2021 INSC 0291
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1537 OF 2016
R. JANAKIAMMAL ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1538 OF 2016
S.R. SOMASUNDARAM AND ANOTHER ... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
S.K. KUMARASAMY(DECEASED) THROUGH
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
These   two   appeals   have   been   filed   challenging   the
Division   Bench   judgment   dated   23.11.2011   of   Madras   High
Court dismissing the A.S. No.281 of 2000 and A.S. No.332
of   1999   filed   by   the   appellants   respectively.     The
parties shall be referred to as described in O.S.No.1101
of   1987   (S.R.   Somasundaram   vs.   S.K.   Kumarasamy).   The

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appellant,   R.   Janakiammal   in   C.A.No.1537   of   2016   was
defendant   No.7   in   O.S.No.1101   of   1987   whereas   S.R.
Somasundaram,   appellant   in   C.A.No.1538   of   2016   was   the
plaintiff   in   O.S.No.1101   of   1987.   Janakiammal   is   the
mother   of   Somasundaram.   Relevant   facts   and   events
necessary to decide these two appeals are:
2. The  parties  came  from Pattanam,  Coimbatore  District,
Tamil   Nadu.   We   may   notice   the   Genealogical   Tree   of   the
family which is to the following effect:
Kandaswami Gounder (died in 1964)
|
   ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­|
   |                                       |  
Senniamalai(died)                          |
1 st
 wife's son                       2 nd
 wife's sons
                                           |
           ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
           |                 |                            |
           Rangasami        Kumaraswami D­1   S.K. Chinnaswami D­4
           (Died in 1967­   Sundarambal D­2   Smt.C.Kamalgm    D­5
       Smt. Janakiammal D­7               |                |
             |                            |                | 
 ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­       |                |  
 |                 |             |        |                | 
 Shanmugha     Somasundaram  Saraswathi   |                |
 valauyutham    Plaintiff     D­8     |                 |  
 D­10                                     |                |  
                                    |              | 
                          Kandaavadival D­3        |  
                                                   |
                        ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
                         |             |               |
     C.Senthil Kumaravel     Satyavathi     Ponmeenakshi
                     D­6

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3. The   plaintiff,   S.R.   Somasundaram   and   his   mother,
Janakiammal   who   are   the   appellants   in   these   two   appeals
belong   to   branch   of   Rangasamy   Gounder   whereas   other   two
branches   are   of   S.K.   Kumarasamy,D­1   and   S.K.
Chinnasamy,D­4.   Three   brothers   with   their   father   A.V.
Kandasamy   Gounder   were   residing   as   a   joint   family   in
ancestral   house   at   Sadapalayam   Hemlet,   Karumathampatti
Village,   Palladam   Taluka,   District   Coimbatore.   Rangasamy
and   others   received     a   land   measuring   86.72   acres   by
partition   deed   executed   on   27.09.1953   between   late   A.V.
Kandasamy Gounder and Ponnammal, junior wife of Kandasamy
Gounder,   his   first   wife,   Senniamalai,   son   of   Kandasamy
Gounder   from   first   wife,   Rangasamy   Gounder,   S.K.
Kumarasamy,   S.K.   Chinnasamy,   all   sons   of   second   wife   of
Kandasamy.  
4. These   appeals   are   concerned   with   three   branches,
namely, Rangasamy, Kumarasamy and Chinnasamy. In the year
1954­55,   three   brothers   purchased   various   properties   and
started   rice   mill   business   called   Laxmi   Rice   Mills   and
also   started   Swamy   Textiles   in   1976,   a   match   factory,   a

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slate factory, saw mills, timber business and power loom
out of joint family funds. On 07.11.1960 a partition deed
was registered between three brothers with respect to the
properties   allotted   to   them   as   per   registered   partition
deed dated 27.09.1953 along with the properties purchased
by three brothers in the ratio of 1/3rd each. Even after
partition,   three   brothers   continued   to   live   under   the
same   roof   and   carried   on   business   as   partners.   In   the
year 1963 they purchased housing site by sale deed dated
16.10.1963   in   Somanur   Hemlet,   Village   Karumathampatti,
and   constructed   a   house   therein   and   all   the   three
brothers   started   living   in   Somanur   house   from   the   year
1964   and   carried   on   their   different   joint   business.   On
27.05.1967,   Rangasamy   Gounder   died   in   a   road   accident
leaving   behind   his   widow,   Janakiammal,   two   sons,   S.R.
Somasundaram,   S.R.   Shanmugavelayutham   and   one   daughter,
S.Saraswathy.   From 1968 to 1978 various properties were
purchased in the name of three branches. The family also
purchased in the year 1972 Tea Estate known as High Field
Estate   in   the   name   of   defendant   Nos.1,   4,   10   and
plaintiff.   A   Private   Limited   Company   known   as   Swamy   and

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Swamy Plantations (P) Ltd. was also promoted with  family
members being shareholders and Directors. 
5. In   the   year   1975,   50   acres   of   lands   were   purchased
in Vedapatti village, in the name of defendant Nos.1, 4,
10   and   plaintiff.   In   the   year   1978   a   palatial   Bungalow
was   purchased   in   Tatabad,   Coimbatore.   Defendant   No.10,
who   was   Captain   in   the   Indian   Army,   came   back   to
Coimbatore after leaving his job to look after the family
business   and   properties.   From   the   year   1973,   he   started
looking   after   the   properties   at   Coonoor.   Somasundaram,
the   plaintiff   started   his   studies   at   Coimbatore   and
Chennai   and   after   completing   his   studies   came   back   to
Coimbatore in the year 1979. 
6. In   Coimbatore   one   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd.,   which
was     in   liquidation   since   1967   was   taken   on   lease   from
official   liquidator   of   Madras   High   Court   by   one   Shroff,
who   along   with   defendant   No.4,   S.K.   Chinnasamy   formed   a
partnership   firm   to   run   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd.
Defendant  No.1,  S.K.  Kumarasamy  was  appointed  as  General
Manager to look after the affairs of Vasudeva Industries
Limited.   An   application   was   filed   in   the   year   1981   in

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Company   Petition   No.39   of   1956.   Defendant   No.1,   S.K.
Kumarasamy   filed   an   affidavit   in   support   of   Company
Application   No.320   of   1981   praying   that   liquidation
proceedings   be   closed.   On   30.04.1981,   the   High   Court   of
Madras   passed   order   directing   convening   of   a   meeting   of
the creditors. In the meeting of creditors a draft scheme
submitted   was   approved   on   09.06.1981,   Madras   High   Court
passed   an   order   on   22.01.1982   allowed   the   application
filed   by   defendant   No.1,   permanently   stayed   the
liquidation proceedings and permitted running of Vasudeva
Industries Ltd. by the Board of Directors. On 03.02.1982
a   Resolution   was   passed   to   bring   the   mills   under   the
control   of   the   Board   of   Directors,   including   the
plaintiff,   defendant   Nos.1,   4   and   10.   The   name   of
Vasudeva Industries Ltd. was changed to Vasudeva Textiles
Mills.   In   the   year   1983   Vasudeva   Textiles
Mills(   hereinafter  referred  to  as  “Mills”)  obtained  loan
from Punjab National Bank in which personal guarantee was
also given by the plaintiff and defendant No.10, who were
Directors. The plaintiff and defendant No.10 were also in
the year 1984 elected as Managing Directors. The Swamy &

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Swamy Co. which was earlier running the Mill on lease was
dissolved   in   the   year   1984.   The   Mills   although   started
running by the Board of Directors but in the years 1983,
1984   and   1985   accumulated   losses   were   more   than   the
profit of Mills. 
7. On   19.01.1984,   C.   Senthil   Kumaravel,   defendant   No.6
and   son   of   S.K.   Chinnasami,   defendant     No.4   filed   O.S.
No.37   of   1984   praying,   inter   alia,   for   partition   and
allotment   of   1/6th   share   to   him.   In   O.S.No.37   of   1984
Senthil Kumaravel, the plaintiff came with the case that
the   plaintiff   and   defendant   Nos.1,   3,4,   8,9   and   10   were
members   of   joint   family.   In   O.S.No.37   of   1984,
Janakiammal   was   impleaded   as   defendant   No.8,
Shanmugavelayutham   as   defendant   No.9,   Somasundaram   as
defendant No.10 and Saraswathi as defendant No.11. In the
plaint   case,   it   was   stated   that   even   after   registered
partition   deed   dated   07.11.1960   between   three   branches,
defendant   Nos.1,   4   and   the   deceased   K.   Rangasami
continued   to   live   jointly   and   did   business   jointly.   All
the   three   branches   lived   jointly.   In   the   plaint,   it   was
further stated that from the savings of the income and by

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mortgaging   ancestral   property,   the   capital   necessary   for
the business was found and the business was expanded from
time   to   time.   It   was   further   pleaded   that   plaintiff,
Senthil  Kumaravel  was  entitled  to  1/6th  share.   Defendant
Nos.8   to   11,   representing   the   branch   of   deceased   K.
Rangasami, were entitled jointly 1/3rd share in all suit
properties.   The   plaintiff   in   suit   had   prayed   following
reliefs:
"a) to   divide   the   immovable   suit   properties  
described   in   the   schedules   'B',   'D'   and  
'E'   and   items   1   to   9   in   Schedule   'C'  
hereunder   into   six   equal   shares   by   metes  
and bounds with reference to good and bad  
soil and allot one such share to him with  
separate possession;
 b) to   allot   1/6th   share   in   the   shares  
mentioned   in   item   10   and   11   of   Schedule  
'C'   and   item   2   of   Schedule   'D'   described  
hereunder;
 c) directing   the   defendants   to   pay   cost   of  
the suit;” 
8. The   plaint   Schedule   'B'   included   ancestral   land   in
Palladam   and   Samalapuram   villages   with   house   at
Sadapalayam   Helmet.   Schedule   'C'   included   various
immovable   properties   and   included   residential   building,

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shares   in   M/s.   Swamy   and   Swamy   Plantations   (P)   Ltd.
Coonoor,     and   shares   of   M/s.   Vasudeva   Industries   Ltd.
were   also   mentioned   as   item   Nos.   10   and   11   of   Scheduled
'C'.   In   the   above   suit   only   defendant   Nos.1   to   3   of   the
suit,  namely,  S.K.   Kumarasamy,  Sundarambal,  wife   of  S.K.
Kumarasamy   and  minor  Kandavadivel  son  of   S.K.  Kumarasamy
filed their written statements. In the written statement,
it   was   pleaded   that   no   doubt   some   properties   have   been
acquired jointly in the names of the defendant Nos.1, 3,
4,9 and 10, but they must be deemed to be only co­sharers
in respect of those properties. It was pleaded that three
branches   were   allotted   shares   in   1960   partition   and
plaint   case   that   parties   continued   to   live   jointly   was
denied. 
9. In   O.S.No.37   of   1984,   an   application   under   Order
XXIII   Rule   3   was   filed   on   06.08.1984   by   the   plaintiff
containing signatures of plaintiff and defendants. In the
application   under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3   in   Schedule   'A'   to
Schedule 'J', various items of properties were listed and
allocated   to   different   members   of   the   family.   On   the
basis   of   application   under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3,   Sub­

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ordinate Judge, Coimbatore passed an order dated 6.8.1984
and   directed   for   preparation   of   decree   on   the   basis   of
compromise petition. 
10. In   the   compromise   decree   although   various
agricultural properties, house properties and shares were
allotted   to   two   other   branches,   i.e.,   branches   of   S.K.
Kumarasamy   and   S.K.   Chinnasamy   but   the   branch   of
Rangasamy   was   allocated   only   shares   in   Vasudeva
Industries   which   was   under   liquidation   and   taken   under
the   orders   of   Madras   High   Court   dated   21.01.1982   to   be
run by the Board of Directors.
11. Minor   children   of   defendant   No.10   filed   O.S.No.   827
of   1987   through   their   mother   challenging   the   compromise
decree dated 06.08.1984 on the ground that they were not
parties   thereto.   On   03.08.1987   O.S.   No.1101   of   1987   was
filed   by   both   the   sons   of   Rangasamy,   i.e.,   S.R.
Shanmugnavelayutham   and   S.R.   Somasundaram.   In   O.S.
No.1101   of   1987   defendant   Nos.1,2   and   3   filed   their
written   statements   where   it   was   pleaded   that   there   was
agreement  on   08.03.1981  between  the  three  branches   where
defendant   No.1   was   to   pay   Rs.   4   lacs   to   defendant   No.4

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and plaintiff was to pay Rs. 7 lacs to defendant No.4 and
since   payment   was   not   made   to   defendant   No.4   suit   was
filed   through   his   son.   It   was   further   pleaded   that
compromise dated 06.08.1984 was to give effect to earlier
agreement   dated   08.03.1981.   In   the   O.S.   No.827   of   1987,
an affidavit was filed by the mother of the minor stating
that they had entered into the compromise with defendant
No.1   hence   seeking   permission   to   withdraw   the   suit.   On
10.02.1993, the O.S. No.827 of 1987 was withdrawn, on the
same  date  Shanmugavelayuthem  who   was  the   first   plaintiff
in O.S.No.1101 of 1987 withdrew himself from the suit and
was   transposed   as   defendant   No.10   in   the   suit.   The
written   statement   was   filed   by   Janakiammal,   defendant
No.8 supporting the plaintiff's case and also praying for
partition   of   her   share.   Senthil   Kumaravel,   who   was
plaintiff   in   Suit   No.37   of   1984,   filed   a   written
statement in O.S.No.1101 of 1987 where he stated that he
filed   Suit   No.37   of   1984   at   the   instance   of   S.K.
Kumarasamy,   defendant   No.1   and   decree   dated   06.08.1984
was sham and nominal, and was not to be given effect to.
Additional   written   statements   were   filed   by   defendant

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Nos.1 to 3. Defendant No.10 also filed written statement
supporting the case of defendant No.1. Reply was filed by
plaintiff,   Somasundaram   to   the   written   statements   filed
by defendant Nos. 1 to 3. 
12. Five   witnesses   were   examined   on   behalf   of   the
plaintiff.   Somasundaram,   plaintiff   appeared   as   PW.1.   The
plaintiff   filed   Exhs.   A­1   to   A­55.   On   the   side   of
defendants,   four   witnesses   were   examined.   Janakiammal
appeared   as   DW.2   whereas   S.K.   Kumarasamy   appeared   as
DW.1.   Exh.B­1   to   B­104   were   marked   on   behalf   of   the
defendants.     Exh.   X­I   to   X­27   have   been   marked   through
witnesses. 
13. The   trial   court   framed   five   issues   and   six
additional issues. One of the additional issues was that
whether   the   suit   is   not   maintainable   under   Order   XXIII
Rule   3A   of   the   CPC.   The   trial   court   vide   its   judgment
dated   30.09.1997   dismissed   the   suit.   The   trial   court
upheld the plea of defendant Nos.1 to 3 that O.S.No.1101
of 1987 was barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC. The trial
court also upheld the partition deed dated 07.11.1960 and
the agreement dated 08.03.1981. The trial court held that

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after   the   year   1960   the   entire   family   was   not   living   as
joint family and all the three branches are co­owners as
far   as   properties   are   concerned   and   were   running
partnership   businesses.   Challenging   the   judgment   of   the
trial court dismissing the suit two appeals were filed in
the   High   Court.   A.S.No.332   of   1999   was   filed   by
Somasundaram,   the   plaintiff   and   A.S.   No.281   of   2000   was
filed by Janakiammal defendant No.8. 
14. The   High   Court   has   noticed   the   point   for
determination in the appeal, i.e., whether O.S.No.1101 of
1987   is   maintainable   in   the   light   of   the   provisions
contained   in   Order   XXIII   Rule   3A   of   the   CPC.   The   High
Court,   however,   observed   that   appeals   could   be   disposed
of   according   to   the   finding   to   be   recorded   on   the
aforesaid   point   for   consideration,   however,   it   has   not
formulated   any   other   point   for   consideration   though
extensive   arguments   have   been   made   by   the   respective
counsel. It is useful to reproduce paragraphs 163 and 164
of   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   which   are   to   the
following effect:
“163. The point for determination that

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arises   for   consideration   in   the   above   appeals
is   as   to   whether   the   suit   seeking   to   declare
the   decree   passed   in   O.S.No.37   of   1984   on   the
file of the Sub Court, Coimbatore, is sham and
nominal, ultra­vires, collusive, unsustainable,
invalid,   unenforceable   and   not   binding   on   the
plaintiff, is maintainable in the light of the
provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 3 of the
CPC and Order 23 Rule 3­A of the CPC?
164.   As   the   appeals   could   be   disposed   of
on   the   basis   of   the   finding   to   be   recorded   on
the  aforesaid  point  for  determination,   we  have
not   formulated   any   other   point   for
determination,   though   extensive   arguments   have
been   made   by   the   respective   counsel   as   to
whether   the   partition   effected   under   Ex.B­26,
dated   07.11.1960   between   Rangaswamy   (father   of
the   plaintiff),   Kumaraswamy   (D­1)   and
Chinnaswamy   (D­4)   was   acted   upon   or   not;
whether   there   was   a   joint   family   among   the
three   branches   after   07.11.1960;     whether   the
various   businesses   run   under   different
partnership   firms   are   the   joint   family
businesses.”
15. The   High   Court   after   considering   the   submissions   of
the   respective   counsel   came   to   the   conclusion   that
compromise decree dated 06.08.1984 in Suit No.37 of 1984
was   valid,   the   plaintiff   failed   to   prove   that   any   fraud
was played.  The plaintiff, further, failed to prove that
they gave any guarantee in the year 1984 for taking loan
from Punjab National Bank. Hence, basis of the suit that

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they signed the compromise deed on the representation of
defendant   No.1   and   that   the   plaintiff   and   defendant
having   given   personal   guarantee   for   loan   obtained   for
Vasudeva  Industries  Ltd.,  to   save  family   properties  from
claim   of   the   Bank,   the   properties   be   kept   only   in   the
name   of   defendant   No.1   and   defendant   No.4   but   the   right
of the plaintiff and defendants will be held intact. 
16. The High Court held that it has not been proved that
any   personal   guarantee   was   given   by   the   plaintiff,   the
very ground   pleaded by the plaintiff is knocked out.  The
High   Court   further   held   that   suit   was   barred   by   Order
XXIII   Rule   3A   CPC   and   only   remedy   available   was   to
question the compromise decree in the same suit. The High
Court   dismissed   both   the   appeals.   Aggrieved   by   the
judgment   of   the   High   Court,   these   two   appeals   have   been
filed.
17. We   have   heard   Shri   V.   Giri   and   Shri   Gaurav   Agrawal,
learned   senior   counsel     for   the   appellants.   Shri   Kapil
Sibal, learned senior counsel has appeared for contesting
respondents.   Shri   S.   Nagamuthu,   learned   senior   counsel

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has appeared for defendant No.11 and other defendants.
18. Shri V.Giri, learned senior counsel appearing for R.
Janakiammal   submits   that   the   compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984   in   Suit   No.37   of   1984   is   unfair,   inequitable
and   fraudulent.   Shri   Giri   submits   that   Janakiammal   who
was defendant No.8 in Suit No.37 of 1984 was not aware of
the compromise application or its terms. Janakiammal is a
widow only knowing Tamil, she signed the English written
papers which was brought to her by DW­2, wife of D­1. She
never   engaged   any   counsel.   Shri   P.R.   Thirumalnesan,
learned counsel, was never engaged by her. She never went
into   the   Court   nor   appeared   before   the   Court   on
06.08.1984.   The   family   possessed   several   hundreds   acres
of land, several houses and other numerous assets but in
the compromise decree, she was allotted 200 shares which
were   in   the   name   of   Smt.   Kamalam,   DW­2   of   a   sick   mill,
i.e., Vasudev Mill. 
19.   The   properties   which   she   inherited   from   her   late
husband   Rangasamy   and   numerous   properties   which   were
purchased in her name after the death of her husband were

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all   allocated   to   branches   of   D­1   and   D­4   without   giving
an inch of land to her. The shares were also allotted to
D­2   and   D­5,   the   wives   of   D­1   and   D­4,   who   have   no   pre
existing rights. Janakiammal and her son Somasundaram did
not   get   any   immovable   property   in   the   compromise   decree
except shares of the Vasudeva mills, a sick company. The
consent   decree   clearly   records   that   no   Vakalatnama   has
been filed by D­8. When no Vakalatnama was filed by    D­8,
she   was   not   represented   by   a   counsel   and   the   Court   was
misled   to   believe   that   Thirumalnesan,   advocate
represented D­8.
20. The learned counsel submits that the family of three
brothers   lived   jointly   and   continued   to   be   joint   family
even   after   partition   dated   07.11.1960   and   acquired
several   properties   in   the   name   of   three   branches.   The
family possessed more than 260 acres of land at different
places with several houses but no immovable property was
allocated to Janakiammal or her sons.
21.   O.S.   No.37   of   1984   was   filed   on   the   behest   of   S.K.
Kumarasamy by C. SenthilKumaravel, son of S.K.Chinnasamy.

18
C.   SenthilKumaravel   in   his   written   statement   in   Suit
No.1101 of 1987 has pleaded that Suit No. 37 of 1984 was
filed   by   him   at   the   behest   of   S.K.Kumarasamy,   D­1.   C.
Senthilkumaravel   further   pleaded   that   decree   in   O.S.
No.37   of   1984   was   sham   and   nominal.   The   200   shares
allotted   to   Janakiammal   as   per   compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984   which   were   in   the   name   of   Smt.   Kamalam   were
never   transferred   to   Janakaiammal.   Janakiammal     fully
supported the plaint case of suit No.1101 of 1987.  
22. The   partition   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   as   pleaded
by   D­1   was   only   an   imaginary   story.   No     such   agreement
was   filed   in   the   court   nor   the   same   was   pleaded   in   a
written   statement   filed   by   D.1­3   in   O.S.   No.37   of   1984.
Despite the agreement dated 08.03.1981 not being produced
in   the   Court,   the   trial   court   in   its   judgment   dated
30.09.1997   had   erroneously   accepted   the   factum   of
partition  by   agreement   dated   08.03.1981  and  accepted  the
case   of   defendant   No.1   that   compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984   was   to   give   effect   to   the   partition   dated
08.03.1981.  

19
23. No   partition   was   affected   in   the   year   1981   and   the
family remained as a joint family. In O.S. No.37 of 1984,
the   house   property   at   Tatabad   which   was   in   the   name   of
D­1,   was   not   included,   which   property   was   purchased   by
joint   family   fund   and   the   three   branches   had   share   in
house   at   Tatabad   which   was   mentioned   at   item   No.10   in
Schedule C of Suit No.1101 of 1987.
24.   The   pleading   of   defendant   No.1   that   under   the
agreement dated 08.03.1981, the plaintiff was to pay Rs.
Seven   Lakhs  to   D­4  and   D­1  was   to   pay   Rs.   Four   Lakhs   to
D­4 were all imaginary stories set up by D­1. Neither any
agreement took place on 08.03.1981 nor any amount was to
be   paid   by   plaintiff   to   D­4.   The   house   at   Tatabad
purchased in the year 1978 with the joint family fund was
not included in O.S.    No.37 of 1984, and in the house all
members   of   the   family   had   a   share.   The   amount   of
Rs.1,03,000/­, which was received by Janakiammal from the
Insurance Corporation after the death of her husband was
given to defendant No.1, which was utilised for business
purposes.   The   High   Court   did   not   consider   the   case   of

20
Janakiammal as pleaded.  
25.   Shri   Gaurav   Agrawal,   learned   counsel   appearing   in
Civil   Appeal   No.   1538   of   2016   on   behalf   of   Somasundaram
submits   that   plaintiff   was   deprived   of   his   immovable
properties   including   land   and   houses   and   was   given   only
worthless   shares   in   the   Compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984. He submits that the suit No.1101 of 1987 was
filed   by   the   plaintiff   to   declare   the   decree   dated
06.08.1984 void, unenforceable and fraudulent. 
26.   It   is   submitted   that   the   plaintiff   was   taken   to   the
Court   by   D­1   on   06.08.1984   and   was   asked   to   sign   the
compromise   application   on   the   representation   that   since
the   plaintiff   and   D­10   had   given   personal   guarantee   for
the   loan   taken   for   Vasudeva   Textiles   Mills   from   Punjab
National   Bank,   their   name   should   not   be   any   immovable
property   to   save   the   family   property.   The   plaintiff   was
assured by D­1 that his right in immovable property shall
not   be   affected   by   the   Compromise   decree   as   the   decree
dated 06.08.1984 shall not be made effective.  

21
27. It is submitted that the allocation of the properties
in the compromise decree is unfair. A fraud was played on
the   plaintiff   as   well   as   on   the   court   in   obtaining   the
compromise   decree.   It   is   submitted   that   the   Order   XXIII
Rule   3A   shall   not   govern   a   case   where   a   fraud   is   played
on   the   Court.   Suit   No.   37   of   1984   was   filed   on   illusory
cause of action, bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A shall not
apply.   The   High   Court   after   having   found   that   suit   is
barred   under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3A   has   not   entered   into
other   issues.   The   house   property   of   Tatabad   which   was
purchased   in   1978   was   not   included   in   Schedule   of
O.S.NO.37   of   1984   which   property   was   included   in   Suit
No.1101 of 1987, hence, suit for share in house property
at   Tatabad   was   fully   maintainable.   The   plaintiff   has
completed his graduation in Textile Engineering. Vasudeva
Industries   was   not   a   family   concern,   which   was   under
litigation   and   was   not   a   profit   making   venture.   The
consent decree dated 06.08.1984 was never acted upon. The
mill   could   not   be   revived   and   closed   down   in   1987.   The
defendant   No.1   continued   to   manage   the   affairs   of   the
mill till 1989 when he resigned.  

22
28.   Shri   Kapil   Sibal   refuting   the   submissions   of   the
appellants   contends   that   partition   dated   07.11.1960
between   three   branches   was   given   effect   to.   Income   Tax
Returns were filed by three branches on the basis of 1960
partition.   There   was   an   arrangement   made   in   1981   under
which the D­1 was to take properties at Coonoor, D­4 was
to   take   properties   at   Somnur   whereas   plaintiff   and
defendant   No.1   decided   to   take   Vasudeva   Textiles   Mills.
The Suit No.37 of 1984 was filed by the son of D­4 at his
instance.    
29.   Shri   Sibal   submits   that   the   Suit   No.37   of   1984   has
been decided on compromise where all the defendants have
signed   the   compromise   application   including   Janakiammal
as   well   as   Somasundaram.   The   Vakalatnama   on   behalf   of
defendant Nos.7 to 11 was filed by Advocate Thirumalnesan
who represented defendants 8 to 11. It is submitted that
plaintiff   and   D­10   were   all   educated   persons   and   having
signed the compromise application, it is not open to them
to   contend   that   they   signed   the   application   under   some
misrepresentation or fraud.  

23
30. The plaintiff and defendant No.10 wanted to take the
mill   in   their   share   hence,   the   shares   of   the   mill   were
allocated   in   the   compromise   decree   to   Rangasamy   Branch.
Rangasamy   Branch   had   95%   shares   in   the   Mill,   i.e.,   the
controlling   share.   The   mill   was   valued   at   the   rate   of
Rs.32 Lakhs. There is no fraud in the compromise decree.
The   Compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was   given   effect
to.   There   being   partition   in   the   year   1960   there   was
neither   any   joint   family   property   nor   any   joint   family.
It   was   pleaded   by   the   plaintiff   that   his   mother   and
sister expressed a desire not to take any share. In 1989,
the plaintiff had sold the Vasudeva Mills. 
31. Shri Sibal submits that none of the pleadings of the
plaintiff falls in the definition of fraud. No fraud was
committed   on   the   plaintiff.   Under   Order   XXIII   Rule   3A
CPC,   no   separate   suit   could   have   been   filed   to   question
the compromise decree. 
32.   Shri   Sibal   submits   that   the   remedy   open   for   the
plaintiff was to either file an application in suit No.37

24
of 1984 or file an appeal against the Compromise decree.
Filing of suit No.1101 of 1987 is nothing but litigative
gambling   by   the   plaintiff.   Shri   Sibal   submits   that   the
suit filed by the plaintiff deserves to be dismissed with
costs.  
33.  Shri   Nagamuthu,  learned  senior   counsel  appearing  for
the   defendant   No.11   has   supported   the   judgment   of   the
Courts   below.   He   submits   that   from   1989,   selling   of
shares of the mill started. The defendant No.1 purchased
the   shares   of   the   mill.   The   Compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984   was   acted   upon.   In   1994,   the   complete   shares
of the mill were transferred. Shri Nagamuthu submits that
the  defendant  No.11  and  other  defendants   were  transferee
of the shares.
34.   Shri   Giri   in   rejoinder   submission   submits   that
Janakiammal’s   case   was   that   she   never   engaged   any
advocate.   She,   however,   stated   that   she   had   signed   the
compromise   application   in   Tamil.   Her   case   was   that   she
does   not   know   English   and   the   Compromise   was   written   in

25
English.   Signatures   of   Janakiammal   were   taken   on
compromise application by D­2, wife of D­1, who in usual
course,   for   the   purposes   of   business   and   Tax   obtains
signatures   of   Janakiammal   from   time   to   time.   The   family
was   running   various   businesses.   Shri   Giri   submits   that
the judgment of the trial court dated 06.08.1984 in O.S.
No.37 of 1984 states that Vakalatnama of defendant Nos.8
to   13   was   not   filed.   He   submits   that   certified   copy   of
Vakalatnama  filed  by  advocate  Thirumalnesan  on  behalf  of
defendant Nos.8 to 13 has also not been brought on record
and   according   to   the   papers   submitted   by   D­1,   the
Vakalatnama   and   the   documents   have   been   destroyed.   How
can D­1 say that the Vakalatnama has been destroyed.  
35. Shri Giri submits that the house at Tatabad which was
included   as   Item   No.10   in   Schedule   C   in   Suit   No.1101   of
1987 was purchased from a joint family fund. Although the
house   was   taken   in   auction   by   D­1   but   the   consideration
for   house   was   not   paid   by   D­1   individually,   rather   the
amount   was   obtained   from   company   Swamy   and   Swamy
Plantations, which is a private limited company in which

26
D­1, D­4 and D­10 had shares. The Branch of Rangasamy in  
Swamy and Swamy Plantations had about more than one­third
share.   The   Tatabad   house   having   been   obtained   from   a
private   company   which   was   a   family   business,   all   the
branches   shall   have   shares   in   the   house.   The   Suit   No.37
of   1984   having   not   included   the   Tatabad   house,   the   suit
for   partition   of   house   being   Suit   No.1101   of   1987   was
fully   maintainable   and   both   the   Courts   erred   in   not
granting share to the plaintiff in the said house. 
36. One of the additional   issues,   which   were   framed   by
the   trial   court,   was   “Whether   the   suit   is   not
maintainable   in   view   of   Order   23   Rule   3   (A)   of   the   Code
of Civil Procedure?”
37.   The   trial   court   has   decided   the   above   issue   against
the  plaintiff  holding  that  separate  suit   challenging  the
compromise decree is barred as per Order XXIII Rule 3A of
Civil Procedure Code.
38.   The   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   as   noted
above   has   observed   that   the   appeals   can   be   decided   on
only one point of consideration, i.e., as to whether Suit

27
No.   1101   of   1997   filed   by   the   plaintiff   Somasundaram
challenging   the   compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was
barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A.   The High Court in the
impugned judgment relying on judgments of this Court held
that   no   separate   suit   is   maintainable   questioning   the
compromise decree, hence Suit No.1101 of 1987 was barred.
Both   the   Courts   having   held   that   Suit   No.1101   of   1987
filed   by   the   plaintiff   is   barred   under   Order   XXIII   Rule
3A,   we   deem   it   appropriate   to   first   consider   the   above
issue. 
39.   Order   XXIII   Rule   3   provides   for   compromise   of   suit.
In Rule 3 amendments were made by Act No. 104 of 1976 by
which   a   proviso   and   an   explanation   was   added.     Order
XXIII Rule 3 as amended is to the following effect:­
“ 3.   Compromise   of   suit.   ­   Where   it   is
proved   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   Court   that
a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by
any lawful agreement or compromise   in writing
and   signed   by   the   parties,   or   where   the
defendant   satisfies   the   plaintiff   in   respect
of   the   whole   or   any   part   of   the   subject­
matter   of   the   suit,   the   Court   shall   order
such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to
be   recorded,   and   shall   pass   a   decree   is
accordance   therewith   so   far   as   it   relates   to
the   parties   to   the   suit,   whether   or   not   the
subject­matter   of   the   agreement,   compromise

28
or   satisfaction   is   the   same   as   the   subject­
matter of the suit:
Provided   that   where   it   is   alleged   by   one
party   and   denied   by   the   other   that   an
adjustment   or   satisfaction   has   been   arrived
at,   the   Court   shall   decide   the   question;   but
no   adjournment   shall   be   granted   for   the
purpose   of   deciding   the   question,   unless   the
Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit
to grant such adjournment.
Explanation ­An   agreement   or   compromise
which   is   void   or   voidable   under   the   Indian
Contract   Act,  1872  (9  of   1872),  shall  not  be
deemed   to   be   lawful   within   the   meaning   of
this rule;”
40. By the same amendment Act No.104 of 1976, a new Rule,
i.e., Rule 3A was added providing
“3A.   Bar   to   suit.   ­   No   suit   shall   lie   to
set   aside   a   decree   on   the   ground   that   the
compromise   on   which   the   decree   is   based   was
not lawful.”
41.  Determination  of  disputes  between  persons  and  bodies
is   regulated   by   law.   The   legislative   policy   of   all
legislatures  is  to   provide  a  mechanism  for   determination
of   dispute   so   that   dispute   may   come   to   an   end   and   peace
in   society   be   restored.     Legislative   policy   also   aims
for giving finality  of  the  litigation,  simultaneously

29
providing   higher   forum   of   appeal/revision   to   vend   the
grievances of an aggrieved party.  Rule 3A which has been
added by above amendment provides that no suit shall lie
to   set   aside   a   decree   on   the   ground   that   the   compromise
on which the decree is based was not lawful.  At the same
time,   by   adding   the   proviso   in   Rule   3,   it   is   provided
that when there is a dispute as to whether an adjustment
or   satisfaction   has   been   arrived   at,   the   same   shall   be
decided by the Court which recorded the compromise.  Rule
3 of Order XXIII provided that where it is proved to the
satisfaction   of   the   Court   that   a   suit   has   been   adjusted
wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise,
the Court shall order such agreement or compromise to be
recorded and pass a decree in accordance therewith.  Rule
3   uses   the   expression   “lawful   agreement   or   compromise”.
The   explanation   added   by   amendment   provided   that   an
agreement  or a compromise which is void or voidable under
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be
lawful.”
42.   Reading   Rule   3   with   Proviso   and   Explanation,   it   is

30
clear   that   an   agreement   or   compromise,   which   is   void   or
voidable, cannot be recorded by the Courts and even if it
is recorded the Court on challenge of such recording can
decide   the   question.     The   Explanation   refers   to   Indian
Contract   Act.     The   Indian   Contract   Act   provides   as   to
which contracts are void or voidable.   Section 10 of the
Indian   Contract   Act   provides   that   all   agreements   are
contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties
competent   to   contract,   for   a   lawful   consideration   and
with   a   lawful   object,   and   are   not   hereby   expressly
declared   to   be   void.   Section   14   defines   free   consent   in
following words:­
“ 14.   “Free   consent”   defined. —Consent   is
said to be free when it is not caused by— 
(1)  coercion, as defined in section 15, or 
(2)  undue   influence,   as   defined   in   section
16, or 
(3)  fraud, as defined in section 17, or
(4)   misrepresentation,   as   defined   in   section
18, or 
(5)     mistake,   subject   to   the   provisions   of
sections 20, 21 and 22.
Consent   is   said   to   be   so   caused   when   it
would not have been given but for the existence
of   such   coercion,   undue   influence,   fraud,
misrepresentation or mistake.” 

31
43.   A   consent   when   it   is   caused   due   to   coercion,   undue
influence,   fraud,   misrepresentation   or   mistake   is   not
free consent and such agreement shall not be contract if
free   consent   is   wanting .   Sections   15,   16,   17   and   18
define   coercion,   undue   influence,   fraud   and
misrepresentation.    Section  19  deals  with  voidability  of
agreements   without   free   consent.     Section   19   is   to   the
following effect:­
“ 19.   Voidability   of   agreements   without
free consent. —When consent to an agreement is
caused   by   coercion,   fraud   or
misrepresentation,   the   agreement   is   a
contract   voidable   at   the   option   of   the   party
whose consent was so caused. 
A   party   to   a   contract   whose   consent   was
caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if
he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall
be performed, and that he shall be put in the
position   in   which   he   would   have   been   if   the
representations made had been true. 
Exception.—If   such   consent   was   caused   by
misrepresentation   or   by   silence,   fraudulent
within   the   meaning   of   section   17,   the
contract,   nevertheless,   is   not   voidable,   if
the party whose consent was so caused had the
means   of   discovering   the   truth   with   ordinary
diligence. 
Explanation.—A fraud or misrepresentation
which did not cause the consent to a contract
of   the   party   on   whom   such   fraud   was
practised,   or   to   whom   such   misrepresentation
was   made,   does   not   render   a   contract
voidable.”

32
44.   A   conjoint   reading   of   Sections   10,   13   and   14
indicates   that   when   consent   is   obtained   by   coercion,
undue   influence,   fraud,   misrepresentation   or   mistake,
such consent is not free consent and the contract becomes
voidable   at   the   option   of   the   party   whose   consent   was
caused   due   to   coercion,   fraud   or   misrepresentation.     An
agreement,   which   is   void   or   voidable   under   the   Indian
Contract   Act,   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   lawful   as   is
provided by Explanation to Rule 3 of Order XXIII. 
45.   We   need   to   examine   the   grounds   on   which   the
compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was   sought   to   be
impeached by pleadings in Suit No. 1101 of 1987.  Whether
the grounds to impeach the compromise deed are one which
can   be   raised   before   the   Court   recording   the   compromise
decree   as   per   Rule   3   of   Order   XXIII?     We   need   to   look
into   the   grounds   on   the   basis   of   which   Suit   No.1101   of
1987   was   filed   questioning   the   compromise   decree.
Paragraphs   12   and   13   of   the   plaint   contain   the
allegations, which are to the following effect:­
“ 12.     In   the   beginning   of   1984,   the   1 st

33
defendant   represented   that   since   the
plaintiff   have   given   personal   guarantee   to
the   Bank   for   the   loans   of   several   lakhs,   it
would  be  risky  and   not  expedient  to  have  the
family   properties   in   the   name   of   the
plaintiff   and   it   would   be   advantageous   and
safe   to   keep   off   the   names   of   the   plaintiff
on   records   as   owners.     Even   there   the
plaintiff did not direction and wisdom of the
1 st
  defendant.     The   1 st
  defendant   further
represented that the entire family properties
would   be   kept   in   the   name   of   defendants­   1
and 4 for the purpose of record and to avoid
the risk of any bank claim.  The 1 st
 defendant
assured   that   this   arrangement   would   not
affect or extinguish the plaintiff legitimate
share   in   the   properties.     Here   again   the
plaintiff   obeyed   and   acted   according   to   the
decision and directions of the 1 st
 defendant. 
13. The   1 st
  defendant   arranged   to   file   a
suit   in   Sub   Court,   Coimbatore,   through   the
family lawyer.  It was a collusive suit and a
mere   make   believe   affairs.   There   was   no
misunderstanding   or   provocations   for   any   one
of the members of the family to go to a Court
of Law for partition.” 
  
46.   In   paragraph   15   of   the   plaint,   the   plaintiffs   had
further   pleaded   that   entre   proceedings   and   the   decree
secured from the Court is a fraud played not only on the
plaintiff   but   also   against   the   Court.     The   plaintiffs
pleads that compromise decree which was intended only to
secure   and   safeguard   the   properties   is   sham   and   nominal
besides being fraudulent.

34
47.   From   the   above,   it   is   clear   that   plaintiff   pleaded
that   compromise   recorded   on   06.08.1984   was   not   lawful
compromise   having   been   obtained   by   fraud   and
misrepresentation.     The   plaintiff’s   case   was   that   they
were   represented   by   D1   that   the   compromise   is   being
entered   only   to   save   the   family   property   since   the
plaintiff   has   given   personal   guarantee   to   the   Punjab
National   Bank   for   obtaining   loan   for   Vasudeva   Mills.
Pleadings clearly make out the case of the plaintiff that
the   consent   which   he   gave   for   compromise   by   signing   the
compromise   was   not   free   consent.     The   compromise,   thus,
become voidable at the instance of the plaintiff.     
48. Whether the bar under Rule 3A of Order XXIII shall be
attracted in the facts of the present case as held by the
Courts below is the question to be answered by us.   Rule
3A   bars   the   suit   to   set   aside   the   decree   on   the   ground
that   compromise   on   which   decree   was   passed   was   not
lawful.   As noted above, the word “lawful” has been used
in   Rule   3   and   in   the   Explanation   of   Rule   3   states   that
“an   agreement   or   compromise   which   is   void   or   voidable
under the Indian Contract Act,1872 (9 of 1872), shall not

35
be deemed to be lawful……………….;”
49.   Thus,   an   agreement   or   compromise   which   is   clearly
void or voidable shall not be deemed to be lawful and the
bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted if compromise on the
basis of which decree was passed was void or voidable.    
50.   Order   XXIII   Rule   3   as   well   as   Rule   3A   came   for
consideration before this Court in large number of cases
and we need to refer to few of them to find out the ratio
of judgments of this Court in context of Rule 3 and Rule
3A.     In   Banwari   Lal   Vs.   Chando   Devi   (Smt.)   Though   LRs.
And Anr., (1993) 1 SCC 581,   this Court considered Rule 3
as well as Rule 3A of Order XXIII.   This Court held that
object of the Amendment Act, 1976 is to compel the party
challenging   the   compromise   to   question   the   Court   which
has   recorded   the   compromise.     In   paragraphs   6   and   7,
following was laid down:­
“6.   The   experience   of   the   courts   has   been
that   on   many   occasions   parties   having   filed
petitions   of   compromise   on   basis   of   which
decrees are prepared, later for one reason or
other   challenge   the   validity   of   such
compromise.   For   setting   aside   such   decrees
suits   used   to   be   filed   which   dragged   on   for
years   including   appeals   to   different   courts.
Keeping in view the predicament of the courts

36
and   the   public,   several   amendments   have   been
introduced   in   Order   23   of   the   Code   which
contain provisions relating to withdrawal and
adjustment   of   suit   by   Civil   Procedure   Code
(Amendment)  Act,  1976.  Rule  1  of  Order  23  of
the   Code   prescribes   that   at   any   time   after
the   institution   of   the   suit,   the   plaintiff
may abandon his suit or abandon a part of his
claim.   Rule   1(3)   provides   that   where   the
Court  is  satisfied  ( a )  that  a  suit  must   fail
by  reason  of   some  formal   defect,  or  ( b )  that
there are sufficient grounds for allowing the
plaintiff   to   institute   a   fresh   suit   for   the
subject­matter  of  a  suit  or  part  of  a  claim,
it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant
the   plaintiff   permission   to   withdraw   such
suit   with   liberty   to   institute   a   fresh   suit.
In   view   of   Rule   1(4)   if   plaintiff   abandons
his   suit   or   withdraws   such   suit   without
permission   referred   to   above,   he   shall   be
precluded   from   instituting   any   such   suit   in
respect   of   such   subject­matter.   Rule   3   of
Order   23   which   contained   the   procedure
regarding   compromise   of   the   suit   was   also
amended   to   curtail   vexatious   and   tiring
litigation   while   challenging   a   compromise
decree.   Not   only   in   Rule   3   some   special
requirements   were   introduced   before   a
compromise is recorded by the court including
that   the   lawful   agreement   or   a   compromise
must be in writing and signed by the parties,
a   proviso   with   an   explanation   was   also   added
which is as follows:
“Provided  that  where  it is  alleged
by one party and denied by the other
that   an   adjustment   or   satisfaction
has been  arrived at,  the Court shall

37
decide   the   question;   but   no
adjournment   shall   be   granted   for   the
purpose   of   deciding   the   question,
unless   the   Court,   for   reasons   to   be
recorded,   thinks   fit   to   grant   such
adjournment.
Explanation .—   An   agreement   or
compromise   which   is   void   or   voidable
under   the   Indian   Contract   Act,   1872
(9   of   1872),   shall   not   be   deemed   to
be  lawful within the  meaning of this
rule.”
7.   By   adding   the   proviso   along   with   an
explanation the purpose and the object of the
amending   Act   appears   to   be   to   compel   the
party   challenging   the   compromise   to   question
the   same   before   the   court   which   had   recorded
the   compromise   in   question.   That   court   was
enjoined   to   decide   the   controversy   whether
the   parties   have   arrived   at   an   adjustment   in
a   lawful   manner.   The   explanation   made   it
clear that an agreement or a compromise which
is void or voidable under the Indian Contract
Act   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   lawful   within
the   meaning   of   the   said   rule.   Having
introduced   the   proviso   along   with   the
explanation   in   Rule   3   in   order   to   avoid
multiplicity   of   suit   and   prolonged
litigation,   a   specific   bar   was   prescribed   by
Rule   3­A   in   respect   of   institution   of   a
separate   suit   for   setting   aside   a   decree   on
basis of a compromise saying:
“3­A.   Bar   to   suit .—   No   suit   shall
lie   to   set   aside   a   decree   on   the
ground   that   the   compromise   on   which

38
the decree is based was not lawful.”
51.     The next judgment to be noted is   Pushpa Devi Bhagat
(Dead)   Through   LR.   Sadhna   Rai   (Smt.)   Vs.   Rajinder   Singh
and   Ors.,   (2006)   5   SCC   566,   Justice   R.V.   Raveendran
speaking   for   the   Court   noted   the   provisions   of   Order
XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A and recorded his conclusions in
paragraph 17 in following words:­
“17.   The   position   that   emerges   from   the
amended   provisions   of   Order   23   can   be   summed
up thus:
( i )   No   appeal   is   maintainable
against   a   consent   decree   having
regard   to   the   specific   bar   contained
in Section 96(3) CPC.
( ii )   No   appeal   is   maintainable
against   the   order   of   the   court
recording   the   compromise   (or
refusing   to   record   a   compromise)   in
view   of   the   deletion   of   clause   ( m )
of Rule 1 Order 43.
( iii )   No   independent   suit   can   be
filed   for   setting   aside   a   compromise
decree   on   the   ground   that   the
compromise  was not  lawful in view of
the bar contained in Rule 3­A.
( iv )   A   consent   decree   operates   as
an  estoppel and is valid and  binding
unless   it   is   set   aside   by   the   court
which   passed   the   consent   decree,   by

39
an  order  on an application  under  the
proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.
Therefore,   the  only  remedy  available  to  a
party   to   a   consent   decree   to   avoid   such
consent   decree,   is   to   approach   the   court
which   recorded   the   compromise   and   made   a
decree   in   terms   of   it,   and   establish   that
there   was   no   compromise.   In   that   event,   the
court   which   recorded   the   compromise   will
itself consider and decide the question as to
whether   there   was   a   valid   compromise   or   not.
This   is   so   because   a   consent   decree   is
nothing   but   contract   between   parties
superimposed with the seal of approval of the
court.   The   validity   of   a   consent   decree
depends   wholly   on   the   validity   of   the
agreement   or   compromise   on   which   it   is   made.
The   second   defendant,   who   challenged   the
consent   compromise   decree   was   fully   aware   of
this position as she filed an application for
setting aside the consent decree on 21­8­2001
by   alleging   that   there   was   no   valid
compromise   in   accordance   with   law.
Significantly,   none   of   the   other   defendants
challenged   the   consent   decree.   For   reasons
best   known   to   herself,   the   second   defendant
within  a  few   days  thereafter   (that   is  on  27­
8­2001)   filed   an   appeal   and   chose   not   to
pursue the application filed before the court
which   passed   the   consent   decree.   Such   an
appeal   by   the   second   defendant   was   not
maintainable,   having   regard   to   the   express
bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.”
52. The next judgment is  R. Rajanna Vs. S.R. Venkataswamy
and Ors., (2014) 15 SCC 471  in which  provisions of Order
XXIII   Rule   3   and   Rule   3A   were   again   considered.     After

40
extracting   the   aforesaid   provisions,   following   was   held
by this Court in paragraph 11:­
“11.   It   is   manifest   from   a   plain   reading
of the above that in terms of the proviso to
Order   23   Rule   3   where   one   party   alleges   and
the   other   denies   adjustment   or   satisfaction
of   any   suit   by   a   lawful   agreement   or
compromise   in   writing   and   signed   by   the
parties,   the   Court   before   whom   such   question
is   raised,   shall   decide   the   same.   What   is
important   is   that   in   terms   of   Explanation   to
Order   23   Rule   3,   the   agreement   or   compromise
shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   lawful   within   the
meaning of the said Rule if the same is void
or   voidable   under   the   Contract   Act,   1872.   It
follows that in every case where the question
arises whether or not there has been a lawful
agreement or compromise in writing and signed
by   the   parties,   the   question   whether   the
agreement   or   compromise   is   lawful   has   to   be
determined   by   the   court   concerned.   What   is
lawful   will   in   turn   depend   upon   whether   the
allegations   suggest   any   infirmity   in   the
compromise and the decree that would make the
same void or voidable under the Contract Act.
More   importantly,   Order   23   Rule   3­A   clearly
bars   a   suit   to   set   aside   a   decree   on   the
ground   that   the   compromise   on   which   the
decree   is   based   was   not   lawful.   This   implies
that   no   sooner   a   question   relating   to
lawfulness   of   the   agreement   or   compromise   is
raised   before   the   court   that   passed   the
decree  on  the  basis  of  any   such  agreement  or
compromise,   it   is   that   court   and   that   court
alone   who   can   examine   and   determine   that
question. The court cannot direct the parties
to file a separate suit on the subject for no
such   suit  will  lie   in  view   of  the  provisions
of   Order   23   Rule   3­A   CPC.   That   is   precisely

41
what   has   happened   in   the   case   at   hand.   When
the   appellant   filed   OS   No.   5326   of   2005   to
challenge   the   validity   of   the   compromise
decree,   the   court   before   whom   the   suit   came
up  rejected  the  plaint   under   Order   7  Rule  11
CPC   on   the   application   made   by   the
respondents   holding   that   such   a   suit   was
barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3­A
CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the
defendants   (respondents   herein)   could   hardly
be   heard   to   argue   that   the   plaintiff
(appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy
against the compromise decree in pursuance of
OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the
suit   has   been   rejected   to   pursue   his   remedy
against   such   rejection   before   a   higher
court.” 
53.   The   judgments   of   Pushpa   Devi(supra)   as   well   as
Banwari   Lal   (supra)   were   referred   to   and   relied   by   this
Court.     This   Court   held   that   no   sooner   a   question
relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is
raised   before   the   court   that   passed   the   decree   on   the
basis   of   any   such   agreement   or   compromise,   it   is   that
court and that court alone who can examine and determine
that question.
54.   In   subsequent   judgment,   Triloki   Nath   Singh   Vs.
Anirudh   Singh   (Dead)   Through   Legal   Representatives   and
Ors.,   (2020)   6   SCC   629 ,   this   Court   again   referring   to

42
earlier   judgments   reiterated   the   same   preposition,   i.e.,
the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree
to   avoid   such   consent   decree   is   to   approach   the   court
which   recorded   the   compromise   and   separate   suit   is   not
maintainable.     In   paragraphs   17   and   18,   following   has
been laid down:­
“17.   By   introducing   the   amendment   to   the
Civil   Procedure   Code   (Amendment)   1976
w.e.f.   1­2­1977,   the   legislature   has
brought into force Order 23 Rule 3­A, which
creates   bar   to   institute   the   suit   to   set
aside   a   decree   on   the   ground   that   the
compromise on which decree is based was not
lawful.   The   purpose   of   effecting   a
compromise between the parties is to put an
end   to   the   various   disputes   pending   before
the   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   once
and for all.
18.   Finality   of   decisions   is   an
underlying   principle   of   all   adjudicating
forums.   Thus,   creation   of   further
litigation   should   never   be   the   basis   of   a
compromise between the parties. Rule 3­A of
Order   23   CPC   put   a   specific   bar   that   no
suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the
ground   that   the   compromise   on   which   the
decree   is   based   was   not   lawful.   The   scheme
of   Order   23   Rule   3   CPC   is   to   avoid
multiplicity   of   litigation   and   permit
parties   to   amicably   come   to   a   settlement
which   is   lawful,   is   in   writing   and   a
voluntary   act   on   the   part   of   the   parties.

43
The   court   can   be   instrumental   in   having   an
agreed   compromise   effected   and   finality
attached   to   the   same.   The   court   should
never   be   party   to   imposition   of   a
compromise   upon   an   unwilling   party,   still
open   to   be   questioned   on   an   application
under   the   proviso   to   Order   23   Rule   3   CPC
before the court.”
55.   The   above   judgments   contain   a   clear   ratio   that   a
party   to   a   consent   decree   based   on   a   compromise   to
challenge   the   compromise   decree   on   the   ground   that   the
decree was not lawful, i.e., it was void or voidable has
to approach the same court, which recorded the compromise
and   a   separate   suit   challenging   the   consent   decree   has
been   held   to   be   not   maintainable.     In   Suit   No.1101   of
1987,   the   plaintiff   prayed   for   a   declaration   declaring
that the decree passed in O.S. No. 37 of 1984 is sham and
nominal,   ultravires,   collusive,   unsustainable   invalid,
unenforceable and not binding on the plaintiffs. We have
noted the grounds as contained in the plaint to challenge
the consent decree in foregoing paragraphs from which it
is   clear   that   the   compromise,   which   was   recorded   on
06.08.1984   was   sought   to   be   termed   as   not   lawful,   i.e.,
void or voidable. On the basis of grounds which have been

44
taken by the plaintiff in Suit No.1101 of 1987, the only
remedy   available   to   the   plaintiff   was   to   approach   the
court   in   the   same   case   and   satisfy   the   court   that
compromise   was   not   lawful.     Rule   3A   was   specifically
added by the amendment to bar separate suit to challenge
the   compromise   decree   which   according   to   legislative
intent   to   arrest   the   multiplicity   of   proceedings.     We,
thus,   do   not   find   any   error   in   the   judgment   of   trial
court   and   High   Court   holding   that   Suit   No.1101   of   1987
was barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A. 
56.   We   having   found   that   Suit   No.1101   of   1987   being
barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A, it is not necessary for
us to enter into correctness or otherwise of the grounds
taken in the plaint for questioning the compromise decree
dated   06.08.1984.     The   compromise   decree   dated
06.08.1984, thus, could not have been questioned in Suit
No. 1101 of 1987. 
57. There   remains   one   more   submission   which   needs   to   be
considered.
58. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that even

45
if   consent   decree   dated   06.08.1984   could   not   have   been
challenged,   the   appellants   were   entitled   for   shares   in
residential   building   at   Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa   Chettiar
Road,     Coimbatore,   which   was   left   out   from   the   decree
dated 06.08.1984. The above residential suit property was
not   a   part   in   O.S.   No.37   of   1984   and   was   not   in
compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984.   The   averment   of   the
appellant   is   that   the   said   residential   property   was
although   in   the   name   of   defendant   No.1   but   it   was
acquired from joint family funds hence the appellant had
also share in the property. 
59.   The   residential   building   at   Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa
Chettiar Road,  Coimbatore  was included in Item No.10 of
Schedule 'B' of properties to the following effect:
“Item No.X
In   Coimbatore   Registration   on   District,
Coimbatore   Corporation   Limits,   Tatabad,   Dr.
Alagappa  Chettiar  Road,    D.No.101,   Extent  0.33
acres   with   4500   sq.ft.   built   up   residential
building.”
60.   The   above   residential   property   was   neither   included
in O.S.No.37 of 1984 nor part of compromise decree dated

46
06.08.1984.  The  plaintiff's  prayer  to  declare  the  decree
passed   in   O.S.37   of   1984   as   unenforceable   shall   not
preclude   the   consideration   of   a   property   which   was   not
part   of   the   decree.   The   appellants'   case   for   claiming
share   in   the   residential   property   at   Tatabad,   Alagappa
Chettiar   Road,   Coimbatore,   thus,   needs   to   be   considered
in these appeals.
61. We   may   first   notice   pleadings   regarding   the   case   of
the   plaintiff   and   defendant   No.1   with   regard   to   above
mentioned house property as reflected in O.S. No.1101 of
1987.
62. In   paragraph   6(e)   of   the   plaint,   following   has   been
pleaded by the plaintiff:
"6(e) In 1978 a palatial bungalow was purchased
in   Tatabad,   Coimbatore.   This   is   set   out   and
described   as   Item   No.10   of   Schedule   'B'.   The
acquisition   of   this   property   was   only   out   of
the   joint   income   and   for   the   benefit   of   the
family.”
63. Defendant   Nos.1   to   3   filed   written   statements   in
O.S.   No.1101   of   1987   and   with   regard   to   above   averment
made in paragraph 6(e), following has been pleaded by the
defendant No.1:

47
"6. The   allegations   in   paragraph   6   of   the
plaint are not wholly true. The allegation that
the   property   described   as   Item   No.10   of
Schedule   'B'   was   acquired   out   of   the   joint
income   for   the   benefit   of   the   family   is
absolutely   false.   Firstly   there   was   no   joint
income. Secondly there is no family, thirdly it
was   not   purchased   out   of   joint   income.   The
property   was   taken   in   auction   by   the   1 st
defendant.   The  amount  necessary  for  payment  of
the   price   was   drawn   by   the   1 st
  defendant   from
Swamy   &   Swamy   Co.   The   amount   was   debited
against him in the amounts of the Swamy & Co.”
64.   The   case   of   defendant   No.1   was   that   above   property
was   purchased   in   auction   by   the   defendant   No.1.   The
defendant No.1 had filed Ex.B­27 in support of his claim
that   house   property   is   a   separate   property   of   defendant
No.1.  Ex.B­27  indicates  that   defendant   No.1  was  declared
as   the   purchaser   of   the   property   as   sold   by   public
auction held on 28.11.1979 for Rs.1,51,000/­. Ex.B­27 was
a sale certificate issued by Court of Subordinate Judge,
Coimbatore   to   the   above   effect.   Although   in   paragraph   6
of   the   written   statement   the   defendant   No.1   had   pleaded
that   amount   necessary   for   payment   of   price   was   drawn   by
defendant   No.1   from   Swamy   and   Swamy   Co.   Defendant   No.1
appeared in Witness Box as DW­2 and stated  in his cross­

48
examination that he has for payment of house property at
Tatabad   utilised   the   funds   of   the   Swamy   and   Swamy
Plantations   Co.   In   his   cross­examination,   he   admitted
that   he   had   taken   Rs.1,50,000/­.   In   his   cross­
examination, following was stated by defendant No.2:
“It   is   incorrect   to   say   that   for
purchasing house company funds were taken. I do
not   remember   and   there   are   no   records   to   show
from   which   partnership   and   from   which   account
it   was   drawn.   It   is   not   correct   to   say   that   I
took joint family funds and purchased. I would
have   taken   about   Rs.1.50   lakhs.   It   was   not
returned. Records cannot be produced now.”
65.  In   subsequent   cross­examination,   he   clearly
mentioned   that   the   amount   which   was   taken   for   the
purchase   of   the   house   property   at   Tatabad   was   not
returned to Swamy and Swamy Plantations Co. In his cross­
examination on 12.08.1997, defendant No.2 states:
“On   12.8.1997   the   witness   was   sworn   and   re­
examined. 
The   reason   for   not   returning   the   amount   to
Swamy & Sawmy Plantation Company from which it
was   borrowed   for   the   purchase   of   the   house   in
Tatabad, because there was credit balance in my
name in the said company.”

49
66.   Evidence   on   record,   thus,   indicates   that   Tatabad
house   property   was   purchased   in   the   name   of   defendant
No.1   and   the   consideration   for   purchase   was   paid   from
Swamy and Swamy Plantations Co. having its Directors and
shareholders only the family members of all the branches.
In his cross­examination defendant No.2 has stated:
“We   started   Co.   by   name   Swamy   and   Swamy
Plantations in 1974 in which members of all the
three   branches   of   the   family   were   the
shareholders.”
67.  The   details   of   the   shareholders   of   the   Swamy   and
Swamy   Plantations   (P)   Ltd.,   Coonoor,   were   mentioned   in
O.S.No.37 of 1984 as Item No.10 of Schedule 'C' which is
to the following effect:
“Item No.10
Details   of   shares   in   M/s.   Swami   and   Swami
Plantations (P) Ltd., Coonoor.
S.No. Name     No. of Shares    Total Value
1.S.K. Kumaraswamy 920 Rs.92,000.00
2.S.K. Chinnasamy 440 Rs.44,000.00
3.S.R.Shanmugavelautham 410 Rs.41,000.00
4.S.R. Somasundaram 230 Rs.23,000.00
5.Smt.R. Janaiammal 810 Rs. 1,000.00
6.Smt. S. Saraswathy 750 Rs.75,000.00
7.C.Kamalam 610 Rs.61,000.00
8.Smt. C. Sathiyavathi  75 Rs. 7,500.00

50
Total    4245    Rs.4,24,500.00”
68. As per details given above the Rangasamy branch held
2190   shares   out   of   4245   shares   which   is   more   than   50%
shares of the Company. 
69. The main plank of submission on behalf of respondent
No.1   is   that   after   the   partition   dated   07.11.1960,   the
three branches had separated and joint family status came
to   end.   He   submitted   that   partition   dated   07.11.1960   is
the   registered   partnership   deed   which   partition   was
accepted by trial court in its judgment. The partition of
joint   family   of   three   branches   having   been   accepted   on
07.11.1960   there   was   no   joint   family   when   the   Tatabad
house property was purchased in 1979. 
70. The   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the
appellants   in   support   of   the   appeals   is   that   partition
dated   07.11.1960   was   entered   between   three   brothers   to
save   the   landed   property   from   Land   Ceiling   Act.   The
partition   deed   dated   07.11.1960   was   got   registered   on
07.11.1960, it claims that parties have divided immovable
properties   on   01.04.1960.   The   submission   is   that   Land

51
Ceiling   Act   was   being   implemented   immediately   after
01.04.1960   hence   the   said   claim   was   set   up   in   the
partition   deed.   The   partition   deed   was   executed   to   save
the   landed   property   of   the   three   branches   and   there   was
no   intention   of   separating   each   branch   and   bringing   the
change   in   joint   family   status.   The   submission   of   Shri
Giri has been reiterated which was also raised before the
High   Court   that   after   partition   dated   07.11.1960   the
three   brothers   united   and   joint   family   continued   even
after   07.11.1960,   which   is   evident   from   different
properties   purchased   in   the   name   of   all   the   three
branches,   living   together   in   ancestral   house   at
Sadapalayam  and  newly  constructed  house  at  Somnur.   After
the   purchase   of   land   in   1963   all   the   three   branches
continued to run family businesses together. 
71. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   further   submits
that   it   is   own   case   of   defendant   No.1   that   partition
agreement dated 08.03.1981 took between the parties under
which   Rangasamy   branch   agreed   to   take   Vasudeva   Textile
Mills,   the   branch   of   defendant   No.1,   S.K.   Kumarasamy
decided to take property at Coonoor and Vedapathi village

52
and Chinnasamy branch decided to take property at Somnur.
Defendant No.1 has pleaded that under the agreement dated
08.03.1981,   the   plaintiff   had   to   pay   Rs.7   lacs   to
defendant No.4 and defendant No.1 had to pay Rs.4 lacs to
defendant No.4 to equalise the valuation by partition as
was   agreed   on   08.03.1981.   Shri   Giri   submits   that   DW.1
himself came with case that partition had taken place on
08.03.1983   and   compromise   decree   was   nothing   but
implementation   of   the   said   agreement.   Shri   Giri   submits
that   when   defendant   No.1   himself   states   about   the
partition   in   the   year   1981,   the   partition   pre­supposes
the   joint   family   and   had   the   three   branches   separated
from 07.11.1960, there was no question of again effecting
partition in the year 1981. 
72. One   of   the   points   for   consideration   before   us   is
that   as   to   whether   at   the   time   when   Tatabad   house   was
acquired   by   defendant   No.1   whether   all   three   branches
were part of joint family or all the three branches after
partition  dated  07.11.1960   continued   to  be  separate  from
each other.

53
73. The sheet anchor of the defendant No.1 is that three
branches   of   family   were   not   joint   as   it   was   partitioned
by partition deed dated 07.11.1960.     The partition deed
dated   07.11.1960   is   a   registered   partition   deed   between
three   branches.   The   partition   deed   dated   07.11.1960
referred   to   earlier   partition   deed   dated   27.09.1953   by
which   the   father   of   three   brothers   partitioned   property
between   son   of   his   first   wife   and   his   three   sons   from
second   wife.     The   properties   which   were   allotted   to   in
the   partition   deed   dated   27.09.1953   was   86.72   acres
between   three   brothers.     The   Partition   Deed   dated
07.11.1960 reads:­
“A   Document   dated   28.09.1953   bearing
No.3158/1953   has   been   registered   at   the
Coimbatore   Registrar’s   Office   as   a
Partition Deed and has been executed on the
27 th
  day   of   September,   1953   wherein   the
properties   belonging   to   our   brother
Sennimalai   Gounder,   the   son   of   the   first
wife   of   our   father   A.V.   Kandasamy   Gounder
between   us   and   our   father.     We   have   been
enjoying   the   properties   allotted   to   the
three   of   us   vide   the   said   document   as   one
family and have developed it, sold it, done
agriculture in it and carried out business.
We have also partitioned among us. 
Since   we   decided   to   partition   amongst
ourselves   we   have   divided   the   business

54
capital   belonging   to   our   joint   family   vide
accounts   dated   1.4.1960.     We   have   already
divided   the   jewels,   utensils   and   other
articles   and   each   of   us   are   enjoying   them
separately.     Though   on   01.04.1960   we   have
divided   the   immovable   properties   such   as
house   buildings,   factory   buildings,   farm
and   lands   to   avoid   litigation   among   us   in
future   we   have   registered   it   through   this
document.”  
                 
74. The case of the appellant is that the partition deed
dated   07.11.1960   was   entered   between   three   brothers   to
save the properties from land ceiling laws.  The relevant
date   under   the   Land   Ceiling   Act   was   07.04.1960   on   which
date the extent of properties in hands of a person has to
be   determined   and   since   three   brothers,   who   consisted
members   of   joint   family   on   the   relevant   date   had   more
than   the   land   which   was   permitted   to   a   person,   a
partition   was   entered   to   save   the   properties   from   land
ceiling   laws.     This   argument   was   rejected   by   the   trial
court   holding   that   it   has   not   been   proved   that   land
ceiling laws in any manner affected the extent of land in
the   hands   of   three   brothers.   We   need   to   notice   some
provisions   of   Tamil   Nadu   Land   Reforms   (Fixation   of
Ceiling   on   Land)   Act,   1961.     Section   3   of   the   Act   which

55
is   a   definition   clause   defines   the   word   “person”   in
Section 3(34) which is to the following effect:­
“3(34).         “person”   includes   any
company,   family   firm,   society   or
association   of   individuals,   whether
incorporated or not or any private trust or
public trust.”
75.   Section   5   of   the   Act   provide   for   ceiling   area.
According to sub­section (1)(a) of Section 5 the ceiling
area in the case of every person and in the case of every
family   consisting   of   not   more   than   five   members   was   30
standard   acres.   Figure   of   30   standard   acres   was
subsequently   reduced   to   15   standard   acres   by   Tamil   Nadu
Act   No.   37   of   1972.     Section   5(1)(b)   further   provided
that ceiling area in the case of every family consisting
of   more   than   five   members   shall   be   30   standard   acres
together   with   an   additional   5   standard   acres   for   every
member   of   the   family   in   excess   of   five.   In   event,   the
ceiling   area   is   determined   treating   the   Hindu   Undivided
Family,   joint   family   consisting   of   three   brothers,   the
ceiling area shall be 30 standard acres by which 5 acres
additional   for   every   member   of   the   family   in   excess   of
five.  The land which was possessed by the three brothers

56
in the year 1960 was more than 86.52 acres, which extent
was   received   by   the   three   brothers   in   1953   partition.
Thereafter  three  brothers  have  acquired further land.  In
case,   three   brothers   before   07.04.1960   partition   their
joint   family,   then   each   person   will   be   entitled   to   30
acres.     Thus,   partition   of   the   properties   among   three
brothers   was   clearly   beneficial   to   the   properties
possessed   by   the   three   brothers.     The   view   of   the   trial
court   that   it   is   not   proved   that   any   benefit   under   the
Ceiling   of   Land   Act   could   have   been   obtained   by   three
brothers is clearly untenable. The view expressed by the
trial   court   was   not   after   examining   the   provisions   of
Act,   1961.     Further   the   statement   in   the   partition   that
three   brothers   have   already   divided   the   immovable
properties   on   01.04.1960   clearly   was   with   intent   to   get
away   from   Act,   1961   since   the   relevant   date   under   the
Ceiling Act was 07.04.1960.  
76.   Under   Hindu   Law,   any   member   of   the   joint   family   can
separate himself from joint family.  The intention of the
parties   to   terminate   the   status   of   joint   family   is   a
relevant   factor   to   determine   the   status   of   Hindu

57
Undivided Family.   From the above, it is clear that real
intendment   of   three   branches   to   partition   their
properties was not that they did not want Hindu Undivided
Family   to   continue   rather   the   said   partition   was   with
object to get away from  application  of Ceiling Act, 1961.
The intention of the parties when they partitioned their
properties in the year 1960 is a relevant fact.         
77. However, the Partition Deed dated 07.11.1960 being a
registered   Partition   Deed   between   three   branches,   the
same   cannot   be   ignored.     Properties   admittedly   were
divided   in   three   branches   by   the   said   partition.     The
question   is   as   to   whether   after   07.11.1960,   the   family
continued as a Joint Family or the status of joint family
came to an end on 07.11.1960.   The case of the appellant
which was also pressed by the High Court was that even if
partition dated 07.11.1960 is accepted; the parties lived
in   a   joint   family   and   continued   their   joint   family
status.     The   contention   advanced   by   the   appellant   was
that   there   was   reunion   between   three   brothers   to   revert
to   the   status   of   Joint   Hindu   Family,   which   is   amply
proved   from   the   acts   and   conducts   of   the   parties

58
subsequent to 07.11.1960.  
78.   The   concept   of   reunion   in   Hindu   Law   is   well   known.
Hindu   Joint   Family   even   if   partitioned   can   revert   back
and   reunite   to   continue   the   status   of   joint   family.
Mulla   on   Hindu   Law,   22 nd
  Edition,   while   deliberating   on
reunion   has   status   following   in   paragraphs   341,   342   and
343:­
“ 341.   Who   may   reunite,­   ‘A   reunion   in
estate   properly   so   called,   can   only   take
place   between   persons   who   were   parties   to
the   original   partition’.   It   would   appear
from   this   that   a   reunion   can   take   place
between   any   persons   who   were   parties   to
the   original   partition.   Only   males   can
reunite.
342.   Effect   of   reunion,­   The   effect   of   a
reunion   is   to   remit   the   reunited   members
to   their   former   status   as   members   of   a
joint Hindu family.
343.   Intention   necessary   to   constitute
reunion:   To   constitute   a   reunion,   there
must   be   an   intention   of   the   parties   to
reunite  in   estate  and  interest.   In   Bhagwan
Dayal   v.   Reoti   Devi ,   the   Supr eme   Court
pointed   out   that   it   is   implicit   in   the
concept   of   a   reunion   that   there   shall   be
an   agreement   between   the   parties   to
reunite   in   estate   with   an   intention   to
revert   to   their   former   status.   Such   an
agreement may be express or may be implied
by the conduct of the parties. The conduct
must   be   of   an   incontrovertible   character

59
and   the   burden   lies   heavily   on   the   party
who assets reunion.”
79.   The   Privy   Council   in   Palani   Ammal   Vs.
Muthuvenkatacharla Moniagar and Ors., AIR 1925 PC 49   has
held   that   if   a   joint   Hindu   family   separates,   the   family
or   any   members   of   it   may   agree   to   reunite   as   a   joint
Hindu   family,   but   such   a   reuniting   is   for   obvious
reasons, which would apply in many cases under the law of
the   Mitakshara,   of   very   rare   occurrence,   and   when   it
happens it must be strictly proved as any other disputed
fact   is   proved.   In   paragraph   9,   the   Privy   Council   laid
down following :­
“ 9.    But  the  mere   fact   that   the   shares
of   the   coparceners   have   been   ascertained
does   not   by   itself   necessarily   lead   to   an
inference   that   the   family   had   separated.
There   may   be   reasons   other   than   a
contemplated   immediate   separation   for
ascertaining   what   the   shares   of   the
coparceners on a separation would be. It is
also now beyond doubt that a member of such
a   joint   family   can   separate   himself   from
the   other   members   of   the   joint   family   and
is on separation entitled to have his share
in   the   property   of   the   joint   family
ascertained   and   partitioned   off   for   him,
and that the remaining coparceners, without
any   special   agreement   amongst   themselves,

60
may continue to be coparceners and to enjoy
as   members   of   a   joint   family   what   remained
after   such   a   partition   of   the   family
property.   That   the   remaining   members
continued   to   be   joint   may,   if   disputed,   be
inferred from the way in which their family
business   was   carried   on   after   their
previous   coparcener   had   separated   from
them.   It   is   also   quite   clear   that   if   a
joint Hindu family separates, the family or
any members of it may agree to reunite as a
joint Hindu family, but such a reuniting is
for   obvious   reasons,   which   would   apply   in
many cases under the law of the Mitakshara,
of   very   rare   occurrence,   and   when   it
happens   it   must   be   strictly   proved   as   any
other   disputed   fact   is   proved.   The   leading
authority   for   that   last   proposition
is   Balabux   Ladhuram   v.   Rukhmabai   (1903)   30
Cal. 725.” 
80.   Another   judgment   which   needs   to   be   noticed   is
judgment of Madras High Court in  Mukku Venkataramayya Vs.
Mukku Tatayya and Ors., AIR 1943 Mad. 538 .   In the above
case, there was partition in the family in the year 1903
as a result of which the father with his second wife and
children separated and begin to live apart from his sons
by the first wife.     The case of the respondent was that
he and his brothers continued to remain joint after their
father   decided   to   remain   away   from   them   in   1903.   An
alternative case was also put forward that there has been

61
a   reunion   amongst   the   brothers   after   the   partition.
Madras High Court in paragraph 5 stated:­
“5.     …………………….. But   if   a   general   partition
between   all   the   members   takes   place,   re­
union   is   the   only   means   by   which   the   joint
status   can   be   re­established.   Mere
jointness   in   residence,   food   or   worship   or
a   mere   trading   together   cannot   bring   about
the conversion of the divided status into a
joint   one   with   all   the   usual   incidents   of
jointness   in   estate   and   interest   unless   an
intention   to   become   re­united   in   the   sense
of   the   Hindu   law   is   clearly   established.
The   rule   is,   if   I   may   say   so   with   respect,
correctly   stated   by   the   Patna   High   Court,
in   Pan   Kuer   v.   Ram   Narain   Chowdhary,
A.I.R.   1929   Pat.   353   where   the   learned
Judge observes that:
To   establish   it,   (reunion),   it   is
necessary   to   show   not   only   that   the
parties   already   divided,   lived   or
traded   together,   but   that   they   did
so   with   the   intention   of   thereby
altering   their   status   and   of   forming
a   joint   estate   with   all   its   usual
incidents.
81.   The   High   Court   held   that   the   brothers,   who   had
divided,   lived   and   traded   together,   the   case   of   the
reunion   was   accepted.     In   paragraph   17,   following   was
laid down:­
“ 17.  The question then is, whether this

62
finding   is   sufficient   to   support   a   case   of
reunion.   We   are   conscious   that   the   burden
of   proof   is   heavily   on   the   respondent   and
also   that   proof   of   mere   jointness   in
residence,   food   and   worship   dees   not
necessarily make out reunion. What is to be
established   is   that   not   only   did   the
parties   who   had   divided   lived   and   traded
together,   but   that   they   did   so   with   the
intention of thereby altering their divided
status   into   a   joint   status   with   all   the
usual   incidents   of   jointness   in   estate   and
interest.   In   our   opinion   the   way   in   which
the   brothers   dealt   with   each   other   leaves
no   room   for   doubt   that   it   was   their
deliberate   intention   to   reunite   so   as   to
reproduce   the   joint   status   which   had
existed   before   the   partition   of   1903.   The
immediate   object   of   the   partition   was   to
enable   the   father   to   live   separately   from
his   sons   by   the   first   wife,   as
misunderstandings   had   arisen   between   them.
As   between   the   sons   themselves   there   never
was   any   reason   for   a   separation   inter   se
and   there   can   be   no   doubt   that   the   moment
they   separated   away   from   their   father   they
desired to live and lived together in joint
status.   It   is   true   that   at   that   time   the
first   respondent   was   a   minor.   But   this   can
make little difference if after he attained
majority   he   accepted   the   position   in   which
the appellant and Nagayya had already begun
to   live   together.   In   our   view   it   is   not
necessary that there should be a formal and
express   agreement   to   reunite.   Such   an
agreement   can   be   established   by   clear
evidence   of   conduct   incapable   of
explanation   on   any   other   footing.   Such,   in
our view, is the position here established.
That   being   so,   the   claim   of   the   appellant
to   the   exclusive   ownership   of   the

63
properties   in   suit   must   be   negatived.   The
appeal   fails   and   must   therefore   be
dismissed with costs.”
82.   One   more   judgment   on   the   concept   of   reunion   which
need to be referred to is the judgment of Karnataka High
Court   is   M/s.   Paramanand   L.   Bajaj,   Bangalore   Vs.   The
Commissioner   of   Income   Tax,   Karnataka,   II,   Bangalore,
(1981) SCC Online Karnataka 131.   Justice Rama Jois after
referring   to   Smritis   and   relevant   judgments   on   the
subject   laid   down   that   reunion   is   the   reversal   of   the
process of partition, following was held in paragraphs 8
and 12:­
“ 8.   The   basic   proposition   of   Hindu   Law
on   reunion   is   laid   down   in   Brihaspati
Smriti   (Gaekwad’s   Oriental   Series,   Vol.
LXXXV­pp   214­215),   also   vide   Smrti­
Chandrika III Vyavaharakanda Part II (1916)
published   by   Government   of   highness   the
Maharaja   of   Mysore   pp   702­703;   English
version   J.R.   Gharpura   (1952)   Part   III   pp
667­670).
वविभत्कक   य   पपन :  वपत	तरर   भ	तररत	तरर   चचैक्त	तर   सवसस्थित :  ।
वपत	
तव्ययेणर   स्थिविर   प	तररीत्यर   तत्ससंस	तष्ट :  स   उच्यतये   ॥
He   who   being   once   separated   dwells
again   through   affection   with   his   father
brought   or   paternal   uncle   is   termed
reunited.

64
ससंसतष्टटौ यटौ प	पन :  प	तररीत्यतटौ परसपरभरवगिनटौ ।
When   two   coparceners   have   again   become
reunited   through   affection,   they   shall
mutually   participate   in   each   others
properties.
The   view   expressed   by   Devanna   Bhatta,
the   author   of   Smriti­Chandrika   on   the   text
of Brihaspati is­ 
सहविरसये प	
परुषरणरमरहत्य ससंसगिर्ग भरविरत धनदररयेण 
ससंसगिकर्ग विरच्य इतरीदसंतरव्य विहररवनवमतभ	
भतरविच्छ	येदकरप
नकदयेन वविभक्तरनरसं प	
भविर्गविदयेकररशरीकरणपयर्गन्तसससंसगिटौ
न प	
पन :  सहविरसमवतमवत मन्तव्यम	त ।
Association   not   necessarily   being   by
co­residence,   the   association   is   expressed
to be through wealth; so by way of removing
the   distinguishing   factor   of   that,   it
should   be   understood   that   the   re­
association   of   the   separated   members   shall
be   to   the   extent   of   pooling   together(all)
the   wealth   etc.,   as   before,   and   not   merely
by a co­residence only.
Mitakshra   on   Yaj.II   138­139,   which   lay
down   special   rule   of   inheritance   at   a
partition   among   reunited   members   explains
the effect of reunion as follows:
वविभक्तसं धनसं प	
पनवमश	तररीक	ततसं ससंसस	तष्टसं
तदसयरसतरीवत ससंस	
तष्टरी ।
Effects   which   had   been   divided   and
which   are   again   mixed   together   are   termed
re­united. He, to whom such appertain, is a
re­united parcener.
The   aforesaid   provisions   have   been   the
subject   matter   of   interpretation   in   number

65
of cases.
12.   On   a   consideration   of   the   basic
texts   on   the   point   and   the   views   of
commentators   expressed   in   Mitakshara   and
Smriti­chandrika   and   the   case   law   cited
before us and having due regard to the real
purpose   and   intent   of   the   Hindu   law
governing   HUF,   it   appears   to   us   that
provision   for   reunion   has   been   provided
for,   for   enabling   erstwhile   members   of   a
Hindu   undivided   family,   to   come   together
and   to   form   once   again   a   joint   family
governed   by   Mitakshara   law.   The   mutual
love,   affection   arising   from   blood
relationship   and   the   desire   to   reunite
proceeding   therefrom,   constitutes   the   very
foundation of reunion. This is evident from
the   text   of   Brihaspati   in   which   even   the
relationship   of   persons   who   could   reunite
is   specified   though   some   of   the
commentators have taken the view that it is
only   illustrative   and   not   exhaustive   and
that reunion is possible even among persons
not   specified   in   the   text   of   Brihaspati.
(See:   Virmitrodaya,   translated   by
Gopalachandra   Sarkar   (1879)   pp   204­
205;   Vivadachintamani   Gaekwad's   Oriental
Series   Vol.   XCIX   pp   288­289).   But   even   so
there   is   no   controversy   that   reunion   is
possible   only   among   persons   who   were   on   an
earlier   date   members   of   a   HUF.   Reunion
therefore   is   a   reversal   of   the   process   of
partion.   Therefore,   it   is   reasonable   to
take the view that reunion is not merely an
agreement   to   live   together   as   tenants   in
common,   but   is   intended   to   bring   about   a
fusion   in   interest   and   estate   among   the
divided   members   of   an   erstwhile   HUF   so   as
to   restore   to   them   the   status   of   HUF   once
again   and   therefore   reunion   creates   right

66
on   all   the   reuniting   coparceners   in   the
joint   family   properties   which   were   the
subject   matter   of   partition   among   them   to
the   extent   they   were   not   dissipated   away
before   the   date   of   reunion.   That   would   be
the   legal   consequence   of   a   genuine   reunion
is   forcefully   brought   about   by   the   text   of
Brihaspati,   which   provides   “where
coparceners   have   again   reunited   through
affection,   they   shall   mutually   participate
in   each   others   properties”.   Mitakshara
states that mixing up of divided properties
is   the   effect   of   reunion.   Therefore   it
follows, no coparcener, who is a party to a
reunion   and   who   admits   reunion,   shall   be
heard to contend that the property which he
had   got   at   an   earlier   partition   and   still
with him has not become the property of the
reconstituted   HUF.   But   there   can   be   no
doubt   that   reunion,   when   disputed   must   be
proved as any disputed question of fact and
the   circumstances   that   all   the   reuniting
members   have   not   brought   back   their
properties   to   form   the   common­stock,   may
support   the   plea   taken   by   any   concerned
party   that   there   was   no   reunion.   However,
if   reunion   is   admitted   by   all   the   parties
to   the   reunion   or   it   is   proved,   the   share
of   the   properties   of   reunited   members   got
at   an   earlier   partition   and   in   their
possession   at   the   time   of   reunion   becomes
the   properties   of   the   joint   family,
notwithstanding   the   fact   that   some   of   them
have   failed   to   throw   those   properties   into
the   common   hotch   pot,   whether   with   or
without   the   knowledge   or   consent   of   each
other.   It   is   a   different   aspect   if   reunion
itself   is   not   admitted   by   the   persons   who
are   parties   to   a   reunion   and   it   is   not
proved   by   the   party   pleading   reunion,   in
which   event   there   would   be   no   reunion   at

67
all.”
 
83. We may now notice the judgment of this Court dealing
with   reunion   in   a   Hindu   Undivided   Family.     In   Bhagwan
Dayal   Vs.   Reoti   Devi ,   AIR   1962   SC   287,   this   Court
examined   the   principles   of   Hindu   Law   and     principles   of
Hindu   Joint   Family.     In   paragraph   16,   it   was   held   that
the   general   principle   is   that   every   Hindu   family   is
presumed   to   be   joint   unless   the   contrary   is   proved;   but
this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by
course   of   conduct.   In   the   above   case,   one   of   the
questions   was   as   to   whether   there   was   reunion   between
members of the Joint Family after partition.   This Court
quoted   with   approval   the   judgments   of   Privy   Council   in
Palani Ammal (supra)  and laid down following in paragraph
22:­
“22.   For   the   correct   approach   to   this
question,   it   would   be   convenient   to   quote
at   the   outset   the   observations   of   the
Judicial   Committee   in   Palani
Ammal   v.   Muthuvenkatacharla   Moniagar
[(1924) LR 52 IA 83, 86] :
“It is also quite clear that if a
joint   Hindu   family   separates,   the
family   or   any   members   of   it   may

68
agree   to   reunite   as   a   joint   Hindu
family,   but   such   a   reuniting   is   for
obvious   reasons,   which   would   apply
in   many   cases   under   the   law   of   the
Mitakshara,   of   very   rare   occurrence,
and   when   it   happens   it   must   be
strictly   proved   as   any   other
disputed   fact   is   proved.   The   leading
authority   for   that   last   proposition
is   Baldbux
Ladhuram   v.   Rukhmabai   [(1903)   LR   30
IA 190] .”
It   is   also   well   settled   that   to
constitute   a   reunion   there   must   be   an
intention   of   the   parties   to   reunite   in
estate   and   interest.   It   is   implicit   in   the
concept of a reunion that there shall be an
agreement between the parties to reunite in
estate with an intention to revert to their
former   status   of   members   of   a   joint   Hindu
family.   Such   an   agreement   need   not   be
express,   but   may   be   implied   from   the
conduct   of   the   parties   alleged   to   have
reunited.   But   the   conduct   must   be   of   such
an   incontrovertible   character   that   an
agreement   of   reunion   must   be   necessarily
implied   therefrom.   As   the   burden   is   heavy
on   a   party   asserting   reunion,   ambiguous
pieces of conduct equally consistent with a
reunion   or   ordinary   joint   enjoyment   cannot
sustain   a   plea   of   reunion.   The   legal
position   has   been   neatly   summarized
in   Mayne's Hindu law , 11th Edn., thus at p.
569:
“As   the   presumption   is   in   favour
of   union   until   a   partition   is   made
out,   so   after   a   partition   the
presumption   would   be   against   a
reunion.   To   establish   it,   it   is

69
necessary to  show,  not only that  the
parties   already   divided,   lived   or
traded   together,   but   that   they   did
so   with   the   intention   of   thereby
altering   their   status   and   of   forming
a   joint   estate   with   all   its   usual
incidents.   It   requires   very   cogent
evidence   to   satisfy   the   burden   of
establishing   that   by   agreement
between   them,   the   divided   members   of
a   joint   Hindu   family   have   succeeded
in   so   altering   their   status   as   to
bring   themselves   within   all   the
rights   and   obligations   that   follow
from   the   fresh   formation   of   a   joint
undivided Hindu family.”
As   we   give   our   full   assent   to   these
observations, we need not pursue the matter
with   further   citations   except   to   consider
two   decisions   strongly   relied   upon   by   the
learned   Attorney­
General.   Venkataramayya   v.   Tatayya   [AIR
1943   Mad   538]   is   a   decision   of   a   Division
Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court.   It   was
pointed   out   there   that   “mere   jointness   in
residence,   food   or   worship   or   a   mere
trading   together   cannot   bring   about   the
conversion   of   the   divided   status   into   a
joint   one   with   all   the   usual   incidents   of
jointness   in   estate   and   interest   unless   an
intention   to   become   reunited   in   the   sense
of   the   Hindu   law   is   clearly   established”.
The   said   proposition   is   unexceptionable,
and   indeed   that   is   the   well   settled   law.
But   on   the   facts   of   that   case,   the   learned
Judges   came   to   the   conclusion   that   there
was   a   reunion.   The   partition   there   was
effected   between   a   father   and   his   sons   by
the   first   wife.   One   of   the   sons   was   a
minor. The question was whether there was a

70
reunion between the brothers soon after the
alleged   partition.   The   learned   Judges   held
that   as   between   the   sons   there   was   never
any   reason   for   separation   inter   se,   and
that   the   evidence   disclosed   that   on   their
conduct   no   explanation   other   than   reunion
was   possible.   They   also   pointed   out   that
though   at   the   time   of   partition   one   of   the
brothers   was   a   minor,   after   he   attained
majority,   he   accepted   the   position   of
reunion.   The   observations   relied   upon   by
the learned Attorney­General read thus:
“In   our   view,   it   is   not   necessary
that   there   should   be   a   formal   and
express   agreement   to   reunite.   Such
an   agreement   can   be   established   by
clear   evidence   of   conduct   incapable
of   explanation   on   any   other
footing.”
This   principle   also   is   unexceptionable.
But   the   facts   of   that   case   are   entirely
different   from   those   in   the   present   case,
and   the   conclusion   arrived   at   by   the
learned   Judges   cannot   help   us   in   arriving
at a finding in the instant case.”
84.  The   above   observations   indicates   that   this   Court
also   approved   the   Madras   High   Court   judgment   in   Mukku
Venkataramayya(supra).     Again   this   Court   in   Anil   Kumar
Mitra and Ors. Vs. Ganendra Nath Mitra and Ors., (1997) 9
SCC 725  held that the acts of the parties may lead to the
inference that parties reunited after previous partition.

71
In paragraph 4, following observations have been made:­
“4.   …………………………It   is   true   that   by   the
acts   of   the   parties   that   even   after   the
previous   partition,   they   continued   to   be
members   of   the   joint   family.   But   it   should
be   by   conduct   and   treatment   meted   out   to
the properties by the members of the family
in this regard……………………………” 
 
85.   Now,   we   look   into   other   materials   on   record.     The
ancestral   house   of   the   parties   was   at   Helmet ,
Sedapalayam,   Village   Karumathampaty   where   three   brothers
alongwith their father   A.V. Kandaswamy   used to live. DW2
in   her   statement   has   also   stated   that   after   she   was
married   with   Rangasamy,   she   lived   at   ancestral   house   at
Sedapalayam.  Further the three brothers in the year 1963
purchased   the   house   site   at   Hemlet   Somanur   and
constructed   a   new   house   where   three   brothers   with   their
families   shifted   and   lived   at   Somanur   which   become   the
new   home   of   the   Joint   Family   consisting   of   three
brothers.  The new house was constructed after purchasing
the   land   in   the   year   1963   and   the   families   of   the   three
brothers   started   living   at   about   in   1964,   which   clearly
indicate   that   intention   of   all   the   brothers   was   to   live
jointly   and   continue   as   Joint   Hindu   Family.     After

72
partition dated 07.11.1960, three branches have purchased
several   immovable   properties   together,   details   of   which
are as follows:­
i) Sale deed dated 09.06.1962 filed as exhibit A­42
in favour of (a) K.Rangasamy, (b) S.K.Kumarasamy
and (c) S.K.Chinmasamy of the land to the extent
of 5.6 acres in Karumathampaty village.
ii) Sale   deed   dated   16.10.1963   which   has   been   filed
as   exhibit   A­43.   By   sale   deed,   property   was
purchased   for   construction   of   house   only   which
fact   was   stated   in   the   sale   deed   itself.   The
sale deed was in the name of three brothers  (a)
K.Rangasamy,   (b)   S.K.Kumarasamy   and   (c)
S.K.Chinmasamy.
iii) On   14.09.1972,   by   three   sale   deeds   which   were
filed   as   exhibit   A­41,   B­10   and   B­11,   huge
property   situated   at   Coonoor   namely   High   Field
estate   was   purchased   in   the   name   of
S.K.Kumarasamy,   S.R.Somasundaram(minor   in   the
guardianship   of   his   mother   Mrs.   Janakiammal),
S.R.Shammugha   velcyutham   in   which   estate   the

73
family carried business.
86.   The   three   branches   continued   joint   business   by
establishing   firms   and   companies   which   was   carried   by
joint   family   in   the   partnership   or   by   private   company.
It   was   only   the   members   of   the   family,   who   were
shareholders   and   directors.     The   purchase   of   various
immovable   properties   in   the   names   of   the   three   branches
clearly   indicate   the   intention   that   all   the   three
branches are joint and they are purchasing the properties
in   the   name   of   all   the   three   branches.     After   the   death
of   Rangasamy   in   the   year   1967,   it   was   S.K.   Kumarasamy,
defendant   No.1,   who   took   the   reins   of   the   family   being
the   eldest.     The   plaintiff   and   defendant   No.10,   sons   of
Ranagasamy were very young at the time when their father
died   and   thereafter   they   were   under   the   guidance   and
control of defendant No.1 and the materials on the record
indicate   that   it   was   the   defendant   No.1   under   whose
guidance,   all   businesses   were   carried   out.       Even   the
Suit   No.37   of   1984   which   was   filed   for   partition   of
properties   was   at   the   instance   of   defendant   No.1,   which
pleadings   have   been   made   by   the   plaintiff   of   that   suit

74
when he filed written statement in Suit No. 1101 of 1987.
The plaintiff of Suit No.37 of 1984 Senthil Kumaravel in
his   written   statement   in   Suit   No.   1101   of   1987   has
clearly   stated   that   he   filed   the   Suit   No.37   of   1984   at
the instance of defendant No.1, which fact has also been
noted in paragraph 9 of the trial court’s judgment.     
87. It is relevant to note that in suit No.1101 of 1987,
it   was   only   D­1,   who   filed   the   written   statement   and
appeared   in   the   witness   box.   D­4,   S.K.   Chinnasamy,
neither   filed   written   statement   nor   came   to   the   witness
box.   It   was   D­1   who   was   pleading   that   joint   family   came
to   the   an   end   after   partition   dated   07.11.1960.   D­1   in
his   written   statement   and   in   his   oral   statement   before
the   court   has   come   up   with   the   case   that   there   was
partition   of   the   properties   on   08.03.1981   and   an
agreement   was   entered   between   the   three   branches   and
compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   was   passed   to
implement   the   agreement   which   was   entered   in   the   year
1981.   In   the   written   statement   filed   by   D­1   to   D­3,   in
paragraphs 16 and 17, following was pleaded by D­1:­

75
"16....The   arrangement   to   put   an   end   to   the   co­
ownership   had   been   arrived   at   even   in   1981   and
separate   ownership   had   been   agreed   upon.   Hence
there could be no representation or assurance as
alleged in the plaint.
17....As   the   mode   of   division   and   allotment   of
the   various   items   had   been   agreed   upon
previously   and   the   amounts   were   paid   to   the   4 th
defendant   the   compromise   was   arrived   at,   an
early date in a smooth manner and the decree was
passed   in   terms   thereof.   The   decree   has   also
been   registered.   At   the   terms   of   the   agreement
were   being   incorporated   in   the   compromise   the
parties   were   advised   that   it   was   not   necessary
to   refer   to   the   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   in
the compromise.”
88. The case of partition of all properties by agreement
dated   08.03.1981   standing   in   name   of   different   branches
including   the   branch   of   Rangasamy   was   the   case   of
defendant   No.1   who   was   the   eldest   member   of   the   family
and   has   been   denying   the   jointness   of   the   family   after
07.11.1960.   D­1   S.K.   Chinnasamy   appeared   in   witness   box
as DW­2. In his cross examination dated 10.04.1997, DW­2
stated: ­
"In   March,   1981,   we   divided   the   common
properties. On 08.03.1981 we reduced the same in
to   a   written   agreement,   written   on   stamp   paper,
and   we   signed   the   same.   Myself,   4 th
,   7 th
  and   10 th

76
defendants and the plaintiff signed in it. Three
copies   were   taken.   The   same   has   not   been   filed.
All of us had signed in all the three copies. We
took   possession   of   our   respective   shares   in   the
properties.   After   08.03.1981   the   common
properties   were   not   in   joint   possession   and
common enjoyment of all...”
89.   Further   in   his   cross­examination   on   11.08.1997,   D­2
further stated: ­
“...I had stated that division of all properties
was   done   in   1981.   The   arrangement   that   was
decided   in   1981   was   implemented   in   1984   under
the   decree.   Nothing   new   was   done.   As   per   the
arrangement decided in March, 1981, Vasudev Mill
having   16   acres   of   land   and   buildings   and   the
machineries   belonging   to   the   mill   were   allotted
to the branch of my elder brother...”
The   trial   court   in   its   judgment   dated   30.09.1997   in
paragraph 28 held:­
"28....the   agreement   that   had   been   executed   on
08.03.1981   is   genuine   and   it   is   clear   that   it
has   come   into   force   and   that   the   shares   which
were   more   or   less   raised   afresh   were   given   to
the   plaintiff   branch   and   that   after   the   year
1981,   the   family   of   the   1 st
  defendant,   had
relieved   themselves   from   Swamy   &   Co.,   Rangasamy
Brothers.   Swamy   Textiles,   Rengavilas   Warfing   &
Sizing   Factory   and   that   it   had   been   proved
through   the   oral   evidence   and   the   documentary
proof   and   that   through   the   Ex.A12   document,   the
plaintiff   and   the   10 th
  defendant   were   in   the
management   of   the   mill   and   the   same   had   been

77
clearly   proved   and   that   after   08.03.81,   the   1 st
defendant   had   obtained   the   right   in   the   estate
and that it is clearly proved through Ex.B67 and
that   it   is   the   stock   register   maintained   in   the
Sciefield   Tea   Factory   and   that   it   would   reveal
that   till   March,   1981   and   10 th
  defendant   had
signed   in   the   register   and   that   thereafter   the
1 st
  defendant   had   signed   in   the   same   is   clearly
revealed, in the Ex.B68, 69 gate pass also it is
found as above and that from this, it is clearly
revealed   that   after   the   1981,   the   above   said
agreement   was   brought   into   force   and   that   it   is
proved clearly and that it had been indicated on
the   side   of   the   plaintiff   that   it   is   incorrect
to   state   that   the   property   at   Coonoor,
Veerakeralam   is   in   the   custody   of   the   1 st
defendant   and   the   properties   at   Somanur   are
lying   with   the   4 th
  defendant   and   that   the
plaintiff   had   accepted   in   the   evidence   that   he
had   not   managed   the   property   at   Coonoor,   and
that   from   this   it   is   clearly   revealed   that   the
above said agreement was brought into force.”
90. Further in paragraph 159, the trial court again held
that   agreement   of   the   year   1981   is   genuine   and   it   was
brought   into   force   and   the   argument   of   DW­1   is   found   to
be acceptable.
91. The   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   denied   by   the
plaintiff.   The   plaintiff's   case   was   that   at   no   point   of
time, there was any agreement entered between parties in
the   year   1981   to   divide   the   properties   standing   in   the

78
names   of   three   branches.   The   agreement   dated   08.03.1981
was   not   filed   by   D­1   in   the   evidence.   The   agreement   was
not filed nor exhibited by the defendant, D­1. 
92. In   the   written   statement   which   was   filed   by   D­1   in
O.S. No.37 of 1984, no plea was taken regarding agreement
dated   08.03.1981.   It   was   for   the   first   time   in   the
written   statement   filed   by   D­1   in   suit   No.1101   of   1987
that   mention   of   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   made.
Neither   any   agreement   dated   08.03.1981   was   filed   or
proved nor there is any other evidence on record to prove
the division of properties between three branches in the
year 1981. 
93. It   is   the   case   of   the   defendant   No.1   that   the
compromise   decree   dated   06.08.1984   is   nothing   but
implementation   of   agreement   dated   08.03.1981.   It   is,
thus,   clear   that   the   case   of   D­1   is   that   there   was
partition   of   all   properties   standing   in   the   names   of
three   branches   and   allocated   to   different   branches   on
08.03.1981,   which   has   been   subsequently   implemented   by

79
consent   decree   dated   06.08.1984.   As   per   the   case   of
defendant,   the   Vasudeva   Textiles   Mills   was   given   to   the
branch of Rangasamy, property at Coonoor was taken by D1
and properties at Somnur by D­4.
94. When   the   D­1   comes   with   the   case   that   there   was
partition   on   08.03.1981   of   all   immovable   properties
standing   in   the   names   of   three   branches,   which   was
implemented on 06.08.1984, the conclusion is irresistible
that family was joint and had the three branches were not
part   of   joint   Hindu   family,   there   was   no   occasion   for
attempting any partition on 08.03.1981 as claimed by D­1.
The fact that defendant No.1 is coming with the case that
there   was   partition   on   18.03.1981   itself   proves   that
three   branches   were   joint   till   then   as   per   case   of   D­1
himself. 
95. It   is   to   be   noted   that   plaintiff   never   admitted   the
agreement   dated   08.03.1981   or   alleged   partition   of
08.03.1981,   it   is,   thus,   clear   that   parties   remained
joint   and   properties   standing   in   the   names   of   three
branches   remained   joint   till   the     consent   decree   was

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passed on 06.08.1984. 
96. Thus,   in   the   year   1979   when   residential   property   of
Tatabad   was   obtained   in   the   name   of   defendant   No.1,   all
three   branches   were   part   of   the   joint   Hindu   family   and
the house property purchased in the name of one member of
joint Hindu family was for the benefit of all. 
97. Both the Courts below although accepted the partition
dated   18.03.1981   as   pleaded   by   D­1   but   erred   in   not
considering   the   consequence   of   such   pleading.   When
partition   of   all   immovable   and   movable   properties   is
claimed   on   08.03.1981,   the   conclusion   is   irresistible
that   the   family   was   joined   till   then.   The   theory   set   up
by   D­1   that   all   the   three   branches   were   separate   after
07.11.1960   is   denied/belied   by   claim   of   partition   on
08.03.1981.
98.  Both   the   trial   court   and   High   Court   have   given   much
emphasis   on   the   fact   that   three   branches   were   filing
separate  Income­Tax  Returns  and  Wealth   Tax  Returns   after
1967. An individual member of joint Hindu Family can very
well file his separate Returns both under the Income Tax

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Act as well as Wealth Tax Act and filing of such Returns
was   not   conclusive   of   status   of   the   family.   The
plaintiff's  case   throughout  was  that  family  continued  to
be joint after 07.11.1960 and D­1 who alone had filed the
written statement and appeared in the witness box having
come   with   the   case   of   partition   on   08.03.1981   which   he
claims   to   be   implemented   on   06.08.1984   by   Compromise
Decree, it is proved that family was joint at least till
then,   i.e.,   08.03.1981   or   06.08.1984.   Thus,   in   the   year
1979, when the Tatabad residential property was acquired,
the three branches were joint. 
99. The Tatabad residential property was for the benefit
of   all   the   three   branches   which   is   further   proved   from
the   fact   that   the   consideration   for   the   said   amount   was
not   paid   by   DW­1   from   his   separate   account   or   in   cash.
The   amount   was   drawn   from   the   private   limited   company
Swamy   and   Swamy   Plantation   Private   Limited   in   which   all
the   three   branches   were   shareholders   and   Directors.   The
Swamy and Swamy Plantation Company had not purchased the
residential   property   at   Tatabad   for   the   company.   The
Swamy   and   Swamy   plantation   private   company   is   not   the

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owner   of   the   residential   property   and   the   residential
property   at   Tatabad   is   a   joint   family   property   for   the
benefit of all the three branches.
100. We thus conclude that all three branches have equal
share   in   the   Tatabad   residential   property,   i.e.,   Item
No.X   of Schedule 'B' of plaint in Original Suit No.1101
of   1987.   This   residential   property   being   not   a   part   of
O.S.No.37   of   1984,   there   is   no   bar   in   seeking   partition
of   the   said   property   by   the   plaintiff.   Accordingly   we
declare that plaintiff/defendant No.7, defendant No.1 and
defendant No.4 are entitled to 1/3 rd
  share jointly in the
aforesaid Item No.X of Schedule 'B' of the suit property
( 1/3 rd
 share each to K. Rangasamy branch, S.K. Kumarasamy
branch   and   S.K.   Chinnasamy   branch).   Accordingly,   a
preliminary   decree   for   partition   shall   be   drawn   for   the
aforesaid property.
101.     Civil   Appeal   No.1537   of   2016   and   Civil   Appeal
No.1538   of   2016   are   partly   allowed.   Consequently,   the
Original   Suit   No.1101   of   1987   stands   decreed   to   the
extent indicated above, by granting a decree of partition
of   Item   No.X   of   Schedule   'B',   i.e.,   “In   Coimbatore

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Registration   on   District,   Coimbatore   Corporation   Limits,
Tatabad,   Dr.   Alagappa   Chettiar   Road,   D.No.101,   Extent
0.33   acres   with   4500   sq.ft.   built­up   residential
building.”
102.   Parties   are   at   liberty   to   make   an   application
before   the   trial   court   for   passing   an   appropriate   final
decree   and   such   application   is   to   be   disposed   of   by   the
trial court in accordance with law.
103. Parties shall bear their own costs.
..........................J.
  ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
..........................J.
( R. SUBHASH REDDY )
NEW DELHI,
JUNE 30, 2021.