2021 INSC 0279
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1735­1736 OF 2010
SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER                 …APPELLANTS
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA              …RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
N. V. RAMANA, CJI.
1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated
06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3­SB of 1998 and 16­SB of
1998, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred
by   the   appellants   and   upheld   the   order   of   conviction   and
sentence passed by the Trial Court on 11.12.1997.
1 R EPORTABLE

2. The case of the prosecution  is that  the deceased and accused­
appellant   no.1   were   married   on   01.07.1994.   On   31.7.1995,   at
about   4   or   4.30   P.M,   some   persons   informed   the   complainant
that   his   daughter   was   ailing   and   admitted   in   the   hospital.   On
this   information   he,   along   with   his   wife   and   son,   reached   the
hospital and found that the deceased passed away due to burn
injuries.   The   prosecution’s   case   was   that   the   deceased
committed   suicide   by   setting   herself   ablaze   just   after   one   year
of   her   marriage   and   that   soon   before   her   death   she   was
subjected   to   cruelty   and   harassment   on   account   of   bringing
less dowry by both the accused.
3. The   appellants   were   convicted   by   the   Trial   Court   vide   order
dated   11.12.1997   for   the   offences   under   Sections   304­B   and
306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304­B,
IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the
offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.
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4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court to
set   aside   the   order   of   conviction   and   sentence   passed   by   the
Trial   Court.   The   High   Court   vide   impugned   judgment   dated
06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed
the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the
present   appeals   by   way   of   Special   Leave,   challenging   the
concurrent findings of the Courts below.
5. The   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants
submitted   that   the   possibility   of   accidental   fire   has   not   been
ruled out in the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the
prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand for dowry.
Lastly,   the   prosecution   has   failed   to   prove   that   the   demand,
assuming   there   was   one,   was   made   proximate   to   the   death   of
the deceased­victim.
6. On   the   other   hand,   the   learned   counsel   for   the   respondent­
State submitted that the appellants had not been able to show
any material which would merit the interference of this Court in
the   concurrent   findings   of   the   Courts   below.   The   counsel
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especially   emphasized  upon   the  fact   that   the   suspicious   death
of   the   deceased   victim   occurred   within   almost   1   year   of
marriage.   Moreover,   the   witnesses   have   stated   the   specific
instances of demand for dowry with consistency.
7. Having   heard   counsel   appearing   on   either   side   and   perusing
the   material   on   record,   this   Court   needs   to   answer   following
questions:
I. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in
convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B, IPC?
II. Whether   the   Trial   Court,   and   the   High   Court,   was   correct   in
convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306, IPC?
I SSUE  I   
8. At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death.
Section 304­B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment
for dowry demand, reads as under:
“ 304­B.   Dowry death . —(1) Where the death of
a   woman   is   caused   by   any   burns   or   bodily
injury   or   occurs   otherwise   than   under   normal
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circumstances   within   seven   years   of   her
marriage   and   it   is   shown   that  soon   before  her
death   she   was   subjected   to   cruelty   or
harassment   by   her   husband   or   any   relative   of
her   husband   for,   or   in   connection   with,   any
demand   for   dowry,   such   death   shall   be   called
‘dowry   death’,   and   such   husband   or   relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation .   —For   the   purpose   of   this   sub­
section,   ‘dowry’   shall   have   the   same   meaning
as   in   Section   2   of   the   Dowry   Prohibition   Act,
1961 (28 of 1961).
(2)   Whoever   commits   dowry   death   shall   be
punished   with   imprisonment   for   a   term   which
shall   not   be   less   than   seven   years   but   which
may extend to imprisonment for life .”
Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides
that     ‘dowry   death’   is   where   death   of   a   woman   is   caused   by
burning   or   bodily   injuries   or   occurs   otherwise   than   under
normal   circumstances,   within   seven   years   of   marriage,   and   it
is   shown   that   soon   before   her   death,   she   was   subjected   to
cruelty   or   harassment   by   her   husband   or   any   relative   of   her
husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Sub­clause (2)
provides   for   punishment   for   those   who   cause   dowry   death.
5

Accordingly, in  Major Singh v. State of Punjab , (2015) 5 SCC
201, a three­ Judge  Bench of this Court held as follows:
“10.   To   sustain   the   conviction   under   Section
304­B   IPC,   the   following   essential
ingredients are to be established:
( i ) the death of a woman should be caused by
burns   or   bodily   injury   or   otherwise   than
under a ‘normal circumstance’;
( ii ) such a death should have occurred within
seven years of her marriage;
( iii )   she   must   have   been   subjected   to   cruelty
or   harassment   by   her   husband   or   any
relative of her husband;
( iv ) such cruelty or harassment should be for
or in connection with demand of dowry; and
( v )   such   cruelty   or   harassment   is   shown   to
have   been   meted   out   to   the   woman   soon
before her death.”
9. The   first   contentious   part   that   exists   in   the   interpretation   of
Section   304­B,   IPC   relates   to  the   phrase   “ soon   before ”   used   in
the   Section .   Being   a   criminal   statute,   generally   it   is   to   be
interpreted   strictly.   However,   where   strict   interpretation   leads
to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts
may   in   appropriate   cases   place   reliance   upon   the   genuine
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import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such
ambiguities .   [ refer   Commissioner   of   Customs   (Import),
Mumbai  v.  Dilip Kumar &  Company , (2018) 9 SCC 1,   State
of   Gujarat   v.   Mansukhbhai   Kanjibhai   Shah,   2020   SCC
OnLine   SC   412].   At   this   juncture,   it   is   therefore   necessary   to
undertake   a   study   of   the   legislative   history   of   this   Section,   in
order   to   determine   the   intention   of   the   legislature   behind   the
inclusion of Section 304­B, IPC. 
10. Section   304­B,   IPC   is   one   among   many   legislative   initiatives
undertaken by Parliament to remedy a long­standing social evil.
The   pestiferous   nature   of   dowry   harassment,   wherein   married
women   are   being   subjected   to   cruelty   because   of   covetous
demands by husband and his relatives has not gone unnoticed.
The   Parliament   enacted   the   Dowry   Prohibition   Act,   1961   as   a
first step to eradicate this social evil. Further, as the measures
were   found   to   be   insufficient,   the   Criminal   Law   (Second
Amendment)   Act,   1983   (Act   46   of   1983)   was   passed   wherein
Chapter   XX­A   was   introduced   in   the   IPC,   containing   Section
498­A. 
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11. However,   despite   the   above   measures,   the   issue   of   dowry
harassment   was   still   prevalent.   Additionally,   there   was   a
growing   trend   of   deaths   of   young   brides   in   suspicious
circumstances   following   demands   of   dowry.   The   need   for   a
stringent  law  to   curb  dowry  deaths  was   suo  motu   taken  up  by
the   Law   Commission   in   its   91 st
  Law   Commission   Report.   The
Law   Commission   recognized   that   the   IPC,   as   it   existed   at   that
relevant   time,   was   insufficient   to   tackle   the   issue   of   dowry
deaths   due   to   the   nature   and   modus   of   the   crime.   They
observed as under:
“1.3       If,   in   a   particular   incident   of   dowry
death,   the   facts   are   such   as   to   satisfy   the
legal   ingredients   of   an   offence   already
known   to   the   law,  and   if  those   facts  can   be
proved   without   much   difficulty,   the   existing
criminal   law   can   be   resorted   to   for   bringing
the   offender   to   book.     IN   practice,   however,
two main impediments arise ­­
(i) either   the   facts   do   not   fully   fit   into
the pigeon­hole of any known offence; or
(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are
such   that   proof   of   directly   incriminating
facts is thereby rendered difficult .”
(emphasis supplied)
8

12. Taking   into   consideration   the   aforesaid   Law   Commission
Report,   and   the   continuing   issues   relating   to   dowry   related
offences, t he  Parliament  introduced amendments to  the  Dowry
Prohibition   Act,   as   well   as   the   IPC   by   enacting   Dowry
Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of
this   amendment,   Section   304­B,   IPC   was   specifically
introduced   in   the   IPC,   as   a   stringent   provision   to   curb   the
menace   of   dowry   death   in   India.   Shrimati   Margaret   Alva,   who
presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as
follows:
“This   is   a   social   evil   and   social   legislation,
as I said cannot correct every thing. We are
trying to see how and where we can make it
a little more difficult and therefore we have
increased   the   punishment.   We   have   also
provided   for   certain   presumptions   because
upto now one of our main problem has been
the question of evidence. Because the bride
is   generally   burnt   or   the   wife   is   burnt
behind   closed   doors   in   her   in­law’s   home .
You   have   never   really   heard   of   a   girl
being   burnt   while   cooking   in   her
mother’s   house   or   her   husband’s   house.
It is always in the mother­in­law’s house
that  she  catches  fire  and   is  burnt   in   the
kitchen.   Therefore,   getting   evidence
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immediately   becomes   a   great   bit
problem. Therefore, we have brought in a
couple   of   amendments   which   give
certain   presumptions   where   the   burden
of proof shifts to the husband and to his
people   to   show   that   it   was   not   a   dowry
death   or   that   it   was   not   deliberately
done .”
(emphasis supplied)
13. There   is   no   denying   that   such   social   evil   is   persisting   even
today. A study titled “ Global study on Homicide: Gender­related
killing   of   women   and   girls ”,   published   by   the   United   Nations
Office   on   Drugs   and   Crime,   highlighted   that   in   2018   female
dowry   deaths   account   for   40   to   50   percent   of   all   female
homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that
from   the   period   1999   to   2016,   these   figures   have   remained
constant.   In   fact,   the   latest   data   furnished   by   the   National
Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases
were registered under Section 304­B, IPC alone.
14. Considering   the   significance   of   such   a   legislation,   a   strict
interpretation   would   defeat   the   very   object   for   which   it   was
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enacted.  Therefore, i t is safe to deduce that when the legislature
used  the  words,  “soon  before”  they  did  not   mean   “immediately
before”.   Rather,   they   left  its   determination   in   the   hands   of   the
courts.  The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to
case.   Even   the   spectrum   of   cruelty   is   quite   varied,   as   it   can
range   from   physical,   verbal   or   even   emotional.   This   list   is
certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore
be   laid   down   by   this   Court   to   define   what   exacts   the   phrase
“soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by
this Court, in the case of   Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ,   (2000)
5 SCC 207, wherein the three­Judge Bench held that:
“ 15.   … “Soon before” is a relative term which
is   required   to   be   considered   under   specific
circumstances   of   each   case   and   no
straitjacket   formula   can   be   laid   down   by
fixing any time­limit. …  In relation to dowry
deaths,   the   circumstances   showing   the
existence   of   cruelty   or   harassment   to   the
deceased are not restricted to a particular
instance but normally refer to a course of
conduct.   Such   conduct   may   be   spread
over   a   period   of   time.   ….   Proximate   and
live   link   between   the   effect   of   cruelty
based   on   dowry   demand   and   the
consequential   death   is   required   to   be
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proved by the prosecution. The demand of
dowry,   cruelty   or   harassment   based   upon
such demand and the date of death should
not   be   too   remote   in   time   which,   under
the   circumstances,   be   treated   as   having
become stale enough .”
(emphasis supplied)
A   similar   view   was   taken   by   this   Court   in   Rajinder   Singh   v.
State of Punjab ,  (2015) 6 SCC 477.
15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the
period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the
victim   would   come   within   the   term   “soon   before”.   What   is
pivotal   to   the   above   determination,   is   the   establishment   of   a
“ proximate   and   live   link ”   between   the   cruelty   and   the
consequential death of the victim. 
16. When   the   prosecution   shows   that   ‘ soon   before   her   death   such
woman   has   been   subjected   by   such   person   to   cruelty   or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry ’ , a
presumption   of   causation   arises   against   the   accused   under
Section 113­B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has
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to   rebut   this   statutory   presumption.   Section   113B,   Evidence
Act reads as under:
“ 113B. Presumption as to dowry death— When the
question   is   whether   a   person   has   committed   the
dowry   death   of   a   woman   and   it   is   shown   that   soon
before her death such woman has been subjected by
such   person   to   cruelty   or   harassment   for,   or   in
connection   with,   any   demand   for   dowry,   the   Court
shall   presume   that   such   person   had   caused   the
dowry death. 
Explanation.   ­   For   the   purpose   of   this   section,
“dowry   death”   shall   have   the   same   meaning   as   in
section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)” 
17. This   Court,   in   the   case   of   Bansi   Lal   v.   State   of
Haryana ,   (2011)   11   SCC   359,   emphasized   the   mandatory
application   of   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B   of   the
Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304­B of IPC stood
proved: 
“ 19.   It   may   be   mentioned   herein   that   the
legislature   in   its   wisdom   has   used   the   word
‘shall’   thus,   making   a   mandatory   application
on   the   part   of   the   court   to   presume   that
death had been committed by the person who
had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in
connection   with   any   demand   of   dowry.   …
13

Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the
accused to rebut the presumption and in case of
Section   113­B   relatable   to   Section   304­B   IPC,
the   onus   to   prove   shifts   exclusively   and   heavily
on the accused. …
20.   Therefore,   in   case   the   essential
ingredients   of   such   death   have   been
established by the prosecution, it is the duty
of   the   court   to   raise   a   presumption   that   the
accused has caused the dowry death. ”
( emphasis supplied )
18. Therefore,   once  all   the   essential   ingredients   are  established  by
the   prosecution,   the   presumption   under   Section   113­B,
Evidence   Act   mandatorily   operates   against   the   accused.   This
presumption   of   causality   that   arises   can   be   rebutted   by   the
accused. 
19. The   usage   of   rebuttable   presumption   of   causality,   under
Section 113­B, Evidence Act, creates a greater responsibility on
Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to be extra careful
during   conducting   criminal   trials   relating   to   Section   304­B,
IPC.   In   order   to   address   this   precarious   situation,   procedural
law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning herein.
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20. It   is   a   matter   of   grave   concern   that,   often,   Trial   Courts   record
the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very
casual   and   cursory   manner,   without   specifically   questioning
the   accused   as   to   his   defense.   It   ought   to   be   noted   that   the
examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be
treated   as   a   mere   procedural   formality,   as   it   is   based   on   the
fundamental   principle   of   fairness.   This   provision   incorporates
the valuable principle of natural justice­ “ audi alteram partem ”,
as   it   enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the
incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it
imposes an obligation on the part of the Court to question the
accused   fairly,   with   care   and   caution.   The   Court   must   put
incriminating   circumstances   before   the   accused   and   seek   his
response.  A  duty  is  also  cast  on   the  counsel  of  the  accused  to
prepare   his   defense,   since   the   inception   of   the   trial,   with   due
caution,   keeping   in   consideration   the   peculiarities   of   Section
304­B, IPC read with Section 113­B, Evidence Act.
21. Section   232,   CrPC   assumes   importance,   which   reads   as,   “ If,
after   taking   the   evidence   for   the   prosecution,   examining   the
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accused   and   hearing   the   prosecution   and   the   defence   on   the
point,   the   Judge   considers   that   there   is   no   evidence   that   the
accused   committed   the   offence,   the   Judge   shall  record   an  order
of   acquittal ”.   Once   the   Trial   Court   decides   that   the   accused   is
not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232,
CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence
evidence’,   calling   upon   the   accused   to   present   his   defense   as
per  the  procedure provided under  Section 233, CrPC, which is
also   an   invaluable   right   provided   to   the   accused.   Existence   of
such   procedural   right   cohesively   sits   with   the   rebuttable
presumption as provided under Section 113­B, Evidence Act.
22. The   second   contentious   part   relating   to   Section   304­B,   IPC   is
that   it   does   not   take   a   pigeonhole   approach   in   categorizing
death   as   homicidal   or   suicidal   or   accidental,   as   was   done
earlier. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact
that   death   occurring   “otherwise   than   under   normal
circumstances”   can,   in   cases,   be   homicidal   or   suicidal   or
accidental.   However,   the   Section   304­B,   IPC   endeavors   to   also
16

address   those   situations   wherein   murders   or   suicide   are
masqueraded as accidents.
23. Therefore,   if   all   the   other   ingredients   of   Section   304­B   IPC  are
fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury
or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall,
as   per   the   legislative   mandate,   be   called   a   "dowry   death"   and
the   woman's   husband   or   his   relative  "shall  be  deemed  to  have
caused her death" unless proved otherwise. The section clearly
specifies   what   constitutes   the   offence   of   dowry   death   and   also
identifies   the   single   offender   or   multiple   offenders   who   has   or
have   caused   the   dowry   death.   [ refer   Maya   Devi   v.   State   of
Haryana ,   (2015)   17   SCC   405,   Shanti   v.   State   of   Haryana ,
(1991) 1 SCC 371]
24. After   having   observed   the   law   on   Section   304­B,   IPC,   we   may
now   turn   to   the   merits   of   this   case.   It   is   clear   that   the
submissions of the counsel for the appellants must be rejected.
It   is   an   admitted   fact   that   the   deceased   and   accused   were
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married on  01.07.1994, and  the death of the  lady  occurred on
31.07.1995.  
25. With respect to the cause of death, the doctor (P.W.3) found the
smell   of   kerosene   oil   on   the   body   of   the   deceased   who   had
suffered 85% burn injuries. Therefore, in the present case, the
deceased   victim   succumbed   to   burns.   As   the   death   was
relatable   to   burn   injuries   within   seven   years   of   marriage,   it
clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence.  
26. Coming   to   the   issue   of   dowry   demand,   the   evidence   on   record
indicates that when the brother of the deceased (P.W.7) visited
her   in   the   matrimonial   house   after   one   month   of   marriage   on
the   occasion   of   Raksha   Bandhan,   the   deceased   had   disclosed
that   the   accused,   husband   and   mother­in­law,   used   to
physically   harass   her   on   the   account   of   bringing   insufficient
dowry.   Furthermore,   the   accused   persons   had  made   a   specific
demand   of   a   scooter.   Pursuant   to   this   disclosure,   she   was
brought   back   to   her   paternal   house   where   this   fact   was
disclosed   to   father   of   the   deceased   (P.W.6).   It   is   pertinent   to
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note   that,   only   a   month   prior   to   her   death,   the   deceased   had
returned   to   her   matrimonial   house.   However,   the   accused   still
used  to   harass   the  deceased   for   dowry.   The  aforesaid  fact  was
revealed   by   the   deceased  to   her  father,   when   she  had   come  to
visit him. 
27. It   must   be   emphasized   herein   that,   just   a   week   before   the
death,   on   the   occasion   of   Teej   festival,   another   brother   of   the
deceased   (P.W.10)   had   visited   her   while   she   was   in   her
matrimonial   home.   The   deceased   had   reiterated   her   plight   to
her   brother.   Thereafter,   on   31.07.1995,   the   father   of   the
deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has
been   admitted   in   the   hospital.   Upon   reaching,   the   father
discovered  that   the  deceased   succumbed  to   burn  injuries.  The
aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live
and   proximate  link  between  the   instances  of  demand   of  dowry
and   the   death   of   the   deceased.   The   Trial   Court,   and   the   High
Court,   upon   a   close   appreciation   of   the   aforesaid   witnesses
came to the conclusion  that the  statements were corroborative
and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and on
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the  basis of  the same held  that  the  deceased was subjected to
cruelty   soon   before   her   death   as   she   failed   to   bring   sufficient
dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding
of the Trial Court and the High Court. 
28. From   the   above   analysis,   it   is   clear   that   the   prosecution   was
able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to
burn   injuries   took   place   within   approximately   one   year   of   her
marriage. It has further been proved that soon before her death
she   was   subjected   to   harassment   and   cruelty   pursuant   to
demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304­B, IPC
stand   satisfied,   the   presumption   under   113­B,   Evidence   Act
operates   against   the   appellants,   who   are   deemed   to   have
caused the offence specified under Section 304­B of IPC. 
29. The   burden   therefore   shifts   on   the   accused   to   rebut   the
aforesaid   presumption.   The   counsel   for   the   appellants   has
canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and
hence   no   liability   can   be   fixed   upon   them.   However,   in   the
present  case, the accused persons failed to place any  evidence
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on   record   to   prove   that   the   death   was   accidental   or
unconnected with the accused persons. 
30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the
doctor,   the   entire   body   of   the   deceased   was   doused   with
kerosene   oil.   Therefore,   the   possibility   of   an   accident   can   be
safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded:
“All   these   circumstances   go   to   prove   that   either
deceased   committed   suicide   by   sprinkling
kerosene   oil   on   her   body   or   she   was   burnt   by
sprinkling   kerosene   on   her   body   either   by   the
accused   or   by   somebody   else   and   the   plea   of
accident   tried   to   be   made   out   by   the   learned
counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.”
31. Therefore,   the   presumption   adumbrated   in   Section   113­B,
Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has
not   been   rebutted   by   the   accused­appellants   herein.   The
appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interfere in
the   concurrent   opinions   of   the   Courts   below,   convicting   the
accused­appellants under Section 304­B, IPC.   
I SSUE  II   
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32. Apart   from   their   conviction   under   Section   304­B,   IPC,   the
appellants   have   also   additionally   challenged   their   conviction
under     Section   306,   IPC.   Section   306,   IPC   relates   to   the
abetment of suicide and is extracted below:
“ 306. Abetment of suicide . —If any person
commits   suicide,   whoever   abets   the
commission   of   such   suicide,   shall   be
punished   with   imprisonment   of   either
description for  a term  which may  extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
33. A   bare   reading   of   the   provision   indicates   that   for   the   offence
under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish
that   a   suicide   has   been   committed.   Secondly,   the   prosecution
must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the
commission   of   suicide,   has   played   an   active   role   in   the   same.
With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113­A, Evidence
Act   creates   a   presumption   against   the   husband   and/or   his
relative   with   respect   to   the   abetment   of   suicide   of   a   married
woman,   under   certain   conditions.   Not   going   into   the   other
conditions,   a   perusal   of   the   provision   indicates   that   such
presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has
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been   established   by   the   prosecution   first.   The   necessary
ingredients   to   constitute   an   offence   under   Section   306,   I.P.C.
were   considered   by   this   court   in   Wazir   Chand   v.   State   of
Haryana , (1989) 1 SCC 244,  wherein this Court held that:
“5.   …Reading   Sections   306   and   307   ( sic   107)
together it is clear that if any person instigates any
other  person   to  commit  suicide  and  as  a  result  of
such instigation the other person commits suicide,
the   person   causing   the   instigation   is   liable   to   be
punished   under   Section   306   of   the   Penal   Code,
1860   for   abetting   the   commission   of   suicide.   A
plain   reading   of   this   provision   shows   that
before   a   person   can   be   convicted   of   abetting
the   suicide   of   any   other   person,   it   must   be
established   that   such   other   person   committed
suicide .”  
(emphasis supplied)
34. In   the   present   case,   the   Trial   Court   and   the   High   Court   have
concluded   that   the   deceased   committed   suicide.   However,   we
are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   conclusion   reached   by
the   Courts   below   is   based   on   assumptions,   as   there   is   no
evidence   on   record   to   support   the   same.   The   reasoning   of   the
Trial Court in this regard is as follows:
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“Further,   there   is   no   direct   evidence   having
been   adduced   by   the   prosecution   the   ( sic )
any   of   the   accused   caused   death   by
sprinkling   kerosene   on   the   body   of   the
deceased,   the   only   possibility   is   that   Meena
Kumari   put   an   end   to   her   life   by   sprinkling
kerosene on her body.”
35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove
the   factum   of   suicide   beyond   reasonable   doubt,   the
presumption under Section 113­A, Evidence Act, is not of much
help   for   the   prosecution.   The   essential   ingredient   of   deceased
committing  suicide has  not been proved by  the prosecution by
adducing   sufficient   evidence.   In   the   present   case,   the
prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due
to   suicide.   Therefore,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   finding   of
the  Courts below  convicting   the appellants  under  Section 306,
IPC merits interference by this Court.
C ONCLUSIONS   
36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304­B, IPC read
with Section 113­B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:
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i. Section   304­B,   IPC   must   be   interpreted   keeping   in   mind   the
legislative   intent   to   curb   the   social   evil   of   bride   burning   and
dowry demand.
ii. The   prosecution   must   at   first   establish   the   existence   of   the
necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section
304­B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable
presumption   of   causality,   provided   under   Section   113­B,
Evidence Act operates against the accused.
iii. The   phrase   “ soon   before ”   as   appearing   in   Section   304­B,   IPC
cannot   be   construed   to   mean   ‘immediately   before’.   The
prosecution   must   establish   existence   of   “ proximate   and   live
link ”   between   the   dowry   death   and   cruelty   or   harassment   for
dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
iv. Section   304­B,   IPC   does   not   take   a   pigeonhole   approach   in
categorizing   death   as   homicidal   or   suicidal   or   accidental.   The
reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death
occurring   “ otherwise   than   under   normal   circumstances ”   can,   in
cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. 
v. Due   to   the   precarious   nature   of   Section   304­B,   IPC   read   with
113­B,   Evidence   Act,   Judges,   prosecution   and   defence   should
be careful during conduction of trial.
vi. It   is   a   matter   of   grave   concern   that,   often,   Trial   Courts   record
the   statement   under   Section   313,   CrPC   in   a   very   casual   and
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cursory   manner,   without   specifically   questioning   the   accused
as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of
an   accused   under   Section   313,   CrPC   cannot   be   treated   as   a
mere   procedural   formality,   as   it   based   on   the   fundamental
principle   of   fairness.   This   aforesaid   provision   incorporates   the
valuable principle of natural justice “ audi alteram partem ” as it
enables   the   accused   to   offer   an   explanation   for   the
incriminatory   material   appearing   against   him.   Therefore,   it
imposes   an   obligation   on   the   court   to   question   the   accused
fairly, with care and caution. 
vii. The   Court   must   put   incriminating   circumstances   before   the
accused   and   seek   his   response.   A   duty   is   also   cast   on   the
counsel   of   the   accused   to   prepare   his   defense   since   the
inception   of   the   Trial   with   due   caution,   keeping   in
consideration  the  peculiarities of  Section  304­B,  IPC  read  with
Section 113­B, Evidence Act.
viii. Section   232,   CrPC   provides   that,   “ If,   after   taking   the   evidence
for   the   prosecution,   examining   the   accused   and   hearing   the
prosecution   and   the   defence   on   the   point,   the   Judge   considers
that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,
the   Judge   shall   record   an   order   of   acquittal ”.   Such   discretion
must   be   utilized   by   the   Trial   Courts   as   an   obligation   of   best
efforts. 
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ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to
be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must
move   on   and   fix   hearings   specifically   for   ‘defence   evidence’,
calling   upon   the   accused   to   present   his   defense   as   per   the
procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an
invaluable right provided to the accused. 
x. In   the   same   breath,   Trial   Courts   need   to   balance   other
important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In
this   regard,   we   may   caution   that   the   above   provisions   should
not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
xi. Apart   from   the   above,   the   presiding   Judge   should   follow   the
guidelines   laid   down   by   this   Court   while   sentencing   and
imposing appropriate punishment.
xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is
increasing   day   by   day.   However,   it   is   also   observed   that
sometimes   family   members   of   the   husband   are   roped   in,   even
though   they   have   no   active   role   in   commission   of   the   offence
and   are   residing   at   distant   places.   In   these   cases,   the   Court
need to be cautious in its approach.
37. In   light   of   the   above   findings,   after   perusing   the   relevant
material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court
and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the
appellants under Section 304­B, IPC as the appellants failed to
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discharge   the   burden   under   Section   113­B,   Evidence   Act.
However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are
of   the   opinion   that   the   offence   under   Section   306,   IPC   is   not
made   out.   We   therefore   set   aside   the   conviction   and   sentence
under Section 306, IPC. 
38. Appeals   allowed   to   the   above   extent.   Pending   applications,   if
any, stand disposed of.
………………………..CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)   
…………………………. J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI;
MAY 28, 2021
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