2021 INSC 0248
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1140 ­1141 OF 2010
Achhar Singh
..... Appellant
                             VERSUS
State of Himachal Pradesh ..... Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1144 of 2010
Budhi Singh
..... Appellant
                             VERSUS
State of Himachal Pradesh ..... Respondent 
                                                                  
J U D G M E N T
Surya Kant, J:
The appellants Achhar Singh and Budhi Singh are aggrieved by
the   judgment  and   order   dated   12.05.2010/27.05.2010   passed   by   the
High Court of Himachal Pradesh whereby  their acquittal  by the Addl.
Sessions   Judge,   Mandi   dated   24.02.1998   has   been   set   aside.
Consequently,   Achhar   Singh   has   been   convicted   for   offences   under
Sections 452, 326 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and
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sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years along with
fine, while Budhi Singh has been convicted for offences under Sections
302   and   452   IPC   and   sentenced   to   undergo   imprisonment   for   life
along with fine. 
FACTS:
2. The   prosecution   case,   in   brief,   is   that   on   the   night   of
23.02.1996,   the   complainant   Netar   Singh’s   wife   (Meera   Devi,   P.W.11)
and   mother   (Swari   Devi)   had   attended   the   marriage   function   in   a
nearby   village   at   the   house   of   the   bridegroom   with   whom   their
neighbour   Budhi   Singh’s   daughter   got   married.   Both   the   ladies
returned home with  ‘Dhaam’  (traditional food served on social events).
It   is   relevant   to   mention   here   that   owing   to   their   social   boycott   by
Budhi   Singh   and   some   other   villagers,   Netar   Singh’s   family   did   not
attend   any   marriage   function   at   the   former’s   house.   At   about   8   pm
when   the   complainant   and   his   family   were   taking   Dhaam ,   Budhi
Singh,   Achhar   Singh   along   with   some   other   villagers   shouted   for   the
complainant and his father (Beli Ram, P.W.12) to come out. When they
neared   the   door,   they   sensed   the   intention   of   the   accused   to   kill   the
complainant   party.   The   appellants   and   other   villagers   started   pelting
stones at the complainant party which forced them to rush back to the
house   and   bolt   their   door.   The   assailants,   however,   broke   open   the
door   and   entered   the   house   bearing   arms.   Budhi   Singh   and   Achhar
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Singh   had   axes,   while   the   other   accused   were   armed   with   sickles,
spears and sticks. It is alleged that Budhi Singh executed an axe blow
on Swari Devi’s head causing her death on the spot and Achhar Singh
hit   Beli   Ram   with   an   axe   due   to   which   the   latter   fainted.   The
complainant   was   also   allegedly   beaten   with   sticks   by   other   villagers
after   which   he   somehow   managed   to   escape   to   the   roof.   Meera   Devi
begged   the   assailants   for   mercy   and   they   left   threatening   that   the
complainant’s family will be killed if they tried to leave the house. 
3. Meanwhile,   some   villagers   including   Govind   Ram   (D.W.2)   and
Bahadur   who   were   standing   outside   intervened   and   called   on   the
accused   persons   to   stop   the   violence   whereupon   the   accused   were
forced   to   leave   the   place   of   incident.   Afterwards,   at   around   2:00   AM
the complainant went to the house of the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat
(Beasa Devi ­ D.W.1) to inform her about the assault. She advised the
complainant to contact the police. Since phone lines were down in the
village and no buses plied at night, the complainant walked 24 kms to
Jogindernagar   police   station   and   lodged   FIR   No.   36   of   1996   against
sixteen   villagers   including   the   appellants   at   9:30   AM   on   24.02.1996.
The police after investigation found that only seven persons out of the
lot   were   involved   in   the   attack   against   whom   charge­sheet   was   filed.
The   accused   persons   were   committed   to   stand   trial   for   offence   under
Sections 147, 148, 452, 506, 323, 302 and 326 of the IPC. 
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4. The Additional Sessions Judge, Mandi acquitted all the accused
vide judgment dated 24.02.1998. The trial Court while observing prior
enmity   and   extensive   litigation   between   the   parties,   did   not   rule   out
the   possibility   of   false   implication.   The   belatedly   exaggerated
allegations   by   the   prosecution   witnesses,   were   held   to   be   an   attempt
by   the   complainant   party   to   rope   in   as   many   people   as   possible.   In
regard   to   the   role   of   present   appellants,   it   was   pointed   out   that
according   to   the   FIR,   Swari   Devi   died   owing   to   a   single   axe   blow
inflicted by Budhi Singh and the post­mortem report also showed only
one   head   injury   on   her   person.   However,   three   prosecution   eye­
witnesses, namely, Netar Singh – P.W.1 (the complainant), Meera Devi
–   P.W.11  and   Beli   Ram   –  P.W.12   deposed   that  Budhi   Singh   gave  two
axe blows on her head and then Narinder Singh (co­accused) also hit
the   deceased’s   left   ear   with   an   axe   twice.   It   was   further   noticed   that
while the complainant initially  stated that his father was attacked on
the   face   by   Achhar   Singh   and   Prakash   (co­accused),   but   in   their
depositions   the   injured   or   eyewitnesses   have   attributed   attacks   to
other   co­accused   persons   also   which   were   not   corroborated   by   the
medico   legal   report   of   Beli   Ram.   They   also   changed   the   nature   of
attack attributed to co­accused Prakash.  
5. The   trial   Court   also   observed   that   eyewitness   –   Govind   Ram
(D.W.2)   did   not   support   the   prosecution   story   and   the   Gram
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Panchayat Pradhan (Beasa Devi – D.W.1) stated that the complainant
only informed her about a minor dispute after which she advised him
to   contact   the   police.   Noting   that   no   evidence   was   put   forth   by   the
complainant to establish the unavailability of telephone network in the
neighbouring  village, the Court found  the delay in registering the FIR
to   be   fatal   to   the   prosecution.     The   spot   of   occurrence   was   also
doubted   observing   that   bloodstains   were   noticed   in   the   passage
leading to the village. Keeping in view the conflicting exaggerations by
the   prosecution   witnesses   coupled   with   the   allegation   that   about
sixteen   persons   entered   a   small   room   and   started   attacking   the
complainant party with various deadly weapons, the trial Court could
not   attribute   any   specific   injury   to   any   of   the   accused   and   thus
acquitted them all by giving the benefit of doubt.  
6. The   High   Court  upon   re­appreciation   of   the   entire   evidence,   set
aside   the   acquittal   of   the   appellants   Achhar   Singh   and   Budhi   Singh
though   it   has   upheld   the   acquittal   of   the   rest   of   the   five   accused.
While   acknowledging   the   contradiction   between   the   contents   of   FIR,
the witness testimonies and the medical reports, the High Court stated
that a thread of  consistent evidence against the  appellants could  still
be   extracted   from   the   material   on   record,   howsoever   messy   it   was.
Disregarding   the   exaggerations   and   improvements   made   by   the
complainant party, the High Court observed that the allegation of the
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first   axe   blow   by   Budhi   Singh   on   the   head   of   Swari   Devi   was
corroborated   by   the   FIR,   the   prosecution   witnesses,   the   post­mortem
report which mentioned one fatal head injury by a sharp weapon and
the   recovery   of   axe   from   him.   The   High   Court   noted   that   the
allegations   against   Achhar   Singh   with   regard   to   his   assault   on   Beli
Ram   with   an   axe   were   also   consistent,   and   medical   evidence   showed
that some injuries could have been caused by an axe. 
7. It was noticed  that  Govind  Ram  (D.W.2)  being  the  son­in­law  of
the appellant Budhi Singh could not have deposed against him. While
dealing with the delay in filing the FIR, the High Court considered the
unavailability   of   buses   at   night,   terrain   of   the   area   and   the   distance
between the complainant’s house and Jogindernagar police station (24
kms) while concluding that he could not have reached there until next
morning.  With  regard  to   the   trial   Court’s  confusion  about the  spot  of
the   occurrence,   it   was   held   that   the   evidence   regarding   the   broken
windowpanes, scattered articles in the room, plates with leftover food
etc. was enough to conclude that the occurrence took place inside the
room and the presence of random blood marks elsewhere ought not to
be given undue credit. It was also observed that since the marriage of
Budhi   Singh’s   daughter   was   solemnized   on   21.02.1996,   no   marriage
function   could   have   been   underway   at   Budhi   Singh’s   house   on   the
night of the incident. While observing that the evidence on record did
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not   suggest   a   common   intention   to   kill   Swari   Devi   or   cause   grievous
hurt   to   Beli   Ram,   the   appellants   were   held   to   be   liable   for   their
individual   acts.   Budhi   Singh   was   thus   convicted   for   offences   under
Sections   302   and   452   IPC   and   Achhar   Singh   was   convicted   for   the
offences under Sections 452, 326 and 323 IPC. They have now come to
this Court against their conviction by the High Court. 
CONTENTIONS:   
8. Relying   on   Murugesan   v.   State 1
,   Learned   Senior   Counsel   for
Budhi   Singh   contended   that   so   long   as   the   trial   Court’s   view   was   a
‘possible   view’,   further   scrutiny   by   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of
powers   under   Section   378   CrPC   was   not   called   for.   While   citing
Aruvelu v. State 2
,   it was urged that the trial Court’s judgment cannot
be   set   aside   merely   because   the   appellate   Court’s   view   is   more
probable and that to merit interference by the High Court there has to
be   perversity   in   the   trial   Court’s   judgment.   It   was   also   pressed   that
owing   to   their   proximity   to   the   witnesses,   the   trial   Courts   are   at   an
advantage   to   judge   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses   and   make
intangible   observations.   Learned   Senior   Counsel   highlighted   the
prosecution   witnesses’   tendency   to   exaggerate   and   falsely   implicate,
and pointed out that the four head injuries to the deceased as alleged
1  
(2012) 10 SCC 383. 
2  
(2009) 10 SCC 206.
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by   the   eye­witnesses   were   falsified   by   the   medical   evidence   which
showed   only   one   head   injury.   It   was   also   accentuated   that   nine
persons   who   were   mentioned   in   the   FIR   were   let   go   at   the   stage   of
charge   as   bystanders.   The   contention   was   that   the   prosecution   also
ought to have arrayed these nine persons as witnesses.  Salim Akhtar
v.   State   of   UP 3
  was   cited   to   urge   that   since   the   axe   was   recovered
from   a   public   place,   it   could   not   be   held   that   Budhi   Singh   was   in
possession   of   the   article   recovered.   Additionally,   no   conclusive
presence of blood on the axes recovered was stated in the FSL report. 
9. Highlighting the fact that there was a marriage function going on
in   Budhi   Singh’s   house,   it   was   urged   that   he   had   no   reason   to   leave
mid­celebration   and   attack   his   neighbours.   Doubt   was   also   cast   on
the actual spot of the incident contending that P.W.16 – ASI Jaisi Ram
had   deposed   that   there   was   a   blood   trail   outside   the   house.   It   was
further   contended   that   Narinder   Singh   had   also   been   accused   of
inflicting   a   head   injury   on   the   deceased   with   an   axe   and   despite
recovery   of   an   axe   from   him,   the   High   Court   has   not   interfered   with
his acquittal. Suspicion was cast on the actual time of lodging the FIR
(lodged   at   9:30AM)   as   P.W.11   ­   Meera   Devi   had   stated   in   her   cross
examination  that  the  police  arrived   at  8­9  AM  in   the  morning.  It  was
then asserted that the police could not have arrived before the FIR had
3  
(2003) 5 SCC 499, ¶ 11­12. 
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been   lodged.   Doubt   was   also   cast   on   the   exact   time   of   death   of   the
deceased as the prosecution witnesses stated that she died on the spot
whereas according to P.W.3 – Dr. D.D. Rana who conducted the post­
mortem,   the   time   between   the   death   and   the   post­mortem   (on
25.02.1996 at 11am) was ‘within 10 hours’. 
10. Learned   Senior   Counsel   for   Achhar   Singh   also   reiterated   these
very   contentions   and   made   a   pointed   reference   to   the   statements   of
eye­witnesses according to which, some other accused besides Achhar
Singh,   too   had   hit   Beli   Ram   with   their   respective   weapons.   It   was
claimed   that   trial   Court   rightly   expressed   its   inability   to   identify   the
definite architect of individual injuries. 
11. On   the   other   hand,   counsel   for   the   State   while   placing   reliance
on   Sheikh   Hasib   @   Tabarak   v.   State   of   Bihar 4
  &   Dharma   Rama
Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra 5
, canvassed that the FIR was not
a substantive piece of evidence and could be used for contradicting or
corroborating   only   its   maker   and   not   other   witnesses.   He   contended
that   the   credibility   of   the   witnesses   cannot   be   called   into   question
merely   because   they   were   related   to   the   deceased   (while   citing   State
of  UP  v.  Kishan  Chand 6
) or because there were minor discrepancies
4
 (1972) 4 SCC 773.
5  
(1973) 1 SCC 537.
6  
(2004) 7 SCC 629.
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or exaggerations (relying on  Leela Ram v. State of Haryana 7
).  While
bringing   out   attention   to   this   Court’s   observations   in   Gangadhar
Behera   v.   State   of   Orissa 8
  and   Prabhu   Dayal   v.   State   of
Rajasthan 9
  it   was   urged   that   inconsistent   evidence   by   the
prosecution   witnesses   against   one   accused   cannot   be   capitalised   to
give the benefit of doubt to another. 
ANALYSIS:   
12. The   question   which   falls   for   consideration   in   these   appeals   is
whether the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 378
of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   (“CrPC”)   was   justified   in
interfering with the acquittal by the trial Court?   
13. It is fundamental in criminal jurisprudence that every person is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, for criminal accusations
can be hurled at anyone without him being a criminal. The suspect is
therefore   considered   to   be   innocent   in   the   interregnum   between
accusation   and   judgment.   History   reveals   that   the   burden   on   the
accuser to prove the guilt of the accused has its roots in ancient times.
The   Babylonian   Code   of   Hammurabi   (1792­1750   B.C.),   one   of   the
oldest   written   codes   of   law   put   the   burden   of   proof   on   the   accuser.
7  
(1999) 9 SCC 525.
8  
(2002) 8 SCC 381.
9  
(2018) 8 SCC 127. 
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Roman Law coined the principle of   actori incumbit (onus) probatio   (the
burden of proof weighs on the plaintiff) i.e., presumed innocence of the
accused.   In   Woolmington   v.   Director   of   Public   Prosecutions 10
,   the
House   of   Lords   held   that   the   duty   of   the   prosecution   to   prove   the
prisoner’s guilt was the “golden thread” throughout the web of English
Criminal Law. Today, Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,   Article   14   of   the   International   Covenant   on   Civil   and   Political
Rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights all
mandate presumption of innocence of the accused. 
14. A characteristic feature of Common Law Criminal Jurisprudence
in India is also that an accused must be presumed to be innocent till
the contrary is proved. It is obligatory on the prosecution to establish
the guilt of the accused save where the presumption of innocence has
been   statutorily   dispensed   with,   for   example,   under   Section   113­B   of
the   Evidence   Act,   1872.   Regardless   thereto,   the   ‘Right   of   Silence’
guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution is one of the facets
of   presumed   innocence.   The   constitutional   mandate   read   with   the
scheme   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973   amplifies   that   the
presumption of innocence, until the accused is proved to be guilty, is
an   integral   part   of   the   Indian   criminal   justice   system.   This
presumption   of   innocence   is   doubled   when   a   competent   Court
10
 [1935] AC 462 (HL) 
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analyses   the   material   evidence,   examines   witnesses   and   acquits   the
accused.  Keeping  this  cardinal  principle   of  invaluable  rights  in  mind,
the   appellate   Courts   have   evolved   a   self­restraint   policy   whereunder,
when   two   reasonable   and   possible   views   arise,   the   one   favourable   to
the  accused  is adopted  while respecting  the  trial  Court’s  proximity  to
the   witnesses   and   direct   interaction   with   evidence.   In   such   cases,
interference   is   not   thrusted   unless     perversity   is   detected   in   the
decision­making process.
15. It   is   thus   a   well   crystalized   principle   that   if   two   views   are
possible,   the   High   Court   ought   not   to   interfere   with   the   trial   Court’s
judgment.   However,   such   a   precautionary   principle   cannot   be
overstretched to portray that the  “contours of appeal”  against acquittal
under Section 378 CrPC are limited to seeing whether or not the trial
Court’s view was impossible. It is equally well settled that there is no
bar on the High Court’s power  to re­appreciate evidence in an appeal
against   acquittal 11
.   This   Court   has   held   in   a   catena   of   decisions
(including   Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 12
  ,   State of Andhra
Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao 13
  and   Raveen Kumar v. State of
Himachal   Pradesh 14
, )   that   the   CrPC   does   not   differentiate   in   the
11
 Sangappa v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 686, ¶ 10.
12
 (2007) 4 SCC 415, ¶ 42.
13
 (2008) 15 SCC 582, ¶ 20 – 21.
14
 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869, ¶ 11. 
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power,   scope,   jurisdiction   or   limitation   between   appeals   against
judgments   of   conviction   or   acquittal   and   that   the   appellate   Court   is
free   to   consider   on   both   fact   and   law,   despite   the   self­restraint   that
has been ingrained into practice while dealing with orders of acquittal
where there is a double presumption of innocence of the accused.
16. The   trial   Court   in   the   instant   case   rightly   observed   that   the
evidence   was   chaotic   with   regard   to   many   accused   persons   and   no
definite   view   could   be   formed   regarding   their   participation.   The   High
Court   also   shared   the   view   of   the   trial   Court   and   expressed   concern
regarding   the   exaggerations   and   contradictions   within   the   evidence.
Keeping   in   mind   the   attempts   by   the   prosecution   witnesses   to
implicate   numerous   people,   the   High   Court   delineated   the   strands   of
consistent   evidence   against   some   of   the   accused   which   were
overlooked   by   the   trial   Court   amid   the   chaos.     While   analysing   the
witness statements and other evidence, we will now consider whether
the High Court did so correctly. 
17. Complainant   Netar   Singh   (P.W.1),   deposed   that   when   the
accused persons broke open the door and entered their house, Budhi
Singh, Achhar  Singh,  Narinder Singh  were  armed with  axes, Prakash
had   a   spear,   Sodha   Ram   had   a   sickle   and   other   accused   (Jai   Singh
and   Hem   Singh)   were   bearing   sticks.   While   mentioning   the   present
appellants   he   said   that   “Budhi   Singh   accused   gave   two   axe   blows   on
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the   head   of   my   mother,   while   Narender   accused   gave   two   axe   blows
one above the left ear and second below the left ear of my mother, and
my mother Swari Devi died on the spot... Achhar Singh and Sodha also
gave blows of drat and axe to my father. As a result of the beatings my
father   became   unconscious   and   fell   down.   Hem   Singh   and   Jai   Singh
accused   gave   me   danda   blows”.   It   was   also   mentioned   that   the
accused   had   broken   the   door,   windows   and   utensils.   He   then
described how he went to the Pradhan’s house at 2:00 AM and later to
the far away police station (Jogindernagar) on foot and lodged the FIR
at   about   8­9   AM   the   next   morning.   He   also   mentioned   that   prior
animosity   existed   between   the   parties   because   Budhi   Singh   and
Narinder   Singh   wanted   to   purchase   the   land   where   he   had
constructed   a   house   and   that   his   father   ­   Beli   Ram   had   previously
filed   a   case   against   the   accused   persons   in   which   they   had   been
acquitted. 
18. Meera Devi – P.W.11, the daughter in law of the deceased stated
in   her   testimony   that   Budhi   Singh   and   Narinder   Singh   were   armed
with   axes,   while   Prakash   carried   a   spear   and   Sodha   Ram   carried   a
sickle.   She   said   that   “Budhi   Singh   accused   gave   two   blows   of   axe   on
the head of my mother­in­law Smt. Swari Devi on which my mother­in­
law   raised   cry.   Narinder   Singh   accused   gave   two   blows   of   axe   on   the
ear   of   my   mother­in­law   and   my   mother­in­law   fell   down   and   died.
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Narinder Singh gave blow from backside of the axe to Beli Ram on his
face and Achhar Singh gave blow of axe on the neck of Beli Ram. Sodha
Ram gave drat blow on the leg of my father­in­law Beli Ram…Jai Singh
and   Hem   Singh   gave   danda   blow   to   my   husband   Netar   Singh.”   She
stated   that   her   husband     escaped   to   the   roof,   reported   the   matter   to
the Pradhan and came back with the police the next day. Her husband
and father­in­law were taken for medical examination and her mother­
in­law’s   body   was   sent   for   post­mortem.   During   her   cross­
examination,   she   mentioned   that   the   police   came   at   about   8­9AM   in
the morning. 
19. Injured   witness,   Beli   Ram   (P.W.12)   was   also   examined   and   he
stated   that   Budhi   Singh,   Narinder   and   Achhar   Singh   came   bearing
axes, while Prakash had a spear, Sodha Ram had a sickle and Jai and
Hem   Singh   were   armed   with   sticks.   While   describing   the   attacks,   he
said that   “Budhi Singh gave two blows of axe on the head of my wife,
Swari Devi and two blows of axe were given by Narinder near the ear of
my wife and my wife died on the spot. Achhar Singh accused gave axe
blow on the backside of my head while Sodha accused gave drat blow
on   my   leg….Netar   Singh   was   given   beatings   by   Jai   Singh   and   Hem
Singh with danda and stones.”  He added that his son escaped through
the   roof.   It   was   mentioned   that   the   accused   persons   had   formed   a
committee   to   boycott   them   and   thus   nobody   from   the   village   gave
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evidence   in   their   favour.   He   also   disclosed   that   “Narinder   Singh
accused   also   gave   blow   blunt   side   of   the   axe   on   my   face   near   ear.”
Thereafter,   he   fell   unconscious   and   was   medically   examined   at   the
hospital.  
20. Dr.   DD   Rana,   who   conducted   the   post­mortem   of   the   deceased
and   medically   examined   the   injured   (Netar   Singh   and   Beli   Ram)   was
examined   as   P.W.3.   with   regard   to   Swari   Devi,   he   described   one
incised wound on the left temporal region, which he stated, could have
been caused by the axe shown in Court. On medically examining Beli
Ram, he stated that he found incised wounds on the face and the back
of his skull, a lacerated wound on the right foot, fracture in the facial
bone and a black eye. He  said that the incised  wounds were possible
by the axe shown in Court and the rest were possible by stick blows.
During cross­ examination, he added that the incised injuries on Beli
Ram   could   be   inflicted   by   falling   on   a   sharp­edged   stone   and   other
injuries   were   possible   from   falling   on   a   hard   surface.   After   medically
examining   Netar   Singh   (P.W.1),   he   is   stated   to   have   found   abrasions
on   the   right   foot,   left   leg   and   forehead.   He   added   that   such   injuries
were possibly a result of stick blows and could also be from a fall.  
21. A meticulous reading of the above statements makes it clear that
even   if   the   exaggerations   of   multiple   axe   blows   being   given   to   the
deceased were discarded, the allegation that Budhi Singh entered the
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house   of   the   victims   armed   with   an   axe   and   hit   Swari   Devi   on   her
head,   and   that   Swari   Devi   died   due   to   a   head   injury   was   consistent
and undisputed throughout the FIR and the deposition by prosecution
witnesses.   The   same   is   also   supported   by   the   post­mortem   report
stating one fatal injury to the head by a sharp­edged weapon and the
medical officer’s testimony that her injury could have been caused by
the   axe   shown   in   Court.   Considering   this,   the   trial   Court’s   confusion
as   to   who   caused   Swari   Devi’s   fatal   injury   was   unwarranted   and
uncalled for. 
22. The fact that Budhi Singh executed an axe blow on Swari Devi’s
head knowing fully well that an axe blow on an old woman’s vital body
part   would   in   all   probability   cause   her   death,   justifies   his   conviction
for   the   offence   under   Section   302   IPC.   As   for   Achhar   Singh,   we   find
that   the   injuries   sustained   by   Beli   Ram   (incised   wounds   on   the   face
and   posterior   skull   along   with   fracture   in   the   facial   bone)   being   a
combination of grievous and simple injuries were opined to have been
caused  by both sharp and blunt edged weapons.  Considering that  all
the   witnesses   have   been   consistent   about   Achhar   Singh’s   attack   on
Beli Ram with an axe, his conviction under Sections 326 and 323 IPC
cannot be found faulty and deserves to be upheld.
23. The   appellants’   contention   that   the   testimony   of   P.W.1,   P.W.11
or P.W.12 was wholly unbelievable and inconsistent with the evidence
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of the Doctor (P.W.3) and the post­mortem report, is unacceptable.  As
noticed   earlier,   the   prosecution   witnesses   have   given   an   over­
exaggerated   version   of   the   injuries   suffered   by   the   deceased.   They
have, however, consistently deposed that the head injury which proved
to   be   fatal,   was   caused   by   Budhi   Singh.     Their   statement,   to   this
extent,   is   consistent   and   in   conformity   with   the   medical   evidence   on
record.  Despite the fact that the presence of many persons inside the
room   of   occurrence   created   chaos   and   some   of   such   persons   were
bystanders   or   fence   sitters,   the   eye­witnesses   have   been   able   to   see
that   the   fatal   blow   to   the   deceased   was   caused   by   none   else   than
Budhi Singh. 
24. It  is   vehemently   contended  that  the  evidence  of  the   prosecution
witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines
“exaggeration” as  “the fact of making something larger, more important,
better   or   worse   than   it   really   is” .   Merriam­Webster   defines   the   term
“exaggerate”   as   to   “enlarge   beyond   bounds   or   the   truth” .   The   Concise
Oxford   Dictionary   defines   it   as   “enlarged   or   altered   beyond   normal
proportions”.   These   expressions   unambiguously   suggest   that   the
genesis   of   an   ‘exaggerated   statement’   lies   in   a   true   fact,   to   which
fictitious additions are made so as to make it more penetrative. Every
exaggeration,   therefore,   has   the   ingredients   of   ‘truth’.   No   exaggerated
statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand,
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Advance Law Lexicon defines “false” as   “erroneous, untrue; opposite of
correct,   or   true”.   Oxford   Concise   Dictionary   states   that   “false”   is
“wrong;   not   correct   or   true”.   Similar   is   the   explanation   in   other
dictionaries   as   well.   There   is,   thus,   a   marked   differentia   between   an
‘exaggerated   version’   and   a   ‘false   version’.   An   exaggerated   statement
contains   both   truth   and   falsity,   whereas   a   false   statement   has   no
grain of truth in it (being the ‘opposite’ of ‘true’). It is well said that to
make   a   mountain   out   of   a   molehill,   the   molehill   shall   have   to   exist
primarily.   A   Court   of   law,   being   mindful   of   such   distinction   is   duty
bound   to   disseminate   ‘truth’   from   ‘falsehood’   and   sift   the   grain   from
the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain
and   the   chaff   are   so   inextricably   intertwined   that   in   their   separation
no real evidence survives, that the whole evidence can be discarded. 15
 
25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on   Gangadhar Behera
(Supra)   to   contend   that   even   in   cases   where   a   major   portion   of   the
evidence is found deficient, if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt
of   the   accused,   conviction   can   be   based   on   it.   This   Court   in   Hari
Chand v. State of Delhi 16
 held that:
“24. …So far as this contention is concerned it must be kept in
view that   while appreciating  the  evidence  of witnesses  in
15
 Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643, ¶ 18. 
16  
(1996) 9 SCC 112. 
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a   criminal   trial   especially   in   a   case   of   eyewitnesses   the
maxim   falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus   cannot   apply
and   the  court   has   to  make  efforts   to  sift   the  grain   from
the chaff.   It is of course true that when a witness is said
to have exaggerated  in his  evidence at  the stage of trial
and   has   tried   to   involve  many   more   accused   and   if  that
part   of   the   evidence   is   not   found   acceptable   the
remaining   part   of   evidence   has   to   be   scrutinised   with
care   and   the   court   must   try   to   see   whether   the
acceptable   part   of   the   evidence   gets   corroborated   from
other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can
be safely relied upon ...”
(emphasis supplied)
26. There   is   no   gainsaid   that   homicidal   deaths   cannot   be   left   to
judicium   dei .   The   Court   in   their   quest   to   reach   the   truth   ought   to
make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The
solemn  duty  is to  dig out the  authenticity. It is  only  when the  Court,
despite its best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit
of doubt is extended. 
27. An   eye­witness   is   always   preferred   to   others.   The   statements   of
P.W.1,   P.W.11   and   P.W.12   are,   therefore,   to   be   analysed   accordingly,
while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity.
We   find   that   the   truth   can   be   effortlessly   extracted   from   their
statements.   The   trial   Court   apparently   fell   in   grave   error   and
overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with
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a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eye­
witnesses belie their version.
28. As regard to the appellants’ contention that an appellate Court is
not   justified   in   reversing   the   trial   Court’s   judgment   unless   it   was
found to be “perverse”, it is important to point out that in the instant
case, the trial Court being overwhelmed by many contradictions failed
to   identify   and   appreciate   material   admissible   evidence   against   the
appellants.   The   trial   Court   misdirected   itself   to   wrong   conclusions.
Suffice it to cite  Babu v. State of Kerala 17
 where this Court observed
that:
“12. …While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate
court   has   to   consider   the   entire   evidence   on   record,   so   as   to
arrive   at   a   finding   as   to   whether   the   views   of   the   trial   court
were   perverse   or   otherwise   unsustainable.   The   appellate
court   is   entitled   to   consider   whether   in   arriving   at   a
finding   of   fact,   the   trial   court   had   failed   to   take   into
consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into
consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to
law …”
(emphasis supplied)
29. There are numerous later decisions (including   Aruvelu v. State
(supra),   Triveni   Rubber   &   Plastics   v.   CCE 18
  and   Basalingappa   v.
17   
(2010) 9 SCC 189. 
18  
1994 Supp (3) SCC 665, ¶ 3. 
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Mudibasappa 19
)   where   this   Court   has   firmly   held   that   a   finding
contrary to the evidence is “perverse”. The finding of the trial Court in
ignorance   of   the   relevant   material   on   record   was   undoubtedly
“perverse” and ripe for interference from the High Court. 
30. While testing the ‘possibility’ of the conclusion drawn by the trial
Court,   it   has   to   be   kept   in   mind   that   neither   is   there   a   reason   on
record nor have the appellants led any defence evidence to suggest as
to why Netar Singh (P.W.1), his wife Meera Devi (P.W.11) or his father
Beli   Ram   (P.W.12)   would   allow   the   real   culprits   to   go   scot­free     and
instead   falsely   implicate   the   appellants   to   settle   scores   on   trivial
issues. Rather, from the very beginning (FIR) till their last deposition,
the   complainant   and   other   two   injured/eye   witnesses   have   been
consistently   accusing   Budhi   Singh   for   committing   murder   of   Swari
Devi and Achhar   Singh for grievously hurting Beli Ram. Their ocular
version   is   duly   corroborated   by   the   medical   evidence   on   record.   This
Court in  Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab 20
 opined that:
“ 26…. Ordinarily,   a   close   relative   would   be   the   last   to
screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person.   It   is   true,   when   feelings   run   high   and   there   is
personal   cause   for   enmity,   that   there   is   a   tendency   to
drag  in an  innocent  person  against whom a witness has
19  
(2019) 5 SCC 418, ¶ 31.
20
 AIR 1953 SC 364, ¶ 26. 
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a   grudge   along   with   the   guilty,   but   foundation   must   be
laid   for   such   a   criticism   and   the   mere   fact   of
relationship   far   from   being   a   foundation   is   often   a   sure
guarantee   of   truth.   However,   we   are   not   attempting   any
sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own
facts.   Our   observations   are   only   made   to   combat   what   is   so
often   put   forward   in   cases   before   us   as   a   general   rule   of
prudence.   There   is   no   such   general   rule.   Each   case   must   be
limited to and be governed by its own facts.”
(emphasis supplied)
            T his   decision   has   been   usually   followed   by   this   Court   in   various
cases such as,   Mohd. Rojali Ali v. State of Assam 21
,  Laltu Ghosh v.
State   of   West   Bengal 22
,   Khurshid   Ahmed   v.   State   of   J&K 23
  and
Shanmugam v. State 24
.
31. Coming   to   the   arguments   of   Learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the
appellants   that   since   the   axe   was   recovered   from   a   public   place   it
should not have  been  held  to be in  the  possession  of  Budhi Singh or
that an axe was also recovered from Narinder Singh (with whom parity
was   sought),   it   is   clear   from   the   facts   that   this   was   a   farming
community   in   rural   Himachal   where   tools   like   axes   are   found   in
everyone’s   homes.   The   argument   that   the   spot   of   incident   was
doubtful   as   there   was   a   blood   trail   outside   the   house   as   deposed   by
21
 (2019) 19 SCC 567, ¶ 14. 
22
 (2019) 15 SCC 344 ¶ 14. 
23
 (2018) 7 SCC 429, ¶ 29. 
24
 (2013) 12 SCC 765, ¶ 13. 
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P.W.16   ­   ASI   Jaisi   Ram,   carries   no   force.   The   presence   of   random
blood   marks   elsewhere   could   not   put   in   doubt   the   fact   that   the
incident   happened   in   the   house   of   the   complainant   from   where   the
same   witness   recovered   sticks,   blood­stained   stone,   glass   splinters,
pieces of wood and leftover food, etc. The fact that the ASI did not find
it   necessary   or   even   material   to   investigate   the   blood   marks   shows
that   they   had   no   legal   impact   on   the   investigative   conclusions.   It   is
pertinent   to   note   that   independent   witness         P.W.14   ­   Lauhalu   Ram
also   corroborated   the   recovery   of   broken   pieces   of   the   door,   broken
bulb,   stones,   blood­stained   soil   etc.   from   the   house   of   the
complainant.
32. Non­examination of many alleged bystanders is well­explained as
it   is   clear   from   the   facts   that   the   complainant’s   family   had   prior
litigation with some people in the village and most of them had socially
boycotted   the   victim’s   family.   The   fact   that   nine   persons   who   were
initially accused in the FIR but not charge­sheeted subsequently, were
not   arrayed   as   prosecution   witnesses   is   understandable.   It   is   not
necessary   for   the   prosecution   to   examine   every   cited   or   possible
witness.     So   long   as   the   prosecution   case   can   withstand   the   test   of
proof   beyond   doubt,   non­examination   of   all   or   every   witness   is
immaterial. 
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33.   This   Court   in   Sarwan   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab 25
  was   of   the
view that:
“13.…The onus of proving the prosecution case rests entirely on
the   prosecution   and   it   follows   as   a   logical   corollary   that   the
prosecution has  complete liberty to  choose its witnesses  if it  is
to   prove   its   case.   The   court   cannot   compel   the   prosecution   to
examine one witness or the other as its witness. At the most, if
a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an adverse
inference   against   the   prosecution… The   law   is   well­settled
that   the   prosecution   is   bound   to   produce   only   such
witnesses   as   are   essential   for   unfolding   of   the
prosecution   narrative.   In   other   words,   before   an   adverse
inference   against   the   prosecution   can   be   drawn   it   must   be
proved   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   court   that   the   witnesses   who
had   been   withheld   were   eyewitnesses   who   had   actually   seen
the occurrence and were therefore material to prove the case.  It
is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses
after witnesses on the same point; it is the quality rather
than   the   quantity   of   the   evidence   that   matters .   In   the
instant  case,  the   evidence   of  the  eyewitnesses   does   not  suffer
from   any   infirmity   or   any   manifest   defect   on   its   intrinsic
merit…”
(emphasis supplied)
34. Similarly,  the   doubt  cast  on   the  actual  time   of   death  relying   on
P.W.3   ­   Dr.   D.D.   Rana’s   statement   does   not   inspire   confidence   as   he
besides stating that the time between the death and the post­mortem
was   ‘within   10   hours’,   has   also   deposed   that   the   time   between   the
25
 (1976) 4 SCC 369, ¶ 13. 
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death of Swari Devi and the injury was ‘within 5­10 minutes’, thereby
supporting   the   prosecution   witnesses   who   deposed   that   she   died   on
the spot owing to the injuries. 
35. Coming to the case of Narinder Singh, whose acquittal has been
upheld   by   the   High   Court   also,   it   is   imperative   to   point   out   that   the
FIR,   though   not   an   encyclopedia   of   the   entire   incident,   is   the   most
spontaneous   account   of   it.   It   is   very   hard   to   believe   that   the
complainant   who   walked   seven   hours   overnight   to   reach   the   police
station to record his account of the incident would forget to mention a
fatal attack with a deadly weapon on his deceased mother by Narinder
Singh   as   well.   Such   a   major   omission   on   the   complainant’s   part   is
very   material   to   contradict   his   testimony   in   Court   with   regard   to   his
belated   allegations   against  Narinder   Singh.   The  medical  evidence   has
also   not   substantiated   such   allegations   against   Narinder   Singh.   The
High   Court   has   only   acted   on   consistent   and   corroborated   evidence
against   Budhi   Singh   and   Achhar   Singh   which   was   conspicuously
missing in the case of Narinder Singh. 
36. Likewise,   the   contention   relying   on   P.W.11’s   statement   that   the
police could not have arrived before the FIR was filed does not defeat
the  case of the  prosecution as  it is  a minor  contradiction  considering
that P.W.16 ­ ASI Jaisi Ram has deposed that he reached the house of
the complainant at 1PM on 24.02.1996. The argument that there was
Page  |  26

no reason for Budhi Singh to start a fight with his neighbours on the
day   of   his   daughter’s   wedding   also   does   not  help   the   appellants.   The
High   Court   has   specifically   pointed   out   that   his   daughter’s   wedding
was solemnized two days prior to the date of the incident and there is
no credible evidence as to whether a wedding function was underway
at   the   relevant   time.   Even   Budhi   Singh   has   not   said   so   in   his
statement under Section 313 CrPC.
37. In light of the above discussion and upon an in­depth reading of
the trial Court and High Court records, we are convinced that the High
Court   was   merited   to   interfere   with   the   perverse   findings   of   the   trial
Court   and   has   prevented   miscarriage   of   justice   by   separating   grain
from the husks leading to the conviction of the appellants.  
CONCLUSION:   
38. For the above­stated reasons, the appeals are dismissed. Achhar
Singh’s   conviction   under   Sections   452,   326   and   323   IPC   and   Budhi
Singh’s conviction under Sections 302 and 452 IPC by the High Court 
Page  |  27

39. are   maintained.   Their   bail   bonds   are   cancelled   and   they   are
directed to undergo the remainder of their sentence.
……………………….. CJI.
  ………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………. J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 07.05.2021
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