2021 INSC 0310 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos 2401 -2402 of 2021 @ SLP (C) Nos. 29975 -29976 of 2018 Sayyed Ayaz Ali .... Appellant Versus Prakash G Goyal & Ors. .... Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 These appeals arise from a judgment of a Single Judge at the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. 2 The appellant is the plaintiff in a suit instituted before the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Nagpur. The first r espondent filed an application at Exhibit -50 for the rejection of the plaint on the ground that it was barred under clauses (b) and (d) of 10 consequential relief. The submission is that in the present case, the suit has been instituted to protect the possession of the plaintiff simpliciter without claiming a declaration of title. S eeking a declaration of title is , according to the submission, n ot mandatory : what the proviso to Section 34 provides is that seeking a mere declaration of title without seeking further relief is impermissible. On these grounds, it is urged that the suit could not be held to be barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Learned counsel urged that w hether the suit would be maintainable in the absence of the plaintiff – appellant seeking a declaration of title is a distinct question, but it cannot be held to be barred by any law within the meaning of Order 7 Rule 11(d) . The appellant instituted a writ petition before the High Court on 23 July 2018, to challenge the order of the Trial Court allowing the application (Exhibit -50) for rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11. F or clarity, it is necessary to extract t he reliefs which were claimed before the High Court in the writ petition: “1. …quash and set aside the order passed below Exh: 50 (ANNEXURE -F ) on 01/08/2017 in RCS No.4990/2012 (Sayyad -Vs. -Om Mittal and others) by the 5 th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur … 2. Reject the application at Exh: 50 filed RCS No.4990/2012 (Sayyad -Vs. -Om Mi ttal and other s) pending on the file of 5 th Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, in the interest of justice.” 1 0 The High Court has , in the cour se of its judgment , rejected the writ petition on the ground that it was “by way of an afterthought and belated”. This was on the premise that after the order of the Trial Judge dated 1 August 2017, the appellant 11 filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 on 14 August 2017 in terms of the liberty granted by the Trial Judge for amending the plaint to seek a declaration in regard to the sale deeds in question. The first and second defendants to the suit challenged the grant of the liberty by the Trial Judge by filing a revision application on 12 September 2017 and it was only on 24 July 2018 that the appellant – plaintiff sought to challenge the order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (d). 11 Mr Pankaj Kothari, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent s - defendants raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that against the rejection of the plaint, the remedy of the appellant was to file a regular first appeal since an order of rejection operates as a decree. It has been urged that the appellant, after having complied with the order of the Trial Court, deliberately filed a writ petition, instead of an appeal, to avoid the issue of limitation in filing an appeal. Mr Navare, learned Senior Counsel contested the submission by urging that since a civil revision application had been filed by the first and second d efendant s before the High Court, the appellant - plaintiff was justified in seeking recourse to the writ jur isdiction of the High Court. Moreover, he submitted that the availability of a remedy of a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC would not ipso facto bar a recourse to the writ jurisdiction. 12 Section 2( 2) of the CPC defines the expression ‘decree’ in the following terms: “(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of 12 the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminar y or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include — (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation. —A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final; ” Order 7 Rule 13 provides that the rejection of the plaint “on any of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned shall not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action”. The definition of “decree” i n Section 2(2) “shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint”. Hence, t he order of the Trial Court rejecting the plaint is subject to a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. The writ petition filed by the appellant was liable to be rejected on that ground. We therefore affirm the judgment of the High Court rejecting the writ petition, though for the above reason leave it open to the appellant to pursue the remedy available in law. 13 The High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction accepted the plea of the first and second defendants that the Trial Judge, having allowed the application Order 7 Rule 11(d) , was not justified in granting to the appellant-plaintiff liberty to am end the plaint by seeking appropriate reliefs and paying the court fee. In this context, it is necessary to advert to Order 7 Rule 11 which provides as follows: 13 “ 11. Rejection of plaint. — The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: — (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly v alued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp- paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9 [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requis ite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp- paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]” The proviso quoted above deals with a situation where time has been fixed by the Court for the c orrection of the valuation or for supplying of the requisite stamp paper . U nder the proviso, the time so fixed shall not be extended unless the court , for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by a cause of an exceptional nature from complying within the time fixed by the court and that a refusal to extend time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. The proviso evidently covers the cases falling within the ambit of clauses (b) and (c) and has no application to a rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d) . In the circumstances, 14 the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the further direction that was issued by the Trial Judge was not in consonance with law. 1 4 For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Si ngle Judge of the High Court: (i) allowing the revision application filed by the first and second defendants ; and (ii) dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant -plaintiff . S ince the dismissal of the writ petition has been upheld on the ground that the order rejecti ng the plaint operates as a decree within the meaning of Section 2( 2) of the CPC , the appellant is at liberty to take recourse to the remedy against the rejection of the plaint as prescribed by the CPC. 1 5 The appeals shall stand disposed of in the above terms. 1 6 Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of . ……….….....................................................J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] …..….….....................................................J. [M R Shah] New Delhi; July 20, 2021