2021 INSC 0273
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.522 OF 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2096 of 2021]
Nathu Singh ..... Appellant
                             VERSUS
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. .....Respondents
  AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.523 OF 2021
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2271 of 2021]
Ompal Singh     ..... Appellant
                             VERSUS
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. .....Respondents
 
    J U D G M E N T
N.V. RAMANA, CJI.   
1. Leave granted.
2. The   present   Criminal   Appeals,   by   way   of   Special   Leave,
raise   common   question   of   law   and   are   therefore   being
disposed of together. 
1 REPORTABLE

3. In   both   the   impugned   orders,   the   High   Court   of
Judicature   at   Allahabad,   while   dismissing   the   anticipatory
bail application of the respondents­accused, granted them 90
days   to   surrender   before   the   Trial   Court   to   seek   regular   bail
and granted them protection from coercive action for the said
period. Aggrieved by the grant of such relief, the complainants
in both the matters are currently in appeal before us.
4. As   only   a   question   of   law   is   being   raised,   it   is   not
necessary   for   this   Court   to   advert   to   the   facts   of   both   the
matters   extensively.   It   is   sufficient   to   point   out   that   in   the
first case, pertaining to Nathu Singh, the appellant’s daughter
was married to respondent no. 2 in that case on 14.02.2014.
As   she   died   under   suspicious   circumstances   in   her
matrimonial home on 02.01.2021, the complainant registered
FIR   No.   07/2021   at   police   station   Masuri,   Ghaziabad   under
Sections   304B   and   498A,   IPC   read   with   Sections   3   and   4   of
the   Dowry   Prohibition   Act   against   the   respondents   nos.   2   to
5.
5. In   the   second   case,   the   allegations   are   that   the
appellant’s brother and the latter’s two sons were attacked by
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the   respondents   in   that   case,   due   to   a   dispute   between   the
parties   relating   to   encroachment   of   land.   The   two   sons   were
attacked   on   their   vital   parts,   with   one   of   them   suffering   a
skull  fracture  as   a   result   of   which  he   was   in   a   coma   for   one
week. The other had lacerations on his head. The complainant
registered   FIR   No.   371/20   at   police   station   Thana   Bhawan,
Shamili under Sections 307, 504 and 34, IPC.
6. The respondents in both the cases approached the High
Court   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   during   ongoing
investigation,   and   sought   protection   from   arrest.   Vide   the
impugned orders dated 08.02.2021 and 28.01.2021, the High
Court   dismissed   the   applications   of   the   respondents   but
granted   them   the   aforementioned   relief   in   identically   worded
orders.   The   relevant   portion   of   the   order,   as   extracted   from
the impugned order dated 08.02.2021, is as follows: 
“…. Having heard learned counsel for the
parties   and   upon   perusal   of   material
brought   on   record   as   well   as   complicity
of   accused   and   also   judgement   of   the
Apex   Court   in   the   case   of   P.
Chidambaram   v.   Directorate   of
Enforcement,   AIR   2019   SC   4198,   this
Court   does   not   find   any   exceptional
ground   to   exercise   its   discretionary
jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C.
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However,   in   view   of   the   entirety   of   facts
and   circumstances   of   the   case   and   on
the   request   of   learned   counsel   for   the
applicants, it is directed that in case the
applicants   appear   and   surrender   before
the   court   below   within   90   days   from
today and apply for bail, their prayer for
bail   shall   be   considered   and   decided   as
per   the   settled   law   laid   by   this   Court   in
the   case   of   Amrawati   and   another   v.
State   of   U.P .  r eported  in   2004   (57)   ALR
290   as   well   as   judgement   passed   by
Hon’ble   Apex   Court   in   the   case   of   Lal
Kamlendra   Pratap   Singh   v.   State   of
U.P.   reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).
Till   then,   no   coercive   action   shall   be
taken against the applicants.... ” 
( emphasis supplied )
7. Aggrieved   by   the   impugned   orders,   the   complainants­
appellants   have   filed   the   present   appeals   by   way   of   special
leave.
8. Heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants,   the
respondent­State and the respondents­accused at length. 
9. The learned counsel for the appellants, supported by the
learned   State   counsel,   urged   that   once   the   High   Court
declined   the   final   relief   of   pre­arrest   to   the   respondents,   it
could   not   grant   them   any   further   protection.   The   learned
counsel   submitted   that   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   does   not
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contemplate the grant of any such protection on the dismissal
of  the  application   filed  by  an   accused.  Rather,  the  proviso   to
Setion 438(1), Cr.P.C. specifically provides for the arrest of the
accused on a rejection of the relief sought in their application.
The   impugned   orders,   wherein   the   High   Court   granted
protection  to   the  respondents  subsequent  to  the   dismissal  of
their   application,   was   therefore   passed   in   excess   of   the   High
Court’s   jurisdiction   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   The   learned
State  counsel further  submitted that the  High Court’s orders
have   hampered   the   ongoing   investigation   as   the   police   have
been   denied   custodial   interrogation   of   the   accused,
notwithstanding   the   fact   that   the   nature   of   offences   in   both
cases is grave and heinous.
10. On   the   contrary,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents­
accused   justified   the   discretion   exercised   by   the   High   Court
and   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has   the   power   to   pass
such orders, in the interest of justice.
11. The   sole   question   to   be   answered   by   the   Court   in   the
present   appeals   relates   to   whether   the   High   Court,   while
dismissing   the   anticipatory   bail   applications   of   the
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respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.
12. The considerations on the basis of which the Court is to
exercise   its   discretion   to   grant   relief   under   Section   438,
Cr.P.C.   have   been   decided   by   this   Court   in   a   catena   of
judgments and needs no restatement.
13. A   recent   Constitution   Bench   judgment   of   this   Court,   in
Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2020) 5 SCC 1
has clarified the extent of power exercisable by Courts under
Section 438, Cr.P.C. The Court ultimately held as follows:
“ 91.1.   Regarding   Question   1,   this
Court   holds   that   the   protection
granted   to   a   person   under   Section
438   CrPC   should   not   invariably   be
limited   to   a   fixed   period ;   it   should
enure   in   favour   of   the   accused
without   any   restriction   on   time.
Normal   conditions   under   Section
437(3)   read   with   Section   438(2)
should   be   imposed;   if   there   are
specific   facts   or   features   in   regard
to   any   offence,   it   is   open   for   the
court   to   impose   any   appropriate
condition   (including   fixed   nature   of
relief, or its being tied to an event),
etc.     
91.2.   As   regards   the   second
question referred to this Court, it is
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held   that   the   life   or   duration   of   an
anticipatory bail order does not end
normally   at   the   time   and   stage
when  the  accused  is  summoned  by
the   court ,   or   when   charges   are
framed,   but   can   continue   till   the
end   of   the   trial.   Again,   if   there   are
any   special   or   peculiar   features
necessitating   the   court   to   limit   the
tenure   of   anticipatory   bail,   it   is
open for it to do so.”     
( emphasis supplied )
14. The   Constitution   Bench   in   Sushila   Aggarwal   ( supra )
has authoritatively held that when a Court grants anticipatory
bail   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   the   same   is   ordinarily   not
limited to a fixed period and would subsist till the end of the
trial.   However,   it   was   clarified   by   the   Court   that   if   the   facts
and   circumstances   so   warranted,   the   Court   could   impose
special   conditions,   including   limiting   the   relief   to   a   certain
period. 
15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court
or   a   High   Court,   in   certain   special   facts   and   circumstances
may   decide   to   grant   anticipatory   bail   for   a   limited   period   of
time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which
would be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without
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giving   reasons,   would   be   contrary   to   the   pronouncement   of
this   Court   in   Sushila   Aggarwal   ( supra ).   If   the   High   Court
had   therefore   decided   to   allow   the   anticipatory   bail
application   of   the   respondents­accused   herein,   albeit   for   a
limited   period   of   90   days,   the   task   before   this   Court   would
have   been   somewhat   easier.   We   would   only   have   had   to
assess   the   reasons   assigned   by   the   Court,   if   any,   for   the
imposition of such special condition in terms of the judgment
in  Sushila Aggarwal  ( supra ).   
16.   However,   in   the   present   appeals,   the   High   Court,   after
considering   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,
particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations against
the  respondents,  rejected the  application  of the respondents­
accused.   It   is   after   rejecting   the   application   that   the   High
Court   chose   fit   to   grant   some   relief   to   the   respondents   while
directing   them   to   surrender   before   the   Trial   Court   to   file   a
regular   bail   application   within   90   days,   by   protecting   them
from   any   coercive   action   during   that   period.   The   appellants­
complainants   are   aggrieved   by   the   same   and   are   challenging
the   power   of   the   Court   to   pass   such   a   protective   order   after
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the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application.
17. To determine whether the Court can pass such orders, it
is   necessary   to   first   analyze   the   relevant   provision,   viz .,
Section   438,   Cr.P.C.   The   relevant   portion   of   Section   438,
Cr.P.C. is extracted below:
438. Direction for grant of bail to
person apprehending arrest
(1) Where any person has reason to
believe   that   he   may   be   arrested   on
an   accusation   of   having   committed
a   non­bailable   offence,   he   may
apply   to   the   High   Court   or   the
Court   of   Session   for   a   direction
under this section that in the event
of   such   arrest   he   shall   be   released
on   bail;   and   that   Court   may,   after
taking into consideration,  inter alia,
the following factors, namely:­
xxx
either   reject   the   application
forthwith   or   issue   an   interim   order
for the grant of anticipatory bail:
Provided   that,   where   the   High
Court   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the
Court   of   Session,   has   not   passed
any   interim   order   under   this   sub­
Section   or   has   rejected   the
application for grant of anticipatory
bail,   it   shall   be   open   to   an   officer
incharge   of   a   police   station   to
arrest,   without   warrant,   the
applicant   on   the   basis   of   the
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accusation   apprehended   in   such
application.
xxx
(2)   When   the   High   Court   or   the
Court   of   Session   makes   a   direction
under   sub­section   (1),   it   may
include   such   conditions   in   such
directions in the light of the facts of
the particular case, as it may think
fit, including ­
xxx
(3)   If   such   person   is   thereafter
arrested   without   warrant   by   an
officer   in   charge   of   a   police   station
on   such   accusation,   and   is
prepared either at the time of arrest
or at any time while in the custody
of such officer  to  give bail, he  shall
be   released   on   bail;   and   if   a
Magistrate   taking   cognizance   of
such offence decides that a warrant
should   issue   in   the   first   instance
against   that   person,   he   shall   issue
a   bailable   warrant   in   conformity
with   the   direction   of   the   Court
under sub­section (1).
( emphasis supplied )
18. The   focus   of   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,   when   read   in   its
entirety, clearly relates to the grant of anticipatory bail by the
Court. Section 438(1) explicitly lays down certain factors that
need  to  be considered  by  the  Court  before  granting  the  relief
sought. Section 438(2) lays down the  conditions  that  may  be
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imposed by the Court while granting the relief. Section 438(3)
dictates   the   consequences   of   the   grant   of   relief   under   the
Section.
19. The only guidance relating to what is to take place once
an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. is rejected is found
in   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.,   which   specifically
provides   that   once   an   application   is   rejected,   or   the   Court
seized with the matter refuses to issue an interim order, it is
open   to   the   police   to   arrest   the   applicant.   It   is   this   proviso
that the present appellants have relied upon to argue that the
High Court, once it rejected the anticipatory bail applications
of   the   respondents­accused,   did   not   have   the   power   to   grant
any further relief. 
20. At   first   blush,   while   this   submission   appears   to   be
attractive, we are of the opinion that such an  analysis of  the
provision   is   incomplete.   It   is   no   longer   res   integra   that   any
interpretation of the provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. has to
take  into  consideration   the  fact   that   the   grant   or  rejection   of
an application under Section 438, Cr.P.C. has a direct bearing
on   the   fundamental   right   to   life   and   liberty   of   an   individual.
11

The   genesis   of   this   jurisdiction   lies   in   Article   21   of   the
Constitution,   as   an   effective   medium   to   protect   the   life   and
liberty   of   an   individual.   The   provision   therefore   needs   to   be
read   liberally,   and   considering   its   beneficial   nature,   the
Courts   must   not   read   in   limitations   or   restrictions   that   the
legislature   have   not   explicitly   provided   for.   Any   ambiguity   in
the   language   must   be   resolved   in   favour   of   the   applicant
seeking  relief. In this context, this Court, in the Constitution
Bench   decision   of   this   Court   in   Gurbaksh   Singh   Sibbia   v.
State   of   Punjab ,   (1980)   2   SCC   565 ,   which   was   recently
upheld   and   followed   by   this   Court   in   Sushila   Aggarwal
( supra ), held as follows:
“26.   We   find   a   great   deal   of
substance   in   Mr   Tarkunde's
submission that since denial of bail
amounts   to   deprivation   of   personal
liberty,   the   court   should   lean
against   the   imposition   of
unnecessary   restrictions   on   the
scope   of   Section   438,   especially
when   no   such   restrictions   have
been   imposed   by   the   legislature   in
the   terms   of   that   section .   Section
438 is a procedural provision which
is   concerned   with   the   personal
liberty   of   the   individual,   who   is
entitled   to   the   benefit   of   the
presumption   of   innocence   since   he
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is not, on the date of his application
for   anticipatory   bail,   convicted   of
the   offence   in   respect   of   which   he
seeks   bail.   An   over­generous
infusion   of   constraints   and
conditions   which   are   not   to   be
found   in   Section   438   can   make   its
provisions   constitutionally
vulnerable   since   the   right   to
personal   freedom   cannot   be   made
to   depend   on   compliance   with
unreasonable   restrictions.   The
beneficent   provision   contained   in
Section   438   must   be   saved,   not
jettisoned… ”
( emphasis supplied )
 
21. When   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.   is   analyzed
in line with the above dictum, it is clear that the proviso does
not create any rights or restrictions. Rather, the sole purpose
of   the   proviso   appears   to   be   clarificatory   in   nature.   It   only
restates,   inter   alia ,   the   obvious   proposition   that   unless   an
individual   has   obtained   some   protection   from   the   Court,   the
police   may   arrest   them.  In   line   with   the   ruling   in   Gurbaksh
Singh   Sibbia   ( supra ),   the   proviso   cannot   be   read   as
constituting a bar on the power of the Court. 
22. If the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. does not act as a
bar  to the grant of additional protection to the applicant, the
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question   still   remains   as   to   under   what   provision   of   law   the
Court   may   issue   relief   to   an   applicant   after   dismissing   their
anticipatory bail application. 
23. Without going into the question of whether Section 438,
Cr.P.C. itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to
undertake   such   an   exercise   in   the   present   case,   it   is   clear
that   when   it   comes   to   the   High   Court,   such   a   power   does
exist.   Section   482,   Cr.P.C   explicitly   recognizes   the   High
Court’s   inherent   power   to   pass   orders   to   secure   the   ends   of
justice.   This   provision   reflects   the   reality   that   no   law   or   rule
can   possibly   account   for   the   complexities   of   life,   and   the
infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future. 
24. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts
are   faced   with   day   in   and   day   out,   while   dealing   with
anticipatory   bail   applications.   Even   when   the   Court   is   not
inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be
circumstances where the  High Court  is of the opinion  that  it
is   necessary   to   protect   the   person   apprehending   arrest   for
some   time,   due   to   exceptional   circumstances,   until   they
surrender   before   the   Trial   Court.   For   example,   the   applicant
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may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary
caregiver   or   breadwinner   of   his/her   family   members,   and
needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary
circumstances,   when   a   strict   case   for   grant   of   anticipatory
bail   is   not   made   out,   and   rather   the   investigating   authority
has  made  out  a  case for  custodial  investigation,  it  cannot  be
stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It
needs   no   mentioning,   but   this   Court   may   also   exercise   its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an
order. 
25. However,   such   discretionary   power   cannot   be   exercised
in   an   untrammeled   manner.   The   Court   must   take   into
account   the   statutory   scheme   under   Section   438,   Cr.P.C.,
particularly,   the   proviso   to   Section   438(1),   Cr.P.C.,   and
balance the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant
and   the   society   at   large   with   the   concerns/interest   of   the
applicant.   Therefore,   such   an   order   must   necessarily   be
narrowly   tailored   to   protect   the   interests   of   the   applicant
while   taking   into   consideration   the   concerns   of   the
investigating   authority.   Such   an   order   must   be   a   reasoned
one.
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26. The   impugned   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court,   in   the
present appeals,  do not meet any of the standards as laid out
above.   We   say   so   for   the   following   reasons:   firstly ,   after   the
dismissal  of   the   anticipatory   bail   application,   on   the  basis  of
the   nature   and   gravity   of   the   offence,   the   High   Court   has
granted   the   impugned   relief   to   the   respondents   without
assigning   any   reasons.   Secondly,   in   granting   the   relief   for   a
period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the
concerns   of   the   investigating   agency,   complainant   or   the
proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which necessitates that
the   Court   pass   such   an   exceptional   discretionary   protection
order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A
period   of   90   days,   or   three   months,   cannot   in   any   way   be
considered   to   be   a   reasonable   one   in   the   present   facts   and
circumstances. 
27. The   impugned   orders   therefore   do   not   withstand   legal
scrutiny. The resultant effect of the High Court’s orders is that
neither   are   the   respondents   found   entitled   to   pre­arrest   bail,
nor   can they   be  arrested  for  a long  duration.  During  the  said
duration   they   can   roam   freely   without   being   apprehensive   of
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coercive   action.   We   are   thus   of   the   view   that   the   High   Court
committed   a   grave   error   in   passing   such   protection   to   the
respondents­accused.   Such   a   direction   by   the   High   Court
exceeds   its   judicial   discretion   and   amounts   to   judicial
largesse, which the Courts do not possess.
28. For   the   aforestated   reasons,   the   present   appeals   are
allowed.   The   impugned   order   of   the   High   Court   dated
08.02.2021   in   Criminal   Miscellaneous   Anticipatory   Bail
Application  No. 2219  of 2021, and  order  dated 28.01.2021 in
Criminal Miscellaneous Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1700
of 2021, to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the
respondents­accused   are   set   aside,   leaving   it   open   to   the
Investigating   Agency   to   proceed   in   the   matters   in   accordance
with   law   and   complete   the   investigation.   If   the   respondents­
accused   have   been   meanwhile   sent   to   judicial   custody,   their
application(s)   for   regular   bail   or   any   request   for   their   police
remand   made  by   the   Investigating   Officer   shall   be   decided  by
the   competent   Court,   uninfluenced   by   the   observations   made
hereinabove.
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29. Ordered accordingly.
………………………..CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)   
  ………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………. J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 28, 2021
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