2021 INSC 0306 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPEME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.2492 OF 2021 K.P. NATARAJAN & ANR.                                  … PETITIONER(S) VERSUS MUTHALAMMAL & ORS.             …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. In a Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short  “the Code” ), challenging an order of   the   trial   Court   refusing   to   condone   the   delay   of   862   days   in seeking to set aside an ex­parte decree for specific performance, the High   Court   found   that   the   ex­parte  decree  was   a  nullity,   as  it  was passed   against   a   minor   without   the   minor   being   represented   by   a guardian   duly   appointed   in   terms   of   the   procedure   contemplated 1 under Order XXXII,  Rule 3 of the Code.  Therefore, the High Court, exercising   its   power   of   superintendence   under   Article   227   of   the Constitution,   set   aside   the   ex­parte   decree   itself   on   condition   that the   petitioners   before   the   High   Court/defendants   pay   a   sum   of Rs.2,50,000/­, representing the amount already spent by the decree holders in purchasing stamp paper etc.  Aggrieved by the said order of   the   High   Court,   the   decree   holders   are   before   us   in   this   special leave petition. 2. We   have   heard   Mr.   S.   Nagamuthu,   learned   senior   Counsel appearing   for   the   petitioners/plaintiffs   and   Mr.   R. Balasubramanian,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   the respondents/defendants. 3. In a suit O.S. No.264 of 2013 filed by the petitioners­ herein  for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 25.04.2011, the respondents   were   duly   served   with   summons,   but   after   having entered   appearance   through   counsel   they   remained   ex­parte.   The trial Court decreed the suit ex­parte on 08.04.2015. 4. At   this   stage   it   may   be   relevant   to   take   note   of   one   fact, namely, that the petitioners sought, as an alternate relief, a decree 2 for refund of the money paid with interest at 18% per annum in the event   of   the   Court   not   granting   the   relief   of   specific   performance. But the trial Court held   albeit   without reasons, that the petitioners are entitled, for the primary relief of specific performance. 5. In the plaint as it was filed by the petitioners­ herein , the third defendant was described as   “minor S Aravindarajan, aged about 16 years, son of Sampathkumar represented by the next friend father M. Sampathkumar”.   Therefore, the petitioners had filed, along with the plaint,   an   application   in   I.A   No.981   of   2013   under   Order   XXXII, Rule 3 of the Code for appointing the second respondent­ herein  (his father  and the second defendant) as the guardian of the minor. As noted by the High Court, the trial Court, after serving notice on the second   defendant,   passed   an   Order   in   I.A.No.   981   of   2013   on 23.03.2014 to the following effect:­  “Batta   served.   Vakalat   by   guardian   to   minor filed. Hence this petition is closed.” 6. Seeking execution of the decree, the petitioners filed E.P No.33 of   2015.   Notices   were   served   on   all   the   respondents   in   the Execution Petition and the Execution Petition is said to have come 3 up for hearing on two dates in December­2015 and on several dates in   the   year   2016.   Eventually   the   respondents   were   set   ex­parte   in the Execution Petition on 18.10.2016 and the petition was allowed.  7. Thereafter   the   respondents   filed   an   application   in   November­ 2016 for setting  aside the ex­parte order in the Execution Petition. It was numbered only in the year 2017 as E.A. No.40 of 2017. 8. But   in   the   meantime   the   petitioners   were   called   upon   to deposit non­judicial stamp papers of the value of Rs.1,98,000/­ for the execution of the sale deed. They did so and a sale deed was in fact executed by the Court on 04.01.2017.   9. It is only thereafter that the respondents filed an application in I.A   No.142   of   2017   for   condonation   of   the   delay   of   862   days   in seeking   to   set   aside   the   ex­parte   decree.   This   application   filed   on 19.09.2017   was   dismissed   by   the   trial   Court   by   an   order   dated 28.11.2017,   primarily   on   three   grounds   namely:   (i)   that   there   was no   proper   explanation   for   the   delay;   (ii)   that   even   the   written statement   was   not   filed   within   the   time   stipulated   in   Order   VIII, Rule   7;   and   (iii)   and   that   after   allowing   even   the   execution   to proceed   ex­parte   and   after   having   allowed   the   sale   deed   to   be 4 executed   by   the   Executing   Court,   the   respondents   cannot   seek condonation of the huge delay. 10. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition to condone the delay in  seeking  to set aside the  ex­parte decree, the respondents filed a revision   petition   under   Section   115   of   the   Code   before   the   High Court.   Entertaining   a   doubt   about   the   appointment   of   a   guardian for   the   third   defendant,   the   learned   Judge   summoned   the   original records in the  suit from  the trial Court. Finding  that  I.A No.981 of 2013  filed   along   with   the   plaint  for   the  appointment   of  a   guardian for the third defendant, was not properly dealt with and that there was no appointment of a guardian for the minor as required under Order  XXXII,  Rule  3, the  learned  Judge invoked the  general  power of   superintendence   under   Article   227   of   the   Constitution   and   set aside   the   ex­parte   decree   itself,   without   going   into   the   question   of delay and without examining whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay.  In order to ensure that the petitioners/decree holders are not poorer after a decree (or because of the decree), the learned   Judge   put   the   respondents   on   condition   that   they   should pay   of   Rs.2,50,000/­   as   cost   to   the   petitioners­ herein   on   or   before 5 16.10.2020,   as   the   petitioners/decree   holders   had   already deposited   stamp   papers   of   the   value   of   Rs.1,98,000/­   and   got   the sale deed executed. 11. It   appears   that   pursuant   to   the   aforesaid   order   of   the   High Court,   the   respondents   deposited   the   cost   of   Rs.2,50,000/­   on 12.10.2020.   As   a   consequence,   the   trial   Court   appears   to   have taken up the suit for trial after framing issues. It is stated by Mr. R. Balasubramanian,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   respondents   that the suit now stands posted for examination of PW­1.   12. The main grounds of attack, to the impugned order of the High Court, as articulated by Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel for   the   petitioners   are   :­   (i)   that   the   High   Court   ought   not   to   have set aside an ex­parte decree, in a revision petition arising out of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963;  (ii)  that the Court   was   not   even   entitled   to   invoke   equity   in   favour   of   the respondents who were grossly negligent, first in defending the suit, next in defending the executing proceedings and then in seeking to set   aside   the   ex­parte   decree   after   nearly   a   year   of   seeking   to   set aside the ex­parte   order passed in the Execution Petition; and   (iii) 6 that it was not even one of the grounds raised or points argued by the   respondents­ herein   in   their   revision   petition   before   the   High Court either that the procedure prescribed under Order XXXII, Rule 3 of the Code was not followed or that a grave prejudice or injustice has been caused to the defendant/minor, on account of the failure, if any, on the part of the trial Court. 13. Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel appearing for the   respondents   contended   in   response,   that   the   revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 are wider in nature and   that   when   the   High   Court   finds   that   the   trial   Court   has   not taken   care   of   the   interest   of   the   minor   who   was   a   party   to   the proceeding, by following  the procedure prescribed by  law, the High Court cannot shut its eyes on the basis of technicalities.  14. We   have   carefully   considered   the   rival   contentions.     There   is no dispute on facts and there is no escape from the conclusion that the   respondents   have   been   grossly   negligent   in   defending   the   suit as   well   as   the   execution   proceedings.   But   the   fact   remains   that while the parties can afford to remain negligent, the Court cannot. The   High   Court   has   found,   after   summoning   the   records   from   the 7 trial Court that as a matter of fact, the trial Court failed to appoint a guardian for the third respondent/minor in a manner prescribed by law. As pointed out earlier, an application was in fact filed by the petitioners­ herein /plaintiffs under  Order XXXII, Rule 3 of the Code in  I.A No.981  of 2013.  The said application was  closed by  the  trial Court by an Order passed on 23.03.2014, which we have extracted elsewhere.   The   manner   in   which   the   trial   Court   disposed   of   the application under  Order  XXXII, Rule 3, is without doubt, improper and cannot at all be sustained, especially in the teeth of the Madras Amendment.    15. Order   XXXII,   Rule   3,   is   found   in   the   First   Schedule   to   the Code.   Under   Section   121   of   the   Code,   the   Rules   in   the   First Schedule   shall   have   effect   as   if   enacted   in   the   body   of   the   Code until   annulled   or   altered   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of Part­X,   which   comprises   of   Sections   121   to   131.   The   High   Courts are empowered under Section 122 of the Code to annul/alter or add to   all   or   any   of   the   Rules   in   the   First   Schedule,   for   regulating   the procedure of the civil courts subject to their superintendence. 8 16. In   exercise   of   such   a   power,   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at Madras   has   made   Rule   3   of   Order   XXXII   of   the   Code,   much   more elaborate than how the Rule was originally framed. 17. In the impugned order, the learned Judge has extracted Order XXXII, Rule 3 of the Code in its original form. But in its application to   civil   courts   subject   to   the   superintendence   of   the   Madras   High Court Order XXXII, Rule 3 1  actually reads as follows:­ `”3.   Qualifications   to   be   a   next   friend   or guardian.   – (1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as next friend of a minor or as his guardian for the suit: Provided   that   the   interest   of   that   person   is   not adverse   to   that   of   the   minor   and   that   he   is   not   in   the case   of   a   next   friend,   defendant,   or   in   the   case   of   a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff. (2) Appointed   or   declared   guardians   to   be   preferred and   to   be   superseded   only   for   reasons   recorded.   – Where   a   minor   has   a   guardian   appointed   or   declared by   competent   authority   no   person   other   than   the guardian shall act as the next friend of the minor or be appointed   his   guardian   for   the   suit   unless   the   Court considers,   for   reasons   to   be   recorded,   that   it   is   for   the minor’s welfare that another person be permitted to act or be appointed, as the case may be. (3) Guardians   to   be   appointed   by   Court.­   Where   the defendant   is   a   minor,   the   Court,   on   being   satisfied   of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for the minor. 1      The  amendment  was  made  by  a Notification  in  P.  Dis.  No.256  of  1938  Vide  St.  George  Gazette,  dated 13­3­1938.  Unfortunately most of the Bare Acts published in recent times and even the 19 th  Edition of Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure does not make a mention of the Notification number and date in so far as the Madras Amendment is concerned. 9 (3A) A person appointed under sub­rule (3) to be guardian   for   the   suit   for   a   minor   shall   unless   his appointment   is   terminated   by   retirement,   removal     or death   continue   as   such   throughout   all   proceedings arising   out   of   the   suit   including   proceedings   in   any appellate   or   revisional   Court   and   any   proceeding   in execution of a decree. (4) Appointment   to   be   on   application   and   where necessary  after  notice  to   proposed   guardian.­   An  order for   the   appointment   of   a   guardian   for   the   suit   may   be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the Plaintiff. The application, where it is by   the   plaintiff,   shall   set   forth,   in   the   order   of   their suitability, a list of persons (with their full addresses for service of notice in Form  No. 11A set  forth in Appendix H.   Hereto)   who   are   competent   and   qualified   to   act   as guardian for the suit for the minor defendant. The Court may, for reasons to be recorded in any particular case, exempt the applicant from furnishing the list referred to above. (5) Contents of affidavit in support of the application for   appointment   of   guardian.­   The   application   referred to   in   the   above   sub­rule   whether   made   by   the   plaintiff or on behalf of the minor defendant shall be supported by   an   affidavit   verifying   the   fact   that   the   proposed guardian   has   not   or   that   no   one   of   the   proposed guardians   has   any   interest   in   the   matters   in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that the proposed guardian or guardians are fit persons to   be   so   appointed.     The   affidavit   shall   further   state according   to   the   circumstances   of   each   case   (a) particulars   of   any   existing   guardian   appointed   or declared   by   competent   authority,   (b)   the   name   and address   of   the   person,   if   any,   who   is   the   de   facto guardian  of  the   minor,  (c)  the   names  and  addresses  of persons, if any, who in the event of either the natural or the   de   facto   guardian   or   the   guardian   appointed   or declared by competent authority, not being permitted to act,   are   by   reason   of   relationship   or   interest   or otherwise, suitable persons  to act as  guardians  for the minor for the suit. 10 (6) Application   for   appointment   of   guardian   to   be separate   from   application   for   bringing   on   record   the legal   representatives   of   a   deceased   party.   –   An Application   for   the   appointment   of   a   guardian   for   the suit   of   a   minor   shall   not   be   combined   with   an application   for   bringing   on   record   the   legal representatives   of   a   deceased   plaintiff   or   defendant. The applications shall be by separate petitions. (7) Notice   of   application   to   be   given   to   persons interested   in   the   minor   defendant   other   than   the proposed   guardian.–   No   order   shall   be   made   on   any application under sub­rule (4) above except upon notice to  any  guardian  of   the  minor appointed  or  declared  by an authority competent in that behalf or where there is no   guardian,   upon   notice   to   the   father   or   other   natural guardian   of   the   minor,   or   where   there   is   no   father   or other natural guardian, to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub­rule. The  notice required by this sub­rule shall be   served   six   clear   days   before   the   day   named   in   the notice  for the  hearing  of  the  application and  may be  in Form No. 11 set forth in Appendix H hereto. (8)  Special   provision   to   shorten   delay   in   getting   a guardian   appointed.­Where   the   application   is   by   the plaintiff,   he   shall,   along   with   his   application   and affidavit   referred   to   in   sub­rules   (4)   and   (5)   above, produce the necessary forms in duplicate filled in to the extent   that   is   possible   at   that   stage,   for   the   issue simultaneous of notices  to  two  at  least  of the proposed guardians  for the  suit  to  be  selected  by the  Court  from the list referred to in sub­rule (4) above together with a duly   stamped   voucher   indicating   that   the   fees prescribed for service have been paid.  If   one   or   more   of   the   proposed   guardians   signify   his or   their   consent   to   act,   the   Court   shall   appoint   one   of them   and   intimate   the   fact   of   such   appointment   to   the person   appointed   by   registered   post.   If   no   one   of   the persons   served   signifies   his   consent   to   act,   the   Court shall   proceed   to   serve   simultaneously   another   selected two,   if   so   many   there   be,   of   the   persons   named   in   the 11 list   referred   to   in   sub­rule   (4)   above   but   no   fresh application   under   sub­rule   (4)   shall   be   deemed necessary.     The   applicant   shall   within   three   days   of intimation  of  unwillingness   by the   first  set  of   proposed guardians,   pay   the   prescribed   fee   for   service   and produce the necessary forms duly filled in. (9) No personal shall be appointed guardian without his   consent.­   No   person   shall   without   his   consent,   be appointed   guardian   for   the   suit.     Whenever   an application is made proposing the name of a person as guardian for the suit a notice in Form No.11 A set forth in   Appendix   H   hereto   shall   be   served   on   the   proposed guardian, unless the applicant himself be the proposed guardian or the proposed guardian consents. (10)   Court   guardian.­   When   to   be   appointed­How   he is   to   be   placed   in   funds.­   Where   the   Court   finds   no person fit and willing to act as guardian for the suit, the Court may appoint any of its officers or a pleader of the Court  to be the guardian and  may direct that the costs to   be   incurred  by  that   officer  in  the   performance   of   the duties as guardian shall be borne either by the parties or by any one or more of the parties to the suit or out of any fund in Court in which the minor is interested, and may   give   directions   for   the   repayment   or   allowance   of the   costs   as   justice   and   the   circumstances   of   the   case may require. (11)   Funds for a guardian other than Court guardian to   defend.­   When   a   guardian   for   the   suit   of   a   minor defendant is appointed and it is made to appear to the Court   that   the   guardian   is   not   in   possession   of   any   or sufficient   funds  for  the  conduct  of  the   suit  on  behalf  of the defendant and that the defendant will be prejudiced in   his   defence   thereby,   the   Court   may,   from   time   to time,   order   the   plaintiff   to   advance   monies   to   the guardian   for   purpose   of   his   defence   and   all   monies   so advanced  shall  form part of  the  costs  of  the  plaintiff  in the   suit.     The   order   shall   direct   that   the   guardians,   as and when directed, shall file in Court an account of the monies so received by him.” 12 18. There   is   a   great   deal   of   difference   between   the   Rules   of Procedure   laid   down   in   Rule   3   of   Order   XXXII   by   the   Central   Act and   Rule   3   as   applicable   to   civil   courts   subject   to   the superintendence   of   Madras   High   Court.   Order  XXXII,   Rule  3   in   its original form reads as follows:­ “3. Guardian for the suit to be appointed by court for   minor   defendant.­   (1)   Where   the   defendant   is   a minor,   the   court,   on   being   satisfied   of   the   fact   of   his minority,   shall   appoint   a   proper   person   to   be   guardian for the suit for such minor. (2)   An   order   for   the   appointment   of   a   guardian   for   the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the plaintiff. (3)   Such   application   shall   be   supported   by   an   affidavit verifying   the   fact   that   the   proposed   guardian   has   no interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that he is a fit person to be so appointed. (4)   No   order   shall   be   made   on   any   application   under this   rule   except   upon   notice   to   any   guardian   of   the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in   that   behalf,   or,   where   there   is   no   such   guardian, upon notice to the father, or where there is no father, to the   mother,   or   where   there   is   no   father   or   mother,   to other   natural   guardian   of   the   minor,   or,  where   there   is no   father,   mother,   or   other   natural   guardian,   to   the person   in   whose   care   the   minor   is,   and   after   hearing any   objection   which   may   be   urged   on   behalf   of   any person served with notice under this sub­rule. (4A)   The   Court   may,   in   any   case,   if   it   thinks   fit,   issue notice under sub­rule (4) to the minor also. 13 (5)   A   person   appointed   under   sub­rule   (1)   to   be guardian   for   the   suit   for   a   minor   shall,   unless   his appointment   is   terminated   by   retirement,   removal   or death,   continue   as   such   throughout   all   proceedings arising   out   of   the   suit   including   proceedings   in   any Appellate   or   Revisional   Court   and   any   proceedings   in the execution of a decree.” 19. A   comparison   of   the   two   sets   of   Rules   show   that   the   rules applicable   to   Courts   subject   to   the   superintendence  of   the   Madras High   Court   are   more   elaborate   and   also   rigorous.   We   may immediately note  (i)  that sub­rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules applicable   to   Courts   subject   to   the   superintendence  of   the   Madras High   Court   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “ applicable   rules”   for   the purpose of convenience ),   are additional requirements;   (ii)   that sub­ rule  (3)  of   Rule  3  of   the   ‘ applicable   rules ’  is   a  reproduction   of  sub­ rule   (1)   of   Rule   3   of   the   original   Code;   (iii)   that   sub­rule   (3­A)   of Rule   3   of   the   ‘ applicable   rules’   is   a   reproduction   of   sub­rule   (5)   of the Central Act;  (iv ) sub­rule (7) of Rule 3 of the ‘ applicable rules ’ is an improved version of sub­rule (4) of Rule 3 of the Central Act. 20. More importantly   sub­rules (4), (5), (6) and  a  part  of sub­rule (7) of Rule 3 of Order XXXII of the ‘ applicable rules ’ prescribe certain additional   requirements   which   are   as   follows:­   (i)   when   an 14 application  for   the  appointment   of  a  guardian  is  by  the   plaintiff, it shall set forth in the order of their suitability, a list of persons with their full addresses for service of notice in Form No.11­A set forth in Appendix H, who are competent and qualified to act as guardian for the   minor   defendant;   (ii)   the   application   for   appointment   of   a guardian   should   be   supported   by   an   affidavit,   not   merely   verifying (as   in  the   Central   Act)   the  fact   that   the   proposed   guardian  has   no interest in the matters in controversy adverse to that of the minor, but   also   stating   additional   particulars   including   the   name   and address   of   the   de­facto   guardian   and   the   names   and   addresses   of other   suitable   persons,   whenever   a   natural   or   de­facto   guardian   is not permitted to act. 21. Admittedly, the learned Judge summoned the records from the trial Court after  entertaining  a doubt about the procedure followed by the trial Court in this case and found as a matter of fact that the trial   Court   failed   to   appoint   a   guardian   for   the   third   defendant   as required by Order XXXII, Rule 3. The power of the learned Judge to call   for   the   records   and   examine   the   same,   in   a   revision   under Section   115(1)   of   the   Code   is   not   and   cannot   be   doubted   or 15 questioned by the petitioners. It is true that the learned Judge was dealing   only   with   a   revision   petition   arising   out   of   an   Order dismissing   a   petition   under   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963. But   it   does   not   take   away   or   curtail   the   jurisdiction   of   the   High Court   to   look   into   the   records   with   particular   reference   to   an important   rule   of   procedure,   especially   when   the   same   relates   to something concerning persons under disability. The rigorous nature of  the   Madras  amendment   to  Rule  3 of  Order  XXXII, is  perhaps  to be attributed to the wider jurisdiction that the High Court exercised on   its   original   side,   under   Clause­17   of   the   Letters   Patent   and   the parens   patriae   jurisdiction   that   a   Court   normally   exercises   while dealing  with cases of minors. Therefore, we find no illegality in the action   of  the   High  Court   in  summoning   the  original   records  in   the suit and finding out whether or not a guardian of a minor defendant was   appointed   properly   in   accordance   with   the   procedure prescribed in Order XXXII, Rule 3, even in the absence of a specific contention being raised by the petitioners.   22. The contention that in a revision arising out of the dismissal of a   petition   under   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act,   1963,   the   High 16 Court   cannot   set   aside   the   ex­parte   decree   itself,   by   invoking   the power under Article 227, does not appeal to us. It is too well settled that the powers of the High Court under Article 227 are in addition to   and   wider   than   the   powers   under   Section   115   of   the   Code.   In Surya   Dev   Rai   vs.   Ram   Chander   Rai   and   Others 2 ,   this   Court went as far as to hold that even   certiorari   under Article 226 can be issued   for   correcting   gross   errors   of   jurisdiction   of   a   subordinate Court.  But the correctness of the said view in so far as it related to Article   226,   was   doubted   by   another   Bench,   which   resulted   in   a reference to a three member Bench. In  Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs. Chhabi   Nath   &   Others 3 ,   the   three   member   Bench,   even   while overruling   Surya   Dev   Rai   (supra)   on   the   question   of   jurisdiction under   Article   226,   pointed   out   that   the   jurisdiction   under   Article 227   is   distinguishable.   Therefore,   we   do   not   agree   with   the contention that the High Court committed an error of jurisdiction in invoking Article 227 and setting aside the ex­parte decree.  23. In fact the learned Judge also went into the question whether a   decree   passed   against   a   minor   without   proper   appointment   of   a 2 (2003) 6 SCC 675 3 (2015) 5 SCC 423 17 guardian, is a nullity   ipso facto   or whether the same would depend upon   prejudice   against   the   minor   being   established.   The   learned Judge found that in this case, the minor was prejudiced. 24. It   may   be   of   interest   to   note   that   Rule   3­A   was   inserted   in Order   XXXII   by   CPC   Amendment   Act   104   of   1976.   It   is   this   Rule that   introduced   for   the   first   time   into   the   Code,   the   question   of prejudice   to   the   minor.   But   this   Rule   3­A   applies   only   to   cases where the next friend or  guardian for the suit of the minor  had an interest   in   the   subject   matter   of   the   suit   adverse   to   that   of   the minor. This amendment was a sequel to certain conflicting opinions on   the   question   as   to   whether   a   decree   passed   in   cases   where   the minor   was   represented   by   a   guardian   who   had   an   interest   in   the subject matter of the suit adverse to that of the minor, was void or voidable. 25. In other words the Parliament chose to introduce the element of   prejudice,   specifically   in   relation   to   one   category   of   cases   under Order   XXXII,   Rule   3A.   The   case   on   hand   does   not   fall   under   that category.   In   any   case,   we   need   not   go   into   that   question   in   this case, as the learned Judge found that the minor was prejudiced. 18 26. A  valiant  attempt was  made during  the  hearing, to  show  that the   3 rd   Respondent/defendant   was   not   a   minor   at   all.   Such   a contention   was   sought   to   be   raised   on   the   basis   of   the   long   cause title   in   the   execution   application   E.A.No.65   of   2017   where   the   3 rd Respondent  was described as a person  aged about 24 years in the year 2017. Therefore, it was sought to be contended that he should have   attained   majority   long   before   the   ex   parte   decree   and   that therefore the question of appointment of a guardian and the decree becoming a nullity did not arise. 27 . The said contention  is to be stated only  to be rejected. It was the petitioners herein who filed the suit in the year 2013 describing the   3 rd   defendant   as   a   minor   and   seeking   the   appointment   of   a guardian. Therefore, there is no place for any innovative arguments contrary to one’s own pleadings. 28. Another   contention   was   raised   that   in   any   event,   the   decree could   have   been   set   aside   only   as   against   the   3 rd   Respondent   and not   against   all   the   others.   But   the   said   logic   does   not   apply   to something that is a nullity in law. 19 29. The  reliance  placed  by  the   learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Lanka   Sanyasi   vs.   Lanka   Yerran   Naidu 4   is   misplaced.   The question in  Lanka Sanyasi  (supra) was whether a person who had become   a   major   on   the   date   on   which   a   compromise   decree   was passed in a suit, was entitled to challenge the compromise decree in a   subsequent   suit.   The   subsequent   suit   was   decreed   by   the   First Appellate Court and while dealing with the Second Appeal, the High Court   held   in   Lanka   Sanyasi   that   a   mere   circumstance   that   a minor   defendant  had  attained majority  during  the  pendency   of the suit, but not elected to continue the defence himself and to have his guardian  ad litem  discharged, is not sufficient to enable him to have the   judgment   passed   in   the   suit   declared   as   not   binding   on   him. Nothing turned on the provisions of Order XXXII, Rule 3 in the said case. 30. The decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court in   Ouseph Joseph   vs.   Thoma   Eathamma 5 ,   relied   upon   by   the   petitioners, 4 1929 Law Weekly 455 5 AIR 1956 TC 26 20 more   than   helping  the   petitioners,  confirms   that   the   view  taken   in the impugned order is correct. 31. The   decision   in   Divya   Dip   Singh   and   others   vs.   Ram Bachan Mishra and others 6 ,   concerned the question whether the appointment   of   a   guardian   for  a  minor   under   Order   XXXII,   Rule   3 will   take   away   the   right   of   the   natural   guardian.   The   answer   was too obvious and the same has nothing to do with the issue on hand. 32 . The  decision  of  the  Rajasthan  High Court  in   Anandram   and another   vs.   Madholal and others 7   relied upon by the petitioners, dealt   with   the   question   of   prejudice   to   the   minor,   specially   in   the context   of   the   father   filing   a   written   statement   on   behalf   of   the minors and admitting receipt of part consideration. In  Rangammal vs.   Minor   Appasami 8   there was  a  finding  on  fact  that   the  minor’s interests   were   sufficiently   safeguarded   in   the   suit.   Therefore,   none of   these   decisions   relied   upon   by   the   petitioners,   advance   their cause. 6 (1997) 1 SCC 504 7 AIR 1960 Raj 189 8 85 Law Weekly 574 21 33. Therefore,   we   find   no   illegality   in   the   order   of   the   High   Court warranting   our   interference   under   Article   136.   Hence,   this   Special Leave Petition is dismissed. ……………………………..J. (INDIRA BANERJEE) ………………………………..J. (V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN) New Delhi July 16, 2021 22