2021 INSC 0346
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION     (C) No.28592 of 2018
SUMAN CHADHA & ANR.          .... PETITIONER(S) 
Versus
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA  ... RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
V. Ramasubramanian, J.
1. Upon   being   found   guilty   of   committing   contempt   of   Court,   the
petitioners   who   are   husband   and   wife   respectively,   were   sentenced   to
simple   imprisonment   for   three  months  along   with   a   fine  of   Rs.2000/­
each,   by   a   learned   Judge   of   the   Delhi   High   Court.   The   said   Order
having been confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in an
appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (‘Act’ for
short),   the   petitioners   have   come   up   with   the   above   Special   Leave
Petition.
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2. We have heard Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for
the   petitioners   and   Mr.   Anuj   Jain,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
respondent­Bank.
3. The background facts which led to the petitioners being held guilty
of   contempt   of   Court,   are   lucidly   recorded   in   the   Order   dated
18.07.2017 of the learned Judge. They are as follows:
(i)     The   petitioners   were   Directors   of   a   company   by   name   Parul
Polymers   Private   Limited,   which   availed   loan/credit   facilities   from   the
respondent   Bank.   The   petitioners   guaranteed   the   repayment   of   the
loan and had also offered immovable properties as security. 
(ii)   On   24 th
  July,   2014,   the   loan   of   the   respondents   was
categorized   as   a   Non   Performing   Asset   due   to   defaults   in   repayment.
On   18 th
  August,   2014,   a   notice   under   Section   13(2)   of   SARFAESI   Act
was   issued   for   recovery   of   Rs.   28,82,25,942.24   plus   interest.   It   was
followed   by   a   possession   notice   under   section   13(4)   in   respect   of   two
properties.
(iii)  Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed S.A. No. 367/2014
before  the   Debts   Recovery   Tribunal­III,   New   Delhi   (‘DRT­III’   for   short),
under  Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. However, the DRT­III declined
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to   grant   any   interim   relief   against   the   physical   possession   of   the
aforesaid properties.
(iv)       The   petitioners   filed   an   appeal   but   could   not   deposit   Rs.   7
crores being 25% of the amount demanded in the notice under Section
13(2).   Eventually   the   appeal   was   dismissed   as   withdrawn   on
31.03.2015.
(v)     However,   on   01 st
  April,   2015,   the   petitioners   secured   a
conditional order of stay from DRT­III, New Delhi in S.A. No. 367/2014
whereby the petitioners were required to deposit a sum of Rs. 5 crores
within thirty days. The order also stipulated that Rs. 2 crores would be
deposited by 03 rd
 April, 2015.
(vi)     On   03 rd
  April,   2015,   the   petitioners   gave   a   letter   to   SHO,
Police   Station   Katju   Marg,   Rohini,   Delhi   showing   their   intention   to
deposit the amount of Rs. 2 crores by way of four cheques. Therefore,
the Receiver was unable to take possession of the properties.
(vii)       Thereafter, the   petitioners  challenged  the   conditional  order
of stay passed by DRT­III on 01 st
  April, 2015 before the High Court by
way   of   W.P.(C)No.3406/2015   stating   that   the   Bank   and   DRT­III   were
acting unfairly and unjustly in not accepting their cheques totalling to
Rs. 2 crores.
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(viii)     When   the   writ   petition   came   for   admission   and   interim
orders on 8 th
 April, 2015, the petitioners admitted liability and offered,
by way of a statement under oath, to deposit Rs. 7 crores, i.e. 25% of
the   notice   amount   in   three   instalments   on   or  before   30 th
  June,   2015.
The   Bank   gave   its   assent   and   thereafter   the   Court   ordered   that   the
possession   of   the   properties   of   the   petitioners   shall   not   be   disturbed
subject   to   the   petitioners   depositing   Rs.   7   crores   on   or   before   30 th
June, 2015, i.e. Rs. 2 crores on 30 th
 April, 2015, Rs. 2.5 crores each on
31 st
 May, 2015 & 30 th
 June, 2015.
(ix)     On 29 th
  April, 2015, the petitioners gave a letter  along  with
four   cheques  for   Rs.  50  lakhs   each   dated  06 th
  May,  2015  purportedly
in compliance of the order dated 08 th
 April, 2015.
(x)       Accordingly,   the   possession   proceedings   for   one   property
scheduled for 30 th
  April, 2015 were deferred by the Bank. But on 08 th
May, 2015, all the four cheques bounced.
4. Therefore,   the  respondent­Bank   filed   a  petition  under   Sections   10
and   12   of   the   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   for   punishing   the
petitioners  for  wilful  and  deliberate  breach   of  their  undertaking  dated
08.04.2015.   Though   the   petitioners   resisted   the   contempt   petition   on
the ground that breach of an undertaking, made with a view to secure
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a conditional order of stay may not tantamount to contempt, especially
when the consequences of breach of such undertaking are spelt out in
the   order   of   the   Court   itself,   the   learned   Judge   was   not   convinced.
Therefore,   by   an   Order   dated   18.07.2017,   the   learned   Judge   of   the
High Court held the petitioners guilty of contempt and sentenced them
simple imprisonment for three months with a fine of Rs.2000 each. The
Division Bench upheld the said order and the petitioners are before us.
5. Before   we   proceed   further   we   should   record   certain   developments
which  have   taken   place   after   the   order  of  single  Judge dated 
18.07.2017.  They are as follows:­ 
(i)  The learned Judge himself granted suspension of the sentence
of   imprisonment   till   26.07.2017,   to   enable   the   petitioners   to   move   an
intra­court appeal; 
(ii)  The   petitioners   moved   an   intra­court   appeal,   which   came   up
before the  Division  Bench  on  25.07.2017.  The Division  Bench  wanted
the   petitioners   to   comply   at   least   with   a   part   of   their   undertaking
before the sentence could be suspended.  But the petitioners could not.
Therefore, the Division Bench did not grant suspension of sentence on
25.07.2017; 
(iii)     The   petitioners   filed   a   Special   Leave   Petition   along   with   an
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application  for   exemption  from   surrendering.  But  the   said  application
was dismissed by an order in Chamber dated 31.07.2017; 
(iv)  On   03.08.2017,   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
dismissed   the   miscellaneous   application   seeking   suspension   of
sentence; 
(v)  Challenging   the   said   order   dated   03.08.2017,   the   petitioners
moved   a   Special   Leave   Petition   along   with   an   application   seeking
exemption   from   surrendering.   This   application   was   dismissed   vide
order in Chamber dated 18.08.2017.
(vi)  On   a   subsequent   application   seeking   extension   of   time,   this
Court granted three weeks’ time vide order dated 11.09.2017; 
(vii)     Eventually,   the   petitioners   surrendered   and   were   taken   into
custody   on   06.11.2017.   After   being   in   custody   for   11   days,   the
petitioners were released on interim bail by Order dated 16.11.2017;
(viii)  The contempt appeal was thereafter dismissed by the Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   by   an   Order   dated   27.09.2018,   with   a
direction   to   the   petitioners   to   surrender   within   10   days.     However   on
01.11.2018,   this   Court   ordered   notice   in   the   present   SLP   and   also
granted stay of the impugned order.
6. The reason why we have noted certain events post the order of the
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learned single Judge is to bring on record the fact that the petitioners
have  already  served simple imprisonment  for  a period  of  11 days, out
of the penalty of simple imprisonment for three months. They have also
paid the fine.
7. The   main   grounds   of   attack   of   the   petitioners   to   the   impugned
order,   as   articulated   by   Mr.   Santosh   Kumar,   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioners,   are:   (i)   that   the   failure   of   a   party   to   comply   with   an
undertaking,   on   the   basis   of   which   a   conditional   order   of   stay   was
granted,   cannot   be   treated   as   a   wilful   disobedience   warranting   the
invocation   of   the   contempt   jurisdiction;   (ii)   that   the   failure   of   the
petitioners to honour the undertaking cannot be taken to substantially
interfere with the due course of justice and, hence, the case would fall
under  Section   13(a)  of   the  Act;   (iii)    that   when   an   order  indicates   the
consequences   of   the   failure   of   a   party   to   comply   with   a   condition   or
honour   the   undertaking,   the   invocation   of   the   contempt   jurisdiction
may   not   be   appropriate;   and   (iv)     that   in   any   case   if   the   defaulting
party   has   relied   upon   an   interpretation   of   the   order   that     the
consequences   of   failure   are   already   inbuilt   in   the   order,   such   an
understanding of the order is to be treated as reasonable and rational
and he cannot be held guilty of contempt.
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8. In   support   of   his   first   contention,   the   learned   counsel   for   the
petitioners, relies upon the decisions of a few High Courts. They are: (a)
Narain Singh    vs.   Lala Rajendra Lal & Ors . 1
; (b)   Indian Overseas
Bank     vs.     Lalit   Kumar   Aggarwal   &   Anr. 2
;  (c)     K.   Saravankumar
vs.   Sheela   &   Ors. 3
;   and   (d)   National   Agricultural   Cor.   Marketing
vs.  Reliance Polycrete Ltd. 4
.
9. In support of his third contention, the learned counsel relies upon
the  decision  of this Court in   Dinesh  Kumar  Gupta   vs.   United  India
Insurance   Company   Limited 5
.   In   addition,   the   learned   counsel   also
submitted   that   in   the   light   of   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Niaz
Mohammad   vs.  State of Haryana 6
, the disobedience should be wilful
and intentional, to tantamount to contempt.
10.      In response to the aforesaid, Shri Anuj Jain, learned counsel for
the   respondent   submitted   that   the   petitioners   had   several
opportunities   to   honour   their   commitments,   but   they   repeatedly
adopted dilatory  tactics. The  learned counsel took us through various
orders   passed   by   the   High   Court   and   the   orders   passed   in   various
1     1976 SCC Online All 425
2     2000 SCC Online Del 710
3     2008 (3) CTC 669
4     (2009) 163 DLT 441
5     (2010) 12 SCC 770
6     (1994) 6 SCC 332
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proceedings   before   other   forums   including   the   DRT   and   the   Chief
Metropolitan   Magistrate   and   sought   to   impress   upon   us   that   the
conduct of the petitioners throughout, has been one of deceit and that
such persons do not deserve any leniency.  Inviting our attention to the
decisions   in   (i)   Bank   of   Baroda     vs.     Sadruddin   Hasan   Daya   &
Anr 7
.;   (ii)   Rama   Narang     vs.     Ramesh   Narang   &   Another 8
  and   (iii)
Rama   Narang(5)     vs.     Ramesh   Narang   and   Another 9
,   the   learned
counsel contended that the availability of other  modes of enforcement
need   not   deter   the   Court   from   invoking   its   contempt   jurisdiction   and
that   the  deliberate   failure   to   comply   with   a   solemn   undertaking  given
to a Court has always been frowned upon by Courts.
11.    We have carefully considered the rival submissions.  
12.      Before we analyze the rival contentions, it will be useful first to
see   the   actual   undertaking   given   by   the   petitioners   on   08.04.2015,
which  led  to  the   contempt   proceedings.  The  undertaking   given   by  the
first petitioner on 08.04.2015 reads as follows:­
“   Statement of Mr. Suman Chadha S/o Jangi Lal Chadha R/o
H­3/50 Sector­18, Rohini, Delhi
I am the petitioner and the director of the third petitioner
in this case. I am duly authorised to make a statement on its
behalf. I have also filed an affidavit in support of the petition
7   (2004) 1 SCC 360
8   (2006) 11 SCC 114
9   (2009) 16 SCC 126
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and   have   taken   advice   from   my   lawyer   who   is   present   with
me in Court.
I   hereby   state   and   confirm   that   the   sum   of
Rs.28,82,25,942.24   (Twenty   Eight   Crores   Two   Lakh   Twenty
Five   thousand   Nine   Hundred   Forty   Two   and   Paise   Twenty
Four   only)   as   on   18.8.2014   is   due   and   payable   to   the
respondent   i.e.   the   Central   Bank   of   India   as   per   notice   u/s
13(2) of SARFAESI Act. I request that in view of the demand I
may   be   granted   relief   of   some   deferment   with   regard   to   the
repayment of the loan liability. I hereby agree on behalf of self
and other petitioners to deposit a total amount of Rs.7 (seven)
crores   with   respondent   –Bank   on   or   before   30.6.2015.   An
amount  of  Rs. 2(two)  crores  of the said amount  shall be paid
on or before 30.04.2015; the  balance would be paid  in equal
instalments   i.e.   Rs.2.5   (Two   and   a   half)   crores   on   or   before
31.5.2015 and 30.06.2015.
I  also  agree  and  affirm  that  in the  event  of  default, the
Bank   is   free   to   initiate   any   such   proceedings   and   avail   of
legal remedies as are available.”
13.     The   above   undertaking   given   by   the   first   petitioner   was   also
accompanied by an  affidavit  sworn  to by the  second  petitioner. In the
said affidavit, it was stated by the second petitioner that her husband
has   made   a   statement   before   the   Court   which   she   had   understood
from   him   and   that   she   and   her   husband   undertake   to   abide   by   the
same.
14.    On the basis of the undertaking filed as aforesaid on 08.04.2015,
the   High   Court   passed   an   order   in   W.P   (C)   No.3406   of   2015   on   the
same day, namely, 08.04.2015. Paragraphs 6 to 8 of the said order of 
the High Court dated 08.04.2015 read as follows:­
“ 6. In   view   of   the   submission   of   the   parties,   it   is   ordered
that   the   possession   of   the   petitioners   over   the   property   in
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question   shall   not   be   disturbed   subject   to   their   compliance
with the following conditions:
(1) Deposit by the petitioners on or before 30.04.2015
–   the   sum   of   Rs.   2   crores   with   the   respondent   Bank   and
thereafter   deposit   of   Rs.2.5   crores   each   on   or   before
31.05.2015 and 30.06.2015.
(2) The   second   petitioner   shall   file   an   affidavit/
undertaking, to comply with the above said arrangement.
(3) In the event of default, the respondent Bank shall
be at liberty to take recourse to law including the enforcement
of   further   action   in   follow   up   order   of   appointment   of   the
receiver   by   the   Chief   Metropolitan   Magistrate   (CMM).     The
order to such effect passed by CMM shall be kept in abeyance
to ensure compliance in the meanwhile till 30.6.2015.
7. Petitioners’ counsel requests that after compliance of the
above   order,   any   application   for   relief   to   the   Bank   including
the   restructuring   of   the   account   may   be   considered
reasonably.  The Bank shall consider such application if made
on   its   merits   independently   having   regard   to   its   applicable
policy.     This   will   not   in   any   way   preclude   the   rights   of   the
Bank for recovering the amounts due.
8. Subject   to   the   petitioner   filing   the   necessary
affidavit/undertaking   copy   of   which   shall   be   provided   to   the
counsel for the respondent within a week from today, the writ
petition is disposed of.”
15.      It is seen from  the portion of the order  of the High Court dated
08.04.2015   that   it   was   not   an   order   passed   on   the   basis   of   an
affidavit/undertaking.     It   was   on   the   basis   of   an   offer   made   by   the
petitioners, the first of whom  was actually  present in  Court. The offer
so  made  was accepted  by   the Bank  and hence the  order  was  actually
based   upon   the   consent   of   parties.   This   is   made   clear   by   what   is
recorded   by   the   Court   in   Paragraph   5   of   its   order   dated   08.04.2015.
Paragraph 5 reads as follows:­
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“ 5. During   the   course   of   hearing   counsel   for   the   petitioner
Dr.   Sharma   stated   that   the   petitioners   are   admitting   the
liability   provided   some   time   is   granted   in   order   to   settle   the
matter   finally.   It   was   suggested   by   the   counsel   that   the
petitioners   may   be   afforded   opportunity   of   depositing   Rs.   7
(seven)   crores   i.e.   25%   of   the   notice   amount   in   three
instalments   on   or   before   30.06.2015.   The   first   petitioner   is
present   in   Court.   He   is   a   director   of   the   third   petitioner   and
authorised   to   depose   on   its   behalf.   His   statement   to   above
effect has been recorded under oath separately and has been
kept   on   record.   The   second   petitioner   is   directed   to   file   an
affidavit/undertaking   within   one   week   confirming   the
statement   of   the   first   petitioner.   The   counsel   for   the
respondent   submitted   his   assent   to   the   disposal   of   the   writ
petition on terms offered.”
16.    It is true that this Court has held in a series of decisions that the
wilful   breach   of   the   undertaking   given   to   the   Court   amounts   to
contempt   of   Court   under   Section   2(b)   of   the   Act.   But   the   Court   has
always   seen   (i)   the   nature   of   the   undertaking   made;   (ii)   the   benefit   if
any, reaped by the party giving the undertaking; and   (iii)   whether the
filing of the undertaking was with a view to play fraud upon the court
or   to   hoodwink   the   opposite   party.   The   distinction   between   an   order
passed on consent terms and an order passed solely on the basis of an
undertaking   given   to   court   and   the   distinction   between   a   person
playing   fraud   on   the   court   thereby   obstructing   the   course   of   justice
and a person playing fraud on one of the parties, was brought out by
this Court in  Babu Ram Gupta    vs.  Sudhir Bhasin 10
, in the following
10    (1980) 3 SCC 47
12

words:­
“… Indeed,   if   we   were   to   hold   that   non­compliance   of   a
compromise   decree   or   consent   order   amounts   to   contempt   of
court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to
execution of decrees may not be resorted to at all.  In fact, the
reason   why   a   breach   of   clear   undertaking   given   to   the   court
amounts to contempt of court is that the contemner by making
a false representation to the court obtains a benefit for himself
and  if  he  fails  to  honour the  undertaking, he  plays  a serious
fraud   on   the   court   itself   and   thereby   obstructs   the   course   of
justice   and   brings   into   disrepute   the   judicial   institution.     The
same   cannot,   however,   be   said   of   a   consent   order   or   a
compromise   decree   where   the   fraud,   if   any,   is   practised   by
the   person   concerned   not   on   the   court     but   on   one   of   the
parties.  Thus, the offence committed by the person concerned
is   qua   the   party   not   qua   the   court,   and,   therefore,   the   very
foundation   for   proceeding   for   contempt   of   court   is   completely
absent in such cases.”  
17.      But the decision in   Babu Ram Gupta   (supra) was clarified and
held   in   part   to   be   obiter   by   a   three   member   Bench   of   this   Court   in
Rama   Narang     vs.     Ramesh   Narang   and   Another 11
.   In   Rama
Narang   (supra),   this   Court   pointed   out   the   distinction   between   two
categories of cases covered  by   Section  2(b) of  the Act  namely   (i)   wilful
disobedience   to   a   process   of   court;   and   (ii)   wilful   breach   of   an
undertaking given to a court.
18.    In fact, in  Rama Narang  (supra), this Court went to the extent of
holding   that   it   would   neither   be   in   consonance   with   the   statute,
judicial   authority,   principle   or   logic   to   draw   any   distinction   between
11   (2006) 11 SCC 114
13

the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree and wilful violation
of a decree passed on adjudication. We have our own doubts whether
the first category of cases covered by Section 2(b) can be stretched so
far.     Anyway,   that   question   does   not   arise   in   this   case   and   hence   we
leave it at that.
19.       But   what   has   happened   in   this   case   is   that   the   subsequent
conduct   of   the   petitioners   after   the   order   dated   08.04.2015,   seems   to
have   tilted   the   balance   against   the   petitioners.   Purportedly   in
compliance   of   the   undertaking   given   to   Court   on   08.04.2015   and   the
order   passed   thereon,   the   petitioners   issued   four   cheques   for   Rs.50
lakhs   each.   These   cheques   were   handed   over   to   the   Bank   on
29.04.2015 along with a covering letter. But all the four cheques were
post­dated, bearing the date 06.05.2015, though the undertaking given
to the Court was to deposit the amount on or before 30.04.2015.
20.    On 08.05.2015, all the four cheques bounced. The conduct of the
petitioners   first   in   issuing   post­dated   cheques   and   then   in   allowing
them   to   be   dishonoured,   showed   the   petitioners   in   poor   light.   The
petitioners   could   have   at   least   mend   their   ways   thereafter.   However
they did not.
21.     On   14.07.2015,   the   learned   Single   Judge   seems   to   have   ordered
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the   issue   of   notice   in   the   Contempt   Petition.   The   notice   was   made
returnable   by   05.11.2015   and   the   petitioners   were   directed   to   be
present   personally   in   Court.   But   what   happened   on   05.11.2015,   as
brought on record by the learned Judge reads as follows:­
“ When the  matter was  taken up at  first  call, this  Court
was   informed   that   none   of   the   respondents   were   in   Station
and even summons had been received by their daughter.
However,   a   perusal   of   the   file   reveals   that
notices/summons   had   been   received   by   respondent   No.   1
personally   and   by   respondent   No.   2’s   husband   by   dasti   as
well as by speed post.
Though   this   Court   was   inclined   to   issue   warrants
against  the  respondents  No. 1 and  2, yet  as  learned  counsel
for respondents states that he would ensure that not only the
respondents are personally present in Court on the next date
of   hearing,   but   the   matter   is   amicably   resolved,   matter   is
adjourned to 16 th
 November, 2015.”
22.    On the next date of hearing, the petitioners raised a defence that
they   had issued post­dated  cheques in  the  hope of  receiving  amounts
due   to   them   from   their   debtors   and   that   their   debtors   failed   to   make
payment.   The   petitioners   also   named   three   debtors   from   whom   they
were expected to receive money.
23.       Doubting   the   genuineness   of   the   claim   made   by   the  petitioners,
the learned Judge before whom the Contempt Petition came up, passed
an   order   on   07.12.2015   directing   an   investigation   by   Serious   Fraud
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Investigation   Office   (‘SFIO’   for   short).   To   the   misfortune   of   the
petitioners,   SFIO   submitted   a   report   that   the   alleged   debtors   of   the
petitioners   are   only   shell   entities   of   Parul   Polymers   Private   Ltd.,   of
which the petitioners were Directors.
24.       All   the   above  events   that   happened   after  08.04.2015,  convinced
the   High   Court   to   come   to   the   conclusion   that   the   petitioners   had
actually played a fraud upon the Court. This is why the learned Single
Judge   as   well   as   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   held   the
petitioners guilty of contempt of court.
25.    It is true that an undertaking given by a party should be seen in
the   context   in   which   it   was   made   and   (i)   the   benefits   that   accrued   to
the   undertaking   party;   and   (ii)   the   detriment/injury   suffered   by   the
counter   party.   It   is   also   true   that   normally   the   question   whether   a
party  is   guilty  of   contempt   is   to   be   seen   in   the  specific   context  of  the
disobedience and the wilful nature of the same and not on the basis of
the   conduct   subsequent   thereto.   While   it   is   open   to   the   court   to   see
whether   the   subsequent   conduct   of   the   alleged   contemnor   would
tantamount to an aggravation of the contempt already committed, the
very determination of an act of contempt cannot simply be based upon
the subsequent conduct.
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26.       But   the   subsequent   conduct   of   the   party   may   throw   light   upon
one   important   aspect   namely   whether   it   was   just   the   inability   of   the
party   to   honour   the   commitment   or   it   was   part   of   a   larger   design   to
hoodwink the court.
27.    In this case, the series of acts committed by the petitioners  (i)  in
issuing  post­dated cheques, which were dated beyond the date within
which they had agreed to make payment;  (ii)  in allowing those cheques
to   be   dishonoured;   (iii)   in   not   appearing   before   the   Court   on   the   first
date   of   hearing   with   an   excuse   that   was   found   to   be   false;   (iv)   in
coming   up   with   an   explanation   about   their   own   debtors   committing
default;   and   (v)   in   getting   exposed   through   the   report   of   the   SFIO,
convinced the High Court to believe that the undertaking given by the
petitioners on 08.04.2015 was not based upon good faith but intended
to hoodwink the Court. Therefore, we are unable to find fault with the
High Court holding the petitioners guilty of contempt.
28.    The 1 st
 contention of Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the
petitioners   that   the   failure   to   honour   a   commitment   made   while
securing   a   conditional   order   of   stay,   cannot   be   treated   as   wilful
disobedience, could have been accepted by us, but for the fact that the
petitioners issued post­dated cheques purportedly in compliance of the
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undertaking, but allowed them to be dishonoured. The story cooked up
for the dishonor of the cheques having been found to be false, it is not
open to the petitioners to raise the contention that there was no wilful
disobedience.
29.       The 2 nd
  contention  based upon  the language of Section  13(a) of
the Act also does not appeal to us, in the light of what had happened
after   08.04.2015.   The   fact   that   the   order   dated   08.04.2015   also
indicated certain other consequences to follow, may not take away the
contempt jurisdiction of the Court. In appropriate cases where a party
had acted bonafide while giving an undertaking, but could not honour
the   undertaking   on   account   of   reasons   that   are   reasonable   and
genuine,   the   Court   could   certainly   withhold   its   stick   from   being
wielded. But in this case there are findings of fact to the effect that the
petitioners   did   not   act   bonafide.     Therefore,   the   3 rd
  contention   is   also
unsustainable.
30.    The last contention that if the order dated 08.04.2015 is capable
of   being   interpreted   and   understood   in   more   than   one   way   as   to   the
consequences   flowing   out   of   the   same,   the   party   understanding   and
interpreting   the   said   order   in   one   particular   manner   must   be   allowed
the   benefit,   is   perfectly   correct,   as   a   pure   and   simple   proposition   of
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law.   But   in   this   case,   the   same   cannot   be   permitted   to   be   used,   to
cover up whatever the petitioners have done. On the contention of the
learned   counsel   for   the   petitioners   that   the   disobedience,   if   any,   was
not wilful and intentional, less said the better.
31.   In the light of the above, we are clearly of the view that the finding
of the High Court that the petitioners are guilty of contempt, does not
call for our interference under Article 136.
32.   However, Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners,
pleaded that the Court may show sympathy on the petitioners, in view
of   the   fact   that   the   immovable   properties   which   the   petitioners
attempted to save, by approaching the DRT and the High Court, have
already been sold. All the attempts made by the petitioners from 2015
onwards, to save the mortgaged properties have been in vain.  
33.      There  is  no  dispute  on  facts that  the mortgaged properties  have
now been sold and with extraordinary efforts, the Bank has also taken
possession. The petitioners have also  spent 11 days in custody  out  of
the total period of imprisonment of three months imposed by the High
Court.   In   such   circumstances,   we   think   that   it   is   sufficient
punishment for the petitioners.
34.       Therefore,   the   SLP   is   disposed   of   upholding   the   finding   of   the
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learned   Single   Judge   and   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   that
the petitioners are guilty of contempt of court, but reducing the period
of   sentence   from   three   months   to   the   period   of   imprisonment   already
suffered/undergone   by   the   petitioners.   There   will   be   no   order   as   to
costs.
32.   Pending application(s) if any, shall also stand disposed of.
… ..…………....................J.
      (Indira Banerjee)
… ..………........................J
(V. Ramasubramanian)
August  9, 2021
New Delhi .
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