2021 INSC 0282
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3905 OF 2011
JIGYA YADAV (MINOR)
(THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER
HARI SINGH) ...APPELLANT
Versus
C.B.S.E. (CENTRAL BOARD OF
SECONDARY EDUCATION) & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)
with
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3572 OF 2019
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1822/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7381 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 9445 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1823/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7382 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 9482 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1824/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7383 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 14737 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1825/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7384 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 16291 of 2020)
1

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1826/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10927 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1827/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10948 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1828/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7385 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 18711 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1829/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10959 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1830/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10801 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1831/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10795 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1832/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 10796 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1833/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7386 OF 2021
(@ DIARY NO. 19181 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 11320 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1835/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 11558 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1836/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7387 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 21923 of 2020)
2

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1837/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO(S). 7388 OF 2021)
(@ DIARY NO. 25053 of 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1838/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 15089 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1839/ 2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 15124 OF 2020)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1840/2021
(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO. 15625 OF 2020)
AND
T.P. (C) NOS. 1139­1140 OF 2020
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. “ What's   in   a   name?   that   which   we   call   a   rose   by   any   other
name   would   smell   as   sweet ”,  said   Juliet.    This   quote   from   William
Shakespeare’s   “Romeo   and   Juliet”   is   unarguably   one   of   the   most
iconic  dialogues in  classical literature.   It conveys that the natural
characteristics   of   an   individual   are   more   important   than   his/her
artificial/acquired characteristics.  A poetic statement as it certainly
is, it does not go in tune with the significance of a name in marking
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the identity of an individual in his/her societal transactions.  To put
it differently, name is an intrinsic element of identity.
2. The   seminal   issue   in   these   cases   is:   whether   an   individual’s
control   over   such   cardinal   element   of   identity   could   be   denied   to
him/her   by   the   Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education 1
  on   the
specious   ground   that   its   Examination   Byelaws   of   2007 2
  must
prevail  over   the   claim   of   the   candidate,   which  are   merely   intended
to   regulate   such   a   claim   and   to   delineate   the   procedure   for
correction/change   in   the   contents   of   certificate(s)   issued   by   it
including regarding maintenance of its office records?
3. The   CBSE   Examination   Byelaws   restrict,   both   qualitatively
and quantitatively, the corrections/changes that can be carried out
in the certificates issued by the Board.  Various students with need­
based   requests   approached   different   High   Courts   resulting   into
inconsistent   outcomes   leading   up   to   this   batch   of   appeals.     Apart
from   the   fact   that   the   judgments   have   produced   conflicting
outcomes,   the   petitions   raise   some   peculiar   questions   on   the
1  for short, “CBSE” or “Board”, as the case may be
2  for short, “Byelaws”
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constitutional   validity   of   CBSE   Examination   Byelaws   (as   amended
from time to time) and interpretation thereof.
4. The   present   case   involves   a   batch   of   22   petitions   wherein
questions   relating   to   correction/change   in   name/surname/date   of
birth of candidates or their parents in the certificates issued by the
Board have been raised.
5. In order to identify the precise scope of challenge, we may now
delineate the factual matrix in individual petitions.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3905 OF 2011
6.   The appellant in this case, Ms. Jigya Yadav, has assailed the
decision   of   the   High   Court   of   Delhi,   dated   20.12.2010   in   W.P.   (C)
No.   3774/2010,   wherein   the   High   Court   rejected   the   prayer   for
direction to the Board to carry  out correction of her parents’ name
in   the   marksheets  issued  by   it.   The   appellant’s  case  was   that   the
name of her parents was incorrectly recorded as “Hari Singh Yadav”
instead   of   “Hari   Singh”   (as   recorded   in   the   identity   documents   of
father)   and   “Mamta   Yadav”   instead   of   “Mamta”   (as   recorded   in   the
5

identity   documents   of   mother).   Relying   upon   Byelaw   69.1   of   the
CBSE   Examination   Bye­laws,   2007,   the   High   Court   affirmed   the
decision   of   the   Board   in   refusing   the   desired   corrections/changes.
The   Court   relied   upon   the   nursery   application   form,   school
admission form and stream allotment form for class XI filled by the
parents   of   the   appellant   to   conclude   that   the   errors   were   not
inadvertent, and they had consciously chosen and retained the said
names despite having opportunity to rectify before the X th
 standard.
It observed thus:
“15.   From   the   aforesaid,   it   is   apparent   that   despite   the
parents   of   the   petitioner   having   mentioned   their   names   as
“Hari  Singh”  and  “Mamta”  in  the  petitioner’s  birth  certificate,
they have consciously and consistently chosen to record their
names   as   “Hari   Singh   Yadav”   and   “Mamta   Yadav”   in   the
school   record.   Consequently,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   this
Court   in   the   present   petition   should   not   deal   with   the
challenge   of   constitutional   validity   as   it   is   the   petitioner’s
parents   who   are   at   fault   and   the   error,   if   any,   has   been
repeated on a number of occasions by the petitioner’s parents
themselves. In fact, we are of the view that for the fault of the
petitioner’s  parents,  the  impugned  Bye­law   of  the  respondent
no. 1 cannot be set aside ...”
The   Court,   however,   made   an   avoidable   observation   that   in   a
country  with caste­based reservations, changes in name cannot be
permitted readily.  It noted thus:
“17.  We  are   also   of  the  view   that   in  a  country   where  there  is
reservation   on   caste   and   religious   grounds,   change   of   names
6

of   parents   or   ward’s   name   cannot   be   allowed   at   the   drop   of
the hat.”
The   Court   then   observed   that   Byelaw   69.1   permits   CBSE   to   carry
out   corrections   only   to   the   extent   of   bringing   the   record   in
conformity   with   the   school   record.     In   paragraph   21,   the   Court
noted thus:
“21. Even if one were to apply the aforesaid test one finds that
the   respondent   no.   1   essentially   records   what   has   been
mentioned   in   the   school   records   consistently   and   that   too,
upto   Class   X,   that   means,   for   more   than   10   years   the   child
and/or   her   parents   have   the   liberty   to   rectify   the   record.
Consequently,   we   are   of   the   opinion   that   the   impugned   Bye­
law is perfectly reasonable.”
While concluding, the Court observed that the Courts must be wary
of interfering in academic matters and should refrain from giving an
expansive   interpretation   to   statutory   rules/byelaws   as   it   may
render the system unworkable. It noted in paragraph 22:
“22.   Moreover,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   Court   should   be
extremely   reluctant   to   substitute   its   own   views   as   to   what   is
wise,   prudent   and   proper   in   relation   to   academic   matters   in
preference   to   those   formulated   by   professional   men
possessing   technical   expertise   and   rich   experience   of   actual
day­to­day   working   of   educational   institutions   and   the
departments   controlling   them.   It   will   be   wholly   wrong   for   the
Court to take a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the
problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and
grass root problems involved in the working of the system and
unmindful   of   the   consequences   which   would   emanate   if   a
purely   idealistic   view   as   opposed   to   a   pragmatic   one   were   to
be propounded. It is equally important that the Court should
also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of
7

a statutory provision, rule or bye­law which would bring about
the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice – as
contended by the respondent no. 1 in its counter affidavit.”
7. Assailing   the   decision,   the   appellant   contends   that   Byelaw
69.1 (after 2007 amendment) is invalid as being  unreasonable and
arbitrary,   thereby   violative   of   Article   14   of   the   Constitution,   as   it
puts a blanket embargo on corrections other than those which are
necessary for bringing the documents in conformity with the school
record.   It   is   contended   that   the   amended   byelaw   does   not   address
the   possibility   of   error   in   the   school   record   itself,   and   leaves   the
student   with   no   opportunity   to   correct   the   error   committed   by   the
parents   in   the   school   records.     To   buttress   this   submission,   the
appellant has submitted that the resultant hardship caused to her
is   infringement   of   her   right   guaranteed   in   Article   19(1)(g),   right   to
freely   express   one’s   identity   as   per   Article   19(1)(a)   and   right   to
dignity in Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. In   the   written   submissions,   the   appellant   has   urged   that
CBSE certificates are public records of the  Board and they  carry  a
presumption of genuineness which must be respected by preserving
the accuracy of such certificates.   It is further urged that the 2007
8

Byelaws   place   school   records   above   public   documents   which   carry
presumption of genuineness under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 3
.
To buttress this submission, it is stated that it would be contrary to
the objectives of CBSE if it refuses to correct its documents despite
having verified the genuineness of the supporting public documents
(like Aadhar card, Passport, Birth Certificate etc.) and continues to
perpetuate the obvious errors in the school records.
9. The appellant has further submitted that by amending Byelaw
69.1 in this manner, CBSE has acted in violation of Regulation 10
and   objectives   of   CBSE   by   rendering   itself   incapable   of   rectifying
errors in the certificates and issuing  accurate certificates, which is
a   basic   function   of   the   Board.     The   CBSE   has,   the   appellant
submitted, exceeded its powers by effecting the said amendment as
it was never  meant  to exercise such authority  of putting  fetters on
its basic duties.  Reliance has been placed upon  Dhruva Parate vs.
CBSE   &   Anr. 4
,   State   of   NCT   of   Delhi   &   Anr.   vs.   Sanjeev   @
Bittoo 5
,   Indian   Aluminium   Company   vs.   Kerala   State
3 For short, “1872 Act”
4 ILR 2009 V Delhi 371
5 2005 (5) SCC 181
9

Electricity   Board 6
  and   J.K.   Aggarwal   vs.   Haryana   Seeds
Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. 7
 to urge that CBSE cannot
circumscribe   its   own   powers   with   a   self­imposed   limitation   in   this
manner.
10. The   appellant   has   further   submitted   that   the   impugned
judgment erroneously connects the subject matter of the case with
caste­based reservations which displays stereotype prejudice of the
Court towards her cause.  The appellant also takes exception to the
observations regarding wrongful conduct of the appellant’s parents
in failing to get the records rectified before X th
 standard. It is stated
that   the   impugned   judgment   overlooked   the   fact   that   the   parents
had   no   choice   of   getting   the   application   form   corrected   in   XI th
standard   as   it   necessarily   reflected   the   details   of   X th
  standard
without offering a choice of alteration.
11. In response, the Board has relied upon Byelaw 69.1 to submit
that the appellant’s request for rectification was considered and the
certificates were found to be matching with the school records and
thus,   no   case   for   rectification   was   made   out.     It   is   submitted   that
6 1975 (2) SCC 414
7 1991 (2) SCC 283
10

before amendment Byelaw 69.1 permitted a different procedure for
rectification   –   approval   by   Court   of   law   and   notification   in   the
gazette.  Under this procedure, umpteen number of cases were filed,
even   after   more   than   ten   years   of   declaration   of   result,   for
rectification   of   name/surname   and   Courts   were   constantly
approached   for   seeking   leave   to   get   the   rectification   done.     As   a
result,   objections   were   raised   by   various   government   authorities
questioning   the   power   of   the   Board   to   carry   out   changes   in   the
identity   of   the   students   even   after   they   have   passed   the
examinations conducted by the Board.  It is submitted that various
Courts   also   expressed   displeasure   and   suggested   rephrasing   of
Byelaw   69.1.   Resultantly,   the   2007   amendment   was   effected
permitting corrections only to the extent of bringing the certificates
in conformity with the school record.
12. To   buttress   the   above   submission,   it   is   urged   that   CBSE,
being   an   autonomous   society   registered   under   the   Societies
Registration Act, 1860, has the power to make, amend or delete its
Rules,   Regulations   and   Byelaws.   Accordingly,   Byelaw   69.1   was
amended as the basic record of a student is kept by the school and
11

the   Board   has   no   option   but   to   rely   upon   the   school   record.   It   is
further   submitted   that   the   parents   of   the   appellant   had   ample
opportunity   to   correct   the   school   record   and   they   chose   not   to   do
so.   In   fact,   the   respondent   adds,   they   repeatedly   filled   the   same
particulars of their names in all the school forms from time to time.
13. The   Board   has   also   filed   elaborate   written   submissions   to
support their case.  It is submitted that the Examination Byelaws of
the   Board   are   statutory   in   nature   as   they   were   framed   in
furtherance of the powers granted to the Board as per Government
of   India   Resolution   dated   1.7.1929   and   deviation   cannot   be
permitted   from   the   Byelaws.     As   regards   the   argument   of   violation
of fundamental rights, the Board has submitted that there may be a
fundamental right to be identified as per the choice of an individual,
but   there   can   be   no   fundamental   right   to   claim   that   the   changed
identity   must   be   operative   since   birth   thereby   compelling   all
including   statutory   bodies   to   carry   out   changes   in   documents
issued   by   them.     It   is   urged   that   any   other   view   would   amount   to
misuse   of   liberty   and   cause   serious   confusion   at   different   level.
12

Reliance has been placed upon   Rayaan Chawla vs. University of
Delhi & Anr. 8
 to support this position.
14. The   Board   has   further   submitted   that   the
restrictions/conditions   for   change   of   name   and   date   of   birth   are
reasonable   as   all   the   details   are   supplied   by   the   students/parents
at various stages of admissions which offers a  prima facie  guarantee
of   genuineness.     It   is   submitted   that   change   of   name   and   date   of
birth   in   a   reckless   manner   could   have   serious   repercussions   –
misuse   for   employment,   manipulating   age   of   the   accused   etc.
Reliance has been placed upon  Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Anr. 9
 to illustrate this.
15. The   written   submissions   also   touch   upon   the   question   of
relevant date for the applicability of 2007 Byelaws.   It is submitted
that   the   relevant   date   would   be   the   date   of   passing   X th
  standard
examination   and   not   the   date   of   making   application   for   changes.
Lastly,   it   is   submitted   that   the   remedy   of   writ   petition   may   not   be
appropriate   for   effecting   changes   in   CBSE   certificates   as   usually,
8 275 (2020) Delhi Law Times 314
9 (2019) 12 SCC 370
13

students come up with independent documents for supporting their
claim   and   the   writ   Courts   are   not   expected   to   adjudicate   disputed
facts   concerning   the   relied   upon   documents.     To   buttress   this
submission,   it   is   stated   that   despite   presumption   in   favour   of
certified   copies   of   public   documents,   they   cannot   be   accepted   at
face   value   without   providing   an   opportunity   to   rebut   them   as   per
Section 4 of the 1872 Act.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3572 OF 2019
16. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated   6.2.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Delhi   in   L.P.A.   No.
128/2017,   reversing   the   order   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   (C)
No. 6996/2016, wherein the prayer of the respondent (father of the
student)   to   change   the   mother’s   name   in   the   certificate   was
rejected.     The   respondent   had   applied   to   CBSE   for   the   change   of
mother’s   name   from   “Kiran   Khan”   to   “Fakiha   Khan”   stating   that
“Kiran Khan”, being the nickname of the mother, was inadvertently
recorded   in   the   school   record   of   the   student   at   the   time   of   her
admission in class I in 2005.
14

17. The   Division   Bench   granted   the   prayer   primarily   on   the
ground  that  the  stated change  was a  mere  correction  of  name and
not   a   change   of   name   per   se   as   per   the   language   of   Rules   69.1(i)
and   69.1(ii)   of   the   Byelaws   (as   amended   in   2015).     To   reach   this
conclusion,   the   Court   relied   upon   the   birth   certificate   of   the
student,   educational   certificates   of   mother,   passport   etc.   which
revealed that the mother’s name was recorded as “Fakiha Khan” in
all these documents and it was nothing but an inadvertent error on
the part of parents to have used the nickname of the mother while
filling   her   school   forms.     The   High   Court   noted   that   the   case   is
neither   a   change   of   name   as   per   Rule   69.1(i)   nor   a   correction   of
typographical nature as per Rule 69.1(ii).  It is relevant to reproduce
paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:
“4.   Having   considered   the   diverse   aspects   and   the   admitted
factual conspectus on record, we find, the case in hand, is not
a   case   of   any   change   of   name,   but,   a   mere   correction   in   the
mother's   name   of   the   child   Ms.   Filza   Khan.   Apparently,   an
inadvertent   mistake   in   mentioning   the   mother's   nickname
"Ms. Kiran Khan" in the admission form in the year 2005, got
transmitted  by  the  respondent  No.2  school  to the  respondent
No.1   Board.   The   application   made   by   the   petitioner   was   not
for   any   change   of  name,  but,  for   correction   of  an  inadvertent
mistake   in   mentioning   the   name   of   the   mother   in   the
admission   form   as   "Kiran   Khan"   instead   of   "Fakiha   Khan",
which   fact,   undisputedly,   finds   support   from   the   birth
certificate   dated   17.12.02,   copy   whereof   forms   part   of   the
record as Annexure­P1. This birth certificate clearly mentions
15

that Ms. Filza Khan was born to the petitioner and Ms. Fakiha
Khan.   The   applicant   has   placed   on   record   other   documents,
such   as   the   educational   certificates   of   the   mother   Fakiha
Khan,   her   passport   etc.,   which   show   that   her   name   always
was Fakiha Khan. Thus, it is not a case of change of name of
the mother to Kiran Khan, from Fakiha Khan, post the filling
up   of   the   examination   form   of   the   appellant's   daughter.
Pertinently, even in the documents relating to the daughter of
the   appellant   Filza   Khan,   such   as   her   Birth   Certificate,   the
name   of   the   mother   is   recorded   as   “Fakiha   Khan”   and   not
“Kiran Khan”. Thus, the case in hand is certainly not a case of
change of name as contemplated under Rule 69.1(i). It is also
not   a   case   of   correction   in   spelling   errors   and   factual
typographical errors as contemplated under Rule 69.1(ii). The
case   in   hand   is   completely   founded   on   the   premise   of   an
inadvertent mistake in mentioning the name of the mother in
the   admission   form,   which   was   filled   way   back   in   the   year
2005 at the time of admission of the child in class ­I. …”
The Court, relying upon   Mazhar Saleem Chandroth (Minor) Thr.
Saleem   Chandroth   (father   and   natural   guardian)   vs.   Central
Board   of   Secondary   Education 10
,   also   observed   that   the
Examination Byelaws of the appellant (CBSE) are not of a statutory
nature.     The   Court,   before   parting,   further   noted   that   a   restrictive
and strict approach is not warranted in matters involving correction
or change of name by the Board merely on ground of administrative
inconvenience.  It noted thus:
“6.   The   adoption   of   a   strict   and   restrictive   approach   in   the
matter   of   change   or   correction   of   name   of   the   candidate   or
his/her   parents,   in   the   certificates   issued   by   the   respondent
No.1,   cannot   be   justified   on   the   foundation   that   such
changes,   when   made   later,   may   be   exploited   to   mislead   all
10 LPA 315/2017
16

concerned   about   the   identity   of   the   candidate.   Such   a   strict
and   restrictive   approach   cannot   be   justified   merely   on   the
ground   of   some   administrative   inconvenience.   After   all,
respondent   No.1   charges   the   fee   to   cover   its   costs   for
undertaking such an exercise. ...”
Observing that the subject change in the mother’s name would not
result   into   an   alteration   of   identity   of   the   student   as   the   name
“Fakiha Khan” was a part of the documents all along, it noted thus:
“6. ...In the present case, there is no possibility of the identity
of   the   candidate   Filza   Khan   being   changed   by   permitting   the
change   of   name   of   her   mother   from   "Kiran   Khan"   to   Fakiha
Khan", since the name of the child/candidate; the name of the
father;   the   date   and   place   of   birth,   continue   to   remain   the
same. Even the name of the mother – which is now sought to
be   brought   on   record,   is   the   real   name   of   the   mother   which
has always remained so and the same name of the mother is
also   reflected   in   the   Birth   Certificate   of   the   child/candidate
Filza   Khan.   In   fact,   the   non­amendment   of   the   name   of   the
mother   of   the   child/candidate   from   “Kiran   Khan”   to   “Fakiha
Khan”   would,   in   future,   lead   to   confusion   and   may   mar   the
future   prospects   of   the   child/candidate   while   seeking
admissions   to   institutions   of   higher   education,   or
employment.”
18. The   appellant   (CBSE),   in   this   appeal,   has   submitted   that   the
impugned   judgment   has   incorrectly   treated   the   subject   change   in
mother’s   name   as   a   mere   correction   born   out   of   an   inadvertent
error.   It is submitted that the said change is a complete change of
name   which   was   continuously   retained   in   the   school   records   for   a
period   of   11   years.     It   is   urged   that   the   impugned   judgment   has
failed to give effect to Rules 69.1(i) and 69.1(ii) of the Board as such
17

change   of   name   without   an   order   of   the   Court   and   followed   by   a
notification   in   the   official   gazette   was   outrightly   prohibited.
Justifying   the   said   Rules,   it   is   submitted   that   the   Board   has   no
power or independent sources to verify the identity of the students
and   owing   to   the   nature   of   its   functioning,   it   has   to   rely   upon   the
school records to furnish certificates.
19. The   appellant   (CBSE)   further   submits   that   the   records   were
sent   by   the   school   in   the   academic   year   2014­2015   when   the
student filled the examination form for submission to the Board and
the said form not only recorded the mother’s name as “Kiran Khan”
but   also   carried   the   signature   of   the   mother   in   the   verification
portion   of   the   form.     To   buttress   this   submission,   it   is   urged   that
the said mistake (if any) could not have been treated as inadvertent
as it was retained as such for a long period of 11 years.  It is added
that   parents   themselves   were   the   source   of   information   regarding
the   name   and   thus,   there   could   be   no   reason   to   regard   it   as
inadvertent.
20. The   appellant   has   further   submitted   that   the   impugned
judgment   is   in   conflict   with   another   judgment   of   a   co­ordinate
18

bench of the High Court in   Mazhar Saleem Chandroth 11
  wherein
the prayer  for addition of word “Saleem” in the name was not held
to   be   a   correction   or   typographical   error   and   was   rejected   stating
that such change would be inconsistent with the school record and
thus,   impermissible.     It   is   added   that   in   such   a   situation,   the
Division bench ought to have sent the matter for consideration by a
larger bench.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S) 1822/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s) 7381/2021  
(@ Diary No. 9445/2020)
21. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated   5.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
2225/2019   affirming   the   decision   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.
(C)   No.   5287/2019   dated   28.2.2019.   The   respondent   student   had
approached   the   Board   for   correction   of   his   father’s   name   in   the
CBSE   certificate   from   “P.P.   Abdul   Latheef”   to   Latheef   P.A.”.     The
said   request   was   denied   by   the   Board   citing   Byelaw   69.1   of   the
2007   Byelaws,   as   applicable.     The   Board   stated   that   the
respondent’s   case   does   not   meet   the   conditions   stipulated   in   the
11 supra at Footnote No.10
19

said   byelaw   and   thus,   change   in   name   cannot   be   permitted.
Aggrieved   by   this   denial,   the   respondent   moved   the   High   Court.
The   correction   or   change   of   name   was   then   permitted   by   the   High
Court   upon   payment   of   Rs.   5,000   by   the   student   to   the   Board   for
availing   its   service.     The   Board   appealed   against   that   decision.
Affirming the decision, the High Court observed that the decision is
in accordance with the decision of a co­ordinate bench of the same
High   Court   in   Subin   Mohammed   vs.   Union   of   India 12
  wherein   a
change   in   date   of   birth   of   a   student   was   permitted   by   the   Court.
While   recognising   that   the   case   at   hand   involved   the   change   of
father’s name (and not date of birth), the Court noted the similarity
of grounds raised by the appellant before it, and relied upon  Subin
Mohammed 13
 to reject the same.  It observed thus:
“6.   Though   the   issue   relates   to   correction   of   the   petitioner's
father's   name   in   the   CBSE   certificate,   the   grounds   on   which
the appellants had assailed the correctness of the judgment of
the  writ  court  are  more  or   less  similar,  based on  the  bye­law
of   the   CBSE   and   the   delay   in   making   the   application   for
correction. Except the above, there is no variance. Though Mr.
Nirmal   S.,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants,   made
submissions   on   the   grounds   extracted   supra   assailing   the
correctness of judgment of the writ court, we are not inclined
to   accept   the   said   contentions   for   the   reason   that   a   Hon'ble
Division Bench of this Court in Subin Mohammed S. v. Union
12 2016 (1) KLT 340
13 supra at Footnote No.12
20

of   India   and   others   reported   in   2016   (1)   KLT   340,   has
considered the said contentions and rejected the same. ...”
22. The   impugned   judgment   relied   upon   the   respondent’s   Birth
Certificate dated 25.7.2013 and his father’s Death certificate dated
12.8.2009   to   conclude   that   the   father’s   name   was   indeed   “Latheef
P.A.”   in   statutory   records   and   there   could   be   no   objection   in
permitting the said change.
23. In   its   challenge,   the   primary   ground   of   the   appellant   is   that
the reliance placed by the High Court upon   Subin Mohammed 14
  is
misplaced.     For,   the   said   judgment   is   inapplicable   in   the   factual
matrix of the case.  It is submitted that in  Subin Mohammed 15
, the
case involved a change in date of birth and the Court had recorded
a   specific   finding   that   CBSE   Byelaws   would   not   permit   the   said
change.  It is further submitted that the Court failed to acknowledge
that CBSE Byelaws, though not strictly statutory, have a regulatory
colour and must bind those who have chosen to comply with them
while participating in the examinations conducted by the Board.
14 supra at Footnote No.12
15 supra at Footnote No.12
21

24. The   appellant   has   further   submitted   that   neither   Byelaw
69.1(i)   nor   69.1(ii)   apply   to   the   facts   of   the   case.     It   is   stated   that
Byelaw  69.1(i)  would  apply  only  when  change  of name  is approved
by   a   Court   of   law   followed   by   a   notification   in   the   official   gazette,
that too before the declaration of result by the Board.   To buttress
this submission, it is added that the respondent obtained his birth
certificate in 2013, one year before the matriculation examination in
2014   and   thus,   there   was   no   difficulty   for   the   respondent   in
applying for the said change as per Byelaw 69.1(i).  According to the
appellant (CBSE), the conditions of the aforesaid Byelaws have not
been   fulfilled   by   the   respondent   and   in   absence   thereof,   no   such
changes can be permitted.
25. The   appellant   has   also   urged   that   the   reliance   upon   Birth
Certificate   and   Death   Certificate   is   unwarranted   as   both   these
documents were not proved before any Court of law and there is no
material   on   record   to   establish   that   “P.P.   Abdul   Latheef”   and
“Latheef   P.A.”   is   the   same   person.     The   appellant   has   placed
reliance  upon   Board   of   Secondary   Education   of   Assam   vs.   Md.
22

Sarifuz Zaman & Ors. 16
 to further argue that correction of entries
in   a   certificate   duly   issued   by   the   Board   cannot   be   claimed   as   a
matter   of   legal   right   and   frequent   corrections   cannot   be   permitted
readily as it would have the effect of rendering this power arbitrary,
in   addition   to   reducing   the   credibility   of   certificates   issued   by   the
Board.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1823/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021  
(@ Diary No. 9482/2020)
26. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
20.11.2019   of   the   Kerala   High   Court   in   W.A.   No.   2354/2019
affirming   the   decision   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   No.
11876/2018, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in
date of birth was granted by the Court.  The respondent passed her
matriculation   examination   in   2011.     The   concerned   certificate
issued   by   the   Board   recorded   her   date   of   birth   as   28.11.1995.
Thereafter,   in   2013,   the   respondent   applied   for   the   issuance   of
Birth Certificate which was issued on 28.6.2013 bearing her date of
birth as 21.11.1995.
16 (2003) 12 SCC 408
23

27. The   respondent   applied   to   the   Board   for   change   in   date   of
birth.     It   was   rejected   by   the   Board.     The   High   Court   allowed   her
prayer   after   placing   reliance   on   Subin   Mohammed 17
.     The
observations   of   the   High   Court   are   similar   to   those   in   civil   appeal
arising from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021   (@Diary No. 9445/2020) and
are not being discussed again for brevity.
28. The appellant (CBSE) has assailed the decision on the ground
that the respondent’s case does not fulfil the criteria/conditions for
change   in   date   of   birth   under   Byelaws   69.2   and   69.3   of   the   2007
Byelaws,   as   applicable.     It   is   submitted   that   as   per   Byelaw   69.2,
change   in   date   of   birth   is   permissible   only   before   the   same   is
recorded   in   the   record   of   the   Board   and   despite   having   sufficient
time, the respondent did not approach the Board for any correction
on   or   before   2011.     Afterwards,   under   Byelaw   69.3,   corrections   of
merely typographical or other similar errors are permissible to bring
the   particulars   in   consonance   with   the   school   record.     It   is   stated
that the respondent’s case does not fulfil any of these criteria.
17 supra at Footnote No.12
24

29. It   is   further   submitted   that   the   impugned   judgment   was
passed   without   granting   an   opportunity   to   the   appellant   for
ascertaining   the   genuineness   of   the   request   for   change   in   date   of
birth,   which   is   a   mandatory   requirement   as   per   Subin
Mohammed 18
.   The   appellant   has   raised   a   question   on   the
genuineness of the request by stating that even if the incorrect date
of birth is treated as an error, it is inconceivable that the appellant
or her parents could not notice the error for a period of 23 years.
30. The submissions regarding the inapplicability of the dictum in
Subin   Mohammed 19
  are   similar   to   those   made   in   civil   appeal
arising   from   SLP   (C)   No(s).   7381/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9445/2020)
and are not being repeated for brevity.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1824/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7383/2021  
(@ Diary No. 14737/2020)
31. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgment
dated   13.12.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   for
Rajasthan   in   D.B.   Civil   Special   Appeal   (Writ)   No.   838/2019
confirming   the   order   of   the  learned   Single   Judge   in   S.B.   Civil   Writ
18 supra at Footnote No.12
19 supra at Footnote No.12
25

Petition   No.   18013/2018   in   terms   of   the   Byelaws   (as   amended   in
2015 and as applicable to the case).
32. The case involves a request for change of mother’s name of the
student   in   CBSE   certificates   from   “Seema   Manak”   to   “Sanyogeta
Manak”.     The   respondent   participated   in   the   matriculation
examination   conducted   by   the   Board   in   May,   2016.     In   October,
2016,   the   said   request   was   made   when   the   mother   changed   her
name.  The Board denied the request for change of name citing their
inability   under   the   Byelaws.     Another   request   was   made   by   the
respondent which was met with the same response from the Board.
The matter went to the High Court by way of a writ petition and the
Court   granted   the   prayer   for   change   of   name   by   holding   that   the
Board failed to perform its duty in denying the request for change of
name.     The   Court   took   note   of   the   birth   certificate   of   the
respondent,   copy   of   passport   and   copy   of   Aadhar   card   of   the
mother,   and   also   noted   that   the   requirements   of   newspaper
publication   and   gazette   notification   were   fulfilled.     It   then   directed
the Board to effect the change.   The Court observed that the CBSE
rules   cannot   prohibit   an   individual   from   having   his/her   identity
26

recognized through the  parents and  if they  are applied for  denying
such   corrections,   it   would   be   ultra   vires   the   rules   as   they   are   not
statutory in nature. It observed thus:
“In   the   opinion   of   this   Court   such   rules   framed   by   CBSE   go
contrary   to   the   basic   principles   laid   down   in   the
circumstances   regarding   individual   to   have   his   identity
recognized from his/her parents, the CBSE cannot be allowed
to   force   any   individual   to   have   his   mother’s   name   or   his
father’s   name   different   from   what   his/her   mother’s   name   or
father’s   name   is   known   in   the   Society   as   well   as   in   the
records. If such rules are applied for denying a candidate from
getting   correction   done   in   the   mark   sheet   or   certificates,   the
same have to be declared as ultra vires to the rules since the
rules not statutory.”
33. In  order  to   assail  the  above  decision,  the  appellant  has  relied
upon   Byelaws   69.1(i)   and   69.1(ii)   to   contend   that   Byelaw   69.1(i)
provides   for   change   of   name   of   the   student   only   and   change   of
name of parents is not envisaged in it.   It is submitted that Byelaw
69.1(ii)   provides   for   corrections   and   the   present   case   is   not   one   of
corrections, rather, it  involves a  material  change of  name.   Similar
to   the   submissions   advanced   in   previous   appeals,   it   is   submitted
that   the   Board   cannot   act   in   violation   of   their   byelaws   and   permit
corrections   when   the   same   are   not   permitted   under   them.     The
appellant has urged that they duly applied their mind to the request
27

of the respondent twice and there was no occasion for the Court to
pass an order in complete ignorance of the byelaws.
34. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment holds the
byelaws   as   ultra   vires   despite   the   fact   that   their   validity   was   not
even in question before the Court.  Reliance has been placed by the
appellant   upon   Md.   Sarifuz   Zaman 20
  to   urge   that   there   is   no
vested right to claim corrections in certificates at any point of time.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1825/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021  
(@ Diary No. 16291/2020) 
35. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   decision   dated
20.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
2340/2019 confirming the order passed by learned Single Judge in
W.P. (C) No. 8540/2019, wherein the High Court allowed the prayer
for   change   of   the   respondent   student’s   name   from   “Mohammed
Shafeek” to “Mohammed Shafeek S.” in terms of the 2007 Byelaws,
as applicable.  The respondent passed matriculation examination in
2014.   During school, the name of the respondent was recorded as
“Mohammed   Shafeek”   in   accordance   with   the   birth   certificate
20 supra at Footnote No.16
28

issued   in   2002.     After   passing   matriculation,   another   birth
certificate   was   issued   in   2017   wherein   a   different   name   i.e.,
“Mohammed   Shafeek   S.”   was   recorded.     In   accordance   with   the
second   birth   certificate,   the   respondent   approached   the   Board   for
change   of   name   which   was   denied   by   the   Board   citing   failure   to
fulfil   the   conditions   envisaged   in   the   Byelaws.     The   High   Court
granted   the   prayer   by   placing   reliance   upon   the   dictum   in   Subin
Mohammed 21
.
36. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is similar to that in
civil   appeals   arising   from   SLP   (C)   No(s).   7381/2021   (@   Diary   No.
9445/2020) and SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020),
and we are not reiterating the same.
37. Assailing the decision, the appellant’s submissions are largely
similar   to   those   in   previous   appeals.     Other   than   grounds   already
urged   before,   the   appellant   has   submitted   that   the   Court   failed   to
consider the presence of two birth certificates and went on to grant
the prayer without weighing the genuineness of the certificates and
21 supra at Footnote No.12
29

without   seeking   an   explanation   from   the   respondent   for   bringing
two birth certificates on record.
38. It is submitted that in 2004, while taking admission in class I,
the respondent’s name was recorded as “Mohammed Shafeek”.  The
same   name   was   carried   forward   while   filling   the   admission   form
again   in   2008   for   a   different   school.     It   is   further   submitted   that
even at the time of filling the form for class XI, the same name was
recorded and it was duly communicated by the school to the Board.
The   name   recorded   in   the   certificate,   therefore,   is   in   complete
accordance with the school record.   To buttress this submission, it
is urged that the record clearly shows that there is no possibility of
typographical   error   in   the   record   of   the   respondent   and   a
subsequent substantial change of name cannot be permitted in the
certificates of the Board in this manner.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1826/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10927/2020)
39. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
24.8.2020  passed  by  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  L.P.A.  No.  219/2020
confirming   the   order   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   (C)   No.
30

10841/2019   wherein   the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for   addition
of   surname   was   granted   in   terms   of   the   2007   Byelaws,   as
applicable.   The respondent passed the examinations conducted by
the   Board   under   the   name   “Jyoti”.     The   name   was   consistently
recorded   as   such   in   all   her   school   records   and   accordingly,   the
CBSE   certificates   carried   the   same   name.     Thereafter,   she
completed   her   MBBS   and   applied   for   education   in   a   foreign
institution.   As a part of her application, she was asked to mention
her   surname.     Since   none   of   her   documents   carried   this
information,  she  applied  to   the  Board  for  addition   of  surname  and
change   her   name   from   “Jyoti”   to   “Jyoti   Dalal”   in   the   certificates.
The Board refused and the respondent approached the High Court.
40. The High Court considered the applicability of Byelaws 69.1(i)
and 69.1(ii) and ruled that the said byelaws are inapplicable to the
facts  of   the   case   as  the   respondent’s  case  is  not   one   for   change  of
name but for incorporation of a surname which existed throughout
in  the records of her  parents and for  which  no ambiguity  could be
alleged. It observed thus:
“8.   Looking   to   the   peculiar   facts   and   circumstance   of   the
present case, we are of the opinion that the same does not fall
31

under   the   ambit   of   Clause   69(1)(i)   of   the   Examination   Bye­
Laws as:­
a)   This   is   not   a   case   of   change   of   name,   but   of
incorporation   of   the   surname   of   the   person
concerned,
b)   This   is   not   a   case   where   something   which   was
altogether   omitted   is   to   be   added,   as   the   parents’
names   were   available   in   full   in   the   records   of   the
appellant­Board,
c)   The   respondent   (original   petitioner)   in   this   case
carries   the   surname   of   the   father   and   the   mother
which   she   wanted   to   mention   after   her   name.   There
is   no   dispute   about   her   identity   or   confusion   about
the   veracity   of   the   name   which   she   seeks   to
incorporate.”
Before   parting,   the   High   Court   specifically   noted   that   its   decision
must   not   be   treated   as   a   precedent   and   would   operate   on   the
specific facts of the case.
41. The   appellant   has   assailed   the   decision   by   contending   that
any   request   for   change   of   name   is   to   be   examined   as   per   Byelaw
69.1(i) and not beyond it.   If such change is not permissible under
the said byelaw, then it would be wholly  improper  for  the Court to
direct such changes.  It is contended that there was no challenge to
the   validity   of   the   byelaws,   and   until   and   unless   the   byelaws   are
declared   to   be   invalid,   the   Court   cannot   direct   any   action   in
complete   contravention   thereof.     As   urged   in   previous   cases,   it   is
added   that   the   respondent’s   case   failed   to   fulfil   the   condition
32

precedent   in   the   said   byelaw   –   prior   approval   by   a   Court   of   law
followed by publication in gazette – and the impugned order had the
effect of diluting these conditions.
42. The   appellant   has   submitted   that   the   relief   claimed   by   the
respondent   is   highly   delayed   in   time   and   in   law,   delay   defeats
discretion.  It is urged that the respondent was always aware of the
absence of surname in her records and she kept on sleeping on her
rights   for   a   period   of   seven   years   and   therefore,   the   loss   of
limitation must bar any legal remedy for her. It is further submitted
that such changes cannot be permitted in a routine manner as the
credibility   attached   with   CBSE   certificates   would   be   compromised
and   subsequent   changes   would   create   anomalies   in   the   record.
Reliance   has   been   placed   upon   Abhishek   Kumar   @   Bal   Kishan
vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 22
  to   urge   that   subsequent   issuance   of
revised   certificates   would   create   discrepancy   in   the   record   and
reflect   status   which   did   not   even   exist   at   the   time   of   making
certificates.
22 (2014) 144 DRJ 8 (DB) : 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3459
33

43. The   appellant   has   submitted   that   exercise   of   jurisdiction
under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   in   this   manner   is
unwarranted as it amounts to substitution of the views of the Court
in the place of byelaws formulated on the basis of technical advice.
It   is   urged   that   the   Court   must   be   reluctant   to   venture   into
academic matters in this manner.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1827/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10948/2020)
44. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   decision   dated
13.7.2020   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.   863/2020
confirming   the   order   of   the   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   (C)   No.
21357/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in
date   of   birth   was   granted   on   the   basis   of   the   birth   certificate   in
terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.   The observations of the
High Court are similar to those in civil appeals arising from SLP (C)
No(s).7381/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9445/2020),                                 SLP   (C)
No(s).7382/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9482/2020)   and   SLP   (C)
34

No(s).7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020).  We are not reiterating
the same for the sake of brevity.
45. On perusal of the submissions, we find that the grounds urged
for assailing the decision are also similar to those taken in previous
appeals and we are not repeating the same.
46. In   addition   to   grounds   already   advanced,   the   respondent   has
filed   elaborate   written   submissions   and   additional   written
submissions   to   which   we   may   make   a   brief   reference.     It   is
submitted   that   as   per   Byelaw   7   of   the   Examination   Byelaws,   the
admission   procedure   upto   class   VIII   is   to   be   regulated   by
rules/regulations/orders   of   the   concerned   State   Government.
Accordingly, reference has been made to the Kerala Education Act,
1958   and   Chapter­VI   of   Rules   framed   thereunder   which   provides
that   the   primary   source   for   determining   date   of   birth   is   birth
certificate.   It is submitted that even under the Right to Education
Act,   the   primary   proof   of   age   is   the   birth   certificate   and   therefore,
primacy has to be accorded to birth certificate for determination of
correct date of birth and CBSE’s Byelaws must provide for bringing
their certificates in accord with such official or public documents.  
35

47. In   additional   written   submissions,   the   respondent   has
answered this Court’s query as to what would be the relevant point
of  time  for  determining   the application of  byelaws.   It is submitted
that   the   relevant   date   would   be   the   date   of   considering   the
application i.e., the  Byelaws  in  force at the  time of considering  the
application   for   recording   correction/change.     The   date   of
examination   would   be   irrelevant   for   this   purpose.     Reliance   has
been   placed   upon   Somdev   Kapoor   vs.   State   of   West   Bengal   &
Ors. 23
  and   State   of   Kerala   &   Ors.   vs.   Palakkad   Heritage
Hotels 24
 to advance the legal proposition that rules standing on the
date   of   final   decision   by   the   competent   authority   would   be
applicable.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1828/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s).7385/2021  
(@ Diary No. 18711/2020) 
48. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
19.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
2328/2019 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C)
23 (2014) 14 SCC 486
24 (2017) 13 SCC 672
36

No.   8465/2019   wherein   the   respondent   student’s   request   for
change in date of birth was allowed.   The case of the respondent is
that   his   date   of   birth   was   recorded   as   16.4.1994   instead   of
16.4.1995   in   the   school   records.     On   the   basis   of   the   birth
certificate and other supporting documents, the respondent applied
for   change   in   date   of   birth   which   was   rejected   by   the   appellant
Board citing the 2007 Examination Byelaws.
49. The   High   Court   allowed   the   change   on   grounds   similar   to
those in the previous appeals.  We are not repeating the same.
50. The   submissions   of   the   appellant   Board   are   also   similar   to
those   in   previous   appeals   and   there   is   no   need   to   reiterate   the
same.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1829/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10959/2020)
51. The appellant Board has assailed the decision dated 3.7.2020
passed   by   D.B.   Special   Appeal   Writ   No.   450/2020   confirming   the
order   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   (C)   No.   8808/2019   allowing
the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for   change   of   her   father’s   and
37

mother’s names in the certificates issued by the CBSE.  Citing it as
an error, a request was made by the respondent for change of name
of   father   from   “Vinod   Mittal”   to   “Vinod   Kumar   Jain”   and   mother
from “Meenakshi Mittal” to “Meenakshi Agarwal”.
52. The   High   Court   did   not   consider   the   permissibility   of   this
change   under   the   applicable   Byelaws   (as   amended   in   2018)   and
instead noted that no prejudice would be caused to the Board if the
said changes are allowed.  It observed thus:
“It   is   noticed   that   in   the   writ   petition,   respondent   seeks   only
to   amend   the   surname   of   her   parents   and   not   their   names.
On a query by this Court from the counsel for the appellants
that   on   account   of   change   of   surname,   what   prejudice   was
going to be caused to the appellants, he has failed to give any
response.”
53. The   submissions   advanced   by   the   appellant   are   substantially
similar   to   those   adopted   in   previous   appeals.     Non­applicability   of
Byelaws,   absence   of   any   typographical   error,   consonance   between
school record and certificates, and lapse of substantial time despite
knowing the alleged errors are primary submissions which form the
basis   of   this   challenge.     We   are   not   elaborating   upon   the   same   to
avoid repetition.
38

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1830/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10801/2020
54. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
4.6.2020   passed   by   the   Kerala   High   Court   in   W.A.   No.   697/2020
confirming   the   order   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.   (C)   No.
11791/2019,  wherein   the   respondent   student’s   request   for   change
in   date   of   birth   was   allowed   in   terms   of   the   2007   Byelaws,   as
applicable.     The   respondent’s   case   was   that   her   date   of   birth   was
incorrectly   recorded   as   22.3.1990   instead   of   21.6.1989.     The   High
Court   allowed   the   prayer   on   grounds   similar   to   those   in   appeals
arising   from   SLP   (C)   No(s).   7381/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9445/2020),
SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020),             SLP (C)
No(s).   7384/2021   (@   Diary   No.   16291/2020)   and   SLP   (C)   No(s).
7385/2021   (@   Diary   No.   18711/2020).     We   are   not   reiterating   the
same.
55. Having   gone   through   the   appeal   memo,   we   note   that   the
submissions are similar to those in previous appeals and we are not
repeating them.
39

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1831/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10795/2020)
56. In   this   appeal,   the   challenge   is   against   the   decision   dated
6.8.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 987/2020
confirming   the   order   of   learned   Single   Judge   in   W.P.(C)   No.
25663/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of
name of his mother and father was allowed and accordingly, CBSE
was directed to modify the certificates.
57. Originally,   the   school   records   and   CBSE   certificates   recorded
the father’s name as “Shaji” and mother’s name as “Jijimol”.  These
names   were   in   also   in   accordance   with   the   old   birth   certificate   of
the   respondent   dated   27.10.2002.     As   stated   by   the   respondent,
they   noticed   this   mistake   for   the   first   time   in   2018   after   CBSE
released the respondent’s Secondary School Examination certificate
on   29.5.2018.     Thereafter,   the   respondent   applied   for   issuance   of
fresh   birth   certificate   wherein   father’s   name   was   changed   from
“Shaji”   to   “Shaji   P.”   and   mother’s   name   from   “Jijimol”   to   “Jijimol
S.”.     It   was   issued   on   27.10.2018   and   in   furtherance   thereof,   the
respondent   applied   to   the   appellant   Board   for   changing   the
40

certificates in light of the changed names.   The Board refused that
request   citing   the   Byelaws   (as   amended   in   2018)   and   the   matter
reached the High Court.
58. The grounds that weighed upon the High Court while granting
the prayer are substantially similar to those in civil appeals arising
from   SLP   (C)   No(s).   7381/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9445/2020),   SLP   (C)
No(s).   7382/2021   (@   Diary   No.   9482/2020),   SLP   (C)   No(s).
7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7385/2021 (@
Diary No. 18711/2020) and SLP (C) No. 10801/2020.
59. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   are   similar   to   those   in
previous appeals and we are not reiterating the same.
60. The   respondent   has   filed   written   submissions   to   submit   that
the present case does not involve any  delay  in applying for change
of   name   as   they   took   prompt   action   upon   receiving   the   CBSE
certificates   and   realizing   the   defect,   and   applied   for   a   new   birth
certificate so that changes could be made at the earliest.   It is also
submitted   that   it   is   not   a   case   of   change   of   name   or   correcting   a
mistake   in   name   per   se.     Rather,   it   is   a   case   of   merely   including
initials   of   mother   and   father   in   their   respective   names   in
41

accordance   with   a   duly   modified   birth   certificate   which   leaves   no
question as regards the genuineness of record.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1832/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10796/2020)
61. In   this   appeal,   the   appellant   (Board)   has   challenged   the
decision   dated   19.12.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in
W.A.   No.   2513/2019   confirming   the   decision   of   learned   Single
Judge   in   W.P.(C)   No.   14384/2019,   wherein   the   respondent
student’s prayer for change of name from “Vaibhav R.” to “Vaibhav
D.” in  certificates  issued by  the  Board was allowed in  terms of  the
2007 Byelaws, as applicable.
62. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
63. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   already   been   urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
42

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1833/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7386/2021  
(@ Diary No. 19181/2020)
64. The   appellant   Board   herein   has   impugned   the   decision   dated
8.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
2207/2019 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C)
No.   10410/2019,   wherein   the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for
change   in   his   date   of   birth   was   allowed   on   the   basis   of   the   birth
certificate issued by the appropriate authority in terms of the 2007
Byelaws, as applicable.
65. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   elaboration   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
66. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   already   been   urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11320/2020)
67. The appellant (CBSE) has approached this Court for assailing
the decision dated 12.5.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana   at   Chandigarh   in   R.S.A.   No.   499/2020   declining   to
43

interfere with the decision of the District Judge, Karnal who upheld
the   decision   of   the   Additional   Civil   Judge   (Senior   Judge),   Assandh
in Civil Suit No. 204/2018 wherein, a declaratory relief was granted
in   favour   of   the   respondent   student   declaring   his   date   of   birth   as
7.5.2004 instead of 15.2.2001, father’s name as “Joginder” instead
of   “Joginder   Singh”   and   mother’s   name   as   “Darshan”   instead   of
“Darshan   Devi”   (as   mentioned   in   the   CBSE   certificate).     The
declaratory   relief   was   coupled   with   a   mandatory   injunction
directing   the   appellant   Board   to   effect   necessary   changes   in   the
certificates of the respondent.
68. The   High   Court   referred   to   the   birth   certificate   issued   by   the
authorities   under   the   Registration   of   Births   and   Deaths   Act,   1969
and   noted   that   correctness   of   the   certificate   is   not   under   dispute
and   thus,   the   information   recorded   in   the   certificate   cannot   be
questioned.  It observed thus:
“As   far   as   correctness   of   the   certificate   issued   by   the
authorities   under   the   1969   Act,   identity   of   the   plaintiff   as
also   correctness   in   the   names   of   his   parents   are   not
disputed.”
Noting   thus,   the   High   Court   declined   to   interfere   with   the
concurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below.
44

69. In   addition   to   the   grounds   already   advanced   by   the   Board   in
light   of   the   applicable   Byelaws   (as   amended   in   2018),   it   is
submitted   that   the   relief   of   declaration   and   mandatory   injunction
could   not   have   been   granted   by   the   Court   due   to   non­joinder   of
necessary   parties   in   the   case.     It   is   submitted   that   Registrar   of
Births   and   Deaths   (owing   to   change   in   date   of   birth)   and   the
concerned school (owing to changes in their records) were necessary
parties  in  the  case  and  ought  to   have  been   joined.  It is  urged  that
the non­joinder would be fatal.
70. It is further submitted that the respondent’s claim was barred
by   the   principle   of   estoppel   as   he   was   mandatorily   required   to
submit his birth certificate in school at the time of admission as per
Byelaw   6   of   the   Examination   Byelaws,   1995   so   that   the   school
record could be in consonance with the birth certificate.   Since the
respondent failed to produce the same at the time of admission, it is
urged,   the   school   record   carried   the   information   voluntarily
supplied in the admission form and no change can be permitted at
this stage.
45

71. The   respondent   has   further   submitted   that   the   relief   of
mandatory injunction was barred due to Sections 41(g) and 41(i) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which specifically provide that no such
relief could be provided if the plaintiff when he/she has acquiesced
of rights.   In the instant case, it is stated, the respondent failed to
apply for change in date of birth for 15 years, despite there being a
long   gap   of   three   years   between   the   recorded   date   and   modified
date, and such conduct must bar any such relief.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1835/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11558/2020)
72. The   appellant   Board   has   approached   this   Court   in   appeal
against the judgment dated 29.7.2020 passed by the High Court of
Kerala in W.A. No. 724/2020 confirming the order of learned Single
Judge   in   W.P.   No.   24214/2019,   wherein   the   respondent   student’s
prayer for change in date of birth from 30.5.1992 to 23.7.1991 was
granted and original record was held to have recorded an incorrect
date.  For reaching this conclusion, reliance was placed by the High
Court upon a subsequently obtained birth certificate.
46

73. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
74. The   appellant   has   placed   reliance   upon   the   Byelaws   (existing
before   2007)   to   assail   the   decision.     The   grounds   urged   by   the
appellant have already been urged in previous appeals and we need
not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1836/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7387/2021  
(@ Diary No. 21923/2020)
75. The present appeal involves a challenge against the judgment
dated   13.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
2267/2019 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)
No.   8034/2019,   wherein   the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for
change of name from “Ganga” to “Ganga S” and father’s name from
“Rajendran   C”   to   “Rajendran   Pillai   C”   was   allowed   in   terms   of   the
Byelaws (as amended in 2018).
76. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
47

77. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   already   been   urged
in previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1837/2021 
(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7388/2021  
(@ Diary No. 25053/2020)
78. In this appeal, the appellant (Board) has assailed the judgment
dated   26.11.2019   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Madras in W.A. No. 4077/2019 affirming the order of learned Single
Judge with slight modification.  The respondent student had prayed
for   change   of   his   father’s   name   from   “Fazal   Rehmaan”   to   “Shaik
Fazul Rahiman” which was permitted by the learned Single Judge.
In   writ   appeal   before   the   High   Court,   the   learned   counsel   for   the
Board,   citing   the   applicable   Byelaws   (as   amended   in   2018),
submitted   that   appropriate   precautions   ought   to   be   taken   while
issuing such directions for change of name as there is a possibility
of   misuse.       The   High   Court   observed   that   such   corrections   must
not   be   permitted   for   ulterior   or   extraneous   reasons.     In   order   to
prevent   such   possibility,   the   Board   was   permitted   to   obtain   an
affidavit   in   the   nature   of   indemnity   against   any   such   exigency.   It
observed thus:
48

“2.   We   find   that   the   request   made   by   the   learned   counsel   to
that   extent   is   appreciable,   inasmuch   as   a   person   should   not
be   allowed   to   carry   out   corrections   if   the   same   is   for   any
ulterior motive or for any extraneous considerations that may
have   itself   roots   either   in   any   form   of   impersonation   arising
out   of   any   civil   or   criminal   activity.     In   this   regard,   it   will   be
open   to   the   appellant   Board   to   obtain   an   affidavit   from   the
candidate   in   the   nature   of   indemnity   against   any   such
exigency   as   referred   to   above   and   correction   be   carried   out
subject to such conditions as may be necessary.”
79. As   regards   cases   wherein   the   request   for   change   of   name   is
bona fide  and there is no scope for prejudice, the decision of learned
Single   Judge   directing   such   changes   was   held   to   be   correct.     The
Court observed thus:
“3.   On   the   other   hand,   we   find   that   if   correction   has   been
genuinely   and   bona   fide   sought   and   no   prejudice   is   caused,
then   in   that   event   the   conclusion   arrived   at   by   the   learned
Single Judge cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity.”
80. The grounds urged by the appellant herein (CBSE) have since
been adverted to and require no reiteration.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1838/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15089/2020)
81. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
25.9.2020   passed   in   W.A.   No.   1102/2020   affirming   the   order   of
learned   Single   Judge   wherein   the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for
change   in   date   of   birth   from   17.1.1992   to   17.1.1991   was   allowed
49

upon   payment   of   cost   of   Rs.1000   to   the   school   authority   and
Rs.5000 to the Board.  Like previous cases, the prayer was granted
on the basis of a subsequently obtained birth certificate and in light
of the applicable 2007 Byelaws.
82. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
83. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   also   been   urged   in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1839/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15124/2020)
84. This   appeal   involves   a   challenge   to   the   judgment   dated
25.9.2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.   No.
1037/2020 affirming the order of learned Single Judge, wherein the
respondent   student’s   prayer   for   change   in   date   of   birth   in   the
certificates   issued   by   the   Board   was   allowed   upon   payment   of
certain   costs   to   the   school   and   the   Board.   Reliance   was   again
placed   upon   a   subsequently   obtained   birth   certificate   for   ordering
the said changes and on the applicable 2007 Byelaws.
50

85. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
86. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   also   been   urged   in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1840/2021
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15625/2020)
87. The   challenge   in   this   appeal   is   against   the   judgment   dated
7.9.2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   in   W.A.     No.
1155/2020   confirming   the   order   of   learned   Single   Judge,   wherein
the   respondent   student’s   prayer   for   change   of   his   father’s   name
from   “Hashim   Abdulla”   to   “Hashim   A.”   and   mother’s   name   from
“Shahina Duneera” to “Shahina Beegum D.S.” was allowed in terms
of the applicable Byelaws (as amended in 2018).
88. In the facts of the case, the respondent obtained the certificate
issued   by   the   Board   on   29.5.2018   after   passing   the   Secondary
School   Examination,   2018   wherein   the   names   of   his   parents   were
recorded   in   accordance   with   the   school   records   and   old   birth
certificate. Contrary to the names in these documents, the names of
51

father and mother of the respondent were recorded as “Hashim A.”
and   “Shahina   Beegum   D.S.”   respectively   in   their   school   leaving
certificates.     In   light   of   this   conflict,   the   respondent   applied   to   the
Registering Authority for issue of a corrected birth certificate under
Section­15 of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 read
with Rule­11 of the Kerala Registration of Births and Deaths Rules,
1999.     The   High   Court   permitted   the   changes   in   accordance   with
this subsequently obtained birth certificate.
89. The   impugned   judgment   requires   no   discussion   as   it   is
reasoned in similar terms, as already delineated above.
90. The   grounds   urged   by   the   appellant   have   also   been   urged   in
previous appeals and we need not repeat them.
91. Apart   from   grounds   already   advanced   in   previous   cases,   the
respondents   have   advanced   certain   additional   grounds   in   support
of   the   impugned   decision.     It   is   submitted   that   the   CBSE   has   no
jurisdiction   or   power   to   deny   correction   of   records   belonging   to   a
student   after   due   changes   by   competent   public   authorities   and
acceptance   of   the   same   by   school.     It   is   further   submitted   that
CBSE  is  a  society   and  its  Byelaws  cannot  be  treated  as  equivalent
52

to   a   law   made   by   a   competent   legislature.     Thus,   they   cannot   be
invoked   to   deny   the  fundamental  rights  of   the   students  much   less
being reasonable restriction.
92. The   respondents   have   further   questioned   the   vires   of   the
Byelaws on the ground that the government resolution providing for
the   power   to   frame   Byelaws   does   not   permit   the   Board   to   impose
such   conditions   for   denying   corrections   in   certificates.     Relying
upon Sections 76 and 77 of the 1872 Act, it is lastly submitted that
the   certified   copies   of   public   records   are   duly   admissible   and   the
Board ought to ensure that their certificates are corrected in light of
such updated public records.
T.P. (C) NOS. 1139­1140 OF 2020
93.  The petitioner (CBSE) herein seeks a direction from this Court
to   withdraw   before   itself   two   proceedings,   namely   –   W.P.   (C)   No.
5828/2016   pending   before   the   Jharkhand   High   Court   and   L.P.A.
No. 423/2020 pending before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
at   Chandigarh,   as   similar   questions   are   involved   in   these
proceedings.
53

94. The former proceeding before the Jharkhand High Court is for
change   of   name   of   the   student   from   “Saddam   Hussain”   to   “Sajid
Hussain”   on   the   basis   of   changes   effected   in   Official   Gazette,
Passport,   Aadhar   card,   Driving   License   and   PAN   card.     The
proceeding   before   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   &   Haryana   at
Chandigarh is against the decision of learned Single Judge in CWP
No.  21388/2018,  wherein  the  student’s  prayer   for  change  of  name
in   the   certificates   issued   by   the   Board   from   “Satish   Kumar   s/o
Rampal” to “Shrey s/0 Rampal” was allowed on the basis of public
notices   in   two   local   newspapers,   official   gazette   notification
notifying change of name, Aadhar card and PAN card.
95. The Board submits that it is already contesting multiple cases
before   this   Court   in   which   similar   questions   touching   upon   the
power   of   Courts   to   issue   directions   for   changing   particulars   in
CBSE   certificates   is   being   examined,   despite   there   being   a   clear
prohibition   against   the   same   in   the   Examination   Byelaws.     The
Board   submits   that   identical   arguments   are   required   to   be
advanced by it at multiple forums and it is causing grave harm to it
including in passing of conflicting directions.
54

96. Respondent   No.   6   (Satish   Kumar   @Shrey)   has   filed   “Note   on
submissions”   wherein   various   grounds   have   been   advanced   to
question the prohibitory Byelaws of the Board and support the case
for   permitting   genuine   changes   in   certificates.     It   has   been
submitted   that   the   Byelaws   are   not   statutory   in   nature   and   thus,
they cannot be made as “law” within the meaning of Article 19(2) of
the Constitution and cannot be the basis to deprive the students of
their fundamental right to express their identity under Article 19(1)
(a).     Reliance   has   been   placed   upon   Kabir   Jaiswal   vs.   Union   of
India & Ors. 25
 to support this position.
97. It is then submitted that there is a conflict between   Kalpana
Thakur   &   Anr.   vs.   Central   Board   of   Secondary   Education   &
Anr. 26
  and   Vyshnav   @   Vishnu   Viswam   V.   vs.   Central   Board   of
Secondary   Education   &   Ors. 27
  as   regards   the   relevant   point   of
time for determining the applicability of Byelaws, as amended from
time   to   time.   Supporting   the   view   taken   in   Vyshnav 28
,   it   is   urged
25 2020 SCC OnLine All 1488
26 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12156
27 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 39806
28 supra at Footnote No.27
55

that   the   relevant   point   of   time   ought   to   be   the   date   of   issuance   of
certificate.
98. Having   gone   through   the   elaborate   set   of   submissions   and
documents   on   record   in   the   respective   matter,   the   following   broad
points emerge for our consideration:
(i) Whether   the   CBSE   Examination   Byelaws   have   the   force   of
law?
(ii) Whether   examination   byelaws   impose   reasonable   restrictions
on   the   exercise   of   rights   under   Article   19   of   the   Constitution
including   fail   the   test   of   rationality   for   excessively   restricting
the scope of permissible corrections/changes?
(iii) Whether the Board is obliged to carry out corrections/changes
in the certificates issued by it owing to correction/updation of
public   records/documents   which   have   statutory   presumption
of genuineness?
(iv) Whether   the   examination   byelaws   in   force   on   the   date   of
examination   conducted   by   CBSE   or   the   date   of   consideration
of   the   application   for   recording   correction/change   would   be
56

relevant?    And,   whether   the  effect  of   correction   or  change,  as
the case may be, will have retrospective effect from the date of
issue of the original certificate?
(v) Whether   writ   of   mandamus   issued   for   effecting  corrections   in
CBSE   certificates   can   be   in   the   teeth   of   explicit   provisions   in
the   examination   byelaws,   without   examining   validity   of   the
byelaws?
Point No. 1
99. Indubitably,   the   CBSE   Board   came   to   be   established   vide
Government   of   India   resolution   dated   1.7.1929   with   a   view   to
“enable it to play a useful role in the field of Secondary Education”
and   “make   the   services   of   the   Board   available   to   various
educational   institutions   in   the   country”,   as   stated   in   the
Constitution of the Board.  Article 9 29
 of the said Constitution deals
with the “Powers and Functions of the Board”, which include to do
all such things as may be necessary for furthering the objectives of
29  “9.   The Board shall have the following powers: ­
  xxx xxx xxx
          (xvi)   To   do   all   such   or   other   things   as   may   be   necessary   in   order   to   further   the
objectives   of   the   Board   as         a   body   constituted   for   regulating   and   maintaining   the
standard of secondary education.”
57

the Board.   One of the functions or so to say power of the Board is
to make regulations for giving effect to the afore­stated resolution as
predicated   in   Article   16 30
  of   the   Constitution.     Clause   (2)   thereof
envisages that the Regulation so framed may provide for conditions
for issuing certificates for examination conducted by the Board.  We
may also take note of Article 18 31
  of the Constitution of the Board,
which   makes   it   amply   clear   that   the   byelaws   to   be   framed   by   the
Board   ought   to   be   consistent   with   and   subservient   to   the
Regulations and the Resolution establishing the Board.  This Article
also indicates that byelaws may be made for the purposes referred
to   in   clauses   (a)   to   (c)   pertaining   to   procedural   aspects.
Indisputably, the constitution/organisation or structure of CBSE is
30  “16.POWERS OF THE BOARD TO MAKE REGULATIONS
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In particular and without prejudice to any generality of the foregoing powers, the
Board     may make Regulations for all or any of the following matters, namely:
…..
(f)  The conditions for the award of certificates of the Board;”
31     “18.   The   Board   and   its   Committees   may   make   Bye­laws,   consistent   with   this
Resolution and   the Regulations, for the following purposes, namely:
(a) Laying down the procedure to be observed at their meetings and the number of
members required to form a quorum;
(b) Providing   for   all   matters   which,   consistent   with   this   Resolution   and   the
Regulations, are to be prescribed by Bye­laws; and
(c) Providing  for  all  other  matters  solely  concerning  the  Board  and  its  Committees
and not provided for by the Resolution and the Regulations.”
58

not backed by a statute.  It is, therefore, a misnomer to characterise
byelaws framed by the Board as statutory.
100. The real question is: whether byelaws so framed have the force
of law?  
101. To have the force of law, it must qualify the test predicated in
Article   13   of   the   Constitution,   else   it   would   be   mere   contractual
terms   of   engagement.     For   the   nature   of   activities   undertaken   by
the   Board  including   the  powers  and   functions  of   the   Board,   it  can
be safely  assumed that the Board is a State within the meaning of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as a corollary thereof, its
actions   would   be   amenable   to   Part­III   of   the   Constitution   of   India.
The   fact   that   the   Board   can   be   treated   as   a   State   within   the
meaning   of   Article   12   of   the   Constitution   does   not   mean   that   the
byelaws   framed   by   it   would   necessarily   become   law   within   the
meaning   of   Article   13   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     Only   a   “law”
under Article 13 can be reckoned as a restriction in respect of rights
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution.
102. Before we proceed to analyse any further, it would be apposite
to   reproduce   Article   13   of   the   Constitution   of   India   to   answer   the
59

point   under   consideration.     Article   13   of   the   Constitution   reads
thus:­
“13.   Laws   inconsistent   with   or   in   derogation   of   the
fundamental   rights.—   (1)   All   laws   in   force   in   the   territory   of
India   immediately   before   the   commencement   of   this
Constitution,   in   so   far   as   they   are   inconsistent   with   the
provisions   of   this   Part,   shall,   to   the   extent   of   such
inconsistency, be void.
(2)   The   State   shall   not   make   any   law   which   takes   away   or
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in
contravention   of   this   clause   shall,   to   the   extent   of   the
contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, —
(a)   “law”   includes   any   Ordinance,   order,   bye­law,   rule,
regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the
territory of India the force of law;
(b)   “laws   in   force”   includes   laws   passed   or   made   by   a
Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of
India   before   the   commencement   of   this   Constitution   and
not   previously   repealed,   notwithstanding   that   any   such
law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either
at all or in particular areas.
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this
Constitution made under article 368.”
(emphasis supplied)
103. The tenor of Article 13 clearly suggests that it was not enacted
to restate the obvious proposition that all statutory laws are “laws”
in   any   legal   system.     For,   it   requires   no   restatement   that   laws
enacted   by   the   legislature   are   “laws”.     The   underlying   purpose   of
60

defining   “law”   under   Article   13   is   to   encompass   a   practical
administrative   reality   that   there   can   be   laws   other   than   ordinary
statutory   laws.     It,   therefore,   takes   within   its   sweep   those   matters
(declaration in the form of Byelaws in this case) as having the “force
of law”  albeit  not enacted by the legislature as such.
104. For,   it   defines   “law”   to   include   ordinances,   orders,   byelaws,
rule,   regulation   or   notification   issued/made   by   the   State.     The
precise   meanings   of   these   terms   cannot   be   confined   in   the   rigidity
of   language   and   the   same   is   neither   desirable   nor   required   in   the
present case.
105. The   examination   revolves   around   the   expression   “ having   in
the   territory   of   India   the   force   of   law”,   irrespective   of   the
packaging in which the said provision is formally couched. The text
impels   us   to   focus   on   the   substance   of   the   provision,   and   not   its
form. Broadly speaking, law made by State refers to a body of rules
which   shapes   the   rights   and   liabilities   of   persons   in   a   universal
sense as opposed to a private transaction between parties. Such law
has the ability to bind people by providing for all prominent aspects
of   their   conduct   as   the   subjects   of   law.   Therefore,   any
61

rule/notification/order/byelaw   issued/made   by   the   State   or   its
instrumentalities   would   have   the   force   of   law   and   bind   all   entities
subjected  to   it  and   operates  as  a   code  of   conduct   to   regulate  their
functioning.   Yet   another   crucial   characteristic   would   be
enforceability   in   a   court   of   law.   Needless   to   observe,   we   are   not
talking   about   binding   codes   or   set   of   rules   decided   by   parties   for
themselves   as   they   fall   under   the   realm   of   law   of   contract.   We   are
dealing with rules which flow from the instrumentality of the “State”
during the performance of essential public functions.
106. CBSE,   despite   being   packaged   as   a   registered   society,   is
performing an essential public function for the government since its
establishment in 1929.   In  Binny Ltd. & Anr. vs. V. Sadasivan &
Ors. 32
,   this   Court   laid   down   certain   characteristics   of   public
functions thus:
“11.   ...It   is   difficult   to   draw   a   line   between   public   functions
and   private   functions   when   they   are   being   discharged   by   a
purely   private   authority.   A   body   is   performing   a   "public
function"   when   it   seeks   to   achieve   some   collective   benefit   for
the   public   or   a   section   of   the   public   and   is   accepted   by   the
public   or   that   section  of   the   public   as   having   authority   to   do
so.   Bodies   therefore   exercise   public   functions   when   they
intervene   or   participate   in   social   or   economic   affairs   in   the
public interest.  In a book on Judicial Review of Administrative
32 (2005) 6 SCC 657
62

Action   (5th   Edn.)   by   de   Smith,   Woolf   &   Jowell   in   Chapter   3,
para 0.24, it is stated thus:
"A   body   is   performing   a   ‘public   function’   when   it
seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public
or   a   section   of   the   public   and   is   accepted   by   the
public   or   that   section   of   the   public   as   having
authority   to   do   so.   Bodies   therefore   exercise   public
functions   when   they   intervene   or   participate   in   social   or
economic   affairs   in   the   public   interest.   This   may   happen
in   a   wide   variety   of   ways.   For   instance,   a   body   is
performing   a   public   function   when   it   provides   ‘public
goods’   or   other   collective   services,   such   as   health   care,
education and personal social services, from funds raised
by   taxation.   A   body   may   perform   public   functions   in   the
form   of   adjudicatory   services   (such   as   those   of   the
criminal  and  civil   courts   and  tribunal  system).   They   also
do   so   if   they   regulate   commercial   and   professional
activities   to   ensure   compliance   with   proper   standards.
For all these purposes, a range of legal and administrative
techniques   may   be   deployed,   including   rule­making,
adjudication   (and   other   forms   of   dispute   resolution);
inspection; and licensing.
Public   functions   need   not   be   the   exclusive   domain   of
the   State.   Charities,   self­regulatory   organizations   and
other nominally private institutions (such as universities,
the Stock Exchange, Lloyd's of London, churches) may in
reality also perform some types of public function. As Sir
John   Donaldson,   M.R.   urged,   it   is   important   for   the
courts   to   ‘recognise   the   realities   of   executive   power’
and   not   allow   ‘their   vision   to   be   clouded   by   the
subtlety   and   sometimes   complexity   of   the   way   in
which it can be exerted’.  Non­governmental bodies such
as these are just as capable of abusing their powers as is
Government.””
(emphasis supplied)
The principles associated with a public function deducible from the
above analysis can be illustratively culled out as follows:
63

a.   Extension   of   collective   benefit   to   public   by   a   public
authority;  
b.   Participation   in   social   or   economic   affairs   including
health, education, social services etc.;
c.   Private   bodies   or   charitable   institutions   performing
public   functions   could   also   be   regulated   in   the   same
manner as a public authority.
In   the   school   education   structure   as   we   have   it,   there   are   state
government   boards   limited   to   respective   states.     There   are   central
boards   having   its   area   of   operation   throughout   India,   namely,
Council   for   the   Indian   School   Certificate   Examinations   (ICSE),   a
private   board;   International   Baccalaureate   (IB),   formerly   known   as
International   Baccalaureate   Organization   (IBO)   a   non­profit
foundation/organization   having   headquarter   in   Geneva,
Switzerland; and CBSE.
107. CBSE is the only central body for conducting examinations in
the country created by a resolution of the Central Government.   All
the bodies constituted at various levels are working in the direction
of   just   educational   governance.     Article   41   of   the   Constitution,
couched as a directive, is the source behind the basic functioning of
64

the CBSE Board as it secures nothing but right to education.   It is
participating   in   educational   affairs   which   form   an   intrinsic   part   of
social affairs. The CBSE Board is a public authority functioning  in
public interest for the performance of a public function.
108. We may gainfully refer to the Constitution of the Board which
reaffirms the  public  character   of the  Board  as the  ultimate control
over   the   functioning   of   the   Board   is   exercised   by   the   Ministry   of
Education (now Ministry of Education & Social Welfare) 33
. Article 1
states that:
“1.   The   Board   shall   conduct   examinations   at   the   secondary
stage of the education and such other examinations as it may
consider   fit,   subject   to   the   approval   of   the   Controlling
Authority   or   as   it   may   be   called   upon   to   conduct   by   the
Government   of   India,   Ministry   of   Education,   (now   Ministry   of
Education & Social Welfare) and do such acts ancillary to the
objects as may be necessary.”
Article 4 further reads thus:
“4.   The   Secretary   to   the   Government   of   India,   Ministry   of
Education   (now   Ministry   of   Education   and   Social   Welfare)
shall continue to be the Controlling Authority of the Board.”
109. Reverting   to   the   CBSE   Examination   Byelaws,   the   same   are
couched   in   the   form   of   a   code.       They   provide   for   all   essential
aspects   relating   to   formal   education   of   a   student   including
33 Now known as “Ministry of Human Resource Development”
65

admission,   examination,   migration,   transfer,   curriculum,   fee   for
various   services,   issuance   of   verified   certificates,   modifications   in
certificates   etc.     This   Byelaws,   therefore,   bind   the   parties   and   are
duly enforceable in a court of law, even by way of writ remedies as
we have seen in the present batch of petitions.
110. To put it differently, the Byelaws of the Board have the force of
law and must be regarded as such for all legal purposes.   It would
serve no meaningful purpose to hold these authoritative set of rules
originating from an instrumentality of the State as mere contractual
terms despite there being overwhelming public interest in their just
application.
111. The   argument   that   Byelaws   of   the   Board   are   contractual
elements   as   CBSE   is   a   registered   society   unbacked   by   a   statute
cannot   be   accepted   for   at   least   four   reasons   –   first ,   CBSE   is   not   a
private corporate body.   It is a juristic person  and a “State”  within
the meaning of Article 12, which in itself warrants its amenability to
the   courts   including   constitutional   writ   courts;   second ,   the
functions   performed   by   the   CBSE   Board   are   public   functions   and
not private functions;  third , the test of “force of law” takes within its
66

sweep   the   nature   of   rule,   its   authoritative   impact   on   the   subjects,
nature of function performed by the rule making body, the origin of
the body, the binding value of the rules, existence of any competing
set   of   rules   and   fourth ,   absence   of   statute   does   not   automatically
render the rules to be contractual terms, as already observed. 
112. As   in   the   ultimate   analysis,   the   Byelaws   operate   as   law,   the
scrutiny   of   this   Court   cannot   be   undermined   by   giving   them   an
artificial colour.   For a student enrolled with the CBSE, there is no
other   body   of   rules   but   the   subject   Byelaws   for   dealing   with   all
significant   aspects   of   her   education.     By   now   it   is   an   established
tenet   that   even   body   corporates,   co­operative   societies,   registered
societies   etc.   can   be   declared   as   instrumentalities   of   the   State,   for
the   only   reason   that   the   outer   form   of   organization   must   not   be
allowed   to   defeat   the   ultimate   constitutional   goal   of   protection   of
fundamental   rights   as   and   when   they   suffer   at   the   hands   of   the
State,   directly   or   indirectly.     The   Court   ought   to   intervene   with
circumspection   even   when   the   public   body   derives   its   authority
from a government resolution.
67

113. We say so because there is an evolving body  of jurisprudence
enunciating   that   the   principle   of   presumption   of   constitutionality
attached   with   statutes   ought   not   to   be   extended   to   subordinate
legislations   with   the   same   vigour.       For,   the   legislature   enjoys   the
sacred backing of people’s will and naturally, every act of legislature
is   presumed   to   be   constitutional.     In   other   words,   the   Courts
generally do not look upon duly enacted laws with suspicion at the
first   glance   as   they   enjoy   legal   presumption   of   its   validity.
Nevertheless, circumspect intervention on the part of the Court is to
advance   constitutional   protection   for   guarantees   under   Part­III   of
the Constitution.
114. Arguendo,   the   Examination   Byelaws   are   not   “law”   under
Article   13,   it   would   not   affect   the   power   of   the   Court   to   scrutinize
them in reference to Part­III of the Constitution of India as CBSE is
“State”   within   the   meaning   of   Article   12   and   all   its   actions   are
consequently subject to Part­III.
68

Point No. 2
115. The   question   whether   Byelaws   under   consideration   impose
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article 19 of
the Constitution of India, may have to be understood in the context
of enunciation of this Court that the core existence of an individual
is not exemplified by her outer characteristics but by her inner self­
identification   and   also   about   the   significance   of   the   acquired
identity in the form of name.  The identity of an individual is one of
the   most   closely   guarded   areas   of   the   constitutional   scheme   in
India.  The sanctity of identity has been recognized by this Court in
a   plethora   of   cases   including   National   Legal   Services   Authority
vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 34
,   Navtej   Singh   Johar   &   Ors.   vs.
Union   of   India   through   Secretary,   Ministry   of   Law   and
Justice 35
  and   K.S.   Puttaswamy   and   Anr.   vs.   Union   of   India   &
Ors 36
.   In   fact,   in   Navtej   Singh   Johar 37
,   the   Court   noted   how   the
core   existence   of   an   individual   is   not   exemplified   by   her   outer
characteristics but by her inner self­identification. In the context of
34 (2014) 5 SCC 438
35 (2018) 10 SCC 1
36 (2017) 10 SCC 1
37 supra at Footnote No.35
69

natural   identity   of   an   individual,   this   Court   in   Navtej   Singh
Johar 38
 had noted that:
“5.   The   natural   identity   of   an   individual   should   be   treated   to
be   absolutely   essential   to   his   being.   What   nature   gives   is
natural.   That   is   called   nature   within.   Thus,   that   part   of   the
personality   of   a   person  has   to  be  respected   and   not   despised
or   looked   down   upon.   The   said   inherent   nature   and   the
associated natural impulses in that regard are to be accepted.
Non­acceptance   of   it   by   any   societal   norm   or   notion   and
punishment by law on some obsolete idea and idealism affects
the   kernel   of   the   identity   of   an   individual.   Destruction   of
individual   identity   would   tantamount   to   crushing   of
intrinsic   dignity   that   cumulatively   encapsulates   the
values   of   privacy,   choice,   freedom   of   speech   and   other
expressions.   It   can   be   viewed   from   another   angle.   An
individual   in   exercise   of   his   choice   may   feel   that   he/she
should be left alone but no one, and we mean, no one, should
impose solitude on him/her.”
(emphasis supplied)
116.   Identity,   therefore,   is   an   amalgam   of   various   internal   and
external   including   acquired   characteristics   of   an   individual   and
name can be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity.
And   therefore,   an   individual   must   be   in   complete   control   of   her
name and law must enable her to retain as well as to exercise such
control freely “for all times”.   Such control would inevitably include
the aspiration of an individual to be recognized by a different name
for  a   just  cause.     Article   19(1)(a)   of  the   Constitution   provides   for   a
38 supra at Footnote No.35
70

guaranteed   right   to   freedom   of   speech   and   expression.   In   light   of
Navtej   Singh   Johar 39
,   this   freedom   would   include   the   freedom   to
lawfully express one’s identity in the manner of their liking. In other
words,   expression   of   identity   is   a   protected   element   of   freedom   of
expression under the Constitution. 
117. Having   recognized   the   existence   of   this   right,   the   essential
question pertains to the rights that flow due to the change of name.
The   question   becomes   vital   because   identity,   as   stated   above,   is   a
combination of diverse set of elements.   Navtej Singh Johar 40
 dealt
with   “natural   identity”   and   here   we   are   dealing   with   name,   which
can   only   be   perceived   as   an   ‘acquired   identity’.     Therefore,   the
precise   scope   of   right   and   extent   of   restrictions   could   only   be
determined upon deeper examination.
118. To   begin   with,   it   is   important   to   explain   what   we   understand
by this right to change of name as a constituent element of freedom
of   expression   of   identity.     Any   change   in   identity   of   an   individual
has   to   go   through   multiple   steps   and   it   cannot   be   regarded   as
complete   without   proper   fulfilment   of   those   steps.     An   individual
39 supra at Footnote No.35
40 supra at Footnote No.35
71

may   self­identify   oneself   with   any   title   or   epithet   at   any   point   of
time.   But the change of identity would not be regarded as formally
or legally complete until and unless the State and its agencies take
note   thereof   in   their   records.     Afterall,   in   social   sphere,   an
individual   is   not   only   recognized   by   how   an   individual   identifies
oneself   but   also   by   how   his/her   official   records   identify   him/her.
For,   in   every   public   transaction   of   an   individual,   official   records
introduce   the   person   by   his/her   name   and   other   relevant
particulars. 
119. Thus,   the   essential   question   is   whether   the   aforesaid   right   to
alter   name   would   mean   that   the   State   and   its   agencies   are
unconditionally   bound   to   reckon   the   changed   identity   of   the
individual  and   give  recognition  to   the  same  by  altering  its  records,
whenever such request is made by him/her.
120. Going   by   the   very   nature   of   rights  under   Article  19,   the   right
to get changed name recorded in the official (public) records cannot
be   an   absolute   right   and   as   a   matter   of   public   policy   and   larger
public   interest   calls   for   certain   reasonable   restrictions   to   observe
consistency and obviate confusion and deceptive attempt.
72

121. We   may   now   examine   whether   CBSE   Byelaws   are   just   and
reasonable   restrictions   in   the   context   of   rights   guaranteed   under
Part­III and in the interests of the general public.
122. The   test   of   reasonableness   requires   that   the   impugned   law   is
intelligently   crafted   in   such   a   manner   that   it   is   able   to   justify   the
ultimate   impact   of   the   law   on   its   subjects.     If   it   restricts,   it   must
restrict   on   the   basis   of  reason   and  if   it  permits,  it   must   permit  on
the   basis   of   reason.     Similarly,   if   a   law   draws   a   classification,   it
must   classify   intelligently   i.e.,   backed   by   reason.   Reason   is   the
foundation of all laws and their validity is immensely dependent on
the   availability   of   sound   reason.    Equally   crucial   is  the   availability
of a legitimate object. It is important to note that reasonableness is
adjudged   in   the   specific   context   of   the   case   and   is   not   confined   to
the words of a definition. In  Om Prakash & Ors. vs. State of U.P.
& Ors. 41
, this Court noted thus:
“32.   The   concept   of   “reasonableness”   defies   definition.
Abstract   definition   like   “choice   of   a   course   which   reason
dictates”   as   propounded   in   the   earliest   case   of   this   Court   in
Chintamanrao 42
  is   elastic.   In   the   subsequent   case   of   V.G.
Row 43
  therefore,   this   Court   has   observed   that   “no   abstract
41  (2004) 3 SCC 402
42  Chintamanrao vs. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118
43  The State of Madras vs. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
73

standard   or   general   pattern”   of   reasonableness   can   be   laid
down as applicable to all cases. Legal author Friedmann in his
book   Legal   Theory,   4th   Edn.,   at   pp.   83­85,   comments   that
reasonableness   is   an   expression   used   to   convey   basically   the
natural   law   ideal   of   “justice   between   man   and   man”.   The
concept   of   “reasonable   man”   is   also   an   application   of   the
principles   of   natural   justice   to   the   standard   of   behaviour
expected   of   the   citizen.   The   functional   and   conceptual
implication   of   the   term   “reasonableness”   is   that   it   is
essentially   another   word   used   for   public   policy.   It   means   the
application   of   the   underlying   principles   of   social   policy   and
morality   to   an   individual   case.   Friedmann   further   observes
that   the   “test   of   reasonableness   is   nothing   substantially
different   from   'social   engineering',   'balancing   of   interests',   or
any   of   the   other   formulas   which   modern   sociological   theories
suggest as an answer to the problem of the judicial function”.”
In   V.G.   Row 44
,   the   Court,   noting   that   there   can   be   no   general
pattern   of   reasonableness,   laid   down   certain   factors   to   be   kept   in
mind while determining this question thus:
“(15) …It is important in this context to bear in mind that the
test   of   reasonableness,   wherever   prescribed,   should   be
applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract
standard,   or   general   pattern   of   reasonableness   can   be   laid
down   as   applicable   to   all   cases.   The   nature   of   the   right
alleged   to   have   been   infringed,   the   underlying   purpose
of   the   restrictions   imposed,   the   extent   and   urgency   of
the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion
of  the imposition, the prevailing  conditions  at the time,
should all enter into the judicial verdict.  …”
(emphasis supplied)
123. As   noted   above,   the   Byelaws   permit   change   of   name   only   if
permission   from   the   Court   has   been   obtained   prior   to   the
44 supra at Footnote No.43
74

publication   of   result.     It   puts   a   clear   embargo   on   any   change   of
name   sans   prior   permission   before   the   publication.     The   provision
is problematic on certain counts.  Firstly, it is not a mere restriction
on the right, it is a complete embargo on the right post publication
of   result   of   the   candidate.     It   fails   to   take   into   account   the
possibility of need for change of name after the publication of result
including   the   uncertainty   of   timeline   required   to   obtain   such
declaration   from   the   Court   of   law   due   to   law’s   delay   and   upon
which   the   candidate   has   no   control   whatsoever.     Whereas,   while
amending   the   Byelaws   in   2007,   the   CBSE   itself   had   noted   that
children   are   not   of   mature   age   while   passing   school   examinations
and they may not be in a position to decide conclusively  on issues
concerning   their   identity.     The   Byelaws   completely   overlook   this
possibility when it ordains seeking declaration from the Court prior
to   the   publication   of   results   of   the   concerned   examination
conducted by it.
124. The   overriding   state   interest,   as   per   the   Board,   to   retain   this
stringency   is   nothing   but   efficiency   of   administration.
Administrative   efficiency,   despite   being   a   crucial   concern,   has   not
75

been and cannot be elevated to a standard that it is used to justify
non­performance of essential functions by an instrumentality of the
State.     To   use   administrative   efficiency   to   make   it   practically
impossible   for   a   student   to   alter   her   identity   in   the   Board
certificates,   no   matter   how   urgent   and   important   it   is,   would   be
highly   disproportionate   and   can   in   no   manner   be   termed   as   a
reasonable   restriction.     Reasonableness   would   demand   a   proper
balance   between   a   student’s   right   to   be   identified   in   the   official
(public) records in manner of her choice and the Board’s argument
of   administrative   efficiency.     To   sustain   this   balance,   it   would   be
open   to   the   Board   to   limit   the   number   of   times   such   alterations
could   be   permitted   including   subject   to   availability   of   the   old
records   preserved   by   it   as   per   the   extant   regulations.     But   to   say
that   post   the   publication   of   examination   results   and   issuance   of
certificates, there can be no way to alter the record would be a case
of total prohibition and not a reasonable restraint.
125. The   limitation   as   regards   maximum   period   upto   which
changes can be permitted also requires a different approach.  Upon
receiving   the   certificates,   the   student   would   naturally   be   put   to
76

notice   of   the   particulars   of   certificates.     Due   to   young   age   and
inadvertence   including   being   casual   and   indolent,   a   student   may
fail   to   identify   the   errors   or   to   understand   the   probable   impact   of
those   errors   and   accordingly,   may   not   apply   for   rectification
immediately.  It is also possible that a student may not have to use
the   certificates   immediately   after   passing   out   and   by   the   time   she
uses   them,   the   limitation   period   for   correction   may   elapse.
Therefore,   a   realistic   time   for   permitting   corrections   is   very
important.     Indeed,   it   can   be   commensurate   with   the   statutory   or
mandatory   period   upto   which   CBSE   is   obliged   to   preserve   its   old
record.
126. However, we need not explore upon the question as to whether
the exercise of a fundamental right can be foreclosed by prescribing
a rigid period of limitation.  In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is
important that the action for enforcement of such rights is initiated
in   prescribed   time   and   consistency   is   maintained,   but   is   it
permissible to say the same about fundamental rights?   The rights
which   are   recognised   as   fundamental   under   the   Constitution   are
“preferred   or   chosen   freedoms”   and   a   very   sensitive   and   realistic
77

approach   has   to   be   taken   in   such   matters.     We   wonder   whether
after the lapse of prescribed time, let us say 3 years, there could be
no   reasonable   and   legitimate   circumstances   to   warrant   change   of
name.
127. At   the   same   time,   there   is   merit   in   CBSE’s   argument   that
frequent   changes   cannot   be   permitted   as   there   is   scope   of   abuse
and   misuse,   apart   from   administrative   burden.     This   argument
cannot   be   lightly   brushed   aside.     We   deem   it   fit   to   observe   that
same   concerns   could   apply   to   other   bodies   as   well,   like   Unique
Identification Authority of India 45
 and Passport Authority.
128. As   regards   the   argument   of   misuse,   no   doubt,   there   are
instances  of   misuse  of   provisions  that   permit   change   of  identity  in
criminal  matters.   However, mere possibility  of abuse  cannot deter
the   Board   from   fulfilling   their   essential   functions.     A   possibility   of
abuse   cannot   be   used   to   deny   legitimate   rights   to   citizens.     The
balance   simply   does   not   tilt   in   favour   of   such   a   proposition.     The
course   of   law   cannot   choose   to   change   its   stream   merely   because
there are apprehensions of abuse on the way.  The Board’s concern
45  for short, “UIDAI”
78

is only to regulate and maintain efficient educational standards.   It
is   not   a   penal   authority.     If   any   of   the   provisions   of   Byelaws   are
subjected   to   misuse   or   abuse   by   anyone,   the   Board   would   be   well
within   its   rights   to   approach   the   appropriate   body   for   necessary
penal or  civil action.   As a nodal agency  made for  a specific public
purpose, CBSE can only use its means and resources to put proper
safeguards in place while performing its functions.   More so, when
it is not even the job of the Board to verify anything, as changes are
made   after   grant   of   permission   by   a   Court   of   law.     There   is
involvement   of   judicial   application   of   mind.   The   Board   only   has   to
give effect to the Court order granting permission, as and when it is
so pronounced irrespective of publication of examination results in
earlier point of time.
129. Administrative   efficiency,   we   must   note,   cannot   be   the   sole
concern   of   CBSE.   Every   institution   desires   efficiency   in   their
functioning.     But   it   does   not   mean   that   efficiency   is   achieved   by
curbing   their   basic   functions.   Article   9   of   CBSE’s   Constitution,   in
point (xvi), instructively  states that  CBSE is a body  constituted for
79

“regulating   and  maintaining”  the  standard  of  secondary  education.
The same is reproduced again for ready reference:
“9.  The Board shall have the following powers:­
xxx xxx xxx
(xvi)   To   do   all   such   or   other   things   as   may   be   necessary   in
order   to   further   the   objectives   of   the   Board   as   a   body
constituted for regulating and maintaining the standard
of secondary education .”
(emphasis supplied)
The   terms   “regulation”   and   “maintenance”   are   terms   of   very   wide
import and signify that the functioning of the Board is not narrowed
down   in   any   manner   whatsoever.     Regulation   of   standard   of
education would empower the Board to take all necessary steps, as
permissible   under   the   Resolution   and   Regulations,   to   control   all
possible aspects of school education that may have a bearing on its
standard.  Quality of curriculum, services extended to the students,
effective   grievance   redressal   mechanism,   oversight   over   affiliated
schools   etc.   are   some   of   the   essential   elements   touching   upon   the
standard   of   education.     Maintenance   of   those   standards   would
demand constant upgradation of rules and services of the Board in
tune with  changing  needs of  the students  and  the  ultimate  goal of
education.  
80

130. One   of   the   primary   functions   of   the   Board   is   to   grant
certificates to its students.  Effective maintenance and regulation of
standard of education would include complete accountability of the
Board   in   grant   of   such   certificates   and   its   duty   does   not   get
extinguished   after   publication   of   examination   results   and   issue   of
certificates.     Rather,   it   extends   to   taking   care   of   post­publication
concerns of students as and when they emerge, as students seek to
use   their   certificates   for   purposes   of   higher   education   and   career
opportunities.     A   narrow   reading   of   the   functions   of   the   Board
would   leave   glaring   gaps   in   the   field   of   school   education   and   may
jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimate concerns.
131. The   concerned   Byelaw   has   been   framed   on   the   assumption
that there can be no situation wherein a legitimate need for change
of name could arise for a student after publication of results.   It is
presumed that only typographical/factual errors could come in the
certificates   and   they   can   be   corrected   using   the   provision   for
corrections.   The presumption, we must note, is erroneous, absurd
and   distances   itself   from   the   social   realities.     There   can   be
numerous   circumstances   wherein   change   of   name   could   be   a
81

legitimate   requirement  and  keeping   the   ultimate  goal   of  preserving
the   standard   of   education   in   mind,   the   Board   must   provide   for   a
reasonable opportunity to effect such changes.   
132. It would not be out of place to note that the two parties here –
the Board and students – are not in an equal position of impact.  In
other   words,   the   balance   of   convenience   would   tilt   in   favour   of
students.   For, they stand to lose more due to inaccuracies in their
certificates   than   the   Board   whose   sole   worry   is   increasing
administrative   burden.     The   obligation   of   Board   to   take   additional
administrative burden is no doubt onerous but the propensity  of a
student   losing   career   opportunities   due   to   inaccurate   certificate   is
unparalleled.     Illustratively,   a   juvenile   accused   of   being   in   conflict
with   the   law   or   a   victim   of   sexual   abuse   whose   identity   gets
compromised   due   to   lapses   by   media   or   the   investigative   body,
despite   there   being   complete   legal   protection   for   the   same,   may
consider changing the name to seek rehabilitation in the society in
exercise   of  her   right   to   be   forgotten.    If   the   Board,   in  such   a   case,
refuses to change the name, the student would be compelled to live
with   the   scars   of   the   past.     We   are   compelled   to   wonder   how   it
82

would not be a grave and sustained violation of fundamental rights
of  the  student.   In such  circumstances, the  avowed public interest
in   securing   rehabilitation   of   affected  persons  would  overwhelm  the
Board’s   interest   in   securing   administrative   efficiency.     In   fact,   it
would   be   against  the   human   dignity   of   the   student,   the   protection
whereof is the highest duty of all concerned.   A Board dealing with
maintenance of educational standards cannot  arrogate to  itself the
power to impact identity of students who enrol with it.  The right to
control   one’s   identity   must   remain   with   the   individual,   subject,   of
course, to reasonable restrictions as observed above and as further
discussed later.
133. The utility of certificates issued by the Board is not confined to
educational  purposes anymore.   They  serve  a social  purpose  today
and are often used to cross verify particulars like name and date of
birth while applying for other government identity documents.  They
assume   immense   relevance   while   applying   for   various   jobs,   both
public and private.   Interestingly, CBSE itself has argued at length
on   the   importance   and   authoritative   value   of   their   certificates.     In
such   circumstances,   an   inaccuracy   or   denial   of   change   could   be
83

fatal to a student’s future prospects and all these concerns cannot
be brushed aside in the name of administrative exigencies.
134. Pertinently,   the   Parliament   is   also   alive   to   the   social   realities
having   bearing   on   identity   documents.   There   are   various   statutory
enactments   wherein   detailed   provisions   are   made   for   change   of
identity.     The   UIDAI   allows   changes   in   the   Aadhar   card   upon
fulfilment   of   required   conditions.   Section­31   of   Aadhaar   (Targeted
Delivery   of   Financial   and   Other   Subsidies,   Benefits   and   Services)
Act,   2016   provides   for   changes   in   the   records.     The   provision
permits both demographic and biometric changes. It reads thus:
“ 31.   Alteration   of   demographic   information   or   biometric
information. —   (1) In case any demographic information of an
Aadhaar   number   holder   is   found   incorrect   or   changes
subsequently,   the   Aadhaar   number   holder   shall   request   the
Authority to alter such demographic information in his record
in   the   Central   Identities   Data   Repository   in   such   manner   as
may be specified by regulations.
(2)   In   case   any   biometric   information   of   Aadhaar   number
holder   is   lost   or   changes   subsequently   for   any   reason,   the
Aadhaar   number   holder   shall   request   the   Authority   to   make
necessary   alteration   in   his   record   in   the   Central   Identities
Data   Repository   in   such   manner   as   may   be   specified   by
regulations.
(3)   On   receipt   of   any   request   under   sub­section   (1)   or   sub­
section   (2),   the   Authority   may,   if   it   is   satisfied,   make   such
alteration   as   may   be   required   in   the   record   relating   to   such
Aadhaar   number   holder   and   intimate   such   alteration   to   the
concerned Aadhaar number holder.
84

(4)   No   identity   information   in   the   Central   Identities   Data
Repository   shall   be   altered   except   in   the   manner   provided   in
this Act or regulations made in this behalf.”
Schedule   II   attached   with   Aadhar   (Enrolment   and   Update)
Regulations, 2016 provides for the list of documents acceptable for
the purpose of verification of identity when a request for changes is
made.   Proof   of   Identity   could   be   verified   on   the   basis   of   following
documents 46
:
a. Passport;
b. PAN Card;
c. Driving License;
d. Voter ID
For   proof   of   date   of   birth,   following   documents 47
  are
acceptable:
a. Birth certificate;
b. Passport;
c.   Certificate   of   date   of   birth   issued   by   Group   A
Gazetted Officer on letterhead.
The UIDAI  website also notes why  such changes could be required
and we feel it relevant to reproduce the same thus:
46 List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.
47 List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.
85

“Demographic data update, the need could arise from:
Changes in life events such as marriage may lead to
residents   changing   their   basic   demographic   details   such
as   name   and   address.   Address   and   mobile   number   could
also   change   due   to   migration   to   newer   locations.
Residents   may   also   want   changes   in   their   relative’s
details due to changes in life events such marriage, death
of   a   relative   etc.   In   addition,   residents   could   have   other
personal   reasons   to   change   their   mobile   number,   email
address etc.
 Changes   in   various   service   delivery   platforms   may   lead
residents   to   declaration   request   changes   and   to   add   mobile
number to CIDR etc.
 Errors   made   during   the   enrolment   process   wherein   the
resident’s   demographic   data   may   have   been   captured
incorrectly.   Changes   to   “DoB/Age”   and   “Gender”   fields   are
expected primarily due to enrolment errors.
 Since   a   resident   can   enrol   anywhere   in   India,   it   may
happen that a native speaker of language "A" is enrolled by an
operator   of   language   "B"   and   consequently   the   resident’s   local
language   of   enrolment   is   "B".   Later,   the   resident   may   want   to
change the local language of enrolment to another that he/she
prefers.   If   so,   then   all   the   demographic   information   that   is
printed   on   the   Aadhaar   letter   will   need   to   be   updated   in   the
new local language.
 UIDAI   may   also   ascertain   availability   of   POI,   POA   and
other documents collected at the time of enrolment/update and
its   quality   and   decide   to   notify   resident   to   update   their
demographic information and submit the required document.”
(emphasis supplied)
Apart from changes required due to marriage, migration, death etc.,
the   authority   takes   into   account   the   need   for   permitting   changes
due   to   “personal   reasons”.     The   underlying   idea   is   to   ensure
86

accuracy   of   record   whilst   ensuring   free   exercise   of   control   by   an
individual over her identity.
135. Similarly, Section 24 of the Passports Act, 1967 read with the
Passport   Rules,   1980   permit   change   of   name   and   date   of   birth   on
the   basis   of   certain   documents.     The   Ministry   of   External   Affairs 48
permits change of name and other information, including signature,
of   the   passport   holder   as   a   part   of   its   passport   services.   It   allows
change of name under three categories:
“ Change   of   name   may   be   allowed   to   the   applicant   in   the
following events:
1. Following marriage, divorce or Remarriage or
2. Adding surname (childhood to adulthood) or
3. Change of complete name.”
It   permits   such   changes   on   the   basis   of   certain   documents   which
are listed as:
“ Documents required
(i)  Prescribed Deed Poll
(ii)  Original   newspaper   cutting   announcing   the   change   of
name published in two leading daily newspapers (in the areas
of   residence   &   permanent   residence)   –   in   Indian   &   local
Newspaper
(iii)  The   applicant   has   to   furnish   a   Sworn   Affidavit(s)   for   the
purpose quoting the reason for name change.”
48 for short, “MoEA”
87

The Ministry also permits change in signature on the Passport upon
fulfilment of certain conditions which read thus:
“ Change of Signature
For   changing   signature   in   the   passport,   application   for   new
passport has to be made and the applicant must append his /
her old signature along with new signature on the second page
of   the   passport   application   form   along   with   the   following
documents.
Requirements:
1.  Application   form   should   be   completely   filled   in   and
signed.
2.  4   (four)   passport   size   (35   mm   x   45   mm)   identical
photographs   showing   frontal   view   of   full   face   with   white
background.
3.  The   current   passport   having   valid   visa   or   residence
permit is required to be enclosed. In case the latest passport is
additional   booklet(s)   issued   to   the   original   passport,   the
additional   booklet(s)   plus   the   original   passport   must   be
furnished.”
Furthermore, the Ministry also permits change of appearance in its
records if it has changed significantly over time, thus:
“Change in appearance
If   your   appearance   has   changed   significantly   since   your   last
passport was made, you can apply for a fresh passport with a
recent photograph.”
136. What   emerges   from   the   above   analysis   is   that   the
government(s) is cognizant of its duty to upgrade its identity records
in   tune   with   changing   requirements   of   the  citizens.     From   reasons
purely   personal   to   reasons   flowing   from   life   events   such   as
88

marriage,  death   or   migration,   the   authorities  are  responsive   to   the
changing   needs  of   citizens.   As   per  the   nature   of  identity,   changes
are   permissible.     In   light   of   the   clear   dicta   in   National   Legal
Services Authority 49
and  K.S. Puttaswamy 50
,  it is bounden duty of
all state instrumentalities to play the role of enablers in the exercise
of rights by the citizens, including to correct their records owing to
purely personal choices of the citizens.  For instance, “gender” is an
evolving   concept   which   could   warrant   changes   in   identity
documents.   In   such   cases,   too   much   insistence   on   disclosure   of
reasons   could   be   invasive   to   privacy.     Though,   in   an   ultimate
analysis, this exercise of examining the reasons has to be left to the
court   of   law   empowered   to   permit   changes   in   a   specific   factual
scenario.   
137. No   doubt,   it   is   true   that   CBSE   certificates   are   not   strictly
meant   to   be   considered   as   identity   documents,   however,   the   same
are being relied upon for corroborative purposes in all academic and
career  related transactions as foundational document.   In fact, the
CBSE   itself   has   conceded   to   this   fact   that   their   certificates   are
49  s upra at Footnote No.34
50   supra at Footnote No.36
89

relied for all official purposes, as noted above.   The date of birth in
matriculation   certificate,   in   particular,   is   relied   upon   as   primary
evidence   of   date   of   birth   of   a   citizen.     Therefore,   as   regards   the
information contained in a CBSE certificate, the Board must afford
opportunity   to   the   students   to   modify   it   subject   to   complying   with
requisite   formalities   which   are   reasonable   in   nature.     If   all   other
State agencies could allow it for the preservance of consistency and
accuracy, alongside being  enablers in free exercise of rights  by  the
citizens, there is no reason for the CBSE to not uphold that right of
the   students.     More   so,   it   would   be   in   the   interest   of   CBSE’s   own
credibility   that   their   records   are   regarded   as   accurate   and   latest
records   of   a   student   worthy   of   being   relied   upon   for   official
purposes.   Therefore,   this   approach   would   serve   twin   purposes   –
enabling free exercise of rights and preservance of accuracy.
138. We must, however, note that the justiciability of the requested
changes   can   of   course   be   gone   into.   Every   agency   has   its   own
method  of verification  while  accepting   or  rejecting   changes in  their
records.     For   instance,   some   agencies   use   sworn   affidavits   for
carrying  out  changes, some agencies require prior  permission  by  a
90

court   of   law.     The   CBSE   itself   uses   the   same   mechanism   –   prior
permission   by   court   of   law   and   publication   in   official   gazette.     We
may discuss the relevance of prior permission by court in deciding
the questions of justiciability and genuineness of requested changes
at a later stage.
139. Law gives no recognition to an act of shunning essential duties
by   an   entity   of   the   State.     There   is   a   settled   body   of   cases   which
expounds   that   a   body   entrusted   with   essential   public   functions
cannot   unduly   put   fetters   on   its   powers.     In   Indian   Aluminium
Company 51
, this Court noted the proposition thus:
“12. This case was followed by Russell. J. in York Corporation
v.   Henry   Leetham   &   Sons   Ltd. 52
.   There,   the   plaintiff­
corporation   was   entrusted   by   statute   with   the   control   of
navigation   in   part   of   the   rivers   Ouse   and   Fose   with   power   to
charge   such   tolls   within   limits,   as   the   corporation   deemed
necessary to carry on the two navigations in which the public
had an interest. The corporation made two contracts with the
defendants   under   which   they   agreed   to   accept,   in
consideration   of   the   right   to   navigate   the   Ouse,   a   regular
annual payment of £600 per annum in place of the authorised
tolls. The contract  in regard  to navigation  of the Fose was  on
similar lines. It was held by Russell, J. that the contracts were
ultra  vires and void because under  them  the  corporation had
disabled   itself,   whatever   emergency   might   arise,   from
exercising its statutory powers to increase tolls as from time to
time   might   be   necessary.   The   learned   Judge,   after   citing   Ayr
Harbour's   case 53
  and   another   case   Straffordshire   and
51 supra at Footnote No.6
52  ( 1924) 1 Ch 557
53 (1883) 8 App 623
91

Worcestershire   Canal   Navigation   v.   Birmingham   Canal
Navigation 54
 observed:
The   same   principle   underlies   many   other   cases
which   show   the   incapacity   of   a   body   charged   with
statutory   powers   for   public   purposes   to   divest   itself
of   such   powers   or   to   fetter   itself   in   the   use   of   such
powers.
13.   Finally   Lord   Parker,   C.J.   said   in   Southend­on­Sea
Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd. 55
:
There   is   a   long   line   of   cases   to   which   we   have   not
been   specifically   referred   which   lay   down   that   a
public   authority   cannot   by   contract   fetter   the
exercise of its discretion. ”
(emphasis supplied)
Similar proposition is enunciated in  J.K. Aggarwal 56
 In the context
of   CBSE,   the   Delhi   High   Court   in   Dhruva   Parate 57
  noted   how
CBSE   has   created   self­imposed   restrictions   in   its   Byelaws   by
permitting   no   change   of   name.   The   Court   deprecated   this   exercise
of discretion and noted thus:
“8.   The   interests   of   efficiency   of   an   organization   ordinarily
determine   the   guidelines   that   have   to   be   administered;   yet
when they constrain the authorities of the organization, which
is meant to sub­serve the general public, from doing justice, in
individual cases, the guidelines become self­defeating. In such
cases, as in the present one, the end result would mean that
the petitioner would be left with two certificates with different
names   and   a   whole   lifetime   spent   possibly   on   explaining   the
difference – hardly conducive to him, reflecting the inadequacy
in the system.”
54 1866 LR 1 HL 254
55 1961 2 All ER 46
56 supra at Footnote No.7 
57 supra at Footnote No.4
92

In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we   must   note   that   there   are   no
restrictions  on  the  power  of  CBSE  to  permit  change  of  name.    The
Constitution, Resolution and Regulations are functional documents
of   the   Board   and   none   of   these   documents   provide   for   any   such
fetters.  Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the Board cannot
put   fetters   on   its   duties   so   as   to   cause   grave   prejudice   to   the
students with legitimate causes for changing their certificates.   The
exercise   of   discretion   in   this   negative   manner   would   be   arbitrary
and unreasonable, at best.
140. We,   thus,   hold   that   the   provision   regarding   change   of   name
“post   publication   of   examination   results”   is   excessively   restrictive
and   imposes   unreasonable   restrictions   on   the   exercise   of   rights
under Article 19.   We make it clear that the provision for change of
name is clearly severable from those for corrections in name/date of
birth and therefore, our determination shall not affect them  except
as   regards   the   condition   of   limitation   period,   in   terms   of   the
aforesaid discussion and guidelines stated later.
93

141. Let   us   now   understand   the   journey   of   examination   byelaws
from   1995   to   2018,   as   they   sailed   through   multiple   amendments
over the course of time.
142. We may begin with Byelaws which were in force upto 2007 i.e.,
upto   the   2007   amendment.     Byelaw   69   dealt   with   “Changes   in
Board’s   Certificate”   wherein   Byelaw   69.1   covered   “Changes   and
Corrections in Name” and 69.2 covered “Change/Correction in Date
of   Birth”.     On   an   understanding   of   the   language   adopted   in   the
Byelaws, we must note at the very outset that the terms “correction”
and   “change”   are   not   used   interchangeably   in   the   Byelaws.
Whereas,   the   term   “correction”   denotes   spelling   errors,   factual
errors   or   typographical   errors   and   the   term   “change”   denotes   a
complete   change   of   name.     For   ready   reference,   a   summary   of   the
development of Examination Byelaws can be tabulated as follows:
CBSE EXAMINATION BYELAWS
Correction in 
candidate’s 
name Correction in 
names of 
candidate’s 
father/mother  Change of 
candidate’s 
name Change in 
names of 
candidate’s 
father/mother Change/correctio
n in candidate’s 
date of birth Time period
Before 2007 
Amendment Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record. Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record. Alteration/addit
ion/deletion 
permitted to 
make it different
from school 
record upon 
fulfilment of two
conditions – 
permission by 
court of law and
notification in 
government  Alteration/additio
n/deletion 
permitted to 
make it different 
from school 
record upon 
fulfilment of two 
conditions – 
permission by 
court of law and 
notification in 
government  No change in date 
of birth permitted. 
Only corrections 
permitted to make 
it consistent with 
school records. For correction in
name ­ No 
limitation.
For D.o.B. ­ within
2 years of 
declaration of 
result.
94

gazette. gazette.
Post 2007 
Amendment Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record. Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record. No change in 
name/surname 
permitted. No change in 
name/surname 
permitted. Same as before.
For name ­ within 
10 years of 
declaration of 
result.
For D.o.B. ­ same 
as before.
Post 2011 
Amendment  Same as 
before. Same as before. Can be 
considered on 
written request 
of 
candidate/fathe
r/mother duly 
forwarded by 
Head of the 
Institution. Can be 
considered on 
written request of
candidate/father
/mother duly 
forwarded by 
Head of the 
Institution. Same as before.
For change of 
name ­ within 10 
years of 
declaration of 
result.
Post 2015 
Amendment Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record 
but only within 
one year of 
result. Permitted to 
make it 
consistent with 
school record but
only within one 
year of result. Can be 
considered upon
fulfilment of two
prior conditions 
before 
publication of 
result of 
candidate  – 
permission by 
court of law and
gazette 
notification. No change in 
name of 
father/mother of 
candidate 
permissible. Same as before. 
Only time was 
reduced to one 
year after 
declaration of 
result. For correction of
name ­ within 1 
year of declaration
of result.
For D.o.B. ­ within
1 year of 
declaration of 
result.
Post 2018 
Amendment Same as before.
Time limit 
changed to five 
years after 
declaration of 
result. Same as before. 
Time limit 
changed to five 
years after 
declaration of 
result. Same as before. 
Caption made 
mandatory for 
showing the 
changed 
information in 
certificate. Change in name 
of father/mother 
permitted with 
same conditions 
as applicable in 
case of change of 
name of 
candidate. No change in date 
of birth permitted. 
Two categories of 
corrections 
permitted – as per 
school records and
as per court 
orders. For correction of
name ­ within 5 
years of 
declaration of 
result.
For D.o.B .­ within
5 years of 
declaration of 
result.
143. The   aforesaid   table   depicts   that   there   is   hardly   any
consistency   in   the   Examination   Byelaws   operating   during   the
relevant period, either in the scope of permissible changes or in the
timelines provided for effecting such changes.  Presumably, drawing
upon   experiences   and   judicial   pronouncements,   the   Board   had   to
carry  out frequent amendments in the Byelaws, sometimes to do a
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somersault   and   go   back   to   the   earlier   position.     By   and   large,   the
impression   gathered   from   the   above   tabular   analysis   is   that   the
Board has been groping in the dark without having  an all­purpose
long term objective policy in place as regards permissible changes.
EXAMINATION OF VALIDITY OF BYELAWS
144. At the outset, we note that there are certain characteristics of
changes   that   students   usually   apply   for   being   recorded   in   their
certificates.   Change   of   name   of   the   student/father/mother,
correction in name of the student/father/mother and correction in
date   of   birth   are   the   primary   ones.     All   these   changes   cannot   be
weighed   with   the   same   scale.   Even   in   the   Byelaws,   all   these
changes are not subjected to the same set of restrictions/conditions
and different changes are circumscribed by different conditions. 
145. The conditions regarding “correction” in name or date of birth
are not as stringent as conditions applicable to change thereof. For
correction in name, the 2018 Byelaws provide for a limitation period
of five years and permit such corrections that can be characterized
as   typographical,   factual   or   spelling   mistake   in   comparison   with
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school records.  Understandably, a correction would mean retention
of the original record with slight modification to make it consistent
with the school records.   This requirement of modification could be
born   out   of   various   reasons,   namely   typographical   mistake   at   the
time of publishing, spelling error or factual error i.e., an error of fact
as it existed at the time when the certificate was published.   Thus,
correction   in   name   is   done   to   bring   unanimity   between   the   school
records   (as   they   existed   at   the   time   of   sending   information   to   the
Board)   and   CBSE   certificates.       However,   if   school   records   are
altered afterwards  and Board is called upon  to alter   its certificates
in   light   of  the  updated  school  records,  the  same cannot   be  termed
as correction  per se  but would be in the nature of recording change.
Therefore,   substantially   deviating   from   a   “correction”,   the   Byelaws
provide   for   an   option   to   “change”   the   name,   which   is   subject   to
different conditions.
146. Similar   provision   is   available   for   “correction”   in   date   of   birth,
either   on   the   basis   of   school   records   or   on   the   basis   of   order   of
court.     The   word   “change”   is   not   used   for   date   of   birth   as,   unlike
name, there can only  be one date of birth and there can only  be a
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correction   to   make   it   consistent   with   school   record   or   order   of
Court.   It cannot be changed to replace the former with a fresh date
of   one’s   choice.       Be   it   noted,   provisions   relating   to   correction   in
date of birth and name are just and reasonable and do not impose
any   unreasonable   restriction   on   permissibility   of   corrections.     The
restriction regarding limitation period shall be examined later, along
with other provisions.  
147. The   provision   for   “change”   of   name   is   far   more   stringent   and
calls for a thorough review to settle the correct position. As per the
present   law,   change   of   name   is   permissible   upon   fulfilment   of   two
prior   conditions   –   prior   permission   of   the   Court   of   law   and
publication   of   the   proposed   change   in   official   gazette.   These
conditions   co­exist   with   another   condition   predicating   that   both
prior   permission   and   publication   must   be   done   before   the
publication of result .   What it effectively means is that change of
name would simply be impermissible after the publication of result
of the candidate even if the same is permitted by a Court of law and
published in official gazette.   In other words, once the examination
result   of   the   candidate   has   been   published,   the   Board   would   only
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permit   corrections   in   name   mentioned   in   the   certificate.     Further,
changing the name out of freewill is simply ruled out.
148. Notably,   the   cases   before   us   pertain   to   different   periods.     As
aforesaid,   the   CBSE   byelaws   which   existed   prior   to   2007   were
different.   The summary of the journey of the examination byelaws
from   2007   till   2018   has   been   tabulated   hitherto.     The   distinction
between   “correction”   and   “change”   was   always   well­demarcated
including   prior   to   2007.     As   regards   the   correction   which   could
mean   to   carry   out   modification   to   make   it   consistent   with   school
record   but   when   it   came   to   request   for   change   of   name   of   the
candidate   or   his   parents,   that   could   be   done   only   after   complying
with   the   pre­conditions   specified   therefor.     However,   when   it   came
to change in the date of birth that was completely prohibited.  Only
correction   regarding   date   of   birth   was   permitted   to   be   made
consistent  with  the school  record.   And  for  which  limitation  of two
years  from  declaration   of  result  was  specified.   The  requirement  of
two   years   cannot   be   considered   as   unreasonable   restriction.     The
candidate   and   his   parents   are   expected   to   be   vigilant   and   to   take
remedial   measures   immediately   after   declaration   of   result   of   the
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candidate.    That  too  for  being  made  consistent  with  school   record.
The   Board   must   follow   the   discipline   of   continuation   of   entries   in
the   school   record   as   it   is   vital   for   pursuing   further   and   higher
education   including   career   opportunities   by   the   candidate.
Significantly, the position as obtained prior to 2007 did not provide
for any time limit within which correction of candidate’s name or of
his   parents   was   to   be   pursued.     These   restrictions   are   certainly
reasonable restrictions while recognising  the  enabling  power  of  the
Board   to   alter   its   record   in   the   form   of   certificates   issued   to   the
candidate   concerned  to   make  it  consistent   with   the  school   records
or otherwise.
149. Suffice it to observe that frequent amendments in the Byelaws
have   been   made   providing   for   different   dispensations   for   the
relevant period.   For  the  nature  of final  directions that  we propose
to   issue,   it   may   not   be   necessary   to   dilate   on   the   validity   of   the
concerned Byelaw as amended from time to time.  Broadly, it can be
noted that the Byelaw recognises two different dispensations.   First
is to carry out modifications in the original certificate on request for
making it consistent with the school records of the incumbent.  The
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second is to incorporate particulars in the original certificate which
are different from the school records.  
150. Indisputably,   the   candidate   would   pursue   further   education
and   explore   future   career   opportunities   on   the   basis   of   school
records including the CBSE Board.  The CBSE maintains its official
records   in   respect   of   candidate   on   the   basis   of   foundational
documents   being   the   school   records.     Therefore,   the   CBSE   is
obliged  to   carry   out   all   necessary   corrections  to   ensure  that  CBSE
certificate   is   consistent   with   the   relevant   information   furnished   in
the   school   records   as   it   existed   at   the   relevant   time   and   future
changes   thereto   including   after   the   publication   of   results   by   the
CBSE.  However, when it comes to recording any information in the
original certificate issued by the CBSE which is not consistent with
the   school   records,   it   is   essential   that   the   CBSE   must   insist   for
supporting   public   document   which   has   presumptive   value   and   in
the   given   case  declaration   by   a  Court  of   law   to  incorporate  such   a
change.     In   that   regard,   the   CBSE   can   insist   for   additional
conditions  to   reassure   itself   and   safeguard   its   interest   against   any
claim  by  a third  party/body  because of  changes incorporated by  it
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pursuant to application made by the candidate.   In the concluding
paragraph, we intend to issue directions to the CBSE Board in light
of   the   discussion   in   this   judgment.     For   the   nature   of   uniform
directions that we propose to issue so as to obviate any inconsistent
approach in the cases under consideration including future cases to
be dealt with by the CBSE Board, it is not necessary for us to dilate
on   the   question   of   validity   of   the   respective   amendments   in   the
relevant Byelaws effected from time to time.
Point No. 3
BINDING VALUE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
151. Whether   CBSE   is   obliged   to   effect   changes   in   the   certificates
issued   by   it   upon   production   of   updated   public   documents   (other
than school records), is the next issue for consideration.  According
to the Board, it would not be permissible as it has no independent
mechanism   to   verify   the   genuineness   of   the   public   documents.
Even   under   the   Byelaws,   there   is   no   requirement   for   the   Board   to
verify the genuineness of the documents.  It is simply not the job of
the Board.   
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152. The   Byelaws   provide   for   a   two­tier   mechanism   for   recording
change of name or other details (as indicated above).   One of them
is prior permission or declaration by a Court of law to be obtained.
As regards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette,
Aadhaar   Card,   Election   Card,   etc.,   the   same   enjoy   legal
presumption   of   its   correctness   in   terms   of   explicit   provisions
contained in Chapter V of the 1872 Act.  The 1872 Act extends such
presumption in terms of Section 76 read with Sections 79 and 80 of
the 1872 Act and as in the case of Official Gazette under Section 81
of   the   same   Act.     Even   other   legislations   concerning   public
documents   attach   equal   importance   to   the   authenticity   of   such
documents   including   while   making   changes   in   their   certificates   to
which we have alluded to in this judgment.  Understood thus, there
is   no   reason   for   the   CBSE   Board   to   not   take   notice   of   the   public
documents   relied   upon   by   the   candidate   and   to   record   change   on
that   basis   in   the   certificate   issued   by   it,   for   being   consistent   with
the relied upon public documents.  It matters not   if the information
furnished   in   the   public   documents   is   not   entirely   consistent   with
the   school   records   of   the   incumbent.     The   CBSE   while   accepting
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those   documents   as   foundational   documents   for   effecting   changes
consistent therewith may insist for additional conditions and at the
same time while retaining the original entry make note in the form
of caption/annotation in the fresh certificate to be issued by it while
calling   upon   the   incumbent   to   surrender   the   original   certificate
issued by it to avoid any misuse thereof at a later point of time.   It
would be permissible for the CBSE to insist for a sworn affidavit to
be   given   by   the   incumbent   making   necessary   declaration   and   also
to   indemnify   the   CBSE.     The   fresh   certificate   to   be   issued   by   the
CBSE may  also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly  mentioning
that   change   has   been   effected   at   the   behest   of   the   incumbent   in
light of the public documents relied upon by him.   In addition, the
incumbent   can   be   called   upon   to   notify   about   the   change   in   the
Official   Gazette   and   by   giving   public   notice   as   precondition   for
recording the change by way of abundant precaution.
153. This   Court   in   CIDCO   vs.   Vasudha   Gorakhnath
Mandevlekar 58
,   has   observed   that   the   records   maintained   by
statutory   authorities   have   a   presumption   of   correctness   in   their
58 (2009) 7 SCC 283
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favour   and   they   would   prevail   over   any   entry   made   in   the   school
register. The Court observed thus:
“18.   The   deaths   and   births   register   maintained   by   the
statutory   authorities   raises   a   presumption   of   correctness.
Such entries made in the statutory registers are admissible in
evidence  in  terms  of  Section   35   of  the  Evidence   Act.   It   would
prevail over an entry made in the school register, particularly,
in   absence   of   any   proof   that   same   was   recorded   at   the
instance   of   the   guardian   of   the   respondent.   (See   Birad   Mal
Singhvi v. Anand Purohit 59
.)”
The same position of law can be extended to the mandate laid down
in   Right   to   Education   Act   and   Chapter­3   of   the   CBSE   Byelaws
relating   to   admission   of   students.   Byelaw   6.1   is   instructive   and
relevant extract thereof reads thus:
“6. Admission: General Conditions:
6.1  (a) A student seeking admission to any class in a ‘School’
will be eligible for admission to that Class only if he:
....
....
(iv) produces:
  ...
(c)   For   the   purposes   of   admission   to   elementary
education,   the   age   of   a   child   shall   be   determined   on   the
basis of the birth certificate issued in accordance with the
provisions   of   the   Births,   Deaths   and       Marriages
Registration   Act,   1886   or   on   the   basis   of   such   other
document, as may be prescribed, as stipulated in section
14(1)   of   THE   RIGHT   OF   CHILDREN   TO   FREE   AND
COMPULSORY EDUCATION ACT, 2009.
(d) No child shall be denied admission in a school for lack
of age proof, as stipulated in section 14(2) of THE RIGHT
OF   CHILDREN   TO   FREE   AND   COMPULSORY
EDUCATION ACT, 2009.”
59 AIR 1988 SC 1796
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Therefore,   even   at   elementary   education   level,   there   is   a   clear
legislative   intent   to   rely   on   statutory   Birth   Certificates   for   the
purpose of date of birth. The authoritative value of these certificates
is duly affirmed in this scheme.
154. There   is   no   difficulty   in   correcting   CBSE   record   to   bring   it   in
conformity   with   the   school   record.   The   difficulty   arises   when   a
statutory   document   is   not   consistent   with   the   school   record.   As
observed   earlier,   the   version   supported   by   statutory   documents
could be reckoned for the purpose of correction in CBSE certificate
to make it consistent with public documents.
155. Post   2018   amendment   of   Byelaws,   even   in   case   of   date   of
birth,   corrections   are   permitted   on   two   basis   –   to   bring   in
conformity   with   school   records   and   in   pursuance   of   court   order.
The relevant provision reads thus:
“ A. “Correction as per the school records:
i.   Corrections   to   correct   typographical   and   other   errors   to
make the certificate consistent with the school records can be
made   provided   that   corrections   in   the   school   records   should
not   have   been   made   after   the  submission   of   application   form
for admission to Examination to the Board.
...
...
106

B. Correction as per Court Orders.
Applications regarding correction in date of birth of candidates
will be considered provided the correction have been admitted
by  the  Court  of law.   In   cases  of   correction   in   date   of   birth
in   documents   after   the   court   orders   caption   will   be
mentioned   on   the   document   “CORRECTION   ALLOWED   IN
DATE OF BIRTH FROM _______ TO ___ ON (DATED) ____ AS
PER COURT ORDER NO. ____ DATED ____. ”
156. When a student applies to a Court of law for prior permission
and/or   declaration   and   produces   public   document(s),   the   Court
would  enter  upon  an  inquiry  wherein  the   legal  presumption  would
operate in favour of the public document(s) and burden would shift
on   the   party   opposing   the   change   to   rebut   the   presumption   or
oppose   the   claim   on   any   other   ground.     The   question   of
genuineness   of   the   document   including   its   contents   would   be
adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of law would permit
the desired change only upon verifying the official records and upon
being satisfied of its genuineness.  At the same time, the question of
justiciability of the requested changes would be considered and only
upon   being   satisfied   with   the   need   demonstrated   by   the   student,
the   Court   would   grant   its   permission.     The   said   permission   can
then   be   placed   before   the   Board   along   with   copy   of   publication   in
the official gazette and requisite (prescribed) fee (if any).  The Board
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would   then   have   no   locus   to   make   further   enquiry   nor   would   be
required to enter upon any further verification exercise.
157. We may now advert to the dictum of the Kerala High Court in
Subin   Mohammed 60
.     The   same   has   been   relied   upon   in   most   of
the   impugned   judgments   for   permitting   corrections.   In   that
decision, the Court discussed the inadequacies in the Byelaws and
issued directions to CBSE to correct date of birth with reference to
statutory   Birth   Certificates   provided   the   request   is   found   to   be
genuine.  The operative directions read thus:
“41. Hence,  to  meet   the  ends  of  justice,  it  will be appropriate
for   this  Court   to  dispose  the  Writ   Petitions  with  the   following
directions:
(i)   That   CBSE   shall   correct   the   entries   in   the   mark
sheet   of   the   petitioners   with   reference   to   their
corresponding   birth   certificates   issued   by   the
statutory   authority,   if   the   request   is   found   to   be
genuine.
(ii) Genuineness of the birth certificate can be ascertained
from  the respective local/statutory authority/Head of the
Institution or such other method, CBSE may deem it fit.
(iii)   CBSE   can   demand   in   advance   a   consolidated   fee,
including all expenses for processing such applications.
(iv)   Each   of   the   petitioners   shall   pay   ₹   5,000/­   (Rupees
Five   thousand   only)   as   cost   to   CBSE   within   a   period   of
one month.”
(emphasis supplied)
60 supra at Footnote No.12
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Thus, the task of determining genuineness of the request was left to
the CBSE, which not only goes contrary to our discussion above but
also   fails   to   take   into   account   the   limitations   of   CBSE   as   a   body.
While considering requests for changes in certificates, CBSE cannot
act   as   a   court   and   it   cannot   effectively   consider   any   request   over
and   above   those   requests   that   merely   require   bringing   the
certificates   in   conformity   with   the   school   records   or   public
documents, as the case may be.
Point No. 4
158. As   noticed   in   the   submissions   above,   there   is   a   conflict   of
opinion amongst the High Courts as regards the point of time which
would   determine   the   applicability   of   Byelaws.   The   frequent
amendments   carried   out   by   the   CBSE   had   made   it   imperative   for
the courts to grapple with this question. The immediate question is
whether   the   date   of   declaration   of   result  or   the   date  of  application
for changes would be determinative of the applicable Byelaws. While
addressing   this   question,   the   Delhi   High   Court   in   Kalpana
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Thakur 61
  took   the   view   that   the   Byelaws   existing   on   the   date   of
application   would  apply,  irrespective  of   amendment.   This   view   can
be discerned from the following paragraphs of the judgment:
“12.2 In my view, the submission of Mr. Bansal that amended
Bye­laws 69.1(i) would apply, is untenable, for a simple reason
that   the   amendment   to  the   said   bye­law   was   notified  only   on
25.06.2015;   a   date   which   falls   beyond   the   date   on   which   the
application   for   change   of   name   was   preferred   in   the   instant
case.   The   argument   advanced   in   support   of   this   submission
by  Mr.  Bansal  that   the  Office  Order  was  in  place   prior   to  the
date   of   the   application,   in   my   view,   will   not   sustain,   as   the
Office   Order,   is   an   internal   document,   which   could   have   no
legal   validity   till   the   position   taken   therein   is   put   in   public
realm.   The   very   fact   that   a   notification   in   respect   of   the
amended   Bye­law   was   issued   by   respondent   no.   1/CBSE,
would   show,   that   the   decision   to   amend   bye­law   69.1(i)
required a public notice.
12.3 Consequently, all applications for change of name which
are   filed   prior   to   notification   dated   25.06.2015,   will   be
governed,   in   my   view,   by   the   unamended   Bye­law   69.1(i).
Therefore, quite logically, the petitioners, in my opinion, would
have to be given the reliefs as sought in the writ petition.”
Notably, the question before the Court was slightly different. It was
only   whether   the   unamended   Byelaws   would   continue   to   apply   if
the   application   was   preferred   before   the   date   of   amendment.
Nevertheless,   the   Kerala   High   Court   in   Vyshnav 62
  has   taken   a
different view of the matter and observed that the Byelaws existing
on the date of passing out would apply. It observed thus:
61   supra at Footnote No. 26
62   supra at Footnote No. 27
110

“5. On an analysis of the said rule and amended provision it is
evident   that,   the   first   respondent   relied   on   an   incorrect
provision   in   order   to   non­suit   the   petitioner   by   rejecting   the
applications submitted for change of name. Therefore, Exts.P7
and   P9   cannot   be   sustained   under   law,   since   the   same   is
violative   of   the   rule   provided   for   the   purpose.   Petitioner   has
passed out in the year 2013 and therefore, the law as it stood
then   has   to   be   taken   in   to   account,   since   there   is   no
retrospective   operation   to   the   amendment.   Therefore,   I   quash
Exts.P7 and P9, and direct the first respondent to re­consider
the   application   submitted   by   the   petitioner   based   on   Rule
69(1(i), as it stood before as is specified above.”
159. Considered   in   the   context   of   the   Byelaws,   the   controversy   is
actually   simple   in   nature.     The   Byelaws   consistently   provide   that
the   period   of   limitation   is   to   be   calculated   from   the   date   of
declaration   of   the   result   and   issue   of   certificate.   It   means   that   the
period   of   limitation   begins   to   run   against   the   student   after
declaration of result and publication of certificates as the student is
put to notice of the contents of the document, upon its issue.   The
student can now be said to be in a position to verify the correctness
of the certificate(s).  The irresistible outcome of this legal position is
that   the   Byelaws   existing   on   the   date   of   such
declaration/publication   of   result   and   issue   of   certificate   would   be
relevant for the purpose of effecting changes in the certificates.  The
express   language   of   the   Byelaws   would   be   defeated   if   we   say   that
111

the   law   existing   on   the   date   of   application   for   recording   change
would   be   relevant.     That   would   negate   the   very   importance   of
having a period of limitation for correction of the certificates.
160. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to be reckoned
from the date of application for correction/change and not the date
of   result   of   the   examination   conducted   by   CBSE,   we   would   be
leaving  things  to   a   state  of   uncertainty.    For,  a   student   who   could
possibly   have   surpassed   the   limitation   period   under   unamended
Byelaws   would   regain   the   right   to   change   the   certificates   if   the
Byelaws   existing   on   the   date   of   application   permit   so   and   provide
for   a   longer   period.     Similarly,   a   student   who   had   ten   years   for
carrying out changes under the unamended Byelaws would lose her
right   if   Byelaws   are   amended   within   the   ten­year   period   so   as   to
provide   for   a   much   shorter,   say   two   years,   limitation   period.
Certainty,   consistency   and   predictability   are   the   hallmarks   of   any
legal relationship and it is in the interest of public policy that legal
interpretation   preserves   and   protects   these   hallmarks.     This
determination, however, is only to state the legal position and may
not have any immediate bearing on the cases before us.
112

161. The CBSE also advanced an argument that no changes can be
permitted   in   its   records   as   there   is   no   fundamental   right   to   claim
that changed records be operative since birth and any change must
only   be   prospective   and   not   retrospective.     The   crux   of   the
argument   can   be   traced   from   paragraph   23   of   Rayaan   Chawla 63
which   has   been   relied   upon   to   buttress   this   submission.   It   reads
thus:
“23.   The   legal   position   that   would   follow   from   the   above
conspectus   of   the   judgments   noted   and   cited   by   the   learned
Counsel for the parties is that normally a person would have a
right   to   have   his   name   changed   subject   to   fulfilment   of
appropriate   formalities/procedures   to   ensure   that   there   is   no
misuse   or   confusion   created   on   account   of   the   change   in
name. The change of name is prospective. ...”
Though   a   well­meaning   argument   advanced   to   minimise   the
possibility of misuse, we are not inclined to accept it as something
that   could   turn   the   case.     The   court,   in   Rayaan   Chawla 64
,
accepted   that   expression   of   one’s   name   in   the   manner   of   their
choice is indeed a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), but held
that   the   right   is   prospective   and   does   not   extend   to   permitting
changes   in   the   documents   already   issued   by   the   Board.     It   is
pertinent to note that once changes are permitted in the documents
63 supra at Footnote No.8
64 supra at Footnote No.8
113

of   CBSE,   it   does   not   ipso   facto   mean   that   the   changes   are   given   a
retrospective   effect.   The   changes   are   indeed   prospective   and   to
signify   that   a   remedial   measure   is   provided   in   the   Byelaws,   as
existing   presently.     They   provide   for   the   requirement   of   adding   a
caption/annotation   with   the   date   of   such   change   along   with   the
changed particulars so as to indicate within the certificate that the
changes   have   been   made   on   a   date   subsequent   to   the   date   of
publishing the certificates.   The requirement of caption/annotation
is   indeed   a   sufficient   safeguard   to   prevent   the   usage   of
subsequently altered documents as unchanged original records.  
Point No. 5
ISSUANCE OF MANDAMUS IN CONTRAVENTION OF BYELAWS
162.  The next issue for consideration is whether it is proper for the
High   Courts   to   issue   mandamus   to   the   CBSE   for   correction   of
certificates   in   complete   contravention   of   the   Byelaws,   without
examining the validity of the Byelaws.   For issuing such directions,
reliance   has   been   placed   upon   Subin   Mohammed 65
,   wherein   the
65 supra at Footnote No.12
114

Court   noted   that   the   case   does   not   involve   correction   of   a
typographical nature, as permissible in the Byelaws, but went on to
uphold the right of the student to apply for changes on the basis of
statutory certificate. It observed thus:
“35.   Therefore,   we   have   to   proceed   on   the   basis   that   the   bye
law   of   CBSE   cannot   be   applied   to   the   fact   situation.   But   to
reconcile the date of birth entry in the mark sheet with that of
the   entry   in   the   statutory   certificate,   the   candidates   should
not   be   left   without   any   remedy.   Their   right   to   approach   the
Court for redressing their grievance cannot be ruled out.”
The   court   then   delineated   the   principles   for   issuance   of   writ   of
mandamus and noted that in the strict sense, a mandamus would
not   lie   but   considering   the   damage   that   the   student   could   face   as
regards   his   career   prospects,   the   permission   was   granted.   In
paragraph 39, it noted thus:
“39. It is contended that the future prospects of the petitioners
to   study   or   get   employment   abroad,   will   be   substantially
affected if the entry of date of birth in the mark sheet does not
tally   with   that   in   the   birth   certificate.   Though   a   writ   of
mandamus cannot be issued in the strict sense, we are of
the view that, failure to exercise jurisdiction may put the
petitioners  to  serious hardship.  Hence,  to render  justice,
it   is   always   open   for   the   Court   to   pass   appropriate
orders,   taking  into  account   the  facts  and   circumstances
of each case.   However, if disputed questions of fact arises, it
will not be appropriate for this Court to entertain the matter.”
(emphasis supplied)
115

The   law   regarding   the   writ   of   mandamus   is   settled.   The   foremost
requirement   for   issuance   of   mandamus   is   the   existence   of   a   legal
right  against   a   body   which   is  either   a   public   body   or   a  non­public
body   performing   a   public   function.   In   Binny   Ltd. 66
,   this   Court
summed up the principle thus:
“29.   Thus,   it   can   be   seen   that   a   writ   of   mandamus   or   the
remedy   under   Article   226   is   pre­eminently   a   public   law
remedy   and   is   not   generally   available   as   a   remedy   against
private wrongs. It  is used for  enforcement  of various rights of
the   public   or   to   compel   public/statutory   authorities   to
discharge   their   duties   and   to   act   within   their   bounds.   It   may
be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power
or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped
to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This
writ   could  also  be  issued  against   any   private body   or  person,
specially   in   view   of   the   words   used   in   Article   226   of   the
Constitution.     However,   the   scope   of   mandamus   is   limited   to
enforcement   of   public   duty.   The   scope   of   mandamus   is
determined   by   the   nature   of   the   duty   to   be   enforced,   rather
than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If
the   private   body   is   discharging   a   public   function   and   the
denial   of   any   right   is   in   connection   with   the   public   duty
imposed   on   such   body,   the   public   law   remedy   can   be
enforced.   The   duty   cast   on   the   public   body   may   be   either
statutory   or   otherwise   and   the   source   of   such   power   is
immaterial,   but,   nevertheless,   there   must   be   the   public   law
element in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish
between   public   law   and   private   law   remedies.   According   to
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682,
“1317.   A   public   authority   is   a   body,   not   necessarily   a
county   council,   municipal   corporation   or   other   local
authority, which has public or statutory duties to perform
and   which   perform   those   duties   and   carries   out   its
transactions   for   the   benefit   of   the   public   and   not   for
private profit.”
66 supra at Footnote No.32
116

There   cannot   be   any   general   definition   of   public   authority   or
public action. The facts of each case decide the point.”
In   the   present   case,   the   question   is   not   whether   CBSE   was
amenable   to   writ   of   mandamus   or   not.     For,   we   have   already   held
the Board being a public body is performing a public function.  The
question is whether there was an enforceable legal right in favour of
students   to   seek   such   a   direction   and   whether   Byelaws   have   the
force   of   law   and   directions   can   be   issued   by   the   court   only   in
conformity thereof.
163. The   impugned   judgments   categorically   note   that   the   request
for changes could not be permitted as per the Byelaws.  Thus, there
was no demonstration or inquiry  to determine the existence of any
legal   right   in   favour   of   students.     Even   if   we   assume   that   courts
issued directions purely on the basis of fundamental rights, there is
no   discussion   or   inquiry   in   this   regard.     More   so,   there   is   no
attempt to examine the  vires  of the Byelaws in light of the breach of
fundamental   rights,   as   discussed   in   the   initial   part   of   this
judgment.     Absent   any   such   adverse   determination   on   the   validity
of   the   applicable   rules,   the   fundamental   principle   of   rule   of   law
demands   that   such   rules   be   given   their   intended   effect.     Even   if   a
117

constitutional   Court   feels   that   the   case   at   hand   is   deserving   of   an
extraordinary   remedy,   it   may   do   so   using   its   wide   powers   under
Article 226 but only upon specific appraisal of the facts of the case
and   after   duly   demonstrating   the   extraordinary   character   of   the
case.  Despite holding that the prayers are impermissible under the
Byelaws,   the   Courts   in   the   present   set   of   cases   went   on   to   issue
directions   to   the   Board   without   having   any   regard   to   the   factual
circumstances of the case or to the nature of changes sought by the
students,   by   mechanically   relying   upon   the   dictum   in   Subin
Mohammed 67
.     We   must   note   that   Subin   Mohammed 68
  is   not   in
challenge   before   us   but   must   be   now   understood   in   terms   of
opinion recorded in this judgment.  Our concern is with the manner
in   which   mechanical   reliance   has   been   placed   upon   the   earlier
decision   for   deciding   cases   which   involved   an   altogether   different
set of changes.
164. Once   a   Court   of   law   notes   that   the   applicable   rules   do   not
permit it to grant a particular relief and it still goes on to grant the
relief   on   sympathetic   grounds,   such   decisions   can   in   no   way   be
67 supra at Footnote No.12
68 supra at Footnote No.12
118

treated   as   precedents.     We   are   constrained   to   note   that   following
such   decision   as   precedent   will   be   in   utter   disregard   of   the   well­
established principle of   “equity acts in personam”   and, thus, courts
cannot   deploy   equity   in   “rem”   by   replicating   the   same   order,
disregarding the personal characteristics of the case at hand.  There
can   be   no   application   of   Subin   Mohammed 69
  to   a   different   set   of
facts. 
165. The High Courts, being constitutional Courts, are duly vested
with the power to review any law in light of Part­III.   Despite being
called upon to do so, if they choose not to do it, the same cannot be
countenanced.     There   cannot   be   mechanical   directions   by   way   of
mandamus   to   a   public   authority   without   going  into   the   veracity  of
the   claims   and   without   sufficiently   explaining   why   the   case
demands extraordinary treatment.
166. In   fact,   in   Md.   Sarifuz   Zaman 70
,   a   two­Judge   Bench   of   this
Court noted that such exercise of power in itself would be arbitrary.
It observed thus:
69 supra at Footnote No.12
70 supra at Footnote No.16
119

“10.   ... People,   institutions   and   government   departments,
etc.   —   all   attach   a   very   high   degree   of   reliability,   near
finality, to the entries made in the certificates issued by
the   Board.   The   frequent   exercise   of   power   to   correct
entries   in   certificates   and   that   too   without   any
limitation   on   exercise   of   such   power   would   render   the
power   itself   arbitrary   and   may   result   in   eroding   the
credibility   of   certificates   issued   by   the   Board.   We,
therefore,   find   it   difficult   to   uphold   the   contention   that   the
applicants   seeking   correction   of   entries   in   such   certificates
have any such right or vested right.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus,   the   Courts   need   to   be   extra   cautious   and   alive   to   the
immediate   factual   position   before   permitting   changes.   No   two
requests   for   change   of   name   or   change   in   date   of   birth   can   be
viewed   with   the   same   judicial   eye.   Sometimes,   change   of   name
could   be   a   necessity,   sometimes   it   could   be   a   pure   exercise   of
freewill   without   any   need.     As   long   as   Byelaws   or   the   applicable
rules   permit   so,   there   is   no   occasion   for   any   court   to   deny   such
relief.     But   when   Byelaws   do   not   permit   for   the   same,   the   Court
must   be   circumspect   before   issuing   directions,   that   too   without
commenting   upon   the   validity   of   the   Byelaws   and   without
demonstrating   the   rights   which   are   at   stake   –   constitutional   or
legal.
120

167. Before   proceeding   further,   we   must   briefly   note   that   the
dictum of this Court in  Md. Sarifuz Zaman 71
 has been relied upon
by   the   Board   to   contend   that   it   prohibits   any   change   in
contravention of the Byelaws as it does not recognize any legal right
to claim such changes beyond the prescribed conditions. It has also
been asserted that   Md. Sarifuz Zaman 72
  and  Subin Mohammed 73
contradict   each   other.     Whether   the   two   judgments   are   in   conflict
with   each   other   is   an   examination   that   is   not   called   for.     For,   we
have not placed any reliance upon  Subin Mohammed 74
 for deciding
this case and also because   Md. Sarifuz Zaman 75
  is a judgment of
this   Court   as   against   Subin   Mohammed 76
  is   a   judgment   of   the
Kerala   High   Court.   It   requires   no   reiteration   that   even   if   a   conflict
exists,   the   judgment   of   this   Court   must   prevail   under   all
circumstances unless there is another judgment of larger Bench of
this Court which takes a different view.
71 supra at Footnote No.16
72 supra at Footnote No.16
73 supra at Footnote No.12
74 supra at Footnote No.12
75 supra at Footnote No.16
76 supra at Footnote No.12
121

168. Be that as it may, we must examine the dictum of this Court
in   Md.   Sarifuz   Zaman 77
.     The   case   involved   a   request   for
correction of clerical nature in date of birth to bring it in conformity
with the correct school records. Paragraph 3 notes thus:  
“3.   One   of   the   respondents,   a   student,   having   taken   his
education   in   Government   Boys   Higher   Secondary   School,
passed the matriculation examination conducted by the Board
of Secondary Education, Assam, in the year 1991. Thereafter,
he   passed   higher   secondary   examination   and   then   BSc
examination in the year 1998. When he filed the writ petition,
he   was   undergoing   a   course   of   study   in   computers.   At   that
point of time, on 12­10­1999, he moved an application to the
Board   complaining   that   his   date   of   birth   was   wrongly
mentioned   in   the   school   records   as   30­5­1974,   while   his
actual   date   of   birth   was   16­8­1975.   The   mistaken   date   of
birth,   as   forwarded   by   the   school,   had   crept   into   the   admit
card issued by the Board. The writ petitioner student pleaded
that   he   did   not   realise   the   importance   of   the   correct   date   of
birth  being  entered  into  the  school  records,  and  therefore,  he
did   not   also   realise   the   implications   thereof   until   he   was
prompted in moving the application. The application moved by
the   respondent   to   the   Principal   of   the   school,   was   forwarded
by the latter to the Board. The Principal indicated that the age
of the respondent was entered as 16­8­1975 in the admission
register   and   other   school   records,   but   it   was   by   mistake   that
while   filling   the   form   of   the   Board   examination,   the   date   of
birth   was   wrongly   entered   as   30­5­1974.   The   Principal
described   the   mistake   as   “clerical”   and   recommended   for   its
correction.   As   the   Board   did   not   take   any   decision   on   the
application,   the   respondent   filed   a   writ   petition   in   the   High
Court.”
The   Court   was   considering   the   Regulations   framed   under   the
Assam   Secondary   Education   Act,   1961   which   provided   for   a   three
77 supra at Footnote No.16
122

years’  period  post   the   declaration  of   result   for   effecting   corrections
in   their   certificates.   The   student   approached   the   Board   after   the
expiry   of   three   years   and   thus,   the   primary   question   before   the
Court   was   only   whether   the   three   years’   period   would   be   enforced
as   per   Regulations   or   any   relaxation   could   be   given.   The   Court
refused to give any relaxation stating that expiry of limitation would
extinguish the remedy. In paragraph 12, it notes thus:
“12.   Delay   defeats   discretion   and   loss   of   limitation   destroys
the remedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit
of   discretionary   power   being   denied   on   principles   of   equity.
Loss   of   limitation   resulting   into   depriving   of   the   remedy,   is   a
principle   based   on   public   policy   and   utility   and   not   equity
alone.   There   ought   to   be   a   limit   of   time   by   which   human
affairs   stand   settled   and   uncertainty   is   lost.   Regulation   8
confers a right on the applicant and a power coupled with an
obligation on the Board to make correction in the date of birth
subject   to   the   ground   of   wrong   calculation   or   clerical   error
being   made  out.  A  reasonable  procedure   has   been  prescribed
for   processing   the   application   through   the   Inspector   of
Schools   who   would   verify   the   school   records   and   submit
report   to   the   Board   so   as   to   exclude   from   consideration   the
claims   other   than   those   permissible   within   the   framework   of
Regulation 8. Power to pass order for correction is vested on a
high   functionary   like   Secretary   of   the   Board.   An   inaccuracy
creeping in at the stage of writing the certificates only, though
all other prior documents are correct in all respects, is capable
of being corrected within a period of three years from the date
of issuance of certificate.”
It, then, held the three years’ period to be a reasonable time as it is
sufficient   time   for   a   student   to   notice   any   error   in   her   certificates.
Paragraph 13 notes thus:
123

“13.   Three­year   period   provided   by   the   Regulation,   is   a   very
reasonable   period.   On   the   very   date   of   issuance   of   the
certificate,   the   student   concerned   is   put   to   notice   as   to   the
entries   made   in   the   certificate.   Everyone   remembers   his   age
and   date   of   birth.   The   student   would   realise   within   no   time
that   the   date   of   birth   as   entered   in   the   certificate   is   not
correct,   if   that   be   so,   once   the   certificate   is   placed   in   his
hands.   Based   on   the   certificate   the   applicant   would   seek
admission   elsewhere   in   an   educational   institution   or   might
seek a job or career where he will have to mention his age and
date of birth. Even if he failed to notice the error on the date of
issuance   of   the   certificate,   he   would   come   to   know   the   same
shortly   thereafter.   Thus,   the   period   of   three   years,   as
prescribed   by   Regulation   3,   is   quite   reasonable.   It   is   not
something   like   prescribing   a   period   of   limitation   for
filing   a   suit.   The   prescription   of   three   years   is   laying
down   of   a   dividing   line   before   which   the   power   of   the
Board to make correction ought to be invoked and beyond
which it may not be invoked.  Belated applications, if allowed
to be received, may open a Pandora's box. Records may not be
available   and   evidence   may   have   been   lost.   Such   evidence   —
even convenient  evidence — may be brought into existence as
may   defy   scrutiny.   The   prescription   of   three   years'   bar   takes
care of all such situations.  The  provision is  neither  illegal  nor
beyond the purview of Section 24 of the Act and also cannot be
called   arbitrary   or   unreasonable.   The   applicants   seeking
rectification   within   a   period   of   three   years   form   a   class   by
themselves and such prescription has a reasonable nexus with
the   purpose   sought   to   be   achieved.   No   fault   can   be   found
therewith on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
It  can  be  noticed  that   apart  from   a  wholly  different  factual  matrix,
the Court in   Md. Sarifuz Zaman 78
  was dealing with a very narrow
question   of   reasonability   of   the   limitation   period   for   correcting
clerical mistakes under the umbrella of a statutory law.   The Court
had no occasion to deal with circumstances wherein a person would
78 supra at Footnote No.16
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want   to   change   her   name   out   of   her   freewill   in   exercise   of   her
guaranteed fundamental rights under the Constitution.   The Court
was looking at it as a purely civil transaction and in fact, treated it
like   one   while   speaking   of   how   the   expiry   of   limitation   would
entirely   bar   the   remedy.     As   already   observed   above,   we   reiterate
that   we   see   a   difference   between   rights   originating   under   the   civil
laws   and   rights   considered   to   be   fundamental   under   the
Constitution and protected as such.  The exercise of a fundamental
right   can,   at   best,   be   regulated   on   reasonable   grounds   but   not
entirely foreclosed without a strong and legitimate purpose.  Except
that   the   dictum   in   Md.   Sarifuz   Zaman 79
  pertains   to   the   specific
facts of its case and also because no prejudice was actually caused
to the student in that case (the changes were anyway permitted), we
say no more.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS TO CBSE
79 supra at Footnote No.16
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169. Although   we   have   discussed   the   broad   issues   canvassed
before   us,   in   the   ultimate   analysis   the   real   dispute   requiring
resolution is  about  the nature of  correction  or  change, as the  case
may   be,   permissible   to   be   carried   by   the   CBSE   at   the   instance   of
the   student   including  past  student.    As noted  earlier,  broadly,  two
situations would arise.  
170. The   first   is   where   the   incumbent   wants   “ correction ”   in   the
certificate   issued   by   the   CBSE   to   be   made   consistent   with   the
particulars mentioned in the school records.  As we have held there
is no reason for the CBSE to turn down such request or attach any
precondition   except   reasonable   period   of   limitation   and   keeping   in
mind   the   period   for   which   the   CBSE   has   to   maintain   its   record
under the extant regulations.  While doing so, it can certainly insist
for compliance of other conditions by the incumbent, such as, to file
sworn  affidavit making  necessary  declaration  and  to  indemnify   the
CBSE   from   any   claim   against   it   by   third   party   because   of   such
correction.     The   CBSE   would   be   justified   in   insisting   for
surrender/return   of   the   original   certificate   (or   duplicate   original
certificate, as the case may be) issued by it for replacing it with the
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fresh   certificate   to   be   issued   after   carrying   out   necessary
corrections   with   caption/annotation   against   the   changes   carried
out   and   the   date   of   such   correction.     It   may   retain   the   original
entries   as   it   is   except   in   respect   of   correction   of   name   effected   in
exercise   of   right   to   be   forgotten.     The   fresh   certificate   may   also
contain disclaimer that the CBSE cannot be held responsible for the
genuineness   of   the   school   records   produced   by   the   incumbent   in
support   of   the   request   to   record   correction   in   the   original   CBSE
certificate.  The CBSE can also insist for reasonable prescribed fees
to   be   paid   by   the  incumbent  in   lieu   of   administrative   expenses   for
issuing   fresh   certificate.     At   the   same   time,   the   CBSE   cannot
impose   precondition   of   applying   for   correction   consistent   with   the
school records only before publication of results.  Such a condition,
as we have held, would be unreasonable and excessive.   We repeat
that   if   the   application   for   recording   correction   is   based   on   the
school   records   as   it   obtained   at   the   time   of   publication   of   results
and   issue   of   certificate   by   the   CBSE,   it   will   be   open   to   CBSE   to
provide   for   reasonable   limitation   period   within   which   the
application for recording correction in certificate issued by it may be
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entertained   by   it.     However,   if   the   request   for   recording   change   is
based on changed school records post the publication of results and
issue of certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled to
apply for recording  such a change within the reasonable limitation
period   prescribed   by   the   CBSE.     In   this   situation,   the   candidate
cannot claim that she had no knowledge about the change recorded
in the school records because such a change would occur obviously
at her instance.  If she makes such application for correction of the
school   records,   she   is   expected   to   apply   to   the   CBSE   immediately
after   the   school   records   are   modified   and   which   ought   to   be   done
within a reasonable time.   Indeed, it would be open to the CBSE to
reject   the   application   in   the   event   the   period   for   preservation   of
official   records   under   the   extant   regulations   had   expired   and   no
record   of   the   candidate   concerned   is   traceable   or   can   be
reconstructed.     In   the   case   of   subsequent   amendment   of   school
records, that may occur due to different reasons including because
of choice exercised by the candidate regarding change of name.   To
put   it   differently,   request   for   recording   of   correction   in   the
certificate   issued   by   the   CBSE   to   bring   it   in   line   with   the   school
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records   of   the   incumbent   need   not   be   limited   to   application   made
prior to publication of examination results of the CBSE.
171. As regards request for “ change ” of particulars in the certificate
issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars intended to
be   recorded   in   the   CBSE   certificate   are   not   consistent   with   the
school   records.     Such   a   request   could   be   made   in   two   different
situations.   The first is on the basis of public documents like Birth
Certificate,   Aadhaar   Card/Election   Card,   etc.   and   to   incorporate
change   in   the   CBSE   certificate   consistent   therewith.     The   second
possibility   is   when   the   request   for   change   is   due   to   the   acquired
name   by  choice   at   a   later   point   of   time.     That   change   need  not   be
backed by public documents pertaining to the candidate.  
(a) Reverting   to   the   first   category ,   as   noted   earlier,   there   is   a
legal presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged
in   the   1872   Act.     Such   public   documents,   therefore,   cannot   be
ignored   by   the   CBSE.     Taking   note   of   those   documents,   the   CBSE
may   entertain   the   request   for   recording   change   in   the   certificate
issued by it.  This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject
to   certain   reasonable   conditions   to   be   fulfilled   by   the   applicant   as
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may   be   prescribed   by   the   CBSE,   such   as,   of   furnishing   sworn
affidavit   containing   declaration   and   to   indemnify   the   CBSE   and
upon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrative expenses.
The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice and publication
in   the   Official   Gazette   before   recording   the   change   in   the   fresh
certificate  to   be   issued   by   it   upon   surrender/return   of   the   original
certificate   (or   duplicate   original   certificate,   as   the   case   may   be)   by
the   applicant.     The   fresh   certificate   may   contain   disclaimer   and
caption/annotation   against   the   original   entry   (except   in   respect   of
change   of   name   effected   in   exercise   of   right   to   be   forgotten)
indicating   the   date   on   which   change   has   been   recorded   and   the
basis   thereof.     In   other   words,   the   fresh   certificate   may   retain
original   particulars   while   recording   the   change   along   with
caption/annotation referred to above (except in respect of change of
name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten).
(b) However,   in   the   latter   situation   where   the   change   is   to   be
effected on the basis of new acquired name without any supporting
school record or public document, that request may be entertained
upon insisting for prior permission/declaration by a Court of law in
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that   regard   and   publication   in   the   Official   Gazette   including
surrender/return   of   original   certificate   (or   duplicate   original
certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and upon payment
of   prescribed   fees.     The   fresh   certificate   as   in   other   situations
referred   to   above,   retain   the   original   entry   (except   in   respect   of
change of  name effected in  exercise of  right to  be forgotten) and  to
insert caption/annotation indicating the date on which it has been
recorded and other details including disclaimer of CBSE.  This is so
because   the   CBSE   is   not   required   to   adjudicate   nor   has   the
mechanism to verify the correctness of the claim of the applicant.
172. In light of the above, in exercise of our plenary jurisdiction, we
direct   the   CBSE   to   process   the   applications   for   correction   or
change,   as   the   case   may   be,   in   the   certificate   issued   by   it   in   the
respective   cases   under   consideration.     Even   other   pending
applications and future applications for such request be processed
on   the   same   lines   and   in   particular   the   conclusion   and   directions
recorded hitherto in paragraphs 170 and 171, as may be applicable,
until amendment of relevant Byelaws.  Additionally, the CBSE shall
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take   immediate   steps   to   amend   its   relevant   Byelaws   so   as   to
incorporate   the   stated   mechanism   for   recording   correction   or
change, as the case may be, in the certificates already issued or to
be issued by it.
173. Accordingly, we dispose of the cases before us with directions
to the CBSE as noted in paragraphs 170 to 172 above.  No order as
to costs.
..................................J.
         (A.M. KHANWILKAR)
..................................J.
     (B.R. GAVAI)
..................................J.
 (KRISHNA MURARI)
New Delhi;
June 03, 2021.
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