2021 INSC 0287
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1411 OF 2020
G. MOHAN RAO & ORS. ...PETITIONER(S)
versus
STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS.       ...RESPONDENT(S)
with
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 173 OF 2021
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 174 OF 2021
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. The   Indian   Constitution   ordains   a   structure   of   governance
wherein   the   three   organs   of   the   State   are   entrusted   with
independent functions.  The Legislature legislates on the law, the
Executive puts the law into execution and the Judiciary being the
sentinel on the  qui vive  reviews and enforces the law in light of its
primary   role   as   the   guardian   of   the   Constitution.     Thus,   we   the
1

people  of   India  have   embraced   a  system  of   separation   of  powers
for   securing   checks   and   balances.   Consequently,   in   day­to­day
functioning   of   the   government   institutions   many   a   times   a
perception   emerges   about   the   “overstepping”   between   three
organs.     Similar   grievance   has   been   made   in   the   case   at   hand.
The   extent   and   manner   in   which   the   basis   of   a   judicial
determination   of   unconstitutionality   of   a   legislation   could   be
altered   by   the   legislature   by   subsequently   enacting   a   validating
or reviving legislation, without overstepping on the jurisdiction of
the constitutional Court, is the pivotal issue in this case.
FACTS IN BRIEF
2. The present case is outcome of a long  chain of proceedings
at   different   forums.   Traversing   the   entire   storyline   may   not   be
relevant for the determination of the question at hand. Thus, we
are   delineating   only   the   relevant   facts   in   brief   for   a   proper
perspective.
3. The resource in the form of land is an essential requirement
for the development of a nation. At the same time, property rights
of   individuals   have   always   had   an   important   status   in   the
hierarchy   of   rights.   To   resolve   this   apparent   conflict   between
2

right to property of individuals and duty of State towards holistic
development,   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894 1
  had   been   enacted
as a uniform law for the whole country with the short title:
“An   Act   to   amend   the   law   for   the   acquisition   of   land   for
public purposes and for Companies.”
The   1894   Act   was   in   force   throughout   the   country.   After   1950,
when the Constitution came into force, we adopted the principle
of   distribution   of   powers   and   the   legislative   competence   of   the
Union and States. It was differentiated on the basis of the Union
List   (List­I),   State   List   (List­II)   and   the   Concurrent   List   (List­III).
As   regards  the   subjects   listed  in   the   Concurrent   List,  the   Union
and   States   have   been   given   concurrent   powers   to   legislate.   In
pursuance   thereof,   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu   carved   out   three
public   purposes   for   which   a   different   land   acquisition   law   was
envisioned.   The   three   sectors   were   highways,   industries   and
Harijan welfare schemes. Accordingly, the Tamil Nadu legislative
assembly enacted the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan
Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 2
, Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for
Industrial   Purposes   Act,   1997 3
  and   Tamil   Nadu   Highways   Act,
2001 4
.   Be   it   noted   that   besides   the   1894   Act,   the   field   of   land
1  for short, “1894 Act”
2  for short, “1978 Act”
3  for short, “1997 Act”
4  for short, “2001 Act”
3

acquisition was also governed by another enactment made by the
Parliament   being   a   special   legislation,   namely,   the   National
Highways   Act,   1956 5
.     This   Act   was   enacted   to   provide   for   the
declaration   of   certain   highways   to   be   national   highways   and   for
matters   connected   therewith   including   power   to   the   competent
authority to acquire lands required for national highways.   Since
there   was   a   law   made   by   the   Parliament   operating   in   the   same
field   regarding   land   acquisition,   the   State   obtained   Presidential
assent   as   per   Article   254   to   avoid   repugnancy   and   thus,   the
aforementioned State Acts prevailed in the State.
4. The   1894   Act   was   found   to   be   inadequate   on   certain
aspects,   including   measures   relating   to   compensation,
rehabilitation and resettlement, and thus, the Parliament enacted
the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 6
. The Act
received assent of the President of India on 27.09.2013 and came
into   force   w.e.f.   01.01.2014.   The   2013   Act   carried   a   special
provision   –   Section   105   –   to   declare   that   this   Act   shall   have   no
application   to   certain   enactments   made   by   the   Parliament
relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. This
5  for short, “1956 Act” 
6  for short, “2013 Act”
4

was   however,   subject   to   sub­section   (3)   whereunder   the   Central
Government   had   been   bestowed   power   to   issue   notification
within   one   year   from   the   date   of   commencement   of   the   Act,   to
notify that the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply to the cases of
land   acquisition   under   the   enactments   specified   in   the   Fourth
Schedule   relating   to   determination   of   compensation,
rehabilitation   and   resettlement   being   beneficial   to   affected
families   with   such   exceptions   or   modifications   as   prescribed.
Thereafter,   on   28.04.2015   vide   S.O.   2368   (E),   the   Central
Government   extended   the   provisions   relating   to   compensation
(First   Schedule),   rehabilitation   and   resettlement   (Second
Schedule)   and   infrastructure   amenities   (Third   Schedule),   as
provided in the 2013 Act, to the enactments placed in the Fourth
Schedule of the Act (which included 1956 Act) as well — so as to
extend the benefit of the 2013 Act to all categories of acquisitions
irrespective of the purpose.
5. On   the   lines  of   Section   105  read   with   the   Fourth   Schedule
of   the   2013   Act,   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu   also   sought   to   protect
and reserve its three State enactments — 1978 Act, 1997 Act and
2001   Act   —   from   the   operation   of   the   2013   Act   as   it   found   its
own   legislations   to   be   expedient.     For   this   purpose,   a   State
5

amendment,   namely,   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2014 7
 was effected to
the   2013   Act   whereby   Section   105­A   came   to   be   inserted   in   the
2013   Act.     The   purport   of   the   State   amendment   in   terms   of   the
2014   Act   made   the   provisions   of   the   2013   Act   inapplicable   to
acquisition   of  land   under   the   three  State  enactments   mentioned
in   the   Fifth   Schedule   of   the   2013   Act   which   also   came   to   be
inserted   by   the   same   State   amendment   Act,   2014.   The   State
legislature, thus, inserted a new Schedule — Fifth Schedule — in
the   2013   Act   and   placed   the   three   State   laws   in   that   schedule.
The 2014 Act received Presidential assent on 01.01.2015 and was
applied retrospectively from 01.01.2014 onwards i.e., the date of
coming   into   force   of   the   2013   Act.   The   retrospective   date   was
chosen   by   the   State   legislature   with   the   objective   to   protect   the
acquisition   under   the   three   State   enactments   from   being
rendered   void   due   to   repugnancy   after   coming   into   effect   of   the
2013   Act.     However,   this   legislative   exercise   to   protect   and
preserve the three state enactments by way of insertion of Section
105A   and   Fifth   Schedule   to   2013   Act   turned   out   to   be   fatal,   as
noticed  infra .
7  for short, “2014 Act”
6

6. The 2014 Act, along with the 1997 Act and 2001 Act, came
to be challenged before the High Court of Judicature at Madras,
primarily   on   twin   grounds   of   repugnancy   with   the   2013   Act
and   violation   of   Article   14   due   to   manifest   arbitrariness   and
discrimination in the operation of the State Acts. Pertinently, on
18.09.2014,   the   High   Court   vide   an   interim   order   in   W.P.   (C)
24182/2014,   allowed   the   acquisition   proceedings   to   go   on   with
the caveat that no final order shall be passed and status quo as
regards   possession   on   the   land   be   maintained.   Thereafter,   the
High Court vide judgment and order dated 03.07.2019 in a batch
of   petitions   with   W.P.(C)   No.   22448/2018 8
  as   main   matter,
framed four issues in the case thus:
“ Issues:
74. The issues therefore, which arise for our consideration
are:
1)   Are   the   State   Enactments   void   because   of
inherent Arbitrariness?
2)   Did   the   President   of   India   fail   to   apply   his
mind while granting assent to Section 105A?
3)   Did   the   Impugned   State   Enactments   become
repugnant   once   the   Parliament   ‘made’   the   New
Land   Acquisition   Act.   If   so,   did   the   presidential
assent   to   Section   105A   inserted   by   Tamil   Nadu
Act No. 1 of 2015, revive the three acts?
4)   Are   the   provisions   of   Section   105A(2)   and   (3)
mandatory, and if so, whether non­compliance of
these   provisions   fatal   to   the   validity   of   these
enactments.”
8  (2019) 5 MLJ 641
7

7. The  High  Court vide judgment  and  order  dated  03.07.2019
rejected   the   challenge   as   regards   the   violation   of   Article   14   and
non­application   of   mind   by   the   President   while   granting   assent.
On   the   point   of   repugnancy,   however,   it   found   that   the   State
enactments became repugnant to the 2013 Act and thus void, on
27.09.2013   itself   (date   of   Presidential   assent   to   the   2013   Act).
Resultantly, subsequent enactment of 2014 Act w.e.f. 01.01.2014
would   not   go   on   to   reactivate   the   three   enactments.   The   High
Court   held   that   the   State   enactments   could   only   be   revived
through                                 re­enactment   by   the   Legislative   Assembly
followed   by   fresh   assent   of   the   President   in   accordance   with
Article 254 of  the Constitution. As  a consequential  order, it  also
quashed   all   pending   acquisition   proceedings   under   the   three
enactments on and after  27.09.2013. The said decision is under
challenge   before   this   Court   in   connected   but   separate
proceedings and we may advert to it at the appropriate stage, as
and when need arises for decision of the present case.
8. On   19.07.2019,   the   State   Government   made   an   attempt   to
revive the three enactments held to be void and unconstitutional
by   the   High   Court   by   using   a   legislative   tool.   It   tabled   a   Bill   to
revive   the   operation   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acquisition   for   Harijan
8

Welfare Schemes Act,  1978, the  Tamil Nadu  Acquisition of  Land
for  Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 and the Tamil Nadu Highways
Act,   2001   on   the   floor   of   the   legislative   assembly.   The   bill   was
passed   by   the   Assembly   titled   as   “The   Tamil   Nadu   Land
Acquisition   Laws   (Revival   of   Operation,   Amendment   and
Validation)   Act,   2019 9
”.   This   Act   was   sent   for   the   assent   of   the
President in terms of Article 254(2) and the same was granted on
02.12.2019.   Notably,   the   2019   Act   was   applied   retrospectively
from   26.09.2013   with   the   objective   to   validate   all   pending
acquisitions   on   and   after  that   date   under   the   State   enactments,
otherwise   quashed   by   the   High   Court.   The   said   Act   of   2019   is
under   challenge   before   us   in   the   instant   batch   of   petitions   on
grounds delineated hereinafter.
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
9. The   petitioners   are   landowners   whose   lands   are   sought   to
be   acquired   under   the   1997   Act   and   2001   Act.   The   primary
contention of the petitioners is that the legislative tool adopted by
the   State   legislature   to   revive   unconstitutional   enactments   is   a
direct   attempt   to   overrule   and   nullify   the   judgment   of   the   High
Court   and   the   same   is   impermissible   in   the   constitutional
9  for short, “2019 Act”
9

scheme   as   it   violates   the   doctrine   of   separation   of   powers.   It   is
submitted   that   on   being   declared   unconstitutional   due   to
repugnancy, the only option available to the State legislature was
to   re­enact   the   repugnant   enactments   after   removing   the
repugnant areas and pass it afresh in the Assembly, followed by
a   fresh   Presidential   assent.   It   is   further   urged   that   the
permissible method is to remove the material basis of a judgment
by   correcting   the   anomalies   pointed   out   by   the   Court   and   re­
enact   the   legislation.   It   is   added   that   amending   an
unconstitutional   enactment   cannot   be   a   permissible   method   of
revival   because   the   moment   an   enactment   is   declared   as
unconstitutional,   there   remains   nothing   to   amend.   To   support
this   position,   reliance   has   been   placed   upon   State   of
Karnataka & Ors. vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association
&   Ors. 10
,   Pt.   Rishikesh   &   Anr.   vs.   Salma   Begum 11
,   Saghir
Ahmad   &   Anr.   vs.   State   of   U.P.   &   Ors. 12
  and   P.L.   Mehra   &
Ors. vs. D.R. Khanna & Ors. 13
.
10. To   buttress   the   above   submission,   it   is   urged   that,   despite
incorporating   the   provisions   relating   to   compensation,
10   (2018) 6 SCC 363
11  (1995) 4 SCC 718
12  AIR 1954 SC 728
13  AIR 1971 Delhi 1
10

rehabilitation   and   resettlement   from   the   2013  Act,   the  2019  Act
is   still   repugnant   to   the   2013   Act   as   it   fails   to   incorporate
material   provisions   relating   to   social   impact   assessment,
timelines for  various  steps  involved in  the  process of  acquisition
and other provisions relating to fair procedure. Thus, it cannot be
termed   as   a   curative   legislation   and   would   again   fall   foul   of
Article 254.
11. The   petitioners   have   emphasized   on   the   meaning   of   the
word “made” as used in Article 254 to assert that retrospectivity
in   the   2019   Act   is   actually   fatal   to   its   own   validity.   It   is   stated
that the 2019 Act was made on 26.09.2013 (date of retrospective
commencement)   and   not   on   02.12.2019   (date   of   Presidential
assent),   whereas   the   2013   Act   was   made   on   27.09.2013.   Thus,
there was no Act made by the Parliament in force on 26.09.2013
and   the   moment   the   2013   Act   was   made   on   the   next   day,   the
2019 Act again became repugnant.
12. The   petitioners   further   submit   that   the   2019   Act   has   been
enacted without a determining principle as it fails to comply with
the   material   aspects   of  the   2013   Act  and   stands   to  discriminate
with the people of the State by subjecting them to a different and
less advantageous procedure of land acquisition. To buttress, it is
11

added   that   equally   placed   persons   cannot   be   subjected   to   two
different laws as it would be violative of Article 14 and even if this
course is to be adopted, the classification has to be duly justified
in   light   of   the   settled   principle   of   intelligible   differentia   and
reasonable classification. It is further  added that the State must
show   special   circumstances   to   demonstrate   their   inability   to
apply   the   Act   made   by   the   Parliament   in   the   State   and   without
such circumstances, the State legislature has no power to deviate
and   frame   its   own   law.   Reliance   has   been   placed   on   Union   of
India   &   Anr.   vs.   Tarsem   Singh   &   Ors. 14
  and   Nagpur
Improvement Trust & Anr. vs. Vithal Rao & Ors. 15
.
13. In   W.P.   (C)   No.   173/2021   and   W.P.   (C)   No.   174/2021,
similar arguments have been raised to assail the validity of 2019
Act   and   we   are   not   reiterating   the   same   to   avoid   repetition.   In
addition, the petitioners in these two petitions have also assailed
the 1997 Act and 2001 Act dealing with industries and highways
respectively.   The   petitioners   have   attempted   a   comparative
analysis   of   the   State   enactments   and   the   Act   made   by   the
Parliament   to   illustrate   discrimination   and   unequal   treatment
with   equally   placed   persons   merely   on   the   basis   of   purpose   of
14  (2019) 9 SCC 304
15  (1973) 1 SCC 500
12

acquisition.   It   is   urged   that   despite   incorporating   provisions
relating   to   compensation   from   the   2013   Act,   the   State
enactments   do   not   provide   the   same   amount   of   compensation
due   to   absence   of   fixed   timelines   for   acquisition   and   a   lapse
provision   in   case   of   undue   delay.   Placing   reliance   upon   P.
Vajravelu Mudaliar & Anr. vs. The Special Deputy Collector
for   Land   Acquisition,   West   Madras   &   Anr. 16
,   it   is   submitted
that the State enactments violate Articles 14, 19, 21 on account
of   unreasonable   classification   between   those   persons   whose
lands are acquired for industrial purposes and those whose lands
are   acquired   for   other   purposes   thereby   impacting   their   right   to
trade and occupation coupled with right to livelihood. It is further
submitted   that   deprivation   of   property   without   complying   with
due procedure is also violative of Article 300A of the Constitution.
14. As regards the Presidential assent, it is urged that the same
is   vitiated   as   the   State   enactments   were   not   placed   before   the
President   and   attention   was   not   drawn   towards   the   provisions
which   are   repugnant   to   the   Act   made   by   the   Parliament.   To
buttress   this   submission,   reliance   has   been   placed   upon   the
16  AIR 1965 SC 1017
13

dictum   of   this   Court   in   Kaiser­I­Hind   Pvt.   Ltd.   &   Anr.   vs.
National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Ors. 17
.
15. Responding   to  the petitioners,  learned  Attorney  General for
India   advanced   arguments   for   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu.   It   is
submitted that the 2019 Act is an acceptance on the part of the
State that the previous measure of enacting  Section 105­A to do
away   with   repugnancy   did   not   commend   to   the   High   Court   and
therefore,   the   State   adopted   another   legislative   measure   of
enacting   a   validating/curative   Act   in   accordance   with   its
legislative   competence   under   List­III   of   the   Seventh   Schedule.
Placing reliance upon  State of Tamil Nadu vs. State of Kerala
& Anr. 18
, it is submitted that this Court has laid down twin tests
for testing the constitutionality of validating enactments, namely
— presence of legislative competence and removal of defect found
by the Court.
16. The   respondents   have   further   submitted   that   the   power   of
the   State   legislature   is   plenary   in   its   own   field   and   it   is   well
within its competence to amend a law retrospectively as well as to
remove   the   cause   for   invalidation   by   enacting   a   new   law
17  (2002) 8 SCC 182
18  (2014) 12 SCC 696
14

altogether. It has been added that the 2019 Act has been enacted
by   the   legislature   in   its   wisdom   keeping   in   mind   the   State
interest,   public   interest   and   land   owners’   interest.   To   support
these   submissions,   reliance   has   been   placed   upon   Karnataka
Pawn   Brokers   Association 19
  and   B.K.   Pavitra   &   Ors.   vs.
Union   of   India   &   Ors. 20
  and   Jaora   Sugar   Mills   (P)   Ltd.   vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. 21
.
17. The   respondents   have   also   attacked   the   judgment   of   the
High   Court   stating   that   the   judgment   does   not   undertake   any
examination   to   determine   the   repugnancy   between   provisions
and   fails   to   severe   the   repugnant   provisions   from   the   rest.   It   is
submitted   that   Article   254   does   not   contemplate   striking   down
an entire enactment due to repugnancy between some provisions
of   the   Act   made   by   the   Parliament   and   State   enactments,   and
therefore, there is no need for the State legislature to re­enact the
entire   legislation   to   rectify   the   repugnancy   between   some
provisions.   To   support   these   submissions,   reliance   has   been
placed   upon   M.P.V.   Sundararamier   and   Co.   vs.   The   State   of
Andhra   Pradesh   &   Anr. 22
,   State   of   Gujarat   &   Anr.   vs.   Shri
19  supra at Footnote No. 10
20  (2019) 16 SCC 129
21  (1966) 1 SCR 523
22  (1958) 1 SCR 1422
15

Ambica   Mills   Ltd.,   Ahmedabad   &   Anr. 23
,   Devi   Das   Gopal
Krishnan & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 24
  and   Municipal
Committee,   Amritsar   &   Anr.   vs.   State   of   Punjab   &   Ors. 25
.
Furthermore,   it   is   urged   that   even   after   the   declaration   of
repugnancy, an Act does not get wiped off from the statute book
and   it   can   be   amended   to   remove   the   defect   in   terms   of   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   State   of   Kerala   &   Ors.   vs.   Mar
Appraem Kuri Company Limited & Anr. 26
.
18. The   respondents   have   submitted   that   the   2019   Act   is   an
effective re­enactment of the State Acts, in line with the decision
of   the   High   Court.     Further,   the   key   features   of   2013   Act,
including   those   relating   to   compensation,   resettlement   and
rehabilitation, have been introduced in all three State enactments
by   way   of   reference   vide   2019   Act.   It   is   added   that,   for   the
purpose   of   obtaining   assent,   there   is   no   difference   between
placing  the entire 2019 Act before the  President  and placing  the
three   State   Acts   individually.   Reliance   has   been   placed   upon
23  (1974) 4 SCC 656
24  (1967) 3 SCR 557
25  (1969) 3 SCR 447
26  (2012) 7 SCC 106
16

Krishna Chandra Gangopadhyaya & Ors.  vs. Union of India
& Ors. 27
 to support the permissibility of referential legislation.
19. As regards the date for deciding repugnancy, it is submitted
by   the   respondents   that   the   date   of   making   of   the   State   law
would   be   relevant.   Further,   it   is   added   that   the   date   of   making
would   be   the   date   of   Presidential   assent   i.e.,   02.12.2019   in   this
case   and   merely   because   the   2019   Act   has   been   applied   from   a
retrospective date, that date would not be referred to as the date
of making the Act, for that would defeat the purpose of the entire
exercise behind a validating legislation. To explain the meaning of
the word “made”, as used in Article 254, support has been drawn
from the decision of this Court in   Mar Appraem Kuri Company
Limited 28
.
20. The   respondents   have   urged   that   for   the   purpose   of
determining   the   constitutionality   of   an   independent   legislation,
as   the   2019   Act,   there   can   be   no   comparative   analysis   between
provisions of  the  Act made by  the  Parliament and the  impugned
State Acts. It is added that the State is well within its competence
to deviate from the law made by the Parliament and obtain assent
27  (1975) 2 SCC 302
28  supra at Footnote No. 26
17

of the President to such deviation.  In support, reliance has been
placed upon the decision of this Court in   The State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. G.C. Mandawar 29
.
21. We   have   heard   Shri   P.   Wilson,   learned   senior   counsel   and
Shri   Suhrith   Parthasarthy,   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners,
Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India and Shri
Aman Sinha, learned senior counsel for the respondents.
22. Before   traversing   the   arguments   on   the   issues   involved   in
the   case,   we   deem   it   fit   to   describe   the   scope   of   enquiry   at   the
very   outset.   We   had   clarified   during   the   course   of   the   hearing
that the issues relating  to the constitutional validity  of the 1997
Act   and   2001   Act   in   context   of   Part­III   of   the   Constitution   have
since   been   raised   in   the   Special   Leave   Petitions   emanating   from
the   decision   of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras,   dated
03.07.2019. The same may be considered in the aftermath of this
decision, as noted in our order dated 23.02.2021. 
23. Therefore, our enquiry in this case is limited to whether the
2019 Act has been validly enacted and thus, succeeds in reviving
the   State   Acts   declared   as   null   and   void   by   the   High   Court,   for
29  (1955) 1 SCR 599
18

being   repugnant   to   the   2013   Act   and   amending   the   same
including validating actions taken thereunder.
24. In   light   of   the   aforesaid   facts   and   grounds   urged   by   the
parties, the following issues arise for our consideration:
(i)   Whether   the   State   legislature   had   legislative
competence   to   enact   the   2019   Act,   a   retrospective
validating Act?
(ii)   Whether   the   State   legislature   transgressed   the
limits of its legislative competence having  the effect of
nullifying/overruling   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,
by enacting the 2019 Act?
(iii) Whether the 1997 Act and 2001 Act again fall foul
of   Article   254   on   account   of   being   repugnant   to   the
2013   Act,   owing   to   the   date   of   retrospective
commencement of the 2019 Act?
CONSIDERATION
LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCY
25. Chapter­I   titled   “Legislative   Relations”   of   Part­XI   of   the
Constitution   provides   for   the   distribution   of   legislative   powers
19

between   the   Union   and   the   States.   Article   245   talks   about   the
territorial competence of the Union and the States, and whereas
it  empowers  the  Parliament  to  legislate  for  the   entire  territory  of
India   (even   beyond   in   certain   circumstances),   the   State
legislature   is   empowered   to   legislate   only   for   the   territory   of   the
State.   Within   its   territory,   the   States   are   empowered   to   legislate
on   any   of   the   subjects   of   List­II   (State   List)   and   List­III
(Concurrent   List)   of   the   Seventh   Schedule.   The   concurrent   list
contains   subjects   which   can   be   legislated   upon   both   by   the
Union and States. Even within the State list, the legislative power
of  the  State cannot  be said to be absolute and can be subjected
to   intervention   of   the   Parliament   under   certain   circumstances
such   as   national   emergency,   national   interest,   desire   expressed
by   legislatures   of   two   or   more   States   etc.,   as   delineated   by
Articles   249   to   253.   It   is   crystal   clear   from   this   constitutional
scheme that  the  balance  of power  tilts  in  favour  of the Union  in
multiple   circumstances.   An   example   of   this   tilt   is   manifested   in
Article 254 of the Constitution which is a subject of debate in the
present case. The same reads thus:
“ 254.   Inconsistency   between   laws   made   by   Parliament
and laws made by the Legislatures of States. —
(1)   If   any   provision   of   a   law   made   by   the   Legislature   of   a
State   is   repugnant   to   any   provision   of   a   law   made   by
20

Parliament   which   Parliament   is   competent   to   enact,   or   to
any   provision  of  an existing  law   with respect  to one  of  the
matters   enumerated   in   the   Concurrent   List,   then,   subject
to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament,
whether   passed   before   or   after   the   law   made   by   the
Legislature   of   such   State,   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the
existing   law,   shall   prevail   and   the   law   made   by   the
Legislature   of   the   State   shall,   to   the   extent   of   the
repugnancy, be void.
(2)   Where   a   law   made   by   the   Legislature   of   a   State   with
respect   to   one   of   the   matters   enumerated   in   the
Concurrent   List   contains   any   provision   repugnant   to   the
provisions   of   an   earlier   law   made   by   Parliament   or   an
existing   law   with   respect   to   that   matter,   then,   the   law   so
made by  the Legislature  of such  State shall,  if  it  has been
reserved   for   the   consideration   of   the   President   and   has
received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided   that   nothing   in   this   clause   shall   prevent
Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect
to   the   same   matter   including   a   law   adding   to,   amending,
varying   or  repealing  the  law   so  made  by   the Legislature  of
the State.”
26. Notably,   Entry­42   of   List­III   enables   both   Parliament   and
State legislature to legislate on “Acquisition and requisitioning of
property”   under   which   the   land   acquisition   laws   are   enacted.
Using this entry, the State legislature had enacted the stated Acts
including the 1997 Act and the 2001 Act. Using the same entry,
the   Union   legislature   had   thereafter   enacted   the   2013   Act   for
land   acquisition   across   the   country.   The   Union   and   State
enactments   clashed   with   each   other   and   the   High   Court   found
the   State   enactments   to   be   null   and   void   in   the   face   of   the   Act
made   by   the   Parliament.   To   protect   the   nullified   State
enactments,   the   State   legislature   again   resorted   to   Entry­42   of
21

List­III and brought the 2019 Act with the objective of “revival of
operation”,   “amendment”   and   “validation”   of   the   State
enactments.
27. As the name suggests, the impugned Act is in the nature of
a validation Act i.e., an Act which validates something invalid in
the eyes of law and to make such validation effective, it has been
given   a   retrospective   effect   by   the   State.   Whereas   the   subject­
matter   legislative   competence   is   manifest   from   List­III   of   the   VII
Schedule   read   with   Article   246.     Despite   that,   an   in­principle
question   has   been   raised   on   the   competence   of   the   State
legislature to pass a revival Act with retrospective effect.
28. The   constitutional   scheme   and   decisions   of   this   Court   on
the   subject   untangle   a   settled   position   that   the   power   of   a
legislature to legislate retrospectively is within the constitutional
bounds. It emanates from the basic principle that a legislature is
deemed to be the main protagonist of the public interest at large.
For, the legislature is the bulwark of a democratic polity. It is also
beyond   debate   that   a   legislature   can   validate   an   invalidated   law
by   removing   the   cause   for   such   invalidity   through   a   legislative
exercise. However, no doubt, there are some judicially recognised
limitations   to   such   power   as   summed   up   by   this   Court   in
22

National   Agricultural   Cooperative   Marketing   Federation   of
India Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. 30
 thus:
“ 15.   The   legislative   power   either   to   introduce   enactments
for   the   first   time   or   to   amend   the   enacted   law   with
retrospective   effect,   is   not   only   subject   to   the   question   of
competence   but   is   also   subject   to   several   judicially
recognized limitations with some of which we are at present
concerned.   The   first   is   the   requirement   that   the   words
used   must   expressly   provide   or   clearly   imply
retrospective   operation . 31
  The   second   is   that   the
retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or
harsh,   otherwise   it   runs   the   risk   of   being   struck   down
as   unconstitutional . 32
  The   third   is   apposite   where   the
legislation   is   introduced   to   overcome   a   judicial
decision. Here the power cannot be used to subvert the
decision   without   removing   the   statutory   basis   of   the
decision . 33
”
(emphasis supplied)
It further stated thus:
“17.   A   validating   clause   coupled   with   a   substantive
statutory   change   is   therefore   only   one   of   the   methods
to   leave   actions   unsustainable   under   the   unamended
statute,   undisturbed.   Consequently,   the   absence   of   a
validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective
operation   of  the  statutory   provision,  if  such  retrospectivity
is otherwise apparent.”
(emphasis supplied)
30   (2003) 5 SCC 23
31    S.S. Gadgil v. Lal and Co., AIR 1965 SC 171, 177; J.P. Jani v. Induprasad Devshanker
Bhatt, AIR 1969 SC 778, 781.
32     Rai   Ramkrishna   v.   State   of   Bihar,   AIR   1963   SC   1667   :   (1964)   1   SCR   897,   915;
Jawaharmal   v.   State   of   Rajasthan,   AIR   1966   SC   764   :   (1966)   1   SCR   890,   905;   Ujagar
Prints (II) v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 488, 517 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 469
33     Shri   Prithvi   Cotton   Mills   Ltd.   v.   Broach   Borough   Municipality,   (1969)   2   SCC   283;
Lalitaben   v.   Gordhanbhai   Bhaichandbhai,   1987   Supp   SCC   750;   Janapada   Sabha
Chhindwara   v.   Central   Provinces   Syndicate   Ltd.,   (1970)   1   SCC   509;   Indian   Aluminium
Co. v. State of Kerala, (1996) 7 SCC 637.
23

In   Ujagar   Prints   &   Ors.   (II)   vs.   Union   of   India   &   Ors. 34
,   a   5­
judges   bench   of   this   Court   categorically   observed   that
retrospective validating statutes are permissible as follows:
“ 65 . ... A competent legislature can always validate a law
which   has   been   declared   by   courts   to   be   invalid,
provided the infirmities  and vitiating infactors noticed
in   the   declaratory   judgment   are   removed   or   cured.
Such a validating law can also be made retrospective.  If
in   the   light   of   such   validating   and   curative   exercise   made
by  the legislature — granting legislative competence — the
earlier   judgment   becomes   irrelevant   and   unenforceable,
that   cannot   be   called   an   impermissible   legislative
overruling of the judicial decision.   All that the legislature
does is to usher in a valid law with retrospective effect
in   the   light   of   which   earlier   judgment   becomes
irrelevant.   (See   Sri   Prithvi   Cotton   Mills   Ltd.   v.   Broach
Borough Municipality 35
).”
(emphasis supplied)
The   Court   also   highlighted   the   utility   of   such   validating
enactments in a practical scenario thus:
“ 66.    Such legislative expedience of validation of laws is
of   particular  significance   and   utility   and   is   quite   often
applied,   in   taxing   statutes.   It   is   necessary   that   the
legislature   should   be   able   to   cure   defects   in   statutes.
No   individual   can   acquire   a   vested   right   from   a   defect
in   a   statute   and   seek   a   windfall   from   the   legislature's
mistakes.   Validity   of   legislations   retroactively   curing
defects   in   taxing   statutes   is   well   recognised   and   courts,
except   under   extraordinary   circumstances,   would   be
reluctant to override the legislative judgment as to the need
for and wisdom of the retrospective legislation. ....”
(emphasis supplied)
34   (1989) 3 SCC 488
35   (1969) 2 SCC 283 : (1970) 1 SCR 388
24

In  Indian Aluminium Co. & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. 36
,
the Court again culled out certain principles and we find it useful
to   reproduce   the   following   two   passages   relevant   to   the   case   at
hand:
“ 56.  …
(1) to (7) …
(8)   In   exercising   legislative   power,   the   legislature
by   mere   declaration,   without   anything   more,
cannot   directly   overrule,   revise   or   override   a
judicial   decision.   It   can   render   judicial   decision
ineffective   by   enacting   valid   law   on   the   topic
within its legislative field fundamentally altering or
changing   its   character   retrospectively.   The
changed   or   altered   conditions   are   such   that   the
previous decision would not have been rendered by
the   court,   if   those   conditions   had   existed   at   the
time   of   declaring   the   law   as   invalid.   It   is   also
empowered   to   give   effect   to   retrospective
legislation with a deeming date or with effect from
a   particular   date.   The   legislature   can   change   the
character   of   the   tax   or   duty   from   impermissible   to
permissible tax but the tax or levy should answer such
character   and   the   legislature   is   competent   to   recover
the   invalid   tax   validating   such   a   tax   on   removing   the
invalid base for recovery from the subject or render the
recovery from the State ineffectual. It is competent for
the legislature to enact the law with retrospective effect
and   authorise   its   agencies   to   levy   and   collect   the   tax
on   that   basis,   make   the   imposition   of   levy   collected
and   recovery   of   the   tax   made   valid,   notwithstanding
the   declaration   by   the   court   or   the   direction   given   for
recovery thereof.
(9)   The consistent thread that runs through all the
decisions   of   this   Court   is   that   the   legislature
cannot   directly   overrule   the   decision   or   make   a
direction   as   not   binding   on   it   but   has   power   to
make the decision ineffective by removing the base
on   which   the   decision   was   rendered,   consistent
36  (1996) 7 SCC 637
25

with the law of the Constitution and the legislature
must have competence to do the same. ”
(emphasis supplied)
In   State   of   Tamil   Nadu 37
,   the   Court   laid   down   twin   tests   for
testing validity of a validating law thus:
“ 126.   On   deep   reflection   of   the   above   discussion,   in   our
opinion,   the   constitutional   principles   in   the   context   of
Indian   Constitution   relating   to   separation   of   powers
between   the   legislature,   executive   and   judiciary   may,   in
brief, be summarized thus:
126.1 to 126.5  …..
126.6.     If   the   legislature   has   the   power   over   the
subject­matter   and   competence   to   make   a   validating
law, it can at any time make such a validating law and
make it retrospective. The validity of a validating law,
therefore,   depends   upon   whether   the   legislature
possesses   the   competence   which   it   claims   over   the
subject­matter   and   whether   in   making   the   validation
law  it  removes   the   defect   which   the   courts   had   found
in the existing law. ”
(emphasis supplied)
29. The   line   of   decisions   discussed   above   reveals   a   settled
position   as   regards   the   competency   of   legislature   to   enact   a
retrospective validating Act,  inter alia , delineated as under:
(i) The   legislature   must   be   having   power   over   the
subject   matter   as   also   competence   to   make   a
validating law.
(ii) There must be a clear validating clause coupled
with substantive change in the earlier position.  
37  supra at Footnote No. 18
26

(iii) The   retrospective   operation   must   be   specified
clearly.
(iv) There   can   be   no   express   or   declaratory
overruling of the judgment of the Court.
(v) It   is   permissible   for   the   legislature   to   make   a
decision of the Court ineffective by removing the
material   basis   of   the   decision   in   the   manner
that   the   Court   would   not   have   arrived   at   the
same   conclusion   had   the   corrected/modified
position   prevailed   at   the   time   of   rendering   the
said earlier decision.
Notably, the factum of power  vested in the State legislature over
the subject matter and its competence to make a validating law is
not in issue or disputed in the present case.
30. Relying   upon   the   decision   of   Delhi   High   Court   in   P.L.
Mehra 38
,   the   petitioners   have   urged   that   the   moment   the   Court
declared the State enactments as null and void, they were wiped
off   the   statute   book   and   further   amendment   therein   was   simply
not permissible to revive the same. On a reading of this decision,
38  supra at Footnote No. 13
27

it   is   clear   that   the   Court   was   analysing   the   effect   of   voidness   in
the light of Article 13 i.e., voidness due to violation of any of the
provisions   of   Part­III   of   the   Constitution.     This   decision,   in   our
view,   has   no   bearing   on   the   issues   involved   in   the   present
proceedings.  Thus, without dilating on this decision, suffice it to
observe that when voidness is a result of repugnancy between the
State   law   and   law   made   by   the   Parliament,   that   is,   voidness
under Article 254 of the Constitution, revival of such State law by
enacting   a   subsequent   amendment   substantively   changing   the
basis of the voidness and applying it retrospectively from a prior
date   is   recognised   time   and   again   by   this   Court,   as   discussed
above. We say no more.
DOES   2019   ACT   NULLIFY   THE   JUDGMENT   OF   THE   HIGH
COURT?
31. Having   understood   the   legislative   competency   of   the   State
legislature in principle and in law, we may now examine whether
the   legislature   acted   in   violation   of   the   above   stated   principles
and   thus,   exceeded   its   competency.   For   that,   we   must   first
examine the material basis of the judgment of the High Court and
see  whether   the   substantive  changes   brought   about   by   enacting
28

the   2019   Act   result   into   successful   revival   of   the   State
enactments.
32. The   Madras   High   Court   framed   four   issues   for
consideration,   as   produced   in   the   initial   part   of   this   judgment.
We   are   not   concerned   with   any   other   issue   except   issue   no.   3
relating   to   repugnancy   between  the   State   Acts   and  Act  made   by
the   Parliament   and   permissibility   of   Section   105­A   of   the   2014
Act   (Tamil   Nadu   State   amendment   of   2013   Act)   for   reviving   the
repugnant   State   Acts.   Issue   no.   3   is   reproduced   for   better
appraisal thus:
“ Issues:
74.  The issues therefore, which arise for our consideration
are:
1) …..
2) …..
3)   Did   the   Impugned   State   Enactments   become
repugnant   once   the   Parliament   ‘made’   the   New   Land
Acquisition   Act.   If   so,   did   the   presidential   assent   to
Section   105A   inserted   by   Tamil   Nadu   Act   No.   1   of
2015, revive the three acts?
….”
The High Court first examined the sweep of Article 254 and then
declared the State enactments to be repugnant from the moment
Presidential assent was obtained for the 2013 Act. It noted thus:
“111.   Applying   the   above   principles,   it   is   clear   that   both
Parliament   and   the   State   Legislature   are   competent   to
enact   these   laws.   The   three   State   enactments   received  the
29

assent   of   the   President   on   21.7.1978,   25.5.1999   and
16.9.2002 respectively and therefore, prevailed in the State
of   Tamil   Nadu   even   when   the   Old   Act,   1894   covered   the
entire   field.   Contention   of   the   petitioner   is   that   when   the
new   Act   came   into   force,   the   three   state   enactments   have
become void. In order to save the acquisitions made under
the   three   State   enactments,   the   State   of   Tamil   Nadu
brought out an amendment to the Central Act by inserting
Section 105­A in order to save the acquisitions made under
the   three   State   enactments   from   1.1.2014   to   the   insertion
of   105­A.   The   State   Government   also   brought   out   three
Government   Orders   dated   31.12.2014,   clearly   mentioning
that   the   acquisitions   made   under   the   three   State
enactments   would   be   saved   by   amendment   to   the   new
Land   Acquisition   Act   and   for   this   purpose   the   amending
Act   even   though   received   the   assent   of   the   President   on
1.1.2015 was deemed to have come into force on 1.1.2014.
Article   254   kicks   in   when   there   is   repugnancy   in   any
provision of the law made by the Legislature of the State to
any   provision   of   law   made   by   the   Parliament   which   the
Parliament   is   competent   to   enact.   Therefore,   these   state
enactments   are   rendered   void,   the   moment   the   New
Act   was   “made.”   i.e.   when   it   received   the   presidential
assent, as on 27.09.2013 .”
(emphasis supplied)
Applying   clause   (2)   of   Article   254,   it   then   observed   that   Section
105­A   of   the   2014   Act   could   not   have   revived   the   State
enactments once rendered void due to repugnancy having struck
at   a   prior   point   of   time,   and   the   only   course   of   action   for   the
revival   of   a   repugnant   law   is   re­enactment   followed   by   fresh
presidential assent thus:
“112. The only protection in this sense offered to law made
by the States in case of repugnancy is under Article 254(2).
Importantly, the repugnancy  is noted only in respect of an
earlier   law   laid   down   by   the   Parliament.   The   provisions   of
Article 254(2) would not apply in the case of a law already
made   by   the   State,   which   has   become   repugnant   as   a
result   of   a   new   enactment   of   Parliament.   Article   254(2)
30

does not offer any protection to laws made by States before
the Central Legislation, which leads them to be repugnant,
comes into force. It requires the entire repugnant law to be
reserved for the consideration of the President, afresh, and
the President must give his consent to the entire law. This
law   which   otherwise   would   be   repugnant,   is   then
specifically   saved.   These   laws   must   receive   his   assent   in
the present sense.  Thus, in order to bring any act within
the purview of Article 254(2) it must necessarily be re­
enacted,   and   reconsidered   by   the   President   afresh.
Merely inserting Section 105A in the New Act, shall not
fulfil   the   requirements   of   Article   254(2),   and   the   laws
would remain repugnant. ”
(emphasis supplied)
The   High   Court   then   recorded   certain   conclusions   and   the
relevant ones read thus:
“ Conclusions:
158.   In   view   of   the   discussion,   the   net   result   of   Writ
Petitions before us is as follows:
158.1 .....
158.2 …..
158.3.   However,   the   Writ   Petitioners   before   us   ultimately
succeed   because,   Article   254(1)   by   its   operation   rendered
the impugned Tamil Nadu Legislations repugnant, and null
and void, as on the date on which the New Act was made,
i.e. 27.09.2013, the date of making of the New Act, as held
in   the   case   of   State   of   Kerala   v   Maar   Appraem   Kuri   Co.
(supra) 39
 and therefore the impugned Acts do not survive.
158.4.   By   enacting   Section   105­A   of   the   New   Act,   the
State   of   Tamil   Nadu   could   not   have   revived   the   three
state   Acts,   that   had   become   repugnant   as   on
27.09.2013 .
158.5.   In order to revive these acts, the State must re­
enact these statutes, in accordance with Article 254(2)
of   the   Constitution   of   India,   and   obtain   the   assent   of
the   President.   Merely,   by   inserting   Section   105­A   and
the   5 th
  Schedule,   in   the   new   Act,   these   impugned
enactments do not get revived . Since this had admittedly
not   been   done,   the   Acts   remain   repugnant,   and   Article
254(1) renders them inoperative.
39  supra at Footnote No. 26
31

…..”
(emphasis supplied)
33. Analysing   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   for   the   limited
purpose   of   this   case   and   without   impinging   upon   the   other
contentions   including   the   outcome   of   cases   pending   by   way   of
special   leave   against   the   said   judgment,   we   note   that   the   High
Court   has   correctly   explained   the   concept   of   repugnancy   under
Article   254,   but   did   not   apply   it   in   the   same   manner   to   identify
the   actual   existence   of   repugnancy   between   the   State   Acts   and
law   made   by   the   Parliament.   Assuming   the   presence   of
repugnancy   as   assumed   by   the   High   Court   itself,   the   only
enquiry   before   the   High   Court   was   regarding   the   method   of
revival of repugnant State laws. While undertaking such enquiry,
it   found   Section   105­A   of   the   2014   Act   to   be   an   impermissible
method   of   revival   and   called   for   re­enactment   as   per   Article
254(2) of the Constitution. This, in our view, is the sole material
basis   of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court.   Strikingly,   the   High
Court did not rule out revival and validation at all and grounded
the enquiry on due compliance with Article 254(2), for that is the
only way for a State law to prevail in the face of a subsequent law
made by the Parliament on the same subject.
32

34. We   may   briefly   examine   the   concept   of   repugnancy   and   its
functioning   under   Article   254.   The   concept   of   repugnancy   is
meant   to   prevent   the   operation   of   two   conflicting   laws   on   the
same   field   so   as   to   result   into   uncertainty   and   inconsistency.
Naturally, when a situation like that emerges, the subjects of law
cannot be expected to approach a Court immediately and seek a
resolution   as   to   which   of   the   two   laws   would   operate   on   them.
Thus,   the   Constitution   provides   for   univocal   and   unambiguous
solution   in   the   form   of   Article   254   which   makes   it   clear   that   in
such   circumstances,   the   law   made   by   the   Parliament   ought   to
prevail   and   the   subjects   would   be   governed   by   it.   However,   it
does   not   stop   here.   It   goes   beyond   this   basic   declaration   and
gives   an   opportunity   to   the   legislature   to   which   the   repugnant
law   belonged   (State   legislature)   to   revive   it   by   obtaining   the
Presidential assent, thereby providing impetus to the competency
of the State legislature to meet with the fallouts of repugnancy.  It
is crucial  to  note  that Article 254 does not  contemplate that  the
State law and law  made by  the Parliament  must  be the same   in
toto .  For,   to   say   that   would   render   the   whole   objective   of   revival
through   Presidential   assent   as   pointless   exercise   as   it   will   serve
no purpose for  any State to enact a law exactly the same as the
33

law made by the Parliament. In fact, any such dittoed and  clichéd
law made by the State legislature would be redundant.   It (State)
would rather follow the law made by the Parliament.
35. Indubitably, Article 254 contemplates co­existence of Union
and State laws, even if repugnant, but only after the repugnancy
is   assented   to   by   the   President.   Differently   put,   Article   254   is   a
manifestation of decentralized law­making and recognition of the
competency   of   the   State   legislature   to   modulate   dispensation   as
may be expedient to that State, upon seeking Presidential assent
for such deviation.
36. Having   understood   the   material   basis   of   the   High   Court
judgment and basic essence of the concept of repugnancy in light
of Article 254, the fundamental question now is whether the 2019
Act qualifies as sufficient compliance of Article 254(2). For, Article
254(2)   is   the   only   mode   of   revival   as   per   the   High   Court
judgment.
37. Article 254(2) is produced again for ready reference thus:
“ 254.   Inconsistency   between   laws   made   by   Parliament
and laws made by the Legislatures of States. —
(1) …
(2) Where a   law made by the Legislature of a State   with
respect   to   one   of   the   matters   enumerated   in   the
Concurrent   List   contains   any   provision   repugnant   to
34

the   provisions   of   an   earlier   law   made   by   Parliament   or
an   existing   law   with   respect   to   that   matter,   then,   the   law
so made by the Legislature of such State shall , if it has
been   reserved   for   the   consideration   of   the   President   and
has received his assent ,  prevail in that State :”
(emphasis supplied)
The basic ingredients for the application of Article 254(2) can be
noted thus:
(i)  A   law   made   by   the   legislature   of   the   State   (the
2019 Act in this case);
(ii)  Such   law   is   made   on   a   subject   falling   in   the
concurrent   list   (Entry­42   of   the   Concurrent   List   in
this case);
(iii)  Such   law   is   repugnant   to   the   provisions   of   an
earlier/existing   law   made   by   the   Parliament   (the
2013 Act in this case); and
(iv)  The   State   law   is   reserved   for   the   assent   of   the
President and has received the same.
Upon   fulfilment   of   the   above   conditions,   such   State   law   would
prevail   in   the   State   despite   there   being   a   law   made   by   the
Parliament   on   the   same   subject   and   despite   being   repugnant
thereto.   The   most   peculiar   feature   of   Article   254(2)   is   the
recognition of existence of repugnancy  between the law made by
the   Parliament   and   State   law   and   rendering   that   repugnancy
inconsequential upon procurement of Presidential assent. In this
35

case,   the   State   legislature   duly   passed   the   2019   Act   (State   law)
on a subject of the concurrent list in the presence of a law made
by   the   Parliament   (2013   Act)   and   obtained   the   assent   of   the
President to the same on 02.12.2019 after duly placing the State
law before the President and duly stating the reason for reserving
it   for   his   assent.   A   priori,   we   hold   that   this   is   in   compliance   of
Article 254(2). 
38. This   understanding   of   Article   254(2)   is   well   settled   and
reference can be usefully made to the following paragraph of   Pt.
Rishikesh 40
:
“ 15.     Clause (2) of Article 254 is an exception to clause
(1). If law made by the State Legislature is reserved for
consideration   and   receives   assent   of   the   President
though   the   State   law   is   inconsistent   with   the   Central
Act,   the   law   made   by   the   Legislature   of   the   State
prevails over the Central law and operates in that State
as   valid   law.     If   Parliament   amends   the   law,   after   the
amendment made by the State Legislature has received the
assent   of   the   President,   the   earlier   amendment   made   by
the State Legislature, if found inconsistent with the Central
amended   law,   both   Central   law   and   the   State   Law   cannot
coexist   without   colliding   with   each   other.   Repugnancy
thereby   arises   and   to   the   extent   of   the   repugnancy   the
State   law   becomes   void   under   Article   254(1)   unless   the
State   Legislature   again   makes   law   reserved   for   the
consideration   of   the   President   and   receives   the   assent   of
the President. Full Bench of the High Court held that since
U.P. Act 57 of 1976 received the assent of the President on
30­12­1976,   while   the   Central   Act   was   assented   on   9­9­
1976,   the   U.P.   Act   made   by   the   State   Legislature,   later   in
point of time it is a valid law.”
(emphasis supplied)
40  supra at Footnote No. 11
36

39. The petitioners have advanced lengthy arguments as to how
the 2019 Act is repugnant to the 2013 Act. We are constrained to
observe   that   the   whole   exercise   of   pointing   out   any   repugnancy
after a validating Act has obtained the assent of the President is
otiose.   For,   the   whole   purpose   of   Article   254(2)   is   to   resuscitate
and   operationalize   a   repugnant   Act   or   repugnant   provisions   in
such Act. For, the Constitution provides concurrent powers to the
states as well on subjects falling in List­III. After duly complying
with   the   requirements   of   Article   254(2),   the   Court   is   left   with
nothing   to   achieve   by   identifying   repugnancy   between   the   laws
because   the   same   has   already   been   identified,   accepted   and
validated   as   per   the   sanction   of   the   Constitution   under   Article
254(2).   To   indulge   in   such   an   exercise   would   be   intuitive.
Moreover,   the   Court   ought   not   to   nullify   a   law   made   in
compliance with Article 254(2) on the sole ground of repugnancy.
For,   repugnancy,   in   such   cases,   is   said   to   have   been
constitutionalized.     To   put   it   differently,   the   very   purpose   of
engaging in the exercise, in terms of clause (2) of Article 254, pre­
supposes   existence   of   repugnancy   and   is   intended   to   overcome
such repugnancy.   Therefore, the endeavour of the petitioners in
37

the present matter to highlight repugnancy, is misdirected, flimsy
and inconsequential.
40. Having said thus, the argument that the 2019 Act could not
be   said   to   be   a   “re­enactment”   of   the   1997   Act   and   2001   Act
deserves to be addressed. For, the High Court judgment called for
re­enactment   for   the   proper   fulfilment   of   Article   254(2).   While
enacting   the   2019   Act,   the   State   legislature   neither   individually
placed the 1997 Act and 2001 Act in the form of fresh bills before
the   House,   nor   introduced   amending   Acts   for   the   said   three
enactments   in   order   to   incorporate   the   provisions   of
compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation. Instead, it framed
one bill that sought to achieve four purposes –
first ,   amend   the   State   enactments   to   provide   for   different
provisions   of   compensation   to   bring   them   in   line   with   the   law
made by the Parliament;
second ,   add   fresh   provisions   relating   to   resettlement,
rehabilitation   and   infrastructure  amenities  at   par   with   the   2013
Act;
38

third , revive the enactments declared to be repugnant and void by
the   High   Court   and   validate   them   after   passing   this   bill   in   the
assembly and placing it before the President; and
fourth , restore the validity of all past acquisitions under the State
legislations,   quashed   by   the   High   Court   by   making   the   Act
operative from a retrospective date.
41. Be it noted, enactment or re­enactment involves introducing
a   bill   in   the   legislature,   readings   of   the   bill   as   mandated   in   the
assembly   rules   of   conduct,   passing   thereof   by   the   legislature,
placing   it   before   the   Governor   or   the   President   (if   necessary).
Such   a   bill   could   either   delineate   all   the   existing   and   fresh
provisions from scratch or could incorporate those provisions by
way   of   reference.   The   latter   would   fall   in   the   category   of
referential   legislation,   as   done   in   the   present   case.   The
petitioners   have   contended   that   such   referential   legislation   is
impermissible   and   re­enactment   would   mean   introducing   fresh
bills   containing   the   same   provisions   of   1997   Act   and   2001   Act.
We   must   note   that   the   argument   is   tenuous.   For,   we   fail   to   see
what   material   difference   would   result   in   following   either   of   the
two   methods.   The   legislature   has   made   no   attempt   to   hide   the
39

provisions   as   the   2019   Act   is   divided   into   three   parts   and   each
part is specifically dedicated to concerned State enactment. 
42. To   wit,   the   Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   of   the   2019
Act  depicts the background in  which  it  was thought  appropriate
to  resort  to  such legislative tool, for  the  revival  of the  concerned
State Acts declared to be repugnant by the High Court including
to   amend   the   same   and   for   validating   the   actions   already   taken
thereunder.     It   would   be   useful   to   reproduce   the   Statement   of
Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Act, which reads thus: ­
“In   the   Writ   Petitions   filed   against   the   Right   to   Fair
Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,
Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   (Tamil   Nadu   Amendment)
Act, 2014 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 2015), the Division Bench of
Hon’ble   High   Court   of   Madras   in   its   order   dated   03­07­
2019 has held that Article 254(1) of the Constitution, by its
operation   rendered   the   Tamil  Nadu   Land   Acquisition   Acts,
namely,   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acquisition   of   Land   for   Harijan
Welfare   Schemes   Act,   1978   (Tamil   Nadu   Act   31   of   1978),
the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes
Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999) and the Tamil Nadu
Highways   Act,   2001   (Tamil   Nadu   Act   34   of   2002)
inoperative   on   the   date   on   which   the   Right   to   Fair
Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,
Rehabilitation   and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   (Central   Act   30
of   2013)   was   made,   namely,   27th   September   2013.
Consequently,   the   High   Court   has   held   that   all   the
acquisitions made under the said three Tamil Nadu Acts on
or   after   the   27th   September   2013   as   illegal   and   quashed
them save those lands which have already been put to use
and the purpose for which the land was acquired has been
accomplished. 
2. Under the aforesaid three Tamil Nadu Acts, on and from
26th September 2013, though 23804 hectares of land have
been acquired, only 1,373 hectares have been actually put
to use. The acquisitions proceedings are in progress in the
remaining   22,431   hectares   of   land.   This   involves   an
40

approximate   value   of   Rs.1,84,778   crores   and   the   projects
are   capable   of   generating   employment   for   1.83   lakh
persons. As a  result, the State Exchequer  would be  put  to
heavy monetary loss besides derailing many developmental
projects,   causing   significant   negative   impact   on   the   State
economy. 
3.   To   tide   over   the   situation,   the   Government   have
decided   to   revive   the   aforesaid   three   Tamil   Nadu   Acts
and   to   apply   the   provisions   relating   to   the
determination   of   compensation,   rehabilitation   and
resettlement   and   infrastructure   amenities   as   in   the
said   Central   Act   30   of   2013   to   the   land   acquisitions
made   under   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acts   and   to   validate   the
action   already   taken   under   the   said   Acts.   Accordingly,
the   Government   have   decided   to   undertake   legislation
for the above said purpose . 
4. The Bill seeks to give effect to the above decision.”
(emphasis supplied)
The   provisions   of   the   2019   Act   notified   in   the   Tamil   Nadu
Government   Gazette   Extraordinary   No.   451   (Part   IV   –   Section   2)
on 5.12.2019, as commended to the State legislature and also the
Governor and the President of India to accord assent to overcome
the repugnancy with the Act made by the Parliament, read thus: ­
“The   following   Act   of   the   Tamil   Nadu   Legislative   Assembly
received   the   assent   of   the   President   on   the   2nd   December
2019 and is hereby published for general information: — 
ACT No. 38 OF 2019.
An   Act   to   revive   the   operation   of   the   Tamil   Nadu
Acquisition   of   Land   for   Harijan   Welfare   Schemes   Act,
1978,   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acquisition   of   Land   for
Industrial   Purposes   Act,   1997   and   the   Tamil   Nadu
Highways Act, 2001 . 
BE it enacted by  the Legislative Assembly  of the State
of   Tamil   Nadu   in   the   Seventieth   Year   of   the   Republic   of
India as follows: — 
41

1.   (1)   This   Act   may   be   called   the   Tamil   Nadu   Land
Acquisition   Laws   (Revival   of   Operation,   Amendment
and Validation) Act, 2019 .
(2)  It shall be deemed to have come into force on
the 26th day of September 2013 .
2.  (1)   All   the   provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu
Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   1978   Act),   except   the
provisions   relating   to   the   determination   of   compensation,
shall   stand   revived   with   effect   on   and   from   the   26th
day of September 2013.
(2)   All  rules,   notifications,   notices,   orders,   directions
issued   or   any   other   proceedings   initiated   under   the   1978
Act,   except   those   relating   to   determination   of
compensation,   which   were   in   force   immediately   before   the
26th   day   of   September   2013   shall,   for   all   purposes,   be
deemed to have been revived on and from the 26th day
of September 2013.
(3)   The   provisions   relating   to   the   determination   of
compensation   as   specified   in   the   First   Schedule,
rehabilitation   and   resettlement   as   specified   in   the   Second
Schedule   and   infrastructure   amenities   as   specified   in   the
Third   Schedule   to   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   apply   to   the   land
acquisition proceedings under the 1978 Act.
3.   Save   as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Act,   the
provisions   of   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   cease   to   apply   to   any   land
which   is   required   for   the   purpose   specified   in   sub­section
(1) of section 4 of the 1978 Act and any  such land shall be
acquired   by   the   Government   only   in   accordance   with
the provisions of the 1978 Act .
4.  Section 20 of the 1978 Act shall be omitted .
5.   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any
judgment,   decree   or   order   of   any   court,   the   provisions   of
the   1978   Act,   except   the   provisions   relating   to
determination   of   compensation,   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been   in   force   in   all   material   times   during   the   period
commencing   on   the   26th   day   of   September   2013   and
ending with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil
Nadu   Government   Gazette,   and   anything   done   or   any
action   taken   under   the   1978   Act,   except   those   relating   to
42

determination   of   compensation   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been validly done or taken under the 1978 Act .
PART – II.
6.  (1)   All   the   provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu
Acquisition   of   Land   for   Industrial   Purposes   Act,   1997
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   1999   Act),   except   the
provisions   relating   to   the   determination   of   compensation,
shall   stand   revived   with   effect   on   and   from   the   26th
day of September 2013 .
(2)   All   rules,   notifications,   notices,   orders,
directions   issued   or   any   other   proceedings   initiated   under
the   1999   Act,   except   those   relating   to   determination   of
compensation,   which   were   in   force   immediately   before   the
26th   day   of   September   2013   shall,   for   all   purposes,   be
deemed to have been revived on and from the 26th day
of September 2013 . 
(3)   The   provisions   relating   to   the   determination
of   compensation   as   specified   in   the   First   Schedule,
rehabilitation   and   resettlement   as   specified   in   the   Second
Schedule   and   infrastructure   amenities   as   specified   in   the
Third   Schedule   to   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   apply   to   the   land
acquisition proceedings under the 1999 Act.
7.   Save   as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Act,   the
provisions   of   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   cease   to   apply   to   any   land
which   is   required   for   the   purpose   specified   in   sub­section
(1) of section 3 of the 1999 Act and any such land  shall be
acquired   by   the   Government   only   in   accordance   with
the provisions of the 1999 Act .
8.  Section 21 of the 1999 Act shall be omitted .
9.   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any
judgment,   decree   or   order   of   any   court,   the   provisions   of
the   1999   Act,   except   the   provisions   relating   to
determination   of   compensation,   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been   in   force   in   all   material   times   during   the   period
commencing   on   the   26th   day   of   September   2013   and
ending with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil
Nadu   Government   Gazette,   and   anything   done   or   any
action   taken   under   the   1999   Act,   except   those   relating   to
43

determination   of   compensation   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been validly done or taken under the 1999 Act .
PART – III.
10.  (1)   All   the   provisions   of   the   Tamil   Nadu
Highways   Act,   2001   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   2002
Act),  except   the   provisions   relating   to  the   determination   of
compensation ,   shall   stand   revived   with   effect   on   and
from the 26th day of September 2013 .
(2)   All   rules,   notifications,   notices,   orders,
directions   issued   or   any   other   proceedings   initiated   under
the   2002   Act,   except   those   relating   to   determination   of
compensation,   which   were   in   force   immediately   before   the
26th   day   of   September   2013   shall,   for   all   purposes,   be
deemed to have been revived on and from the 26th day
of September 2013 .
(3) The provisions relating to the  determination
of   compensation   as   specified   in   the   First   Schedule,
rehabilitation   and   resettlement   as   specified   in   the   Second
Schedule   and   infrastructure   amenities   as   specified   in   the
Third   Schedule   to   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   apply   to   the   land
acquisition proceedings under the 2002 Act .
11.   Save   as   otherwise   provided   in   this   Act,   the
provisions   of   the   Right   to   Fair   Compensation   and
Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation   and
Resettlement   Act,   2013   shall   cease   to   apply   to   any   land
which   is   required   for   the   purpose   specified   in   sub­section
(1)   of  section  15  of  the   2002  Act   and   any   such   land   shall
be acquired by the Government only in accordance with
the provisions of the 2002 Act .
12.   Section 68 of the 2002 Act shall be omitted .
13.   Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   any
judgment,   decree   or   order   of   any   court,   the   provisions   of
the   2002   Act,   except   the   provisions   relating   to
determination   of   compensation,   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been   in   force   in   all   material   times   during   the   period
commencing   on   the   26th   day   of   September   2013   and
ending with the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil
Nadu   Government   Gazette,   and   anything   done   or   any
action   taken   under   the   2002   Act,   except   those   relating   to
determination   of   compensation   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been validly done or taken under the 2002 Act .
44

(By order of the Governor) 
C. GOPI RAVIKUMAR, 
Secretary to Government (FAC) 
Law Department.”
(emphasis supplied)
As aforesaid, the legislative intent behind the 2019 Act and more
particularly, the assent accorded thereto by the Governor and the
President of India for overcoming repugnancy with the Act made
by   the   Parliament,   was   to   revive   the   operation   of   the   State
enactments declared as null and void being unconstitutional and
repugnant to the Act made by  the Parliament and to amend the
same, as well as, validate the actions already taken by the State
authorities thereunder.
43. For   instance,   Part­I   of   the   2019   Act   talks   about   revival   of
1978   Act   in   Section­2(1),   revival   of   all   the   notifications,   orders
etc.   passed   thereunder   in   Section­2(2),   incorporation   of   First,
Second  and   Third  Schedules   of  the   2013   Act  to   the   1978  Act   in
Section­2(3),   saving   clause   in   Section­3   and   validation   of
previous acts in Section­5. Similar  pattern is followed in Parts­II
and III for 1997 Act and 2001 Act respectively.   Notably, Section
20 of the 1978 Act, Section 21 of the 1999 Act and Section 68 of
the  2002  Act were omitted, respectively   by  Sections  4,  8  and  12
of   the   2019   Act.     The   overall   scheme   is   well   laid­out   and   is   not
45

cryptic in any manner so as to play a fraud upon the mandate of
the Constitution. More importantly, the concerned constitutional
bodies   i.e.,   legislative   assembly,   Governor   and   President   have
understood the substance of what is placed before them. We are
concerned with the substance of the legislation, and not its form.
44. We   must   note   that   referential   legislation   is   a   recognized
form   of   legislation   and   the   Constitution   does   not   attach
unconstitutionality   to   a   legislation   for   being   framed   in   a   certain
manner   until   and   unless   it   violates   any   provision   of   the
Constitution.   In   Girnar   Traders   (3)   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra
&   Ors. 41
,   this   Court   noted   how   the   provisions   imported   in   a
legislation   by   way   of   reference   become   a   part   of   the   legislation
itself for all practical purposes. It observed thus:
“ 89.     With   the   development   of   law,   the   legislature   has
adopted the common practice of referring to the provisions
of the existing statute while enacting new laws.   Reference
to   an   earlier   law   in   the   later   law   could   be   a   simple
reference   of   provisions   of   earlier   statute   or   a   specific
reference where the earlier law is made an integral part
of   the   new   law   i.e.   by   incorporation.   In   the   case   of
legislation by  reference, it is fictionally  made a  part of
the later law.  …”
(emphasis supplied)
41  (2011) 3 SCC 1
46

In   Ujagar   Prints 42
,   the   Court   while   deciding   the   impact   of
subsequent   changes   in   a   statute   referred   to   in   a   legislation,
promptly noted how the reference of an Act or its provisions into
another   Act practically   amounts  to   re­enactment   of the  existing
provisions at the time of such reference. It observed thus:
“ 93.   Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an
earlier   Act   or   some   of   its   provisions   are   incorporated   by
reference into a later Act.  In this event, the provisions of
the  earlier  Act  or   those   so  incorporated,   as they  stand
in   the   earlier   Act   at   the   time   of   incorporation,   will   be
read   into   the   later   Act.   Subsequent   changes   in   the
earlier   Act   or   the   incorporated   provisions   will   have   to
be   ignored   because,   for   all   practical   purposes,   the
existing   provisions   of   the   earlier   Act   have   been   re­
enacted  by such  reference  into the later  one , rendering
irrelevant   what   happens   to   the   earlier   statute
thereafter. ...”
(emphasis supplied)
In   Krishna   Chandra   Gangopadhyaya 43
,   the   Court
acknowledged   that   there   is   no   constitutional   inhibition   to
legislation   by   incorporation   and   found   it   in   accordance   with   the
power   accorded   by   the   constitutional   law   to   instrumentalities
clothed   with   plenary   authorities   (the   State   legislature   in   this
case). The relevant paragraph reads thus:
“12. …
…
The kernel of Gwalior Rayon 44
  is the ambit of delegation by
Legislatures,   and   the   reference   to   legislation   by
42  supra at Footnote No. 34
43  supra at Footnote No. 27
44   Gwalior Rayon Mills v. Asst. C.S.T., (1974) 4 SCC 98, 125­126 : 1974 SCC (Tax) 226
47

adoption   or   incorporation   supports   the   competence
and   does   not   contradict   the   vires   of   such   a   process   —
not  an  unusual   phenomenon  in  legislative  systems  nor
counter   to   the   plenitude   of   powers   constitutional   law
has   in   many   jurisdictions   conceded   to   such
instrumentalities   clothed   with   plenary   authority.   The
Indian   Legislatures   and   courts   have   never   accepted   any
inhibition   against   or   limitation   upon   enactment   by
incorporation, as such.”
(emphasis supplied)
45. The   authorities   discussed   above   indicate   a   clear   line   of
precept   that   plenary   power   of   legislature   is   not   limited   to   the
substance   of   legislation   in   context   of   the   Seventh   Schedule,   but
also   extends   to   the   determination   of   the   form   of   legislation.   To
say that a particular form of legislative activity is not permissible
would   require   a   strong   basis   in   the   Constitution,   which   has   not
been pointed out by the petitioners. The Constitution envisages a
judicial review of the existence of legislative competence and use
of   such   competence   to   enact   something   that   does   not   violate
Part­III   or   other   provisions   of   the   Constitution.   It   does   not
envisage   a   review   of   the   cosmetic   characteristics   of   a   legislation
as   long   as   the   substance   of   such   legislation   has   its   roots   in   the
Constitution.
46. We may now consider the argument that the 2019 Act does
not remove the defects found by  the High Court and thus, lacks
determinative principle thereby making it arbitrary. The 2019 Act
48

is   a   conscious   attempt   by   the   State   legislature   to   bring   four
material   aspects   of   land   acquisition   under   the   three   State
enactments   at   par   with   the   2013   Act   i.e.,   compensation,
rehabilitation,   resettlement   and   infrastructure   facilities.   No
doubt, certain features of the stated law made by the Parliament
have   been   left   out,   but   that   debate   does   not   fall   for   our
consideration  as the  vires of  1997 Act  and  2001 Act  are  already
under   consideration   in   the   batch   of   SLPs,   as   already   pointed
above. To say that failure to import all provisions of the law made
by   the   Parliament   in   the   State   enactments   results   into   non­
removal   of   defects   pointed   by   the   High   Court,   is   nothing   but   a
palpable misreading of the judgment of the High Court.
47. Whereas,   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   does   not   even
point   out   the   absence   of   compensation/rehabilitation/
resettlement/infrastructure   related   provisions   as   a   defect   in   the
State   enactments.   It   nowhere   points   out   the   exact   provisions
from the State enactments which are repugnant to the law made
by the Parliament. The only defect pointed out by the High Court
was the impermissibility of Section 105­A (coming into effect from
01.01.2014),   as   a   tool   for   reviving   the   State   enactments   once
rendered   repugnant   (on   27.09.2013)   due   to   law   made   by   the
49

Parliament.     The   State   has   since   been   advised   to   accept   that
defect pointed out by the High Court and has moved on from that
thought   process   by   devising   a   new   legislative   tool   for   validating
the   State   enactments   in   line   with   Article   254(2).   Had   the
legislature re­enacted Section 105­A even after the declaration of
invalidity   by   the   High   Court,   it   would   have   been   a   case   of   non­
removal   of   defect   pointed   out   by   the   High   Court.   In   fact,   that
would   have   been   declaratory   overruling   of   the   judgment   of   the
Court by the legislature, which, as already discussed at length, is
simply impermissible. The effect of the 2019 Act is to change the
law retrospectively and not to overrule the judgment of the Court.
48. The   dictum   of   the   Court   in   Karnataka   Pawn   Broker
Association 45
  does   not   apply   to   this   case.     It   is   based   on   a
radically   different   factual   premise.   In   that   case,   the   Court   was
considering   a   situation   of   clear­cut   overruling   of   mandamus
issued   by   the   Court.   No   such   thing   has   been   done   in   this   case
because   there   is   no   resurfacing   of   Section   105­A   in   the   same
form and also because revival by  way of the 2019 Act is in tune
with   the   mandate   of   Article   254(2).     Strikingly,   the   High   Court
nowhere   issued   a   prohibition   on   revival   and   validation   at   all.   It
45  supra at Footnote No. 10
50

only   disapproved   one   particular   way   of   revival.   Notably,   this
Court   in   State   of   Tamil   Nadu 46
  expounded   that   “ One   of   the
tests   for   determining   whether   a   judgment   is   nullified   is   to   see
whether   the   law   and   the   judgment   are   inconsistent   and
irreconcilable   so   that   both   cannot   stand   together.”   Applying   this
test, we see no irreconcilability between the High Court judgment
and the 2019 Act. The 2019 Act is an evolution, not reiteration of
the earlier position much less regression thereof.
49. Even   noting   the   test   in   Shri   Prithvi   Cotton   Mills   Ltd.   &
Anr.   vs.   Broach   Borough   Municipality   &   Ors. 47
,   which   states
that the ultimate query should be whether the Court would have
given the  same  decision  had  the  circumstances been the altered
ones, we see no indication in the High Court order that the Court
would   have   arrived   at   the   same   decision   even   today.   For,   the
method prescribed under Article 254(2) has been followed now.
PRESIDENTIAL ASSENT UNDER ARTICLE 254(2)
50. We   may   now   address   the   contention   that   the   actual
repugnancy was not pointed out to the President while obtaining
assent   and   thus,   requirements   of   Article   254(2)   remained
46  supra at Footnote No. 18
47  (1969) 2 SCC 283
51

unfulfilled.   To   address   this,   the   respondents   have   placed   on
record   Letter   No.   13566/Rev­Dfg/2019­1   dated   25.07.2019
written   by   the   State   Government   for   obtaining   the   assent   of   the
President.   The   letter   succinctly   narrates   the   entire   factual
position including  about the failed attempt  of  the State to  revive
the   State   enactments   by   enacting   Section   105­A.   After   duly
specifying   the   existence   of   distinctive   provisions   in   various
enactments,   particularly   relating   to   compensation,   resettlement,
rehabilitation   and   infrastructural   facilities,   the   letter   clearly
states   that   some   provisions   of   the   2019   Act   could   be   said   to   be
repugnant  to  the 2013 Act  and thus, the  Act is  being   placed for
consideration   of   the   President   as   per   Article   254.   The   relevant
paragraph reads thus:
“7.   The   provisions   of   the   Bill   proposes   to   revive   the   three
Tamil   Nadu   Acts,   namely,   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acquisition   of
Land   for   Harijan   Welfare   Schemes   Act,   1978   (Tamil   Nadu
Act   31   of   1978),   the   Tamil   Nadu   Acquisition   of   Land   for
Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999)
and   the   Tamil   Nadu   Highways   Act,   2001   (Tamil   Nadu   Act
34   of   2002)   with   retrospective   effect   from   the   26 th
September,   2013   and   the   provisions   of   the   said   three
Tamil   Nadu   Acts   may   be   said   to   be   repugnant   to   the
provisions contained in the Right to Fair Compensation
and   Transparency   in   Land   Acquisition,   Rehabilitation
and   Resettlement   Act,   2013   (Central   Act   30   of   2013),
which   is   an   earlier   law   made   by   Parliament   on   the
Concurrent   subject.   Hence,   the   Bill   is   reserved   for   the
consideration   of   the   President   under   Article   254(2)   of   the
Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
52

51. The   petitioners’   argument   stemmed   from   the   decision   in
Kaiser­I­Hind  Pvt.  Ltd. 48
  However, upon closer examination, we
find   that   the   reliance   is   misplaced.   In   that   case,   the   Court   was
considering   a   requisition   of   assent   by   the   State   Government
without specifying the exact law made by the Parliament which is
purportedly   repugnant   to   the   State   law.   In   that   light,   the   Court
observed   that   the   mandate   of   Article   254   requires   placing   the
State   law   before   the   President   for   his/her   consideration   for
permitting   the   State   law  to   prevail   over   a   specific   law   made   by
the   Parliament.   In   other   words,   there   can   be   no   general   assent
against all laws made by the Parliament operating on the subject.
The Court went on to make it clear that judicial review of assent
does   not   permit   examining   whether   the   assent   was   rightly   or
wrongly or erroneously given. In paragraph 25, it noted thus:
“ 25.     In   our   view,   for   finding   out   whether   the   assent
was   given   qua   the   repugnancy   between   the   State
legislation   and   the   earlier   law   made   by   Parliament,
there is no question of deciding validity of such assent
nor the assent is subjected to any judicial review. That
is to say, merely looking at the record, for which assent
was sought, would not mean that the Court is deciding
whether   the   assent   is   rightly,   wrongly   or   erroneously
granted.   The   consideration   by   the   Court   is   limited   to
the   extent   that   whether   the   State   has   sought   assent
qua   particular   earlier   law   or   laws   made   by   Parliament
prevailing  in  the State or it has sought  general  assent.
48  supra at Footnote No. 17
53

In   such   case,   the   Court   is   not   required   to   decide   the
validity   of   the   “assent”   granted   by   the   President.   In   the
present   case,   the   assent   was   given   after   considering   the
extent and nature of repugnancy between the Bombay Rent
Act   and   the   Transfer   of   Property   Act   as   well   as   the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act.  Therefore, it would be
totally   unjustified   to   hold   that   once   the   assent   is   granted
by   the   President,   the   State   law   would   prevail   qua   earlier
other   law   enacted   by   Parliament   for   which   no   assent   was
sought for nor which was reserved for the consideration of
the President.”
(emphasis supplied)
To state the limited scope of examination of assent under Article
254, the Court went on to observe that it is not even considering
whether   the   assent   was   given   without   considering   the   extent   or
nature of repugnancy and noted that:
“ 27.   In   this   case,   we   have   made   it   clear   that   we   are   not
considering   the   question   that   the   assent   of   the   President
was   rightly   or   wrongly   given.   We   are   also   not   considering
the   question   that   —   whether   “assent”   given   without
considering   the   extent   and   the   nature   of   the   repugnancy
should be taken as no assent at all. …..”
In   the   concurrent   opinion   by   Doraiswamy   Raju   J.   in   the   same
case,   His   Lordship   has   resonated   the   same   view   and   even
observed   that   so   far   the   assent   under   Article   254   is   concerned,
mere supply of copy of the bill may obviate the need to pin­point
provisions thereunder but the law made by the Parliament which
is sought to give way to the State law must be clearly specified. In
paragraph 74, it is noted thus:
54

“ 74.     The   mere   forwarding   of   a   copy   of   the   Bill   may
obviate,   if   at  all,   only  the   need   to   refer  to  each   one   of
the   provisions   therein   in   detail   in   the   requisition   sent
or   the   letter   forwarding   it,   but   not   obliterate   the
necessity   to   point   out   specifically   the   particular
Central   law   or   provisions   with   reference   to   which,   the
predominance   is   claimed   or   purported   to   be   claimed.
The deliberate use of the word “consideration” in clause (2)
of   Article   254,   in   my   view,   not   only   connotes   that   there
should   be   an   active   application   of   mind,   but   also
postulates   a   deliberate  and   careful   thought   process   before
taking   a   decision   to   accord   or   not   to   accord   the   assent
sought   for.   If   the   object   of   referring   the   State   law   for
consideration   is   to   have   the   repugnancy   resolved   by
securing predominance to the State law, the President has
to   necessarily   consider   the   nature   and   extent   of
repugnancy,   the   feasibility,   practicalities   and   desirabilities
involved   therein,   though   may   not   be   obliged   to   write   a
judgment in the same manner, the courts of law do, before
arriving at a conclusion to grant or refuse to grant or even
grant partially, if the repugnancy is with reference to more
than   one   law   in   force   made   by   Parliament.   Protection
cannot   be   claimed   for   the   State   law,   when   questioned
before   courts,   taking   cover   under   the   assent,   merely
asserting   that   it   was   in   general   form,   irrespective   of   the
actual   fact   whether   the   State   claimed   for   such   protection
against a specific law or the attention of the President was
invited to at least an apprehended repugnancy vis­à­vis the
particular Central law. .....”
(emphasis supplied)
52. In   the   present   case,   the   letter   seeking   assent   clearly
demonstrates that the three State enactments were made for the
purpose   of   speedy   acquisitions.   It   further   states   that   the   law
made   by   the   Parliament   rendered   the   three   enactments
repugnant and out of operation owing to the Madras High Court
judgment. It also states that the State has considerable interest,
having   a   strong   bearing   on   the   public   exchequer,   in   saving   and
reviving   the   three   State   enactments.   It   also   clearly   specifies   the
55

law made by the Parliament, which could be coming in the way of
the   State   enactments   for   due   consideration   by   the   President.
Suffice it to say that the communication was in compliance with
the   mandate   of   Article   254   as   well   as   with   the   decision   of   this
Court in  Kaiser­I­Hind Pvt. Ltd. 49
  We see no reason to intervene
on this ground.
EFFECT   OF   RETROSPECTIVE   COMMENCEMENT   DATE   OF
THE 2019 ACT
53. We   may   now   consider   the   argument   that   retrospectivity
from 26.09.2013 was fatal to the 2019 Act as on that date, there
was no 2013 Act in operation and when the 2013 Act came into
operation   on   27.09.2013,   the   State   enactments   would   again
become repugnant. In our view, even this plea is untenable.  For,
a   law   is   said   to   be   “made”   on   the   day   it   obtains   Presidential
assent.   Throughout   the   chapter   on   federal   relations,   the   word
“made”   or   “make”   is   used   in   the   Constitution   while   referring   to
legislative   activity.   Making   of   law   implies   a   clearly   demarcated
procedure   which   culminates   with   the   assent   of   the   President
under   Article   111   or   under   Article   254   (if   legislated   on   same
subject   matter)   or   of   Governor   under   Article   200.   Notably,
49  supra at Footnote No. 17
56

Articles   111,   200   and   254   are   part   of   the   constitutionally
prescribed legislative procedure itself. The other concept relevant
for this discussion is of “commencement”. Commencement of law,
unlike   making   of   law,   is   not   a   part   of   the   legislative   process.
Rather,   it   is   an   offshoot   of   the   successful   culmination   of   the
legislative process. In other words, commencement is a question
which   follows   the   legislative   process   and   intent   and   does   not
overlap with it. The commencement of law could be from the date
of   making   (assent),   or   from   a   back   date   or   even   from   a   future
date.   But   it   does   not   affect   the   fact   that   the   legislation   has
stepped   into   the   statute   book   and   the   provisions   relating   to
repugnancy   as   well   as   other   provisions   of   the   chapter   of
legislative   relations   between   the   Union   and   the   State   have
become   active   from   that   point   onwards,   as   they   are   concerned
with   the   date   of   making.     Thus,   for   checking   repugnancy,   the
relevant   point   of   time   would   be   the   date   of   making   i.e.,   date   of
assent and not date of commencement. This understanding finds
approval   from   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Mar   Appraem   Kuri
Company Limited 50
  thus:
“ 60 .   ...We   have   to   read   the   word   “made”   in   the   proviso   to
Article 254(2) in a consistent manner.
50  supra at Footnote No. 26
57

61.     The   entire   above   discussion   on   Articles   245,   246,
250,  251   is  only  to   indicate   that  the   word   “made”  has
to   be   read   in   the   context   of   the   law­making   process
and,   if   so   read,   it   is   clear   that   to   test   repugnancy   one
has   to   go   by   the   making   of   law   and   not   by   its
commencement. ”
(emphasis supplied)
54. The   above   understanding   emanates   from   the   basic   concept
of   retrospectivity.   The   primary   objective   of   retrospective
application of a law is to alter an undesirable past circumstance
and it is meant to apply to things which have already happened.
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, retrospectivity is defined as:
“ 921.   Meaning   of   “retrospective” .   It   has   been   said   that
“retrospective”   is   somewhat   ambiguous   and   that   a   good
deal   of   confusion   has   been   caused   by   the   fact   that   it   is
used   in   more   senses   than   one.   In   general,   however,   the
courts   regard   as   retrospective   any   statute   which
operates on cases or facts coming into existence before
its commencement in the  sense  that it  affects,  even  if
for   the   future   only,   the   character   or   consequences   of
transactions   previously   entered   into   or   of   other   past
conduct.   Thus   a   statute   is   not   retrospective   merely
because   it   affects   existing   rights;   or   is   it   retrospective
merely   because   a   part   of   the   requisites   for   its   action   is
drawn from a time antecedent to its passing.”
(emphasis supplied)
The   underlying   purpose   of   retrospectivity,   therefore,   is   to   cure
including   validate   certain   transactions   of   the   past   by   making   a
law   in   the   present   and   not   to   compete   with   the   laws   existing   in
the   past   at   that   point   of   time.   In   this   case,   the   objective   was   to
save   and   validate   past   acquisitions   under   the   three   State
58

enactments,   which   were   valid   until   the   commencement   of   the
2013 Act but stood quashed due to the High Court decision.  This
was also for altering the basis of the law in existence at that point
of time and providing for benefits at par with the 2013 Act, so far
as   it   was   fit   in   the   wisdom   of   the   State   legislature.   No   doubt,   it
may   appear   anomalous   to   operationalise   the   2019   Act   from
26.09.2013,   a   day   prior   to   the   making   of   the   2013   Act,   but   it
does   not   make   any   impact   on   the   validity   thereof   or   its
substance.     The   date   has   been   chosen   by   the   State   legislature
only  by  way  of abundant  caution  and, in our  view, rightly.   It is
obviously   relevant  to  overcome the repugnancy  corresponding  to
the   commencement   of   the   2013   Act.   Adopting   any   other
interpretation   would   not   only   be   unwarranted   as   per   the
constitutional   scheme  but  would   also   strike   at  the   very   purpose
of   a   retrospective   reviving   and   validating   enactment.   More   so,   it
would open a pandora’s box of unforeseen conflicts.
55. During   the   course   of   hearing   as   well   as   in   the   written
submissions,   the   petitioners   drew   a   comparative   analysis
between   the   provisions   of   the   three   State   enactments   and   the
2013 Act to establish a case of violation of equality under Article
14. The respondents objected to the same by stating that such an
59

approach is impermissible. Be that as it may, we are leaving this
contention   open   as   it   is   beyond   the   limited   scope   of   our
consideration   herein.   We   deem   it   fit   to   desist   from   dilating
thereon   in   this   judgment.     The   petitioners   herein   may   raise   all
other   issues   not   dealt   with   in   this   judgment   in   relation   to   the
validity   of   State   enactments   in   the   other   pending   cases   arising
from   the   decision   of   the   High   Court,   including   by   getting
themselves impleaded therein.
56. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we hold the 2019 Act to
be   a   legitimate   legislative   exercise   and   find   it   to   be   consistent
with   and   within   the   four   corners   of   Article   254   of   the
Constitution of India and also of the High Court judgment. 
57. Thus, we dismiss the present batch of writ petitions.
58. Interlocutory  applications,  if  any,  shall  also  stand  disposed
of   in   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion.   We   pass   no   order   as   to
costs.
................................J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
................................J.
    (Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
June 29, 2021.
60