2021 INSC 0280
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INHERENT JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 625­626 OF 2019
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
Abhishek Kumar Singh           … Petitioner
Versus
G. Pattanaik & Ors.                  …Respondents
WITH
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 642­643 OF 2019
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 671­672 OF 2019
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 395­396 OF 2020
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 408­409 OF 2020
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018

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CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 598­599/2020 
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018/2018
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 669­670 OF 2020
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NOS. 671­672 OF 2020
IN 
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 11017­11018 OF 2018
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 491 OF 2020
AND
TRANSFER PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1209/2020
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. These   cases   essentially   assail   the   orders   dated   4.12.2018
and 2.3.2020 issued by the Chief Engineer (A­2­1), Uttar Pradesh
Jal   Nigam,   Lucknow 1
,   pursuant   to   the   judgment   of   this   Court
dated 15.11.2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 11017­11018/2018 2
.     This
Court by the aforesaid judgment, had directed the Uttar Pradesh
1
For short, “the Chief Engineer” or “respondents”
2
 Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam & Ors. v. Ajit Singh Patel & Ors., (2019) 12 SCC 285

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Jal   Nigam   (the   respondent   corporation)   to   comply   with   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad 3
  dated
28.11.2017 in a batch of writ petitions (leading case being Writ­A
No. 37143/2017) and pass a fresh, reasoned order.
2. In   pursuance   of   the   aforementioned   decision   of   this   Court,
the   Chief   Engineer   issued   order   dated   4.12.2018,   thereby
reengaging the petitioners and other appointees to their previous
place   of   posting.     However,   with   a   caveat   that   the   said
appointment was subject to the liberty granted by this Court and
that no arrears would be paid by the respondent corporation. The
order of the Chief Engineer dated 4.12.2018 is reproduced thus:
“The   order   dated   11.8.2017   passed   by   the   Chief   Engineer
(A­2­1)   U.P.   Jal   Nigam   Lucknow   has   been   set   aside   by
Hon’ble   High   Court   Allahabad   by   its   order   dated
28.11.2017   in   W.P.   No.   A­37143/2017   and   Review
Application   No.   2/2018   is   also   rejected   by   Hon’ble   High
Court in its order dated 25.07.2018. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court   has   upheld   [ sic ]   the   above   order   passed   by   Hon’ble
High Court in Civil Appeal No. 11017­11018/2018 titled as
U.P. Jal Nigam & Ors. v. Ajit Singh & Ors.
In the above context you are expected to perform your
duty   at   your   previous   posting   place   within   15   days
from issuing of this order.
That it is being clarified that the said appointment will
be   subject   to   the   liberty   granted   to   Nigam ,   by   the
Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   of   India   vide   judgment   dated
15.11.2018   in     Civil   Appeal   No.   11017­11018/2018.   The
concerning paragraphs are extracted below: 
3
For short, “the High Court”

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“15. In   view   of   the   above,   the   challenge   to   the   impugned
judgment   dated   28 th
  November,   2017   and   25 th
  July,   2017
must   fail   but   with   a   clarification   that   the   competent
authority   is   free   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   in
accordance with law.
16. We   may   not   be   understood   to   have   expressed   any
opinion   either   way   on   the   merits   of   the   course   of   action
open   to   the   appellants   against   the   respondents   including
against   the   other   appointees   under   the   same   selection
process.  All questions in that behalf are left open.” 4
That no Arrears prior to the fresh date of appointment
will be granted by Nigam .”
(emphasis supplied)
3. This   order,   according   to   the   contempt   petitioners,   is   in   the
teeth   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   dated   15.11.2018   and,
therefore,   the   respondents   be   proceeded   for   having   committed
wilful disobedience of the order of this Court.
4. Thereafter,   in   terms   of   the   liberty   granted   by   this   Court   in
the aforementioned judgment, the respondent corporation passed
a   fresh   order   dated   2.3.2020,   annulling   the   appointment   of   the
petitioners and similarly placed Assistant Engineers.   In arriving
at   the   fresh   decision,   reliance   was   placed   upon   the   two   internal
inquiry   reports   dated   29.5.2017   and  7.7.2017;   expert   reports   —
of   IIIT   Allahabad   dated   11.9.2018   and   IIT   Kanpur   dated
15.9.2018;   CFSL   report   dated   11.12.2019;   and   recommendation
made   by   the   Special   Investigation   Team   (SIT)   in   its   final   report
4
 extracted in paragraph 14 ibid

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dated   22.1.2020   received   by   the   respondent   corporation   on
18.2.2020,   to   cancel   the   recruitment   process   due   to   corruption
involved.   The   two   expert   reports   given   by   Assistant   Professor   at
IIT   Kanpur   and   Associate   Professor   at   IIIT   Allahabad   dated
15.9.2018 and 11.9.2018 respectively, pointed out that the audit
trail/checksum   and   time   stamps   of   the   candidates   were   not
made   available   and   therefore,   segregation   of   tainted   and
untainted   candidates   was   not   possible,   in   absence   of   primary
data.     The   operative   portion   of   the   order   dated   2.3.2020   is
reproduced below:
“20. …..
After   the   investigation   conducted   by   the
department in the case, the reports of both the experts,
the   relevant   recommendation/conclusion   of   the   SIT
investigation   and   after   examination   of   the   records,   it
has become clear that the selection process in question
is void ab initio for the above reasons . 
In view of the above, the office memo number 08/A­2­
1/2151­0201/17 dated 03.01.2017, memo no. 09/ A­2­1 /
2151­0201/17 dated 03.01.2017 and memo number 10/A­
2­1/2151­0201/17   dated   03.01.2017   is   cancelled   with
effect   from   the   date   of   issue   i.e.   date   03.01.2017   and   the
appointments   in   question   are   declared   void   from   the   said
date.
Due   to   the   cancellation   of   the   above   office
memorandum   issued   on   dated   03.01.2017,   the   orders
which   were   circulated   on   04.12.2018   to   contribute   again
are effectively annuled.
The   Assistant   Engineer   appointed   under   this   process
will get the protection of salary allowances etc. received so
far   and   no   recovery   will   be   made   from   them.   In   the
discharge   of   departmental   responsibilities,   the

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administrative   and   financial   functions   performed   by   them
so far will remain valid.”
(emphasis supplied)
5. This order has been assailed by the writ petitioner(s) directly
in this Court by way of Writ Petition (Civil) No. 491/2020.  We are
informed   that   the   same   order   has   been   assailed   by   similarly
placed   persons   governed   by   the   impugned   order   by   way   of   writ
petition(s) before the  High  Court of  Judicature at  Allahabad  and
also  at its Bench  at  Lucknow.   Some of them  have filed transfer
petition   before   this   Court,   to   transfer   their   Writ   Petition   No.
13083/2020 (S/S) filed at Lucknow Bench of the High Court and
to   hear   it   along   with   contempt   petitions   pending   in   this   Court
involving   overlapping   issues.     Accordingly,   the   assail   in   these
petitions is to the aforementioned order dated 4.12.2018, as well
as, order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondents.
6. In Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 625­626/2019, 642­643/2019
and   671­672/2019 5
,   the   grievance   of   the   petitioners   is   that   the
respondents have appointed them afresh instead of reinstatement
with   continuity   of   service   along   with   arrears   of   wages   and   thus,
have   wilfully   violated   the   direction   of   this   Court   in   judgment
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Collectively, “contempt petitions against non­payment of arrears”

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15.11.2018, to give full effect to the High Court’s judgment dated
28.11.2017. 
7. Whereas, in Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 395­396/2020, 408­
409/2020,   598­599/2020,   669­670/2020   and   671­672/2020 6
,
the grievance is that the order of the respondents dated 2.3.2020,
have   annulled   the   appointment   of   the   petitioners,   without
affording   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   petitioners  in   violation   of
the judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018 in Civil Appeal No.
11017­11018/2018. 
8. In   W.P.   (C)   No.   491/2020,   the   petitioners   have   prayed   for
quashing of order dated 2.3.2020 passed by the respondent and
to   reinstate   the   petitioners   with   continuity   of   service   and   full
back   wages.     While,   in   T.P.   (C)   No.   1209/2020,   the   petitioners
seek to withdraw and transfer to this Court, Writ Petition (C) No.
13083/2020   (Service   Single),   which   is   pending   before   the
Lucknow   Bench   of   the   High   Court,   as   the   order   dated   2.3.2020
(impugned   therein)   is   already   subject   matter   in   second   set   of
contempt   petitions   including   W.P.(C)   No.   491/2020   before   this
Court.
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Collectively, “contempt petitions against termination”

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CONTEMPT PETITIONS AGAINST REENGAGEMENT WITHOUT
CONTINUITY   OF   SERVICE   AND   ARREARS   OF   BACK   WAGES
VIDE ORDER DATED 4.12.2018:
9. The   factual   background   leading   to   filing   of   these   contempt
petitions   is   that   the   respondents,   vide   order   dated   11.8.2017,
annulled   the   recruitment   process   pursuant   to   which   the
petitioners   were   employed,   thereby   terminating   services   of   the
petitioners.  The said order was challenged before the High Court
and   came   to   be   set   aside   by   way   of   common   judgment   dated
28.11.2017.     The   above   judgment   also   directed   that   the
petitioners   be   permitted   to   work   and   be   paid   regular   monthly
salary.  The relevant extract of this decision is reproduced thus: ­
“…..
In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
that   the   impugned   order   dated   11.8.2017   has   been   passed
in   violation   of   principles   of   natural   justice   without   issuing
notice   and   without   affording   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the
petitioners,   no   exercise   was   undertaken   to   distinguish   the
case   of   tainted   and   non­tainted   candidates   to   arrive   at   the
conclusion   while   passing   the   impugned   order   as   such   the
impugned   order   dated   11.8.2017   is   not   sustainable   and   is
liable to be set aside.
Accordingly,   the   impugned   order   dated   11.8.2017
passed   by   the   Chief   Engineer   Jal   Nigam   (Annexure­9   to  the
writ petition) is here by set aside.
The   writ   petitions   succeed   and   are   allowed   with   the
further direction   to permit the petitioners to work on the
post   of   Assistant   Engineer   (Civil);   Assistant   Engineer
(Electrical/Mechanical)   and   Assistant   Engineer
(Computer   Science/Electronics   and
Communication/Electrical   and   Electronics)   and   to   pay
them   regular   salary   month   by   month   with   the   liberty   to

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the   respondents   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   after
providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and other
affected parties on the basis of observations made above.
No order as to costs.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Another  writ petition filed by  some of the petitioners before
Lucknow   bench   of   the   High   Court,   being   Service   Bench   No.
19863/2017 was also disposed of on 12.12.2017, in terms of the
judgment dated 28.11.2017, in the following words:
“…..
Accordingly,   this   writ   petition   is   also   allowed   in   terms   of
the   judgment   and   order   dated   28.11.2017   passed   by   this
Court   at   Allahabad   in   the   bunch   of   Writ   Petitions,   leading
Writ   Petition   being   Writ­A   No.   37143   of   2017,   Ajit   Singh
Patel and others vs. State of U.P. and others with a further
direction   to   permit   the   petitioners   to   work   on   the   post
of   Assistant   Engineer   (Civil),   Assistant   Engineer
(Electrical/   Mechanical)   and   Assistant   Engineer
(Computer   Science/   Electronics   and   Communication   /
Electrical and Electronics) and pay them regular salary
as and when the same accrues to them   with a liberty to
the   respondents   to   pass   a   fresh   reasoned   order   after
providing   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   petitioners   and
other parties on the basis of the observations made by this
Court   at   Allahabad   in   the   judgment   and   order   dated
28.11.2017 (supra).
…..”
(emphasis supplied)
11.   Upon failure of the respondents to act upon the directions
passed   in   judgment   dated   28.11.2017,   the   petitioner(s)   filed
Contempt   Application   (Civil)   No.   6218/2017   before   the   High
Court.  Meanwhile, the respondents preferred SLP (C) Nos. 5410­

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5419/2018   before   this   Court   assailing   the   judgment   dated
28.11.2017.   The said special leave petitions were disposed of by
an   order   dated   16.3.2018,   holding   that   the   respondents   may
approach   High   Court   for   a   liberty   to   re­work   the   answer   sheets
on the basis of corrections.  The said order reads thus: ­
“ORDER
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing
for   the   petitioners,   points   out   that   the   petitioners   having
found   out   that   there   were   defective   questions   and   incorrect
answer   keys,   the   High   Court   should   have   permitted   the
petitioners   to   re­work   the   merit   list.   He   submitted   that   the
High   Court   has   gone   wrong   in   insisting   for   an   individual
notice   in   the   factual   matrix   of   this   case.   In   this   regard   he
has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Vikas
Pratap   Singh   and   Others   v.   State   of   Chhattisgarh   and
Others, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 494. 
Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing
for   the   respondent(s),   however,   points   out   that   whether   the
questions   were   defective   or   key   answers   were   incorrect   are
disputed   question   and,   therefore,   liberty   should   be   granted
to   the   respondents   to   participate   in   the   inquiry.   He   further
submits   that   the   decision   of   this   Court   referred   to   by   the
learned   senior   counsel   for   the   petitioners   may   not   apply   to
the facts of this case. 
Be   that   as   it   may,   having   gone   through   the
impugned  judgment,  we  do  not  find  that the  door is yet
closed. It is for the petitioners, if they are so advised, to
approach   the   High   Court   itself   for   a   liberty   to   re­work
the answer sheets on the basis of the corrections, in case
the   High   Court   is   also   of   the   view   that   the   corrections
need to be made . 
The   special   leave   petitions   are,   accordingly,   disposed
of. 
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)

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12. Upon   disposal   of   the   said   special   leave   petitions,   the
respondents   furnished   an   undertaking   to   the   High   Court   in   the
Contempt   Application   (Civil)   No.   6218/2017   that   the   judgment
dated   28.11.2017   will   be   complied   with   on   or   before   15.5.2018.
In the meantime, the respondents preferred a Review Application
No. 2/2018 in Writ ­ A No. 37143/2017, wherein the High Court,
vide   order   dated   25.7.2018,   refused   to   interfere   with   the
judgment dated 28.11.2017 and reiterated that it was open to the
respondents   to   pass   a   fresh   order.     This   order   dated   25.7.2018
reads thus: ­
“ The Managing Director, U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow and the
Chief   Engineer,   U.P.   Jal   Nigam,   Lucknow   have   both   filed
an   application   for   the   review   of   the   judgement   and   order
dated 28.11.2017 by which a bunch of these writ petitions
were finally decided.
The   submission   of   learned   Advocate   General   of   State   of
U.P.   is   that   the   applicants   be   granted   liberty   to   segregate
tainted   and   untainted   candidates   in   passing   a   fresh   order
for which liberty has been given.
The order impugned in the writ petitions was of 11.08.2017
passed by the Chief Engineer, Jal Nigam which cancels the
entire selection.
In   allowing   the   petition,   we   have   held   that   the   order
impugned   in   the   writ   petition   has   been   passed   in
violation   of   principles   of   natural   justice   and   that   the
selection   as   a   whole   was   not   liable   to   be   cancelled
without   undertaking   any   exercise   to   separate   the
tainted candidates from the untainted one's. The court
in   the   end   while   allowing   the   writ   petitions   had
permitted the applicants to pass a fresh reasoned order
after   providing   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the

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petitioners   and   the   other   affected   parties   keeping   in
view the observations made in the judgment .
The   applicants   till   date   have   not   passed   any   fresh   order.
In  passing  the fresh order they  may consider each  and
every aspect of the matter and they do not require any
permission   of   the   court   for   the   manner   in   which   they
would pass the fresh order .
In view of above, we do not consider that any liberty for the
above purpose is needed from the court.
We   do   not   find   any   apparent   error   in   the   judgment   and
order which is sought to be reviewed.
The Review Application stands disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. Since   the   undertaking   filed   in   Contempt   Application   (Civil)
No. 6218/2017 was not complied with even after  the disposal of
the   review   petition,   the   High   Court   by   order   dated   6.8.2018,
directed that upon failure to file compliance affidavit before next
date   of   hearing,   the   presence   of   the   respondents   would   be
required for framing of charges of contempt.  Likewise, in another
contempt   petition   before   the   Lucknow   bench   of   the   High   Court
(against   non­compliance   of   judgment   dated   12.12.2017),   a
similar order was passed on 7.8.2018. 
14. The   respondents   carried   the   matter   in   appeal   before   this
Court   vide  Civil   Appeal   Nos.   11017­11018/2018,   impugning   the
judgment   and   orders   dated   28.11.2017   passed   in   Writ­A   No.
37143/2017 and also dated 25.7.2018 in Review Application No.

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2/2018.  It may be useful to advert to an interim order passed by
this Court in the stated appeal, dated 20.8.2018, which may have
some   bearing   on   the   grounds   under   consideration.     The   same
reads thus: ­ 
“ The  only liberty  granted  to the petitioners  and as
rightly   understood   by   the   learned   Advocate   General
appearing   for   the   State   was   to   segregate   the   tainted
from the untainted as per Order dated 16.03.2018 . 
We   direct   the   petitioners   to   file   a   report,   in   a   sealed
cover, within one month from today, as to what steps have
been   taken   pursuant   to   the   Judgment   dated   28.11.2017
passed by  the High Court  and the order  dated 16.03.2018
by this Court in the Special Leave Petition. 
List on 20.09.2018. 
The petitioners may approach the High Court and seek
for extension of time.”
(emphasis supplied)
Be   that   as   it   may,   the   decisions   of   the   High   Court   referred   to
above stood confirmed by this Court vide order dated 15.11.2018,
giving liberty to the respondent(s) to pass a fresh, reasoned order.
The relevant portion of the decision of this Court reads thus: ­
“ 14. The   limited   plea   taken   before   this   Court   as   noted
in   the   first   paragraph   of   order   dated   16 th
  March,   2018
was to allow the appellants to re­work the question and
answer sheets and revise the merit list and issue fresh,
reasoned   order   after   providing   opportunity   of   hearing
to  the  affected   candidates.    That  option  has  been  kept
open.     It   is   for   the   appellants   to   pursue   the   same.     In
other words, the appellants must, in the first place, act
upon   the   decision   of   the   High   Court   dated   28 th
November, 2017 whereby the order passed by the Chief
Engineer dated 11 th
 August, 2017 has been quashed and
set   aside.     The   appellants   may   then   proceed   in   the

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matter   in   accordance   with   law   by   passing   a   fresh,
reasoned  order.     Indeed,  while  doing  so,  the  appellants
may   take   into   consideration   the   previous   inquiry
reports   as   also   all   other   relevant   material/documents
which   have   become   available   to   them.     We   make   it
clear   that   we   have   not   dilated   on   the   efficacy   of   the
opinion given by the experts of the “IIIT Allahabad and
IIT Kanpur” .
15. In   view   of   the   above,   the   challenge   to   the   impugned
judgment   dated   28 th  
November,   2017   and   25 th
  July,   2017
must   fail   but   with   a   clarification   that   the   competent
authority   of   Nigam   is   free   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned
order in accordance with law .
16. We   may   not   be   understood   to   have   expressed   any
opinion   either   way   on   the   merits   of   the   course   of   action
open   to   the   appellants   against   the   respondents   including
against   the   other   appointees   under   the   same   selection
process.  All questions in that behalf are left open.”
(emphasis supplied) 
15. After the judgment of this Court dated 15.11.2018, the High
Court   in   the   Contempt   Application   (Civil)   No.   6218/2017,   vide
order dated 26.11.2018, directed the respondents to comply with
the judgment dated 28.11.2017 in the first instance.  An order of
even date was made in Contempt No. 1428/2018 by the Lucknow
bench of the High Court on similar lines.
16. In   terms   of   the   directions   of   this   Court   in   judgment   dated
15.11.2018   and   that   of   High   Court   in   the   two   orders   dated
26.11.2018,   the   respondents   passed   the   impugned   order   dated
4.12.2018 (reproduced in paragraph No. 2 above), reengaging the
petitioners, albeit, without continuity of service and arrears.  The

15
respondents   also   filed   affidavit   of   compliance   before   the   High
Court. 
17. In Contempt Application No. 6218/2017, the petitioner filed
objections   to   the   said   affidavit   of   compliance   on   10.12.2018   on
the ground that withholding the payment of arrears is directly in
teeth   of   the   judgment   dated   28.11.2017,   as   confirmed   by   this
Court   vide   judgment   dated   15.11.2018   and   thus,   it   amounts   to
wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order of the Court.
18. Similarly, in  Contempt  No. 1428/2018, the  objections were
first   noted   in   order   dated   17.12.2018   and   then,   a   detailed
affidavit   of   objections   was   filed   on   21.1.2019.   The   High   Court,
vide   order   dated   22.1.2019,   observed   that   the   reinstatement
should   be   followed   by   payment   of   full   back   wages   and   directed
the   respondents   to   pay   the   same   within   three   months.     The
relevant portion of the said order is reproduced thus:
“.....
The   Supreme   Court   has   observed   in   the   case   of   Deepali
Gundu   Surwase 7
  that   reinstatement   ordinarily   should   be
followed by payment of full back wages.
It   is   not   the   case   of   the   respondents   that   the   termination
order has not been set aside by this Court. It is also not the
case   of   the   respondents   that   the   petitioners   have   been
gainfully   employee   during   the   period   that   they   remained
out   of   service   due   to   termination   order   which   has
7
  Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors .  
(2013) 10 SCC 324

16
ultimately   been   set   aside.   Therefore,   the   respondents   are
directed   to   give   arrears   of   salary   as   are   due   to   the
petitioner after termination order is set aside by this Court.
The   back   wages   of   the   petitioners   in   compliance   of   the
orders   passed   by   this   Court   in   writ   jurisdiction   shall   be
paid to the petitioner within a period of three months.
List this matter after three months on 29.4.2019 by which
date if all arrears of salary are not paid, then the Managing
Director of U.P. Jal Nigam shall appear in person to assist
this Court.”
19. Thereafter,   by   order   dated   1.4.2019,   the   High   Court
recorded that the respondents are  prima facie  guilty of wilful and
deliberate   disobedience   and   directed   their   presence   before   the
Court   on   next   date   of   hearing,   for   framing   charge.     The
respondents   assailed   the   said   order   by   way   of   SLP(C)   No.
10774/2019.     This   Court,   vide   order   dated   7.5.2019,   observed
that   after   the   decision   in   Civil   Appeal   No.   11017­11018/2018,
the   contempt   petitions   cannot   be   continued   before   the   High
Court   and   be   deemed   to   have   been   withdrawn   to   this   Court.
Liberty   was   granted   to   the   petitioners   to   pursue   other   remedies
as per law against the impugned orders.
20. The   respondents   had   challenged   the   High   Court’s   order
dated   22.1.2019   by   way   of   SLP   (C)   Diary   No.   15756/2019,
wherein   this   Court   by   order   dated   10.5.2019,   had   followed   the

17
order   passed   in   SLP   (C)   No.   10774/2019   to   withdraw   the
contempt petition. 
21. In   these   circumstances,   the   present   contempt   petitions   in
reference   to   the   order   dated   4.12.2018   regarding   reengagement
without continuity of service and arrears of back wages, arise for
our consideration.
22. The   thrust   of   the   argument   of   the   petitioners   in   these
petitions   is   that   the   effect   of   judgment   of   High   Court   in   setting
aside   the   termination   order   dated   11.8.2017,   as   upheld   by   this
Court   is   that   the   termination   order   stood   effaced   in   its   entirety.
As   such,   it   was   necessary   to   issue   a   formal   order   of
reinstatement along with continuity in service and arrears of pay
for the relevant period.   It is not open to the respondents to give
any   other   interpretation.     It   was   then   urged   that   the   petitioners
were   not   gainfully   employed   elsewhere   between   the   dates   of
termination   and   reinstatement   and   therefore,   were   entitled   to
back   wages.       In   support,   reliance   has   been   placed   upon   the
decision  of this  Court in   Deepali   Gundu  Surwase 8
.   Further,  it
was submitted that denial of back wages would amount to giving
premium   to   the   respondents   for   their   wrongdoings.   It   was   also
8
supra at Footnote No. 7

18
pointed   out   that   in   Deepali   Gundu   Surwase 9
,   the   judgment   of
this   Court   in   J.K.   Synthetics   Ltd.   v.   K.P.   Agrawal   &   Anr. 10
,
which   has   been   relied   upon   by   the   respondents,   was   held   to   be
not a good law.
23. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondents   would   submit   that
neither the High Court in its judgment dated 28.11.2017 nor this
Court in its judgment dated 15.11.2018 had directed payment of
arrears. Reliance was then placed on the decisions of this Court
in   J.K.   Synthetics   Ltd. 11
  and   U.P.   State   Brassware   Corpn.
Ltd.   &   Anr.   v.   Uday   Narain   Pandey 12
,   to   submit   that   arrears
cannot   be   claimed   as   a   matter   of   right   upon   reinstatement,
unless   it   has   been   expressly   granted   by   the   Court.   In   that,   the
petitioners   are   not   entitled   to   arrears.     Further,   the   petitioners
cannot now claim arrears as it would amount to claiming a fresh
relief   and   is   beyond   the   scope   of   contempt   proceedings,   whilst
placing   reliance   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Director   of
Education,   Uttaranchal   &   Ors.   v.   Ved   Prakash   Joshi   &
Ors. 13
   It is urged that the petitioners had accepted the terms of
9
 supra at Footnote No. 7
10
(2007) 2 SCC 433
11
 supra at Footnote No. 10
12
(2006) 1 SCC 479
13
(2005) 6 SCC 98

19
re­engagement without any demur and therefore it was not open
to them to claim back wages. 
CONTEMPT   PETITIONS   AGAINST   FRESH   TERMINATION
ORDER DATED 2.3.2020:
24. The   fresh   termination   order   dated   2.3.2020   came   to   be
passed   pursuant   to   the   liberty   given   by   this   Court,   leading   to
filing   of   the   present   petitions.     The   background   facts   are   that
there   were   several   lapses   by   few   officials   of   the   respondent
corporation and M/s. Aptech Private Limited (the testing agency)
in   relation   to   the   selection   process   for   filling   up   122   posts   of
Assistant Engineers (113 ­ Civil, 5 ­ Electrical/Mechanical and 4
­   Electrical   and   Electronics/Electronics   and
Communication/Computer   Science).    That   as  per   the   agreement
between   the   respondent   corporation   and   the   testing   agency,   the
testing   agency   was   required   to   display   the   answer   key   for   three
days   and   to   take   remedial   action   on   the   objections   received.
Further,   the   testing   agency   was   also   required   to   retain   the   data
pertaining   to   the   examination   for   at   least   one   year.     The   testing
agency   breached   the   aforesaid   conditions   and   interviews   were
conducted, without confirming if the answer key was uploaded or

20
not.   The   interviews   of   34,158   candidates   were   conducted   in
tearing haste on 30.12.2016 and 31.12.2016 and the final result
was   released   on   3.1.2017,   and   the   appointments   were   made   on
the same day  i.e., 3.1.2017.   Since non uploading  of the answer
key   had   deprived   the   candidates   of   the   opportunity   to   file
objections,   the   unsuccessful   candidates   approached   the   High
Court  alleging  that  the recruitment  process was  not  transparent
and   was   replete   with   several   illegalities   and   irregularities.       The
High   Court,   in   Writ   Petition   Nos.   A/15948/2017   and
9794/S.B./2017   (preferred   by   unsuccessful   or   non­selected
candidates),   directed   the   respondent   corporation   to   inquire   into
the   said   grievance   and   ensure   that   appropriate   action   is   taken.
Accordingly,   two   separate   inquiries   were   conducted   by   the
officers wherein several irregularities were found.  On the basis of
these inquiries, the entire selection process was declared void­ab­
initio and an order to that effect was passed on 11.8.2017.   The
said   order   later   on   came   to   be   set   aside   vide   judgment   dated
28.11.2017 of the High Court. 
25. Meanwhile,   a   complaint   was   received   by   the   U.P.
Government   (Home   Department)   in   regard   to   various

21
examinations   pertaining   to   recruitment   to   several   posts
(including   the   present   recruitment   process).     The   government
forwarded the same to SIT for investigation.  The SIT in its initial
enquiry   found   that   the   testing   agency   had   removed   the   entire
data pertaining to the present recruitment process from the main
server, in violation of the condition to store it for a year.  The said
fact   was   also   admitted   by   the   testing   agency.     Therefore,   in
absence of original data, assistance of the Directors of IIT Kanpur
and   IIIT   Allahabad   was   sought   to   segregate   the   tainted   and
untainted candidates.  The finding in the two expert reports,  inter
alia,   was  that   the  response  sheet   was  uploaded   after  a   long   gap
after   the   conclusion   of   the   test   which   casts   a   doubt   of
manipulation in the response sheets.  Further, the data provided
by the testing agency did not contain the Timestamps and Mouse
Clicks   of   the   candidates   and   there   is   no   mention   of   the   Audit
Trail/Checksum.     Therefore,   the   authenticity   of   the   answers   of
the   candidates   could   not   be   verified   and   certified.     Moreover,
since   primary   data  was  not   available   and   the   data   stored   in  the
CD   could   not   be   authenticated,   it   was   not   possible   to   segregate
the tainted and untainted candidates.

22
26. In   the   meantime,   this   Court   in   Civil   Appeal   No.   11017­
11018/2018   (against   judgment   dated   27.11.2017   and   judgment
in review dated 25.7.2018), had observed that the expert reports
were not available while passing order dated 11.8.2017 and gave
liberty to pass a fresh reasoned order by considering the previous
inquiry   reports   and   other   data   that   becomes   available   to   the
respondents. 
27. In   separate   proceedings   pending   before   the   High   Court   in
W.P.   No.   12222/2017   (against   recruitment   for   other   posts),   the
Court   passed   an   order   dated   21.5.2019   that   it   was   for   the
respondent   corporation   to   decide   to   annul   the   entire   selection
process if the segregation cannot be undertaken.   The said order
was   upheld   by   the   High   Court   in   Special   Appeal   (Defective)   No.
625/2019 and 626/2019 (intra court appeals) by an order dated
31.7.2019.   Furthermore,   the   SIT   sent   its   final   report   dated
22.1.2020   to   the   Government,   which   was   made   available   to   the
respondent corporation on 18.2.2020.   The said report mentions
that the testing agency had removed primary data from the cloud
server in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and recommended
to   consider   cancelling   all   the   appointments   made   in   the   exams

23
conducted   by   the   testing   agency   (including   for   the   post   of
Assistant   Engineer).     In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   and   in  exercise  of
the   liberty   granted   by   this   Court,   the   order   dated   2.3.2020   was
passed   on   the   aforesaid   findings.     Aggrieved   therefrom,   the
present contempt petitions have been filed.
28. The   case   of   the   petitioners   is   that  the   High  Court   and  also
this Court had held that the termination order  dated 11.8.2017,
terminating the services of the petitioners (and other appointees)
en   masse ,   was   invalid   as   it   was   passed   without   adhering   to   the
principles   of   natural   justice.     However,   the   respondent
corporation   had   yet   again   passed   the   order   dated   2.3.2020
without   following   the   principles   of   natural   justice.     By   doing   so,
the respondent corporation in effect has restored the termination
order dated 11.8.2017, under  the guise of the liberty granted by
this Court.  The same cannot be countenanced.
29. It   was   urged   that   the   decision   of   this   Court   dated
15.11.2018   contained   a   categorical   direction   for   the   respondent
corporation   to   pass   a   fresh   reasoned   order   after   providing   an
opportunity   of   hearing   to   the   affected   parties.     However,   the
impugned order had been passed in violation thereof.  In support,

24
reliance   is   placed   on   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Haryana
Financial Corporation & Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. 14
to contend that the judgments are not to be read like statutes. It
was  then  urged  that   liberty  to   pass  a  fresh   order   ‘in  accordance
with   law’   cannot   be   stretched   to   such   an   extent   that   would
circumvent compliance with principles of natural justice.
30. It   was   contended   that   the   reliance   placed   by   the
respondents   upon   decisions   of   High   Court   in   W.P.   No.
12222/2017   and   Special   Appeal   (Defective)   No.   625/2019   and
626/2019   is   misplaced   and   untenable   as   the   same   has   been
done only to overcome the orders of this Court.  It was submitted
that   the   executive   cannot   sit   in   appeal   or   revision   over   the
judicial   orders.     Reliance  is   placed  on   the  decision  of  this   Court
in  Union of India & Anr. v. K.M. Shankarappa 15
 and  Union of
India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal 16
, to contend that an attempt
to renew an order which had been quashed by the Court, would
amount to legal malice. 
31. Per   contra,   the   respondents   would   submit   that   the
judgment   dated  15.11.2018   had   directed   the   respondents   to   act
14
(2002) 3 SCC 496
15
(2001) 1 SCC 582
16
(2013) 16 SCC 147

25
upon   the   High   Court’s   judgment   dated   28.11.2017,   wherein   the
petitioners   were   permitted   to   work   on   the   post   of   Assistant
Engineers.     The   respondents   duly   complied   with   the
aforementioned   judgment   of   this   Court,   by   appointing   the
petitioners   vide   order   dated   4.12.2018.     It   was   then   urged   that
this   Court   had   granted   liberty   to   the   respondents   to   proceed   in
the   matter   in   accordance   with   law.     Therefore,   contempt   action
cannot   be   maintained   in   respect   of   order   dated   2.3.2020   in
absence   of   any   specific   direction   to   afford   opportunity   to   the
petitioners   despite   the   conclusion   and   opinion   recorded   by   the
competent   authority   that   segregation   of   tainted   and   the
untainted   was   not   possible.     The   respondents   contend   that   in
such   a   case   the   entire   selection   process   stood   vitiated   and   no
notice/opportunity   need   be   given   to   the   petitioners.     Reliance   is
placed upon decisions of this Court in  Union of India & Ors. v.
O.   Chakradhar 17
,   Veerendra   Kumar   Gautam   &   Ors.   v.
Karuna   Nidhan   Upadhyay   &   Ors. 18
,   M.P.   State   Coop.   Bank
Ltd.,   Bhopal   v.   Nanuram   Yadav   &   Ors. 19
,   Nidhi   Kaim   v.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 20
,   Kunhayammed & Ors. v.
17
(2002) 3 SCC 146
18
(2016) 14 SCC 18
19
(2007) 8 SCC 264
20
(2016) 7 SCC 615

26
State   of   Kerala   &   Anr. 21
  and   Khoday   Distilleries   Limited   v.
Sri   Mahadeshwara   Sahakara   Sakkare   Karkhane   Limited,
Kollegal 22
  to contend that the respondents have not violated the
judgment   dated   15.11.2018.     In   law,   the   decision   of   High   Court
dated   28.11.2017   had   merged   in   the   judgment   of   this   Court
dated   15.11.2018.     It   was   then   submitted   that   no   additional
direction   can   be   given   in   a   contempt   proceeding   as   the   same
would   amount   to   exercise   of   review   jurisdiction.     In   support   of
this plea, reliance is placed upon the decisions in  Bihar Finance
Service   House   Construction   Cooperative   Society   Ltd.   v.
Gautam  Goswami  &  Ors. 23
  and   Sudhir  Vasudeva,   Chairman
and   Managing   Director,   Oil   and   Natural   Gas   Corporation
Limited   &   Ors.   v.   M.   George   Ravishekaran   &   Ors. 24
.     It   was
then urged that civil contempt would require wilful disobedience.
Passing   of   order   dated   2.3.2020,   assuming   it   to   be   a   case   of
disobedience,   the   same   cannot   be   termed   as   wilful.     Thus,   no
contempt   action   can   be   maintained.     Reliance   was   placed   on
decision of this Court in   Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj & Ors. 25
,
21
(2000) 6 SCC 359
22
(2019) 4 SCC 376
23
(2008) 5 SCC 339
24
(2014) 3 SCC 373
25
(2014) 16 SCC 204

27
Dinesh   Kumar   Gupta   v.   United   India   Insurance   Company
Limited & Ors. 26
 and  Kapildeo Prasad Sah & Ors. v. State of
Bihar & Ors. 27
.   It was then submitted that the implementation
of orders can be insisted depending on its practicability.   But, in
the fact situation of this case, giving notice to the petitioners was
not practical.   Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court
in  Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather 28
. 
RE: W.P. (C) No. 491/2020 
32. W.P.(C) No. 491/2020 is filed for quashing and setting aside
the   termination   order   dated   2.3.2020   and   to   direct   the
respondents to reinstate the petitioners with full back wages and
continuity of service.  Several applications were filed in the above
petition   seeking   impleadment   as   parties.   I.A.   No.   116777/2020,
I.A.   No.   106077/2020   and   I.A.   No.   93552/2020   have   been   filed
by   the   successful   candidates.     Whereas,   I.A.   No.   50899/2020   is
filed   by   the   candidates   who   were   declared   unsuccessful   or   non­
selected in the initial merit list, but whose score was revised after
considering   the   objections   to   the   answer   key,   so   as   to   enter   the
26
(2010) 12 SCC 770
27
(1999) 7 SCC 569
28
(1994) 4 SCC 34

28
merit   list.       An   application   for   directions   being   I.A.   No.
50896/2020   was   filed   by   the   aforesaid   unsuccessful   candidates
seeking   to   be   appointed   as   per   the   revised   merit   list   and   to   pay
arrears   from   January,   2017   when   they   ought   to   have   been
appointed.   The applications of the unsuccessful or non­selected
candidates shall be dealt with a little later.
33. The   ground   for   filing   the   above   writ   petition   is   that   the
termination order dated 2.3.2020 is violative of Articles 14, 19(1)
(g)   and   Article   21   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     That,   the
respondent   corporation   had   malafidely   tried   to   improve   its   case
at every stage by adding new grounds.   For instance, in the first
inquiry   report   dated   29.5.2017,   the   Chief   Engineer   stated   that
the   sanction   for   a   few   posts   was   made   by   Board   of   Directors   of
the   respondent   corporation,   which   was   not   competent   to   do   so,
as   only   the   Government   had   authority   to   sanction   posts.
Further, the candidates with lower marks in the written test were
given higher marks in the interview and that the entire selection
process   was   rushed   through   within   a   period   of   less   than   one
month from the date of advertisement issued on 13.12.2016 and
appointment   orders   issued   on   3.1.2017,   presumably   because

29
election   code   of   conduct   was   about   to   come   into   force.
Thereafter,   in   second   inquiry   report   dated   7.7.2017,   the   Chief
Engineer   added   that   the   respondent   corporation   could   not   have
recruited   without   permission   of   the   Finance   Department   of   the
Government   in   view   of   the   loan   of   Rs.300   crores   given   by   the
Government   to   the   respondent   corporation.     Further,   the
examination   results   were   published   without   inviting   objections,
some of the answers in the answer key and some questions in the
question   paper   were   wrong   and   that   answer   sheets   of   4
successful candidates were identical.
34. Then,   in   the   termination   order   dated   11.8.2017,   it   was
added   that   the   permission   of   Election   Commission   of   India
should have been taken as the Model Code of Conduct had come
into   effect   prior   to   joining   date.     Before   the   High   Court,   it   was
urged   that   the   respondent   corporation   was   facing   shortage   of
funds   and   was   not   in   a   position   to   pay   so   many   additional
employees   and   that   provision   was   not   made   for   reservation   of
posts   in   accordance   with   law.     Thereafter,   in   the   review
application,   the   ground   taken   was   that   on   the   basis   of

30
revaluation, some of the selected candidates would not even have
been eligible for the interview.
35. The   petitioners   would   submit   that   the   writ   petition   is
maintainable   in   view   of   violation   of   their   fundamental   rights
under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.  Reliance is
placed   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Romesh   Thappar   v.
State   of   Madras 29
.   It   was   urged   that   the   action   of   the
respondents in adding new grounds at each stage shows that the
respondent   corporation   despite   being   ‘State’   under   Article   12   of
the   Constitution,   has   been   prosecuting   the   matter   like   a
desperate private litigant, under dictation.
36. The   petitioners   would   then   urge   that   the   impugned   order
had   been   passed   by   the   respondents   whilst   relying   upon   the
opinion   of  experts  that   there was  a  possibility   that   the  response
filed by certain candidates ‘might have been doctored’, which is a
mere   speculation,   without   any   data   in   its   support.     It   was
submitted   that   the   data   upon   which   the   respondents   relied,   to
pass the order dated 2.3.2020, was available even at the time of
passing   of  the  judgment   dated  15.11.2018 by   this  Court; and  is
in the nature of ‘being repacked in a fresh package’ and the same
29
1950 SCR 594

31
cannot   be   permitted   as   per   decision   of   this   Court   in   Manohar
Lal (Dead) by LRs. v. Ugrasen (Dead) by LRs. & Ors. 30
.  
37. It   was   urged   that   the   respondents   deliberately   did   not   ask
the   testing   agency   for   checksum   data   until   one   year   period   of
storing   had   expired.     It   was   then   pointed   out   that   the   testing
agency,   in   an   affidavit   before   the   High   Court   (in   W.P.   (S/S)   No.
7647/2020 – relating to another examination), had stated certain
facts concerning the present selection process.  Particularly, that
the   primary   data   was   not   deleted   but   merely   moved   from   the
cloud   server   to   data   storage   centre   in   accordance   with   its   Data
Retention Policy and is still available with the testing agency and
that   the   respondent   corporation   had   never   approached   them   for
obtaining   the   same.     Therefore,   the   opinion   given   by   the   two
experts was based on conjectures and surmises that the primary
data is not available. 
38. It   was   submitted   that   the   SIT   Report   dated   22.1.2020   and
the   reports   of   Central   Forensic   Science   Laboratory   (CFSL)   dated
28.8.2019, 19.11.2019, 11.12.2019 and 1.1.2020 (considered by
the   SIT   in   its   report)   relied   upon   by   the   respondents   in   passing
the   impugned   order   ought   to   have   been   served   upon   the
30
(2010) 11 SCC 557

32
petitioners before taking any adverse action against them, in light
of dictum in   Union of India & Ors. v. S.K. Kapoor 31
.   Further,
the SIT report is in the nature of a final report by an investigative
agency and cannot be treated as conclusive proof of malpractices.
Moreover, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer at the cost of
any malfeasance by the testing agency. 
39. It   was   urged   that   the   documents   relied   upon   by   the
respondents have never been proved or subjected to scrutiny by a
fact­finding   authority   or   tribunal,   nor   had   the   petitioners   been
given   an   opportunity   to   meet   the   assertions   made   therein.   That
the   testing   agency   had   by   letter   dated   7.11.2017   intimated   the
SIT that primary data was stored in data storage facility and not
the   hard   drive,   despite   which,   the   SIT   raided   its   office   on
10.9.2018   and   seized   random   hard   drives   of   ‘dump   data’   and
sent   the   same   to   CFSL.     Therefore,   the   very   basis   of   CFSL’s
analysis is flawed. 
40. Further,   despite   the   finding   in   SIT   report   that   the   testing
agency was a part of criminal conspiracy for deleting the primary
data, the respondents continued to engage the testing agency for
conducting examinations. The respondent corporation procured a
31
(2011) 4 SCC 589

33
letter   dated   31.8.2020   from   the   Addl.   Chief   Secretary,
Government   of   U.P.   recommending   to   the   DGP,   SIT   that   the
testing   agency   be   blacklisted,   about   three   years   after   the
irregularities   came   to   its   knowledge,   which   clearly   demonstrates
malafides.     It   was   then   submitted   that   there   is   no   substance   in
the argument that the selection process was hastily completed as
the   same   was   in   full   compliance   with   the   advertisement   and
applicable   SoP   and   Rules   of   the   respondent   corporation.
Moreover,   the   said   argument   was   rejected   by   the   High   Court   in
judgment dated 28.11.2017. 
41. It   was   then   urged   that   the   only   liberty   granted   to   the
respondents   is   to   rework   the   answer   sheets   based   on   the
corrections,   after   giving   candidates   an   opportunity   of   hearing.
Further,   the   respondent   corporation   had   failed   to   discharge   the
burden that the response sheets were manipulated and argued of
inability   to   verify   the   veracity   of   examination   process,   which
cannot be permitted. 
42. The   submission   that   principles   of   natural   justice   were
violated was akin to the submissions made in the above contempt
petitions. It was submitted that there can be no exception to the

34
principle of  audi alter partem.   Reliance is placed upon decision of
this   Court   in   Nisha   Devi   v.   State   of   Himachal   Pradesh   &
Ors. 32
  and   Indian   Institute   of   Information   Technology,
Deoghat   Jhalwa,   Allahabad   &  Anr.   v.   Dr.   Anurika   Vaish   &
Ors. 33
  to   submit   that   when   termination   order   was   set   aside   for
not   hearing   the   affected   parties   before   passing   it   and   liberty   is
granted   to   pass   a   fresh   reasoned   order,   the   employer­State
cannot pass another fresh termination order without hearing the
affected persons yet again.
43. On   the   other   hand,   the   respondents   would   raise   a
preliminary   objection   as   regards   the   maintainability   of   the   Writ
Petition   as   the   alternate   remedy   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution   was   not   exhausted,   whilst   placing   reliance   on
decisions   of   this   Court   in   P.N.   Kumar   &   Anr.   v.   Muncipal
Corporation   of   Delhi 34
,   Kanubhai   Brahmbhatt   v.   State   of
Gujarat 35
,   Kunga Nima Lepcha & Ors. v.  State of Sikkim &
Ors. 36
,   Confederation   of   All   Nagaland   State   Services
32
(2014) 16 SCC 392
33
(2017) 5 SCC 660
34
(1987) 4 SCC 609
35
1989 Supp (2) SCC 310
36
(2010) 4 SCC 513

35
Employees’   Assn.   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Nagaland 37
  and   Amrit
Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi & Ors. 38
.
It was also pointed out that parties similarly placed to that of the
petitioners filed writ petition before the High Court being W.P. (C)
No.   13083/2020   (Service   Single)   and   even   the   petitioners   ought
to have approached High Court.
44. With   reference   to   petitioners’   reliance   on   affidavit   filed   by
the testing  agency, the respondents would submit that the onus
was   on   the   testing   agency   to   give   correct   and   complete   data   to
the   SIT   for   investigation.     It   was   pointed   out   that   the   SIT   had
recorded   the   statement   of   Mr.   Vishvajeet   Singh,   Technical   and
Delivery   Head   of   the   testing   agency,   wherein   he   stated   that   the
examination   data   was   kept   in   the   cloud   only   for   a   month,   after
which it was downloaded onto the ‘local environment’ ­ the hard
disk.     Further,   the   testing   agency   had   itself   accepted   in   the
certificate   provided   to   the   SIT   under   Section   65­B   of   the   Indian
Evidence   Act,   1872 39
,   that   the   original   primary   data   had   been
deleted   and   the   backup   data   does   not   contain   any   system   logs.
And that, the deletion of primary  server  data made it impossible
37
(2006) 1 SCC 496
38
(1975) 4 SCC 714
39
For short, ‘the 1872 Act’

36
to   re­analyse   the   response   sheets   using   the   secondary   data
provided in the form of CDs, as the same is not accurate.  It was
then   urged   that   the   respondent   corporation   had   taken   prompt
action against its officials involved in the irregularities committed
in the recruitment process. 
45. It was submitted that the respondents had rightly cancelled
the entire recruitment process and terminated the services of all
the   recruits  in   accordance  with  law   as  the  illegality   was  of   such
nature   that   the   tainted   candidates   could   not   have   been
segregated   from   the   untainted   and   the   veracity   of   the   entire
examination process was doubtful.   Further, it was urged that if
the   tainted   and   untainted   candidates   could   be   segregated,   the
show   cause   notice   would   have   been   issued   to   the   concerned
candidate.   However, since the segregation was not possible and
did   not   take   place,   the   entire   recruitment   process   had   to   be
cancelled in view of  O. Chakradhar 40
.   Thus, no individual show
cause   notice   was   necessary   in   law.   This   submission   of   the
respondents   is   similar   to   the   stand   taken   by   them   in   the   above
contempt petitions.
40
 supra at Footnote No. 17

37
46. It   was   then   urged   that   even   if   an   opportunity   of   hearing   is
given   to   the   candidates,   it   would   be   an   empty   formality   as   the
respondents do not have primary data to compare actual correct
answers   given   by   the   candidates,   as   it   would   be   impossible   to
segregate the tainted and untainted candidates in absence of the
primary   data.     Even   if   an   opportunity   of   hearing   is   granted,   the
decision   of   the   respondent   corporation   would   remain   the   same.
Reliance in that regard was placed upon decision of this Court in
Dharampal   Satyapal   Limited   v.   Dy.   Commissioner   of
Central Excise, Gauhati & Ors. 41
.
RE:   IMPLEADMENT   APPLICATIONS   BY   NON­SELECTED
CANDIDATES:
47. Coming   to   the   impleadment   applications   filed   by   non­
selected  candidates,  their  case is  that   upon  objections  raised  by
the   candidates   that   the   answer   key   was   not   released,   the
respondents had published the answer sheet and answer key on
28.2.2017.     The   applicants   found   various   errors   therein   and
being   aggrieved,   they   had   filed   W.P.   Nos.   10667/2017   and
21876/2017   before   the   High   Court,   wherein   the   High   Court
41
(2015) 8 SCC 519

38
directed   the   respondents   to   conduct   an   enquiry   in   the   alleged
irregularities.     Pursuant   thereto,   an   inquiry   was   conducted
wherein the errors were taken note of and accordingly, the testing
agency  had  submitted  a revised list to the  respondents.    In that
revised merit list, these applicants had stood higher in the merit
list   than   the   appointees.   The   respondents,   instead   of   reworking
the   appointments   in   accordance   with   the   revised   list,   had
annulled   the   entire   selection   process   first   vide   order   dated
11.8.2017   (which   was   later   set   aside)   and   then   again   by   order
dated 2.3.2020.
48. These  applicants  would  submit  that   various  grounds  noted
by the respondents in the order dated 2.3.2020 had already been
rejected   by   the   High   Court   in   its   judgment   dated   28.11.2017,
whereby   the   earlier   order   dated   11.8.2017   was   set   aside.     The
High   Court   in   the   said   judgment   had   held   that   there   was   no
prohibition   imposed  against   appointment   on  regular   selection   in
the   model   code   of   conduct   and   the   post   of   Assistant   Engineers
were   regular   in   nature.     That   the   requirement   mandating   prior
sanction   of   the   State   Government   was   not   applicable   to   the
present   case   as   the   requirement   was   made   by   G.O.   dated

39
13.12.2016   whereas   the   selection   process   in   question   had
commenced on 19.11.2016.  That the permission to advertise the
posts   was   made   by   the   Chairman,   which   was   ratified   by   the
Board of Directors of the respondent corporation.   The argument
of   malafide   in   the   selection   process   was   rejected   by   the   High
Court and the said judgment was upheld by this Court.
49. It was urged that the testing agency undertook the exercise
of   rectification   of   incorrect   entries   in   the   key   and   submitted   a
report   to   the   respondents   dated   8.8.2017   containing   the   revised
merit   list   and   therefore,   the   only   option   available   to   the
respondents   was   to   act   upon   the   revised   merit   list.     It   was
submitted   that   cancellation   of   entire   selection   process   (by   order
dated   2.3.2020)   when   it   was   merely   a   case   of   certain   infirmities
in   the   evaluation,   would   be   unreasonable,   arbitrary   and
disproportionate.   In support of this plea, reliance is placed upon
decisions of this Court in   Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh P.U.
Puthuvalnikathu & Anr. 42
,   Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of
Bihar   &   Ors. 43
  and   K.   Channegowda   &   Ors.   v.   Karnataka
Public Service Commission & Ors. 44
.
42
(2003) 7 SCC 285
43
(2013) 4 SCC 690
44
(2005) 12 SCC 688

40
50. It   was   then   urged   that   the   principle   of   proportionality   has
been   recognised   as   an   aspect   of   Article   14   by   this   Court   in
Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State
of   Madhya   Pradesh   &   Ors. 45
  and   in   view   whereof,   the
cancellation of entire selection process, being disproportionate, is
violative of Article 14.
51. Further,   it   was   urged   that   even   in   the   case   of   malpractice
and   malafide,   entire   selection   process   should   not   be   cancelled
but the tainted and untainted candidates ought to be segregated.
In   support   of   this   plea,   reliance   was   placed   on   decisions   of   this
Court   in   Inderpreet   Singh   Kahlon   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Punjab
&   Ors. 46
,   Girjesh   Shrivastava   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. 47
  and   Joginder Pal & Ors. v. State of Punjab
&   Ors. 48
.     It   was   then   urged   that   the   mandate   of   decisions   of
High   Court   dated   28.11.2017   and   25.7.2018   and   of   this   Court
dated   16.3.2018   and   15.11.2018   was   to   re­work   the   answer
sheets   and   a   limited   liberty   to   that   effect   was   given   to   the
respondents.   The applicants would then take a stand similar to
45
(2016) 7 SCC 353
46
(2006) 11 SCC 356
47
(2010) 10 SCC 707
48
(2014) 6 SCC 644

41
that of the petitioners in the above contempt petitions, to submit
that the judgment of a court has to be understood in its entirety
and cannot be read as a statute, whilst relying upon the decision
of   this   Court   in   Purnendu   Mukhopadhyay   &   Ors.   v.   V.K.
Kapoor & Anr. 49
.  Therefore, the order dated 2.3.2020 passed by
the respondents is against the mandate of the above judgments.
RE: TRANSFER PETITION:
52. In T.P. (C) No. 1209/2020, the petitioners have approached
this   Court   under   Article   139A   for   transfer/withdrawal   of   Writ
Petition   (C)   No.   13083/2020   (Service   Single)   pending   before   the
High   Court   to   this   Court   as   the   subject   matter   of   the   said   writ
petition   (impugned   order   dated   2.3.2020)   is   already   pending
challenge before this Court in W.P. No. 491/2020 and companion
contempt   petitions.   In   W.P.   (C)   No.   13083/2020   (Service   Single)
before the High Court, the petitioners have relied upon opinion of
their own expert, Dr. A.V. Subrahmanyam, Assistant Professor at
IIIT   Delhi,   who   had   discredited   the   IIT   and   IIIT   reports   and
opined   that   the   ‘checksum’   method   of   fingerprinting   not   having
49
(2008) 14 SCC 403

42
been   deployed   shall   have   no   bearing   on   the   candidates   as   they
had no role to play in the same. 
53. These   petitioners   would   submit   that   the   issue   of   veracity
and   weight   of   experts   shall   be   examined   in   a   departmental
inquiry  and cannot be gone into before this Court.   Further, the
petitioners  urge  that  they   would  like  to  present  their  expert  and
to   cross   examine   other   experts,   so   that   the   truth   could   be
distilled.  That the respondents ought to have had a departmental
inquiry   by   giving   the   petitioners   an   opportunity   to   hear,   so   that
the parties could have led their evidence and the decision should
have been taken on the basis of the outcome of such inquiry. 
54. We   have   heard   Mr.   Mukul   Rohatgi,   Ms.   Meenakshi   Arora,
Mr.   Ravindra   Raizada,   learned   senior   counsel,   Mr.   Gaurav
Mehrotra,   Mr.   Kumar   Shivam   and   Mr.   Rohit   Anil   Rathi,   learned
counsel   ­   for   the   petitioners;   Mr.   Nizam   M.   Pasha   for   the
impleaded  petitioners;  Ms.  Sanskriti  Pathak,  learned  counsel  for
applicants   (candidates   successful   as   per   revised   merit   list);   and
Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for the respondents.
55.  The broad points that arise for our consideration are:

43
1.   Whether   the   order   dated   4.12.2018   passed   by   the
respondents is in the teeth of judgment of this Court dated
15.11.2018, requiring compliance of judgment of High Court
dated   28.11.2017,   for   deliberate   failure   to   reinstate   with
continuity of service and to pay arrears to the petitioners?
2. Whether the termination order dated 2.3.2020 passed by
the respondents is in wilful disobedience of and in the teeth
of   judgment   of   this   Court   dated   15.11.2018,   for   not
following   the   principles   of   natural   justice   and   is   thus   non­
est  in law?
CONSIDERATION
56. At   the   outset,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   first   answer   the
preliminary   objection   regarding   maintainability   of   writ   petition
under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     We   have   no
hesitation   in   rejecting   this   preliminary   objection   for   more   than
one reason.  It is well­established position that if the termination
order   is   assailed   on   the   ground   of   violation   of   principles   of
natural justice or fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of
the   Constitution,   such   a   grievance   can   be   brought   before   the
constitutional   Court   including   by   way   of   writ   petition   under

44
Article   32   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     It   is   a   different   matter
that this Court may be loath in entertaining the grievance directly
under  Article 32 and instead relegate the petitioner(s) before the
High   Court   to   first   exhaust   the   remedy   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution   of   India.     That   is   also   because   this   Court   will   then
have the advantage of the judgment of the High Court on relevant
aspects.  In other words, it is not a question of maintainability of
writ   petition,   but   one   of   exercise   of   discretion   with
circumspection   in   entertaining   writ   petition   under   Article   32   in
such   matters.     Further,   in   the   present   case,   there   are   other
proceedings   pending   in   the   form   of   contempt   petitions   and   a
transfer petition wherein the termination order dated 2.3.2020 is
the   subject   matter.     Thus,   the   arguments   in   these   cases   will   be
overlapping.   In  that,  the self­same  order  has  been impugned  in
the   writ   petition   filed   before   this   Court.     The   fact   that   other
affected similarly placed persons have filed writ petitions directly
before the High Court and which are stated to be pending, can be
no   impediment   for   this   Court   in   entertaining   and   deciding   the
writ   petition.     For,   the   issue   regarding   the   purport   of   orders
passed   by   this   Court   needs   to   be   answered   appropriately   in
contempt petitions only by this Court.   It is not open to the High

45
Court   to   interpret   or   explain   the   order   passed   by   this   Court   in
previous   proceedings   between   the   parties.     The   High   Court   can
only   follow   the   dictum   of   this   Court   which   is   binding   on   it.
Accordingly,   we   are   not   impressed   by   the   preliminary   objection
taken   by   the   respondents   regarding   the   maintainability   of   writ
petition   under   Article   32   of   the   Constitution   by   similarly   placed
persons   directly   filed   before   this   Court   to   assail   the   impugned
order dated 2.3.2020, which is also subject matter of second set
of contempt petitions.
57. As   aforesaid,   we   are   dealing   with   two   sets   of   contempt
petitions.  The  first set  complains about non­compliance of order
dated   28.11.2017   passed   by   the   High   Court,   which   came   to   be
upheld   by   this   Court   consequent   to   disposal   of   special   leave
petitions   being   SLP(C)   Nos.   5410­5419/2018   vide   order   dated
16.3.2018,  and   more   particularly,   reiterated   by   this   Court   in   its
order   dated   15.11.2018 50
  directing   the   respondents   to   first   act
upon   the   decision   of   the   High  Court   dated   28.11.2017   and   only
thereafter   proceed   in   the   matter   in   accordance   with   law   by
passing a fresh, reasoned order.  It is not in dispute that after the
judgment   of   this   Court   dated  15.11.2018,  a  consequential   order
50
 supra at Footnote No. 2

46
was passed by the High Court on 26.11.2018.   The respondents
thus   issued   order   dated   4.12.2018   (reproduced   in   paragraph   2
above), reengaging the petitioners on the concerned posts without
continuity of service and arrears.  
58. The   grievance   of   the   petitioners   is   that   the   unambiguous
direction given by  the High Court and upheld by  this Court was
to   reinstate   the   petitioners   on   the   same   position   with   full   back
wages.     No   more   and   no   less.     The   respondents   were,   therefore,
obliged to issue order of reinstatement with continuity  of service
and   back   wages.     The   argument   is   attractive   at   the   first   blush,
but   on   deeper   scrutiny   of   the   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court
and finally by this Court, it is noticed that the direction is limited
to   permit   the   petitioners   to   work   on   the   posts   of   Assistant
Engineer   (Civil),   Assistant   Engineer   (Electric/Mechanical)   and
Assistant   Engineer   ( Computer   Science   and   Electronics   and
Communication/Electrical   and   Electronics)   and   to   pay   them
regular salary month by month as and when it becomes due and
payable to them. That can be discerned from the last paragraph
of the order dated 28.11.2017 (reproduced in paragraph 9 above).
On similar lines, the High Court disposed of another writ petition

47
challenging the termination order dated 11.8.2017 passed by the
respondents,   vide   order   dated   12.12.2017   (reproduced   in
paragraph 10 above).  In these orders, the expression used by the
High Court is “to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned
posts   and   to   pay   them   regular   salary   as   and   when   the   same
accrues   to   them”.     The   order   dated   28.11.2017   passed   by   the
High   Court   was   upheld   by   this   Court   on   16.3.2018.     In   that
order,   after   recording   contentions   of   both   sides,   while   disposing
of petitions it is observed as follows: ­
“…..
Be   that   as   it   may,   having   gone   through   the   impugned
judgment,   we   do   not   find   that   the   door   is   yet   closed.   It   is
for   the   petitioners,   if   they   are   so   advised,   to   approach   the
High Court itself for a liberty to re­work the answer sheets
on   the   basis   of   the   corrections,   in   case   the   High   Court   is
also of the view that the corrections need to be made.
…..”
The   respondents   had,   therefore,   pursued   review   petition   as   per
the liberty given by this Court.  The same came to be disposed of
by   the   High   Court   on   25.7.2018.     On   perusal   of   that   order
(reproduced in paragraph 12 above), there is nothing  to  indicate
that   the   High   Court   expressly   directed   reinstatement   of
petitioners   with   continuity   of   service   and   back   wages,   as   such.
Even in the decision of this Court dismissing the appeals filed by

48
respondents,   vide   order   dated   15.11.2018   (reproduced   in
paragraph   14   above),   no   such   direction   has   been   issued.     The
limited direction is that the respondents must first act upon the
decision of the High Court dated 28.11.2017 and only thereafter
proceed in the matter in accordance with law by passing a fresh,
reasoned order.  
59. After   cogitating   over   the   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court
and this Court referred to above, it becomes amply clear that the
High Court had quashed and set aside the first termination order
dated   11.8.2017   solely   on   the   ground   that   it   was   passed   in
violation of principles of natural justice and further observed that
the   selection   as   a   whole   was   not   liable   to   be   cancelled   without
undertaking  an   exercise  to  separate  the  tainted  candidates  from
the   untainted.     While   so   observing,   it   was   made   clear   that   the
respondents   were   free   to   pass   a   fresh,   reasoned   order   in
accordance with law.
60. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in
accepting   the   explanation   offered   by   the   respondents   that   going
by   the   text   of   the   orders   passed   by   the   High   Court   and   this
Court,   it   was   open   to   the   respondents   to   issue   order   (dated

49
4.12.2018)   to   reengage   the   petitioners   on   the   same   posts   from
the date of order and to pay them regular salary month by month
thereafter   or   as   and   when   it   would   accrue   to   them.     The   orders
passed by the High Court and this Court, as aforementioned, do
not   contain   explicit   direction   to   reinstate   the   petitioners   with
continuity   of   service   and   back   wages   as   such.     Instead,   the
expression used is only “to permit the petitioners to work on the
posts”  which  were  held  by  them  at  the   time  of  their  termination
and   “to   pay   them   regular   salary   month   by   month”   and   “as   and
when   the   same   accrues   to   them”.     Thus   understood,   it   is   not   a
case of wilful disobedience of the orders of the Court.  
61. Arguendo,   the   interpretation   as   propagated   by   the
petitioners   of   the   stated   orders   dated   28.11.2017   passed   by   the
High Court and 16.3.2018 of this Court, is a possible view.  Being
another   possible   view,   the   benefit   must   then   be   given   to   the
respondents.     For,   it   would   certainly   not   be   a   case   of   wilful
disobedience   as   enunciated   by   this   Court   in   Sushila   Raje
Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired) 51
  which follows the dictum of this
Court in  State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari 52
,  Purnendu
51
 (2008) 14 SCC 392
52
 AIR 1961 SC 221

50
Mukhopadhyay 53
  and   Maruti   Udyog   Limited   v.   Mahinder   C.
Mehta & Ors. 54
.
62. It is well settled that contempt action ought to proceed only
in   respect   of   established   wilful   disobedience   of   the   order   of   the
Court.     This   Court   in   paragraph   12   of   the   decision   in   Ram
Kishan 55
 observed thus: ­
“ 12.   Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to be es ­
tablished   that   disobedience   of   the   order   is   “wilful”.   The
word   “wilful”   introduces   a   mental   element   and   hence,
requires   looking   into   the   mind   of   a   person/contemnor
by   gauging   his   actions,   which   is   an   indication   of   one's
state   of   mind.   “Wilful”   means   knowingly   intentional,
conscious,   calculated   and   deliberate   with   full   knowl ­
edge of consequences flowing therefrom . It excludes ca ­
sual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine
inability.   Wilful   acts   does   not   encompass   involuntarily   or
negligent   actions.   The   act   has   to   be   done   with   a   “bad
purpose or without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, ob ­
stinately   or   perversely” .   Wilful  act   is   to  be  distinguished
from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or in ­
advertently. It does not include any act done negligently or
involuntarily.   The deliberate conduct of a person means
that   he   knows   what   he   is   doing   and   intends   to   do   the
same.   Therefore,   there   has   to   be   a   calculated   action
with   evil  motive  on  his  part . Even if  there is a  disobedi ­
ence   of   an   order,   but   such   disobedience   is   the   result   of
some   compelling   circumstances   under   which   it   was   not
possible   for   the   contemnor   to   comply   with   the   order,   the
contemnor   cannot   be   punished.   “Committal   or   sequestra ­
tion  will  not  be  ordered  unless  contempt   involves  a  degree
of   default   or   misconduct.”   (Vide   S.   Sundaram   Pillai   v.   V.R.
Pattabiraman 56
,   Rakapalli   Raja   Ram   Gopala   Rao   v.   Nara ­
53
        supra at Footnote No. 49
54
       (2007) 13 SCC 220
55
 supra at Footnote No. 25
56
  (1985) 1 SCC 591

51
gani   Govinda   Sehararao 57
,   Niaz   Mohammad   v.   State   of
Haryana 58
,   Chordia Automobiles   v.   S. Moosa 59
,   Ashok Paper
Kamgar   Union   v.   Dharam   Godha 60
,   State   of   Orissa   v.   Mohd.
Illiyas 61
  and   Uniworth Textiles Ltd.   v.   CCE 62
).”
(emphasis supplied)
It   is   useful   to   recall   the   exposition   in   Director   of   Education,
Uttaranchal 63
  and   also   in   K.G.   Derasari   &   Anr.   v.   Union   of
India   &   Ors. 64
;   wherein   this   Court   observed   that   in   exercising
contempt jurisdiction, the primary concern must be whether the
acts  of  commission  or   omission  can  be  said  to  be contumacious
conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in
complying with the directions given in the judgment and order of
the Court.  Further, the Court ought not to take upon itself power
to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by
the Court passing the judgment and order.  It is also not open to
go into the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional
directions or delete any direction, which course could be adopted
only in review jurisdiction and not contempt proceedings.
57
  (1989) 4 SCC 255
58
  (1994) 6 SCC 332
59
  (2000) 3 SCC 282
60
  (2003) 11 SCC 1
61
   (2006) 1 SCC 275
62
  (2013) 9 SCC 753
63
 supra at Footnote No. 13
64
        (2001) 10 SCC 496

52
63. Reliance   placed   on   Deepali   Gundu   Surwase 65
  by   the
petitioners   is   inapposite.     It   was   a   case   of   wrongful   termination
and   entitled   the   petitioner   therein   relief   of   back   wages.     The
respondents   have   instead   relied   upon   the   exposition   in   P.
Karupaiah   (Dead)   through   Legal   Representatives   v.   General
Manager,   Thruuvalluvar   Transport   Corporation   Limited 66
and   J.K. Synthetics Ltd. 67
  which has restated the legal position
regarding  back wages.   It has been held that  it is not automatic
or   natural   consequence   of   reinstatement .     Suffice   it   to   mention
that   for   reasons   already   recorded   hitherto   including   that   the
limited   direction   given   by   the   High   Court   and   not   disturbed   by
this Court was to permit the petitioners to work on the concerned
posts   and   to   pay   them   regular   salary   as   and   when   the   same
accrues   to   them,   the   plea   under   consideration   needs   to   be
recorded only to be rejected.
64. Be that as it may, keeping in mind the settled legal position,
we   have   no   hesitation   in   concluding   that   the   case   at   hand   does
not   qualify   the   test   of   contumacious,   much   less   wilful
disobedience   of   the   order   of   the   Court   by   the   officers   of   the
respondents   as   such.     In   other   words,   the   basis   on   which   the
65
       supra at Footnote No. 7
66
 (2018) 12 SCC 663 (paragraph 10)
67
       supra at Footnote No. 10

53
contempt   action   against   the   respondents   in   reference   to   order
dated 4.12.2018 issued by the respondents, has been initiated is
tenuous.  Hence, the same is rejected. 
65. We   would   now   revert   to   the   second   set   of   contempt
petitions , which emanate from termination order dated 2.3.2020
issued by the respondents. These petitions essentially proceed on
the allegation that the respondents committed wilful disobedience
of the order of this Court dated 15.11.2018 passed in Civil Appeal
Nos.   11017­11018/2018   in   not   affording   prior   opportunity   of
hearing   to   the   petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons   despite
express   direction   contained   in   the   said   order.     For   considering
this   grievance,   we   may   reproduce   the   relevant   portion   of   the
order dated 15.11.2018, which reads thus: ­
14. The   limited   plea   taken   before   this   Court   as   noted   in
the first paragraph of order dated 16 th
  March, 2018 was to
allow   the   appellants   to   re­work   the   question   and   answer
sheets   and   revise   the   merit   list   and   issue   fresh,   reasoned
order   after   providing   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the
affected  candidates .    That  option  has  been kept  open.   It
is for the appellants to pursue the same.    In other words,
the   appellants   must,   in   the   first   place,   act   upon   the
decision   of   the   High   Court   dated   28 th
  November,   2017
whereby   the   order   passed   by   the   Chief   Engineer   dated
11 th
 August, 2017 has been quashed and set aside.  The
appellants   may   then   proceed   in   the   matter   in
accordance with law by passing a fresh, reasoned order.
Indeed,   while   doing   so,   the   appellants   may   take   into
consideration   the   previous   inquiry   reports   as   also   all
other relevant material/documents which have become
available   to   them.     We   make   it   clear   that   we   have   not

54
dilated   on   the   efficacy   of   the   opinion   given   by   the
experts of the “IIIT Allahabad and IIT Kanpur .”
(emphasis supplied)
66.   The   Court   had   set   aside   the   termination   order   dated
11.8.2017 issued by the respondents, solely on the ground that it
was in violation of principles of natural justice.  At the same time,
liberty   was   given   to   the   respondents   to   pass   a   fresh   order   in
accordance   with   law   including   by   undertaking   exercise   of
segregating   the   tainted   from   the   untainted   candidates.     Indeed,
the   Court   expected   that   before   taking   any   precipitative   action
against the petitioners, the respondents must afford opportunity
of   hearing   to   them.     This   observation   is   contextual.     It   would
come into play dependent upon the opinion eventually formed by
respondents   after   due   consideration   of   the   material   collated   by
them   to   distinguish   the   tainted   and   untainted   candidates,   was
possible   or   otherwise.     Had   the   respondents   concluded   that   it
was possible to segregate tainted from untainted candidates, they
would   have   been   obliged   to   comply   with   the   directions   given   by
the   High   Court   and   restated   by   this   Court   in   order   dated
15.11.2018,   to   afford   prior   opportunity   of   hearing   to   the
petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons   before   passing   fresh,
reasoned   order.     However,   from   the   subject   termination   order

55
dated 2.3.2020, which is a speaking order, it is crystal clear that
after due enquiry and taking into consideration all aspects of the
matter,   in   particular   the   enquiry   reports   and   the   opinion   of   the
experts including final report of SIT, the respondents were of the
considered   opinion   that   it   was   not   possible   to   segregate   tainted
from the untainted candidates for reasons recorded in that order.
We are not inclined to go into the correctness of the said reasons,
because it is subject matter of challenge in writ petitions pending
before   the   High   Court   (as   pointed   out   in   Annexure   R­29   of   the
Supplementary   Affidavit),   filed   not   only   by   Assistant   Engineers,
but also by Junior Engineers, Routine Grade Clerks and others.  
67. We would, therefore, confine our analysis as to whether the
respondents   were   justified   in   passing   subject   termination   order
dated 2.3.2020 without giving prior opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners.  In light of the conclusion reached by the respondents
in the stated order dated 2.3.2020 — that it was not possible to
segregate   the   tainted   from   the   untainted   candidates,   in   law,   it
must follow that the respondents could annul the entire selection
process   and   pass   the   impugned   order   without   giving   individual
notices   to   the   petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons.     We   are

56
fortified   in   taking   this   view   in   terms   of   the   exposition   in   O.
Chakradhar 68
  and   the   subsequent   decisions   of   this   Court   in
Joginder   Pal 69
,   Veerendra   Kumar   Gautam 70
  and   Vikas
Pratap   Singh   &   Ors.   v.   State   of   Chhattisgarh   &   Ors. 71
,
adverted to in paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 15.11.2018 72
of   this   Court   while   disposing   of   earlier   appeals   between   the
parties.  
68. In   other  words,   since   the   respondents   have   concluded   that
it   was   not   possible   to   segregate   tainted   from   the   untainted
candidates because of the reasons noted in the termination order
dated 2.3.2020, in law, there was nothing wrong  in respondents
issuing   the   said   termination   order   without   affording   prior
opportunity to the petitioners and similarly placed persons.   Had
it   been   a   case   of   even   tittle   of   possibility   in   segregating   the
tainted   from   the   untainted   candidates,   which   exercise   the
respondents were permitted to engage in, in terms of the decision
of   this   Court   dated   15.11.2018,   it   would   have   been   a   different
matter.     In   that   case   alone,   the   petitioners   and   similarly   placed
68
 supra at Footnote No. 17
69
 supra at Footnote No. 48
70
 supra at Footnote No. 18
71
 (2013) 14 SCC 494
72
 supra at Footnote No. 2

57
persons could complain of wilful disobedience of the order passed
by this Court dated 15.11.2018.  
69. Having   said   thus,   we   must   conclude   that   even   the   second
set   of   contempt   petitions   in   reference   to   the   subject  termination
order dated 2.3.2020 being in violation of direction given by this
Court   to   afford   opportunity   to   the   petitioners   vide   order   dated
15.11.2018, must fail.
70. Considering   the   fact   that   multiple   writ   petitions   have   been
filed by different groups of affected persons before the  High Court
being   similarly   placed   persons   against   the   subject   termination
order dated 2.3.2020 and as the same are pending, as aforesaid,
to   obviate   even   slightest   of   prejudice   being   caused   to   the
petitioners in those cases, who are not before us, we refrain from
examining   the   arguments   regarding   the   justness   and   validity   of
the   stated   order   and   leave   all   other   contentions   open   to   the
parties   to   be   pursued   before   the   High   Court   in   pending
proceedings.     Consequently,   we   would   dispose   of   the   transfer
petition, as well as, the writ petition by relegating the petitioners
therein   including   the   applicants   in   intervention/impleadment
applications,   to   pursue   their   grievance   in   the   form   of   writ

58
petitions   before   the   High   Court,   which   could   be   heard   by   the
High   Court   analogously   along   with   all   other   pending   writ
petitions   involving   overlapping   issues   to   obviate   any
inconsistency and conflicting findings regarding the same subject
matter   in   any   manner.     Indeed,   in   the   event   the   High   Court
agrees   with   the   conclusion   recorded   by   the   respondents   in   the
stated   order   dated   2.3.2020,   that   it   is   not   possible   to   segregate
the tainted from the untainted candidates, the High Court would
be bound by the observations made by us in this judgment.  For,
in   that   eventuality,   in   law,   it   would   not   be   necessary   for   the
respondents   to   give   prior   hearing   or   afford   opportunity   to   the
petitioners   and   similarly   placed   persons   before   annulling   the
entire selection process and issuing the termination order under
challenge.
71. Accordingly,   while   discharging   the   show­cause   notices
issued   in   the   concerned   contempt   petitions   and   disposing   of   all
the   contempt   petitions,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   relegate   the
petitioners   in   the   transfer   petition   and   the   writ   petition   filed   in
this   Court,   before   the   High   Court   to   pursue   their   remedy   under
Article 226 of the Constitution to assail the order dated 2.3.2020

59
with   further   direction   that   all   petitions   involving   overlapping
issues   and   referred   to   in   Annexure   R­29   of   the   Supplementary
Affidavit   or   any   other   writ   petition   pending   or   to   be   filed,   list
whereof be furnished by  the parties to the High Court, for  being
heard   analogously.     We   request   the   High   Court   to   expeditiously
dispose   of   the   writ   petitions,   leaving   all   contentions   other   than
decided   in   this   judgment,   open   to   the   respective   parties   to   be
raised   before   the   High   Court.     The   same   be   decided   on   its   own
merits as per law.
72. In view of the above, we pass the following order: ­
(1) Show­cause notices issued in the respective contempt
petitions   stand   discharged.     Contempt   petitions   are
dismissed;
(2) The   transfer   petition   stands   rejected,   as   a   result   of
which   the   writ   petitions   referred   to   therein   will   now
proceed   before   the   High   Court   in   terms   of   this
judgment;
(3) The   writ   petition   is   disposed   of   with   liberty   to   the
petitioners   therein   including   applicants   in
intervention/impleadment   applications   to   pursue

60
their   remedy   before   the   High   Court   by   way   of   writ
petition   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution,   if   so
advised.     That   writ   petition   be   decided   on   its   own
merits   in   accordance   with   law   keeping   in   mind   the
observations   made   in   this   judgment   along   with   other
pending   or   fresh   writ   petitions   involving   similar
issues; and
(4) We request the High Court to take up all writ petitions
involving   overlapping   issues   together   for   analogous
hearing   expeditiously.     We   leave   all   contentions   open
except the issues decided in this judgment.
73. There   shall   be   no   order   as   to   costs.     All   pending
interlocutory   applications   stand   disposed   of   in   terms   of   this
judgment.
………………………………J.
    (A.M. Khanwilkar)
………………………………J.
    (B.R. Gavai)
New Delhi;
June 03, 2021.

61