2021 INSC 0250
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.472 OF 2021
[ Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 10157 of 2019 ]
Sanjay Kumar Rai
..... Appellant
                             VERSUS
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. ..... Respondent(s) 
 
J U D G M E N T
Surya Kant, J:
Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   emanates   from   the   judgment   dated   28.11.2018
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad whereby a
criminal   revision   against   the   order   dated   13.03.2014   of   the

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Chief   Judicial   Magistrate,   Sant   Kabir   Nagar   refusing   to
discharge the appellant in N.C.R. No.120/2012 under Sections
504 and 506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred to
as “IPC”], has been turned down. 
 
3. A   brief   reference   to   the   facts   may   be   necessary   for   disposal   of
the   present   appeal.   A   complaint   was   lodged   with   the
jurisdictional police by Respondent No.2 (Kuldeep Mishra), who
claimed   to   be   a   newspaper   correspondent   working   for   ‘The
Pioneer’.     It   was   alleged   that   he   had   conducted   a   journalistic
investigation   for   malpractices   against   one   gas   agency,   namely
‘Kalpana   Indane   Service’.     He   had   also   applied   for   certain
information   under   the   Right   to   Information   Act   2005,   so   as   to
conduct   investigation   on   alleged   black   marketing   of   gas
cylinders   by   the   aforesaid   agency.     The   appellant   herein   is   a
partner in the aforesaid gas agency.  As per the NCR report it is
stated that the appellant, while he was responding  to the calls
made   by   Respondent   No.2,   started   calling   him   names   and
threatened   to   kill   Respondent   No.2.   It   is   alleged   that   the

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appellant had threatened Respondent No.2 to pump numerous
bullets in his face so that he may not even be recognized.  
4. On   08.05.2012   the   complainant   filed   an   application   before   the
concerned Chief Judicial  Magistrate (“CJM”) under  Section  155
(2)   Cr.P.C.   for   conducting   investigation   in   the   aforesaid
allegations.     The   Court   accordingly   directed   investigation   and
ordered the local police to submit the report.
  
5. It   may   be   noted   that   during   the   course   of   investigation
statement   of   complainant   was   recorded   by   the   police   which
forms part of the case diary.   The material allegations as stated
in the aforesaid statement are as follows:­
“………..The applicant had kept the speaker  of
his   mobile   on   and   from   his   mobile   no.   XXXX
telephoned  to  Sanjay   Rai’s  mobile  no.XXXX  to
enquire   about   the   latest   irregularities   in   the
said   gas   agency.     On   mobile   itself,   Sanjay   Rai
started   to   give   filthy   abuses   to   the   applicant
and   threatened   to   kill   him.     At   the   same   he
also   told   that   your   right   to   information   and
intellectual   concerns   shall   be   kept   back   in
your   hands.   I   will   shot   [ sic. ]   such   number   of
bullets   that   even   your   face   could   not   be
recognized.     Mohd.   Sahrif   Kahn   and   Umesh
Kumar   Bhatt   had   also   heard   the   threatening
given by Sanjay Rai.”

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       It is apparent that there is material change in the statement
of   the   respondent   –   complainant   wherein   he   introduced   Mohd.
Sharif Khan  and  Umesh  Kumar   Bhatt  as witnesses for  the  call
made by the appellant herein.  
6. In   any   case,   on   21.07.2012   a   charge   sheet   came   to   be   filed
against the appellant/accused under Sections 504 and 506 IPC
based on the statement of complainant and the affidavits of two
witnesses.     It   may   not   be   out   of   context   to   mention   here   that
the   Investigating   Officer   did   not   deem   it   necessary   to   take   the
version  of  the appellant  on  record  or  consider  his  side  of story
also.
 
7. The   CJM   took   cognizance   of   the   matter   on   08.11.2012.
However,   well   before   for   framing   of   the   charges   the   appellant
sought his discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. contending that
the complainant has falsely implicated him and the allegation of
telephonic   threats   does   not   constitute   an   offence   under
Sections   504   and   506   of   IPC.     It   was   further   averred   that   the
investigation   was   not   fair   and   was   unilateral   in   its   approach
wherein the investigating officer had made no efforts to find out

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the   truth   and   had   instead   relied   on   the   statement   of   the
complainant   and   other   planted   witnesses   to   fasten   a   case
against the appellant.   The learned CJM did not agree with the
appellant’s   plea   and   rejected   his   discharge   application
observing as under:­
“xxx  xxx xxx
From   perusal   of   record   it   is   obvious   that     no
affidavit   or   any   documentary   evidence     has
been   filed   by   the   applicant/accused   in   support
of his discharge­application.
The   fact   that   which   word   has   been   used   as
abuses   and   threatening   by   the   applicant   is   a
matter of evidence which can not be determined
at this stage. [sic.]
From oral as well as documentary evidences on
records, there are sufficient evidence on records
to frame charges against the accused.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid   facts   and
circumstances,   the   application   dated
20.02.2014 filed by the applicant Shree Sanjay
Kumar Rai, U/s­239, Cr.P.C. does not appear to
be   maintainable   at   this   stage   and   therefore   is
liable to be rejected.
xxx xxx xxx”
8. The  appellant  aggrieved  by  the   aforesaid  order   approached   the
High   Court   through   a   Criminal   Revision   Petition,   seeking

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reversal   of   CJM’s   order.   The   High   Court   relying   on   the
judgment of this Court in  Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency
Pvt.   Ltd.     v.   Central   Bureau   of   Investigation 1
  observed  that
interference   in   the   order   framing   charges   or   refusing   to
discharge is called for in rarest of rare case only to correct the
patent error of jurisdiction.  Finding no such jurisdictional error
in CJM’s order the Criminal Revision Petition was dismissed.  
9. Dissatisfied   with   the   aforesaid   impugned   order,   the   appellant­
accused   has   approached   this   Court   through   Special   Leave
Petition. 
CONTENTIONS:
10. Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellant   urged   that   prima   facie,   the
story of the complainant seems dubious, for he himself initiated
the phone call, put it on speaker  and had two witnesses ready
to listen to the conversation.   No call records had been sought
by   the   police,   affidavits   of   the   witnesses   were   blindly   accepted
and   no   attempt   was   made   to   record   their   statements   under
Section 161 of CrPC.  The Investigating Officer proceeded with a
closed   mind   and   casually   overlooked   the   credentials   of   the
1 (2018) 16 SCC 299

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complainant   who   is   involved   in   seven   criminal   cases   including
under   Sections   323,   504   and   506   of   IPC.     A   letter   from   the
Resident   Editor   of   ‘The   Pioneer’   was   also   produced,   showing
that   the   complainant   was   not   employed   with   their   newspaper
around the time of the alleged incident.
11. On   the   other   hand,   learned   State   Counsel   urged   that   the
allegations  make  for   a  clear  case under  Sections  504  and  506
of   IPC   and   that   no   error   was   committed   by   the   High   Court   or
the CJM.   In addition to the judgment of this Court which the
High   Court   relied   upon,   he   buttressed   his   submissions   citing
State   of   Karnataka   v.   M.R.   Hiremath 2
  which   held   that   the
Court ought not to enter into questions of evidentiary  value of
the material adduced at the stage of considering discharge, and
Srilekha Sentelkumar v. CBI 3
  whereby this Court opined that
it   was   impermissible   to   look   into   the   merits   of   the   case   while
exercising powers under Section 239 CrPC.
ANALYSIS :
2 (2019) 7 SCC 515
3 (2019) 7 SCC 82

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12. At the outset, we may note that the High Court has dismissed
the   Criminal   Revision   on   the   ground   of   lack   of   jurisdiction
under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.   The High Court did not examine
the   issue   in   detail   to   find   out   whether   the   continuation   of
proceedings will amount to abuse of process of law in this case.
The   impugned   order   cites   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Asian
Resurfacing (supra)  wherein it was noted as under:­
“ …Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing
charge   is   not   purely   an   interlocutory   order   nor   a
final   order.     Jurisdiction   of   the   High   Court   is   not
barred   irrespective   of   the   label   of   a   petition,   be   it
under Sections 397 or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of the
Constitution.   However, the said jurisdiction is to be
exercised   consistent   with   the   legislative   policy   to
ensure   expeditious   disposal   of   a   trial   without   the
same   being   in   any   manner   hampered.     Thus
considered,   the   challenge   to   an   order   of   charge
should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to
correct   a   patent   error   of   jurisdiction   and   not   to   re­
appreciate the matter.”
13. It   appears   to   us   that   while   limiting   the   scope   of   a   criminal
revision   to   jurisdictional   errors   alone,   the   High   Court
apparently   under­appreciated   the   Judgment   in   Asian
Resurfacing (supra) .  We say so at least for two reasons.  First,

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the material facts in the above­cited case dealt with a challenge
to   the  charges  framed  under  the   Prevention   of  Corruption   Act,
1988   (“POCA”).     The   cited   judgment   itself   enlightens   that   not
only   is   POCA   a   special   legislation,   but   also   contains   a   specific
bar   under   Section   19   against   routine   exercise   of   revisional
jurisdiction.   Second , This Court in   Asian Resurfacing (Supra)
while expressing concern regarding the need to tackle rampant
pendency   and   delays   in   our   criminal   law   system,   followed   the
ratio   laid   down   in   an   earlier   decision   in   Madhu   Limaye   v.
State   of   Maharashtra 4  
as   can   be   seen   from   the   following
extract:
“ 27.   Thus,   even   though   in   dealing   with   different
situations,   seemingly   conflicting   observations   may
have   been   made   while   holding   that   the   order
framing charge was interlocutory order and was not
liable   to   be   interfered   with   under   Section   397(2)   or
even   under   Section   482   CrPC,   the   principle   laid
down in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye v. State
of   Maharashtra,   (1977)   4   SCC   551:   1978   SCC
(Cri)   10]   still   holds   the   field.     Order   framing
charge   may   not   be   held   to   be   purely   an
interlocutory   order   and   can   in   a   given
situation   be   interfered   with   under   Section
397(2)   CrPC   or   482   CrPC   or   Article   227   of   the
4 (1977) 4 SCC 551

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Constitution which is a constitutional provision
but   the   power   of   the   High   Court   to   interfere
with an order framing charge and to grant stay
is   to   be   exercised   only   in   a   exceptional
situation.”
       (emphasis supplied)
14. In  Madhu Limaye (supra),  this Court authoritatively held:
“ 9… Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High
Court has also been resorted to for the same kind of
relief   by   challenging   the   order   taking   cognizance   or
issuing  processes   or  framing  charge  on the   grounds
that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
and   proceed   with   the   trial,   that   the   issuance   of
process was wholly illegal or void, or that no charge
could be framed as no offence was made out on the
allegations made or the evidence adduced in Court..
10.   …   Even   assuming,   although   we   shall   presently
show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of
the   Court   taking   cognizance   or   issuing   processes   is
an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say
that   inherent   power   of   the   High   Court   cannot   be
exercises   for   stopping   the   criminal   proceeding   as
early   as   possible,   instead   of   harassing   the   accused
up   to   the   end?   The   answer   is   obvious   that   the
bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the
process   of   the   Court   and/or   to   secure   the   ends
of   justice.   The   label   of   the   petition   filed   by   an
aggrieved party is immaterial.
                                                                (emphasis supplied)

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15. The   correct   position   of   law   as   laid   down   in   Madhu   Limaye
(supra) ,   thus,   is   that   orders   framing   charges   or   refusing
discharge   are   neither   interlocutory   nor   final   in   nature   and   are
therefore not affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC.  That
apart,   this   Court   in   the   above­cited   cases   has   unequivocally
acknowledged   that   the   High   Court   is   imbued   with   inherent
jurisdiction   to   prevent   abuse   of   process   or   to   secure   ends   of
justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual
cases.     As   a   caveat   it   may   be   stated   that   the   High   Court,   while
exercising   its   afore­stated   jurisdiction   ought   to   be   circumspect.
The discretion vested in the High Court is to be invoked carefully
and judiciously for effective and timely administration of criminal
justice   system.   This   Court,   nonetheless,   does   not   recommend   a
complete   hands   off   approach.   Albeit,   there   should   be
interference, may  be, in exceptional  cases, failing  which there is
likelihood   of   serious   prejudice   to   the   rights   of   a   citizen.   For
example,   when   the   contents   of   a   complaint   or   the   other
purported material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an

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innocent   person,   it   becomes   imperative   upon   the   Court   to
prevent the abuse of process of law .   
16. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering
the discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The
Court   has   to   sift   through   the   evidence   in   order   to   find   out
whether there are sufficient grounds to try the suspect. The court
has   to   consider   the   broad   probabilities,   total   effect   of   evidence
and   documents   produced   and   the   basic   infirmities   appearing   in
the   case   and   so   on.   [ Union   of   India   v.   Prafulla   Kumar
Samal 5
].     Likewise,   the   Court   has   sufficient   discretion   to   order
further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be.
17. This brings us to the present case wherein the High Court has
not   gone   into   the   merits   of   the   case   and   did   not   analyze   the
case in light of the settled law referred to above.  
18. The   High   Court   has   committed   jurisdictional   error   by   not
entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the
fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused.
In   line   with   the   fact   that   the   High   Court   and   the   court   below
have not examined the fairness of criminal investigation in this
5 (1979) 3 SCC 4

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case   and   other   related   aspects   concerning   improvement   of
witness   statements,   it   is   necessary   for   the   High   Court   to
reconsider   the   entire   matter   and   decide   the   revision   petition
afresh.     Accordingly,   we   set   aside   the   impugned   order   dated
28.11.2018 and remand the case back to the High Court for its
reconsideration in accordance with law.
19.    The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
  All the pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of
accordingly.
..…………………………..CJI.
……………………………J.
(SURYA KANT)
..………………………….J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED: 07.05.2021