2021 INSC 0342
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1677 of 2011
Surajdeo Mahto and Anr. ..... Appellant(s)
                                       VERSUS
The State of Bihar  ..... Respondent
JUDGEMENT
Surya Kant, J.
Surajdeo   Mahto   (Appellant   No.1)   and   Prakash   Mahto   (Appellant
No.2) have laid challenge to the judgment dated 20.05.2010 passed by
the   High   Court   at   Patna,   whereby,   the   order   of   their   conviction   and
sentence   dated   13.05.1988   passed   by   the   3 rd
  Additional   Sessions
Judge,   Nawadah   was   confirmed.   Both   the   Appellants   have   been
convicted   for   offences   under   Section   302   read   with   section   34   of   the
Indian Penal Code [in short, “IPC”] read with Section 120­B of the IPC
and have been sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the offences.
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Additionally,   Appellant   No.1   has   also   been   convicted   under   section
364 IPC and has been sentenced to five years of imprisonment for the
said offence, with a direction that the sentences will run concurrently.
F ACTS
2. The   prosecution   case,   in   brief,   is   that   on   05.04.1987,   Arun
(deceased)   and   Sunder   Prasad   (PW­17)   were   putting   up   in   Arun’s
house at Manawan village when Surajdeo Mahto (Appellant No.1) and
Raj   Kumar   approached   Arun   and   asked   him   to   accompany   them   to
the   Cinema   at   Nawada   village.   While   Arun   was   reluctant   initially   to
accompany   them,   he   eventually   agreed   when   Appellant   No.1
volunteered   to   bear   the   expenses.   Upon   Arun’s   request,   Sunder
Prasad (PW­17) also agreed to go along with them to the Cinema. After
the show, Raj Kumar and Sunder Prasad returned to Manawan village
on 06.04.1987 whereas Arun and Surajdeo Mahto did not come back
with them. As Arun did not return, Ramji Mahto (father of Arun; PW­
16)   enquired   from   Raj   Kumar   who   told   him   that   Arun   and   Surajdeo
Mahto had gone to Arun’s in­laws’ place in Amwa village.
3. A   few   more   days   passed   and   Arun   had   not   yet   returned   home,
Arun’s   worried   family,   therefore,   sent   Raj   Kumar   to   bring   him   back.
Ramji Mahto also requested his fellow villager Kailash Mahto (PW­1) to
join him in looking for Arun. They found out that Surajdeo Mahto and
Arun  had visited the  latter’s  in­laws’  place  on  06.04.1987 and  stayed
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there till 08.04.1987. It was further discovered that the duo had then
proceeded   to   Dopta   village   wherein   Appellant   No.1’s   sister   was
married.   Thereafter,   Appellant   No.1   returned   to   his   village   Manawan
on   10.04.1987,   but   whereabouts   of   Arun   were   still   unknown.     When
asked, Appellant No.1 did not provide  any  credible information  about
Arun,   instead,   he   too   disappeared   and   was   not   seen   for   the   next   few
days. Pursuant to Ramji’s request, PW­1 visited Dopta on 10.04.1987
but   he   too   was   unable   to   track   down   Arun.   Since   Arun   was   still
untraceable,   Ramji   Mahto,   through   his   nephew   Ishwari   Mahto   (PW­
3A), sent information to the Police, which culminated in the lodging of
Sanha Entry No. 227, dated 11.04.1987.  
4. In the meantime, Ram Brikch Paswan (PW­8), Chowkidar, Circle
No.   7,   heard   rumours   of   a   dead   body   in   Ram   Sagar   Ahar   (Reservoir)
near Kakolat. On 11.04.1987, he proceeded to the spot and discovered
the dead body. He also found an iron dagger and two lungis near the
body.   The   statement   of   Ram   Brikch   Paswan   was   subsequently
recorded   by   the   police   and   treated   as   a   Fardbeyan.   Thereafter,
Ramchandra   Singh   (PW­18),   Officer­In­charge,   Govindpur   Police
Station   reached   the   spot   and   prepared   the   inquest   report   in   the
presence   of   witnesses.   Upon   inspecting   the   place   of   occurrence,
additional   material   such   as   one   pair   of   slippers,   one   handkerchief,   a
knife and a jerrycan made of plastic were also discovered and seized. A
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seizure list was prepared in the presence of witnesses. The dead body
was then sent for post mortem examination. 
5. On 12.04.1987, Ramji Mahto (PW­16) received information that a
dead   body   of   a   male   person   was   brought   in   by   the   Govindpur   Police
Station. Subsequently, Ramji Mahto along with some co­villagers went
to the Police Station and identified that the dead body was that of his
son Arun. 
6. The   investigation   then   proceeded   in   light   of   the   above­stated
facts, and upon collection of substantial evidence, a charge sheet was
filed   against   Surajdeo   Mahto   (Appellant   No.1),   Prakash   Mahto
(Appellant   No.2),   Chando   Mahto,   Shankar   Mahto   and   Raj   Kumar
Mahto. The case was committed to the court of 3 rd
 Additional Sessions
Judge,   Nawadah   and   charges   were   framed   against   the   accused
persons   for   offences   under   sections   364,   120­B   and   302   read   with
section   34   of   the   IPC.   The   accused   persons   abjured   their   guilt   and
claimed trial. 
7. In   the   eventual   trial,   a   total   of   18   witnesses   were   examined   by
the   prosecution.   No   documentary   evidence   was   relied   upon   by   the
prosecution.   The   case   of   the   prosecution   rested   heavily   upon
circumstantial evidence, including deposition of Ramji Mahto (PW­16),
father  of  the deceased.  PW­16 in  his  deposition alleged that Surajdeo
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Mahto (Appellant No.1) had lured the deceased away on the pretext of
watching cinema on 05.04.1987. PW­16 deposed that “ Arun told him
that he was not ready to go. Surajdeo told him that he will bear
the cost. Thereafter on being pressurized by Surajdeo, Arun went
out   with   Surajdeo,   Raj   Kumar   and   Sunder ”.   PW­16   also   deposed
that   it   was   at   his   instance   that   Ishwari   Mahto   (PW­3A)   went   and
informed   the   police   on   11.04.1987   about   Arun’s   disappearance,   and
on   12.04.1987   he   visited   Govindpur   Police   Station   and   identified   the
dead   body   of   Arun.   PW­16   further   identified   one   of   the   seized   lungis
belonging   to   Suarjdeo  Mahto   (Appellant  No.1).   The  cross­examination
of   PW­16   also   brought   to   light   the   motive   attributed   to   the   accused
persons:   the   relations   between   the   parties   were   strained   after   a
Panchayati   (village   meeting)   had   been   held   in   connection   with   the
illicit relationship of the deceased with the sister of Appellant No.1. 
8. Likewise,  Ishwari  Mahto   (PW­3A)   deposed   that  he   had   last  seen
Arun   in   the   company   of   Appellant   No.1,   Raj   Kumar   and   Sundar   on
05.04.1987,   and   he   was   informed   by   Appellant   No.1   that   they   were
going to see the cinema. Ishwari Mahto further shed light on the feud
between   the   parties   and   he   stated   that   “ Previously   the   families   of
Surajdeo   and   Arun   had   visiting   and   dining   terms   with   each
other,   but   it   stopped   after   the   month   of   Magh”.   Sunder   Prasad
(PW­17)   corroborated   the   deposition   of   PW­16,   and   stated   that
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Appellant No.1 pressurized Arun to accompany him and Raj Kumar to
watch  Cinema.  PW­17  also  deposed  to  accompanying   Appellant  No.1,
Arun and Raj Kumar to the Cinema and further revealed that after the
Cinema,   instead   of   returning   back   to   their   village,   Appellant   No.1
forced the group to visit Kumbhrawan village. PW­17 stated that upon
Appellant   No.1’s   insistence,   they   spent   the   night   in   Prakash   Mahto’s
house (Brother­in law of Surajdeo; Appellant No.1). The next day, i.e.,
06.04.1987,   when   PW­17   insisted   on   returning   back   to   the   village,
Surajdeo   Mahto   (Appellant  No.1)   informed   him   that   he   and   Arun   will
be visiting Amwa Village. 
9. Dilkeshwar   Mahto   (PW­2),   Arun’s   father­in­law,   deposed   that
Arun   and   Appellant   No.1   visited   his   house   in   Amwa   Village   on   the
evening   of   06.04.1987   and   stayed   there   till   08.04.1987.   He   further
deposed   that   “ On   Wednesday,   I   asked   Arun   and   Surajdeo
insistently  to stay further,  but Surajdeo did  not agree and  took
Arun with him saying that they had to go Dopta .” 
10. Bipat Mahto (PW­4), deposed that on Thursday, i.e., 09.04.1987,
he   received   information   from   his   grandson   that   Arun   was   in
Kumbhrawan   village   and  was  staying   at  the  house  of  Prakash  Mahto
(Appellant No.2). Since PW­4 was Arun’s uncle and also resided in the
same   village,   he   and   his   wife   went   to   invite   Arun   to   their   place.   He
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stated,   “ We   met   Arun,   Prakash   and   Surajdeo   at   that   place.   I
invited Arun to come to my place and take meal there. Prakash
told   me   that   he   had   arranged   food   for   them,   hence   they   would
go   after   taking   meal   at   his   place .”   He   further   stated   that   despite
Appellant   No.2’s   assurance,   Arun   did   not   come   to   their   place.   Later,
when   PW­4’s   wife   went   again   to   call   Arun,   she   was   informed   by
Appellant No.2’s wife that Arun had gone back. Sheodani Mahto (PW­
3),   who   is   the   son   of   PW­4   and   the   cousin   of   the   deceased,   also
deposed   about   the   presence   of   Arun   in   Kumbhrawan   village   on
09.04.1987.   According   to   him,   when   he   was   returning   back   to   the
village, he saw Arun on the outskirts of the village in the company of
Surajdeo,   Prakash,   Raj   Kumar   and   Shankar,   and   upon   asking   them
where they were going, Surajdeo informed PW­3 that all of them were
going towards Kakolat village. 
11. We   may   now   consider   the   statements   of   Bharat   Singh   (PW­10),
Kashi Mahto (PW­11), Ram Prasad (PW­12), Baleshwar Prasad (PW­13)
and   Mathura   Saw   (PW­14).   PW­10   and   PW­11   deposed   that   on   the
night of 09.04.1987, they had heard a motor vehicle (tractor) going in
the direction of Kakolat. However, PW­10 and PW­11 had not seen the
passengers in the vehicle. PW­12, PW­13 and PW­14 were all  present
near  PW­14’s shop  in  the late hours  of  09.04.1987 and  they deposed
about seeing two persons returning from Kakolat. PW­12 went further
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and  stated  that he  was  able  to  identify   the  persons  who  had  stopped
near PW­14’s shop. Upon seeing the accused persons in Court, PW­12
identified   Appellant   No.2   as   one   of   the   persons   who   had   come   to   the
shop   that   night.   PW­12   in   his   cross­examination   admitted   that   the
police   had   not  asked   him   to   take   part   in   a   Test   Identification   Parade
[in   short,   “T.I.P.”].   It   is   pertinent   to   mention   that   this   set   of   evidence
only finds relevance because the dead body of Arun was discovered in
Ram Sagar Ahar which was near Kakolat village. 
12. The   evidence   of   Kailash   Mahto   (PW­1)   and   Umeshwar   Prasad  
(PW­5)   also   bears   some   relevance   to   the   prosecution’s   case.   PW­1
deposed that on 09.04.1987 he was requested by PW­16 to search for
Arun. He further stated that the next day, i.e., 10.04.1987, he went to
the market and there he found Appellant No.1. PW­1 claims that when
he   enquired   about   Arun’s   whereabouts   from   him,   Surajdeo   Mahto
(Appellant No.1) told him that after viewing the cinema, Arun had gone
to   Amwa   village   whereas   he   went   to   Dopta   village.   PW­5   too   has
deposed that he met Surajdeo on 10.04.1987 at Barnwal Medical Hall
at Hisua where Appellant No.1 told him that Arun had gone to Delhi.   
13. Ram Brikch Paswan (PW­8), Chawkidar Circle No.9, was the one
who   discovered   the   dead   body   of   Arun   on   11.04.1987.   In   his   cross­
examination  he deposed that he had heard rumors of a dead body in
Ram   Sagar   Ahar   on   the   night   of   10.04.1987   itself,   however,   it   being
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night   time   and   the   place   being   a   forested   area,   he   could   go   there   on
the   following   day   only.   PW­6,   is   the   Doctor   who   conducted   the   post
mortem   examination   of   the   dead   body.   Upon   examining   the   injuries
present   on   the   deceased’s   body,   PW­6   opined   that   the   injuries   were
sufficient to cause death in the normal course of nature, and the time
elapsed from death was 36 to 72 hours. 
14. The case of the accused persons, as recorded in their statements
under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was one of
denial. No other evidence was led by the defence. 
15. The Trial  Court was conscious  of the fact that in order  to prove
the   guilt   of   the   accused   by   means   of   circumstantial   evidence,   the
chain   of   evidence   should   be   completed   so   as   to   exclude   all   the
hypothesis of innocence of the accused. Upon extensively scrutinizing
the deposition of witnesses, the Trial Court observed that there was a
paucity   of   eyewitnesses   to   explain   circumstances   in   which   the
deceased   met   his   end   and   the   evidence   on   record   fell   short   of
establishing the complicity of Chando Mahto, Shankar Mahto and Raj
Kumar   Mahto.   The   Court,   however,   held   that   the   circumstantial
evidence on record did suggest that Appellant No.1 lured the deceased
out   of   his   house   on   05.04.1987;   remained   with   him   all   along;
Appellant   No.2   then   joined   them   on   09.04.1987;   and   thereafter   the
present   appellants   conspired   and   murdered   the   deceased   near
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Kakolat.   Negating   the   contentions   raised   by   the   defence,   the   Trial
Court believed the testimony of PW­16 in toto and held that purported
motive as well as the identification of incriminating material by PW­16
further   established   the   guilt   of   the   appellants.   While   the   Trial   Court
observed that there were some inconsistencies in the case put forth by
the   prosecution,   but   those   were   held   to   be   “ petty   details ”   and   minor
contradictions. 
16. The Trial Court further noted that Appellant No.1 had exhibited
behaviour that could not have been considered normal. Judicial notice
of   the   false   and   evasive   replies   given   by   Appellant   No.1   to   PW­1   and
PW­5 when they inquired about the whereabouts of the deceased was
also   taken.   The   Court   held   that   since   various   links   in   the   chain   of
evidence   have   been   satisfactorily   proved,   the   false   explanation   given
by   Appellant   No.1   could   be   construed   as   an   additional   link   in   the
chain   of   evidence,   which   would   lend   further   support   to   the
prosecution   case.   The   Court   further   observed   that   when   enquiries
were taking place, instead of helping in the search of Arun, Appellant
No.1   absconded,   and   he   surrendered   before   the   court   on   18.04.1987
only,   when   coercive   measures   were   undertaken   to   compel   his
appearance.   Lastly,   unconvinced   by   the   defense   taken   by   the
Appellant,   the   Trial   Court   opined   that   the   plain   denial   of   the
prosecution   allegations   by   the   accused   persons   was   nothing   but   an
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attempt   to   screen   themselves   from   the   “ rigours   of   legal   punishment” .
The   Trial   Court   thus   held   that   the   circumstantial   evidence   in   the
instant   case   was   clinching,   and   consequently   convicted   the   present
appellants. 
17. Discontented   with   their   conviction,   the   appellants   preferred   an
appeal   before   the   Patna   High   Court.   Upon   a   reappraisal   of   the
evidence   on   record,   the   High   Court   observed   that   the   prosecution
witnesses   were   able   to   provide   a   date   and   stage   wise   testimony   in
order   to   prove   the   prosecution   case.   The   High   Court   further   laid
emphasis on the false information provided by Appellant No.1 to PW­5.
Considering   these   aspects,   the   High   Court   vide   the   impugned
judgement   dated   20.05.2010   affirmed   the   findings   of   the   Trial   Court
and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants. 
18. The aggrieved appellants are now before this Court. 
C ONTENTIONS
19. We   have   heard   Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellants   at
considerable   length.   The   principal   contention   is   that   the   entire   case
rested on circumstantial evidence and there was no eye­witness to the
alleged   incident.   Learned   Counsel   submitted   that   no   independent
witnesses had been examined by the prosecution and all the witnesses
were   either   relatives   or   close   friends   of   the   complainant   party.   The
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Counsel  further   pressed  that  the  Courts   below  have   completely   erred
in relying upon the testimony of PW­10 to PW­14. As far as Appellant
No.2   is   concerned,   it   was   submitted   that   only   evidence   against   him
was that of Sheodani Mahto (PW­3) and Baleshwar Prasad Yadav (PW­
12).   The   Counsel   asserted   that   PW­3   had   seen   the   deceased   in   the
company of Appellant No.2 two days prior to the recovery of the dead
body, and hence the evidence of PW­3 did not support the prosecution
case. Casting doubts on the credibility of the evidence of PW­12, it was
claimed to be highly improbable that PW­12 was able to see the face of
Appellant   No.2   only   through   the   light   of   a   lantern   on   a   pitch­dark
night. Learned Counsel further contended that the failure on the part
of the investigating agency not to send the knife recovered at the spot
of   occurrence   for   forensic   examination   was   fatal   to   the   prosecution
case.  Hence,  it  was  urged  that  the  Courts  below  fell  in  grave  error  in
convicting the appellants merely on the basis of ‘last seen theory’. 
20. In   all   fairness,   we   may   notice   an   additional   plea   taken   by
Appellant   No.1,   which   has   been   raised   for   the   first   time   before   this
Court.  It was claimed that Appellant No.1 was a ‘juvenile’ on the date
of occurrence. In support of such claim, Learned Counsel relied on the
copies of ‘School Leaving Certificate’ along with an ‘admit card’ issued
by the Bihar School Examination Board, according to which Appellant
No.1   was   purportedly   born   on   01.03.1970.   As   the   date   of   occurrence
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was between 09.04.1987 to 11.04.1987, it is submitted that Appellant
No.1   was   17   years   of   age   at   that   time   and   therefore,   a   juvenile.   To
further   buttress   this   claim,   Learned   Counsel   for   the   appellants   drew
our   attention   to   section   7A   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as well as the decision of this Court
in  Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal 1
.  
21. On   the   other   hand,   Learned   Counsel   appearing   for   the   State   of
Bihar   submitted   that   there   has   been   a   concurrent   finding   of   guilt   by
two   courts   on   minute   examination   of   the   evidence   on   record   which
does   not   warrant   any   interference   by   this   Court.   Relying   upon
Inspector   of   Police,   Tamil   Nadu   v.   John  David 2
,  it  was   urged  that
conviction in cases of circumstantial evidence is permissible. The State
Counsel   passionately   argued   that   the   chain   of   circumstances   in   the
present case is complete in every respect.   He made pointed reference
that   First ,   the   motive,   as   recorded   by   the   Trial   Court,   was   clearly
established   in   the   present   case.   Second,   both   the   courts   below   have
concurrently   held   that   the   deceased   was   last   seen   alive   in   the
company   of   the   Appellants.   He   cited   State   of   Rajasthan   v.   Kashi
Ram 3
,   to   urge   that   in   situations   when   the   deceased   was   last   seen   in
the company of the accused, a presumption would arise that the said
1
 (
2012) 10 SCC 489, ¶ 39
2
 (2011) 5 SCC 509, ¶ 33 to 35
3
 ( 2006) 12 SCC 254, ¶19­24
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accused murdered the deceased. It was argued that presumption has
not   been   dislodged   by   the   Appellants   in   the   present   case.   Third ,   the
guilt of the appellants can be adduced from their conduct as not only
did they lure the deceased on the pretext of watching the cinema, but
also   gave   false   and   misleading   information   about   the   deceased’s
whereabouts.   Fourth ,   the   seizures/recoveries   made   during   the
investigation do establish the involvement of appellants, as one of the
two lungis recovered at the place of occurrence was identified as that
belonging   to   Appellant   No.1.   Fifth ,   the   medical   examination   does
establish   that   the   death   of   the   deceased   was   caused   by   unnatural
means   and,   Sixth ,   the   dead   body   which   was   recovered   has   been
identified as that of Arun. 
22. Learned   State   Counsel   further   canvassed   that   all   the   material
witnesses,   PW­1   to   PW­14,   have   corroborated   each   other’s   versions.
Drawing   force   from   the   decisions   in   Sukhar   v.   State   of   U.P. 4
  &
Badruddin Rukonddim Karpude  v. State  of Maharashtra 5
, it was
submitted that the principles of   res  gestae   are applicable to the facts
and   circumstances   of   this   case,   and   the   statements   made   by   one
witness to another are admissible in evidence. He also urged that the
absence of T.I.P. in the present case would not be fatal to the case of
the prosecution 6
. 
4
 (1999) 9 SCC 507, ¶ 5 to 10
5
 (1981) Supp SCC 1, ¶ 16
6
 Malkhansingh v. State of M.P.,  (2003) 5 SCC 746, ¶ 7, 8 to 16
Page  |  14

23. As regard to the plea of Appellant No.1 being a juvenile raised for
the first time before this Court, it was vehemently urged by the State
Counsel   that   the   first   appellant   deliberately   waited   till   this   belated
point of time to raise the plea knowing fully well that in the event of an
inquiry   ordered   by   the   Court,   there   would   be   no   record   available   to
contradict   the   documents   put   forth   by   him.   He   further   pointed   out
certain   patent   discrepancies   in   the   documents   supplied   by   Appellant
No.1, for instance, the documents did not bear his name, but instead
the   name   of   one   ‘Suryadev   Prasad’   was   mentioned.   In   furtherance   of
his arguments, the Counsel submitted that the purported documents
have   not   been   proved   in   terms   of   section   35   of   the   Indian   Evidence
Act,   1872,   [in   short,   “IEA”]   and   as   such   could   not   be   accepted.   Our
attention was brought to the decision of this Court in  Ravinder Singh
Gorkhi  v.  State   of  U.P. 7
, wherein,  the plea of  juvenility  was rejected
because,   inter­alia,   there   was   an   unexplained   inordinate   delay   in
raising the plea. 
A NALYSIS
24. We   find   that   two   questions   fall   for   our   consideration   in   the
instant   appeal;   (A)   Whether   the   circumstantial   evidence   led   in   the
instant   case   is   so   impeachable   that   it   establishes   the   guilt   of   the
appellants beyond any reasonable doubt?   (B)   Whether Appellant No.1
7
 (2006) 5 SCC 584, ¶ 39 to 41
Page  |  15

was a juvenile on the date of the occurrence? 
25. It   may   be   highlighted   at   the   outset   that   although   the   powers
vested   in   this   Court   under   Article   136   of   the   Constitution   are   wide,
this Court in a criminal appeal by special leave will ordinarily loath to
enter   into   a   fresh   re­appraisement   of   evidence   and   question   the
credibility of witnesses when there is a concurrent finding of fact, save
for certain exceptional circumstances. While it is difficult to lay down
a   rule   of   universal   application,   it   has   been   affirmed   time   and   again
that except where the  assessment of  the  High  Court is vitiated  by an
error of law or procedure, or is based on misreading of evidence, or is
inconsistent with the evidence and thus has led to a perverse finding,
this Court will refrain from interfering with the findings of the Courts
below.  
26. Regardless   of   such   self­imposed   restrain,   and   in   the   interest   of
justice,   we   have   given   thoughtful   consideration   to   the   rival
submissions and have endeavored to peruse and discussed the entire
evidence on record to ascertain whether or not the concurrent finding
of   conviction   suffers   from   any   perversity   and/or   whether   the
conviction of the appellants is legally and factually sustainable.
A. Whether   the   guilt   of   the   accused   has   been   proved   beyond
reasonable doubt?
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27. This   Court,   in   its   much­celebrated   judgment   of   Sharad
Birdhichand   Sarda   v.   State   of   Maharashtra 8
,   has   elaborately
considered   the   standard   necessary   for   recording   a   conviction   on   the
basis of circumstantial evidence and has further held: 
“153.xxx  xxx xxx
(1) The  circumstances from  which the  conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
xxx  xxx xxx
(2)     The   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent   only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
say,   they   should   not   be   explainable   on   any   other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3)     The   circumstances   should   be   of   a   conclusive   nature
and tendency,
(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5)  There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to   leave   any   reasonable   ground   for   the   conclusion
consistent   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and   must
show   that   in   all   human   probability   the   act   must   have
been done by the accused.”
These five cardinal principles have been reiterated on numerous
occasions,   including   in   the   recent   decisions   in   Mohd.   Younus   Ali
Tarafdar  v. State  of W.B 9
  &   R. Damodaran v.  State Represented
8
 (1984) 4 SCC 116, ¶ 153
9
  (2020) 3 SCC 747, ¶ 10
Page  |  17

by   the   Inspector   of   Police 10
.   Keeping   these   conditions   in   mind,   we
shall now examine the case at hand. 
28. It   appears   to   us   that   the   following   circumstances   need   to   be
considered to arrive at the guilt of the appellants: (i) Last seen theory;
(ii) Motive & (iii) false information provided and subsequent conduct of
the appellants.
(i) Last seen theory 
29. The   case   of   the   prosecution   in   the   present   case   heavily   banks
upon   the   principle   of   ‘Last   seen   theory’.   Briefly   put,   the   last   seen
theory   is   applied   where   the   time   interval   between   the   point   of   when
the   accused   and  the   deceased   were  last  seen  together,   and   when  the
victim   is   found   dead,   is   so   small   that   the   possibility   of   any   other
person other than the accused being the perpetrator of crime becomes
impossible. Elaborating on the principle of “last seen alive”, a 3­judge
bench of this Court in the case of  Satpal v. State of Haryana 11
 has,
however, cautioned that unless the fact of last seen is corroborated by
some   other   evidence,   the   fact   that   the   deceased   was   last   seen   in   the
vicinity   of   the   accused,   would   by   itself,   only   be   a   weak   kind   of
evidence. The Court further held: 
  “……………..Succinctly   stated,   it   may   be   a   weak   kind   of
10
 2021 SCC OnLine SC 134, ¶ 13
11   
(2018) 6 SCC 610,  ¶ 6
Page  |  18

evidence by itself to found conviction upon the same singularly.
But   when   it   is   coupled   with   other   circumstances   such   as   the
time   when   the   deceased   was   last  seen  with   the   accused,  and
the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time,
the   accused   owes   an   explanation   under   Section   106   of   the
Evidence   Act   with   regard   to   the   circumstances   under   which
death   may   have   taken   place.   If   the   accused   offers   no
explanation,   or   furnishes   a   wrong   explanation,   absconds,
motive   is   established,   and   there   is   corroborative   evidence
available inter alia in the form of recovery or otherwise forming
a chain of  circumstances  leading to the  only inference for guilt
of   the   accused,   incompatible   with   any   possible   hypothesis   of
innocence, conviction can be based on the same. If there be any
doubt or break in the link of chain of circumstances, the benefit
of doubt must go to the accused. Each case will therefore have
to be examined on its own facts for invocation of the doctrine.”
30. We may hasten to clarify that the fact of last seen should not be
weighed   in   isolation   or   be   segregated   from   the   other   evidence   led   by
the prosecution.  The last seen theory should rather be applied taking
into   account   the   case   of   the   prosecution   in   its   entirety.   Hence,   the
Courts have to not only consider the factum of last seen, but also have
to   keep   in   mind   the   circumstances   that   preceded   and   followed   from
the   point   of   the   deceased   being   so   last   seen   in   the   presence   of   the
accused. 
31. The prosecution in the present case has undoubtedly established
that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellants,
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and   has   also   adduced   evidence   about   the   events   leading   up   to   and
following the point of last seen. The depositions of PW­2, PW­3A, PW­
16   and   PW­17   do   suggest   that   prior   to   the   point   of   last   seen,   the
deceased was constantly in the company of Appellant No.1. PW­3 and
PW­4   are   the   persons   who   lastly   saw   the   deceased   alive   on
09.04.1987,   and   they   have   categorically   deposed   that   they   had   seen
the   deceased   along   with   the   appellants.   Through   the   depositions   of
PW­1,   PW­5,   &   PWs   10   to   14   the   prosecution   has   attempted   to   shed
light on the events that occurred post the point of last seen. 
32. The   contention   that   most   of   the   prosecution   witnesses   were
either   related   or   close   to   the   complainant   party   and   their   testimony
could   not   be   relied   upon   in   the   absence   of   corroboration   by   any
independent witnesses, in our opinion, is without much substance. It
is   trite   in   law   that   the   job   of   the   prosecution   is   to   put   forth   the   best
evidence that is collected during the investigation. Although it is ideal
that   the   prosecution   case   is   further   substantiated   through
independent   witnesses,   but   it   would   be   unreasonable   to   expect   the
presence   of   third­parties   in   every   case.   This   Court   has   consistently
held that the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded merely on a bald
plea of all witnesses being related to the complainant party. Hence, in
order   to   draw   an   adverse   inference   against   the   non­examination   of
independent   witnesses,   it   must   also   be   shown   that   though   the   best
Page  |  20

evidence was available, but it was withheld by the prosecution. 
33. That apart, PW­3 saw Arun and the Appellants on the outskirts
of   Kumbhrawan   village,   whereas,   PW­4   saw   Arun   and   the   appellants
inside Appellant No.2’s house. Neither of these witnesses claim to have
seen the deceased and the appellants at a public place. Thus, it would
not be illogical to infer that there was no independent witness to this
occurrence.   Further,   the   deposition   of   both   PW­3   and   PW­4   seems
natural and nothing has been adduced in their cross­examination for
us to disbelieve their testimonies.  
34. The   Counsel   for   the   Appellants   further   assailed   the   last   seen
theory   and   submitted   that   even   if   the   deposition   of   PW­3   was
considered   true,   he   had   seen   Arun   in   the   company   of   the   appellants
on   09.04.1987,   which   was   two   days   before   the   discovery   of   the   dead
body.   It   was,   thus,   argued   that   the   intervening   time   period   between
the   two   events   could   not   rule   out   the   possibility   of   intervention   by   a
third   party   and   as   such   there   wasn’t   a   continuous   chain   of
circumstances.   While   this   argument   seems   attractive   at   the   first
instance, but, when considered in the light of testimonies made by the
independent   witnesses   PW­6   and   PW­8,   it   stands   completely   belied.
The   Prosecution   case   is   that   both   the   Appellants   committed   the
murder on the night of 09.04.1987. PW­8, who discovered the body of
Arun   on   11.04.1987,   deposed   that   he   had   heard   rumors   about   the
Page  |  21

dead   body   the   previous   night   itself,   however,   on   account   of   it   being
dark and a forested area, he was only able to proceed to the spot the
next   day.   Given   that   the   body   was   lying   on   the   spot   at   least   since
10.04.1987, the instant crime could have been committed on or before
10.04.1987.   The   medical   evidence   in   the   present   case   further   braces
the   prosecution   story.   PW­6,   the   Doctor,   examined   the   body   of   the
deceased   on   12.04.1987.   In   his   opinion,   the   time   elapsed   since   the
death   of   Arun   was   36   to   72   hours.   Thus,   the   medical   evidence   fully
corroborates   the   prosecution   story   of   the   murder   having   being   taken
place   on   09.04.1987.   We   also   note   that   the   Courts   below   have   dealt
with   this   issue   elaborately   and   have   held   that   the   murder   of   the
deceased indeed took place on 09.04.1987. We see no reason to take a
contrary view. 
35. Counsel   for   the   State   appears   to   be   right   in   relying   upon   the
decision   of   this   Court   in   Kashi   Ram   (Supra)   to   assert   that   once   the
fact   of   last   seen   is   established,   the   Accused   must   offer   some
explanation   as   to   the   circumstances   in   which   he   departed   the
company   of   the   deceased.   This   position   of   law,   as   covered   under
section   106   of   the   IEA,   was   duly   considered   in   the   case   of   Satpal
Singh (Supra) , wherein, this Court clarified that if the accused fails to
offer   any   plausible   explanation,   an   adverse   inference   can   be   drawn
against the accused. In the instant case also, Appellant No.1 has been
Page  |  22

unable   to   offer   any   explanation   as   to   circumstances   in   which   he
departed from the company of the deceased. 
36. As regard to the reliability of the depositions of PW­10 to PW­14,
the   primary   contention   is   that   except   PW­12,   none   of   the   other
witnesses   were   able   to   identify   the   present   appellants.   It   was   further
contended   that   the   testimony   of   PW­12   seems   doubtful   as   it   was
highly   improbable   that   the   witness   was   able   to   see   Appellant   No.2
through the light of a lamp. Assuming that the depositions of PW­10,
PW­11, PW­13 and PW­14 do not add much value to the case in hand,
the question whether PW­12 could or could not identify Appellant No.2
is   purely   a   factual   issue   and   courts   below   have   taken   a   concurrent
view in relation thereto. Suffice to say that PW­12 was able to identify
Appellant No.2 because of the chicken­pox marks on his face. Even in
the   initial   statement   recorded   by   the   police,   PW­12   had   maintained
that one of the two persons who he had interacted with on the night of
09.04.1987, had chicken­pox scars on his face. 
37. Upon   considering   the   prosecution   evidence   in   its   entirety   and
having   meditated   on   the   grounds   raised   by   the   appellants   to   every
possible   extent,   we   find   no   reason   to   disbelieve   the   prosecution
version of last seen theory against the appellants.  
(ii) Motive 
Page  |  23

38. If   motive   in   a   case   is   attributed   to   an   accused(s)   and   thereafter
proved,   the   probability   of   the   crime   being   committed   by   the   said
accused   is   intensified.   It   is   for   this   reason,   that   in   cases   of
overwhelming   circumstantial   evidence,   proof   of   motive   will   be   an
important piece of corroborative evidence, as well as, form a vital link
in the chain of evidence. 
39. The motive attributed to the appellants in this case is that they
murdered the deceased because he was allegedly having an illicit affair
with   Rita,   sister   of   Appellant   No.1.   While   none   of   the   witnesses   have
specifically deposed about the deceased having an affair with Rita, the
motive,   as   alleged,   does   find   some   corroboration   in   the   deposition   of
PW­1, PW­3A, and PW­16. It is revealed from the testimony of PW­3A,
that   initially   there   were   cordial   and   friendly   relations   between   the   1 st
Appellant   and   deceased’s   family   but   the   same   became   sour   after   the
month of February. PW­1 who is a fellow villager has corroborated the
testimonies   of   PW­3A.   PW­16   has   categorically   deposed   that   a
Panchayat   had   been   called   in   regards   to   the   illicit   relationship   of   the
deceased with Rita. 
40. The   fact   of   the   deceased   having   an   affair   with   the   sister   of
Appellant   No.1   has   of   course   not   been   established   beyond   doubt   but
the factum of calling Panchayat so that the issue does not spiral out of
control does suggest that Appellant No.1 carried a motive to eliminate
Page  |  24

the   deceased.   We   may   not   lose   sight   of   the   fact   that   the   events   had
occurred   in   the   year   1987,   when   the   rural   Indian   society   was
irrepressibly   conservative,   and   even   the   slightest   rumor   of   extra­
marital   affairs   could   flare­up   tensions.   Considering   these   ground
realities,   the   Trial   Court,   in   our   opinion   correctly   recorded   that   the
motive as alleged had been sufficiently proved by the prosecution. We
also   note,   that   the   Counsel   for   Appellants   has   not   mounted   any
substantial   challenge  on  the   point  of  motive,   and  as   such,  we   see  no
reason to interfere with the indictment of Appellant No.1 on the point
of motive.   
(iii) False   information   provided   by   Appellant   No.1   and   his
subsequent conduct .
41. We   may   now   briefly   consider   the   false   information   provided   by
Appellant No.1 to PW­1 and PW­5. Both of these witnesses individually
met   Appellant   No.1   on   10.04.1987   and   both   of   them   enquired   about
the   whereabouts   of   Arun.   Appellant   No.1   lied   to   PW­1   and   told   him
that   after   viewing   the   Cinema,   Arun   alone   had   proceeded   to   Amwa
whereas Appellant No.2 had gone to visit Dopta. Even more curiously,
Appellant No.1 informed PW­5 that Arun had left for Delhi. It is clear
to us that the false information provided by the first appellant was an
attempt   to   hide   his   guilt   by   de­railing   the   search   efforts   that   were
being   conducted.   Appellant   No.1   thereafter   absconded   and
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surrendered before the court only after coercive measures were taken.
We   are,   thus,   inclined   to   agree   with   the   State   Counsel   that   the   false
information given by Appellant No.1 and his post occurrence conduct
is   relevant   to   prove   an   additional   link   in   the   chain   of   incriminating
circumstances.  
42.  There is, however, a qualitative difference in the evidence led by
the   prosecution   to   prove   charges   against   Prakash   Mahto   (Appellant
No.2).     The   prosecution’s   case   is   that   it   was   the   1st   Appellant
(Surajdeo   Mahto)   who   allured   the   deceased   and   persuaded   him   to
accompany the said appellant to watch cinema.  It is neither their case
nor have the prosecution witnesses deposed that Appellant No. 2 was
involved   in   the   persuasive   abduction   of   the   deceased   from   his   house
on   05.04.1987.     This   has   to   be   seen   in   the   context   of   motive   behind
the offence.  It is proved on record that the 1st Appellant had an axe to
grind against the deceased who was allegedly having illicit relationship
with his sister. There is no motive alleged or proved which would have
swayed   Appellant   No.   2   to   commit   murder   of   the   deceased.     Still
further, prosecution has led no evidence that there was any meeting of
mind between the 1st and the 2nd Appellant on or before 08.04.1987,
or that they hatched any conspiracy together to commit the murder of
Arun.     There   is   also   no   evidence   on   record   to   suggest   that   Appellant
No.1 disclosed his intention to commit murder of deceased Arun to the
Page  |  26

2 nd
 Appellant.
43. It   is   true   that   the   prosecution   has   led   evidence   comprising   the
statements of PW­3 and PW­4 who had lastly seen the deceased alive
on   09.04.1987   in   the   company   of   the   1 st
  and   the   2 nd
  Appellants.
However,   until   and   unless   the   last   seen   theory   is   substantiated   by
other   circumstantial   evidence   to   constitute   an   unbreakable   chain   of
events,   the   conviction   cannot   rest   solely   on   the   basis   that   the   2 nd
Appellant was also present along with Appellant No.1 in the company
of the deceased when they were seen together on 09.04.1987.
44. It   is   pertinent   to   mention   that   some   incriminating   material
consisting   of   one   pair   of   slippers,   one   handkerchief,   a   knife,   jerrycan
and   two   lungis   were   found   and   seized   at   the   place   of   occurrence.
While PW­16, namely, father of the deceased has identified one of the
seized   lungis   belonging   to   Appellant   No.1,   none   of   the   recovered
articles have been attributed to the 2 nd
 Appellant. The only substantial
evidence against the 2 nd
 Appellant is that he too was in the company of
the   deceased   and   Appellant   No.1   on   09.04.1987,   i.e.,   they   were   seen
together   lastly.   Even   if   we   were   to   presume   that   the   deposition   of  
PW­12   identifying   Appellant   No.2   on   the   night   of   09.04.1987   to   be
true,   such   evidence,   may   create   a   strong   suspicion   in   respect   of
involvement   of   the   2 nd
  Appellant   in   the   murder   of   the   deceased,   but
then,   mere   suspicion   cannot   be   accepted   as   impeccable   evidence   to
prove his guilt beyond any doubt.
Page  |  27

45. Further,   there   is   post   occurrence   circumstantial   evidence   led
against   Appellant   No.1,   namely,   that   he   did   not   disclose   the
whereabouts   of   the   deceased   and   then   surreptitiously   disappeared
from   the   scene   till   he   surrendered   in   Court.     There   is   no   such
allegation   of   being   evasive   or   absconding   post   occurrence   levelled
against   Appellant   No.2.   There   are,   thus,   missing   links   in   the
prosecution   case   so   far   as   the   2nd   Appellant   is   concerned.
Consequently, and for the reasons aforestated, we find that the case of
Prakash   Mahto   (Appellant   No.2)   is   distinguishable   from   that   of
Surajdeo   Mahto   (Appellant   No.1)   and   the   prosecution   has   not   been
able to prove the guilt of 2nd Appellant beyond the pale of doubt.  The
2nd Appellant is, thus, entitled to the benefit of doubt.
B. Appellant No.1’s plea of Juvenility 
46. There is no gainsaying that section 7­A of Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 [in short, “JJ Act”] sets out the
procedure   to   be   followed   by   a   court   to   determine   the   claim   of
juvenility.   Its   proviso   enables   to   raise   the   claim   of   juvenility   before
“any court” and at “any stage”, even after the final disposal of the case.
However,   in   order   to   take   advantage   of   the   aforesaid   provision,   there
lies an initial onus on the accused to produce some cogent evidence to
prima   facie   establish   the   juvenility   on   the   date   of   commission   of   the
offence.
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47. In the instant case, the 1 st
 Appellant has raised plea of juvenility
for the first time before this Court.   He has placed before us a School
Leaving   Certificate   along   with   an   Admit   Card   issued   by   the   Bihar
School   Examination   Board,   wherein,   Appellant   No.1’s   date   of   birth   is
claimed  to  be 01.03.1970.  It has  been  asserted  that the  1 st
  Appellant
was   17   years   old   at   the   time   of   occurrence.   Learned   counsel   for   the
appellants   has   also   drawn   our   attention   to   the   decision   in   Abuzar
Hossain   (Supra) ,   wherein,   this   Court   exhaustively   dealt   with   the
provisions and the scope of JJ Act and held as under: 
“39.3. As to what materials would prima facie satisfy the
court   and/or   are   sufficient   for   discharging   the   initial
burden cannot be catalogued nor can it be laid down as to
what weight should be given to a specific piece of evidence
which   may   be   sufficient   to   raise   presumption   of   juvenility
but   the   documents   referred   to   in   Rules   12(3)(a)(i)   to   (iii)
shall  definitely   be  sufficient  for  prima  facie   satisfaction   of
the   court   about   the   age   of   the   delinquent   necessitating
further   enquiry   under   Rule   12.   The   statement   recorded
under Section 313 of the Code is too tentative and may not
by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or reject the claim
of   juvenility.   The   credibility   and/or   acceptability   of
the   documents   like   the   school   leaving   certificate   or
the   voters'   list,   etc.   obtained   after   conviction   would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and   no   hard­and­fast   rule   can   be   prescribed   that
they must be prima facie accepted or rejected….”
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       (Emphasis Supplied)
48. When   the   documents   relied   upon   by   1 st
  Appellant   are   analysed
in   the   backdrop   of   these   settled   principles,   we   find   that   the   same   do
not   inspire   any   confidence.   The   name   of   Appellant   No.1   does   not
appear   on   the   documents,   instead   these   belong   to   one   ‘Suryadev
Prasad’.   It   is   nearly   impossible   to   verify   the   veracity   of   the   two
documents relied upon by Appellant No.1 at this highly belated stage.
Further,   the   record   of   the   Trial   Court   does   suggest   that   the   name   of
the 1 st
 Appellant is ‘Surajdeo Mahto’ and not ‘Suryadev Prasad’.  In the
absence   of   any   cogent   material   indicating   that   the   subject   –
documents   pertain   to   1 st
  Appellant   only,   no   case   to   hold   any   fact­
finding   enquiry   is   made   out.     Consequently,   we   decline   to   place
reliance on the documents in question and reject the plea of juvenility
raised by the 1 st
 Appellant.  
Conclusion
49. In   light   of   the   above   discussion,   the   instant   appeal   is   partly
allowed.   While   the   conviction   and   sentence   of   Surajdeo   Mahto
(Appellant   No.1)   is   upheld   and   appeal   qua   him   is   dismissed,   the   2 nd
Appellant (Prakash Mahto) is acquitted of the charges.  The bail bonds
furnished   by   the   1 st
  Appellant   are   cancelled   and   he   is   directed   to
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surrender   to   undergo   remainder   of  the  sentence.    The   2 nd
  Appellant’s
bail bonds are discharged.
……………………….. CJI.
(N.V. RAMANA)
………..………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
…………………………...J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 04.08.2021
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