
person   in   possession   is   continued   to   be   the   owner.   A
perusal   of   the   order   discloses   that   5   Sy.   Nos.   were
involved   in   the   declaration,   from   the   order   it   is   not
possible   to   make   out   in   which   survey   number   the
excess   land   falls.   If   there   is   no   indication   of   the   said
excess   land   falling   within   any   particular   survey

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number   and   if   the   authorities   have   proceeded   to   take
possession,   it   would   not   be   in   consonance   with   the
order.   If   really   possession   has   not   yet   been   taken
under   the   repealed   Act,   the   petitioner   is   entitled   to
continue   in   possession   of   the   land.   All   these   matter
cannot   be   the   subject   matter   of   the   writ   petition   filed
challenging   the   order   under   Section   10   filed   by   the
declarant .   Notwithstanding   the   dismissal   of   the   writ
appeal   or   writ   petition,   it   is   open   to   the
appellant/petitioner   to   work   out   his   remedy   in
accordance with law ...” (emphasis supplied)
19. We find ourselves unable to agree with the Division Bench on
this   aspect   of   the   matter,   and   thus   set   aside   the   impugned
judgment.   It   was   incumbent   on   the   Division   Bench   to   enquire
into   and   settle   the   questions   of   fact   arising   from   the   present
controversy, such as whether the Appellant’s claim  over the suit
property was valid, whether he was in actual physical possession
of   the   suit   property,   and   resultantly,   whether   he   had   the   locus
standi  to pray for abatement of the proceedings under the Repeal
Act. This would have settled finally the question of abatement of
the   proceedings,   and   prevented   the   inefficient   proliferation   of
further litigation between the parties.
IV. Conclusions and Directions

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20.   Since   the   learned   Single   Judge   has   already   given   a   definite
factual   finding   as   to   the   question   of   the   Appellant’s   ownership
and   possession   of   the   suit   property   in   his   judgment   dated
21.10.2003   (supra),   we   do   not   think   it   appropriate   to   remit   the
matter to the learned Single Judge.
21.   Instead,   we   direct   the   matter   to   be   remitted   to   the   Division
Bench   of  the   Karnataka   High   Court  to  consider  the  case  afresh.
All  questions  of  fact  outlined  above are  to  remain   open,  and  the
parties are given liberty to place on record additional evidence not
made   a   part   of   the   proceedings   heretofore.   Since   the   other
original   owners   of   the   joint   family   property   have   accepted   the
orders   of   the   Competent   Authority,   in   so   far   as   they   have   not
questioned   the   said   orders,   the   Division   Bench   will   confine   its
findings   only   with   regard   to   the   issue   of   possession   of   the   suit
property. 
22.   The   appeal   stands   disposed   of   accordingly.   No   order   as   to
costs.
…..…………................................J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)

17
.……………………………...............J.
(VINEET SARAN)
 
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY  17 , 2021