2021 INSC 0234 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. _______ OF 202 1 [Arising out of SLP (CIVIL No.) ______of 202 1) (Dia ry No. 24414/2020 ) STATE OF ODISHA & ORS . … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS KAMALINI KHILAR & A NR . … RESPONDENT (S) J U D G M E N T K.M. JOSEPH, J. 1. There is a delay of 247 days in filing the SLP. Having considered the matter , we are inclined to condone delay but on condition that a sum of Rs. 50,000 is paid as costs to the Respondent No. 1. Accordingly, the application to condone delay is allowed subject to payment of Rs. 50,000 to the Respondent No. 1 by the Appellant depositing the 2 same in the Registry within 4 weeks from today. Leave granted. 2. The Appellant No. 1 , namely the State of Odisha , passed a resolution dated 12.03. 19 96 prescribing the procedure for recruitment of Gov ernment teacher s in primary schools . T he Appellant No. 3 namely the District Inspector of Schools, Bhadrak - II, Bhadrak had to determine the n umber of vacancies to be filled up through direct recruitment. Appellant No. 3 had to also determine the n umber of vacancies which were required to be reserved for each reserved category. I t is the case of the Appellants that based on the same , on 29. 07.1996 by letter dated 29. 07.1996 , it was communicated to the Respondent No. 1 that her name was sponsored by the District Employment Exchange for the post of primary school teacher. She was called upon to submit her application along with her documents . T he Respondent No. 1 was directed to attend the viva -voce examination. A merit list was made . The Respondent No. 1 secure d the 22 nd 3 positi on in the SEBC ( Women ) Category . T here we re only 16 vacancies which were to be filled by SEBC (W omen ) Category candidate s. Respondent No. 1 was favoured with an order of appointment dated 04.04.1998. She was issued such appoin tment according to the Appellant s on the basis that one of the successful candidate s, namely the Respondent No. 2 who secured the 16 th position could not join within time. The Respondent No. 1 join ed based on the joining letter dated 20 .04. 1998. 3. While so complaining that she was not served with the appointment order and that order was issued in a wrong name , Responde nt No. 2 filed representation which based on an order in an application before the Tribunal was disposed of with certain directions by the 1st Appellant O.A No. 650 of 2000 was there after filed by Respondent No. 2 before the Hon’ble Orissa Administrative Tribunal . The Tribunal allowed the O .A. by order dated 21 .09.2001 . 4 The operative part reads as follows: - “For the reasons indicated above, we allow the Original Application with the direction to the State Respondent in General and D.I of Schools (O.P. No. 3) in particular to issue appointment order in favour of the applicant within one month from the date of receipt of the copy of this order and if the post has bee n filled up by the D.I of Schools is to carry out direction issued by Respondent No. 1 under Annexure -6 in dispensing with the service of the candidate who had been appointed in place of Minati Pradhan, the applicant. ” 4. This led to order dated 16. 04.2002 which was an order of appointment of Respondent No. 2 by the Appellant No. 3 and another order of the same date by which the services of the Respondent No. 1 came to be terminated. This led to the present round of litigation , nam ely O.A. No. 917 (C) of 20 02 filed by the Respondent No. 1 before the tribunal . T he 5 Tribunal after exchange of pleadings allowed the application filed by the Respondent No. 1 . 5. We may refer to the following part of the order: - “In so far as , it is obvious that Smt. Snehalata Nayak who has secured less marks and did not figure in the physically handicapped list, has been given appointment under the “physically handicapped” quot a and has been allowed to continue along with several others, including S.E.B.C (male) and General (male) candidates who have secured less mark than the applicant, (Ref . Letter No. 3235 dtd. 22.10.2001 or D.I. of Schools, Bhadrak -II). Moreover, at least a show -cause notice should have been issued and an opportunity to show -cause before discharge allowed to the applicant even if for argument sake only it is accepted that her service can be terminated, as decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case on Basudeo Tiwari -Vrs -Sido Kandhu University and others (AIR,1998 SC 3261). As no show -cause notice was issued and no opportunity to be heard was allowed and the princip le of ‘Audi 6 alteram part um’ was not observed, even if the applicant is deemed to be the junior most in the S.E.B.C (Women) list, her termination is illegal. Hence, Annexure -6, i.e., her termination order vide office No. 981 dtd. 14.4.2002, is quashed. The applicant be reinstated in service immediately with all attendant service benefits by creating another supernumerary post if necessary, as termination of her service was not as per t he prescribed procedure or in accordance with the law of the land. ” 6. It is this order , which led to the passin g of the imp ugned order by the High Court . By the impugned judgment , the High Court quashed the direction of the Tribunal to reinstate the Respondent No. 1 by creating a supe rnumerary post . Thereafter , it was however ordered as follows: - “However, since the vacancy is available, the petitioners will give appointment to opposite party No. 1 Smt. Kamalini Khilar against one of such vacancies available in Bhadrak district 7 within a period of four weeks hence, the writ petition is allowed the af oresaid extent. ” 7. It is feeling aggrieved by the judg ment that the present appeal has been filed . We heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant s and Respondent s No. 1 and 2 as well. Submission of Appellants 8. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant s would complain that the High Court while grant ing limited relief of qu ashing the direction to cr ea te a super numerary post , erred in the issuance of the direction to appoint the Respondent No. 1 in the vacancy . This is a fter having interfere d with the order of the Tribunal as noted. The Respondent No. 1 came to be appointed only on the basis that Respondent No. 2 who admittedly ha d secured higher rank than the Respondent No. 1 had not report ed for joining . It was only in compliance with the order of the Tribunal, that the services of 8 Respondent No. 1 had to be terminated. It is further contended that as thin gs stand there is no provision for making any appointment as the method of appointment has been altered to absorption from trained junior teachers. 9. Reliance was p la ced on the terms of the Resolution dated 12 th March, 1996 . It is contended that the selection was made based on the same. The Employment Exchange sponsored eligible candidates separately for general vacancies and for each reserved categ ories . It is contended that the sports person or p hysically handicapped person from any Category could apply as much . R ef erence is made to clause 8 of the Resolution . It is contended that the ma ximum age as on the 1 st of January of the year of requisition was fixed as 32 years. Relaxation was however given by 5 years for women candidates interalia. Separate list was to be prepared for each of the reserved categories . Separate sel ect list of the candidates had to be prepared for the vaca nci es notified in respect of 9 that category of candidate s under clause 16 of the Resolution. Clause 17a provided that the District Ins pector was to make appointment against the sanctioned post s strictly in the order in which the names occurred in the respective select list s. 16 vacancies were notified for the category of S.E.B.C. (Women) . It is pointed out that the Respondent was born on 15. 07.1961. She was 34 year s, 5 month s and 17 days as on 01. 01.1996. Sh e therefore , got the relaxation as she had applied as S.E.B.C (Women) in the Category . She secured the 22 nd rank and the Respondent No.2 w as at S.no. 16 . 10. There is no challenge at any point to the resolution dated 12 .0 3.19 96 o r the selectio n procedure. The last person to get an appointment from the list of S.E.B.C (Women) C ategory was Respondent No.1. In order to comply with the direction s of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 650 of 2000 , the services of the Respondent No. 1 were dispensed with. It was only the Respondent No. 1 who got the 10 appointment against one of the vaca ncies notified for S.E.B.C (Women ) Category because the Respondent No.2 was not served the appointment order. If the Respondent No.2 ha d been served the appoin tment letter, then the Respondent no. 1 would not have be en given an appointment based on her position in her m erit list for S.E.B.C (Women) Cate gory . The Res pondent No. 1 never objected to the method of p reparing the select list s and is therefore not entitled to raise objection now to the pr eparation of the separate list . R eference is made to judgment of this Court in Union of India and Ors. vs. Dalbir Singh and Ors 1. The Respondent No.1 was always aware of the separate list for each Category . She got the benefit of relax ation of age by applying as a S.E.B.C (Women) candidate . H er non -inclusion in any other list or the selection procedure interalia was never challenged by her. It is pointed o ut that in the written submission of the Respondent No. 1 , a misleading statement is made that the vacancy occurred prior to 03. 06.1996 1 (2009) 7 SCC 251 11 which is wh y the gov ernment proceeded to fil l up the vacancy by calling upon the Respondent No. 1 . It is point ed ou t that the letter written by the 3rd Appellant to the 2nd Appellant was about complying with the order of the Tribunal in the application filed by the Res pondent No. 2 . The 3rd Appellant refers to the vac ancy having being filled by his predecessor . All the vacancies covered by the selection process in question occurred prior to 30. 06. 19 96. It is also further contended that the none of the decision s relied upon by the Respondent No.1 are relevant having regard to the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the Respondent No.1 and the specific direction s issued by the Tribunal. The Case Of Respondent No .1 . 11. There is a violation of principles of natural justice. The termination of her services is wholly illegal arbitrary and capricious. The Appellants delayed the matter. The Respondent No.1 was a permanent employee having impeccable four years of 12 continuous se rvice record. The finding that her services was terminated in view of the order dated 21.09.2001 is erroneous and not sustainable having regard to the following aspects. The Respondent No. 1 was not a party in the O.A. filed by the Respondent No. 2. Seco ndly, the Tribunal had not directed removal of the Respondent No. 1 but only directed the removal of the person who had taken the place of the Respondent No. 2. It is pointed out that at Page no. 64 of the SLP Paper Book which is the letter dt. 22.01.2001 written by the 3 rd Appellant and also referring to the list of junior most candidates of different categories appointed as primary school teachers at S.No. 3 the candidate is a general category male who had secured 109.10 marks. S.No. 5 is candidate from SEBC (Male) who secured 110.75 marks. At S.No. 7 Jagatanand Panigrahi is specifically earmarked as Physical Handicapped Category but S.No. 8 named as Snehalata Nayak who is specifically earmarked at S.no. 31 of SEBC Category 13 and secured onl y 110.36 marks but is given appointment as PH illegally whereas she belongs to SEBC Category. The Respondent No. 1 belongs to SEBC Category had secured 112.75 marks which was more than what the above persons obtained . Therefore, the Respondent No. 1 was not the person whose services was to be terminated in terms of the order of the tribunal in the earlier proceeding s, it is contended. 12. It is contended that the Respondent No. 1 was not party to the earlier proceeding. The order adversely affecting the Respondent No. 1 should not have been passed and the government should have challenged the order passed in the earlier proceeding. There is the bar under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In other words, there is estoppel. Reliance is placed on the judgement s of this court in Delhi Transport Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors .2, 2 AIR 1991 S C 101 14 Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal -Cum -Labour Court, New Delhi and Ors .3 and Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) and Ors .4 . Reliance is also sought to be placed on the judgement s of this Court in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and Ors .5 and Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido Kanhu University and Ors. 6 There were persons who secured lesser marks than the Respondent No.1 who are allowed to be retained in service and it was the Respondent No. 1 who was harassed and victimised. The delay in litigation is solely attributed to the government. There is a delay of almost 7 years in filing reply by the government. After the pass ing of the order by the Tribunal to reinstate the Respondent No. 1 with all service benefit it woke up only when contempt proceeding was initiated and the order was 3 (1980) 4 SCC 443 4 (2013) 10 SCC 324 5 (1979) 2 SCC 80 6 AIR 1998 SC 3261 15 challenged only after a lapse of two years. The career of the Respondent No. 1 was spoiled due to the illegal termination. She could not properly bring up her children and spent the entire period of litigation in distress and financial hardship. Had she been continued she would have become head mistress now. She being a lady and married woman re siding in rural area she could not get any employment elsewhere due to want of the same in the locality and affidavit is also filed indicating that she could not get suitable employment elsewhere. FINDINGS 13. The Order of the Tribunal passed in O.A. No. 650 of 2000 was bin din g on the department . We cannot at this stage sit in judgment over the correctness of the order passed in th e said O.A . Apparently , though the Res pondent No. 2 having obtained higher rank than the Res pondent No. 1 in the Cate gory of S.E.B.C (Women) had been favoured with an appointment le tter , i t was not delivered 16 to her as it was addressed wrongly . The Respondent No. 2, therefore did not join as apparently, she did not receive the appointment order . At least the se are the finding s of the Tribunal. In fact, the matter had engaged the attention of the 1 st Appellant (govt) and it took a decision dated 24.02.2000 therein. The decision of the Government as extracted in the order of the Tribunal reads as foll ows: - “I am desired to invite a reference to the Order Memo No. 106/OAT, dated 07.01.2000 of the Hon’ble OAT, Bhubaneswar on the subject noted above. It had been reported by the D.I. of Schools, Bhadrak -II in his letter No. 388, dated 31.01.2000 with copy to you in Memo No. 389, dated 31.01.2000 that though one Minati Pradhan was selected and is to be appointed, but the appointment order was dispatched in the name of Minakhi Pradhan. Hence, before taking steps to comply with the order of the Tribunal to appoint M inati Pradhan, please check the fact in the Office of D.I. of Schools, 17 Bhadrak -II to ascertain whether any other person named Minakhi Pradhan has been appointed on the basis of incorrectly addressed letter. If yes, the applicant in the writ petition will j oin in her place if not the junior most candidate will be removed to let her join unless if Government decides to permit the applicant to join in a post subsequently fallen vacant.” The Tribunal directed as already noted that if the post had been filled u p the District Inspector of schools was to carry out the direction of the Respondent No. 1 which we have extracted that is dispense with the service of the candidate who had been appointed in place of Respondent No. 2. Interestingly, we may notice that the Government had directed that the junior most candidate will be removed in order to enable the Respondent No. 2 to join. Th e direction of the Tribunal has become final. 14. While it may be true the Respondent No. 2 was not a party to the O.A. in law nothing p revented 18 her from challenging the said order. It may not be open to her to contend that as she was not a party , the said order cannot be and should not be implemented in letter and spirit . It is an order passed by a Tribunal which ha d juris diction in the matter . The finding that the Res pondent No. 2 could not join because of the let ter of appointment being issued in the wrong name cannot be open to challenge . The Tribunal was therefore, setting right an illega lity and injustice caused to Res pondent No. 2 . There is no dispute that there were only 16 vacancies to be fille d up of th e cate gory of S.E.B.C. (Women ). For complying with the order of the Tribunal the Appellants had to dispense with the service of the person appointed in place of Res pondent No. 2 . Therefore, the only question which survived for consideration is whether it is the Res pondent No. 1 who was appointed in place of the Respondent No. 2 . 15. It would appe ar to be clear that under the resolution and procedure adopted , separate list s 19 were prepared for various categories . Vacancies were earmarked for different groups . Merit list was also based on this classification . The Res pondent No. 1 figured in the merit list at S.no . 22 for the category S.E.B. C. Women. The surest way to find out whether the termination of service of Res pondent No. 1 was in tune with the direction issued by the trib unal in the earlier O.A. filed by the Res pondent No. 2 is to find out as to whether the Res pondent No. 1 would have secured the appointment , if the appointment letter was issued in the name correctly of the Res pondent No. 2 and she had joined on the said basis. If the Res pondent No. 1 would not secure the appointment if the Res pondent No. 2 had so joined and in other words, the appointment of the Res pondent No. 1 was only because of the non -joining of the Res pondent No.2 , then it is the Respondent No. 1 who is the person who was appointed in pl ace of the Res pondent No. 2 within the meaning o f the order passed in O.A. No. 650 of 2000. 20 This is not a case involving dis ciplinary proceedings against Respondent No. 1 . No stigma is attached to the Respondent No. 1 . The whole exercise was necessitated no doubt as a result of a mistake committed by the Appellant s in not sending the appointment le tter at the correct addres s to Res pondent No. 2 . In view of the fact that order O.A. No. 650 of 2000 had become final the Appellant s were obliged to comply with the orde r. If they had nothing to offer by explanation to the case of the Res pondent No. 2 that she was not served with the letter of appointment , the Res pondent No. 1 would not be justified in contending th at the App ellant should have challenged the order of the Trib unal . 16. We find merit also in the conte ntion of the App ellant s that having regard to the Resolution under whi ch the entire appointment were carried out , the mat ter is to be governed by the separate merit list s which were prepared . In the nat ure of the facts which make up th e dispute in this case , 21 it only means that the Res pondent No. 1 was the junio r most in the category of S.E.B.C (Women) . The order of the Tribunal to be complied with contemplated dispensing the service of the candidate who was appointed in place of the Res pondent No. 2 . 17. It may not be possible to find that any person other than the Respondent No. 1 was the candidate who was appointed in pla ce of the Res pondent No. 2. Both the Respondent No. 2 and the Res pondent No. 1 were considered for appoin tment from the Cate gory of S.E.B.C (Women) for which Category, 16 vacanc ies were earmarked . The merit list of SEBC (female) (page 49) shows that the Respondent No. 2 with 117.46 marks was at the 16 th position. Snehalata Nayak is no doubt at Serial No. 31 of SEBC (Women) list. But she is shown in the category of P .H in the list of junior most of different categories in letter dt. 22.11. 20 01 sent by the Appellant No. 3. The person at Serial No.7 Jagatanand Panigrahi is shown P.H . has secured 22 lesser marks than Snehalata Nayak. It is not clear how in the letter dt. 22.11. 20 01, person s at Serial No. 7, and 8 are both mentioned under the category as P.H . and as being the junior most candidates. No doubt under the name of Snehalata Nayak, it is shown S.no. 31 of SEBC Category. Does it mean that Snehalata was appointed from SEBC but under the category of physically handicapped? The office order terminating the service of the Respondent No.1 refers to the letter no. 7119 d ated 16.03. 20 02 sent by the 2nd Appellant Director. It is not produced. However, what is clear is that the person appointed in place of the Respondent No.2 was the Respondent No. 1 . 18. In such circumstances we cannot possibly hold that other candidates who may have secured lesser marks but who it must be noted were treated as falling in different categor ies for which separate list were prepared , should have been shown the door to comply with the order of the Tribunal . The Resp ondent No. 1 was considered under the SEBC 23 (Women) as being a wom an, she could aspire with the age relaxation. 19. We may incidentally notice that the Res pondent No. 1 has only a few months for attaining the age of superannuation . It may be true that she ha s not secured any al ternative emp loyment as stated in he r affidavit and also projected in the written submission s. She has also not been able to work based on the dir ection of the Tribunal or of the High Court. 20. The decision s relied upon by the Respondent No. 1 may not assist her . As far as the decision in the Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) is concerned , the Court was dealing with consti tutionality of the power under the re gula tion to dispense with the service of a permanent employee without holding any enquiry. This Court took the view that dispens ing with the service o f the permanent and confirmed employee by merely issuing a notice without assign ing reasons 24 could not be countenanced. The decision clearly cannot apply in a situation where the Appellants being under the legal obligation to implement the order of the Tribunal dispensed with the services of the employee in accordance with the directions. The decisions in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) relate to Industrial Law and the effect of illegal termination of a workman . An order which is passed pursuant to a direction which is binding on the employer cannot possibly be described as illegal. Therefore , the said case law cannot advance the case of the Respondent. 21. In Basudeo Tiwary (supra) the services of the Appellant ha d been terminated . The Appellant was appointed as a lecturer . T he college was taken over by the University . The services was terminated on the basis that the appointment was not made validly. One of the contentions taken was there was violation of principle s of natural justice. Thou gh rel ianc e was und oubtedly placed on Section 25 35 (3) of the Bihar University Act, 1951 , and the same purported to provide that any appointment interalia contrary to the act statutes rules or re gulation or in any regular or unauthorised manner shall be terminated at any time without any notice , we do notice para 12 of the said judgment: - “The said provision provides that an appointment could be terminated at any time without notice if the same had been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorised manner. The condition precede nt for exercise of this power is that an appointment had been made contrary to Act, Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes, rules or regulation s etc. a finding has to be recorded and unless such a finding is recorded, the termination cannot be made but to arrive at such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have to be made as to whether such appointment was contrary to the provisions of the Ac t etc. If in a 26 given case such exercise is absent, the condition precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held and in holding such an enquiry the person whose appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued to him. If notice is not given to him then it is like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, that is, if the employee concerned whose rights are affected, is not given notice of such a proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his absence, suc h a conclusion would not be just, fair or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C. Mazdoor Sabha's case. In such an event, we have to hold that in the provision there is an implied requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion tha t an appointment had been made contrary to the Act, statute, rule or regulation eta and it is only on such a conclusion being drawn, the services of the person could be terminated without further notice. That is how Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read. ” 27 22. Find ing that there wa s no notice issued to the Appellant therein and further noticing that the Appellant , had died durin g the pendency of the proceedings it was to be deem ed that the Appellant had died in harness. He was allow ed the be nefit of paymen t of arrears of salary from the date of termination of the service till the date of his death. 23. We may notice the decision would appear to the distinguishable in terms of the facts in this case . It is no doubt true that the Respondent No. 1 was offered appoint ment and was appointed. However , the Appellants suffered an order by a competent Tribunal which i t was duty bound to implement . We would be remis s if we were to discard the principles of natural justice as inapplicable . No doubt there was no ne ed to hold any enquiry as the termination was not on disciplinary grounds. No stigma is a ttached to Respondent No. 1. But a notice given to the Res pondent No. 1 a s to why in terms of the order of the Tribunal the Res pondent 28 No. 1 should be treated as the person who se services was to be dispensed with should have been issued . However, we would think that on the materials placed before the Court , with 16 vacancies al one earmarked for S.E.B.C (Women) , and the Res pondent No. 2 being the 16 th and the last of the candidates entitled in the said Category, no t joining in the circumstances r esultin g in the Res pondent No. 1 being appointed and the order of the Tribunal being binding on the Appellants , we would think that in the present case , the failure to afford an opp ortunity to the Respondent No.1 to show cause as to why her services sh ould not be terminated cannot be hel d to be fatal. We also cannot loose sight of the fact near ly two decades have gone by and only for the reason t hat the Respondent was not offered an opp ortunity of being heard in the fac ts of this case , w e cannot support the order of the High Court in directing the appointment of the Res pondent No. 1 . It is not as if the High Court has found that the termination of the service of the Res pondent No. 1 was ab 29 in itio void or illegal as such. The Court in fact set aside the direction of the Tribunal to reinstate by creating a supernumerary post. This is not challenged b y Respondent No. 1 . I t directed only that the appointment of the Res pondent No. 1 be made in the vacan cy. Therefore, the claim of Respondent No. 1 for back wages from the date of termination is at any rate clearly untenable. 24. Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra) , the matter ar ose under the Maharas htra Employees of Private Sch ools (condition of service ) Regulation Act , 1977. This Court undoubtedly laid down that in the case of wrongful termination of service reinst atement with the continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. It was subject to the qualification that the Court may interalia take into consider ation the length of service and the nature of misconduct if any proved , the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors. For the reasons which we have indicated in the facts of this case Respondent No. 1 cannot 30 be permitted to dra w any benefit from the said pronouncement . The High Court rightly set aside the direction for creation of the supernumerary post. We find that there is no basis for the High Court to have thereafter directed the appointment of the Respondent No. 1 in any vacancy available. 25. The upshot of the above dis cussion is that the termination of the service of the Respondent No. 1 was unavoidable in the light of the bindi ng order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 650 of 2000. Conse quently, the order of the High Court to the extent impugned is to be set aside. Resultantly, we allow the appeal and the order of the High Court impugned is set aside and the order passed in the O.A. no. 917 of 200 2 filed by the Res pondent No. 1 will stand set aside . 26. No order as to costs in the appeal. We make it clear that if the cost of Rs. 50,000 ordered as 31 condition to condone delay in filing the SLP is not paid as aforesaid the impugned judgment will stand, the application for condoning delay will stand dismissed and the leave granted will stand revoked and this judgment will stand recalled. If the cost is deposited, the same can be withdrawn by the Respondent No. 1. ......................J. (UDAY UMESH LALIT) ......................J. (K.M. JOSEPH) New Delhi, April 28, 20 21 .