2021 INSC 0242
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1724  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27881 OF 2019)
INDIAN SCHOOL, JODHPUR & ANR. …PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.  …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1713­1722  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS.27907­27916 OF 2019)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1723  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27987 OF 2019)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1725  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2942 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1729   OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5470 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1730  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5589 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1726  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5902 OF 2020)

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1727­1728  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6743­6744 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO(S). 6803 OF 2020)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1732  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6745 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO(S). 44 OF 2021)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1731  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 431 OF 2021)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  1733­1735  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 577­579 OF 2021)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1736  OF 2021
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2494 OF 2021)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. These   two   sets   of   appeals   are   being   disposed   of   by   this
common judgment.
2. In the  first set  of appeals, six appeals 1
 emanate from common
judgment and order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the High Court of
1  arising out of SLP (C) No. 27881 of 2019; SLP (C) Nos.27907­27916 of 2019; SLP (C)
No. 27987 of 2019; SLP (C) No. 2942 of 2020; SLP (C) No. 5902 of 2020; and SLP (C)
No …………. of 2021 @ Diary No(s). 6803 of 2020;

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Judicature   for   Rajasthan   at   Jodhpur   and   two   other   appeals 2
against   the   judgment   and   order   dated   11.02.2020   of   the   Jaipur
Bench   of   the   same   High   Court,   which   followed   the  earlier   decision
of   the   Jodhpur   seat   referred   to   above.     In   these   matters,   the
appellants   (Management(s)   of   private   unaided   schools   in   the   State
of   Rajasthan)   had   assailed   the   validity   of   the   Rajasthan   Schools
(Regulation  of Fee) Act, 2016 3
, in  particular  Sections 3, 4, 6 to 11,
15   and   16   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   titled   Rajasthan
Schools (Regulation of Fee) Rules, 2017 4
, in particular Rules 3, 4, 6
to   8   and   11   thereof   being   ultra   vires   the   Constitution   and   abridge
the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution of India.
3. In   the   second   set   of   appeals,   four   appeals 5
,   also   filed   by   the
Management(s) of private unaided schools in the State of Rajasthan,
emanate from the common judgment and order dated 18.12.2020 of
the   same   High   Court.     In   these   appeals,   the   challenge   is   to   the
orders   passed   by   the   State   Authorities   on   09.04.2020,   07.07.2020
2  arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 5470 and 5589 of 2020
3  f or short, “the Act of 2016”
4  f or short, “the Rules of 2017”
5  arising out of SLP (C) No …………. of 2021 @ Diary No(s). 44 of 2021; SLP (C) No. 
431 of 2021; SLP (C) Nos. 577­579 of 2021; and SLP (C) No. 2494 of 2021

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and   28.10.2020   regarding   deferment   of   collection   of   school   fees
including  reduction of fees limited to 70 per cent of tuition fees by
schools   affiliated   with   the   Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education
and 60 per cent from the schools affiliated with Rajasthan Board of
Secondary   Education,   in   view   of   reduction   of   syllabus   by   the
respective­Boards   due   to   aftermath   of   pandemic   (lockdown)   from
March 2020.
4. The   issues   involved   in   all   these   appeals   concern   around
36,000   private   unaided   schools   including   220   minority   private
unaided   schools   in   the   State   of   Rajasthan   governed   by   the
provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   referred   to   above.     Accordingly,   all
these   appeals   were   clubbed   and   heard   analogously.     However,   as
aforesaid, two broad issues would arise for our consideration.
Re: First Set:
5. Reverting   to   the   first   set   of   appeals,   the   challenge   is   to   the
provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   and   Rules   of   2017   being   violative   of
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry
on   occupation   of   imparting   education   which   includes  autonomy   to

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determine   the   school   fees   by   the   Managements   of   private   unaided
schools.     It   is   urged   that   any   restriction   imposed   in   that   regard
would   be   arbitrary   and   unreasonable.     Further,   the   impugned
provisions inevitably limit the autonomy of the school Management
of   private   unaided   schools   to   the   level   of   merely   proposing   the
school   fees   to   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee 6
,   in   which   the
Management   has   only   one   representative   as   against   eight   others
i.e., five parents, three teachers and one principal.   This imbalance
in   the   constitution   of   the   SLFC   negates   the   effective   control   of   the
Management   in   the   affairs   of   the   school   and   in   particular   the
autonomy   to   determine   its   own   school   fees.     Notably,   five   parents,
who are appointed as members of the SLFC are chosen by draw of
lots   from   amongst   the   willing   parents   of   the   wards   pursuing
education   in   the   schools   concerned   and   could   include   even   the
wards   who   are   availing   free   education   under   the  Right   of  Children
to   Free   and   Compulsory   Education   Act,   2009 7
.     In   fact,   the   latter
have no stakes in the matter of determination of school fees.  As the
willing   parents   are   selected   by   lottery   system,   in   the   process   even
the person who has no modicum of knowledge of development of a
6   for short, “the SLFC”
7  f or short, “the RTE Act”

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school, management of finances and dynamics of quality education,
would   become   part   of   the   process   of   determination   of   school   fees.
The members of the SLFC would inevitably have conflicting interest.
They   would   be   interested   in   ensuring   that   minimum   school   fee   is
finalised.     The   nominated   teachers   may   constantly   seek   favour   of
the   Management   by   exploiting   their   position   as   member   of   the
SLFC.     In   the   process,   an   environment   of   constant   difference   of
opinion would prevail between the school Management on one side
and the parents of the wards and teachers, who would form part of
the SLFC.   Pertinently, the provisions of the impugned Act of 2016
give   authority   to   the   SLFC   to   override   the   proposal   of   the   school
Management   in   the   matter   of   school   fees   to   be   collected   from   the
wards  during  the  relevant  period.    Effectively,  the   parents  who  are
members   of   the   SLFC,   would   control   the   decision­making   process
impacting   the   autonomy   of   the   school   Management   in   regard   to
determination   of   school   fees,   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of
the   Constitution.     The   parents­teachers   duo   who   are   part   of   the
SLFC would have no intention or motivation to create new facilities
or commitment to develop the school towards excellence.  Moreover,
they would not be accountable for anything that finally impacts the

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quality  of education  in the  school concerned.   It is only  the  school
Management who would be held accountable in that regard, whilst
school Management is denuded of its autonomy to determine school
fees.     The   school   fees   so   determined   by   the   SLFC   as   per   the
provisions   of   the   impugned   Act   of   2016,   would   remain   unchanged
and   binding   for   next   three   years   with   no   provision   for   increase   in
case of contingency of funds needed for new development or general
inflation or hike in salary and wages of staff or any other legitimate
purpose.
6. The   impugned   Act   of   2016   also   gives   wide   powers   to   the
Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee 8
  and   Revision   Committee
including power to issue summons, search, seizure and penalties as
if   the   occupation   of   imparting   education   is   akin   to   res   extra
commercium.     The   school   Management­appellants   apprehend   that
dispute   with   regard   to   determination   of   school   fees   would   be
endless   and   get   embroiled   in   the   process   of   appeal,   revision   and
judicial proceedings.   Resultantly, schools would suffer uncertainty
in financial matters.  Furthermore, there is no mechanism provided
to guarantee the recovery of school fees after it is finally determined
8  f or short, “the DFRC”

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under   the   Act   of   2016.     The   working   of   the   impugned   Act   of   2016
would   eventually   stifle   the   growth   and   development   of   the   private
unaided   schools   and   that   all   schools   —   small   and   big,   would   be
treated   equally   with   same   measure,   which   would   be   arbitrary   and
discriminatory   and   against   the   principle   expounded   by   this   Court
that   the   school   fees   of   private   unaided   schools   should   be   school­
based   and   not   a   rigid   or   uniform   arrangement.     According   to   the
appellants, the factors enumerated for determination of school fees
are vague, subjective and irrelevant.  The crucial factors such as for
making   a   good   school   are   not   even   adverted  to   in   Section   8   of   the
impugned Act of 2016.  The process of determination of school fees
is   a   dynamic   exercise   and   could   be   effectively   done   by   the   school
Management   on   its   own   while   keeping   in   mind   that   establishing   a
school   is   essentially   a   charity.     According   to   the   appellants,   the
provisions of the impugned Act of 2016 are unworkable and violate
the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution.     The   State   can   only   regulate   the   fees   determined   by
the private unaided schools only if it shows that the same entails in
profiteering or capitation, which is prohibited by law.

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7. It   is   urged   that   by   now   it   is   well­established   that   the   private
unaided schools ought to have maximum autonomy  with regard to
administration   including   the   right   of   appointment,   disciplinary
powers,   admission   of   students   and   the   “fees   to   be   charged”   as
expounded   by   this   Court   in   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   &   Ors.   vs.
State   of   Karnataka   &   Ors. 9
.     The   Court   noted   that   it   is   in   the
interests   of   the   general   public   that   more   good   quality   schools   are
established.   Autonomy   and   non­regulation   of   the   school
administration   in   matters   referred   to   above   will   ensure   that   more
such   institutions   are   established.     This   view   has   been   restated   in
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan vs. Union of
India & Anr. 10
. 
8. According   to   the   appellants,   the   activities   of   school   level
education   are   qualitatively   different   from   that   of   professional   level
education.  The determination of school fees, therefore, stands on a
totally   different   footing   than   determination   of   fees   for   professional
colleges   for   medicine   etc.     The   impugned   Act   of   2016   falls   foul   of
doctrine of proportionality — as restrictions imposed on the school
9    (2002) 8 SCC 481 (paras 60 and 61)
10   (2012) 6 SCC 1 (paras 50 to 53)

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Management   in   respect   of   determination   of   school   fees   have   no
cogent nexus/object sought to be achieved.
9. It  is   lastly   urged  that   the   legislative   field  regarding   regulation
of   school   fees   is   already   occupied   by   the   law   made   by   the
Parliament being the RTE Act 11
  and the Rules 12
  framed thereunder.
Hence, it was not open to the State legislature to enact a law on the
same subject.  
10. These   points   were   urged   even   before   the   High   Court   at   the
instance   of   the   appellants.     The   respondent­State   countered   the
same   on   the   argument   that   the   impugned   Act   of   2016   was   in   the
nature   of   a   regulatory   law,   with   complete   autonomy   to   the   school
Management to decide about its fee structure which, however, could
be   given   effect   to   upon   approval   given   by   the   SLFC.     The   SLFC
consists   of   not   only   parents   of   wards,   but   also   the   school
Management   and   their   representatives   in   the   form   of   teachers.     It
ensures participation of all the stakeholders and democratisation of
the   decision­making   process.     The   proposal   of   the   school
Management, if found to be in order, is generally approved and it is
11   Sections 13 and 16 of the RTE Act
12   The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010 ( Rules 12, 15
and 16)

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open to the SLFC to give counter suggestion which if   acceptable to
the school Management can be acted upon by it.  In case there is a
difference  of   opinion,   only  then   the  matter   goes  for  adjudication   of
the rival claims before the DFRC and the decision of that Authority
becomes binding on the parties.   Further, the school Management,
the   SLFC   as   well   as   the   Adjudicatory­cum­Regulatory   Authority,
each one of them is guided by the principles and factors delineated
in Section 8 of the Act of 2016 and Rule 10 of the Rules of 2017 in
the matter of determination of school fees.  Such external regulation
for  fee fixation  has  been  recognised  and approved by   this Court  in
successive decisions   viz.,   Islamic Academy of Education & Anr.
vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. 13
,  P.A. Inamdar & Ors. vs. State
of  Maharashtra  &  Ors. 14
,   Modern   School   vs.  Union   of  India  &
Ors. 15
,   Action   Committee,   Unaided   Private   Schools   &   Ors.   vs.
Director   of   Education,   Delhi   &   Ors. 16
  and   Modern   Dental
College   and   Research   Centre   &   Ors.   vs.   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh   &   Ors. 17
.     According   to   the   respondent­State,   the   setting
13   (2003) 6 SCC 697 (5­Judge Bench)
14   (2005) 6 SCC 537 (7­Judge Bench)
15   (2004) 5 SCC 583 (3­Judge Bench)
16   (2009) 10 SCC 1 (3­Judge Bench)
17   (2016) 7 SCC 353 (5­Judge Bench)

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up   of   External   Fee   Regulatory   Authority   is   consistent   with   the
jurisprudential exposition of this Court and held not to be violative
of   Article   19(1)(g)   or   Article   30   of   the   Constitution   of   India.
According to the State, there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the
Act   of   2016.     In   that,   the   principles   enunciated   in   the   statutory
provisions   under   consideration   are   not   irrelevant   or   irrational   as
suggested by the appellants.
11. The   respondent­State   has   also   refuted   the   challenge   to   the
impugned   Act   of   2016   merely   on   the   basis   of   its   nomenclature.
According   to   the   State,   non­mentioning   of   the   words   prevention   of
profiteering   and   charging   of   capitation   fee   in   the   impugned   Act   of
2016,   does   not   ipso   facto   make   the   same   constitutionally   suspect.
It   is   urged   that   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   Modern
Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra)   has   upheld   the
validity   of   identical   provisions   enacted   by   the   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh   in   relation   to   fixation   of   fee   by   external   committees   and,
therefore,   the   challenge   set   up   by   the   appellants   cannot   be
countenanced.

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12. The   respondent­State   would   urge   that   the   High   Court   in   the
impugned   judgment   after   adverting   to   the   exposition   of   different
Constitution   Benches   of   this   Court,   justly   concluded   that   the
impugned   Act   of   2016   did   not   violate   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution   as   the   right   flowing   therefrom   was   not   an   absolute
fundamental   right.     Further,   there   is   no   substance   in   the  grounds
set forth to assail the validity of the impugned Act of 2016.
13. The   High   Court   did   advert   to   these   arguments   canvassed   by
both sides and eventually dismissed the challenge to the validity of
the impugned Act of 2016 vide common judgment and order dated
14.08.2019.     The   High   Court   after   adverting   to   the   exposition   in
T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   (supra),   Islamic   Academy   of   Education
(supra),   Modern   School   (supra)   and   Modern   Dental   College   and
Research Centre  (supra), proceeded to dismiss the writ petitions by
observing as follows:
“19.   Therefore,   in   the   backdrop   of   law   laid   down   by
Constitution   Bench   in   Modern   Dental   College   &   Research
Centre   (supra),   if   the   impugned   Act   and   the   provisions
sought   to   be   assailed   by   the   petitioners   and   the   regulatory
measures provided under the Rules are examined objectively
with   pragmatic   approach,   then,   it   would   ipso   facto   reveal
that   State   has   not   made   any   endeavour   to   trench   into
autonomy   of   petitioner­institutions.   The   provisions   are

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regulatory   in   nature   with   the   solemn   object   of   preventing
profiteering   and   commercialization   in   school   education.   The
constitution of the Committee for regulating fee structure, by
no   stretch   of   imagination   be   construed   as   an   attempt   to
completely bye­pass the school management. The Committee
as   such   is   chaired   by   representative   of   the   management
besides   principal   as   a   Secretary   with   three   teachers
nominated   by   the   management   and   five   parents   nominated
from parent teachers association. Thus, the contention of the
petitioners   that   State   has   completely   chipped   the   wings   of
management   or   invaded   their   autonomy   is   an   euphonious
plea bereft of any merit.
The   criteria   for   determining   fee   are   also   based   on
legitimate   considerations   provided   under   Section   8   of   the
Act. Thus, even while considering fee structure of the school,
the   Committee   cannot   be   allowed   to   act   at   its   whims   and
fancy   but   for   adhering   to   the   criteria   laid   down   under
Section  8 of the  Act. That   apart, the  remedy  against   the fee
determined by the Committee is also provided in the Statute
by   way   of   appeal/reference   and   second   appeal,   which
sufficiently repudiate the contention of the petitioners about
unreasonable   restrictions   on   their   autonomy   within   the
mischief of unacceptable constraints envisaged under clause
(6) of Article 19 of the Constitution.
20.   Switching   on   to   the   coercive   measures   and   penal
provisions   provided   under   the   Statute   and   enforcement
methodology   prescribed   under   the   Rules,   it   would   be   just
and   appropriate   to   observe   that   all   these   provisions   are
essential   and   necessary   concomitant   of   regulatory
mechanism   for   achieving   desired   objectives,   and   therefore
cannot   be   categorized   as   unreasonable   restrictions.   In   the
overall   scenario,   we   are   also   convinced   that   Sections   13   to
18   of   the   impugned   Act   and   Rule   11   of   the   Rules   are   not
intended   to   be   invoked   on   sundry   occasions   for   interfering
with   day   to   day   functioning   of   the   unaided   recognized
schools.   Thus,   complaint   of   the   petitioners   about   fanciful
and   capricious   supplication   of   these   provisions   per   se
appears to be a far cry without any substance.
Indisputably,   the   Rules   are   in   the   nature   of
subordinate   legislation   and   framed   by   the   Government   in

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exercise of power under Section 19 of the Act for carrying out
all or any of the purposes of the Act. Thus, the Rules as such
are   neither   assailable   on   the   ground   of   lack   of   legislative
competence, nor  for  failure to conform  to the parent  statute
under which Rules are made. Moreover, these rules are also
not   offending   any   right   conferred   on   the   petitioners   under
Part III of the Constitution or in violation of any provision of
the   Constitution,   therefore,   challenge   to   the   Rules   is   wholly
unsustainable.
21. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners,
that   the   impugned   Act   is   unconstitutional   as   being   in
derogation to Article 13(2) of the Constitution, appears to be
quite alluring but of no substance. Analyzing this argument
meticulously in the backdrop of lis involved in these matters,
we   have   already   repudiated   the   same.   At   the   cost   of
repetition, we may reiterate here that the impugned Act and
its other provisions are not taking away or abridges rights of
the   petitioners   conferred   by   Part   III   of   the   Constitution.   We
may   hasten   to   add   that   entire   edifice   of   challenge   in   these
petitions   is   alleged   infraction   of   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution,   which   indisputably   is   not   an   absolute
fundamental   right.   As   observed   hereinabove,   the   said
fundamental   right   is   subject   to   reasonable   restrictions   and
such   restrictions   are   permissible   as   they   are   aimed   at
seeking   laudable   objectives   in   the   larger   public   interest.
Therefore,   viewed   from   any   angle,   the   impugned   provisions
of the Act as well as Rules are   intra­vires   of the Constitution
not   being   in   violation   of   Article   13(2)   and   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution.
The   upshot   of   above   discussion   is   that   all   these
petitions   fail   and   are   hereby   dismissed.   The   stay   petitions
are   also   dismissed   and  interim   order   passed   on   9 th
  of   April,
2018 is vacated.”
14. We   have   heard   Mr.   Pallav   Shishodia,   learned   senior   counsel
for   the   appellants,   Dr.   Manish   Singhvi   and   Mr.   Devadatt   Kamat,
learned senior counsel for the State of Rajasthan.

16
15. After   cogitating   over   the   rival   arguments   and   considering   the
impugned   judgment,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   observing   that
although the High Court was right in its conclusion, it has disposed
of   the   challenge   to   the   validity   of   different   provisions   of   the
impugned   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   in   a
summary manner.   We agree that merely adverting to the decisions
of   this   Court   was   not   enough.     The   High   Court   should   have   then
analysed   the   challenge   to   the   respective   provisions   and   also   the
overall   scheme   of   the   Act   of   2016.     Ordinarily,   we   would   have
relegated   the   parties   before   the   High   Court   for   reconsideration   of
the entire matter afresh.  However, considering the nature of issues
raised   and   the   concerns   expressed   by   the   parties,   we   proceed   to
address the challenge to  the relevant  provisions  of the Act of 2016
in this judgment itself. 
16. Indeed,   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   T.M.A.   Pai
Foundation  (supra) has expounded that the private unaided school
management must have absolute autonomy to determine the school
fees.     But   at   the   same   time   the   consistent   view   of   this   Court   has
been restated and enunciated by the Constitution Bench in  Modern

17
Dental   College   and   Research   Centre   (supra)   in   paragraph   75   of
the   reported   decision.     In   that,   though   the   fee   can   be   fixed   by   the
educational   institutions   and   it   may   vary   from   institution   to
institution   depending   upon   the   quality   of   education   provided   by
each of such institutions, commercialisation is not permissible; and
in   order   to   ensure   that   the   educational   institutions   are   not
indulging in commercialisation and exploitation, the Government is
equipped with necessary powers to take regulatory measures and to
ensure   that   the   private   unaided   schools   keep   playing   vital   and
pivotal   role   to   spread   education   and   not   to   make   money.       The
Court   further   noted   that   when   it   comes   to   the   notice   of   the
Government   that   the   institution   was   charging   fee   or  other   charges
which are excessive, it has complete authority coupled with its duty
to issue directions to such an institution to reduce the same so as
to avoid profiteering and commercialisation.
17. In   paragraph   76   of   the   same   decision,   the   Court   then
proceeded   to   consider   the   next   question   as   to   how   a   regulatory
framework   for   ensuring   that   no   excessive   fee   is   charged   by   the
educational   institutions,   can   be   put   in   place.     For   that,   the   Court

18
adverted   to   the   decision   in   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation   (supra),
Islamic   Academy   of   Education   (supra),   Modern   School   (supra)
and   P.A.   Inamdar   (supra)   and   noted   that   primary   education   is   a
fundamental   right,   but   it   was   not   an   absolute   right   as   private
schools   cannot   be   allowed   to   receive   capitation   fee   or   indulge   in
profiteering   in   the   guise   of   autonomy   to   determine   the   school   fees
itself.     The   Court   plainly   noted   that   every   school   management   of
private   unaided   school   is   free   to   devise   its   own   fee   structure,   but
the   same   can   be   regulated   by   the   Government   in   the   interests   of
general   public   for   preventing   profiteering   and/or   charging   of
capitation   fee.     Further,   fixation   of   fees   needs   to   be   regulated   and
controlled at  the  initial  stage  itself.    The Constitution  Bench  noted
with approval the exposition in  Association of Private Dental and
Medical Colleges vs. State of M.P. 18
,  which reads thus:
“ 42.   We   are   of   the   view   that   Sections   4(1)   and   4(8)   of   the
2007  Act  have  to  be  read with Section  9(1)  of  the 2007 Act,
which   deals   with   factors   which   have   to   be   taken   into
consideration by the Committee while determining the fee to
be   charged   by   a   private   unaided   professional   educational
institution.   A   reading   of   sub­section   (1)   of   Section   9   of   the
2007   Act   would   show   that   the   location   of   private   unaided
professional   educational   institution,   the   nature   of   the
professional   course,   the   cost   of   land   and   building,   the
available   infrastructure,   teaching,   non­teaching   staff   and
18   2009 SCC Online MP 760

19
equipment,   the   expenditure   on   administration   and
maintenance,   a   reasonable   surplus   required   for   growth   and
development   of   the   professional   institution   and   any   other
relevant   factor,   have   to   be   taken   into   consideration   by   the
Committee   while   determining   the   fees   to   be   charged   by   a
private   unaided   professional   educational   institution.   Thus,
all   the   cost   components   of   the   particular   private   unaided
professional educational institution as well as the reasonable
surplus   required   for   growth   and   development   of   the
institution   and   all   other   factors   relevant   for   imparting
professional   education   have   to   be   considered   by   the
Committee   while   determining   the   fee.   Section   4(8)   of   the
2007 Act further provides that the Committee may require a
private aided or unaided professional educational institution
to   furnish   information   that   may   be   necessary   for   enabling
the Committee to determine the fees that may be charged by
the   institution   in   respect   of   each   professional   course.   Each
professional   educational   institution,   therefore,   can   furnish
information with regard to the fees that it proposes to charge
from   the   candidates   seeking   admission   taking   into   account
all the cost components, the reasonable surplus required for
growth and development and other factors relevant to impart
professional   education   as   mentioned   in   Section   9(1)   of   the
2007   Act   and   the   function   of   the   Committee   is   only   to   find
out,   after   giving   due   opportunity   of   being   heard   to   the
institution   as   provided   in   Section   9(2)   of   the   2007   Act
whether the fees proposed by the institution to be charged to
the   student   are   based   on   the   factors   mentioned   in   Section
9(1) of the 2007 Act and did not amount to profiteering and
commercialisation   of   the   education.   The   word
“determination”   has   been   defined   in   Black's   Law   Dictionary ,
Eighth   Edn.,   to   mean   a   final   decision   by   the   Court   or   an
administrative   agency.   The   Committee,   therefore,   while
determining   the   fee   only   gives   the   final   approval   to   the
proposed   fee   to   be   charged   after   being   satisfied   that   it   was
based   on   the   factors   mentioned   in   Section   9(1)   of   the   2007
Act   and   there   was   no   profiteering   or   commercialisation   of
education. The expression “fixation of fees” in Section 4(1) of
the   2007   Act   means   that   the   fee   to   be   charged   from
candidates   seeking   admission   in   the   private   professional
educational institution did not vary from student to student
and also remained fixed for a certain period as mentioned in
Section   4(8)   of   the   2007   Act.   As   has   been   held   by   the
Supreme   Court   in   Peerless   General   Finance   and   Investment

20
Co. Ltd.   v.   RBI 19
,  the  Court  has  to examine  the substance  of
the   provisions   of   the   law   to   find   out   whether   provisions   of
the  law  impose  reasonable  restrictions  in the  interest   of  the
general public. The provisions in Sections 4(1), 4(8) and 9 of
the   2007   Act   in   substance   empower   the   Committee   to   be
only satisfied that the fee proposed by a private professional
educational   institution   did   not   amount   to   profiteering   or
commercialisation of education and was based on the factors
mentioned in Section 9(1) of the 2007 Act. The provisions of
the   2007   Act   do   not   therefore,   violate   the   right   of   private
professional educational institution to charge its own fee.”
18. After   having   quoted   the   above   exposition   with   approval   in
paragraph 81, the Court then proceeded to examine the need for a
regulatory   mechanism.     It   noted   that   the   regulatory   measures   are
felt   necessary   to   promote   basic   well­being   for   individuals   in   need.
In paragraphs 90 to 92 in   Modern   Dental  College  and  Research
Centre  (supra), this Court noted as follows:
“ 90 .   Thus,   it   is   felt   that   in   any   welfare   economy,   even   for
private   industries,   there   is   a   need   for   regulatory   body   and
such   a   regulatory   framework   for   education   sector   becomes
all   the   more   necessary.   It   would   be   more   so   when,   unlike
other   industries,   commercialisation   of   education   is   not
permitted as mandated by the Constitution of India, backed
by   various   judgments   of   this   Court   to   the   effect   that
profiteering in the education is to be avoided.
91 .   Thus,   when   there   can   be   regulators   which   can   fix   the
charges for telecom companies in respect of various services
that   such   companies   provide   to   the   consumers;   when
regulators can fix the premium and other charges which the
insurance   companies   are   supposed   to   receive   from   the
persons   who   are   insured;   when   regulators   can   fix   the   rates
at which the producer of electricity is to supply the electricity
19   (1992) 2 SCC 343

21
to   the   distributors;   we   fail   to   understand   as   to   why   there
cannot   be   a   regulatory   mechanism   when   it   comes   to
education   which   is   not   treated   as   purely   economic   activity
but welfare activity  aimed at achieving  more egalitarian and
prosperous society by empowering the people of this country
by   educating   them.   In   the   field   of   education,   therefore,   this
constitutional   goal   remains   pivotal   which   makes   it   distinct
and   special   in   contradistinction   with   other   economic
activities as the purpose of education is to bring about social
transformation   and   thereby   a   better   society   as   it   aims   at
creating   better   human   resource   which   would   contribute   to
the   socio­economic   and   political   upliftment   of   the   nation.
The   concept   of   welfare   of   the   society   would   apply   more
vigorously   in   the   field   of   education.   Even   otherwise,   for
economist,   education   as   an   economic   activity,   favourably
compared   to   those   of   other   economic   concerns   like
agriculture   and   industry,   has   its   own   inputs   and   outputs;
and   is   thus   analysed   in   terms   of   the   basic   economic   tools
like   the   laws   of   return,   principle  of  equimarginal  utility   and
the   public   finance.   Guided   by   these   principles,   the   State   is
supposed   to   invest   in   education   up   to   a   point   where   the
socio­economic   returns   to   education   equal   to   those   from
other State expenditures, whereas the individual is guided in
his decision to pay for  a type of education by the possibility
of   returns   accruable   to   him.   All   these   considerations   make
out a case for setting up of a stable regulatory mechanism.
92.   In   this   sense,   when   imparting   of   quality   education   to
cross­section   of   the   society,  particularly,   the  weaker   section
and   when   such   private   educational   institutions   are   to   rub
shoulders with the State managed educational institution to
meet   the   challenge   of   the   implementing   ambitious
constitutional   promises,   the   matter   is   to   be   examined   in   a
different   hue.   It   is   this   spirit   which   we   have   kept   in   mind
while   balancing   the   right   of   these   educational   institutions
given   to   them   under   Article   19(1)(g)   on   the   one   hand   and
reasonableness of the restrictions which have been imposed
by  the  impugned legislation.  The  right  to  admission or  right
to   fix   the   fee   guaranteed   to   these   appellants   is   not   taken
away   completely,   as   feared.   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation 20
  gives
autonomy to such institutions which remains intact. Holding
of   CET   under   the   control   of   the   State   does   not   impinge   on
this   autonomy.   Admission   is   still   in   the   hands   of   these
institutions. Once it is even conceded by the appellants that
20  supra at footnote No.9

22
in   admission   of   students   “triple   test”   is   to   be   met,   the
impugned legislation aims at that. After all, the sole purpose
of   holding   CET   is   to   adjudge   merit   and   to   ensure   that
admissions   which   are   done   by   the   educational   institutions,
are   strictly   on   merit.   This   is   again   to   ensure   larger   public
interest.   It   is   beyond   comprehension   that   merely   by
assuming   the   power   to   hold   CET,   fundamental   right   of   the
appellants   to   admit   the   students   is   taken   away.   Likewise,
when   it   comes   to   fixation   of   fee,   as   already   dealt   with   in
detail, the main purpose is that the State acts as a regulator
and   satisfies   itself   that   the   fee   which   is   proposed   by   the
educational   institution   does   not   have   the   element   of
profiteering   and   also   that   no   capitation   fee,   etc.   is   charged.
In   fact,   this   dual   function   of   regulatory   nature   is   going   to
advance the public interest inasmuch as those students who
are   otherwise   meritorious   but   are   not   in   a   position   to   meet
unreasonable   demands   of   capitation   fee,   etc.   are   not
deprived   of   getting   admissions.   The   impugned   provisions,
therefore,   are   aimed   at   seeking   laudable   objectives   in   larger
public   interest.   Law   is   not   static,   it   has   to   change   with
changing times and changing social/societal conditions.”
19. After   this   jurisprudential   exposition,   it   is   not   open   to   argue
that   the   Government   cannot   provide   for   external   regulatory
mechanism for determination of school fees or so to say fixation of
“just” and “permissible” school fees at the initial stage itself.
20. The question is: whether the impugned enactment stands the
test of reasonableness and rationality and balances the right of the
educational   institutions   (private   unaided   schools)   guaranteed   to
them   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   in   the   matter   of
determination of school fees?  The Act of 2016 has been enacted by
the   State   legislature.     It   was   enacted   as   it   was   noticed   that   the

23
earlier enactment on the self­same subject did not include provision
of   appeal   against   the   orders   of   fee   determination   by   the   Fee
Determination  Committee.   It was also noticed that there are large
number   of   private   schools   (approximately   34,000)   and   a   single   fee
determination   committee  cannot  determine  the  fee  of  such   schools
in a proper manner in time.  For that reason, the Act of 2016 came
into being to provide for regulation of collection of fees by schools in
the   State   of   Rajasthan   and   matters   connected   therewith   and
incidental thereto.  It extends to the whole of the State of Rajasthan
and   applies   to   both   aided   and   unaided   schools.     The   Act   provides
for   a   regulatory   mechanism.     The   expression   “aided   school”   is
defined   in   Section   2(b)   to   mean   a   school   receiving   any   sum   of
money as aid from the State Government.  The expression “unaided
school” has not been defined.  It must, however, follow that all other
private   schools,   other   than   aided   schools   would   qualify   that
category (i.e., unaided private schools).  The expression “school” has
been defined in Section 2(t), which reads thus:
“ 2.     Definitions.­     In  this   Act,   unless  the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx

24
(t)   “school”   means   the   school   imparting   elementary,
secondary and senior secondary education recognized by the
Government and managed by any management and affiliated
to   any   Indian   or   foreign   course   or   Board,   whether   aided,
partially   aided,   un­aided   including   the   school   run   by   the
minority   educational   institution   but   does   not   include   a
school imparting religious instructions only;”
21. The   expression   “private   school”   has   been   defined   in   Section
2(p), which reads thus:
“ 2.     Definitions.­     In  this   Act,   unless  the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(p)   “private   school”   means   a   school   established   and
administered   or   maintained   by   any   person   or   body   of
persons   and   which   is   a   recognized   institution   within   the
meaning   of   clause   (q)   of   Section   2   of   the   Rajasthan   Non­
Government   Educational   Institutions   Act,   1989   (Act   No.   19
of 1992), but does not include ­
(i) an aided school; and
(ii)   a   school   established   and   administered   or   maintained   by
the   Central   Government   or   the   State   Government   or   any
local authority;”
It   is,   thus,   clear   that   the   Act   of   2016   applies   to   all   the   schools
within   the   State   of   Rajasthan   referred   to   in   Section   2(t)   including
private schools as defined in Section 2(p).
22. Section 3 of the Act of 2016 predicates that no school itself or
on   its   behalf   shall   collect   any   fee   in   excess   of   the   fee   fixed   or
approved   under   the   Act   of   2016.     The   expression   “fee”   has   been
defined in Section 2(h), which reads thus:

25
“ 2.     Definitions.­     In  this   Act,   unless  the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(h)   “fee”   means   any   amount,   by   whatever   name   called,
collected, directly or indirectly, by a school for admission of a
pupil to any Standard or course of study;”
23. Besides the definition of expression “fee”, it would be apposite
to   advert   to   the   factors   for   determination   of   fee   under   the   Act   of
2016 as delineated in Section 8 of the Act of 2016.  The same reads
thus:
“ 8. Factors for determination of fee.   ­ The following factors
shall   be   considered   while   deciding   the   fee   leviable   by   a
school, namely: ­
(a) the location of the school;
(b) the infrastructure made available to the students for
the   qualitative   education,   the   facilities   provided   and   as
mentioned in the prospectus or web­site of the school;
(c)   the   education   standard   of   the   school   as   the   State
Government may prescribe;
(d) the expenditure on administration and maintenance;
(e) the excess fund generated from non­resident Indians,
as   a   part   of   charity   by   the   management   and
contribution   by   the   Government   for   providing   free­ship
in   fee   or   for   other   items   under   various   Government
schemes   given   to   the   school   for   the   Scheduled   Castes,
the   Scheduled   Tribes,   Other   Backward   Class   and
Special Backward Class students;
(f)   qualified   teaching   and   non­teaching   staff   as   per   the
norms and their salary components;
(g) reasonable amount for yearly salary increments;
(h)   expenditure   incurred   on   the   students   over   total
income of the school;
(i)   reasonable   revenue   surplus   for   the   purpose   of
development   of   education   and   expansion   of   the   school;
and
(j) any other factor as may be prescribed.”

26
24. In addition to Section 8, it is essential to take note of Rule 10
of   the   Rules   of   2017   which   provides   for   additional   factors   to   be
reckoned for determination of school fees.  Rule 10 reads thus:
“ 10.   Additional   factors   for   determination   of   fee.   ­   The
following factors shall be considered while deciding the fee in
addition   to   the   factors   specified   in   section   8   of   the   Act,
namely:­
(i)   facilities   made   available   by   the   school   under
e­governance i.e. hardware and software facilities;
(ii) strength of students;
(iii)   other   facilities   made   available   to   students   such   as
swimming   pool,   horse   riding,   shooting,   archery   and
performing art etc.;
(iv)   supply   of   books,   notebooks,   etc.   and   other
educational material provided to students;
(v) provision of meal or snacks; and
(vi)   any   other   factor   submitted   by   the   Management
before the School Level Fee Committee.”
25. After adverting to Section 8 and Rule 10, it is amply clear that
the   relevant   factors   for   determination   of   reasonable   school   fees
under the Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder have been duly
articulated   and   are   based   on   objective   parameters.     It   was   urged
that clause (a) of Section 8 is vague.  We find force in the argument
of the respondent­State that the factors referred to in Section 8 and
Rule 10 for  determination  of  fee are founded on the dictum  of this
Court   in   successive   reported   precedents,   as   relevant   factors.     The
factor   of   location   of   the   school   is   certainly   relevant   for

27
determination of fee as are the other factors referred to in Section 8
and Rule 10.   The totality of the effect of all the specified factors is
to   be   reckoned   for   determining   the   school   fees   of   the   concerned
school for the relevant period.   The location of the school is not the
only factor that is to be taken into account. 
26. At the end, what is relevant is that the institution is entitled to
fix   its   own   fee   structure,   which   may   include   reasonable   revenue
surplus for the purpose of development of education and expansion
of   the   institution,   as   long   as   it   does   not   entail   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation.  Whether fee structure evolved by the concerned
school   results   in   profiteering   or   otherwise   is   a   matter   which
eventually would become final with the determination/adjudication
by the Statutory Regulatory Committees constituted under Sections
7   and   10   of   the   Act   of   2016,   namely,   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee (DFRC) and Revision Committee respectively, as the case
may be.  That adjudication, however, becomes necessary only if the
SLFC   were   to   disapprove   the   proposal   of   the   school   Management
regarding   fee   structure   determined   by   the   school.     Whereas,   if   the
SLFC   were   to   accept   the   proposal   of   the   school   Management
regarding fee structure as it is, that would be the fees under the Act

28
of 2016 for the relevant period and then there would be no need for
the   DFRC   to   adjudicate   upon   the   fixation   of   fee   in   the   concerned
school.
27. The   SLFC   is   constituted   institution   or   school   wise,   whereas
the   DFRC   is   an   independent   statutory   regulatory   authority
empowered   to   enquire   into   the   factum   of   whether   fee   structure   of
the   given   school   determined   by   its   Management   entails   in
profiteering.  In the event, the SLFC disapproves the proposal of the
school   Management,   the   dispensation   provided   for   adjudication   of
the   contentious   position   between   the   stakeholders   in   no   manner
violate   the   fundamental   right   of   establishment   of   educational
institution guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
28. Section   4   of   the   Act   of   2016   provides   for   Parent­Teachers
Association, which reads thus:
“ 4.   Parent­Teachers   Association.   ­   (1)(a)   Every   private
school shall constitute the Parent­Teachers Association.
(b)   The   Parent­Teachers   Association   shall   be   formed   by   the
head   of   the   school   within   thirty   days   from   the   beginning   of
each  academic year. Every  teacher   of the school and parent
of   every   student   in   the   school   shall   be   a   member   of   the
Parent­Teachers   Association   and   an   annual   amount   of
rupees fifty, in case of urban area and rupees twenty, in case
of   rural   area,   shall   be   collected   from   each   member   of   such
association.

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(c) On formation of the Parent­Teachers Association, a lottery
shall be conducted by drawing a lot of the willing parents to
constitute   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   and   a   notice   of
one week before such lottery shall be given to the member of
the Parent­Teachers Association.
(2)(a) The School Level Fee Committee shall consist of, ­
(i) Chairperson ­ representative of management of the 
private school nominated by such 
management;
(ii) Secretary ­ Principal of the private school;
(iii) Member ­ three teachers nominated by the 
management of private school;
(iv) Member ­ five parents from Parent­Teachers 
Association.
(b)   The   list   of   members   of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee
shall   be   displayed   on   the   notice   board   within   a   period   of
fifteen   days   from   formation   of   the   School   Level   Fee
Committee   and  copy   thereof   shall  forthwith  be   forwarded  to
the District Education Officer concerned.
(c)   The   term   of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   shall   be   for
one   academic   year   and   no   parent   member   shall   be   eligible
for   drawing   a   lot   by   lottery   within   the   period   of   next   three
years since the expiry of his/her last term as the member of
the School Level Fee Committee.
(d) The School Level Fee Committee shall meet at least once
in three months. The procedure to be followed for conducting
the meeting of the School Level Fee Committee shall be such
as may be prescribed.
(e)   The   Parent­Teachers   Association   shall   have   a   general
meeting   at   least   once   before   the   15th   August   of   every   year.
The   procedure   to   be   followed   for   conducting   the   meeting   of
the   Parent­Teachers   Association   shall   be   such   as   may   be
prescribed.   The   Parent­Teachers   Association   shall   discharge
such duties and perform such functions as may be assigned
to it under this Act and as may be prescribed.”
Section   4   predicates   that   every   private   school   shall   constitute   the
Parent­Teachers  Association,  which   is   to   be   formed   by   the   head   of

30
the   school   within   thirty   days   from   the   beginning   of   each   academic
year.  Section 4(1)(b) envisages that every teacher of the school and
parent   of   every   student   in   the   school   shall   be   a   member   of   the
Parent­Teachers   Association.     Section   4(1)(c)   provides   that   on
formation   of   the   Parent­Teachers   Association,   a   lottery   shall   be
conducted  by   drawing  a  lot   of  the  willing  parents  to  constitute  the
SLFC.     In   the   context   of   this   provision,   it   was   urged   that   for
choosing the willing parent to become member of the SLFC by draw
of lots, no eligibility criteria has been prescribed in the Act of 2016
or   the   Rules   of   2017.     Besides,   willing   parent   of   the   ward,   who   is
admitted   in   the   school   against   the   25   per   cent   quota   of   free
education   under   the   RTE   Act,   may   also   fit   into   this   category   even
though   he   would   have   no   stakes   in   the   fee   structure   proposed   by
the school Management.   The argument seems to be attractive, but
for   that   reason   the   provision   need   not   be   struck   down   or   declared
as violative of any constitutional right of management of the school.
This   provision   can   be   read   down   to   mean   that   the   draw   of   lots
would   be   in   respect   of   willing   parents   whose   wards   have   been
admitted   against   the   seats   other   than   the   seats   reserved   for   free
education under the RTE Act.  Further, for ensuring that the willing

31
parent   must   be   well­informed   and   capable   of   (meaningful)
interacting   in   the   discourse   on   the   proposal   of   fee   structure
presented   by   the   school   Management,   he/she   must   have   some
minimum   educational   qualification   and   also   familiar   with   the
development   of   school,   management   of   finances   and   dynamics   of
quality   education.     The   desirability   of   such   eligibility   of   the   willing
parent ought to be specified.
29. Absence  of   such   provisions   in   the   Act  or  Rules,  however,  can
be no basis to suspect the validity of the provision in question.  We
say so because draw of lots can be one of the ways of identifying the
willing parent who could become member of the SLFC.  Whether the
member   should   be   chosen   by   election   from   amongst   the   willing
parents or draw of lots or by nomination including his/her eligibility
conditions, is a legislative policy.  They may serve the same purpose
for   constituting   the   SLFC   to   give   representation   to   the   parents   of
the wards who are already admitted in the school and are pursuing
education thereat.  In any case, this argument of the appellants will
not   take   the   matter   any   further   much   less   to   declare   the   relevant
provision   ultra   vires   as   being   violative   of   fundamental   right   of   the
appellants as such.

32
30. The composition of the SLFC has been specified in Section 4(2)
(a)   of   the   Act   of   2016.     It   consists   of   a   Chairperson   being
representative   of   management   of   the   private   school   nominated   by
such  management;   Secretary   —  Principal   of   the   private   school   ( Ex
officio );   three   teachers   nominated   by   the   management   of   private
school   as   to   be   the   members   of   the   SLFC;   and   five   parents   from
Parent­Teachers   Association   chosen   by   a   lottery   conducted   by
drawing a lot of willing parents.  The SLFC consists of ten members
—   five   are,   in   a   way,   representatives   or   nominees   of   the
Management   and   five   parents   from   the   Parent­Teachers
Association.     The   SLFC   so   constituted   would   continue   to   function
for   one   academic   year   and   the   member   chosen   from   Parent­
Teachers Association is not eligible to participate again for a period
of three years thereafter from the date of expiry of his/her term as
the member of the SLFC.  By this process, the parents representing
different wards get opportunity to be part of the SLFC.  Suffice it to
observe  that  the  constitution  of  the SLFC  and  for  the  nature  of its
function,   no   fault   can   be   found   with   Section   4   of   the   Act   of   2016
much   less   on   the   ground   that   it   violates   the   fundamental   right   to
establish an educational institution.

33
31. Section   5   of   the   Act   of   2016   deals   with   fixation   of   fee   in
“Government   schools”   and   “aided   schools”.     However,   we   are   not
concerned with the said provision in the cases before us.
32. Section   6   deals   with   regulation   of   fees   in   private   schools   and
the   procedure   to   be   followed   for   finalisation   of   the   fee   structure.
The same reads thus:
“ 6.   Regulation   of   fees   in   private   schools.   ­   (1)   The
management   of   the   private   schools   shall   be   competent   to
propose the fee in such schools.
(2) On the formation of the School Level Fee Committee, the
management   shall   submit   the   details   of   the   proposed   fee
along   with   the   relevant   record   to   the   School   Level   Fee
Committee   for   its   approval   at   least   six   months   before   the
commencement   of   the   next   academic   year.   While   giving   the
approval,   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   shall   have   the
authority to decide the amount of fee afresh.
(3) After considering all the relevant factors laid down under
Section 8, the School Level Fee Committee shall approve the
fee  within  a  period   of  thirty   days  from   the  date  of   receipt   of
the   details   of   the   proposed   fee   and   the   record   under   sub­
section   (2)   and   communicate   the   details   of   the   fee   so
approved   in   writing   to   the   management   forthwith.   The
details   of   the   fee   so   approved   by   the   School   Level   Fee
committee   shall   be   displayed   on   the   notice   board   in   Hindi,
English and in the respective medium of school, and if such
school has its own website it shall be displayed on the same
and it shall be binding for three academic years.
(4)   The   School   Level   Fee   Committee   shall   indicate   the
different heads under which the fee shall be levied.
(5)   If   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   fails   to   decide   the   fee
within   the   period   specified   in   sub­section   (3),   the
management   shall   immediately   refer   the   matter   to   the
Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   for   its   decision   under
intimation   to   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   in   such
manner   as   may   be   prescribed.   During   the   pendency   of   the
reference,   the   management   shall   be   at   liberty   to   collect   the

34
fee   of   the   previous   academic   year   plus   ten   percent   increase
in   such   fee   till   the   final   decision   of   the   Divisional   Fee
Regulatory Committee.
(6) The Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee shall decide the
appeal   or   reference   as   far   as   possible   within   the   period   of
sixty days from the date of its filing after giving the opposite
party an opportunity of being heard.
(7)   The   management   or   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee
aggrieved   by   the   decision   of   the   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee   in   appeal   or   reference   may,   within   thirty   days
from   the   date   of   such   decision,   prefer   an   appeal   before   the
Revision Committee in such manner as may be prescribed.”
33. On   bare   perusal   of   this   provision,   it   is   noticed   that   the
Management   has   the   prerogative   to   submit   its   proposal   regarding
the fee structure in the given school.  That proposal is submitted to
the   SLFC   set   up   under   Section   4   of   the   Act   of   2016.     The
mechanism provided in Section 6 onwards would primarily apply to
private unaided schools.   Indeed, the expression “propose” used in
Section   6(1)   would   mean   that   the   proposal   of   the   school
Management is its in­principle decision regarding  the fee structure
for   the   relevant   period.     The   usage   of   expression   “propose”   in   no
way   undermines   the   autonomy   of   the   school   Management,   in
particular to determine its own fee structure for the relevant period.
The   consequence   of   proposal   not   being   accepted   by   the   SLFC   is   a
different   issue.     Notably,  the   SLFC’s  decision   under   Section  6(2)  is
not binding on the school Management.  For, it is open to the school

35
Management to then refer the matter for adjudication to the DFRC
constituted   under   Section   7   of   the   Act   of   2016,   who   in   turn   is
obliged   to   decide   the   reference   one   way   or   the   other.     Indeed,   that
decision   would   be   binding   on   both   —   the   school   Management   as
well   as   the   parents,   unless   it   is   interdicted   by   the   Revision
Committee   constituted   under   Section   10   of   the   Act   of   2016   at   the
instance of the other party.
34. The stipulation such as in Section 6(3) of the Act of 2016 that
the decision of fee structure proposed by the school Management, if
approved by the SLFC, would be binding  for three academic years,
had   been   recognised   and   approved   in   Islamic   Academy   of
Education  (supra) in paragraphs 7 and 161   and also noted in   P.A.
Inamdar  (supra).
35. To put it differently, the dispensation envisaged under Section
6   of   the   impugned   Act   of   2016   is   not   intended   to   undermine   the
autonomy of the school Management in the matter of determination
of   fee   structure   itself.     What   it   envisages   is   that   the   school
Management may determine its own fee structure, but may finalise
or   give   effect   to   the   same   after   interacting   with   the   SLFC.     It   is   a

36
broad­based   committee,   consisting   of   representatives   of   the   school
Management   as   well   as   five   parents   from   Parent­Teachers
Association.     This   is   merely   a   consultative   process   and
democratisation   of   the   decision­making   process   by   taking   all   the
stakeholders   on   board.     The   SLFC   does   not   sit   over   the   proposal
submitted by the school Management as a court of appeal, but only
reassures itself as to whether the proposed fee structure entails in
profiteering   by   the   school   on   applying   the   parameters   specified   in
Section   8   and   Rule   10.     In   other   words,   it   is   open   to   the   SLFC   to
take   a   different   view   regarding   the   school   fees   proposed   by   the
school   Management   and   arrive   at   a   different   fee   structure.     If   that
counter   proposal  is   acceptable  to   the   school   Management,   nothing
further   is   required   to   be   done   and   the   decision   so   taken   by   the
school Management would become binding for three academic years
on   all   concerned.     However,   in   case   the   school   Management
disagrees with the recommendations of the SLFC, it is open to both
sides,   namely,   the   school   Management   as   well   as   the   parents   of
wards   to   take   the   matter   to   the   DFRC   for   adjudication   on   that
aspect.

37
36. While deciding the school fees, the school Management/SLFC
including   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Authorities,   all   concerned   are
guided by the factors delineated in Section 8 of the Act of 2016 and
Rule   10   of   the   Rules   of   2017.     Suffice   it   to   note   that   the   process
envisaged   in   Section   6   is   democratic   and   consensual   resolution   of
the issue of fee structure for the relevant period between the school
Management   and   the   parents’   representative   being   part   of   the
SLFC.   It is not to give final authority to the SLFC to determine the
fee   structure   itself   which,   as   aforesaid,   is   the   prerogative   of   the
school Management as per Section 6(1) of the Act of 2016.   In that
sense, the autonomy of the school Management to determine the fee
structure   itself   in   the   first   place   is   untrammelled   and   not
undermined in any way. 
37. Section   7   of   the   Act   of   2016   is   about   the   constitution   of   the
DFRC.  The same reads thus:
“ 7.   Constitution   of   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee.   ­   (1)   The   Government   shall,   by   notification   in
the   Official   Gazette,   constitute   a   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee for each Revenue Division, which shall consist of
the following members, namely: ­
(a) Divisional 
Commissioner, ­ Chairperson;
(b) Deputy Director,  ­ Member;

38
Secondary Education
(c) Nominee of Director 
Sanskrit Education ­ Member;
(d) Treasury Officer of 
District Treasury situated
at Revenue Division 
Headquarter ­ Member;
(e) Deputy Director, 
Elementary Education ­ Ex­officio Member­
Secretary;
(f) two representatives of 
private schools 
nominated by Divisional 
Commissioner ­ Member;
(g) two representatives of 
parents nominated by 
Divisional Commissioner ­ Member.
(2)(a)   The   term   of   office   of   the   representatives   of   private
schools   and   parents   shall   be   for   a   period   of   two   years   from
the   date   of   their   nomination   and   in   case   of   vacancy   arising
earlier,   for   any   reason,   such   vacancy   shall   be   filled   for   the
remainder period of the term.
(b)   The   representatives   of   private   schools   and   parents   shall
not be eligible for reappointment.
(c)   The   representatives   of   private   schools   and   parents   may
resign   from   the   office   in   writing   addressed   to   the   Divisional
Commissioner   and   on   such   resignation   being   accepted,   his
office   shall   become   vacant   and   may   be   filled   in   within   a
period   of   three   month   from   the   date   of   occurrence   of
vacancy.
(d)   A   representative   of   private   schools   and   parents   may   be
removed,   if   he   does   any   act   which,   in   the   opinion   of   the
Divisional   Commissioner,   is   unbecoming   of   a   member   of
Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee:
Provided   that   no   representative   of   private   schools   or
parents shall be removed from the Divisional Fee Regulation
Committee without giving him an opportunity of being heard.
(e)   The   other   terms   and   conditions   for   the   service   of   the
representatives of private schools and parents shall be such
as may be prescribed.”

39
From   the   bare   perusal   of   Section   7(1),   it   is   noticed   that   first   five
members   are   official   members.     It   is   a   broad­based   independent
Committee which includes two representatives of private schools in
the divisional area “nominated by the Divisional Commissioner” and
similarly   two   representatives   of   parents   “nominated   by   the
Divisional   Commissioner”.     The   representation   is   given   to   the
concerned   stakeholders   in   the   matter   of   determination   of   fee
structure and in particular in the matter of enquiry into the factum
whether   fee   structure   proposed   by   the   concerned   school
Management   entails   in   profiteering   or   otherwise.     In   reference   to
Section   7(2)(a),   we   must   observe   that   the   term   of   office   of
representatives of the private schools and, in particular parents has
been   earmarked   as   two   years   from   the   date   of   their   nomination.
This would mean, necessarily, that the concerned parent would be
eligible   until   his/her   ward   continues   in   the   school   during   the
tenure   and   is   not   a   member   of   the   SLFC   of   any   school   within   the
divisional   area.     Any   member   not   fulfilling   this   criterion   would   be
deemed to have vacated his office forthwith and, in his place, a new
member   can   be   nominated   by   the   competent   authority   from
amongst the parents of the wards pursuing studies in the school in

40
the   concerned   divisional   area.     Moreover,   while   nominating
representative   of   parents,   the   Divisional   Commissioner   must   keep
in   mind   that   the   person   so   nominated   must   possess   basic
qualification  of   accounting,   development   of   a   school  and   dynamics
of   quality   education;   and   whose   ward   has   not   secured   admission
against   25   per   cent   quota   of   free   education   under   the   RTE   Act.
Thus understood, even Section 7 of the Act of 2016 does not violate
the   fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution in respect of establishment of educational institution.
38. Needless to underscore that the Divisional Commissioner, who
is   empowered   to   nominate   two   representatives   of   private   schools
would   keep   in   mind   that   his/her   nominees   are   from   the   schools
within the divisional area and at least one amongst them should be
chosen from a minority school so that representation is given to all
stakeholders,  including   minority  and   non­minority  private  unaided
schools.     At   the   same   time,   it   must   be   borne   in   mind   that   such   a
person   is   already   not   a   member   of   the   SLFC   of   any   school   in   the
divisional area.  The dispensation provided in Section 7, is, thus, to
create   an   independent   machinery   for   adjudication   of   the   question
as to whether the fee structure proposed/determined by the school

41
Management   of   the   concerned   school   entails   in   profiteering,
commercialisation or otherwise.
39. As regards challenge to Section 8 of the Act of 2016, the usage
of   expression   “determination”,   in   our   opinion,   does   not   take   away
the autonomy of the school Management in determining its own fee
structure.     This   provision   is   only   an   indicator   as   to   what   factors
should   be   reckoned   for   determination   of   fee   and   on   that   scale   the
SLFC   as   well   as   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Committees   will   be   in   a
position   to   analyse   the   claim   of   the   school   Management.     This
provision, in fact, sets forth objective parameters as to what would
be the reasonable fee structure — not resulting in profiteering and
commercialisation   by   the   school   Management.     As   aforesaid,   this
provision   will   have   to   be   read   along   with   Rule   10   of   the   Rules   of
2017   which   provides   for   additional   factors   to   be   borne   in   mind
while   examining   the   question   regarding   reasonableness   of   the   fee
structure proposed by the school Management.
40. Reverting to Section 9, which reads thus:
“ 9.   Powers   and   functions   of   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee.   ­ (1) The powers and functions of the Divisional
Fee Regulatory Committee shall be to adjudicate the dispute
between   the   management   and   the   Parent­Teachers

42
Association   regarding   fee   to   be   charged   by   the   school
management from the students.
(2)   The   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   may   authorize
any   officer   not   below   the   rank   of   the   Head   Master   of
Secondary   School   to   enter   any   private   school   or   any
premises belonging to the management of such school, if the
Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee finds so necessary, and
search, inspect and seize any records, accounts, registers or
other   documents   belonging   to   such   school   or   the
management in so far as such records, accounts, registers or
other   documents   are   necessary   and   relevant   to   decide   the
issues before the said Committee. The provisions of the Code
of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (Central   Act   No.   2   of   1974)
relating   to  searches   and   seizures   shall   apply,   so   far   as  may
be, to searches and seizures under this section.
(3)   The   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   shall   regulate
its   own   procedure,   for   the   discharge   of   its   functions,   and
shall, for the purpose of making any inquiry under this Act,
have   all   powers   of   a   civil   court   under   the   Code   of   Civil
Procedure,   1908   (Central   Act   No.   5   of   1908)   while   trying   a
suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: ­
(i)   the   summoning   and   enforcing   the   attendance   of   any
witness and examining him on oath;
(ii) the discovery and production of any document;
(iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits;
(iv)   the   issue   of   commission   for   the   examination   of   the
witness;
(4) No order shall be passed by the Divisional Fee Regulatory
Committee   in   the   absence   of   the   Chairperson.   The   order   of
the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee shall be binding on
the   parties   to   the   proceedings   before   it   for   three   academic
years.   It   shall   not   be   called   in   question   in   any   civil   court
except   by   way   of   an   appeal   before   the   Revision   Committee
constituted under this Act.
(5)   At   the   time   of   resolving   the   dispute,   the   Divisional   Fee
Regulatory Committee shall not grant any interim stay to the
fee determined by the management. On decision in appeal or
reference, the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee may pass
appropriate orders for refund of the excess fee to the student
concerned.   In   case   the   management   fails   to   refund   the
excess   fee   to   such   student,   the   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee shall proceed to recover such excess fee from the
management as an arrear of land revenue and pay the same
to such student.

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(6)   The   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   shall,   on
determining   the   fee   leviable   by   a   private   school,
communicates its decision to the parties concerned.
(7)   Every   private   school   preferring   an   appeal   before   the
Divisional Fee  Regulatory  Committee  shall  place  the  copy  of
decision in appeal on its notice board, and if such school has
web­site, on its web­site;
(8)   The   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   shall   indicate
the different heads under which the fee shall be levied.
(9)   The   orders   passed   by   the   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee   shall   be   binding   on   the   private   school   for   three
academic   years.   At   the   end   of   the   said   period,   the   private
school   shall   be   at   liberty   to   propose   changes   in   its   fee
structure by following the procedure as laid down under this
Act.”
Section 9 deals with powers and functions of the DFRC   inter alia  to
adjudicate   the   dispute   between   the   Management   and   the   Parent­
Teachers   Association   regarding   fee   to   be   charged   by   the   school
Management from the students.  The DFRC has been empowered to
undertake   search,   inspect   and   seize   any   records,   accounts,
registers   or   other   documents   belonging   to   the   concerned   school   or
the   management   in   so   far   as   such   records,   accounts,   registers   or
other   documents   are   necessary   and   relevant   to   decide   the   issues
before   the   said   Committee.     It   can   regulate   its   own   procedure   for
the discharge of its functions and exercise all powers of a civil court
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
41. Essentially,   Section   9   bestows   power   upon   the   DFRC   to
adjudicate the dispute between the school Management and Parent­

44
Teachers   Association   regarding   difference   of   opinion   in   respect   of
fee structure for  the concerned school.   What is significant  to note
is   that   Section   9(5)   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the   DFRC   has   no
power   to   grant   any   interim   stay   to   the   fee   determined   by   the
Management.  However, in light of Section 6(5) during the pendency
of  the   appeal  or  reference  before  the  DFRC,  school  Management  is
at   liberty   to   collect   fee   of   the   previous   academic   year   plus   ten   per
cent   increase   in   such   fee   till   the   final   decision   of   the   DFRC,   as
predicated   in   Section   6(5)   of   the   Act   of   2016.     The   decision   of   the
DFRC   is   amenable   to   appeal   before   the   Revision   Committee
constituted   under   Section   10   of   the   Act   of   2016.     None   of   these
violate the fundamental right of the school Management guaranteed
under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   to   determine   its   own   fee
structure in any manner. 
42. Section   10   deals   with   constitution   of   Revision   Committee.
This   Committee   discharges   the   function   of   an   appellate   authority
where   the   aggrieved   party,   namely,   school   Management   or   the
Parent­Teachers   Association   can   assail   the   decision   of   the   DFRC.
This   is   a   final   adjudicatory   body   created   under   Section   10
consisting   of   official   members   including   two   representatives   of

45
private   schools   nominated   by   the   State   Government   and   two
representatives   of   parents   nominated   by   the   State   Government.
This is again a broad­based independent Committee to consider the
revision preferred against the decision of the DFRC, constituted on
similar   lines.   The  latter  Committee  is  constituted  under  Section 7
of   the   Act   of   2016.     The   observations   made   in   reference   to   the
constitution of the DFRC under Section 7 hitherto would, therefore,
apply with full force to this provision as well.
43. The   procedure   to   be   followed   by   the   Revision   Committee   is
specified in Section 11 of the Act of 2016, which provision makes it
amply   clear   that   the   decision   of   the   Revision   Committee   shall   be
final   and   conclusive   and   shall   be   binding   on   the   parties   for   three
academic   years.     Setting   up   of   an   independent   final   adjudicatory
authority   especially   created   for   considering   the   question   as   to
whether   the   fee   structure   proposed   by   the   school   Management
results   in   profiteering   or   otherwise,   it   does   not   impinge   upon   the
fundamental   right   of   the   school   Management   guaranteed   under
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

46
44. Even the challenge to the validity of Sections 15 and 16 of the
Act of 2016 is devoid of merit.  Section 15 deals with consequences
of   contravention   of   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   or   the   Rules
made thereunder by an individual. Whereas, Section 16 deals with
consequences   of   violation   by   a   management   and   persons
responsible therefor.  It is unfathomable as to how these provisions
can   have   the   propensity   to   violate   the   fundamental   right   of   the
school   Management   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution
especially   when   violation   of   the   mandate   of   certain   compliances
under the Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder has been made
an   offence   and   persons   responsible   for   committing   such   violation
can be proceeded with on that count.
45. The   appellants   having   failed   to   substantiate   the   challenge   to
the validity of the relevant provisions of the Act of 2016, must also
fail with regard to the challenge to Rules 3, 4, 6 to 8 and 11 of the
Rules of 2017.
46. Rule   3   provides   for   a   procedure   for   conducting   meeting   of
Parent­Teachers Association.   The school Management can have no
grievance regarding the procedure for conducting meeting of Parent­

47
Teachers Association of the school concerned much less violating its
fundamental   right   guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution regarding establishment of educational institution and
administration  thereof,   including   determination   of   fee  structure  on
its own.
47. Rule   4   deals   with   duties   and   functions   of   Parent­Teachers
Association, which reads thus:
“ 4.   Duties   and   functions   of   Parent­Teachers
Association.   ­  The   Association   shall   discharge   the   following
duties and perform the following functions, namely:­
(i)   to   get   information   about   Tuition   fees,   Term   fees   and
fees for co­curricular activities as decided by the School
Level Fee Committee;
(ii)   to   observe   completion   of   syllabus   as   per   the
planning;
(iii)   to   assist   school   for   planning   of   other   co­curricular
activities; and
(iv) to assess the needs of co­curricular activities.”
The   above   Rule   enables   the   Parent­Teachers   Association   to   get
information  about   tuition  fees,  term  fees  and  fees for  co­curricular
activities   as   decided   by   the   SLFC;   to   also   observe   completion   of
syllabus as per the planning; to assist school for planning of other
co­curricular   activities;   and   to   assess   the   needs   of   co­curricular
activities.     This   is   an   enabling   provision   bestowing   power   coupled
with duty in the Parent­Teachers Association.  This in no way affect

48
the right of the school Management in the matter  of determination
of   school   fees   by   itself.     The   purpose   of   above   provision   is   to
empower   the   Parent­Teachers  Association   to   get   information   about
tuition   fees,   term   fees   and   fees   for   co­curricular   activities,   to
facilitate it to analyse the claim of the school Management regarding
the fee structure being reasonable or otherwise.  It is on the basis of
that   information,   the   representatives   of   the   Parent­Teachers
Association,   forming   part   of   the   SLFC,   will   be   in   a   position   to
meaningfully   interact   either   to   give   counter   offer   or   agree   with   the
proposal   submitted   by   the   school   Management.     Even   though,   the
Act of 2016 is largely for regulation of fee, the information regarding
the   incidental   aspect   thereof   as   to   whether   co­curricular   activities
proposed   by   the   school   Management   are   necessary   or   not   is
significant.  For, if Parent­Teachers Association is of the view that it
is   unnecessary,   it   can   project   its   perception   in   that   regard   during
the   interaction   to   persuade   the   school   Management   to   avoid   such
co­curricular activities and to reduce the burden of expenses to be
incurred therefor.  That would resultantly reduce the liability of the
parents commensurately due to reduced fee liability.

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48. Rule   6   deals   with   duties   and   functions   of   the   SLFC.     It
specifies the additional duties to be performed by the SLFC besides
the powers and functions specified in the Act of 2016.  Rule 6 reads
thus:
“ 6.   Duties   and   functions   of   School   Level   Fee
Committee.   ­   The   School   Level   Fee   Committee   shall,   in
addition   to   the   powers   and   functions   specified   in   the   Act,
discharge   the   following   duties   and   perform   the   following
functions, namely:­
(a) to oversee the compliance of the provisions of the Act
and rules made their under;
(b)   to   take   decision   on   proposals   received   from
Management, regarding determination of fee within time
specified in sub­section (3) of section 6 of the Act; and
(c)   to   make   available   necessary   documents   to   the
Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   or   Revision
Committee, as the case may be, where appeal is filed by
the Management.”
We   fail  to   understand   as  to   how   Rule  6   would   come   in  the   way   or
infringe   the   fundamental   right   of   the   school   Management
guaranteed   under   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution.     This   Rule
gives additional powers to the SLFC for ensuring compliances of the
provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   made   thereunder
including regarding determination of school fees.
49. Rules   7   and   8   of   the   Rules   of   2017   deal   with   meeting   of   the
SLFC   and   procedure   to   refer   proposal   to   DFRC   and   to   file   appeal

50
and   revision   before   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Committees
respectively.  The same reads thus:
“ 7. Meeting of the School Level Fee Committee.   ­ (1) The
Chairperson of the School Level Fee Committee shall call the
meetings of the School Level Fee Committee. The Secretary of
the  committee  shall issue  notice  of  meeting  to the  members
of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   in   Form­II.   The   notice
shall be issued fifteen days before the date of meeting.
(2)   The   notice   shall   be   sent   to   each   member   of   the   School
Level Fee Committee by registered post or delivered through
any   other   mode.   The   acknowledgement   of   notice   shall   be
preserved for a period of one year.
(3)   No   business   shall   be   transacted   in   the   meeting   of   the
School   Level   Fee   Committee   unless   four   members   are
present   out   of   which   at   least   two   shall   be   the   parent
members   of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee.   If   there   is   no
quorum, the Chairperson of the School Level Fee Committee
shall   adjourn   the   meeting.   The   adjourned   meeting   shall   be
recalled again after the lapse of ten days from the date of the
meeting which is adjourned.
(4)   The   Secretary   of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   shall
prepare minutes of the meeting and circulate the same to all
the   members   within   fifteen   days   from   the   date   of   the
meeting.
(5) The minutes of the meeting shall be made available to the
District   Education   Officer   or   Deputy   Director   concerned,   as
and when required.
(6)   If   a   parent   member   is   absent   for   three   consecutive
meetings,   his   membership   shall   be   deemed   to   be   cancelled
and such vacancy shall be filled in by lottery, from amongst
the   applications   received   for   that   academic   year   under   rule
5.
8.   Procedure   to   refer   proposal   to   Divisional   Fee
Regulatory   Committee   and   to   file   appeal   before
Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee   and   Revision
Committee   under   section   6   of   the   Act.   ­   (1)   The
Management   of   the   school   shall   submit   fee   proposal   to   the
School   Level   Fee   Committee   at   least   six   months   before   the
commencement of the next academic year in Form­III.
(2) If the School Level Fee Committee fails to decide the fees
within   the   period   specified   in  sub­section   (3)   of   section   6   of

51
the Act, the management  shall immediately  refer  the matter
in Form­IV, along­with the proposal submitted to the School
Level   Fee   Committee,   to   the   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee,   within   thirty   days   of   expiry   of   the   period
specified   in   sub­section   (3)   of   section   6   of   the   Act,   for   its
decision.
(3) The management may prefer an appeal in Form­V against
the   decision   of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   within   30
days   from   the   date   of   decision   of   the   School   Level   Fee
Committee.
(4)   The   management   or   School   Level   Fee   Committee
aggrieved   by   the   decision   of   the   Divisional   Fee   Regulatory
Committee   in   appeal   or   reference   may,   within   thirty   days
from the date of such decision, prefer an appeal, in Form­VI,
before   the   Revision   Committee   along   with   the   proposal   of
fees submitted by management and the copy of the decision
of   the   School   Level   Fee   Committee   and   Divisional   Fee
Regulatory Committee.”
These   Rules   deal   with   purely   procedural   matters   and   are   in   line
with   the   powers   and   functions   of   the   concerned   Committees.     The
Rules   provide   for   the   manner   in   which   the   proposal   is   to   be
submitted   by   the   school   Management   and   to   be   taken   forward.
These provisions in no way affect the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution much less autonomy of the
school Management to determine the fee structure itself in the first
place including the administration of the school as such.
50. The   next   challenge   is   to   Rule   11   which   obligates   the   private
schools   to   maintain   accounts   and   other   records   in   the   manner
prescribed thereunder.  The same reads thus:

52
“ 11.   Maintenance   of   accounts   and   other   records. ­   (1)
Every private school shall,­
(a)   maintain   separate   accounts   for   different   kinds   of
transactions,   such   as,   fees   collected,   grants   received,
financial   assistance   received,   payments   of   salary   to   staff,
purchase of machinery and equipment, laboratory apparatus
and   consumables,   library   books,   stationery,   computers,
software and other expenditure incurred;
(b)   keep   the   registers,   accounts   and   records   within   the
premises   of   their   school   as   they   shall   be   made   available   at
all reasonable time for inspection; and
(c)   preserve   the   accounts   maintained,   together   with   all
vouchers   relating   to   various   items   or   receipts   and
expenditure,   until   the   audit   of   accounts   is   over   and
objections, if any, raised are settled.
(2)   Every   private   school   shall,   in   addition   to   accounts   and
records   specified   in   sub­rule   (1),   maintain   the   following,
namely:­
(a) General Register;
(b) Admission Register;
(c) Fee Receipt;
(d) Fee Collection Register;
(e) Cash Book;
(f) Library and Reading Room Account;
(g) Staff Attendance Register and Staff Salary Register;
(h) Students Attendance Register;
(i) Voucher File;
(j) Cheque Register;
(k) Acquaintance Roll;
(1) Stock Registers;
(m) Transfer Certificate Book;
(n) Examination Fees Collection Receipt;
(o) Contingency Expenditure Register;
(p) Asset Register; and
(q) Building Rent Register.
(3) Every private school shall also maintain the other record
of   the   institution   as   per   the   orders   issued   by   the
Government, from time to time.”
In   our   opinion,   even   this   provision   by   no   stretch   of   imagination
would affect the fundamental right of the school Management under
Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   much   less   to   administer   the

53
school.     This   provision,   however,   is   to   ensure   that   a   meaningful
inquiry   can   be   undertaken   by   the   SLFC   or   the   Statutory
Regulatory­cum­Adjudicatory   Authorities   in   determination   of   the
fact   whether   the   fee   structure   propounded   by   the   school
Management   results   in   profiteering   or   otherwise.     If   information   is
furnished in any other manner (other than the manner specified in
Rule   11),   it   would   become   difficult   for   the   concerned
Committees/Authorities   to   answer   the   contentious   issue   regarding
profiteering.     The   fee   structure   determined   by   the   school
Management   can   be   altered   by   the   Adjudicatory   Authorities   only
upon recording a negative finding on the factum of amount claimed
towards   school   fees   relating   to   particular   activities   is   an   essential
expenditure   or   otherwise;   and   that   the   fee   would   be   in   excess   of
reasonable   profit   being   ploughed   back   for   the   development   of   the
institution   or   otherwise.     The   recovery   of   excess   amount   beyond
permissible   limit   would   result   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation.     In   our   opinion,   therefore,   even   Rule   11   is   a
relevant   and   reasonable   provision   and   does   not   impact   or   abridge
the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 

54
51. The   last   assail   was   on   the   argument   that   the   field   regarding
(school)   fee,   in   particular   capitation   fee   is   already   covered   by   the
law enacted by the Parliament being RTE Act and for that reason, it
was not open to the State to enact law on the same subject such as
the impugned Act of 2016.   This argument is completely misplaced
and   tenuous.     For,   the   purpose   for   which   the   RTE   Act   has   been
enacted by the Parliament is qualitatively different.   It is to provide
for free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6 to
14   years,   which   is   markedly   different   from   the   purpose   for   which
the   Act  of  2016  has  been  enacted  by  the  State  legislature.   Merely
because the Central Act refers to the expression “capitation fee” as
defined   in   Section   2(b)   and   also   in   Section   13   of   the   RTE   Act   —
mandating  that  no school  or  person  shall,  while  admitting   a child,
collect any capitation fee, does not mean that the Central Act deals
with   the   mechanism   needed   for   regulating   fee   structure   to   ensure
that   the   schools   do   not   collect   fees   resulting   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation.     By   its   very   definition,   the   capitation   fee   under
the   Central   Act   means   any   kind   of   donation   or   contribution   or
payment   other   than   the   fee   notified   by   the   school.     On   the   other
hand,   fee   to   be   notified   by   the   school   is   to   be   done   under   the

55
impugned   Act   of   2016   after   it   is   so   determined   by   the   school
Management   and   approved   by   the   SLFC   or   by   the   Statutory
Regulatory   Authorities,   as   the   case   may   be.     Suffice   it   to   observe
that  the  field  occupied  by  the  Central  Act  is  entirely  different  than
the   field  occupied  by   the  State   legislation   under  the  impugned   Act
of   2016.     The   impugned   Act   of   2016   deals   specifically   with   the
subject   of   regulating   fee   structure   propounded   by   the   private
unaided school management.   Hence, there is no substance in this
challenge.
52. Taking   overall   view   of   the   matter,   therefore,   we   uphold   the
conclusion   of   the   High   Court   in   rejecting   the   challenge   to   the
validity of the impugned Act of 2016 and Rules framed thereunder.
However, we do so by reading down Sections 4, 7 and 10 of the Act
in   the   manner   indicated   in   paragraphs   28;   37/38   and   42
respectively   of   this   judgment.     These   provisions   as   interpreted   be
given   effect   to,   henceforth,   in   conformity   with   the   law   declared   in
this   judgment.     For   the   reasons   mentioned   hitherto,   we   hold   that
the   High   Court   rightly   concluded   that   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of
2016 as well as the Rules of 2017 are  intra vires  the Constitution of

56
India   and   not   violative   of   Articles   13(2)   and   19(1)(g)   of   the
Constitution.
Re: Second Set:
53. These   appeals   assail   the   common   judgment   and   order   dated
18.12.2020   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature
for   Rajasthan   at   Jaipur   whereby   all   the   connected   cases   involving
challenge   to   the   orders   dated   09.04.2020,   07.07.2020   and
28.10.2020 issued by the State Authorities were disposed of.
54. The   order   dated   09.04.2020   was   issued   by   the   Director,
Secondary Education, in the wake of COVID­19 pandemic, directing
the   private   schools   recognised   by   the   Primary   and   Secondary
Education Departments to defer collection of school fees for a period
of three months.  The said order reads thus:
“OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, SECONDARY EDUCATION,
RAJASTHAN, BIKANER
ORDER
As   per   the  direction   issued  by   Hon’ble   Chief   Minister,   order
is  being  issued  in  regard  to collection  of  fees  by   Elementary
and   Secondary   Education   Department   recognized   non­
government schools, which is as follows:­
1.     No   fee   will   be   charged   by   non­government   schools   from
the   students/guardians   of   the   period   after   15 th
  March,   the

57
applicable   fees   at   present   and   payment   of   advance   fees
which is deferred for 3 months. In case of non deposition of
fees   during   this   period,   name   of   such   student   will   not   be
struck off from the rolls of the school.
2.   In   case   of   continuation   of   the   studies   in   the   non­
government schools, the deferred fees for the present session
2020­21 will be chargeable after deferment period is over. 
3. After completion of the Lock down period, if any student of
non­government   school   wants   his   Transfer   Certificate   for
continuing   studies   in   another   school   then   the   same   can   be
obtained   after   depositing   fees   of   the   previous   session   2019­
20 and obtaining the no­dues certificate. 
(Saurabh Swami)
I.A.S., 
Director, Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner. 
No.­Shivra­Ma/PSP/Sikayat/Vetan/2019­20
dated 09.04.2020”
55. Before expiry of the period noted in the aforementioned order,
the   Director,   Secondary   Education   issued   another   order   on
07.07.2020.  The same reads thus:
“OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, SECONDARY EDUCATION,
RAJASTHAN, BIKANER
ORDER
In  continuation   of  the  Government   letter   No.P.8(3)  Shiksha­
5/COVID­19   Fees   Staghan/2020   dated   01.07.2020,   for
collection   of   fees   by   Elementary   and   Secondary   Education
Department   recognized   non­government   schools,   the
following order is issued:­
1.   The   fee   chargeable   by   non­government   schools   from   the
students/guardians   after   15 th
  March,   the   applicable   fees   at
present   and   payment   of   advance   fee   was   deferred   for   3
months,   as   per   the   direction   of   the   State   Government   the
said  deferment  is  extended  till the  reopening   of  the  schools.
In   case   of   non­deposition   of   fees   during   the   said   period,
name of such student will not be struck off from the rolls of
the school. 

58
2. Remaining all will be as per order No.
(Shivra/Ma/PSP/Sikayat/Vetan/2019­20)   dated
09.04.2020.
(Saurabh Swami)
I.A.S., 
Director, Secondary Education, 
Rajasthan, Bikaner. 
No.­Shivra­Ma/PSP­C/A­2/60566/2019­20
Dated 07.07.2020”
56. The   private   unaided   schools   then   filed   writ   petition(s)   before
the   High   Court   challenging   the   aforesaid   orders   dated   09.04.2020
and 07.07.2020.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court Bench
at   Jaipur   considered   the   prayer   for   interim   relief   and   vide   order
dated   07.09.2020   directed   the   school   Authorities   to   allow   the
students   to   continue   their   studies   online   and   also   to   deposit   only
70 per cent of the tuition fees element from the total fees chargeable
for the period from March 2020 in three instalments.   The relevant
extract   of   the   order   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   dealing   with   the
prayer   for   interim   relief   at   the   instance   of   the   appellants­Schools
reads thus:
“13. I have considered the submissions as above and perusal
the material available on record.
14.   While   there   are   myriad   issues   involved   in   the   present
batch   of   the   writ   petitions,   which   are   required   to   be
examined finally; at this interim  stage, this Court finds that

59
a balance is required to be struck between financial difficulty
of the school management relating to release of the salary of
the staff and minimum upkeep of school on one side and the
financial   pressure,   which   has   come   on   the   parents   due   to
the pandemic and lock­down as noticed above.
15. After noticing the judgments passed by the High Court of
Gujarat   at   Ahmedabad   in   the   case   of   Nareshbhai   Kanubhai
Shah   Versus   State   of   Gujarat   &   2   Others :   R/Writ   Petition
(PIL)   No. 64/2020   and   other   connected   matters   decided   on
31.7.2020,   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   and   Haryana   at
Chandigarh   in   the   case   of   Independent   Schools   Association
Versus   State   of   Punjab   &   Others :   CWP   No. 7409/2020   and
other connected matters decided on 30.6.2020 and the High
Court of Delhi in the case of  Rajat Vats Versus Govt. of Nct of
Delhi   &   Another :   WP   (C)   No.2977/2020   decided   on
20.4.2020,   this   Court   is   of   the   view   that   prima   facie ,
members  of  the petitioner  association cannot   be  deprived  of
receiving  the tuition fees for  the students, who continued to
remain on their rolls.
16.   However,   this   Court   notices   that   total   infrastructure
cost,   which   the   school   may   incur   for   the   regular   studies
during   normal  days,  has  been   definitely   reduced  day   to  day
schools are not opening. It is noticed that the tuition fees is
assessed   on   the   basis   of   the   infrastructure   expenditure
including   staff   salary   and   operation   cost   incurred   by   the
schools   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of   the   Rajasthan   Schools
(Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016, after  following  the procedures
laid down therein.
17.   This   Court   agrees   prima   facie   with   the   counsel   for
intervenors   that   while   the   institutes   had   to   incur   certain
additional expenditure for developing online classes process,
the   same   would   be   less   than   individual   expenditure   being
incurred   by   the  parents  for   providing   infrastructure  to  their
each ward, who is undergoing online classes at home. There
may be also cases where the parents may have two or three
children.   To   each   one   separate   laptop   or   computer   will   be
required   to   provide   as   all   of   them   would   be   undergoing
online   classes   at   the   same   time.   Thus,   comparative   balance
is required to be maintained. 

60
18.   Prima facie , this Court is also of the view that under the
Act   of   2005,   the   authorities   would   have   jurisdiction   to   lay
down policy, guideline and direction, which may be found to
be   suitable   for   the   purpose   of   providing   the   relief   to   the
persons affected by the disaster  as mentioned in Section 22
of   the   Act   of   2005.   The   guidelines   can   be   laid   down   for
mitigation   of   such   loss   to   the   citizens.   The   powers   and
functions   of   the   State   Executive   Committee   under   Section
22(j)   provide   that   the   State   Executive   Committee   shall
ensure   that   non­governmental   organizations   carry   out   their
activities   in   an   equitable   and   non­discriminatory   manner.
The   petitioners   are   all   non­governmental   organizations   and
are   expected   therefore   to   play   their   necessary   role   in
mitigating the sufferance caused to the public at large, while
at   the   same   time   also   protect   their   own   staff   from   facing
financial difficulties. This Court is also conscious of the fact
that   the   State­respondents,   while   passing   the   impugned
orders,   have   not   taken   into   consideration   the   difficulties,
which   the   staff   of   the   concerned   school   would   face   on
account of non­payment of the fees. However, burdening the
parents with complete tuition fees would not  be appropriate
and justified. 
19.   In   view   of   the   above,   this   Court   by   an   interim   measure
and   till   the   situation   gets   normalized,   directs   the   school
authorities   to   allow   the   students   to   continue   their   studies
online   and   allow   them   to   deposit   70%   of   the   tuition   fees
element   from   the   total   fees   being   charged   for   the   year.   The
said 70% of the tuition fees shall be paid for the period from
March, 2020 in three installments to the respective schools.
However,   it   is   made   clear   that   on   non­payment   of   the   said
fees, the student(s) may not be allowed to join online classes,
but   shall   not   be   expelled   from   the   school.   The   three
installments shall be fixed by depositing the first installment
on or before 30.9.2020 while the second installment shall be
paid   by   30.11.2020   and   third   installment   shall   be   paid   by
31.1.2021.   However,   it   is   further   made   clear   that   the
question   regarding   remaining   fees   shall   be   examined   at   the
stage of final disposal of these writ petitions. The orders are
being   passed   as   interim   arrangement   subject   to   final
adjudication of the case.
20. The stay applications are accordingly disposed of.”

61
57. Against   this   decision,   intra­court   cross   appeals   came   to   be
filed.     In   those   appeals,   the   Division   Bench   vide   order   dated
01.10.2020 stayed the operation of the interim order passed by the
learned Single Judge.   The appeals were then heard on 12.10.2020
and reserved for orders.  However, as representations were received
from   several   counsel   that   they   were   unable   to   interact   with   the
court   through   video   conferencing,   the   matters   were   notified   for
further   hearing   on   14.10.2020.     The   Court   then   directed   listing   of
appeals   on   20.10.2020.     However,   before   next   date   of   hearing,   the
State   Government   vide   order   dated   16.10.2020   constituted   a   four­
member Committee to give suggestions to the State Government in
relation   to   recovery   of   fees   from   parents/students   by   Private/Non­
Government   Educational   Institutions   during   the   academic   session
2020­21.     The   High   Court   was   apprised   about   this   development
when the matters were taken up on 23.10.2020 as is noticed from
the said order, which reads thus:
“ Order
23/10/2020
Mr.  Rajesh  Maharshi,  AAG,  submits that   a  committee
has been constituted for determination of fees to be charged
by   the   private   schools   for   the   period   of   lockdown   imposed
due   to  Covid­19   Pandemic.     The  Committee   is  in  process  to
finalize   its   recommendations   and   accordingly   the   affidavit

62
shall   be   filed   on   behalf   of   the   State   Government   on   2 nd
  of
November 2020 positively.
Mr.   Kamlakar   Sharma   learned   Senior   advocate   raised
serious  objection  and  prayed   for   interim   measure  in  view   of
the great hardship being faced by the private schools to run
their institutions.
Considering   the   hardship   of   the   private   schools,   it   is
directed   that   the   State   Government   shall   issue   necessary
directions   by   28.10.2020   positively   regarding   interim   fees
which the private schools shall be allowed to charge subject
to final decision in this regard.
In the meanwhile, necessary affidavit in compliance of
earlier   directions   shall   be   filed   by   the   State   Government   by
02.11.2020 without fail after providing a copy of the same to
all the parties.
List on 03.11.2020”
58. The   appeals   were,   thus,   directed   to   be   notified   on   3.11.2020.
Before   that   date,   however,   the   Director,   Secondary   Education
issued order dated 28.10.2020, which reads thus:
“OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, SECONDARY EDUCATION,
RAJASTHAN, BIKANER
ORDER
The   Hon’ble   High   Court   in   DB   Special   Appeal   No.637/2020
Sunil   Samdria   versus   State   of   Rajasthan   and   other   Special
Appeals   passed   an   order   dated   23.10.2020   directing   the
State Government to take a decision in regard to charging of
school   fees   from   guardians/students   for   academic   session
2020­21   keeping   in   view   COVID   pandemic   and   the
guidelines be issued by 28.10.2020. 
In compliance of the order passed by Hon’ble Rajasthan High
Court,   Jaipur   dated   23.10.2020   and   in   pursuance   to   the
State   Government’s   letter   No.   P.8(3)   Shiksha­5/COVID­19
Fees   Staghan/2020   dated   28.10.2020,   the   guidelines   for
charging   of   school   fees   for   the   academic   session   2020­21
by   non­government   educational   institutions   from
students/guardians,   are   issued   which   are   as   follows:­

63
A   ­   THE   DETAILS   OF   THE   FEES   TO   BE   CHARGED   BY
THE SCHOOLS AFTER REOPENING
1.   After   reopening   of   the   school   only   tuition   fees   will   be
charged from the students. 
2.   The tuition fees will be as per the prescribed syllabus for
teaching. Like CBSE for class 9 th
  to 12 th
  has reduced 30% of
the syllabus and has prescribed 70% of the syllabus,  hence,
the fees to be charged for this session will be 70% of the
tuition fees of last academic session . Similarly, Rajasthan
Board   of   Secondary   Education   for   class   9 th
  to   12 th
  has
reduced 40% of the syllabus and has prescribed 60% of the
syllabus,   hence,   the   fees   to   be   charged   for   this   session
will be 60% of the tuition fees of last academic session . 
3.     Looking   to   the   circumstance   arising   out   of   COVID­19
pandemic, the decision to call the students of Class 1 st
 to 8 th
to school has not been taken, hence whenever the decision is
taken   and   as   per   the   reduction   of   syllabus,   in   the   same
proportion the fees will be charged. 
4.     The   fees   decided   as   per   above   payable   to   the   school   for
which  guardians/student  will be  given  option of payment   of
fees monthly/quarterly. 
5.  The schools will not change the uniform prescribed in the
previous academic session.
6.     The   facilities   not   being   utilized   by   students   like
laboratory,  sports,  library,  curricular  activities, development
fees,   boarding   fees   etc.   no   fees   under   this   head   will   be
charged by schools. 
7.     For   presence   of   the   students   in   the   school,   written
consent of the guardians will be required. 
8.   In case the student  is using conveyance provided by  the
school like Bal Vaihani etc. then the conveyance charges can
be charged but it will not be more than the conveyance fees
charged   during   the   previous   academic   session.   The
conveyance   fees   will   be   in   proportion   to   the   number   of
working days after reopening of the schools. 
9.  The conveyance being provide by the schools for students
will   have   to   follow   the   COVID­19   guidelines   prescribed   by
State   Government   and   any   other   directions   issued   by
Government. 
10.   The   SOP   issued   by   State   Government   will   have   to   be
adhered to by the non­government schools. 

64
B   ­   THE   DETAILS   OF   THE   FEES   TO   BE   CHARGED   BY
THE SCHOOLS BEFORE REOPENING
1.   The   schools   will   determine   the   fees   to   be   charged   from
students  after   reopening  of the school  as  per  the prescribed
syllabus for teaching. 
2.   Before   opening   of   the   schools   the   online   teaching   work
was   for   making   them   acquainted   i.e.   capacity   building   was
the   objective.   Hence,   the   fees   chargeable   will   be   termed   as
capacity building fees. 
3.   The   schools   which   were/which   are   imparting   online
teaching   then   capacity   building   fees   can   be   charged   from
such   students   which   will   be   60%   of   the   tuition   fees.   For
online   teaching,   the   consent   of   the   guardians   will   be
necessary   and   capacity   building   charges   can   be   charged
from consenting students. 
4.   When   the   schools   reopen,   it   will   be   duty   of   schools   to
impart   the   complete   syllabus   as   prescribed   by   the   board   to
the   students   who   did   not   study   in   online   classes   and   the
said   syllabus   will   have   to   be   completed   by   the   schools   the
schools   will   ensure   equality   between   the   online   and   offline
students. 
5.   The   capacity   building   charges   will   be   charge   from   the
guardians in monthly installments. 
6. Till the permission is granted by  Government  for   starting
class/classes   of   students   and   online   teaching   is   imparted
regularly   for   that   period   only   the   capacity   building   fees   will
be charged. 
7. If any student does not subscribe to the online education
being   provided   by   the   school,   no   capacity   building   fees   will
be charged. 
C ­  DETERMINATION OF TUITION FEES
1.   The   fees   determined   by   school   fee   committee   formed   as
per   Rajasthan   Schools   (Regulation   of   Fees)   2016   and   Rules
2017   will   be   the   basis   for   aforesaid   determination   of   fees
which   will   clearly   mention   the   various   fees   i.e.   tuition   fees,
library fee etc. 
2.  The  prescribed  total fees  and  tuition fees  of  last   year   will
not be increased. 
3.   Every   guardian   will   be   provided   of   receipt   of   tuition
fees/capacity building  fees. The said receipt will contain the

65
details   of   the   prescribed   fees   and   the   reduced   fees
necessarily. 
4. The students who are undergoing online classes and want
to   continue   with   online   classes   but   their   guardians   are
unable   to   pay   the   fees,   in   such   cases   a   committee   will   be
formed   at   school   level   which   will   examine   such   cases   and
will   take   a   decision   in   regard   to   the   relaxation   of   fees   to   be
granted looking to the circumstances from case to case. 
5.   The   remaining   fees   for   the   academic   session   2019­20
(remaining till the schools remained open) will be charged in
equal monthly installments. The guardians of such students
will not compelled to pay the fees in single installment. 
6.   No   student   will   be   prevented   from   registration   for   Board
Examination   even   if   he   has   not   attended   the   online   classes
and   has   not   paid   the   fees,   even   the   transfer   certificate   of
such students will not be issued. 
7.   If   any   student   wants   to   take   transfer   certificate   and   has
attended   online   classes   than   capacity   building   fees   as   per
aforesaid provision can be charged. 
8.   For   charging   fees   as   per   aforesaid   the   non­government
schools   will   pay   prescribed   salary   to   the   employees   had
teachers   and   no   retrenchment   will   be   done   due   to
circumstances of COVID­19. 
The   aforesaid   has   been   approved   by   competent   level.   All
concerned ensure the compliance. 
(Saurabh Swami)
I.A.S., 
Director, Secondary Education, 
Rajasthan, Bikaner. 
No.­Shivra­Ma/PSP/C/A­2/60566/2019­20
Dated 28.10.2020”
59. This order  was assailed by  some of the private schools before
the High Court by way of substantive writ petition(s), which, as per
the   High   Court   Rules   was   required   to   proceed   before   the   Single

66
Judge in the first place.   In addition, applications were filed in the
pending   intra­court   appeals   before   the   Division   Bench   seeking
liberty   to   challenge   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the
Director,   Secondary   Education.     As   a   result,   the   Division   Bench
with   the   consent   of   parties   thought   it   appropriate   to   hear   all   the
matters including involving challenge to the order dated 28.10.2020
of the Director, Secondary Education.
60. Accordingly,   the   appeals   and   writ   petitions   were   heard   and
decided   together   by   the   common   judgment   and   order   pronounced
on   18.12.2020,   which   is   impugned   in   the   present   appeals.     The
Division   Bench   vide   impugned   judgment   opined   that   the   State
Government was competent and had jurisdiction to issue directions
as   given   vide   order   dated   28.10.2020   of   the   Director,   Secondary
Education, being a policy decision necessitated due to aftermath of
pandemic   situation.     The   Court   held   that   in   absence   of   any   legal
provision   to   address   the   unprecedented   difficulties   faced   by   the
parents   and   their   wards   across   the   State,   it   was   open   to   issue
administrative   directions   in   exercise   of   power   under   Article   162   of
the   Constitution   and   especially   when   there   was   no   legal   provision
prohibiting   issuance   of   such   directions.     The   Division   Bench   also

67
opined   that   such   order   could   be   issued   even   in   exercise   of   power
under   Section   22   of   the   Disaster   Management   Act,   2005 21
.     The
Division   Bench   rejected   the   argument   of   the   appellants   that   the
stated   order   dated   28.10.2020   does   not   mention   the   source   of
power   under   which   the   same   has   been   issued   by   the   Director,
Secondary   Education   or   that   it   was   vitiated   due   to   lack   of
opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   school   Management(s).     Instead,   the
Court   held   that   even   if   there   is   no   formal   authentication   of   the
order, it would be of no consequence.   For, the direction was given
by the Chief Minister being the administrative and political head of
the   State   Government.     It   was   the   bounden   duty   of   the   State
Government   to   reckon   the   ground   realities   and   strike   a   balance
between   the   interests   of   private   schools   as   well   as   of   the   parents
and   students   and   to   mitigate   the   plight   of   the   citizens   due   to
unprecedented   crisis   post   COVID­19   pandemic.     The   Court   did
advert   to   the   fact   that   the   school   Management   was   obliged   to
honour   its   commitment,   rather   obligation   to   pay   salary   to   its   staff
on  account   of  governing  statutory  provisions  despite  the  pandemic
situation.     Further,   the  State  of   Rajasthan   had  adopted   a  different
21  for short, “the Act of 2005”

68
pattern   of   substantially   reducing   the   school   fees   in   comparison   to
other   States.     Nevertheless,   it   noted   that   it   is   always   open   to   the
school   Management   as   well   as   the   parents   to   approach   the
statutory forum for determination of just fee under the Act of 2016.
The Division Bench finally proceeded to conclude as follows:
“In view of the above discussion, the rest of the petitions are
disposed of as under:­
I.   All   the   private   schools   recognized   by   the   Primary   and
Secondary Education Department shall be entitled to collect
school   fees   from   the  parents   of   their   students   including   the
students   of   pre­primary   classes   in   terms   of   the   order   dated
28.10.2020   issued   by   the   State   Government   subject   to
special determination of fees as being directed hereunder.
II.   All   the   private   schools   are   directed   to   form   necessary
bodies   required   for   special   determination   of   fees   within   15
days,   if   such   bodies   have   not   been   constituted   so   far   in
terms of Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act 2016, and
Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Rules 2017.
III.   In   order   to   safeguard   the   interests   of   the   schools’
management   and   the   parents,   it   is   further   directed   that   all
the private schools recognized by the Primary and Secondary
School   Education   Department   shall   specially   determine   the
school   fees   for   the   period   in  which   schools   remained   closed
due to COVID­19 pandemic and after opening of the schools
in   the   Session   2020­   2021   in   terms   of   the   provisions   of
Section 8 of Rajasthan Schools (Regulation of Fee) Act, 2016
and for   this  purpose all the  schools shall publish necessary
details   including   the   strength   and   salary   paid   to   the   staff
during   the   period   in   which   the   schools   remained   closed   for
such special determination on their notice boards as well as
on   their   websites.   This   special   determination   of   school   fees
shall be completed within two months from the date of order
positively.

69
IV.   With   the   object   to   prevent   any   unfair   practice   of
collection of fees in the process of this special determination
of   fees   the   component   of   tuition   fees   shall   be   specifically
determined and for that purpose, all heads of the school fees
shall   be   bifurcated   as   mandated   under   Section   6(4)   of   the
Act of 2016.
V.   Besides   this,   the   schools’   management   or   the   parents
may take recourse of the provision of appeal/reference before
Divisional   Fee   Regulatory   Committee/Revision   Committee,
as the case may be in case any of them are aggrieved of such
special determination.
Needless   to   say,   that   in   the   process   of   above   special
determination   of   school   fees,   it   will   be   open   for   the   schools’
management   and   the   parents   to   determine   the   fees   in
consonance   with   the   directions   contained   in   order   dated
28.10.2020   or   they   may   increase   or   decrease   the   fees   to   be
collected for the current session.
VI. The interim order dated 07.09.2020 passed by learned
Single Judge stands vacated.”
61. In this backdrop, the management of private unaided schools
in the State of Rajasthan have approached this Court to assail the
impugned   judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   and
also the order  dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary
Education.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   challenge   to   the   orders   issued   by
the   Director,   Secondary   Education   on   09.04.2020   and   07.07.2020
had   worked   out   due   to   efflux   of   time.     For,   by   these   orders   the
school Management was merely directed to defer collection of school
fees   for   specified   period   as   noted   therein;   and   that   period   had
already expired.  Thus, our focus in this judgment will be and ought

70
to be only on the legality and rationality of the order issued by the
Director,   Secondary   Education   on   28.10.2020   and   applicable   to
academic year 2020­21 only, including the basis on which the same
has been upheld by the High Court vide impugned judgment.
62. According   to   the   appellants   (private   unaided   schools),   the
school fee charged from their students was fixed by the SLFC in its
meeting   held   on   28.10.2017,   by   following   procedure   prescribed
under the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.  The same
was   to   remain   in   force   for   the   academic   years   2018­19,   2019­20
and   2020­21.     In   the   present   appeals,   as   aforementioned,   we   are
concerned only with the school fees pertaining to the academic year
2020­21, in light of the impugned order dated 28.10.2020 issued by
the Director, Secondary Education.
63. The   appellants   would   urge   that   being   a   responsive   school
administration   and   also   being   deeply   concerned   with   the
development of wards pursuing education in the concerned schools,
the   school   Management   “on   their   own”   had   decided   to   offer
scholarship of 25 per cent of the annual fee to their students.  That
was to mitigate the difficulties faced by the parents and keeping in

71
mind   that   certain   recurring   expenses   were   not   being   incurred   by
the school Management during  the lockdown period.   Be that as it
may,   in   law,   it   is   not   open   to   the   State   Authorities   to   modify   the
school   fees   once   fixed   by   the   SLFC   for   the   relevant   academic   year
that too in the manner  done by the Director, Secondary  Education
vide order dated 28.10.2020.  The fact that the parties are at liberty
to   challenge   the   modification/reduction   of   school   fees   before   the
statutory   forum   does   not   justify   the   issue   of   such   an   order   —
unless the State Authorities have clear mandate to do so under the
governing   law.     The   departure   made   by   the   Director,   Secondary
Education   vide   order   dated   28.10.2020   was   not   acceptable   to   the
school Management, being   ex facie   illegal.   It does not disclose the
source of power under which it has been issued.  At best, it can rely
on   the   interim   observations   made   by   the   High   Court   in   the
proceedings   pending   at   the   relevant   time.     Those   observations
cannot  confer  power  on  the State Authorities  when  no  such power
exists in the State Government in relation to modification/reduction
of   fee   structure   determined   by   the   school   Management   and
approved   by   the   SLFC.     Moreover,   it   is   well­established   that   there
can   be   no   rigid   uniform   fee   structure   for   all   the   private   unaided

72
schools in the State.  The High Court had erroneously assumed that
the   power   exercised   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   was
ascribable   to   Article   162   of   the   Constitution.     For,   the   subject   of
school   fees   is   fully   covered   and   governed   by   the   provisions   of   the
Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder.     Therefore,   in   the
name   of   policy   decision,   the   impugned   order   dated   28.10.2020
cannot   be   sustained,   which   on   the   face   of   it   is   not   in   conformity
with   the   express   statutory   provisions   governing   the   subject   of
school fees.
64. It   is   urged   that   there   was   no   express   provision   in   the   Act   of
2016   permitting   such   intervention   by   the   State   Authorities   in
respect of school fees already fixed under the Act of 2016.  Reliance
placed on  Section  18  of the  Act  of 2016  was completely   inapposite
as   that   merely   confers   power   upon   the   State   Government   to   issue
directions consistent with the provisions of the Act of 2016 and for
carrying   out   the   purposes   of   that   Act   or   for   giving   effect   to   any   of
the  provisions  of that Act.   Thus, recourse cannot  be  taken by  the
State   Authorities   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of   2016   much   less
Section 18 to justify the impugned order dated 28.10.2020.   In any
case   that   order,   on   the   face   of   it,   is   unreasonable,   arbitrary   and

73
irrational.     For,   Section   8   provides   for   the   parameters   for
determination   of   school   fee   and   admittedly   the   school   fee   had
already   been   fixed   by   the   SLFC   on   28.10.2017   which   was   still   in
force   and   applicable   for   the   academic   year   2020­21   as   well.
Therefore, it was not open to reduce the same much less limit it to
only one parameter of tuition fee amongst other parameters referred
to in Section 8.
65. It   is   urged   that   reliance   placed   on   Section   18   of   the   Act   of
2016 is completely ill­advised.  There is no mechanism in the Act of
2016 to review or reduce the school fees once approved by the SLFC
or   determined   by   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Authorities.     On   the
other   hand,   as   per   Section   6(3)   such   school   fee   is   binding   on   all
concerned for three academic years, which in the present case was
to   remain   in   force   until   the   academic   year   2020­21.     Further,   the
reduction   of   school   fees   has   been   erroneously   linked   to   the
instructions issued by the concerned Board.  In fact, the Board had
issued   directives   to   complete   the   course   including   through   online
training/teaching.     Moreover,   there   is   no   concept   of   “capacity
building   fee”   under   the   Act   of   2016.     The   expression   “capacity
building” obviously has been borrowed from the legislation such as

74
the   Act   of   2005.     In   any   case,   it   is   necessary   to   make   factual
enquiry   school   wise   as   to   whether   the   concerned   school   had
completed   the   entire   syllabus   for   the   relevant   academic   year;   and
also,  whether   the liability  of  the  school  towards  teaching  and  non­
teaching   staff   and   their   administrative   and   infrastructure
(recurring)   expenses,   had   been   discharged   by   the   school
Management.
66. It is then urged that the High Court committed manifest error
in   upholding   the   impugned   order   dated   28.10.2020   as   being
ascribable   to   exercise   of   power   under   the   Act   of   2005.     For,   the
stated   Act   provides   express   mechanism   as   to   when   and   by   whom
the   power   to   issue   directions   can   be   exercised.     The   Director,
Secondary Education has no such power under the Act of 2005 nor
the State Government could do so thereunder much less to reduce
the   school   fees   fixed   after   approval   of   the   SLFC   in   terms   of   the
mechanism stipulated under the Act of 2016.  The provisions of the
Act   of   2005   are   limited   to   providing   effective   management   of
disasters and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

75
67. The   manner   and   method   of   addressing   such   disaster   and   in
particular   “disaster   management”   as   defined   in   Section   2(e)   of   the
Act of 2005 is by preparation of a plan for disaster management by
the authority concerned under that Act.  A National Plan, State Plan
or   District   Plan   is   required   to   be   prepared   under   the   Act   of   2005.
That   is   in   respect   of   prevention   of   disasters   or   mitigation   of   their
effects.     It   is   the   direct   effect   of   disaster   that   is   required   to   be
mitigated   and   not   indirect   hardship   caused   to   individuals   much
less in respect of contractual matters.  The plan must advert to the
measures to be taken for the integration of mitigation measures in
the   development   plans   and   the   measures   to   be   taken   for
preparedness   and   capacity   building   to   effectively   respond   to   any
threatening   disaster   situations   or   disaster   including   the   roles   and
responsibilities   of   different   Ministries   or   Departments   of   the
Government   of   India.     In   any   case,   the   action   is   to   be   initiated   by
the   State   Authorities,   established   under   the   Act   of   2005,   namely,
the   Disaster   Management   Authority   at   the   concerned   level.     In  the
scheme   of   the   Act   of   2005,   there   is   nothing   to   indicate   that   the
Authorities   can   interfere   with   contractual   matters   or   indirect
hardships — such as inability of parents to pay school fees due to

76
pandemic situation.  The Director, Secondary Education, in no way,
is   concerned   with   the   preparation   of   a   disaster   plan   or   its
enforcement   and   implementation   under   the   Act   of   2005.     As   a
result,   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   cannot   be   sustained   with
reference to the provisions of the Act of 2005.   The provision in the
form of Section 72 of the Act of 2005 is also of no avail because the
same   is   in   reference   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   which,   as
aforesaid, in no way apply to the subject of fixation and collection of
school   fees.     That   subject   is   exclusively   governed   under   the   Act   of
2016.
68. Even   the   invocation   of   provisions   of   the   Rajasthan   Epidemic
Diseases   Act,   2020 22
  by   the   State   to   justify   the   stated   order   has
been  stoutly  refuted  by   the  appellants.    The powers  required  to  be
exercised   by   the   State   Government   under   the   Act   of   2020   are
delineated in Section 4 of the Act of 2020.  None of these measures
(referred   to   in   Section   4)   concern   the   subject   of   determination   of
school   fees   much   less   reduction   of   school   fees   once   it   is   approved
by the SLFC  and is in force for the concerned academic year.   The
general   provision   in   Section   4(2)(g)   permitting   the   Government   to
22  f or short, “the Act of 2020”

77
regulate   or   restrict   the   functioning   of   offices,   Government   and
private   and   educational   institutions   in   the   State,   would   not   give
authority to the State Government to decide about the fee structure
of the concerned unaided private school.   The regulation can be in
regard to the timings when the school should be opened and closed
and   the   protocol   to   be   followed   by   the   school   during   the   working
hours,   as   the   case   may   be.     That   provision   does   not   empower   the
State   Government   to   reduce   the   school   fees   which   is   approved   by
the SLFC and is in force for the concerned academic year.
69. According   to   the   appellants   neither   the   order   dated
28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   can   be
sustained   in   law  nor   the   reasons  weighed  with   the   Division   Bench
of   the   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   to   uphold   the   same
can stand the test of judicial scrutiny.
70. Learned   counsel   for   the   minority   private   unaided   school
additionally   contended   that   the   order   issued   by   the   Director,
Secondary   Education   violates   the   fundamental   rights   guaranteed
under   Article   19(1)(g)   as   well   as   Article   30(1)   of   the   Constitution.
That   the   right   to   fix   the   school   fees   is   a   fundamental   right   under

78
Articles   19(1)(g)   and   30   of   the   Constitution   which   cannot   be
regulated   by   the   State   except   for   preventing   profiteering   and
capitation fee.   To buttress his submission, reliance was placed on
the   dictum   in   T.M.A.   Pai   Foundation 23
  (supra),   P.A.   Inamdar 24
(supra) and  Modern School 25
  (supra).  He would submit that in the
case   of   minorities,   the   State   regulation   on   minority   right   has   to
satisfy a dual test — the test of reasonableness and the test that it
is   regulative   of   the   educational   character   of   the   institution   and   is
conducive   to   make   the   institution   an   effective   vehicle   of   education
for   the   minority   community   and   for   other   persons   to   resort   to   it.
Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision dated 20.05.2020
of   the   Delhi   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Ramjas   School   vs.
Directorate   of   Education 26
  wherein   the   High   Court   noted   that   in
the case of unaided educational institutions, availability of surplus
is   no   ground   to   disapprove   the   fee   hike.     Absent   any   charging   of
capitation   fee/profiteering,   the   State   Authorities   cannot   reject   the
fee proposal of the school Management and that the quantum of fee
to   be   charged   is   an   element   of   administrative   functioning   of   the
23  p aras 29­38, 45, 53­57, 61 and 122
24  p aras 91­94, 104, 107 and 139­141
25  p aras 16 and 17
26   Writ Petition (C) No.9688 of 2018 ( paras 66, 78, 88 and 91)

79
school,   over   which   the   autonomy   of   the   unaided   educational
institution cannot be compromised.  He has also placed reliance on
the decision of the Delhi High Court in  Naresh Kumar vs. Director
of Education, Delhi 27
 decided on 24.04.2020.  He then invited our
attention   to   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Pramati   Educational
and   Cultural   Trust   (Registered)   &   Ors.   vs.   Union   of   India   &
Ors. 28
  wherein the Constitution Bench opined that the RTE Act will
not   apply   to   minority   educational   institutions.     Whereas,   non­
minority   institutions   are   bound   by   the   RTE   Act   to   provide   25   per
cent   admission   to   economically   weaker   sections   of   the   society   and
to   get   reimbursement   from   the   Government   towards   unit   cost.     In
substance,   he   has   iterated   the   argument   that   the   school
Management(s) of private unaided schools has a right to fix their fee
structure and to collect school fees as approved by the SLFC or the
Statutory Regulatory Authority.
71. Per   contra,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State   and
representing   the   parents   submit   that   due   to   extraordinary   and
unprecedented situation arisen due to complete lockdown for  such
27   Writ Petition (C) No.2993 of 2020 ( p aras 18 to 21)
28  ( 2014) 8 SCC 1 (paras 53 to 55)

80
a   long   period,   the   parents   are   not   in   a   position   to   pay   the   fixed
school   fees.   It   is   only   because   of   large   number   of   representations
made  by   them, the  State  Government  responded by   issuing  orders
on   09.04.2020   and   later   on   07.07.2020   to   defer   the   payment   of
school   fees   and   finally   to   reduce   the   school   fees   in   terms   of   order
dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education.
The dispensation provided in the order dated 28.10.2020 is merely
to   take   mitigating   measures   and   to   assuage   the   concerns   of   the
parents   who   were   in   dire   need   of   such   assistance.     The   measures
taken   by   the   State   Government   in   terms   of   Sections   38   and   39   of
the   Act   of   2005,   cast   onerous   responsibility   upon   the   Government
to   take   all   measures   for   mitigation   and   capacity   building   in   the
wake   of   a   pandemic.     These   provisions   must   be   given   widest
meaning   as   narrow   construction   would   result   in   curtailing   the
powers   of   a   welfare   State   to   undertake   measures   for   dealing   with
the   unprecedented   situation.     The   spirit   of   the   provisions   must   be
kept   in   mind   and   the   court   must   uphold   the   validity   of   the
impugned   order   which   has   been   issued   in   larger   public   interest.
Reliance has been placed on the dictum of this Court in the   State

81
of   M.P.   &   Ors.   vs.   Nandlal   Jaiswal   &   Ors. 29
and   Pathan
Mohammed   Suleman   Rehmatkhan   vs.   State   of   Gujarat   &
Ors. 30
, to buttress this submission.
72. According   to   the   respondents,   Section   72   of   the   Act   of   2005
gives   an   overriding   effect   over   all   other   laws   and,   therefore,   the
power   of   the   State   Government   exercised   in   terms   of   Sections   38
and   39   in   respect   of   measures   articulated   therein,   need   not   be
constricted keeping in mind the language of the said provisions.  In
other words, all that is required to be done by the State to assuage
the   concerns   of   the   society   and   citizenry   related   to   the   situation
arisen   from   the   lockdown   due   to   pandemic,   is   permissible   within
the meaning of the said provisions.
73. It is urged that mere omission to mention the source of power
will   not   invalidate   the   exercise  of   power   itself  as  long   as  there  is   a
valid   source   to   that   exercise   of   power   as   noted   by   this   Court   in
High   Court   of   Gujarat   &   Anr.   vs.   Gujarat   Kishan   Mazdoor
29   (1986) 4 SCC 566 (para 34)
30   (2014) 4 SCC 156 (para 10)

82
Panchayat & Ors. 31
,   M.T. Khan & Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors . 32
and  N. Mani vs. Sangeetha Theatre & Ors. 33
.
74. It   is   then   urged   that   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   was
necessitated   and   was   in   furtherance   of   the   observations   made   by
the   Division   Bench   vide   order   dated   23.10.2020.     That   was,
obviously, to fulfil the  parens patriae  obligations of the court as well
as of the State.   It is urged that the State has a legitimate interest
under its  parens patriae  powers in providing care   to its citizens and
since   the   direction   issued   is   to   fulfil   that   obligation   which   was
necessitated   because   of   the   unprecedented   situation   coupled   with
the fact that even the High Court had expressed a benign hope that
the   State   Government   ought   to   find   out   some   arrangement,   it
became   necessary   to   issue   direction   vide   order   dated   28.10.2020.
Such   power   could   be   exercised   even   as   a   policy   matter   and   the
State   Government   is   competent   to   do   so   under   Article   162   of   the
Constitution.
75. It   is   also   urged   that   the   direction   given   by   the   Director,
Secondary   Education   vide   order   dated  28.10.2020  could   be   issued
31   (2003) 4 SCC 712 (para 53)
32   (2004) 2 SCC 267 (para 16)
33   (2004) 12 SCC 278 (para 9)

83
by   the   State   in   exercise   of   power   under   Section   18   of   the   Act   of
2016 and hence, no fault can be found with the State Government
having exercised that power.
76. It   is   urged   on   behalf   of   State   that   the   issue   in   the   present
appeals   is   limited   to   the   justness   of   the   order   dated   28.10.2020
and, therefore,   the direction given to the State in the interim order
passed by  this Court on  08.02.2021 to ensure that all government
outstanding   dues   towards   unit   cost   payable   to   respective   unaided
school are settled within one month from the date of the order, was
inapposite and needs to be recalled.  It is urged that computation of
the   unit   cost   is   complex   and   assessment   thereof   is   a   time­
consuming process.
77. Learned   counsel   for   the   State   in   his   written   submission   has
finally suggested to modulate the relief to be given in these appeals
in the following words:
“ 5. Re: Modulation of the relief in the present matter
 The   initial   notification   issued   by   the   State   Government
on   09.04.2020   and   07.07.2020   have   outlived   its   utility
and worked itself out.  The Constitutional Courts do not
pronounce   upon   any   academic   matter.     The   validity   of
the   Circular   dated   09.04.2020   and   07.07.2020   have
become academic in wake of subsequent events.

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 The   order   dated   28.10.2020   can   also   become   passed   if
following relief, with utmost humility, is granted:
(a)   The management  of each school shall propose the
fee   structure   in   terms   of   Section   6(1)   and   place   it
before the school­level committee within a period of 15
days from   the  date  of judgment  of this Hon’ble Court.
This   shall   be   exclusively   for   Covid   Year   (2020­2021)
irrespective of earlier determination of fees.
(b)     The   management   shall   take   into   account   the
special circumstances of the COVID and curtailment of
expenses   during   COVID   along   with   the   factors
mentioned   in   Section   8   of   the   Act   of   2016.     The
management   shall   be   reasonable   and   explain
expenditure   under   each   head   as   enjoined   by   the
statute.   Section 6(4) read in conjunction with Section
8 of the Act.
(c)   The school­level fee committee will approve the fee
within a period of 30 days.
(d)  There shall be compulsory fixation of fee for COVID
year   2020­21   separately   (alone)   for   each   school   in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2016.
(e)  The fixation of fee for 2021­22 can, thereafter, take
place   normally   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of
the Act of 2016.
 Thus,   the   final   school   fee   shall   come   into   existence   for
the COVID year 2020­21 within a period of 45 days from
the date of judgment of this Hon’ble Court and the order
of   28.10.2020   interim   order   passed   by   this   Hon’ble
Court shall subsume in the same.”
78. According to Ms. Pragya Baghel, learned counsel representing
the   parents,   the   State   Government   had   not   followed   proper
procedure   for   determination   of   70   per   cent   of   the   tuition   fees   and
that   decision   is   not   backed   by   any   tangible   material   on   record.
Moreover,   the   impugned   decision   was   taken   without   giving
opportunity   to   the   stakeholders,   in   particular   the   parents’
association.     For   which   reason,   such   a   decision   should   not   be

85
allowed   to   be   taken   forward   by   the   State   Government.     It   is   then
urged that the action taken under the Act of 2005 was obviously in
larger   public   interest   and   being   a   policy   decision   would   not   be
amenable   to   judicial   review.     In   any   case,   the   appropriate   course
would   be   to   relegate   the   parties   before   a   special   Committee
comprising   of   a   retired   Judge   of   the   High   Court,   one   Chartered
Accountant   and   retired   Teachers/Officers   nominated   by   the
Director   of   Public   Education   Board,   who   can   take   an   appropriate
decision after hearing all the stakeholders.
79. A written submission has also been filed on behalf of parents
(by   Mr.   Sushil   Sharma   and   others)   contending   that   online   classes
are   not   a   recognised   form   of   education   and   that   is   being   done   by
the   private   schools   on   their   own   without   any   defined   syllabus   by
the   Board.     No   planning   or   infrastructure   required   for   online
education   is   in   place.     No   permission   has   been   obtained   by   the
private   schools   to   conduct   online   classes   from   the   concerned
Boards   nor   any   feedback   is   taken   from   the   parents   about   the
efficacy   of   the   online   teaching.     It   is   urged   that   there   is   no
uniformity   in   the   teaching   methodology   or   any   standard   operating
procedure   or   protocol   prescribed   by   the   concerned   Boards   to   be

86
followed   by   the   private   schools.     The   focus   is   essentially   on   the
disadvantage of online classes conducted by the private schools.  It
is   also   urged   in   the   written   submission   that   the   recommendation
made by the State Government and recognition of online classes as
capacity building classes are inappropriate.   At the end, it is urged
that   this   Court   ought   to   direct   waiver   of   complete   fees   for   the
duration   schools   were   closed   and   direct   the   State   to   prescribe   a
fixed fee for online classes to a standard uniform charge on par with
NOIS across schools   and to declare exams taken by the schools so
far   as   invalid   in   law   and   to   issue   such   other   direction   as   may   be
necessary.
80. Another   written   submission   filed   for   the   intervener   ­
Mr.   Charanpal   Singh   Bagri,   claiming   to   be   parent   in   a   private
school   in   the   State   of   Punjab.     He   has   raised   several   issues
including   the   questions   pertaining   to   the   matters   concerning   the
schools in the State of Punjab which are  sub judice.   In our opinion,
it   is   not   necessary   to   dilate   on   this   written   submission   as   the
present   appeals   pertain   to   the   issues   concerning   the   private
unaided   schools   in   the   State   of   Rajasthan   governed   by   the   Act   of

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2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder.     It   will   be   open   to   the
intervener to pursue all the points raised in the written submission
in   the   proceedings   pending   in   the   High   Court   or   this   Court
concerning the private schools in the State of Punjab.   We may not
be understood to have expressed any opinion in that regard.
81. We   also   have   the   benefit   of   written   submission   filed   by   Mr.
Sunil   Samdaria,   appearing   in­person   who   has   essentially
commended us to uphold the impugned judgment and order dated
18.12.2020   of   the   High   Court   of   Rajasthan   and   seeking   directions
to   further   reduce   the   school   fees   below   the   percentage  specified   in
the   order   dated   28.10.2020   and   as   upheld   by   the   High   Court.     In
fact, he has gone to the extent of suggesting that no fee should be
charged   for   the   period   the   schools   have   remained   closed   in   the
academic   session   2020­21   as   that   would   result   in   profiteering   by
the school Management.   According to this respondent, the schools
have   saved   colossal   amount   of   money   towards   electricity   charges,
water charges, stationary charges and other miscellaneous charges
which   are   required   for   physical   running   of   the   school   and   which
may not be collected by the school for the relevant period.

88
82. When the hearing of these appeals was in progress considering
the   urgency   involved,   we   thought   it   appropriate   to   pass   interim
directions   which   were   intended   to   address   the   concerns   of   all
parties   in   some   measure.     That   order   was   passed   on   08.02.2021,
which reads thus:
“SLP (C) No(s). 619/2021
De­linked.
List the matter on 15th February, 2021.
SLP   (C)   Nos.27907­27916/2019,   SLP   (C)   No.   27987/2019
SLP   (C)   No.   27881/2019,   SLP   (C)   No.   2942/2020,   SLP   (C)
No.   5902/2020,   Diary   No.   6803/2020,   SLP   (C)   No.
5470/2020,   SLP   (C)   No.   5589/2020,   SLP   (C)   No.   431/2021
Diary   No(s).   44/2021   (XV),   SLP   (C)   No.   577­579/2021   and
SLP (C) No(s). 619/2021
Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 3533 of 2021 is taken
up along with these matters, at the request of the petitioners
therein.
The   hearing   of   these   cases   has   been   commenced   and   is
part   heard.   But,   since   the   hearing   is   likely   to   take   some
more time, we deem it appropriate to pass interim directions
which   will   address   the   concerns   of   all   parties   in   some
measure.
We   propose   to   stay   the   impugned   order   on   the   following
conditions:
(a)   The   management/school   may   collect   fees   for   the
academic year 2019­2020 as well as 2020­2021 from the
students,   equivalent   to   fees   amount   notified   for   the
academic   year   2019­2020,   in   six   monthly   installments
commencing   from   5th   March,   2021   and   ending   on   5th
August, 2021.
(b)   The   Management   shall   not   debar   any   student   from
attending   either   online   classes   or   physical   classes   on
account of non­payment of fees, arrears/outstanding fees
including   the   installments,   referred   to   above,   and   shall
not   withhold   the   results   of   the   examinations   of   any
student on that account.

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(c)   Where   the   parents   have   difficulty   in   remitting   the   fee
in   terms   of   this   interim   order,   it   will   be   open   to   those
parents   to   approach   the   school   concerned   by   an
individual   representation   and   the   management   of   the
school will consider such representation on a case­to­case
basis sympathetically.
(d) The above arrangement will not affect collection of fees
for   the   academic   year   2021­2022,   which   would   be
payable by the students as and when it becomes due and
payable, and as notified by the management/school.
(e)   In   respect   of   the   ensuing   Board   examinations   for
classes   X   and   XII   (to   be   conducted   in   2021)   the   school
management   shall   not   withhold   the   name   of   any
student/candidate   on   the   ground   of   non­payment   of   the
fee/arrears,   if   any,   on   obtaining   undertaking   of   the
concerned parent/student.
(f)   The   above   arrangements   would   be   subject   to   the
outcome of these matters including the final directions to
be given to the parties and without prejudice to the rights
and contentions of the parties in these proceedings.
(g) We also direct the State of Rajasthan to ensure that all
government   outstanding   dues   towards   unit   cost   payable
to   respective   unaided   schools   are   settled   within   one
month   from   the   today   and,   in   any   case,   before   31st
March, 2021.
Ordered accordingly.
Heard in part.
Hearing   of   the   aforesaid   cases,   shall   continue   on   15th
February, 2021.”
83. Learned   counsel   appearing  for   the   appellants  had   stated  that
if   the   Court   were   to   make   this   interim   arrangement   absolute,   the
appellants   would   be   satisfied   with   such   a   direction.     However,   as
aforesaid, the  respondents, namely,  the  State  Government  and  the

90
parents have a  different  perception  and  have  addressed  us fully   to
oppose grant of any relief to the appellants.
84. We   have   heard   Mr.   Pallav   Shishodia,   Mr.   Shyam   Divan,
learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Puneet   Jain   and   Mr.   Romy   Chacko,
learned   counsel   for   the   appellants,   Dr.   Manish   Singhvi   and   Mr.
Devadatt  Kamat,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the   State  of  Rajasthan
and Mr. Sunil Samdaria, in­person.
85. At the outset, in this judgment we consciously opt to limit our
analysis   to   the   challenge/grounds   concerning   the   legality   and
justness   of   the   order   dated   28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,
Secondary   Education   concerning   private   unaided   schools   in   the
State of Rajasthan and as applicable to the academic year 2020­21
only.  We do not wish to advert to or analyse any other issue raised
by the parties and we may not be understood to have expressed any
opinion either way in that regard.
86. Undeniably,   an   unprecedented   situation   has   had   evolved   on
account   of   complete   lockdown   due   to   pandemic.     It   had   serious
effect   on   the   individuals,   entrepreneurs,   industries   and   the   nation
as   a   whole   including   in   the   matter   of   economy   and   purchasing

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capacity   of   one   and   all.     A   large   number   of   people   have   lost   their
jobs   and   livelihood   as   aftermath   of   such   economic   upheaval.     The
parents   who   were   under   severe   stress   and   even   unable   to   manage
their   day­to­day   affairs   and   the   basic   need   of   their   family   made
fervent   representation   to   the   school   Management(s)   across   the
State.     A   public   discourse   in   that   regard   surfaced   in   the   media
which impelled the political dispensation to intervene.  Thus, on the
directions   of   the   Chief   Minister   of   the   State   of   Rajasthan,   the
Department initially issued order dated 09.04.2020 merely to defer
the   collection   of   school   fees   which   restriction   was   extended   by
subsequent order dated 07.07.2020.
87. The matter had reached the High Court and by way of interim
arrangement, learned Single Judge of the High Court issued certain
directions against which the parties approached the Division Bench
of   the   High   Court   by   way   of   intra­court   appeals.     During   the
pendency of intra­court appeals in deference to the observations of
the   court,   the   State   Authority   proceeded   to   issue   further   order   on
28.10.2020,   which,   essentially   is   the   subject   matter   of   assail   in
these appeals.

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88. The  State  cannot  be  heard  to   rest  its  argument  to  defend  the
impugned order dated 28.10.2020 as having been issued in light of
benign hope expressed by the High Court.  It could do so only if the
law   permitted  the   State   Government  to   intervene   on   the  subject  of
school fees of private unaided schools (minority or non­minority, as
the   case   may   be).     Resultantly,   what   we   need   to   examine   in   these
appeals  is whether   order   dated 28.10.2020  issued  by  the  Director,
Secondary Education can be sustained in law.
89. Although the stated order makes no reference to the source of
power   under   which   it   had   been   issued,   four   different   perspectives
have been invoked by the State to justify the exercise of that power.
First, it is competent  to do so under  Section 18 of  the Act of 2016
itself.     Second,   being   a   policy   decision,   it   could   issue   an   executive
direction   to   mitigate   the   concerns   of   the   parents   in   exercise   of
power under Article 162 of the Constitution.  Third, such power can
be exercised by the State Government for mitigating the concerns of
the parents and for capacity building of the stakeholders as one of
the   measures   under   the   Act   of   2005.     Lastly,  such   direction  could

93
be   issued   also   in   exercise   of   power   under   the   Act   of   2020   by   the
State Authorities.
90. We   now   proceed   to   test   the   correctness  of   the   pleas   taken  by
the State Government  in seriatim .
91. The source of power derived from Section 18 of the Act of 2016
is a flimsy argument.  Section 18 of the Act of 2016 reads thus:
“ 18.   Power   to   issue   directions.   ­   The   State   Government
may   issue   to   any   school   such   general   or   special   directions
consistent with the provision of this Act and the rules made
thereunder   as   in   its   opinion   are   necessary   or   expedient   for
carrying   out   the   purposes   of   this   Act   or   for   giving   effect   to
any   of   the   provisions   contained   therein   or   in   any   rules   or
orders   made   thereunder   and   the   management   of   the   school
shall comply with every such direction.”
This provision does bestow power on the State Government to issue
general   or   special   directions   to   any   school   within   the   State.
However,   such   direction   must   be   consistent   with   the   provisions   of
the Act of 2016 and the Rules framed thereunder.   It cannot be in
conflict   with   the   mandate   of   the   Act   and   the   Rules.     Additionally,
such directions must be necessitated due to expediency for carrying
out   the   purposes   of   the   Act   and   the   Rules   or   to   give   effect   to   the
applicable   provisions.     If   the   direction   issued   by   the   State
Government  does not  qualify   these parameters,  it must follow that

94
the   same   has   been   issued   in   excess   of   power   bestowed   under
Section 18 of the Act of 2016.
92. After   analysing   the   scheme   of   the   Act   of   2016,   at   least   two
aspects   are   amply   clear.     The   first   is   that   a   firm   mechanism   has
been specified under the Act of 2016 regarding determination of fee
structure   in   the   form   of   approval   by   the   SLFC   and,   if   required,
adjudication by the DFRC and the Revision Committee.  There is no
express   provision   in   the   Act   or   Rules   authorising   the   stated
functionaries/authorities to modify the school fees once finalised in
the   manner   provided   by   the   Act   of   2016.     Whereas,   the   explicit
mandate   in   the   Act   of   2016   is   that,   the   fees   so   fixed   by   the
concerned   functionaries/authorities   shall   be   binding   on   all
concerned for three academic years.  This is a clear indication of not
altering the school fees unilaterally after it is fixed under the Act of
2016   in any manner for the   specified period.   If we may say so, it
is   in   the   nature   of   prohibition   or   a   mandate   to   continue   the   same
fee   structure   for   at   least   three   academic   years,   after   it   is   fixed   by
the   concerned   authority   under   the   Act.     By   its   very   nature,   the
direction   given   by   the   State   Government   is   in   conflict   with   the
scheme   of   finalisation   of   fee   structure   under   the   Act   of   2016   and

95
also   the   binding   effect   thereof   for   the   specified   period   of   three
academic   years   on   all   concerned.     Thus   understood,   the   direction
issued   by   the   State   Government   in   the   form   of   order   dated
28.10.2020 does not satisfy the twin tests of being consistent with
the provisions of the Act; and also being necessary or expedient for
carrying out the purposes of the Act, as the case may be.  
93. Suffice it to observe that the order dated 28.10.2020 being  in
the   nature   of   direction,   has   been   issued   in   breach   of   the   pre­
conditions specified in Section 18 of the Act of 2016.  As a matter of
law,   the   State   Government   had   no   power,   whatsoever,   to   interdict
the   fee   structure   much   less   which   has   been   finalised   and   fixed   by
the concerned functionaries/authorities under the Act of 2016 itself
before   expiry   of   the   statutory   period   as   specified.     As   a   result,
Section 18 of the Act of 2016 will be of no avail to the respondents,
in   particular   the   State   Government   to   justify   the   order   dated
28.10.2020.
94. A   fortiori,   even   the   argument   of   the   respondents   relying   upon
the   existence   of   executive   power   under   Article   162   of   the
Constitution,   ought   to   fail.     It   is   well­established   position   that   the

96
executive   power   of   a   State   under   Article   162   of   the   Constitution
extends to the matters upon which the legislature of the State has
competency   to   legislate   and   is   not   confined   to   matters   over   which
legislation has already been passed.   It is also well­settled that the
State   Government   cannot   go   against   the   provisions   of   the
Constitution   or   any   law.     The   subject   of   determination   of   fee
structure   and   whether   it   entails   in   profiteering,   is   already   covered
by   the   legislation   in   the   form   of   the   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules
framed   thereunder.     It   is   not   as   if   there   is   no   enactment   covering
that   subject   or   any   incidental   aspects   thereof.     The   Act   of   2016,
which in itself is a self­contained code on the said subject, not only
provides   for   the   manner   in   which   the   concerned   school   ought   to
finalise  its  fee structure, but  also   declares that  the  fee  so  finalised
either by consensus or through adjudication mode shall be binding
on all concerned for a period of three academic years.   In any case,
determination   of   fees   including   reduction   thereof   is   the   exclusive
prerogative of the management of the private  unaided school.   The
State   can   provide   independent   mechanism   only   to   regulate   that
decision   of   the   school   Management   to   the   extent   that   it   does   not
result in profiteering and commercialisation.

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95. Viewed   thus,   reliance   placed   on   Union   of   India   vs.
Moolchand Kharaiti Ram Trust 34
  will be of no avail.  In that case,
the   hospitals   were   obligated   to   render   free   treatment   in   lieu   of
allotment of government land to them for earning no profit and held
in   trust   for   public   good.     The   Court   opined   that   there   was   no
necessity   of   enacting   a   law   and   the   policy   formulated   by   the   State
Government in that regard cannot be disregarded.
96. In   the   present   case,   we   need   not   dilate   on   the   factum   as   to
whether the Director, Secondary Education could have issued such
a policy document in exercise of executive power under Article 162
of   the   Constitution,   which   power   exclusively   vests   in   the   State
Government   alone.     The   fact   remains   that   the   direction   issued   in
terms of impugned order dated 28.10.2020, on the face of it, collide
with  the  dispensation   specified in   the  Act  of  2016  in  the   matter  of
determination of school fees and its binding effect on all concerned
for   a   period   of   three   academic   years,   without   any   exception.     The
fact   that   in   the   proceedings   before   the   High   Court   the   State
Government   had   ratified   the   impugned   order,   does   not   take   the
matter   any   further.     In   that,   there   can   be   no   ex   post   facto
34   (2018) 8 SCC 321 (paras 90 and 91)

98
ratification   by   the   State   Government   in   respect   of   subject,   on
which, it itself could not issue such direction in law.
97. Even   the   exposition   in   Rai   Sahib   Ram   Jawaya   Kapur   &
Ors. vs. State of Punjab 35
  and   Secretary, A.P.D. Jain Pathshala
&   Ors.   vs.   Shivaji   Bhagwat   More   &   Ors. 36
  will   not   come   to   the
aid of the respondents for the same reasons.   Notably, not only the
subject   of   finalisation   of   fee   structure   and   the   matters   incidental
thereto have been codified in the form of the Act of 2016, but also a
law has been enacted to deal with the matters during the pandemic
situation   in   the   form   of   Central   Act,   namely,   the   Act   of   2005
including   the   State   legislation   i.e.,   the   Act   of   2020.     In   fact,   the
State legislation deals with the subject of epidemic diseases and its
management.  Even those enactments do not vest any power in the
State   Government   to   issue   direction   with   regard   to   commercial   or
economic aspects of matters between private parties with which the
State has no direct causal connection, which we shall examine later
at   the   appropriate   place.     In   other   words,   the   power   of   the   State
Government   to   deal   with   matters   during   the   pandemic   situation
35   AIR 1955 SC 549
36   (2011) 13 SCC 99

99
have already been delineated by the Parliament as well as the State
legislature.
98. As   such,   it   is   not   open   to   the   State   Government   to   issue
directions   in   respect   of   commercial   or   economic   aspects   of
legitimate   subsisting   contracts/transactions   between   two   private
parties with which the State has no direct causal connection, in the
guise   of   management   of   pandemic   situation   or   to   provide
“mitigation   to   one”   of   the   two   private   parties   “at   the   cost   of   the
other”.     This   is   akin   to   –   rob   Peter   to   pay   Paul.     It   is   a   different
matter, if as a policy, the State Government takes the responsibility
to subsidise the school fees of students of private unaided schools,
but  cannot  arrogate power   to itself much  less  under   Article  162  of
the   Constitution   to   issue   impugned   directions   (to   school
Management   to   collect   reduced   school   fee   for   the   concerned
academic   year).     We   have   no   hesitation   in   observing   that   the
asservation  of  the State Government of existence of  power  to  issue
directions   even   in   respect   of   economic   aspects   of   legitimate
subsisting   contracts/transactions   between   two   private   parties,   if
accepted   in   respect   of   fee   structure   of   private   unaided   schools,   is
fraught   with   undefined   infinite   risk   and   uncertainty   for   the   State.

100
For,   applying   the   same   logic   the   State   Government   may   have   to
assuage similar concerns in respect of other contractual matters or
transactions   between   two   private   individuals  in   every   aspect  of   life
which   may   have   bearing   on   right   to   life   guaranteed   under   the
Constitution.     That   would   not   only   open   pandora’s   box,   but   also
push the State Government to entertain demands including to grant
subsidy,   from   different   quarters   and   sections   of   the   society   in   the
name   of   mitigating   measures   making   it   financially   impossible   and
unwieldy for the State and eventually burden the honest tax payers
­ who also deserve similar indulgence.   Selective intervention of the
State in response to such demands may also suffer from the vice of
discrimination and also likely to impinge upon the rights of private
individual(s) — the supplier of goods or service provider, as the case
may   be.     The   State   cannot   exercise   executive   power   under   Article
162   of   the   Constitution   to   denude   the   person   offering   service(s)   or
goods   of   his   just   claim   to   get   fair   compensation/cost   from   the
recipient of such service(s) or goods, whence the State has no direct
causal relationship therewith.
99. It   is   one   thing   to   say   that   the   State   may   regulate   the   fee
structure   of   private   unaided   schools   to   ensure   that   the   school

101
Management   does   not   indulge   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation,   but   in   the   guise   of   exercise   of   that   power,   it
cannot   transcend   the   line   of   regulation   and   impinge   upon   the
autonomy   of   the   school   to   fix   and   collect   “just”   and   “permissible”
school   fees   from   its   students.     It   is   certainly   not   an   essential
commodity   governed   by   the   legislation   such   as   Essential
Commodities   Act,   1955   empowering   the   State   to   fix   tariff   or   price
thereof.     In   light   of   consistent   enunciation   by   this   Court   including
the   Constitution   Bench,   that   determination   of   school   fee   structure
(which includes reduction of fixed school fee for the relevant period)
is   the   exclusive   prerogative   of   the   school   Management   running   a
private  unaided  school,  it  is  not   open  to  the  Legislature  to  make a
law   touching   upon   that   aspect   except   to   provide   statutory
mechanism   to   regulate   fees   for   ensuring   that   it   does   not   result   in
profiteering and commercialisation by the school Management.    Ex­
consequenti ,   the   State   Government   also   cannot   exercise   power
under Article 162 of the Constitution in that regard.
100. Notably,   the   direction   given   in   the   impugned   order   to   the
school Management is to collect only specified percentage of annual

102
tuition fees on the assumption that the schools will not be required
to   complete   the   course   for   the   academic   year   2020­21.     This
assumption   has   been   rebutted   by   the   appellants   by   relying   on   the
instructions   issued   by   the   concerned   Board   indicating   to   the
contrary.     In   any   case,   that   does   not   extricate   the   school
Management   from   incurring   recurring   capital   and   revenue
expenditure including to pay their academic and non­academic staff
their   full   salary   and   emoluments   for   the   relevant   period.     For,   no
corresponding   authority   is   given   to   the   school   Management   to
deduct suitable amount from their salaries.   Thus, the effect of the
impugned   order  is   to   reduce  school   fees  determined  under   the   Act
in   absence   of   authority   to   do   so   including   under   the   Act   of   2016.
Further, on the face of it, the direction given is inconsistent with the
provisions   of   the   stated   Act.   To   put   it   tersely,   the   impugned   order
issued   is   in   respect   of   matters   beyond   the   power   of   the   State
Government   ­   to   regulate   the   fee   structure   for   ensuring   that   the
school   Management   does   not   indulge   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation.     Accordingly,   the   impugned   order   dated
28.10.2020   cannot   be   sustained   even   in   reference   to   executive
power under Article 162 of the Constitution.

103
101. Reverting   to   the   provisions   of   the   Act   of   2005,   no   doubt
Section 72 thereof predicates that the provisions of the Act will have
overriding   effect   on   other   laws   for   the   time   being   in   force   or
anything   inconsistent   in   any   instrument   having   effect   by   virtue   of
any law other than the Act of 2005.  This provision, however, would
come into effect only if it is to be held that the Statutory Authorities
under the Act of 2005 have power to deal with the subject of school
fee structure of private unaided schools.  
102. For that, we may usefully refer to Section 23 of the Act of 2005
which provides for the contents of the plan for disaster management
to be prepared for every State called the State Disaster Management
Plan.  Section 23 reads thus:
“ 23.   State   Plan.—   (1)   There   shall   be   a   plan   for   disaster
management   for   every   State   to   be   called   the   State   Disaster
Management Plan.
(2)   The   State   Plan   shall   be   prepared   by   the   State   Executive
Committee having  regard to the guidelines laid down by  the
National   Authority   and   after   such   consultation   with   local
authorities,   district   authorities   and   the   people's
representatives as the State Executive Committee may deem
fit.
(3)   The   State   Plan   prepared   by   the   State   Executive
Committee   under   sub­section   (2)   shall   be   approved   by   the
State Authority.
(4) The State Plan shall include,—
(a)   the   vulnerability   of   different   parts   of   the   State   to
different forms of disasters;

104
(b)   the   measures   to   be   adopted   for   prevention   and
mitigation of disasters;
(c)   the   manner   in   which   the   mitigation   measures   shall
be integrated with the development plans and projects;
(d) the capacity­building and preparedness measures to
be taken;
(e)   the   roles   and   responsibilities   of   each   Department   of
the Government of the State in relation to the measures
specified in clauses   (b),   (c)   and   (d)   above;
(f) the roles and responsibilities of different Departments
of   the   Government   of   the   State   in   responding   to   any
threatening disaster situation or disaster;
(5) The State Plan shall be reviewed and updated annually.
(6)   Appropriate   provisions   shall   be   made   by   the   State
Government for financing for the measures to be carried out
under the State Plan.
(7)   Copies   of   the   State   Plan   referred   to   in   sub­
sections   (2)   and   (5)   shall   be   made   available   to   the
Departments   of   the   Government   of   the   State   and   such
Departments   shall   draw   up   their   own   plans   in   accordance
with the State Plan.”
103. Going   by   the   scheme   of   the   Act   of   2005,   the   State   Authority
established under Section 14 known as State Disaster Management
Authority   is   expected   to   formulate   policies   and   plans   for   disaster
management   in   the   State.     Indeed,   such   policies   and   plans   may
include   mitigation 37
  measures   in   respect   of   persons   affected   by
disaster.     The   mitigation   measures,   however,   are   aimed   merely   for
reducing   the   risk/impact   or   effects   of   a   disaster   or   threatening
disaster situation.  Considering the sphere of functions of the State
37   Section   2(i)   “mitigation”   means   measures   aimed   at   reducing   the   risk,   impact   or
effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation;

105
Authority   including   the   State   Executive   Committee   or   different
Authorities established at concerned level within the State, there is
not   even   a   tittle   of   indication   that   in   the   name   of   mitigating
measures, the disaster management plan may comprehend issue of
direction   in   respect   of   economic   aspects   of   legitimate   subsisting
contracts   or   transactions   between   two   private   individuals   with
which   the   State   has   no   direct   causal   relationship,   and   especially
when   the   determination   of   compensation/cost/fees   is   the
prerogative of  the  supplier  or   manufacturer  of  the  goods or  service
provider   of   the   services.     The   scheme   of   the   Act   of   2005   obligates
the  State  Authority  to  assuage the  concerns of  the  persons  arising
from “direct impact” of the disaster and to take mitigation measures
to minimise the impact of such disaster and for that purpose, resort
of   capacity­building 38
  including   of   its   own   resources 39
  to   wit,
manpower,   services,   materials   and   provisions   as   noted   in   Section
2(p), and preparedness 40
  measures referred to in Section 2(m).  It is
38  Section 2(b) “capacity­building” includes—
        (i)       identification   of   existing   resources   and   resources   to   be   acquired   or
created;
    (ii)  acquiring or creating resources identified under sub­clause (i);
      (iii)   organisation   and   training   of   personnel   and   coordination   of   such   training   for
effective management of disasters;
39   Section 2(p) “resources” includes manpower, services, materials and provisions;
40  Section 2(m) “preparedness” means the state of readiness to deal with a threatening
disaster situation or disaster and the effects thereof;

106
not   possible   to   countenance   the   persuasive   argument   of   the
respondents   that   expansive   meaning   be   assigned   to   the   provisions
of   the   Act   of   2005   so   as   to   include   power   to   reduce   school   fees   of
private unaided school albeit fixed under the Act of 2016 and which
by law is to remain in force until academic year 2020­21. 
104. As   is   noticed   from   the   preamble   of   the   Act   of   2005,   it   is   to
provide   for   the   effective   management   of   disasters   and   for   matters
connected   therewith   or   incidental   thereto.     It   extends   to   the   whole
of   India.   The   Act  is  to  establish   Statutory   Committees  at   different
level   for   carrying   out   the   purposes   for   which   the   Act   has   been
enacted.   It is essentially for effective management of disasters and
for   matters   connected   therewith   or   incidental   thereto.     The
expression “disaster” has been defined in Section 2(d) of the Act of
2005, which reads thus:
“ 2.     Definitions.­     In  this   Act,   unless  the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(d)   “disaster”   means   a   catastrophe,   mishap,   calamity   or
grave   occurrence   in   any   area,   arising   from   natural   or   man
made   causes,   or   by   accident   or   negligence   which   results   in
substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and
destruction   of,   property,   or   damage   to,   or   degradation   of,
environment, and is of such a nature or magnitude as to be
beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected
area;”

107
105. The Authorities created under the Act of 2005 are expected to
deal   with   matters   concerning   the   disaster   management.     The
expression “disaster management” has been defined as follows:
“ 2.     Definitions.­     In  this   Act,   unless  the   context   otherwise
requires,­
xxx xxx xxx
(e)   “disaster   management”   means   a   continuous   and
integrated process of planning, organising, coordinating and
implementing measures which are necessary or expedient for
—
(i) prevention of danger or threat of any disaster;
(ii)   mitigation   or   reduction   of   risk   of   any   disaster   or   its
severity or consequences;
(iii) capacity­building;
(iv) preparedness to deal with any disaster;
(v)  prompt   response to  any   threatening   disaster   situation or
disaster;
(vi)   assessing   the   severity   or   magnitude   of   effects   of   any
disaster;
(vii) evacuation, rescue and relief;
(viii) rehabilitation and reconstruction;”
106. It   is   also   useful   to   advert   to   Section   18   of   the   Act   of   2005
which   provides   for   powers   and   functions   of   State   Authority
established   under   Section   14   consisting   of   Chief   Minister   of   the
State,  who   acts  as  Chairperson   ( Ex   officio)   and  other   Chairpersons
of the respective Authorities.  Section 18 reads thus:

108
“ 18.   Powers   and   functions   of   State   Authority.—   (1)
Subject to the provisions of this Act, a State Authority shall
have the responsibility for laying down policies and plans for
disaster management in the State.
(2)   Without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of   provisions
contained in sub­section   (1), the State Authority may—
(a) lay down the State disaster management policy;
(b)   approve   the   State   Plan   in   accordance   with   the
guidelines laid down by the National Authority;
(c) approve the disaster management plans prepared by
the departments of the Government of the State;
(d)   lay   down   guidelines   to   be   followed   by   the
departments   of   the   Government   of   the   State   for   the
purposes   of   integration   of   measures   for   prevention   of
disasters and mitigation in their development plans and
projects   and   provide   necessary   technical   assistance
therefor;
(e) coordinate the implementation of the State Plan;
(f)   recommend   provision   of   funds   for   mitigation   and
preparedness measures;
(g)   review   the   development   plans   of   the   different
departments   of   the   State   and   ensure   that   prevention
and mitigation measures are integrated therein;
(h)   review   the   measures   being   taken   for   mitigation,
capacity building and preparedness by the departments
of   the   Government   of   the   State   and   issue   such
guidelines as may be necessary.
(3) The Chairperson of the State Authority shall, in the case
of emergency, have power to exercise all or any of the powers
of  the  State  Authority  but  the  exercise of such powers  shall
be subject to   ex post facto   ratification of the State Authority.”
107. The   obligation   of   the   State   Government   for   the   purpose   of
disaster   management   can   be   culled   out   from   Section   38,   which
reads thus:

109
“ 38. State Government to take measures.—   (1) Subject to
the provisions of this Act, each State Government shall take
all   measures   specified   in   the   guidelines   laid   down   by   the
National   Authority   and   such   further   measures   as   it   deems
necessary   or   expedient,   for   the   purpose   of   disaster
management.
(2)   The   measures   which   the   State   Government   may   take
under sub­section   (1)   include measures with respect to all or
any of the following matters, namely:—
(a)   coordination   of   actions   of   different   departments   of
the   Government   of   the   State,   the   State   Authority,
District   Authorities,   local   authority   and   other   non­
governmental organisations;
(b)   cooperation   and   assistance   in   the   disaster
management   to   the   National   Authority   and   National
Executive Committee, the State Authority and the State
Executive Committee, and the District Authorities;
(c) cooperation with, and assistance to, the Ministries or
Departments   of   the   Government   of   India   in   disaster
management,   as   requested   by   them   or   otherwise
deemed appropriate by it;
(d)   allocation   of   funds   for   measures   for   prevention   of
disaster, mitigation, capacity­building and preparedness
by   the   departments   of   the   Government   of   the   State   in
accordance with the provisions of the State Plan and the
District Plans;
(e)   ensure   that   the   integration   of   measures   for
prevention   of  disaster   or   mitigation  by   the   departments
of   the   Government   of   the   State   in   their   development
plans and projects;
(f) integrate in the State development plan, measures to
reduce   or   mitigate  the   vulnerability   of   different   parts   of
the State to different disasters;
(g) ensure the preparation of disaster management plans
by different departments of the State in accordance with
the   guidelines   laid   down   by   the   National   Authority   and
the State Authority;
(h)   establishment   of   adequate   warning   systems   up   to
the level of vulnerable communities;
(i) ensure that different departments of the Government
of   the   State   and   the   District   Authorities   take
appropriate preparedness measures;

110
(j)   ensure   that   in   a   threatening   disaster   situation   or
disaster,   the   resources   of   different   departments   of   the
Government   of   the   State   are   made   available   to   the
National   Executive   Committee   or   the   State   Executive
Committee   or   the   District   Authorities,   as   the   case   may
be,   for   the   purposes   of   effective   response,   rescue   and
relief in any threatening disaster situation or disaster;
(k)   provide   rehabilitation   and   reconstruction   assistance
to the victims of any disaster; and
(l)   such   other   matters   as   it   deems   necessary   or
expedient   for   the   purpose   of   securing   effective
implementation of provisions of this Act.”
108. The corresponding responsibilities of departments of the State
Government have been delineated in Section 39, which reads thus:
“ 39.   Responsibilities   of   departments   of   the   State
Government.—   It   shall   be   the   responsibility   of   every
department of the Government of a State to—
(a) take measures necessary for prevention of disasters,
mitigation,   preparedness   and   capacity   building   in
accordance   with   the   guidelines   laid   down   by   the
National Authority and the State Authority;
(b) integrate into its development plans and projects, the
measures for prevention of disaster and mitigation;
(c)   allocate   funds   for   prevention   of   disaster,   mitigation,
capacity­building and preparedness;
(d)   respond   effectively   and   promptly   to   any   threatening
disaster   situation   or   disaster   in   accordance   with   the
State   Plan,   and   in   accordance   with   the   guidelines   or
directions   of  the  National  Executive  Committee  and  the
State Executive Committee;
(e) review the enactments administered by it, its policies,
rules and regulations with a view to incorporate therein

111
the   provisions   necessary   for   prevention   of   disasters,
mitigation or preparedness;
(f)   provide   assistance,   as   required,   by   the   National
Executive   Committee,   the   State   Executive   Committee
and District Authorities, for—
(i)   drawing   up   mitigation,   preparedness   and   response
plans,   capacity­building,   data   collection   and
identification   and   training   of   personnel   in   relation   to
disaster management;
(ii) assessing the damage from any disaster;
(iii) carrying out rehabilitation and reconstruction;
(g) make provision for resources in consultation with the
State   Authority   for   the   implementation   of   the   District
Plan by its authorities at the district level;
(h)   make   available   its   resources   to   the   National
Executive   Committee   or   the   State   Executive   Committee
or   the   District   Authorities   for   the   purposes   of
responding   promptly   and   effectively   to   any   disaster   in
the State, including measures for—
(i)   providing   emergency   communication   with   a
vulnerable or affected area;
(ii) transporting personnel and relief goods to and from
the affected area;
(iii) providing evacuation, rescue, temporary shelter  or
other immediate relief;
(iv)   carrying   out   evacuation   of   persons   or   live­stock
from   an   area   of   any   threatening   disaster   situation   or
disaster;
(v)   setting   up   temporary   bridges,   jetties   and   landing
places;
(vi)   providing   drinking   water,   essential   provisions,
healthcare and services in an affected area;
(i)   such   other   actions   as   may   be   necessary   for   disaster
management.”

112
109. The   State   Executive   Committee   constituted   under   the   Act   of
2005   vide   Section   20   is   obligated   to   discharge   the   functions
delineated in Section 22 of the Act.  The same reads thus:
“ 22.   Functions   of   the   State   Executive   Committee.—
(1)   The   State   Executive   Committee   shall   have   the
responsibility   for   implementing   the   National   Plan   and   State
Plan   and   act   as   the   coordinating   and   monitoring   body   for
management of disaster in the State.
(2)   Without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of   the   provisions   of
sub­section   (1), the State Executive Committee may—
(a)   coordinate   and   monitor   the   implementation   of   the
National Policy, the National Plan and the State Plan;
(b)   examine   the   vulnerability   of   different   parts   of   the
State   to   different   forms   of   disasters   and   specify
measures to be taken for their prevention or mitigation;
(c)   lay   down   guidelines   for   preparation   of   disaster
management   plans   by   the   departments   of   the
Government of the State and the District Authorities;
(d) monitor the implementation of disaster management
plans   prepared   by   the   departments   of   the   Government
of the State and District Authorities;
(e)   monitor   the   implementation   of   the   guidelines   laid
down by the State Authority for integrating of measures
for   prevention   of   disasters   and   mitigation   by   the
departments in their development plans and projects;
(f)   evaluate   preparedness   at   all   governmental   or   non­
governmental   levels   to   respond   to   any   threatening
disaster situation or disaster and give directions, where
necessary, for enhancing such preparedness;
(g)   coordinate   response   in   the   event   of   any   threatening
disaster situation or disaster;
(h) give directions to any Department of the Government
of the State or any other  authority or  body  in the State
regarding   actions   to   be   taken   in   response   to   any
threatening disaster situation or disaster;

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(i)   promote   general   education,   awareness   and
community   training   in   regard   to   the   forms   of   disasters
to which different  parts  of the State are vulnerable  and
the measures that may be taken by such community to
prevent   the   disaster,   mitigate   and   respond   to   such
disaster;
(j)   advise,   assist   and   coordinate   the   activities   of   the
Departments   of   the   Government   of   the   State,   District
Authorities,   statutory   bodies   and   other   governmental
and   non­governmental   organisations   engaged   in
disaster management;
(k) provide necessary technical assistance or give advice
to  District   Authorities  and  local  authorities  for   carrying
out their functions effectively;
(l)   advise   the   State   Government   regarding   all   financial
matters in relation to disaster management;
(m)   examine   the   construction,   in   any   local   area   in   the
State and, if it  is of the opinion that the standards laid
for   such   construction   for   the   prevention   of   disaster   is
not   being   or   has   not   been   followed,   may   direct   the
District Authority or the local authority, as the case may
be,   to   take   such   action   as   may   be   necessary   to   secure
compliance of such standards;
(n) provide information to the National Authority relating
to different aspects of disaster management;
(o)   lay   down,   review   and   update   State   level   response
plans   and   guidelines   and   ensure   that   the   district   level
plans are prepared, reviewed and updated;
(p) ensure that communication systems are in order and
the   disaster   management   drills   are   carried   out
periodically;
(q) perform such other functions as may be assigned to
it   by   the   State   Authority   or   as   it   may   consider
necessary.”
110. Having   regard   to   the   purport   of   the   Act   of   2005,   it   is
unfathomable as to how the State Authorities established under the
stated Act can arrogate unto themselves power to issue directions to

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private   parties   on   economic   aspects   of   legitimate   subsisting
contractual matters or transactions between them inter se.   In any
case,   the   impugned   order   has   not   been   issued   by   the   State
Authority referred to in the Act of 2005.  It is not enough to say that
the   same   was   issued   under   the   directions   of   the   Chief   Minister   of
the State.  For, the Chief Minister is only the Chairperson ( Ex officio )
of   the   State   Disaster   Management   Authority   established   under
Section 14 of the Act of 2005.   Suffice it to observe that there is no
provision in the Act of 2005 which concerns or governs the subject
of interdicting the school fee structure fixed under the Act of 2016.
111. Section   72   of   the   Act   of   2005   was   pressed   into   service.
However,   that   cannot   be   the   basis   to   justify   the   impugned   order
dated 28.10.2020.  Section 72 reads thus:
“ 72. Act   to   have   overriding   effect.—   The   provisions   of
this   Act,   shall   have   effect,   notwithstanding   anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time
being in force or in any instrument having effect by  virtue of
any law other than this Act.”
The   Act   of   2005   is   not   a   panacea   for   all   difficulties   much   less   not
concerning   disaster   management   [Section   2(e)]   as   such.     As   noted
earlier,   there   is   no   express   provision   in   the   Act   of   2005   which
empowers   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   (or   the   State

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Government)   to   issue   order   and   directions   in   respect   of   school   fee
structure because of the pandemic situation.
112. For the same reasons, reliance placed on the provisions of the
State   legislation,   namely,   the   Act   of   2020   dealing   with   epidemic
diseases   will   be   of   no   avail   to   justify   the   impugned   order   dated
28.10.2020   issued   by   the   Director,   Secondary   Education.     The
power   to   take   special   measures   and   specify   regulation   as   to
epidemic   disease   can   be   exercised   by   the   State   Government   under
Section 4 of the Act of 2020.  Section 4 reads thus:
“ 4.   Power   to   take   special   measures   and   specify
regulations as to epidemic disease.—  (1) When at any time
the Government is satisfied that the State or any part thereof
is visited by or threatened with an outbreak of any epidemic
disease,   the   Government   may   take   such   measures,   as   it
deems   necessary   for   the   purpose,   by   notification   in   the
Official Gazette, specify such temporary regulations or orders
to   be   observed   by   the   public   or   by   any   person   or   class   of
persons   so   as   to   prevent   the   outbreak   of   such   epidemic
disease   or   the   spread   thereof   and   require   or   empower
District   Collectors   to   exercise   such   powers   and   duties   as
may be specified in the said regulations or orders.
(2)   In   particular   and   without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of
the   foregoing   provisions,   the   Government   may   take
measures and specify regulations,­ 
(a)   to   prohibit   any   usage   or   act   which   the   Government
considers   sufficient   to   spread   or   transmit   epidemic
diseases   from   person   to   person   in   any   gathering,
celebration,   worship   or   other   such   activities   within   the
State; 

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(b)   to   inspect   the   persons   arriving   in   the   State   by   air,
rail,   road   or   any   other   means   or   in   quarantine   or   in
isolation,   as   the   case   may   be,   in   hospital,   temporary
accommodation,   home   or   otherwise   of   persons
suspected of being infected with any such disease by the
officer authorized in the regulation or orders;
(c)   to   seal   State   Borders   for   such   period   as   may   be
deemed necessary;
(d) to impose restrictions on the operation of public and
private transport; 
(e)   to   prescribe   social   distancing   norms   or   any   other
instructions   for   the   public   to   observe   that   are
considered   necessary   for   public   health   and   safety   on
account of the epidemic;
(f)   to   restrict   or   prohibit   congregation   of   persons   in
public   places   and   religious   institutions   or   places   of
worship;
(g)   to   regulate   or   restrict   the   functioning   of   offices,
Government and private and educational institutions in
the State;
(h)   to   impose   prohibition   or   restrictions   on   the
functioning   of   shops   and   commercial   and   other   offices,
establishments, factories, workshops and godowns;
(i)   to   restrict   duration   of   services   in   essential   or
emergency   services   such   as   banks,   media,   health   care,
food supply, electricity, water, fuel etc.; and 
(j)   such   other   measures   as   may   be   necessary   for   the
regulation   and   prevention   of   epidemic   diseases   as
decided by the Government.”
The measures enunciated in Section 4 of the Act of 2020 in no way
deal   with   the   “tariffs”   of   air,   rail,   road,   hospital,   temporary
accommodation.  It only enables the Authority to prohibit any usage
or activities which the Government considers sufficient to spread or
transmit epidemic diseases and for that purpose to inspect various
places   suspected   of   being   infected   with   such   diseases.     Indeed,   it

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can   regulate   or   restrict   the   functioning   of   offices,   Government   and
private   and   educational   institutions   in   the   State.     That,   however,
would   be   only   in   respect   of   manner   of   its   use   and   its   timings
including  to   observe   standard   operating  procedures   to  ensure   that
epidemic diseases do not transmit or spread on account of activities
carried   out   therein.     That   power   to   regulate   cannot   be   invoked   to
control   the   tariffs,   fees   or   cost   of   goods   and   services   and   in
particular   economic   aspects   of   contractual   matters   between   two
private   parties   or   so   to   say   school   fees   of   private   unaided   schools.
Accordingly,   even   the   last   point   urged   by   the   State   to   justify   the
impugned order dated 28.10.2020 falls to the ground.
113. A   priori,   it must follow that the Director, Secondary Education
had   no   authority   whatsoever   to   issue   direction   in   respect   of   fee
structure determined under the Act of 2016 including to reduce the
same   for   the   academic   year   2020­21   in   respect   of   private   unaided
schools.  Having failed to trace the legitimate source of power under
which   the   directions   have   been   issued,   as   aforesaid,   the
respondents   ­   State   Authorities   cannot   fall   back   upon   the   benign
hope expressed by the High Court to do the needful in the backdrop
of the representations made by several parents about the difficulties

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encountered   by   them   due   to   pandemic   situation.     It   would   have
been   a   different   matter   if   the   Director,   Secondary   Education   had
used his good offices to impress upon the school management(s) of
the concerned school(s) to explore the mitigating measures/options
on their own for the academic year 2020­21 and to give concession
to   their   students   to   the   extent   possible   at   least   in   respect   of
unutilised   facilities   and   savings   on   overheads   by   the   school
Management   in   that   behalf   or   to   give   concession   in   the   form   of
scholarship   to   deserving   students.     It   is   stated   by   the   appellants
that the school Management on their own had offered scholarship of
25 per cent of the annual fee to their students.  In other words, the
Director,   Secondary   Education   could   have   mediated   between   the
Association   of   the   school   Management   and   representatives   of   the
Parent­Teachers   Association   for   arriving   at   an   amicable   solution
due   to   pandemic   situation   for   the   academic   year   2020­21,   on
humanitarian   grounds,   but   could   not   issue   the   impugned   order
when even the State had no power to issue the same.
114. Accordingly, the appellants are justified in assailing the order
dated 28.10.2020 issued by the Director, Secondary Education and
must succeed.  However, that does not give licence to the appellants

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to be rigid and not be sensitive about aftermath of pandemic.   The
school Management supposedly engaged in doing charitable activity
of   imparting   education,   is   expected   to   be   responsive   and   alive   to
that situation and take necessary remedial measures to mitigate the
hardship   suffered   by   the   students   and   their   parents.     It   is   for   the
school  Management  to  reschedule payment  of  school  fee in  such  a
way that not even a single student is left out or denied opportunity
of   pursuing   his/her   education,   so   as   to   effectuate   the   adage   “live
and let live”.
115. In law, the school Management cannot be heard to collect fees
in respect of activities and facilities which are, in fact, not provided
to   or   availed   by   its   students   due   to   circumstances   beyond   their
control.     Demanding   fees   even   in   respect   of   overheads   on   such
activities   would   be   nothing   short   of   indulging   in   profiteering   and
commercialisation.     It   is   a   well­known   fact   and   judicial   notice   can
also be taken that, due to complete lockdown the schools were not
allowed   to   open   for   substantially   long   period   during   the   academic
year   2020­21.     Resultantly,   the   school   Management   must   have
saved   overheads   and   recurring   cost   on   various   items   such   as
petrol/diesel,   electricity,   maintenance   cost,   water   charges,

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stationery  charges, etc.   Indeed, overheads and operational cost so
saved would be nothing, but an amount undeservedly earned by the
school   without   offering   such   facilities   to   the   students   during   the
relevant period .    Being fee, the principle of   quid pro quo   must come
into   play.     However,   no   accurate   (factual)   empirical   data   has   been
furnished by either side about the extent to which such saving has
been   or   could   have   been   made   or   benefit   derived   by   the   school
Management.     Without   insisting   for   mathematical   exactitude
approach,   we   would   assume   that   the   school   Management(s)   must
have   saved   around   15   per   cent   of   the   annual   school   fees   fixed   by
the   school/adjudicated   by   the   Statutory   Regulatory   Authorities   for
the relevant period.  
116. At   this   stage,   we   must   advert   to   the   stand   taken   by   the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   that   the   appellants   would   be
content with the interim order passed by this Court on 08.02.2021,
being   confirmed   as   a   final   order.     This   suggestion   is   indeed
attractive, but that arrangement does not provision for the amounts
saved   by   the   school   Management   towards   unspent
overheads/expenses in respect of facilities not utilised or could not

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be   offered   by   the   school   Management   to   the   students   due   to
lockdown situation.  As aforesaid, we would assume that at least 15
per   cent   of   the   annual   school   fees   would   be   towards
overheads/expenses   saved   by   the   school   Management.     Arguendo ,
this assumption is on the higher side than the actual savings by the
school Management of private unaided schools, yet we are inclined
to   fix   that   percentage   because   the   educational   institutions   are
engaged   in   doing   charitable   activity   of   imparting   and   spreading
education   and   not   make   money.     That   they   must   willingly   and
proactively do.   Hence, collection of commensurate amount (15 per
cent of the annual school fees for academic year 2020­2021), would
be   a   case   of   profiteering   and   commercialisation   by   the   school
Management.  
117. Ordinarily,   we   would   have   thought   it   appropriate   to   relegate
the   parties   before   the   Regulatory   Authority   to   refix   the   school   fees
for the academic year 2020­21 after taking into account all aspects
of   the   matter   including   the   advantage   gained   by   the   school
Management   due   to   unspent   overheads/expenses   in   respect   of
facilities not availed by the students.   However, that course can be

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obviated   by   the   arrangement   that   we   propose   to   direct   in   terms   of
this   judgment.     To   avoid   multiplicity   of   proceedings   (as   school   fee
structure is linked to school — school wise) including uncertainty of
legal   processes   by   over   36,000   schools   in   determination   of   annual
fee structure for the academic year 2020­21, as a one­time measure
to   do   complete   justice   between   the   parties,   we   propose   to   issue
following directions:
(i) The   appellants   (school   Management   of   the
concerned private unaided school) shall collect annual
school fees from their students as fixed under the Act
of   2016   for   the   academic   year   2019­20,   but   by
providing  deduction  of  15  per  cent  on  that  amount in
lieu   of   unutilised   facilities   by   the   students   during   the
relevant period of academic year 2020­21.
(ii) The   amount   so   payable   by   the   concerned
students   be   paid   in   six   equal   monthly   instalments
before   05.08.2021   as   noted   in   our   order   dated
08.02.2021.

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(iii) Regardless   of   the   above,   it   will   be   open   to   the
appellants   (concerned   schools)   to   give   further
concession   to   their   students   or   to   evolve   a   different
pattern   for   giving   concession   over   and   above   those
noted in clauses (i) and (ii) above.
(iv) The   school   Management   shall   not   debar   any
student   from   attending   either   online   classes   or
physical   classes   on   account   of   non­payment   of   fees,
arrears/outstanding   fees   including   the   installments,
referred to above, and shall not withhold the results of
the examinations of any student on that account.
(v) If   any   individual   request   is   made   by   the
parent/ward finding it difficult to remit annual fees for
the   academic   year   2020­21   in   the   above   terms,   the
school   Management   to   consider   such   representation
on case­to­case basis sympathetically.
(vi) The   above   arrangement   will   not   affect   collection
of fees for the academic year 2021­22, as is payable by

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the   students   of   the   concerned   school   as   and   when   it
becomes due and payable.
(vii) The   school   Management   shall   not   withhold   the
name of any student/candidate for the ensuing Board
examinations   for   Classes   X   and   XII   on   the   ground   of
non­payment   of   fee/arrears   for   the   academic   year
2020­21,   if   any,   on   obtaining   undertaking   of   the
concerned parents/students.
118. We   are   conscious   of   the   fact   that   we   are   issuing   general
uniform   direction  of  deduction of  15 per   cent  of  the  annual  school
fees in lieu of unutilised facilities/activities and not on the basis of
actual data school­wise.  As aforesaid, we have chosen to do so with
a view to obviate avoidable litigation and to give finality to the issue
of determination and collection of school fees for the academic year
2020­21,   as   a   one­time   measure   which   is   the   subject   matter   of
these   appeals.     We   have   consciously   limited   the   quantum   of
deduction   from   annual   school   fees   to   15   per   cent   although   the
school Management had mentioned about its willingness to provide
25   per   cent   scholarship   to   deserving   students,   as   we   have

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compelled the school Management to collect annual school fees for
the   academic   year   2020­21   as   was   fixed   for   the   academic   year
2019­20   on   which   some   of   the   school   Management(s)   could   have
legitimately   asked   for   increase   of   at   least   10   per   cent   in   terms   of
Section 6(5) of the Act of 2016. 
119. As we are disposing of the appeals in terms of this judgment,
the contempt petition(s) filed before the High Court on the basis of
impugned   judgment   also   need   to   be   disposed   of.     Accordingly,   we
deem   it   appropriate   to   dispose   of   all   the   contempt   petition(s)
initiated   in   reference   to   the   impugned   judgment,   as   the   same   is
being overturned by this decision.
120. While   parting,   we   must   note   that   the   respondent­State   of
Rajasthan has moved a formal application for recall/modification of
direction   given   in   clause   (g)   of   the   order   of   this   Court   dated
08.02.2021 — to ensure payment of outstanding dues towards unit
cost payable to respective unaided schools within specified time.  It
is   urged   that   due   to   complexity   of   facts,   it   was   not   possible   to
complete the process of computation before 31.03.2021.  In the first
place, there is no question of recall or modification of that direction.

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We were conscious of the fact that that is not the subject matter of
the   appeals   before   this   Court.     Nevertheless,   such   direction   was
issued taking into account totality of the situation and to give relief
to the private unaided schools by directing the State of Rajasthan to
discharge   its   statutory   obligation   within   specified   time,   of   paying
the   outstanding   dues   of   the   concerned   private   unaided   schools
towards unit cost.   Accordingly, we reiterate that direction but give
further   time   to   the   State   Government   to   complete   the   process   of
calculation   and   disbursal   of   the   outstanding   amount   payable
towards unit cost to the concerned unaided schools in the State of
Rajasthan before the end of July 2021.  The outstanding dues to be
paid   in   terms   of   this   direction   would   be   obviously   in   respect   of
academic year upto 2020­21.
121. We   must   also   note   that   we   have   not   dilated   on   each   of   the
reported decisions relied upon by the parties, as it is not necessary
to do so for the view taken by us.  For, there is nothing inconsistent
in those decisions.

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ORDER
In view of the above, 
(a) we   dispose   of   the   first   set   of   appeals   challenging   the   validity
of   the   Act   of   2016   and   the   Rules   framed   thereunder   with
observations   and   the   conclusion   recorded   in   paragraph   52
above   by   reading   down   Sections   4,   7   and   10   of   the   Act   and
direct that henceforth the same be applied in conformity  with
the law declared in this judgment.  
(b) The   second set   of appeals, however, are allowed in the above
terms  including  mentioned  in  paragraph  117.    The  impugned
judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   dated   18.12.2020   is
quashed   and   set   aside.     Instead,   the   intra­court   appeals
preferred   by   the   appellants   questioning   the   decision   of   the
learned   Single   Judge   and   the   writ   petitions   filed   before   the
High   Court   to   assail   the   impugned   order   dated   28.10.2020,
shall stand disposed of in terms of this judgment.  

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(c) The   contempt   petition(s)   pending   before   the   High   Court   in
connection with the subject matter of these appeals also stand
disposed of.  No order as to costs.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
………………………………J.
       (A.M. Khanwilkar)
………………………………J.
(Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
May 3, 2021.