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REPORTABLE
                
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO.4821 OF 2012
  N.S. Nandiesha Reddy           ……Appellant(s)
 
Versus
  Kavitha Mahesh                         ….Respondent(s)
  With 
  Civil Appeal No. 6171/2012
J U D G M E N T
   A.S. Bopanna, J.
1. The   appellants   in   both   these   appeals   are   assailing
the order dated 01.06.2012 passed by the learned Single
Judge   of   the   High   Court   of   Karnataka   at   Bangalore   in
Election   Petition   No.   7/2008.   By   the   said   order,   the
election   of   the   appellant   in   C.A.   No.   4821/2012   (Mr.
Nandiesha   Reddy)   from   151   K.R.   Pura   Legislative
Assembly   constituency   in   Bangalore   Urban   District   is
held   to   be   void,   in   terms   of   Section   100   (1)   (c)   of   the

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Representation of People Act 1951. Further, in the course
of   the   said   order   the   learned   Judge   has   directed   the
Registrar   General   of   the   High   Court   to   register   a
complaint   against   the   appellant   in   C.A.   No.6171/2012
(Mr.   Ashok   Mensinkai)   before   the   Competent   Court   for
proceeding   in   accordance   with   law   for   the   purpose   of
provisions   of   Section   193   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860.   The
said   direction   is   issued   since   according   to   the   learned
Judge,   the   appellant   in   the   said   appeal   who   was   the
Returning Officer for the said election; on being examined
as PW.3 in the Election Petition had given false evidence
before   the   Court.   In   the   above   circumstance,   the
appellant   in   C.A.   No.   4821/2012   (Mr.   Nandiesha   Reddy)
has   assailed   the   order   in   its   entirety  while   the   appellant
in   C.A.   No.   6171/2012   (Mr.   Ashok   Mensinkai)   has
assailed   the   order   insofar   as   directing   prosecution
against the appellant.
2. In the above background, we have heard Mr. Jayant
Mohan,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   C.A.
No.4821/2012 and Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the
appellant in C.A. No.6171/2012. We have also heard the

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respondent   who   had   appeared   as   a   party­in­person   in
both these appeals and perused the relevant material, as
also the written submission filed on either side.
3. The issue arises from the election which was held in
April/May   2008   to   the   Karnataka   State   Legislative
Assembly.   The   present   case   as   noted   earlier,   relates   to
one   of   the   constituencies,   namely,   151   K.R.   Pura
Legislative   Assembly   Constituency.   The   elections   were
notified on 16.04.2008 and as per the calendar of events
the   publication   of   result   was   fixed   on   27.05.2008,   soon
after  which the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly for
that term  was constituted. In that background, the term
of   the   Assembly   was   up   to   May,   2013   whereafter   the
subsequent   election   to   constitute   the   Karnataka   State
Assembly   afresh   for   the   next   term   has   taken   place.   In
that   circumstance   though   by   the   order   impugned   dated
01.06.2012,   the   election   of   the   appellant   in   C.A.
No.4821/2012   (Mr.   Nandiesha   Reddy)   was   held   to   be
void, immediately thereafter, the instant appeal was filed
and   this   Court   had   granted   stay   of   the   impugned   order
while   issuing   notice   on   11.06.2012.   In   that   view,   the

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appellant   has   completed   the   term   of   the   Assembly   for
which   he   was   elected.   As   such   Mr.   Jayant   Mohan,
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   in   C.A.   No.4821/2012
(Mr.  Nandiesha  Reddy)  has  submitted  that  the  grievance
put forth in the appeal does not survive for consideration.
Having noted the sequence it is evident that the prayer in
C.A.   No.4821/2012   has   rendered   itself   infructuous   and
the appeal does not survive for consideration.
4.  Though that be the position, Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned
counsel  for   the  appellant  in  C.A.  No.6171/2012  submits
that   the   said   appeal   needs   consideration   in   view   of   the
direction   issued   by   the   learned   Judge   to   prosecute   the
appellant   Mr.   Ashok   Mensinkai.   In   that   regard,   the
learned   counsel   has   drawn   our   attention   to   the   manner
of   consideration   made   by   the   learned   Judge   presiding
over   the   election   tribunal   and   contends   that   there   is   no
proper   and   definite   conclusion   reached   by   the   learned
Judge   as   to   the   deliberate   falsehood   uttered   in   the
statement alleged to have been made by the appellant. It
is   contended   that   the   appellant   in   fact   was   cited   as   a
witness   by   the   election   petitioner   herself   and   in   the

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course   of   the   examination­in­chief;   in   answer   to   the
questions   put   by   the   learned   Judge   and   in   the   cross­
examination,   the   appellant   has   been   consistent   in
narrating   the   facts   sequentially   as   it   had   occurred   on
that   day.   The   appellant   though   was   initially   arrayed   as
respondent   No.4   to   the   election   petition,   he   had   been
deleted   and   as   such   the   appellant   did   not   have   the
opportunity   of   putting   forth   his   written
statement/objection statement to the Election Petition so
as   to   controvert   the   allegations   made   against   the
appellant.   In   any   event,   the   election   petitioner   had
examined the appellant and in respect of the statements
made   by   the   appellant   the   election   petitioner   did   not
choose   to   cross­examine   the   appellant   after   seeking   to
treat   him   as   a   hostile   witness   if   the   allegation   of
tendering   false   evidence   was   to   be   made.   Further,   the
learned Judge after noticing the two versions, one by the
election petitioner and the other by the appellant, though
was entitled to rely upon one of the versions as probable
to arrive at his conclusion  on the  merit  of  the case, that
by   itself   cannot   be   made   the   basis   to   order   prosecution.

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That apart no opportunity was granted to the appellant in
terms   of   Section   340   of   the   Criminal   Procedure   Code,
1973 before forming an opinion to direct the Registrar to
lodge a complaint. It is his further case that the action of
the   present   nature   could   not   have   been   initiated   unless
there   was   material   to   indicate   that   the   witness   had
uttered   falsehood   intentionally.   The   appellant   could   not
have   gained   either   way   if   the   election   petitioner   had
contested   the   election   or   not.   In   such   situation   no
purpose   would   have   been   served   by   not   accepting   her
nomination   if   she   had   actually   complied   with   the
requirement   and   presented   the   nomination   papers.   The
appellant   had   accepted   30   nomination   papers   from   18
different   candidates   for   the   same   election   and   on
23.04.2008   i.e.,   the   last   day   itself   the   appellant   had
received   18   nomination   papers   and   one   more   would   not
have made any   difference.  In that  view he  contends that
the order is not sustainable.
5. The   respondent   party­in­person   however,   contends
that   the   appellant   had   by   not  accepting   the   nomination,
denied   an   opportunity   for   the   respondent   to   contest   the

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elections   and   in   such   circumstance   the   learned   Judge
had   noted   the   inconsistent   statements   made   by   the
appellant   in   the   course   of   his   evidence   to   justify   his
illegal   action.     The   learned   Judge   has   therefore   rightly
arrived at  the conclusion  to  direct  prosecution and  such
order does not call for interference is her contention.
6. Having noticed the contentions put forth in C.A. No.
6171/2012   and   also   having   noted   that   the   dispute   in
C.A.   No.4821/2012   has   rendered   itself   infructuous,   we
restrict   our   consideration   limited   to   the   question   as   to
whether   the   appellant   in   C.A.No.6171/2012   (Mr.   Ashok
Mensinkai)   should   be   exposed   to   criminal   prosecution
and   whether   it   is   expedient   to   do   so   in   a   matter   of   the
present   nature.   It   is   no   doubt   true   that   the   election
petition   itself   is   predicated   on   the   allegation   against   the
appellant   in   C.A.   No.6171/2012   to   the   effect   that   as   a
Returning   Officer   for   the   said   election   he   had   wrongly
refused   to   accept   the   nomination   papers   sought   to   be
submitted   by   the   election   petitioner   which   amounts   to
improper   rejection   of   the   nomination   papers   in   terms   of

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Section   100   (1)   (c)   of   the   Act.   The   consequence   of   the
same   has   befallen   on   the   elected   candidate.   However,
presently the ground of improper rejection of nomination
paper   as   alleged   and   the   conclusion   of       the   learned
Judge   on   that   aspect   fades   into   insignificance   for   the
reasons stated earlier.
7. Therefore,   the   limited   aspect   we   are   required   to
notice in  the present situation is only  with  regard to  the
statements   made   by   the   appellant   in   his   evidence   as
PW.3   which   are   considered   by   the   learned   Judge   to   be
inconsistent and, therefore,  stated to  amount  to  perjury.
In that regard whether the action initiated by the learned
Judge on that aspect is justified is the issue, if not, it will
call   for   interference.   As   noted,   the   appellant   was
examined   as   PW.3.     In   the   course   of   his   deposition,   he
had stated that  he can identify  the election petitioner  as
an   intending   candidate   in   151   K.R.   Pura   Legislative
Assembly   Constituency.   He   has   further   stated   that   he
does not remember if the election petitioner had met him
on three occasions on 23.04.2008 which was the last day

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for filing  nomination papers. He has however stated that
he remembers to have seen the election petitioner on two
occasions,   on   that   day.   He   has   also   stated   that   he   does
not   remember   the   exact   time   of   the   election   petitioner
meeting   him   for   the   first   time,   but   it   could   be   between
3.00   pm   and   3.15   pm.   On   the   second   occasion   he
recollects to have met the election petitioner on the same
day   between   5.30   pm   and   6.00   pm   while   he   was   going
out  from   office  after   work for  the  day.  The request  made
by   the   election   petitioner   at   that   stage   to   accept   the
nomination   paper   was   declined   since   the   time   for
acceptance   was   over.   In   that   context   he   states   that   the
nomination   paper   which   was   marked   as   Exhibit   P1   had
not   been   presented   before   him   between   11.00   am   and
3.00 pm on 23.04.2008 which was the permitted time for
filing.   He   also   states   that   he   did   not   refuse   to   accept
Exhibit   P1(nomination   paper)   for   the   reason   it   was   not
accompanied by other necessary documents but in fact it
was not presented before him.
8. As   against   what   has   been   stated   by   the   appellant,
the election petitioner who examined herself as PW1 has

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stated   that   on   23.04.2008   she   had   submitted   her
nomination   paper   before   the   appellant   for   the   general
election.   On   delivering   the   nomination   papers   she   had
requested   the   Returning   Officer   for   extracting   the   new
part   number   and   serial   number   of   the   ten   proposers   to
fill   in   column   no.   2B.   The   Returning   Officer   is   stated   to
have   told   her   that   he   did   not   have   the   electoral   roll   of
K.R.   Pura   State   Assembly   Constituency   and   that   she
should   approach   the   revenue   officials   working   in   the
ground   floor   of   the   building.   She   states   that   as   per   his
request   she   had   entrusted   the   job   to   her   husband   and
supporters   to   collect   the   details   from   the   ground   floor
office.   Later,   she   came   to   know   from   her   husband   and
her   supporter   that   everybody   in   the   revenue   office   were
having lunch break and the details could not be secured.
She   thereafter,   states   that   for   the   first   time   at   14.00
hours   when   she   delivered   nomination   papers,   the
Returning   Officer   directed   her   to   collect   the   details   but
she   could   not   get   the   details   of   her   ten   proposers   who
had   signed   the   nomination   papers.   She   states   that   on
realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing

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nomination papers she submitted her nomination papers
by   15.00   hours   before   the   Returning   Officer   once   again
and   stated   that   she   would   fill   the   column   subsequently
as   she   has   time   upto   24   hours   to   fill   the   column.     She
has   further   alleged   that   the   appellant   refused   to   receive
the   nomination   papers.   What   is   relevant   to   be   noted   is
that   the   election   petitioner   in   the   course   of   her   cross­
examination   recorded   in   para   37   states   that   after
deputing   her   husband   and   supporter   to   get   the   details
and   while   she   was   waiting,   she   was   outside   the   hall
where   the   Returning   Officer   was   sitting.   This   would
indicate, what the election petitioner has stated is in tune
with  the   sequence  stated  by  the  appellant  except  for  the
variance   in   the   stand   insofar   as   actually   tendering   the
nomination   paper   and   pressing   for   acceptance   and
according   to   election   petitioner   the   same   not   being
accepted. 
9.   From   the   two   sets   of   statements,   one   by   the
appellant as PW.3 and the other by the election petitioner
as   PW.1   in   the   course   of   adjudication,   the   reliability   of
one   of  them   was  to   be  deduced.     The  crux   of  the   matter

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was to find out as to whether  the election petitioner  had
actually   submitted   her   nomination   paper   and   the
appellant   had   declined   to   receive   the   same.   Insofar   as
that aspect, if the conclusion was in favour of the election
petitioner it would be a case of an improper rejection and,
on   that   aspect,   it   is   not   necessary   for   us   to   pronounce
upon since the appeal on that question does not survive.
However, only issue for consideration is, from the nature
of   the   statements   made   above,   can   the   Court   come   to   a
conclusion   that   the   appellant   has   uttered   deliberate   or
intentional falsehood in the course of Court proceedings.
In   that   regard,   it   is   to   be   noted   that   the   learned   Judge
during   the   course   of   the   proceedings   had   made   certain
observations   and   had   extracted   the   earlier   order   in   the
final   impugned   order   dated   01.06.2012,   the   same   reads
as hereunder: ­
       ORDER PASSED IN THE MORNING SESSION
“The   witness   is   not   very   sure   of   what
development   took   place   and   the   manner   of   his
deposition   is   inconsistent   every   second   and
minute   keeps   varying   and   to   support   his
version   that   he   had   conducted   in   accordance
with   rules   and   regulations   and   in   a   proper
manner   states   that   a   certain   development   had

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taken   place   around   some   time,   but   goes   back
on   the   earlier   version   that   the   last   nomination
paper   was   received   at   2.58   pm   but   later
mentioned   it   was   after   3   pm   and   on   being
cautioned by the court, goes back to the earlier
version of 2.58 pm etc.
This  witness   is  obviously   lying   on  oath,   his
deposition   is   inconsistent,   varying   by   the
second,   different   version   each   time.   A   person
giving   different   version   of   the   same   incident   is
not merely uttering falsehood once or the other
time, but also committing perjury.
This witness lacks credibility for deposing
before   the   court   on   oath   and   requires   to   be
dealt   with   in   accordance   with   law   and   being   a
public   servant   who   has   taken   oath   to   depose
truth and only truth before this court has been
attempting   to   depose   incorrect   and   false
statements   which   per   se   is   not   only   perjury
within   the   meaning   of   section   191   of   Indian
Penal   Code   but   also   committing   contempt   of
court.
Therefore,   no   need   or   occasion   for
recording further evidence of this witness and if
need   be,   can   be   summoned   later   by   the   court
for   questioning.   As   of   now,   the   witness   is
discharged.
Witness is directed to remain present in the
court hall. Call this matter again at 2.30 pm.
         ORDER PASSED IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION:
Further  cross­examination of the witness is
stopped   at   this   stage   to   enable   the   witness   to
procure   relevant   necessary,   official   records
throwing   light   on   the   developments   that   had
taken   place   during   his   functioning   as   the
returning   officer   in   the   K   R   Pura   assembly
constituency.
As   the   witness   states   that   the   records
pertaining   to   conduct   of   elections   etc.   are   all
now available at the office of the district election
officer,   Mahadevapura   Zone,   BBMP,   Bangalore,
who   is   ex   officio   holding   this   post   is   otherwise
functioning   as   joint   commissioner,   BBMP   at
Mahadevapura   and   as   this   officer   has   to   part

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with   records.   The   witness   to   be   enabled   to
secure   these   records   and   attend   court   for
further cross examination with the records.
Sri   Shashikanth,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent submits that for such purpose, it is
necessary for the election petitioner to make an
application   listing   the   documents   and   records
that   are   required   to   be   summoned   and
summons   may   be   issued   on   such   applications
to the officer who is having the custody of such
records.
It is said that procedure is the handmaid of
justice   and   procedure   should   be   given   only
such importance as is warranted to ensure fair
play,   equal   opportunity   and   practical
possibilities of adhering to the procedure.
An   election   petition   though   is   a   creature   of
the   Representation   of   People   Act   1951   and
being   a petition at the instance of  an aggrieved
persons   with   regard   to   the   validity   of   the
declaration   of   election   result,   and   for
questioning   a   correctness   or   otherwise   of   the
declaration   of   results   and   may   have   the
characteristics   of   an   adversary   litigation,   it
nevertheless   has   a   flavour   of   public   interest
imbedded into it as the conduct of free and fair
election   is   the   ‘sine   qua   non’   of   any   healthy
democratic   process.   Records   relating   to   the
conduct  of elections in a general election either
to   an   assembly   or   to   the   parliament   are   not
private documents but are public documents or
records   and   if   any   such   record   can   throw   light
on   the   manner   of   conduct   of   elections   in   any
particular   assembly   segment,   while   it   is   a
relevant record, familiarity or ignorance of such
a   record   on   the   part   of   the   election   petitioner
cannot   come   in   the   way   of   court   scrutinizing
the   record   for   being   satisfied   or   even   for   being
apprised   about   the   manner   of   conduct   of
election.
It   is   therefore,   hereby   ordered   and   the
witness   who   has   appeared   before   the   Court   as
PW3   today   and   who   had   functioned   as   the
returning   officer   of   the   K   R   Pura   assembly
constituency   is   hereby   directed   to   contact   the
district   election   officer   with   this   order   secure

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the   relevant   records   to   enable   him   to   depose
before   this   court   correctly   with   precision,
unambiguity   and   then   appear   with   such
records   before   this   court   on   28.6.2011   as   the
witness   states   that   he   requires   at   least   seven
days’ time to complete this exercise.
The   district   election   officer   who   is   also   the
joint   commissioner,   BBMP,   Mahadevapura,   is
hereby   directed   to   ensure   compliance   with   this
order and to hand over such records which are
in   his   custody   relating   to   the   conduct   of   K   R
Pura assembly election to enable the witness to
depose further before this court in a proper and
precise   manner   as  the   then   returning   officer   of
the constituency by identifying the record. 
The   Registrar   General   of   this   Court   is
directed to ensure a copy of this order is served
on   the   district   election   officer,   Mahadevapura
zone, BBMP, Mahadevapura, Bangalore­48.
The witness also be furnished with a copy of
this order.
List   the   petition   for   further   cross­
examination of PW3 on 28.6.2011.”
10.  As per the version of the election petitioner she had
met   the   Returning   Officer   at   2   pm   on   23.04.2008   when
certain   requirements   were   indicated   due   to   which   she
made an effort to secure the same from  the ground floor
and   after   about   45   minutes   her   husband   and   the
supporter came back with the information that they were
unable to  get the same. She has also stated that  at that
point   she   waiting   outside   the   room   where   the   Returning
Officer   was   seated.     If   that   version   of   the   election

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petitioner herself is kept in view, it is not the case of the
election   petitioner   herself   that   at   2   pm   when   she   had
come, she had met the Returning Officer and insisted for
receiving   the   nomination   paper   even   without   the   details
to be filled in column 2B. On the other hand, if the case
that   she   made   efforts   to   get   the   details   of   the   proposers
due   to   which   some   time   lapsed   and   then   she   presented
the nomination paper without the details and if the time
spent in that regard as stated by her is about 45 minutes
which is a rough estimate and not precise, the version of
the   appellant   that   he   had   met   the   election   petitioner
around   3.00   pm   to   3.15   pm   on   that   day   is   a   probable
version.   This   is   more   so   when   the   fact   remains   that   the
appellant   was   taking   note   of   the   nomination   papers
presented   by   another   independent   candidate   Smt.
Ambujakshi.   If   in   that   context   he   has   stated   that   the
election   petitioner   had   met   him   between   3.00   pm   and
3.15 pm, it could only mean that it was after the process
of receiving the nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi. In
fact, it is in her own deposition the election petitioner has
stated   that   when   she   was   unable   to   get   the   details   and

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realising the time factor that it was the last day for filing
nomination papers, she submitted her nomination papers
by   15.00   hours   (i.e.   3   pm)   before   the   Returning   Officer.
Even in that situation, if the learned Judge were to come
to a conclusion that the election petitioner having already
entered   the   office   of   the   Returning   Officer   prior   to   the
closing hours for receipt of the nomination papers at 3.00
pm   and   in   that   context   due   to   the   guidelines   the
nomination   papers   were   to   be   received,   notwithstanding
the  same  being   incomplete, it  could  be  an  aspect  on   the
question   of   improper   rejection.   But   certainly,   the   same
could not have been made the basis to conclude that the
appellant was not truthful.
11.   The   extracted   portion   of   the   earlier   order   dated
15.06.2011 indicates an observation made by the learned
Judge   to   indicate   that   he   has   gone   back   on   the   version
wherein   he   had   stated   that   the   last   nomination   paper
was received at 2.58 pm but later mentioned it was after
3.00   pm   and   on   being   cautioned   by   the   court   he   goes
back to the earlier version of 2.58 pm etc. On this aspect
also we do not see any deliberate falsehood uttered by the

18
appellant,   much   less   is   there   any   inconsistency.   The
statement made by the appellant was that he received the
nomination   paper   of   Smt.   Ambujakshi   i.e.   the   last
candidate   at   2.58   pm   and   it   had   taken   him   about   7­8
minutes to go through the papers, after which she had to
take   an   oath   as   stated   in   para­40   of   his   further   cross­
examination. If that be the position, the statement would
mean that the last nomination paper of Smt. Ambujakshi
was presented at 2.58 pm and when the process was over
it   was   past   3.00   pm.   Only   after   that   he   had   met   the
election   petitioner   that   is   between   3   pm   and   3.15   pm.
Even   with   regard   to   the   statement   that   he   had   met   the
General   Observer   on   three   occasions   and   later   stated   it
was on two occasions are to be noted in the context that
the   evidence   was   being   tendered   after   more   than   three
years   and   all   inconsequential   events   cannot   be   recalled
with   precision.     The   further   evidence   of   the   appellant   is
referred in para 81 to 87 of the order, but learned Judge
has   not   pointed   out   any   deliberate   or   intentional
falsehood   arising   therefrom.   Mere   reference   to
inconsistent   statements   alone   is   not   sufficient   to   take

19
action   unless   a   definite   finding   is   given   that   they   are
irreconcilable; one is opposed to the other so as to make
one of them deliberately false.
12.   Therefore,   as   noticed   from   the   evidence   recorded,
the appellant had stated that the nomination papers had
not   been   presented   to   him   before   the   closing   hours   and
had sought to justify his action. He had also stated about
the   procedure   followed   in   all   cases   and   the   presence   of
observers   in   his   office.   On   the   other   hand,   the   election
petitioner   had   contended   that   she   had  made   an   attempt
to   submit   the   nomination   paper   which   was   not   received
by the appellant who was the Returning Officer. When he
had received 18 nomination papers on that day there was
no   particular   reason   to   refuse   the   election   petitioner’s
nomination,   nor   has   motive   been   suggested   or
established.   The   learned   Judge   has   no   doubt   accepted
the   version   put   forth   by   the   election   petitioner.   That   by
itself   does   not   indicate   that   appellant   had   uttered
falsehood   intentionally   and   deliberately   before   the   court
so   as   to   initiate   action   under   Section   193   Indian   Penal
Code.   The   proceedings   of   the   day   in   the   office   of   the

20
Returning   Officer,   namely,   the   appellant   was   video­
recorded and the same was marked as Exhibit P21 to P24
in  the  proceedings.  The  learned  Judge  did  not  choose  to
refer   to   the   same   to   come   to   a   definite   conclusion   as   to
whether   the   election   petitioner   had   actually   met   the
Returning   Officer,   if   so,   the   actual   time   and   in   that
context   a   finding   was   not   recorded   that   the   depiction   in
the   video­recording   is   quite   contrary   to   the   statement   of
the   Returning   Officer   so   as   to   indicate   that   he   had
uttered deliberate falsehood. 
13.   Apart   from   the  factual   aspect  noted  above  relating
to   the   evidence   tendered   in   the   instant   case,   it   is   not   a
case   where   the   appellant   was   a   party­respondent   to   the
election  petition   where his   written   version  was  available.
On the other hand, he was examined as a witness by the
election   petitioner   as   PW3.   No   doubt   the   learned   Judge
has chosen to call him as a court witness by interrupting
the   cross­examination   and   posing   questions   to   him.   Be
that   as   it   may,   it   was   also   not   a   situation   where   the
petitioner   had   filed   an   application   under   Section   340   of
Criminal   Procedure   Code,   1973   seeking   action.   If   that

21
was   the   case   the   appellant   would   have   had   an
opportunity to file his version in reply to the application.
That   apart,   the   learned   Judge   also   had   not   put   the
appellant   on   notice   on   the   allegation   of   committing
perjury   and   provided   him   an   opportunity   nor   has   the
learned   Judge   come   to   the   conclusion   that   one   of   the
versions   is   deliberate   or   intentional   falsehood   and   that
therefore, action is necessary to be taken against him. On
the   other   hand,   the   learned   Judge   during   the   course   of
passing   the   final   order   has   made   certain   observations
and   directed   that   the   Registrar   General   shall   file   a
complaint. 
14. It is apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in
the   case   of   KTMS   Mohammad   and   Another   vs.   Union
of   India,   1992   3   SCC   178   wherein   it   is   observed   as
hereunder: ­
“37.   The   mere   fact   that   a   deponent   has
made   contradictory   statements   at   two
different   stages   in   a   judicial   proceeding   is
not   by   itself   always   sufficient   to   justify   a
prosecution   for   perjury   under   Section   193
IPC   but   it   must   be   established   that   the
deponent   has   intentionally   given   a   false
statement   in   any   stage   of   the   ‘judicial
proceeding’ or  fabricated false evidence  for

22
the   purpose   of   being   used   in   any   stage   of
the   judicial   proceeding.   Further,   such   a
prosecution   for   perjury   should   be   taken
only   if   it   is   expedient   in   the   interest   of
justice.”
Further,   in   the   case   of   Amarsang   Nathaji   vs.
Hardik   Harshadbhai   Patel   &   Ors.,   2017   1   SCC   113
relied   on   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   this
Court   on   referring   to   the   case   of   KTMS   Mohammad   vs.
Union of India (supra) has held as hereunder: ­
“6.   The mere fact that a person has made
a   contradictory   statement   in   a   judicial
proceeding   is   not   by   itself   always
sufficient   to   justify   a   prosecution   under
Sections 199 and 200 of the Penal Code,
1860 (45 of 1860) (hereinafter referred to
as “IPC”); but it must be shown that the
defendant has intentionally  given a false
statement   at   any   stage   of   the   judicial
proceedings   or   fabricated   false   evidence
for the purpose of using the same at any
stage   of   the   judicial   proceedings.   Even
after   the   above   position   has   emerged
also,   still   the   court   has   to   form   an
opinion   that   it   is   expedient   in   the
interests   of   justice   to   initiate   an   inquiry
into   the   offences   of   false   evidence   and
offences  against   public   justice   and   more
specifically referred to in Section 340 (1)
CrPC,   having   regard   to   the   overall
factual   matrix   as   well   as   the   probable
consequences of such a prosecution. The
court   must   be   satisfied   that   such   an
inquiry   is   required   in   the   interests   of

23
justice   and   appropriate   in   the   facts   of
the case.”
15. The   respondent­election   petitioner   has   referred   to
the decisions in the case of  Mahavir Singh and Ors. vs.
Naresh   Chandra   &   Anr.   (AIR   2001   SC   134)   and   the
case   of   Jagan   Nath   vs.   Jaswant   Singh   &   Ors.   (AIR
1954 SC 210) in her written submission.  We however, do
not   find   any   assistance   from   the   same   as   they   are   not
relevant. 
16.   In the light of the above stated facts, we are of the
opinion   that   notwithstanding   the   conclusion   reached   by
the  learned  Judge  on  the  aspect  of  improper   rejection   of
the   nomination   paper,   the   correctness   of   which   was   not
required to be gone into for the reasons stated supra, the
manner   in   which   the   learned   Judge   has   concluded   that
the   appellant   in   C.A.   No.6171/2012   was   inconsistent   in
his statements in the course of his evidence tendered by
him   as   PW3   is   not   justified.   Further   the   conclusion
reached that he is to be prosecuted, without the findings
being   recorded   regarding   deliberate   or   intentional

24
falsehood   cannot   be   sustained.   Hence   the   direction
issued   to   the   Registrar   General   of   the   High   Court   to
initiate   the   proceedings   by   lodging   a   criminal   complaint
also cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances
arising in this case. 
17. As noted from the decision in the case of  Amarsang
Nathaji   (supra)   and   the   position   of   law   which   is   well
established is that even in a case where the Court comes
to   the   conclusion   on   the   aspect   of   intentional   false
evidence, still  the  Court  has  to  form  an   opinion  whether
it   is   expedient   in   the   interest   of   justice   to   initiate   an
inquiry  into  the  offences  of  false evidence, having   regard
to   the   overall   factual   matrix   as   well   as   the   probable
consequences   of   such   prosecution.     The   Court   must   be
satisfied   that   such   an   inquiry   is   required   in   the   interest
of  justice  and  is  appropriate  in  the  facts of  the  case.    In
that   backdrop,   insofar   as   the   observation   made   by   the
learned Judge of the election tribunal relating to the need
for maintaining purity of the election process which is the
heart   and   soul   of   democracy   and   in   that   situation   the

25
role of the Returning Officer being pivotal, we fully concur
with   the   same.     However,   it   is   also   to   be   noted,   merely
because   of   that   position   the   Returning   Officer   in   the
instant case need not be exposed to prosecution.
18.   Firstly,   from   the   evidence   as   tendered,   we   did   not
see reason to permit the prosecution since in our opinion
there   is   no   intentional   falsehood   uttered.   The   other
relevant facts also indicate that the factual matrix herein
does   not   indicate   that   it   is   expedient   in   the   interest   of
justice to  initiate an  inquiry  and  expose  the  appellant to
criminal   prosecution.     On   this   aspect   it   is   to   be   noted
that the instant case is not a case where the nomination
paper  which  was  complete in  all  respect  was filed and  it
had   been  improperly  rejected  in  the   scrutiny  stage.    The
allegation  of   the   election   petitioner   is  that   the  Returning
Officer   had   refused   to   receive   the   nomination   paper,
which   the   learned   Judge   in   the   ultimate   analysis   has
accepted and termed the  same as an improper  rejection.
Even   that   be   so,   to   indicate   that   the   non­acceptance
alleged   by   the   election   petitioner   was   a   deliberate   action
by   the   Returning   Officer   with   a   specific   purpose,   it   has

26
neither   been   pleaded   nor   proved   in   the   course   of   the
proceedings   so   as   to   penalise   the   appellant   to   face   yet
another   proceeding.   The   Assembly   Constituency
concerned   is   a   vast   constituency   which   had   nearly   four
lakh voters on the electoral rolls.   The election petitioner
had   not   placed   material   to   indicate   that   she   had
contested in any earlier election or had wide support base
in   the   election   concerned   and   it   is   in   that   view   she   had
been   shut   out   from   the   contest.     Further   there   is   no
allegation   that   the   Returning   Officer   was   acting   at   the
instance or behest of any other candidate who was feeling
threatened   by   the   participation   of   the   election   petitioner
in the election process.  
19.   On   the   other   hand,   the   election   petitioner,   as   per
her   own   case   was   seeking   to   present   the   nomination
paper   which   was   incomplete   and   even   in   that
circumstance, she had come to the office of the Returning
Officer   only   at   2.00   pm   on   the   last   day   for   filing
nomination   which   was   to   close   at   3.00   pm.     Thereafter
she   made   attempts   to   complete   the   formalities   in   filling
up   the   nomination   paper   and   having   failed   had   still

27
presented   the   nomination   paper   since   according   to   her
the   needful   could   have   been   done   within   24   hours.     In
such  a  case   it   cannot   be   said   that   the   Returning   Officer
with   an   ulterior   motive   had   declined   to   receive   the
nomination paper and to cover up his folly was seeking to
tender   false   evidence   before   the   Court   and   thereby   to
justify   his   illegal   action.   In   fact,   the   appellant   had
received   the   other   nomination   papers   submitted   to   him
on   the   last   day   even   as   late   as   2.58   pm.     It   is   also   the
consistent   view   of   this   Court   that   the   success   of   a
candidate   who   has   won   at   an   election   should   not   be
lightly   interfered   with.   In   any   event   it   ought   not   to   have
been   made   the   basis   to   initiate   prosecution   by   terming
the   appellant   as   unreliable   witness.     Further,   we   notice
that   the   appellant   was   aged   59   years   as   on   15.06.2011
while   recording   his   deposition   and   a   decade   has   passed
by   and   now   would   be   69   years.     As   pointed   out   by   the
learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   the   appellant   has
retired from service about eight years back.  For all these
reasons   also,   we   find   that   any   proceeding   against   the

28
appellant   is   also   not   expedient   apart   from   not   being
justified.
In the result, the following order: ­
(i) Civil   Appeal   No.   4821/2012   is   disposed   of   as
infructuous. 
(ii) Civil   Appeal   No.   6171/2012   is   allowed.
Consequently,   the   direction   contained   in   para
175   of   the   impugned   order   to   the   Registrar
General   of   the   High   Court   to   register   the
complaint   against   the   appellant,   the   then
Returning   Officer   before   the   competent   court
for   proceeding   in   accordance   with   law   for   the
purpose   of   provisions   of   Section   193   of   the
Indian Penal Code is set aside. 
(iii) Parties to bear their own costs.  
(iv) Pending   applications,   if   any,   shall   stand
disposed of.
………….…………CJI
(N.V. RAMANA)
          ………….…………….J.
                                           (A.S. BOPANNA)
………….…………….J.
                                              (HRISHIKESH ROY)
New Delhi,
August 03, 2021